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Preface 
AMADOU-MAHTAR M ' B O W 
Director-General of UNESCO (1974-87) 
For a long time, all kinds of myths and prejudices concealed the true 
history of Africa from the world at large. African societies were looked 
upon as societies that could have no history. In spite of important work 
done by such pioneers as Leo Frobenius, Maurice Delafosse and Arturo 
Labriola, as early as the first decades of this century, a great m a n y non-
African experts could not rid themselves of certain preconceptions and 
argued that the lack of written sources and documents m a d e it impossible 
to engage in any scientific study of such societies. 
Although the Iliad and Odyssey were rightly regarded as essential 
sources for the history of ancient Greece, African oral tradition, the 
collective m e m o r y of peoples which holds the thread of m a n y events 
marking their lives, was rejected as worthless. In writing the history of a 
large part of Africa, the only sources used were from outside the continent, 
and the final product gave a picture not so m u c h of the paths actually 
taken by the African peoples as of those that the authors thought they 
must have taken. Since the European Middle Ages were often used as a 
yardstick, modes of production, social relations and political institutions 
were visualized only by reference to the European past. 
In fact, there was a refusal to see Africans as the creators of original 
cultures which flowered and survived over the centuries in patterns of 
their o w n making and which historians are unable to grasp unless they 
forgo their prejudices and rethink their approach. 
Furthermore, the continent of Africa was hardly ever looked upon as 
a historical entity. O n the contrary, emphasis was laid on everything likely 
to lend credence to the idea that a split had existed, from time immemorial, 
between a 'white Africa' and a 'black Africa', each unaware of the other's 
existence. T h e Sahara was often presented as an impenetrable space 
preventing any intermingling of ethnic groups and peoples or any exchange 
of goods, beliefs, customs and ideas between the societies that had grown 
up on either side of the desert. Hermetic frontiers were drawn between 
the civilizations and Ancient Egypt and Nubia and those of the peoples 
south of the Sahara. 
xix 
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It is true that the history of Africa north of the Sahara has been m o r e 
closely linked with that of the Mediterranean basin than has the history 
of sub-Saharan Africa, but it is n o w widely recognized that the various 
civilizations of the African continent, for all their differing languages and 
cultures, represent, to a greater or lesser degree, the historial offshoots of 
a set of peoples and societies united by bonds centuries old. 
Another phenomenon which did great disservice to the objective 
study of the African past was the appearance, with the slave trade and 
colonization, of racial stereotypes which bred contempt and lack of 
understanding and became so deep-rooted that they distorted even the 
basic concepts of historiography. F r o m the time w h e n the notions of 
'white' and 'black' were used as generic labels by the colonialists, w h o 
were regarded as superior, the colonized Africans had to struggle against 
both economic and psychological enslavement. Africans were identifiable 
by the colour of their skin, they had become a kind of merchandise, they 
were earmarked for hard labour and eventually, in the minds of those 
dominating them, they came to symbolize an imaginary and allegedly 
inferior Negro race. This pattern of spurious identification relegated the 
history of the African peoples in m a n y minds to the rank of ethno-history, 
in which appreciation of the historical and cultural facts was bound to 
be warped. 
T h e situation has changed significantly since the end of the Second 
World W a r and in particular since the African countries became inde-
pendent and began to take an active part in the life of the international 
community and in the mutual exchanges that are its raison d'être. A n 
increasing number of historians has endeavoured to tackle the study of 
Africa with a more rigorous, objective and open-minded outlook by 
using - with all due precautions - actual African sources. In exercising 
their right to take the historical initiative, Africans themselves have felt 
a deep-seated need to re-establish the historical authenticity of their 
societies on solid foundations. 
In this context, the importance of the eight-volume General History of 
Africa, which U N E S C O is publishing, speaks for itself. 
T h e experts from m a n y countries working on this project began by 
laying d o w n the theoretical and methodological basis for the History. 
T h e y have been at pains to call in question the over-simplifications arising 
from a linear and restrictive conception of world history and to re-
establish the true facts wherever necessary and possible. T h e y have 
endeavoured to highlight the historical data that give a clearer picture of 
the evolution of the different peoples of Africa in their specific socio-
cultural setting. 
T o tackle this huge task, m a d e all the more complex and difficult by 
the vast range of sources and the fact that documents were widely 
scattered, U N E S C O has had to proceed by stages. T h e first stage, from 
1965 to 1969, was devoted to gathering documentation and planning the 
xx 
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work. Operational assignments were conducted in the field and included 
campaigns to collect oral traditions, the creation of regional documentation 
centres for oral traditions, the collection of unpublished manuscripts in 
Arabic and Ajami (African languages written in Arabic script), the 
compilation of archival inventories and the preparation of a Guide to the 
Sources of the History of Africa, culled from the archives and libraries of 
the countries of Europe and later published in eleven volumes. In 
addition, meetings were organized to enable experts from Africa and other 
continents to discuss questions of methodology and lay d o w n the broad 
lines for the project after careful examination of the available sources. 
T h e second stage, which lasted from 1969 to 1971, was devoted to 
shaping the History and linking its different parts. T h e purpose of the 
international meetings of experts held in Paris in 1969 and Addis Ababa 
in 1970 was to study and define the problems involved in drafting and 
publishing the History; presentation in eight volumes, the principal edition 
in English, French and Arabic, translation into African languages such 
as Kiswahili, Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba or Lingala, prospective versions in 
G e r m a n , Russian, Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese, as well as abridged 
editions designed for a wide African and international public.1 
T h e third stage has involved actual drafting and publication. This 
began with the appointment of the 3 9 - m e m b e r International Scientific 
Committee, two-thirds African and one-third non-African, which assumes 
intellectual responsibility for the History. 
T h e method used is interdisciplinary and is based on a multi-faceted 
approach and a wide variety of sources. T h e first a m o n g these is 
archaeology, which holds m a n y of the keys to the history of African 
cultures and civilizations. Thanks to archaeology, it is n o w acknowledged 
that Africa was very probably the cradle of mankind and the scene - in 
the neolithic period - of one of the first technological revolutions in 
history. Archaeology has also shown that Egypt was the setting for one 
of the most brilliant ancient civilizations of the world. But another very 
important source is oral tradition, which, after being long despised, has 
n o w emerged as an invaluable instrument for discovering the history of 
Africa, making it possible to follow the movements of its different peoples 
in both space and time, to understand the African vision of the world 
from the inside and to grasp the original features of the values on which 
the cultures and institutions of the continent are based. 
W e are indebted to the International Scientific Committee in charge 
of this General History of Africa, and to its Rapporteur and the editors 
and authors of the various volumes and chapters, for having shed a n e w 
light on the African past in its authentic and all-encompassing form and 
1. Volumes I and II have been published in Arabic, Spanish, Korean, Portuguese, Chinese 
and Italian; Volume IV and Volume VII in Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese. Volume I 
has been published in Kiswahili and Hausa and Volume II in Hausa. 
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for having avoided any dogmatism in the study of essential issues. A m o n g 
these issues w e might cite: the slave trade, that 'endlessly bleeding w o u n d ' , 
which was responsible for one of the cruellest mass deportations in the 
history of mankind, which sapped the African continent of its life-blood 
while contributing significantly to the economic and commercial expansion 
of Europe; colonization, with all the effects it had on population, econ-
omics, psychology and culture; relations between Africa south of the 
Sahara and the Arab world; and, finally, the process of decolonization 
and nation-building which mobilized the intelligence and passion of 
people still alive and sometimes still active today. All these issues have 
been broached with a concern for honesty and rigour which is not the 
least of the History's merits. B y taking stock of our knowledge of Africa, 
putting forward a variety of viewpoints on African cultures and offering 
a n e w reading of history, the History has the signal advantage of showing 
up the light and shade and of openly portraying the differences of opinion 
that m a y exist between scholars. 
B y demonstrating the inadequacy of the methodological approaches 
which have long been used in research on Africa, this History calls for a 
n e w and careful study of the twofold problem areas of historiography and 
cultural identity, which are united by links of reciprocity. Like any 
historical work of value, the History paves the way for a great deal of 
further research on a variety of topics. 
It is for this reason that the International Scientific Committee, in close 
collaboration with U N E S C O , decided to embark on additional studies in 
an attempt to go deeper into a number of issues which will permit a 
clearer understanding of certain aspects of the African past. T h e findings 
being published in the series ' U N E S C O Studies and Documents -
General History of Africa" will prove a useful supplement to the History, 
as will the works planned on aspects of national or subregional history. 
T h e General History sheds light both on the historical unity of Africa 
and also its relations with the other continents, particularly the Americas 
and the Caribbean. For a long time, the creative manifestations of the 
descendants of Africans in the Americas were lumped together by some 
historians as a heterogeneous collection oí Africanisms. Needless to say, 
this is not the attitude of the authors of the History, in which the resistance 
of the slaves shipped to America, the constant and massive participation 
of the descendants of Africans in the struggles for the initial independence 
2. T h e following 11 volumes have already been published in this series: The peopling of 
ancient Egypt and the deciphering ofMeroitic script; The African slave trade from the fifteenth 
to the nineteenth century; Historical relations across the Indian Ocean; The historiography of 
Southern Africa; The decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa; 
African ethnonyms and toponyms; Historical and socio-cultural relations between black Africa 
and the Arab world from içjj to the present; The methodology of contemporary African 
History; The Educational Process and Historiography in Africa; Africa and the Second World 
War; Libya Antiqua. 
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of America and in national liberation movements, are rightly perceived 
for what they were: vigorous assertions of identity, which helped forge 
the universal concept of mankind. Although the phenomenon m a y vary 
in different places, it is n o w quite clear that ways of feeling, thinking, 
dreaming and acting in certain nations of the western hemisphere have 
been marked by their African heritage. T h e cultural inheritance of Africa 
is visible everywhere, from the southern United States to northern Brazil, 
across the Caribbean and on the Pacific seaboard. In certain places it even 
underpins the cultural identity of some of the most important elements 
of the population. 
T h e History also clearly brings out Africa's relations with southern 
Asia across the Indian Ocean and the African contributions to other 
civilizations through mutual exchanges. 
I a m convinced that the efforts of the peoples of Africa to conquer or 
strengthen their independence, secure their development and assert their 
cultural characteristics, must be rooted in historical awareness renewed, 
keenly felt and taken up by each succeeding generation. 
M y o w n background, the experience I gained as a teacher and as 
chairman, from the early days of independence, of the first commission 
set up to reform history and geography curricula in some of the countries 
of West and Central Africa, taught m e h o w necessary it was for the 
education of young people and for the information of the public at large 
to have a history book produced by scholars with inside knowledge of 
the problems and hopes of Africa and with the ability to apprehend the 
continent in its entirety. ' 
For all these reasons, U N E S C O ' s goal will be to ensure that this 
General History of Africa is widely disseminated in a large number of 
languages and is used as a basis for producing children's books, school 
textbooks and radio and television programmes. Young people, whether 
schoolchildren or students, and adults in Africa and elsewhere will thus 
be able to form a truer picture of the African continent's past and the 
factors that explain it, as well as a fairer understanding of its cultural 
heritage and its contribution to the general progress of mankind. T h e 
History should thus contribute to improved international co-operation and 
stronger solidarity a m o n g peoples in their aspirations to justice, progress 
and peace. This is, at least, m y most cherished hope. 
It remains for m e to express m y deep gratitude to the members of the 
International Scientific Committee, the Rapporteur, the different volume 
editors, the authors and all those w h o have collaborated in this tremendous 
undertaking. T h e work they have accomplished and the contribution they 
have m a d e plainly go to show h o w people from different backgrounds 
but all imbued with the same spirit of goodwill and enthusiasm in the 
service of universal truth can, within the international framework provided 
by U N E S C O , bring to fruition a project of considerable scientific and 
cultural import. M y thanks also go to the organizations and governments 
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whose generosity has m a d e it possible for U N E S C O to publish this 
History in different languages and thus ensure that it will have the 
worldwide impact it deserves and thereby serve the international c o m -
munity as a whole. 
xxiv 
Description of the project 
Bethwell A. OGOT* 
President, International Scientific Committee 
for the Drafting of a General History of Africa (1Q78-83) 
T h e General Conference of U N E S C O at its sixteenth Session instructed 
the Director-General to undertake the drafting of a General History of 
Africa. T h e enormous task of implementing the project was entrusted to 
an International Scientific Committee which was established by the 
Executive Board in 1970. This Committee , under the Statutes adopted 
by the Executive Board of U N E S C O in 1971, is composed of 39 m e m b e r s 
(two-thirds of w h o m are African and one-third non-African) serving in 
their personal capacity and appointed by the Director-General of 
U N E S C O for the duration of the Committee's mandate. 
T h e first task of the Commit tee was to define the principal charac-
teristics of the work. These were defined at the first session of the 
Committee as follows: 
(a) Although aiming at the highest possible scientific level, the history 
does not seek to be exhaustive and is a w o r k of synthesis avoiding 
dogmatism. In m a n y respects, it is a statement of problems showing the 
present state of knowledge and the main trends in research, and it does 
not hesitate to s h o w divergencies of views where these exist. In this way , 
it prepares the ground for future work. 
(b) Africa is considered in this work as a totality. T h e aim is to show 
the historical relationships between the various parts of the continent, too 
frequently subdivided in works published to date. Africa's historical 
connections with the other continents receive due attention, these con-
nections being analysed in terms of mutual exchanges and multilateral 
influences, bringing out, in its appropriate light, Africa's contribution to 
the history of mankind. 
(c) The General History of Africa is, in particular, a history of ideas and 
civilizations, societies and institutions. It is based on a wide variety of 
sources, including oral tradition and art forms. 
* During the Sixth Plenary Session of the International Scientific Committee for the 
Drafting of a General History of Africa (Brazzaville, 1983), an election of the new Bureau 
was held and Professor Ogot was replaced by Professor Albert A d u Boahen. 
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(d) T h e History is viewed essentially from the inside. Although a scholarly 
work, it is also, in large measure, a faithful reflection of the way in 
which African authors view their o w n civilization. While prepared in an 
international framework and drawing to the full on the present stock of 
scientific knowledge, it should also be a vitally important element in the 
recognition of the African heritage and should bring out the factors 
making for unity in the continent. This effort to view things from within 
is the novel feature of the project and should, in addition to its scientific 
quality, give it great topical significance. B y showing the true face of 
Africa, the History could, in an era absorbed in economic and technical 
struggles, offer a particular conception of h u m a n values. 
T h e Committee has decided to present the work covering over three 
million years of African history in eight volumes, each containing about 
eight hundred pages of text with illustrations, photographs, maps and 
line drawings. 
A chief editor, assisted if necessary by one or two assistant editors, is 
responsible for the preparation of each volume. T h e editors are elected 
by the Committee either from among its members or from outside by a 
two-thirds majority. T h e y are responsible for preparing the volumes in 
accordance with the decisions and plans adopted by the Committee. O n 
scientific matters, they are accountable to the Committee or, between two 
sessions of the Committee, to its Bureau for the contents of the volumes, 
the final version of the texts, the illustrations and, in general, for all 
scientific and technical aspects of the History. T h e Bureau ultimately 
approves the final manuscript. W h e n it considers the manuscript ready 
for publication, it transmits it to the Director-General of U N E S C O . 
T h u s the Committee, or the Bureau between committee sessions, remains 
fully in charge of the project. 
Each volume consists of some thirty chapters. Each chapter is the work 
of a principal author assisted, if necessary, by one or two collaborators. 
T h e authors are selected by the Committee on the basis of their curricula 
vitae. Preference is given to African authors, provided they have requisite 
qualifications. Special effort is also m a d e to ensure, as far as possible, that 
all regions of the continent, as well as other regions having historical or 
cultural ties with Africa, are equitably represented a m o n g the authors. 
W h e n the editor of a volume has approved texts of chapters, they are 
then sent to all members of the Committee for criticism. In addition, the 
text of the volume editor is submitted for examination to a Reading 
Committee, set up within the International Scientific Committee on the 
basis of the members ' fields of competence. T h e Reading Committee 
analyses the chapters from the standpoint of both substance and form. 
T h e Bureau then gives final approval to the manuscripts. 
Such a seemingly long and involved procedure has proved necessary, 
since it provides the best possible guarantee of the scientific objectivity 
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of the General History of Africa. There have, in fact, been instances w h e n 
the Bureau has rejected manuscripts or insisted on major revisions or 
even reassigned the drafting of a chapter to another author. Occasionally, 
specialists in a particular period of history or in a particular question are 
consulted to put the finishing touches to a volume. 
T h e work will be published first in a hard-cover edition in English, 
French and Arabic, and later in paperback editions in the same languages. 
A n abridged version in English and French will serve as a basis for 
translation into African languages. T h e Committee has chosen Kiswahili 
and Hausa as the first African languages into which the work will be 
translated. 
Also, every effort will be m a d e to ensure publication of the General 
History of Africa in other languages of wide international currency such 
as Chinese, Portuguese, Russian, G e r m a n , Italian, Spanish, Japanese, etc. 
It is thus evident that this is a gigantic task which constitutes an 
immense challenge to African historians and to the scholarly community 
at large, as well as to U N E S C O under whose auspices the work is being 
done. For the writing of a continental history of Africa, covering the last 
three million years, using the highest canons of scholarship and involving, 
as it must do, scholars drawn from diverse countries, cultures, ideologies 
and historical traditions, is surely a complex undertaking. It constitutes a 
continental, international and interdisciplinary project of great proportions. 
In conclusion, I would like to underline the significance of this work 
for Africa and for the world. At a time w h e n the peoples of Africa are 
striving towards unity and greater co-operation in shaping their individual 
destinies, a proper understanding of Africa's past, with an awareness of 
c o m m o n ties a m o n g Africans and between Africa and other continents, 
should not only be a major contribution towards mutual understanding 
a m o n g the people of the earth, but also a source of knowledge of a 
cultural heritage that belongs to all mankind. 
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NOTE TO THE READER 
W o r k on this volume was completed in 1989. For this reason, the 
significant changes which have taken place in the world since that 
date are not reflected in the text. 
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Introduction 
Ali A . M A Z R U I 
For analytical purposes, this volume has divided Africa's history into 
cultural, economic and political domains. O u r sense of 'culturar is not 
the narrow one of artistic experience but rather the wider one of values 
and traditions in society. W e define the economic domain in terms of 
African production of goods and their distribution, as well as in terms of 
patterns of African consumption, and the pertinent modes of exchange.1 
W e define Africa's political experience in relation to issues of power and 
control, and to the rules of participation in society. 
Culturally, w e have chapters which range from religion to literature. 
In economics, our concerns in this volume range from rural water-supply 
to the search for a n e w international economic order. O u r political 
preoccupations include liberation struggles in Southern Africa, social 
revolutions in countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia, nation-building in 
Tanzania and political values in the Maghreb. 
W h y does our time span in this volume begin in 1935? For China the 
Second World W a r did not begin widi Germany's invasion of Poland in 
1939 but with Japan's invasion of China in 1937. Similarly, for Africa, 
the Second World W a r did not start in 1939 but began with Mussolini's 
invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935. W e have devoted a whole section 
of the volume to this decade of international conflict (1935-45). W e have 
also touched on the Second World W a r in subsequent chapters in the 
volume. W e shall return to this theme of global conflict in relation to the 
Great Depression later in this Introduction. 
Values, production and power 
In the cultural field, this period of African history has witnessed an 
important phase in the Africanization of the imported religions of Chris-
tianity and Islam. Independent Christian churches were emerging with 
greater self-confidence, especially in Central and Southern Africa. A n d 
in places like Senegal, Islam was undergoing deeper Africanization under 
1. For some of the economic debates, see World Bank, 1989a and United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, 1989. 
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Africa since içjs 
local legacies like that of A m a d u B a m b a of the Mourides. 
In the field of language, as w e shall see, Africa has been up against the 
role of the imported European tongues and up against the Latin or R o m a n 
alphabet in relation to the codification of national tongues. Curiously 
enough, Africa in this period did not witness the same militancy in 
linguistic nationalism as it manifested in political nationalism. There has 
been less African resentment of the paramountcy of European languages 
than there has been of the supremacy of European political sovereignty. 
In fact, apart from Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania and Arabic-speaking 
Africa, linguistic nationalism is a m u c h weaker emotion in Africa than, 
say, in post-colonial Asia. A s w e shall indicate later in the volume, Africa 
is prepared to tolerate linguistic dependency in this period more readily 
than it seems prepared to accommodate political neo-colonialism.1 
O n the other hand, although often expressed in foreign languages, 
African literature and the theatre are inextricably intertwined with the 
politics of liberation. T h e Theatre of Liberation in this period is certainly 
more committed than the Theatre of Development. South African drama 
has been particularly concerned with liberation, as the volume will later 
indicate. Plays like Sizwe Banzi is Dead by Athol Fugard, John Kani and 
Winston Ntshona, and Survival by Workshop 71, started a whole n e w 
generation of the theatre of liberation. 
Even Ngugi w a Thiong'o's populist play Ngahiika Ndenda ('I will 
marry when I want to') was arguably a play of liberation rather than 
development - liberation from class oppression (black against black) rather 
than racial oppression as in South Africa (white against black). 
O n balance, Africa in this period manifests linguistic dependency and 
literary nationalism. Foreign languages are used to express literary African 
self-reliance. Kenya's Ngugi w a Thiong'o signifies an attempt to merge 
linguistic nationalism with literary independence. His play Ngahiika 
Ndenda was in the Kikuyu language, as well as being against the post-
colonial black African establishment in his country. If Ngugi attempted 
to combine literary nationalism with linguistic nationalism, Julius K . 
Nyerere of Tanzania has attempted to combine linguistic nationalism with 
literary dependency. Certainly a piece of theatre seemingly against liberation 
was Julius Nyerere's translation of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar into 
Kiswahili. 
A n d yet Nyerere was calling upon Kiswahili to carry the burden of 
world culture — by carrying the weight of Shakespeare. In a sense, 
Nyerere's blow was in favour of development - linguistic development. 
In literature, preoccupation with Shakespeare seemed to be a negation of 
liberation. O n the other hand, translating Western genius into an African 
language seemed to be an affirmation of development. 
Nyerere's translation of The Merchant of Venice seemed also to go 
against liberation. A n d yet in a sense the translation was part of the 
theatre of development on two counts. T h e exercise amounted to the 
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promotion of Tanzania's national language for international purposes. 
Secondly, the choice of The Merchant of Venice was part of Tanzania's 
economic education against exploitation. Nyerere's whole ujamaa vision 
was a struggle against the 'Shylocks' of this world (more Gentile than 
Jewish). This was reinforced by Nyerere's translation of the concept of 
The Merchant of Venice. T o him it signified The Capitalist(s) of Venice 
('Mabepari w a Vanisi'). W e shall return in subsequent chapters to the 
symbolism of the Mwalimu and the Bard in post-colonial culture. 
In the economic field, this volume has concerned itself with the issues 
of poverty and underdevelopment at both the global and the micro-level. 
In the West, competition m a y be a capitalist prerogative at the level of 
the stock exchange. B y contrast, in Africa competition is sometimes at 
the poverty level. In the forthcoming chapters w e hope to reveal the 
wider global context of Africa's underdevelopment and indigence.2 
O n e of the major questions for the 1990s is whether the worst days 
for Africa are over. There is already evidence, however inconclusive, to 
suggest that a decline has occurred in infant mortality in Africa from 40 
to 24 per thousand. There is also evidence that Africa's life expectancy 
in this period has been rising from less than 40 years to towards 50 years. 
O n the issue of food production, there was evidence in 1986 of an 
increase in output of 3 per cent. This shift meant that food production 
had outstripped population growth in Africa for the first time in fifteen 
years. B y the mid-1980s African farmers were beginning to be motivated 
by more rational African policies of agricultural returns. T h e wider 
context will be revealed in the economic chapters of this volume.3 
With regard to the political stream of Africa's experience in this period, 
the major processes covered in the volume include: 
(1) liberation; 
(2) state formation; and 
(3) nation-building. 
There are chapters about liberation from European colonial rule proper, 
especially in the period up to the 1960s. T h e n there is coverage of the 
period of Africa's struggle against white-minority governments in coun-
tries like Zimbabwe. T h e volume will of course also discuss struggles in 
those African colonies which were intended to be part of metropolitan 
Europe (like Algeria and the Portuguese colonies). Finally, there will be 
analyses of post-colonial liberation from dependent relationships with the 
former imperial powers - the struggle against ñeo-colonialism. 
In the post-colonial phase, a particularly significant process concerns 
the whole phenomenon of political succession within African states. 
2. Consult J. Ravenhill (ed.), 1986; I a m also grateful for stimulation to Wanjiku 
Kironjo of Kenya. 
3. C . Bassett, 1987. 
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Occasionally, there has been natural posthumous succession - succession 
after a natural death. Examples include Moi's succession of Kenyatta and 
Chadli Bendjedid's succession of Boumedienne. 
T h e n there is succession after assassination, political murder or ambigu-
ous 'accident'. W h e n al-Haji Shehu Shagari took power in 1979, three 
out of the six heads of government that Nigeria had had since inde-
pendence had been killed: a 50 per cent 'regicide' rate. But since Shagari, 
the regicide rate has declined in Nigeria. There was no presidential 
assassination in Nigeria in the 1980s. 
Far more recurrent in Africa has been political succession by a 
military coup. Well over seventy coups have taken place in Africa since 
independence, mainly north of the equator. 
There is in addition political succession after a civilian coup (civilian 
succeeding civilian). In Uganda's experience this has included Obote's 
palace coup against President (King) Mutesa in 1966. Binaisa's succession 
to Lule in 1979 is another Ugandan coup with a civilian succeeding a 
civilian. 
T h e n there has been political succession after actual war. O n e example 
is Lule's ascendancy after the interstate war between Tanzania and 
Uganda (1978-9). T h e n there has been political succession after a civil 
war - Museveni's army in power in Uganda after Obote and Okello is 
the clearest example. 
Next, there has been political succession after a popular uprising. 
Sudan has been exceptional in this regard. In 1964 an uprising spearheaded 
by civilians resulted in the collapse of the military regime of General 
A b o u d . In 1985 Sudan repeated this style of democratic uprising -
bringing d o w n Nimeiri's regime and compelling the military to promise 
a restoration of democracy within a year. T h e promise was kept, though 
civilian rule did not last. 
Cases of political succession after a voluntary military handover by 
soldiers to civilians include General Obasanjo's handover to civilians in 
Nigeria in 1979 and Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings's brief transfer of 
power to civilians in Ghana in the same year. 
A s for political succession after electoral defeat in Africa, Mauritius 
long remained almost the sole example. In most of this period of African 
history it has been extremely rare for an African government to be 
replaced through electoral defeat. T h e relevant chapters in this volume, 
especially Chapters 15 and 16, will explore some of the factors responsible 
for institutional fluidity in post-colonial Africa. 
Meanwhile, however, precedents have been set for political succession 
after voluntary resignation or retirement. T h e clearest case in the first 
three decades of independence was the complete retirement of Senegal's 
President Leopold Sédar Senghor. In 1985 Julius K . Nyerere also became 
a case of stepping d o w n from the highest office of state. But for a while 
Nyerere stopped short of abandoning his role in the national party, Chama 
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Cha Mapinduzi ( C C M ) . Also ambivalent was A h m a d o u Ahidjo's ostensible 
'retirement' from state power in the United Republic of Cameroon a few 
years earlier. 
In the relevant chapters w e hope to demonstrate that the central 
political crises of Africa include the issue of h o w to make our nations 
more culturally coherent and h o w to make our states more politically 
legitimate and authoritative. Africa in this period is landed with artificial 
boundaries, ill-trained armies and excessively dependent economies. T h e 
political and economic chapters of this volume will address some of these 
problems, including the crucial issues of human rights in post-colonial 
Africa. 
However, because of the special character of the twentieth century as 
a century of the truly global economy and of global politics for the first 
time in h u m a n experience, African history in this period can only be 
fully understood in the wider context of world history. W h a t emerges 
from the story of this period is, in part, h o w Africa helped to re-humanize 
Europe, and h o w Europe helped to re-Africanize Africa. T h e history of 
decolonization in the twentieth century is one of the great dramas of the 
entire span of h u m a n history. Remarkable contradictions have been played 
out in the process.4 
T h e years since 1935 especially are a period of history w h e n the 
Western world has inadvertently reminded Africans of their pan-African 
identity. W e k n o w there would have been no Nigerian or Kenyan or 
Ivorian identity but for European colonialism. Europe is therefore the 
illegitimate parent of the national consciousness of Nigerians, Kenyans 
and Ivorians. But is Western imperialism also the illegitimate parent 
of pan-African consciousness? O u r story in this volume is partly about 
the emergence of n e w identities and n e w aspirations a m o n g African 
peoples. 
If class consciousness in Africa is partly the result of the intensification 
of capitalism, race consciousness in the continent has already been partly 
the result of the intensification of imperialism. Just as capitalist exploitation 
helps to m a k e workers more collectively conscious of themselves as 
workers, so European imperialism over time has helped to m a k e the 
colonized Africans more collectively conscious of themselves as a colonized 
people. It is in that sense that European imperialism helped the people 
of, say, Kikuyuland to recognize the Yoruba as 'fellow Africans' -
and helped the people of Algeria to recognize the Zulu as continental 
compatriots. 
4 . W e define 'decolonization' as the process through which colonial rule is ended, 
colonial institutions dismantled and colonial values and styles abandoned. Theoretically, 
the initiative for decolonization can be taken either by the imperial power or by the 
colonized people. In reality, decolonization is usually forced by the struggle of the 
oppressed. 
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Of course Africans in their own societies and sub-regions have long
known and experienced the dignity of their own identity as Kikuyu,
Amhara, Yoruba, Berber, Zulu and Maghreb Arabs without the help of
Europe. But when in his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Gamäl
cAbd al-Nasser called upon Egyptians to remember that they were not
only Arabs and Muslims but also Africans, he referred explicitly to the
evidence of a shared struggle against alien rule with the rest of the
continent. European imperialism had awakened a continental con¬
sciousness.
The Royal Imperial House of Ethiopia was rather slow in recognizing
Ethiopia as an African country. For a long time Ethiopian rulers preferred
to see themselves as part of the Middle East rather than Africa. But we
begin this volume from 1935. When the Italians humiliated and occupied
Ethiopia in 1935, the consequences were particularly poignant. The rest
of Africa and the black world groaned in pain. The consequences have
been extensively documented in some of the chapters of this volume.
plate 1.1 Emperor Haile Selassie addressing the League of Nations on Italy's aggression
against Ethiopia
What has sometimes been forgotten is Ethiopia's self-discovery from
1935 onwards as being truly a part of the African condition. On the one
hand, upon hearing the news of the Italian invasion, Kwame Nkrumah
as a young man walked the streets of London, with angry tears running
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d o w n his cheeks. T h e bad news had been an additional stimulus to young 
Nkrumah's pan-African identity. 
O n the other hand, however, Emperor Haile Selassie was drawn into 
an experience to which other African rulers had already been subjected 
30-50 years earlier - direct European occupation of their land and 
subjugation of their people. T h e emperor also witnessed the widespread 
African and black support for him and his people in the face of the Italian 
challenge. In those factors lay the beginnings of a new racial consciousness 
in the Royal House of Ethiopia - the shock of self-discovery as an African 
dynasty of an African people. Over time, Haile Selassie developed into 
one of the founding fathers, and in m a n y ways the elder statesman, of 
post-colonial pan-Africanism. European imperial excesses had once again 
served as a growth m e d i u m for something far more positive than them-
selves. T h e splendour of a n e w pan-African identity had grown out of 
the squalor of European racism. This volume covers the critical transition 
from the squalor of European excesses to the splendour of Africa's self-
discovery. 
But what about the reverse impact of Africa upon the West? B y fighting 
for its o w n independence, Africa was also helping to change the course 
of European and indeed global history. This volume is of course focusing 
upon historical developments within Africa itself. But since this is the 
period of Africa's m a x i m u m incorporation into the global system, and 
participation therein, it is important to remember that Africa was not 
merely a passive continent being acted upon by others. Africa's o w n 
actions have also helped to transform their fortunes. While Africa as a 
continent m a y indeed have been shocked into self-recognition under 
European pressure, Europe has been forced to learn some:degree of 
international responsibility and democratic humility under the stress 
of an African challenge. T h e entire history of decolonization in the 
twentieth century is to be seen partly as a process under which the 
oppressed have learned more fully w h o they really are — and the 
oppressors have begun to learn the humility of humane global account-
ability. T h e story of Africa since 1935 is to be seen in the context of 
those major contradictions. 
W h o are the Africans?5 
It was the poet-diplomat of Sierra Leone, Davidson Abioseh Nicol, w h o 
once wrote: 
You are not a country, Africa, 
You are a concept, 
Fashioned in our minds, each to each 
5. This section is indebted to A . A . Mazrui, 1986, chs 1 and 5. 
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T o hide our separate fears, 
T o dream our separate dreams.6 
W e shall return to this particular refrain later in the volume. Africa is 
indeed at once more than a country, and less than one! M o r e than fifty 
territorial entities with artificial boundaries created by Europe have in the 
period covered in this volume called themselves 'nations'. All of them 
except the Republic of South Africa and Namibia had by the 1980s joined 
an international body called the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) . 
Yes, Africa is a concept, pregnant with the dreams of millions of 
people. 
A s w e have intimated, it remains one of the great ironies of modern 
African history that it took European colonialism to remind Africans that 
they were Africans. Europe's greatest service to the people of Africa was 
not Western civilization, n o w under siege; or even Christianity, which is 
n o w on the defensive. Europe's supreme gift was the gift of African 
identity, bequeathed without grace or design - but a reality all the same. 
This has been particularly so in the twentieth century. 
But h o w then did Europe pan-Africanize Africa? In what way is the 
sense of identity that Africans today have as Africans an outcome of their 
historical interaction with Europeans? 
In fact, a number of inter-related processes were at work. W e shall 
examine these more fully later in this volume. First and foremost was 
the triumph of European cartography and mapmaking in the scientific 
and intellectual history of the world. It was Europeans w h o named most 
of the great continents of the world, all the great oceans, m a n y of the 
great rivers and lakes and most of the countries. Europe positioned the 
world so that w e think of Europe as being above Africa rather than below 
it in the cosmos. Europe timed the world so that the Greenwich meridian 
chimed the universal hour. A n d Europe named the Tropics of Cancer 
and Capricorn. W h a t is more, it was Europeans w h o usually decided 
where one continent on Planet Earth ended and another began. For 
Africa, Europeans decided that our continent ended at the Red Sea rather 
than at the Persian Gulf. Europeans m a y not have invented the n a m e 
'Africa', but they did play a decisive role in applying it to the continental 
landmass that w e recognize today. 
T h e second process through which Europe Africanized Africa was the 
process of racism in history. As indicated in previous volumes, this was 
particularly marked in the treatment of the black populations of the 
continent. T h e racially-inspired humiliation and degradation of black 
Africans across the centuries contributed to their mutual recognition of 
each other as 'fellow Africans'. Related to racism were imperialism and 
colonization. Again w e shall show in later chapters that these generated 
6. See D . A . Nicol, 1969. 
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a sufficient sense of shared African identity for the movement of pan-
Africanism to take shape in this period. In the words of Julius K . Nyerere 
of Tanzania once again: 
Africans all over the continent, without a word being spoken either 
from one individual to another or from one African country to 
another, looked at the European, looked at one another, and knew 
that in relation to the European they were one.7 
Black consciousness south of the Sahara is an aspect of the African 
identity - but black consciousness was itself born as a response to 
European racial arrogance. It attained a continental scale following the 
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. A s w e shall see in later chapters, négritude, 
an intellectual and literary movement , was born out of the special cultural 
arrogance of French imperialism. It is against this background that Europe 
has pan-Africanized Africa. T h e period of history covered in this volume 
is particularly relevant in this process. 
T h e era of global Africa 
But in the twentieth century, African history is indeed intimately linked 
to global trends. W e shall see later h o w Nyerere's translation of Shake-
speare into Kiswahili was a literary example of the global connection. 
Chapter 29 on 'Africa and the United Nations' will politically dramatize 
this linkage. T h e period covered by this volume includes the dawn of the 
nuclear age and the emergence of the space age — two of the most dramatic 
shifts in our relationship with the universe. Later chapters will touch on 
these scientific trends. In looking at local and regional African experience 
in this volume, both writer and reader have to bear in mind the unique 
and 'cosmic' context of this period of h u m a n history. H o w has Africa 
been affected and conditioned by these immense technological break-
throughs? In what ways has Africa contributed to those dramatic trans-
formations in turn? W e should bear in mind the global context of the 
regional processes covered in this volume. 
Particularly relevant for both the re-humanization of Europe and the 
re-Africanization of Africa were two global cataclysms - the Great 
Depression and the Second World W a r . O n e of the great historical debates 
for Africa concerns which of the two impacted on African history the 
more deeply and the more fundamentally, and which re-humanized the 
West more. 
T h e worst years of the Great Depression occurred in the period 
immediately preceding the years which are to be covered in this volume. 
T h e collapse of Wall Street was after all in 1929. But the 1930s generally 
7. J. K . Nyerere, i960, p. 149. 
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were part of the aftermath of that collapse - and some of the most 
ominous consequences of the depression (including the rise of Hitler) 
unfolded from the 1930s onwards. 
Did the Great Depression hurt the Western world immediately but 
help Africa's liberation subsequently? W a s the depression a catastrophe 
for Western capitalism but a future blessing for the colonies? If so, what 
was the precise nature of that equation? In what ways was Europe 
subsequently m a d e more humane? Under what circumstances did Africa 
become more pan-African? S o m e of these issues will be m a d e clearer in 
the relevant chapters. 
But if every major global crisis is, by definition, partly African, have 
w e reached a stage when every major African crisis is n o w partly global? 
In the period covered in this volume it is indeed true that every dramatic 
African convulsion stands a chance of being more widely internationalized. 
W e shall explore in the relevant chapters the globalization of the Congo 
crisis (Léopoldville) in the early 1960s — with the violent death of two 
of the major political figures in the crisis, Patrice L u m u m b a and D a g 
Hammarskjöld. S o m e twenty years later the Chad crisis was increasingly 
internationalized - as more and more countries were either diplomatically 
or militarily involved. All this is quite apart from the diverse liberation 
wars in Southern Africa, each of which had a considerable international 
component. T h e evidence has been accumulating that just as there is a 
bit of Africa in every global emergency, there is a bit of the globe in 
every African tragedy. 
T h e Suez war of 1956 was more difficult to categorize. W a s it a global 
conflict which was fought out on African soil? O r was it an African 
conflict globalized? W h e n G a m ä l ' A b d al-Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal C o m p a n y he unleashed both Northern forces of imperial power 
and Southern forces of liberation. T h e Suez crisis will feature in the 
relevant chapters of this volume as one of the great linkages between the 
fate of the world and the destiny of Africa. 
But while in this volume w e shall pay special attention to the inter-
nationalization of both the Suez war of 1956 and the Congo crisis of 
1960-5, there is a sense in which the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 was 
equally globalized, though in a different manner. 
T h e Biafra war was indeed a 'world war in microcosm', without the 
nuclear factor! French support for Biafra counterbalanced British support 
for federal Nigeria. Israel's material support for Biafra counterbalanced 
Egyptian pilots for the federal airforce. South African and white Rhodesian 
support for Biafra counterbalanced the Organization of African Unity's 
concern for the territorial integrity of Nigeria. T h e Chinese also intervened 
for Biafra to counterbalance Soviet support for federal Nigeria. Indeed, 
the Soviet Union's strengthened intervention on the side of federal Nigeria 
coincided with Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia on the side of an 
unfragmented socialist world. T h e Second World of socialism and the 
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Third World of underdevelopment were both embedded in the Brezhnev 
doctrine of proletarian internationalism. 
T h e Czech government had previously obeyed a M o s c o w order to 
deliver Delphin jet fighters and other weapons to the Nigerians. But the 
Liberal Dubcek regime in Prague banned all arms sales to Nigeria 
in M a y 1968. Three months later the Warsaw Pact forces invaded 
Czechoslovakia - and a reversal of policy occurred concerning the ban 
on Delphins to the federal side. 
T h e escalation of Soviet support for Nigeria was not due to Ojukwu's 
invasion of the mid-West or due to a counter-offensive into federal 
Nigeria. T o the Soviets at that time the defence of socialism in the Second 
World had become almost indistinguishable from the defence of national 
unity in the Third World - from Vietnam to Nigeria. 
A n d yet, akhough the Nigerian civil war came close to being a 'world 
war' in microcosm, w e k n o w that Uli Airport was its last frontier. 
It is worth reflecting that the British Empire had once been an empire 
over which the sun never set - given that the Empire was scattered over 
all the time zones of the globe. But Biafra — in spite of its flag of the 
rising sun - was a republic over which the sun never really rose. Biafra 
died before its o w n d a w n - in spite of Uli Airport, in spite of generating 
a 'world war' in microcosm. W h a t it did demonstrate was Africa's 
incorporation into the wider world of global rivalries. 
It also showed that an African identity born out of racial humiliation 
and foreign domination was bound to be fragile and uncertain. T h e shock 
of colonialism and imperialism had awakened Africans to the fact that in 
relation to the Western oppressors, Africans were one. But shared exploi-
tation was not enough as a basis of enduring African solidarity. Uniting 
against the foreign oppressor was one thing; uniting for internal develop-
ment was another. T h e earlier part of this period of history has d e m -
onstrated that Africans are effective w h e n they unite for liberation. T h e 
later part of this era demonstrates that Africans are finding it hard to 
unite for political and economic development. S o m e of the chapters take 
a closer look at this dialectic between the pan-Africanism of liberation 
(basically a success story) and the pan-Africanism of integration and 
development (still basically an elusive dream). T h e whole dynamic between 
African identity and African development in this epoch is played out in 
the underlying politics of pan-Africanism. This volume is, in part, an 
introduction to that process. 
Pan-Africanism in disarray 
W h e n the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) was born in Addis Ababa 
in M a y 1963 the most important chair was perhaps an empty chair, the 
most important head of state was a dead president. This was Sylvanus 
Olympio, w h o had been assassinated in Togo earlier that year. His violent 
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death symbolized the shape of things to come. This was the first killing 
of a head of state in post-colonial Africa - and the coup which followed 
was the first of its kind south of the Sahara. This volume will take note 
of this era of coups. T h e stage was set for a version of independence in 
Africa which was periodical ly rocked by violence and death. 
Another theme that this volume explores is pan-Africanism with its 
objective of the attainment of African liberation and African unity, and 
the different approaches adopted for its attainment as exemplified in the 
policies and activities of N k r u m a h and Nyerere, associated with those of 
the moderate Monrovia and the radical Casablanca groups. Put differently, 
one divide between radical and moderate pan-Africanism in the early 
1960s concerned the issue of the geographical scale of African unity. T h e 
radical school was continental in ambition and was opposed to sub-regional 
integration; the moderate school accepted sub-regional experiments in 
pursuit of African unity. This was pan-Africanism's horizontal divide — a 
disagreement about h o w wide African unity should be. 
O n the other hand, the other disagreement concerned h o w deep African 
unity should be. This was the vertical divide. Should there be immediate 
political integration and the formation of a single country? O r should 
African states first aim for more modest (and 'shallower') forms of unity -
like diplomatic co-ordination of foreign policies, or economic co-operation, 
or functional links in communication and shared utilities? A s the chapters 
on pan-Africanism will indicate, the depth of the unity envisaged by the 
O A U when it was formed in 1963 and based in Addis Ababa was shallow, 
but the width of the unity was continental, encompassing both Arab and 
black states. 
In 1966 and 1967 respectively, two separate events helped to change 
the nature of the divide between 'radical' and 'moderate' in pan-African 
politics. In February 1966 K w a m e N k r u m a h was overthrown in a military 
coup in Ghana . A n d the following year Julius Nyerere proclaimed his 
o w n radicalization by launching the Arusha Declaration of Ujamaa na 
Kujitegemea (Socialism and Self-reliance). F r o m then on Julius Nyerere 
began to appear as one of the voices of radicalism on the African stage. 
Dar es Salaam became a more credible capital of a frontline state, a more 
credible headquarters of the O A U ' s liberation activities represented by 
the African Liberation Committee. 
Yet by the time the O A U was celebrating its tenth anniversary in 1973, 
it looked as if radicalism was declining. G a m ä l c Abd al-Nasser had died 
in 1970. N k r u m a h , in exile, also died not long after his Egyptian comrade-
in-arms. Milton Obote had been overthrown by Idi A m i n . A n d countries 
like Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire* had moved substantially to the right in 
those ten years. 
* Since 1985 the government of the country which was formerly entitled 'Ivory Coast' 
in English decided that its n a m e would be 'Côte d'Ivoire' in all languages. 
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But, as this volume will later show, once again history came to the 
rescue of African radicalism precisely as the O A U began its second 
decade. T w o critical events in 1974 contributed to this. O n e was the 
Ethiopian revolution, occurring around the very capital of the O A U . S u b -
Saharan Africa's second-largest country in population was about to go 
Marxist-Leninist. Forty years after Ethiopia was victimized by Italian 
fascism the country was transformed for a while into an ally of Soviet 
c o m m u n i s m . 
But also in 1974 there occurred the coup d'Etat in the Portuguese 
capital, Lisbon. This resulted in a coup de grace to the Portuguese empire. 
Later chapters will demonstrate that this most ancient of all European 
empires in Africa rapidly disintegrated, leaving behind new radical 
members about to enter the politics of the O A U . Indeed, the issue of 
Angola's independence was for a while itself divisive - with the 'moderates' 
of Africa favouring a government of national unity consisting of all three 
liberation movements ( M P L A , U N I T A and F N L A ) while the 'radicals' 
favoured the installation of the M P L A into power. It turned out that the 
F N L A was a paper tiger in any case, and U N I T A was backed by the 
Republic of South Africa and the West. T h e majority of O A U members , 
including influential Nigeria which was sometimes classified as 'moderate', 
swung behind the M P L A . Angola, a n e w radical m e m b e r , was soon to 
enter the ranks of the left within the O A U . 
T h e independence of Zimbabwe five years later also favoured the left 
in the Organization. In other words, among the factors which favoured 
the radicals in the 1980s within the O A U was the simple fact that virtually 
every African country that attained independence from 1975 to 1980 had 
ideologically opted for a leftist orientation: that is, all the former Por-
tuguese colonies, plus Zimbabwe. 
Secondly, every genuine revolution in Africa is ideologically likely to 
be a m o v e to the left. T h e most significant African revolution of the 
1970s was the Ethiopian one. Somalia also moved substantially to the left 
of what it used to be in the 1960s. A n d Libya was truly radicalized under 
M u a m m a r Kadhaffi. 
O n the other hand, military coups in Africa have been mixed in 
ideological orientation. T h e coups in Ghana and Burkina Faso in the 
1980s were initially attempts to m o v e leftwards ideologically, whereas the 
1984 coup in Guinea (Conakry) was a m o v e to the right. 
O n balance, the O A U as a whole had by the 1980s tilted somewhat to 
the left since its inception. T h e voting patterns concerning the status of 
the Sahräwi Arab Democratic Republic ( S A D R ) revealed a new left-of-
centre coalition which had crystallized since 1974. 
W h a t of the future? Usually the future is not the proper focus of study 
for a historian. However, when w e entitled the conclusion of this volume 
'Towards the year 2000' w e were implicitly recognizing that the history 
of the past can be used to estimate likely trends in the future. Namibia, 
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n o w that it has become truly independent, will for a while probably be 
among the members of the left within the O A U . But radicalism and 
leftism in Southern Africa are fragile plants. W h e n ostensibly radical 
countries like Mozambique begin to cooperate with the Republic of South 
Africa and to welcome Pretoria's economic enticements, a n e w look at 
the concepts of 'radical' and 'moderate' m a y be in order. After the political 
decline of Charles Njonjo, Kenya briefly adopted a tougher stance against 
South Africa than Mozambique. Which African country was more radical 
than which - even on the basic issue of apartheid? 
In the 1960s N k r u m a h was admonishing and denouncing Julius Nyerere 
for inviting British troops to deal with Tanzania's o w n military dissidents. 
In the 1980s Marxist Mozambique was in consultation with both the 
military and economic establishments of South Africa in a bid to control 
Mozambique's o w n dissidents. 
W a s N k r u m a h turning in his o w n grave in the 1980s? O r was he more 
understanding of Mozambique than he once was when Julius Nyerere 
turned for British military assistance way back in 1964? 
Perhaps only our ancestors, in their inscrutable wisdom, can answer 
such questions, as they continue to observe our antics from wherever 
they are. K w a m e N k r u m a h and Sékou Touré have n o w joined these 
ancestors, sitting side by side with Sylvanus Olympio at long last. W h o 
said 'Death is an exercise in pan-Africanism'? Perhaps it is the most 
horizontal form of pan-Africanism, a kind of pan-Humanism, the great 
equalizer, the ultimate unifier: or is it? Africans have been pan-Africanized 
enough for liberation. But they have yet to be pan-Africanized enough 
for socio-economic development and political integration. 
W h a t about the pan-Africanization of women} Where does the 'female 
of the species' fit into the African equation? It is to this theme of gender 
that w e must n o w turn. 
O n sovereignty and gender 
In Chapter 19 on the development of modern African literature, attention 
is drawn to Leopold Senghor's poem 'Naked w o m a n , black w o m a n ' . In 
the poem Africa is a w o m a n - 'clad in your colour that is life, in your 
form that is beauty'. 
A n d yet few chapters in this volume have chosen to describe explicitly 
the role of African w o m e n in the making of African history. W o m e n ' s 
role in the struggle for independence, in general, has tended to be under-
studied. However, there are times when historians - while aware of the 
role of w o m e n — prefer to present the story without reference to sexual 
differences. Most of our historians in this volume have presented the 
struggle for independence in terms oí people rather than genders. Unfor-
tunately, when the story is presented without reference to gender, there 
is often a hasty cultural presumption by observers that the only significant 
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participants in the drama were m e n . Such a presumption is of course 
false. 
T h e story of sovereignty in this volume can be seen in three stages: 
the stage of struggling for sovereignty (the fight for independence); the 
stage of exercising sovereignty (the use of state power); the stage of 
representing sovereignty abroad (the symbols of inter-state relationships). 
W e hope to show in this volume that African w o m e n have been particularly 
significant in the first and final stages. As combatants, African w o m e n 
were part of the crusade for the empowerment of the continent. A s 
diplomats, African w o m e n later represented the sovereignty which they 
had helped Africa to acquire in world affairs. But as power-brokers, African 
w o m e n seem to have been on the whole part of the periphery rather than 
at the centre of politics. Let us take each of these three phases of female 
participation in turn - beginning with the struggle for independence. 
Although the slogan of African nationalism in the final decades of 
colonialism was sometimes couched in the sexist phrase of 'one man, one 
vote', African w o m e n rapidly learned to use the vote as part of the 
process of liberation. M u c h of the canvassing of the vote against Bishop 
Muzorewa's regime in Zimbabwe in 1979-80 was done by w o m e n . T h e 
white-settler establishment was taken by surprise by the election results 
partly because most Europeans underestimated the political activism of 
African w o m e n as the 'servants' visited each other from kitchen to kitchen. 
M o r e than a quarter of a century earlier, w o m e n in colonial Kenya had 
played a différent role. There is little doubt that the ' M a u M a u ' struggle 
in Kenya would have fizzled out m u c h sooner if the Kikuyu, M e r u and 
E m b u w o m e n in the Central Province had not risked their lives to send 
in food and information to the male fighters in the Aberdaire forests. 
There was also m a n y an occasion during the Algerian war of inde-
pendence when a particular nationalist operation depended on a w o m a n 
revolutionary, shrouded in a traditional Islamic dress and veil, being able 
to penetrate the enemy lines. Indeed, if Franz Fanon's accounts are 
reliable, heavily-shrouded Muslim w o m e n were a m o n g the most crucial 
carriers of grenades at specific phases of the urban guerrilla war in 
Algeria.8 
O n balance, internalized liberation struggle within an African country 
at war has tended to involve more w o m e n than a liberation struggle in 
exile. In Southern Africa the internalization of struggle has been part of 
the intensification of struggle. A n d both internalization and intensification 
have meant greater involvement of w o m e n in at least supportive roles, 
and sometimes in actual combat roles. In Zimbabwe the liberation army 
of the Zimbabwe African National Union ( Z A N U ) probably involved 
more w o m e n on the frontline than did the army of the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union ( Z A P U ) . 
8. See F. Fanon, 1963. 
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W h a t is less clear is whether the balance between m e n and w o m e n in 
Z A N U and Z A P U generally is partly due to cultural differences between 
the Shona (Robert Mugabe's ancestry) and the Ndebele (Joshua N k o m o ' s 
ancestry). Is the warrior tradition of the Ndebele (linked to Zulu culture) 
more purely masculine than the warrior tradition among the Shona? A n d 
did this difference affect w o m e n and h o w m a n y of them were involved 
in armed struggle in each camp? This volume does not settle such debates. 
Inevitably contemporary history often raises more questions than it 
answers. But the warrior tradition is indeed addressed in Chapters 5 and 
16. In any case, if w o m e n were more active in Z A N L A (the army of 
Z A N U ) than in Z I P R A (the army of Z A P U ) one additional explanation 
could have been ideological. Robert Mugabe's movement was to the left 
of Joshua Nkomo's . 9 
A s for w o m e n in the Horn of Africa, the Islamized Somali, perhaps 
surprisingly, seem to be more sensitized to the role of w o m e n in combat 
than are the Christianized Amhara. Mogadishu does not have a tomb of 
the unknown warrior but it does have a statue of the martyred female 
warrior - a w o m a n fatally wounded, and yet still fighting. 
Legends abound in Mogadishu about H a w a Ismen 'All w h o stood up 
against the return of Italian colonialism after the Second World W a r , and 
paid with her o w n life in 1948. T h e Somalis being a particularly poetic 
African people, have celebrated the martyrdom of H a w a Ismen 'All in 
diverse rhythms. She was Somalia's Joan of Arc. She symbolized sacred 
patriotism with a female face.10 
In the Muslim world as a whole, Somali w o m e n may well be more 
'liberated' than average. In the Christian world as a whole, Ethiopian 
w o m e n may be less 'liberated' than average. But does that mean Somali 
w o m e n are, in absolute terms, more 'liberated' than Ethiopian women? 
B y absolute standards, that is harder to assess. T h e two societies m a y be 
at the same level of public involvement of w o m e n . W h a t is also possible 
is that in the early 1980s there were more Somali w o m e n in military 
uniform, proportionately, than there were Ethiopian. At least, in that 
period, Somalia seemed readier to enlist both genders in the armed forces 
than did Ethiopia." 
In South Africa the role of w o m e n in the struggle against racism has 
been wide-ranging. W o m e n have joined movements of civil disobedience 
going back to the pioneering rebellious efforts of Mahatma Gandhi in 
Durban in 1906. W o m e n were among the dead in both the martyrdom 
of Sharpeville (i960) and the martyrdom of Soweto (1976). Winnie 
9. T h e author is indebted to the field work done in preparation for a special Panorama 
programme, 'Searching for the N e w Zimbabwe', B B C Television, 1982. 
10. T h e case of H a w a Ismen 'All is also discussed in Chapter 6 of this volume. 
11. T h e author is indebted to the fieldwork done in preparation for the B B C / P B S 
television series, 1986. 
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Mandela became part of the vanguard against apartheid, carrying her 
imprisoned husband's torch of resistance for over a quarter of a century. 
Helen Suzman was part of the parliamentary opposition to apartheid for 
thirty-six years - stepping d o w n only in 1989. Female movements against 
racism ranged from the historic Black Sash to the multi-racial alliance, 
W o m e n Against Repression ( W A R ) , rebelling against President F. W . de 
Klerk in 1989. 
All this was quite apart from w o m e n under arms in the African National 
Congress ( A N C ) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) . This tradition of 
armed female comrades had precedents in F R E L I M O during the struggle 
against the Portuguese. 
In Angola under colonial rule, the role of w o m e n differed markedly 
among the three liberation movements - the M P L A , F N L A and U N I T A . " 
T h e M P L A was both the most multi-racial of the movements and the 
most 'androgynous' in its regiments. Both its Marxism-Leninism and its 
multi-racialism favoured the greater participation of w o m e n as fighters. 
F N L A was in some ways the most anachronistic of the three m o v e -
ments. It used marriage relationships as a basis of military alliances -
beginning with Roberto Holden's o w n family ties with President Mobutu 
Sese Seko's establishment and the Bakongo. 
Jonas Savimbi during the struggle against the Portuguese was to the 
left of Jonas Savimbi after Angola's independence. In other words, 
Savimbi and U N I T A moved to the right when their enemy was not 
Portuguese imperialism but the M P L A , backed by the U S S R and Cuba. 
In terms of his dependence on South Africa, his rightist tilt became 
dangerously reactionary. Savimbi came close to being an ally of apartheid. 
A n d yet, by a curious twist of fate, as Savimbi moved to the right in 
political allegiance, he became more progressive in his use of w o m e n in 
the movement. H e entrusted more leadership roles to w o m e n . Post-
colonial Angola reduced Savimbi's chances of enlisting more male allies 
from distant ethnic groups — and increased his dependence on ethnic 
allies in his o w n Ovimbundu heartland, both male and female. T h e ethnic 
concentration of his constituency favoured an androgynous approach to 
struggle. It is also possible that his new international status made him 
more progressive towards w o m e n . At any rate U N I T A used w o m e n in 
positions of responsibility more extensively after independence than 
before. 
But when all is said and done, w o m e n all over Angola - like w o m e n 
elsewhere in Africa - were often the unsung heroines of the struggle for 
freedom. They made a bigger difference to the success of the whole 
enterprise than has often been realized. 
Within this period of history, that struggle for freedom was itself a 
12. M P L A (People's Liberation Movement for Angola); F N L A (National Liberation 
Front of Angola); U N I T A (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). 
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liberating experience even before its formal success on Independence Day. 
W e have sought to show that in that fight for sovereignty, w o m e n were 
often warriors in their different ways. Let us n o w return to that other 
part of the equation - when , on attainment of sovereignty, w o m e n became 
at times the voices of Africa in world affairs. 
It is worth remembering that Uganda appointed a w o m a n foreign 
minister sooner than did the majority of Western countries - including 
the United States, Britain and France, none of which had entrusted the 
foreign ministry to a w o m a n when Elizabeth Bagaya Nyabongo, the former 
Princess Elizabeth of Toro, became the voice of Uganda in world affairs. 
A n d when Angie E . Brooks of Liberia was elected president of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1969, it was before any 
Western w o m a n had risen to such prominence within the United Nations' 
system.13 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Paris m a y have had more female ambassadors 
from Africa than it had female envoys from any other region outside 
Europe. African countries which had influential female diplomats stationed 
in Paris in the 1980s included Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone 
and Uganda. Indeed, Elizabeth Bagaya Nyabongo (Uganda's former 
foreign minister) would have been the second w o m a n ambassador to France 
from Uganda and under President Y . Museveni had she not resigned 
from the diplomatic service in 1988. W e shall return to this theme in 
Chapter 30. 
T h e African National Congress of South Africa was for a while also 
represented by a w o m a n (Mrs Dulcie September) in France - until she 
paid the supreme price for her patriotism. She was mysteriously assassin-
ated in Paris in March 1988. She had been A N C representative to 
U N E S C O , Switzerland and Luxemburg as well as France. 
It is on such occasions that Leopold Senghor's poem fusing Africanity 
with womanhood acquires a particular poignancy. T h e female South 
African martyr in Paris became a brave symbol for the continent as a 
whole. T h e fact that she was born in 1935 gives her a particular relevance 
to this volume's period of history. 
But in a sense Ambassador Dulcie September's sacrifice was also part 
of Africa's struggle to re-humanize 'the white m a n ' . She was a martyr to 
that particular crusade. It is to this theme of Africa's re-humanization of 
Europeans that w e must n o w return. 
A n African Gospel for Europe 
There has been a strong tendency in modern historiography to regard 
Africa as a passive continent - a recipient of influences rather than a 
transmitter of the same. Insulting to both w o m e n and Africa, some have 
13. W e shall return to Ambassador Brooks's achievement in Chapter 30. 
20 
Introduction 
even gone as far as to call Africa 'the female continent' in the pejorative 
sense of passivity and penetrability. This was a far cry from Senghor's 
positive feminization of Africa. 
T h e same event which one historian regards as an illustration of Africa 
under external influence could be viewed by another historian as an 
example of Africa's impact upon the outside world. This volume leans 
on the side of Africa as an active continent. 
In recent decades, there has been Africa's role in redefining the ethics 
of racism in the world system. Africa, more than any other region of the 
world, has helped to m a k e racism in any one country an issue of 
international concern. Under pressure from African states, it has become 
increasingly impossible for the Republic of South Africa to claim that 
apartheid is an issue of domestic jurisdiction. T h e volume will demonstrate 
that, under heavy pressure from both pre-independence African leaders 
and post-colonial African states, die struggle against institutionalized 
racism has been internationalized. People of African ancestry in the 
United States joined the struggle quite early. These African-Americans 
also helped to initiate the transformation of race relations in the Americas, 
as the relevant chapters will reveal. 
This volume also shows that Africa has played a decisive role in 
stripping colonialism of its legitimacy under international morality and 
increasingly under the L a w of Nations. For several centuries, rules of 
European statecraft and diplomatic history had m a d e it perfectly legitimate 
for a European power to colonize and subjugate a non-Western society. 
Millions of people in Africa, Asia, and indeed the Americas, fell under 
European 'sovereignty' - and international law recognized and legitimized 
mat 'sovereignty'. After all, international law was itself a child of European 
diplomatic history and statecraft. It was therefore saturated with European 
assumptions and prejudices as well as values and norms. It has taken the 
joint struggles of people of African and Asian ancestry to challenge some 
of these arrogant and ethnocentric assumptions of international law. If it 
was wrong for Hitler's G e r m a n y to occupy Poland or Belgium, w h y was 
it right for Disraeli's Britain to occupy the Nile valley? Africa and Asia 
have helped to revise the rules of international conduct in the second half 
of the twentieth century. T h e West has been encouraged to re-humanize 
itself. 
But w e shall see in this volume mat Africa's struggles have had even 
wider consequences for our times. W h e n the National Liberation Front 
( F L N ) of Algeria was fighting for independence, it was not simply the 
future of Algeria which was at stake. It was also the future of Europe. 
T h e Fourth Republic of France came under severe stress as a result of 
the Algerian war. In 1958 France hovered on the brink of a civil war. 
T h e Fourth Republic collapsed under these pressures. Only one m a n 
could save France from widespread civil strife - General Charles 
de Gaulle. D e Gaulle returned to power in Paris, insisted on a n e w 
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constitution - and France's Fifth Republic was born. T h e entire history 
of France in the remainder of the twentieth century would have been 
vastly different had the Algerian war not destroyed the Fourth Republic 
and catapulted Charles de Gaulle back to supreme political power. 
Indeed, a strong France under de Gaulle turned out to be also vital to 
the fortunes of the European Economic C o m m u n i t y ( E E C ) in its early 
formative years: de Gaulle presided over those years of the European 
C o m m o n Market. D e Gaulle's vision of the grandeur of France also led 
to a re-definition of the role of France in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization ( N A T O ) , and the removal of the United States' military 
bases from France. Paris decided to be politically integrated with N A T O -
rather than remain part and parcel of die alliance's military organization. 
All these significant changes in the history of the Western world had 
for their catalyst the struggle of Algerian nationalists for the liberation of 
their country. While these African freedom-fighters were busy trans-
forming the destiny of their o w n country, they were, perhaps unwittingly 
at the time, also participating in changing the course of history of the 
Western world. This is the kind of positive emphasis that underlies the 
perspective of this volume. 
African nationalists in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique , 
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands and Sao T o m e and Principe were also 
destined to alter the direction of Portugal's o w n history. It was the strain 
of the anti-colonial wars in those Portuguese dependencies which finally 
led to the military coup in Portugal in April 1974. This also marked the 
end of the era of fascism in the history of modern Portugal. T h e African 
nationalists of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau helped to initiate 
both the democratization and the political modernization of Portugal. 
Portuguese political culture was as a result re-humanized. 
In the case of Algeria's impact on French history, it is instructive to 
reflect on the reaction of Karl M a r x and Friedrich Engels w h e n the 
French were consolidating their hold on Algeria in the 1840s. These two 
European thinkers regarded French colonization of Algeria, in large 
measure, as a civilizing process. In Engels's o w n words: 
A n d the conquest of Algeria has already forced the Beys of Tunis 
and Tripoli and even the Emperor of Morocco, to enter upon the 
path of civilization. . . . A n d , after all, the modern bourgeois, with 
civilization, industry, order, and at least relative enlightenment 
following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or to the marauding 
robber, with the barbarian state of society to which they belong.14 
If the French in the mid-nineteenth century helped to ignite the process 
of 'modernizing' Algeria, the Algerians in the mid-twentieth century, in 
turn, initiated the process of stabilizing France. A n ancient debt was paid 
14. F. Engels, 1849. See also A . A . Mazrui, 1986, ch. 15. 
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when the National Liberation Front ( F L N ) of Algeria helped to destroy 
the Fourth Republic of France with all its instability - and inaugurated 
the more solid Fifth Republic. Stripped of its empire, France was re-
humanized. 
T h e next phase for Africa as a whole is to roll back the curtain of 
Western «io-colonialism. This includes, on one side, reducing the power 
of the West upon Africa; and, on the other, it encompasses an effort to 
increase the power of Africa upon the West. S o m e of the economic 
chapters of this volume will clarify that strategy of counter-power. 
In West Africa, Nigeria's most natural rival is not Libya, but France. 
Nigeria is by far the largest country in the region - with a population of 
a hundred million in 1980. This is larger than the population of all former 
French West Africa added together. Nigeria should be the natural leader 
of West Africa. A n d yet immense influence was still being exercised in 
West Africa in the 1980s by bureaucrats and business people from France. 
Discussion on dependency in this volume will show that there was a 
need in West Africa to reduce French fiscal and economic control and to 
curtail the continuing French cultural and educational penetration of its 
former colonies. In the long run, Nigeria was destined to take the lead 
in the decolonization of its o w n region. 
Quite early, France probably recognized Nigeria as a future rival for 
influence in West Africa. France attempted to assist the secession of 
Biafra in the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 - in a futile bid to fragment 
Nigeria. W h e n fragmentation finally failed, France then began an attempt 
at the greater penetration of Nigeria - through economic investment and 
joint projects. Making Nigeria itself dependent on France was one way 
of neutralizing Nigeria's potential rivalry in the future. Nigeria in the 
1980s had yet to wake up fully to the challenge. 
Great Britain was less of a rival to Nigeria in West Africa, partly 
because Britain invested far less m o n e y than France, utilized far fewer 
British personnel, and used no British troops at all in any of her former 
colonies. N o r was the British pound linked in any manner whatsoever 
with any of the currencies of the former British colonies - unlike the 
way the French Central Bank backed for so long the C F A franc in the 
former colonies. French influence in former French West Africa was 
therefore far greater than British influence in say, Ghana, or Sierra Leone, 
let alone Nigeria. T h e question for the 1990s is whether France will 
become less involved in Africa and become far more interested in the 
newly-transformed Eastern Europe, and in the more deeply integrated 
European C o m m u n i t y after 1992. A s a result, Nigeria m a y find it easier 
to exercise its influence in West Africa in the future. 
O n the basis of the data on mineral wealth and industrial potential 
covered in this volume, w e are in a position to estimate that the second 
major power centre in Africa in the twenty-first century will probably be 
black-ruled South Africa. Following the probable racial war and the 
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inevitable collapse of apartheid, black South Africans will inherit their 
birth-right. They will inherit the mineral wealth of one of the richest 
countries in the world - minerals which are indispensable for the economic 
well-being of the Western world. 
Black South Africans will also inherit the most industrialized economy 
in Africa - built by their o w n black labour and by Western expertise. 
Thirdly, black South Africans m a y inherit a nuclear infrastructure - and 
become the black world's first nuclear power. Clearly, black South 
Africans, the most underprivileged blacks of the twentieth century, m a y 
become among the most privileged of the twenty-first century. T h e 'black 
untouchables' of today m a y well become the 'black Brahmins' of tomorrow. 
A great Western novelist, Charles Dickens, once m a d e the following 
suggestion: 
. . . think for a m o m e n t of the long chain of iron or gold, of thorns 
or flowers, that would never have bound you but for the formation 
of the first link on one memorable day.15 
Africa has for so long experienced and moaned under the chain of 
iron: can the chain n o w be transformed into a necklace of gold? Africa 
has for so long suffered from a chain of thorns: is the garland of flowers 
at hand? This volume provides the data for calculating probabilities. 
T h e lustre of the gold of South Africa should not dazzle us prematurely. 
T h e historic effort to loosen the chains of iron has had its successes -
but w e shall show in later chapters that the war is far from over. T h e 
struggle continues. T o change the metaphor, the fallen angel is only 
beginning to rise again. This volume is about the last years of Africa's 
political damnation under colonialism. T h e volume is also about the dawn 
of Africa's salvation. W h e r e the h u m a n species first began is where h u m a n 
freedom will at last be fulfilled. 
At the beginning of Africa's story in this U N E S C O series w e saw a 
continent bequeath the h u m a n species to populate Planet Earth. At the 
end of Africa's story w e shall n o w see a continent in the process of re-
humanizing that species in moral terms. T h e years since 1935 have 
shocked Africans into a n e w depth of self-recognition. But by fighting 
for their o w n dignity, Africans have also shocked the rest of the world 
into a n e w approximation of global h u m a n identity. That is the story of 
this volume. Let it n o w unfold. 
15. C . Dickens, 1975, p. '67. See also R . Smollan, 1987; and D . Killingray and R . 
Rathbone (eds), 1986. 
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Africa in a decade of world 
conflicts, 1935-45 
The Horn and North 
Africa, 1935-45: 
crises and change 
Tayeb C H E N N T O U F 
In the fourth and fifth decades of the twentieth century, the Horn and 
North Africa were, like other regions, shaken by two major upheavals -
the world recession and the Second World W a r . T h e 1930s saw the 
beginning of a series of crises and changes deepened and accelerated by 
the war. In the post-war period, after m a n y difficulties, new equilibria 
were established; they were at once threatened by political movements 
that had emerged from the war strengthened and more determined. 
Almost half a century later, as the archives are opened to historians, m u c h 
has been written about this recent past in the correct belief that the years 
1930-45 did indeed represent a turning point in contemporary history. 
M a n y questions of course remain unanswered or the subject of debate, 
but it is possible today to present an overview that indicates where gaps 
presently exist and the points that are still controversial. 
The Horn and North Africa, 1935-40 
F r o m 1935 to 1940, economic and social crises arose. 
E c o n o m y and society 
T h e economies that had become sensitive to the international market 
were affected with differences in timing by the reversal of the world 
economic situation. Rapid population growth and urbanization, less depen-
dent on the global economy, were affected by slower and older movements. 
T h e greatest difficulties arise in determining the relative shares of the 
world economic crisis and its knock-on effects and the strictly endogenous 
difficulties of the local economies. 
T h e economies of North Africa and the H o r n had been integrated into 
world trade since at least the second half of the nineteenth century and 
their economies had, in varying degrees, been shaped by legislation 
prepared by the colonial powers; they thus proved to be sensitive to any 
international fluctuations. A n y shift in trade had repercussions on local 
economies because of the importance of external trade, notably with 
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the colonial powers, which increased during the inter-war period, and 
production in particular agricultural crops and minerals that constituted 
key elements in exports. 
External trade directly felt the unfavourable economic climate and the 
crises of the French, British and Italian economies. T h e fall affected both 
imports and exports but the latter held u p better to the fall which affected 
a small n u m b e r of mineral and agricultural products traditionally exported 
to Europe. In Algeria, the value of imports fell by a half from 1929 to 
1935. T h e collapse of Tunisian external trade was a result of the mineral 
and agricultural crisis. Exports halved in value between 1930 and 1935. 
Morocco's external trade weakened between 1929 and 1931 and then 
abruptly collapsed. In 1936, by value, exports were half what they had 
been in 1926 (1932 million francs as against 3800 million francs). T h e 
fluctuations in Libya's external trade were more limited because of its 
very weakness. External trade with Italy or other European countries in 
1930 was extremely small. Even so, Libyan external trade fell from 482 
million lira in 1925 to 366 million in 1934. This was a drop of 30 per 
cent not allowing for inflation.1 
Since virtually all minerals were exported, the influence of the world 
market prevailed, with every fall in d e m a n d having repercussions on local 
production and leading to a mining crisis. 
T h e mining crisis manifested itself first in Tunisia. T h e price of iron 
ore on the world market began to fall in 1928; in 1930 exports of the 
main mineral products fell abruptly: from 330 million francs in 1930 to 
100 million in 1932. 
In Morocco , the sale of phosphates declined in 1931, recording a sharp 
fall from 1.7 million tons in 1930 to 900000 tons in 1931. It stabilized 
subsequently, but remained low. In 1931 to 1932, every mining centre 
except the one at Djerada reduced its activities; the lead and zinc mines 
closed, manganese mining continued but at a low level.2 In Algeria, the 
mining sector suffered a sharp fall in production. Iron-ore production fell 
75 per cent between 1929 and 1932. T h e fall in phosphates of lime was 
about the same: production reached 920000 tons in 1925 — but by 1939 
it had fallen to 400 tons. Other minerals followed the same pattern.3 
In agriculture, some crops experienced a similar decline in production, 
since they too were essentially produced for export. 
In Libya, the few products that the Italian settlers in Tripolitania could 
sell faced a slump in sales but this affected only a few products like 
cabbages. 
Egyptian agriculture was affected by the catastrophic fall in the price 
of cotton on the world market. Farmers w h o had borrowed to develop 
1. J. L . Miège, 1968, p. 186. 
2. R. Galissot, 1964, p. 56. 
3. A. Nouschi, 1962, p. 42. 
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irrigation or to purchase p u m p s found themselves unable to keep u p their 
repayments. Small peasants w e r e faced with the threat of losing their 
properties. T h e SrdT government organized the stockpiling of cotton at 
state expense; in 1931 the Agricultural Credit B a n k w a s established for 
small farmers. Signs of recovery appeared at the end of 1933; it encouraged 
the government to resume w o r k o n irrigation and drainage projects. 
Algerian export crops (citrus fruits, cotton, oil, tobacco) experienced 
difficulties in finding markets especially in France; the measures adopted 
b y the French Parliament temporarily deferred the question of the 
marketing of wine and protected wine-growing for a time. Conversely, 
given their role in agriculture and the e c o n o m y , the fall in the price 
of cereals fuelled the agrarian crisis. T h e price of cereals fell o n the 
world market from 1930 to 1935. Harvests were bad between 1929 and 
1939 except for that of 1933 -4 ; the worst harvests were in 1930-1 and 
I935-6- 4 
F o r the most typical products of Tunisian agriculture (cereals, citrus 
fruits, olive oils) an initial fall in price occurred in 1928. T h e fall lasted 
from 1930-5 and even beyond, and was abrupt between 1932 and 1935. 
T h e fall w a s general for all agricultural export products, the lowest prices 
being in 1933. T h e crisis affected all farming activities and all regions: 
the incomes of farmers fell, threatening the situation of small peasants. 
In M o r o c c o , agricultural colonization w a s disrupted by the fall in 
prices. T h e price of wheat fell from 126.60 francs a quintal to 60 francs 
between 1930 and 1933; barley from 60 francs in 1930 to 23 .20 francs in 
1934. T h e harvests themselves were bad except for 1934. B e t w e e n 1930 
and 1933, farmers' incomes fell b y 60 per cent.5 
C o m p a r e d to mining and agricultural activity for export, artisanal and 
industrial production was not affected by the world recession, at least 
directly. Indirectly, it accelerated a local crisis in M o r o c c o and the other 
countries. 
Tunisian handicrafts were already in crisis w h e n the world recession 
appeared, disrupting it a little m o r e : exports of woollen cloth declined 
between 1928 and 1932 by 82 per cent, whereas imports of woollen goods 
rose by 50 per cent; fez (chechia) exports fell continuously from 1932 to 
1937: from 8 2 6 4 0 units to 2 6 4 9 1 . In Tunis , almost 400 people were 
employed in coppersmithing; the n u m b e r fell to barely 100 in 1932. 
T h e Algerian craft industry evolved in the s a m e w a y despite the 
adoption of recovery measures. Industrial activities that had b e g u n during 
the First W o r l d W a r were devoted to activities derived from agriculture 
(flour-milling, oil-milling, brewing). T h e y w e r e import-substitution indus-
tries, and oriented towards the local market, employing 9 0 0 0 0 workers 
in 1936. 
4. ibid., p. 46. 
5. R . Galissot, 1964, p. 67. 
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The significance of the crises 
T h e world recession had repercussions in the sectors that were most 
closely involved in the world market. Indirectly, it worsened local crisis 
conditions in which the evolution of local economies played a determining 
role. T h e deterioration in the economic situation in the various countries 
was apparent even before the turnaround in the world economic situation 
was felt. In the same way, the improvement in the global economy did 
not automatically lead to a parallel improvement in Egypt and the 
M a g h r e b . 
In Tunisia, while the world recession weakened, the local economic 
situation worsened because of the drought which m a d e the harvest of 
1935-6 disastrous. In 1939, the economy of Algeria had still not yet 
altogether recovered to its 1929 level. 
T h e local economies were affected by a crisis whose origins were 
endogenous. In reality, there were several crises of varying and sometimes 
divergent significance. H o w long colonization had been underway and the 
scale of the economic transformations m a k e it possible to distinguish 
various types of crisis. 
In Libya, the economic difficulties were those of an agricultural 
development that was just beginning. In Morocco, the crisis came after 
a first stage of economic expansion and even euphoria. In Algeria and 
Tunisia, the crisis was that of the colonial economy itself whose foun-
dations were shaken. In Egypt alone, despite the world recession, con-
siderable economic progress continued to be m a d e , making this country 
follow a path that was altogether an original one. 
Libya became an Italian colony in 1916 but administration and develop-
ment were seriously restricted until 1931 by continuing resistance. T h e 
Italian conquest cost the country heavy h u m a n and economic losses. 
Livestock, the principal wealth of Cyrenaica, were decimated; the n u m b e r 
of sheep, goats, cattle, camels, horses and donkeys fell from 1411800 in 
1910 to 978000 in 1926 and 140430 in 1933.6 T h e country was depopu-
lated and ruined by the time of the world recession. T h e 'traditional' 
economy had m u c h m o r e to do overcoming the difficulties consequent 
upon the Italian war of conquest than it had those of a world market to 
which it was hardly linked at all. 
Italian agrarian colonization was confronted with a n u m b e r of problems. 
Economic colonization as practised from 1911 to 1921 was abandoned in 
1928 in favour of settlement colonization. T h e 1928 laws led to a first 
wave of immigration followed by a second launched by Mussolini himself 
after 1928. T h e agricultural land grants were intended for the settlement 
of Italian peasants recruited by the fascist organizations. Agrarian and 
settlement colonization was a double failure, both h u m a n and financial, 
of Italian fascist policy. T h e difficulties of agricultural enterprises in 
6. J. Despois, 1935, p. 14. 
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Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were very similar to the crises met with by 
agrarian colonization in Algeria in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. In Libya, as in Algeria before it, agrarian colonization ran u p 
against three obstacles: the lack of capital, the non-existence of an enlarged 
market and the absence of a work-force available for wage labour. 
T h e crisis in Morocco , placed under a protectorate very late, had a 
different significance. After a first crisis of growth in 1924-5, expansion 
resumed until 1931. Between then and 1936, external trade diminished 
and speculative enterprises, particularly in construction, agriculture and 
mining, were affected. Industrial activities kept going although industrial 
growth fell. N e w activities developed: processing industries such as flour-
mills kept going; sardine-canning factories flourished; the search for oil 
became productive; tobacco-processing factories c a m e into operation in 
Casablanca and Kenitra; the vegetable horsehair industry continued to 
prosper. 
Despite the difficulties, there was no decline in economic activity and 
even s o m e slight growth. In total, while the growth of the years 1925-
30 was lost, industrial activity held u p to the crisis better and recovered.7 
T h e Tunisian and Algerian crises were similar. T h e economic difficulties 
were less those of a colonization in its first stage than of colonial economies 
which had experienced deep transformations and periods of expansion. 
In Tunisia, the world recession (1930-1) affected an agricultural under-
production economy due to the drought of 1930 followed by floods in 
the centre and north in D e c e m b e r 1931. T h e economic situation worsened 
in 1930 with losses of livestock in the south. T h e locust invasion followed 
the floods almost immediately; the agricultural harvest was bad because 
of heavy frosts and high winds. 
Algeria represents the most complex example of difficulties of various 
origins. A s in Tunisia there was a traditional type of crisis which affected 
essentially the Algerian population. It was aggravated by the crisis of the 
colonial sector masked and delayed by the measures adopted. T h e 
consequences of the world recession m a d e themselves felt after the first 
local difficulties; the colonial sector was the first to be affected. 
Although affected by the world recession the Egyptian economy m a d e 
progress in two areas. T h e Misr group, which had appeared after the end 
of the First World W a r , continued its development by creating n e w 
industrial companies: shipping companies in 1932 and 1934, a cotton-
spinning and weaving c o m p a n y in 1937 at Kafr a l -Dawwar, and trading 
companies in 1940. T h e crisis of 1929-33 intensified the inflow of capital 
to the group and enabled it to strengthen its position in the Egyptian 
economy. It also benefited from changes in fiscal and customs legislation. 
In 1930 Egypt recovered its fiscal autonomy and the right to collect 
customs duties on all imports. Until then, an international agreement 
7. R. Galissot, 1964, p. 72. 
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prohibited Egypt from imposing customs tariffs. T h e last trade agreement 
with a foreign power having expired in 1930, a customs tariff was put 
into effect thanks to pressure by the Misr group and despite Great 
Britain. T h e decision marked an important turning-point for industrial 
development: textiles, food industries and light industries experienced 
expansion right up to the war. In the longer perspective, the beginnings 
of industrialization date from the 1930s. 
In the H o r n of Africa, as in Libya, the potential effects of the world 
recession were limited by the lack of economic change since the beginning 
of the century and integration into the circuits of world trade. T h e 
examples of Ethiopia and Somalia are even clearer than that of the 
Sudan. 
In the latter country, the development of the railway network and 
the cultivation of Egyptian cotton m a d e the economy sensitive to any 
international fluctuation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Lord Kitchener built the strategic railway from the northern border to 
Khartoum. In 1905 it was linked to the Red Sea where Port Sudan was 
created at the same time as the town of Atbara at the junction. Later it 
was pushed as far as Sennär and reached Kordofän in the west in 1911. 
F r o m 1924 a n e w line linked Sennär directly with Port Sudan to serve 
the cotton-growing areas. 
T h e choice was for Egyptian long-staple cotton which was initially 
grown on non-irrigated lands. After the First World W a r , the Gezira 
Scheme, involving the irrigation of the whole of the eastern part of the 
Gezira by the Sennär d a m , was launched. Other cultivation zones were 
created, notably on the Gash, a torrent that comes from Ethiopia and 
runs into the sands of Kassala. In 1929, a convention was signed with 
Egypt on sharing the Nile waters.8 
T h e extension of the rail network and cotton cultivation gave the Sudan 
an export product and greater monetarization of the economy. In the 
1930s, cotton accounted for the bulk of exports. As in Egypt, the crisis 
had repercussions in the regions specializing in cotton-growing, affecting 
the producers directly. Indirectly, it affected Sudanese civil servants 
educated at Gordon College. Their wages were sharply cut in 1931, 
whereas those of their foreign colleagues were not affected. They took 
strike action and convened a congress which secured a compromise with 
the authorities.9 
In Ethiopia, external trade was minimal at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: 8000000 thalers for the Shoa and Harar route, or 
20000000 gold francs; for the whole country, external trade did not 
exceed 50000000 francs. Coffee, gold, ivory and skins were the main 
exports; cotton goods, weapons and ammunition were a m o n g the imports. 
8. Collectif, 1966, p. 472. 
9. J. Ki-Zerbo, 1972, p. 564. 
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T h e Djibouti railway had been under construction since 1903 and 
reached Addis Ababa in 1917. It made it possible to link the interior of 
the country with the seaports. In 1935, it m a d e possible the export of 
15000 tons of coffee and 7000 tons of skins. Imports were even smaller.10 
However, the Ethiopian currency was seriously affected by the crisis." 
T h e population explosion and urbanization, already perceptible before 
1930 in the statistics, k n o w n to a handful of experts, worried public 
opinion less than the world recession and were, in the short term, ignored 
by the administrations governing the protectorates and colonies. They 
were the result of an old and slow evolution and belong, by definition, 
to the 'long wave'. However, population increase and urban growth 
became massive after 1930 and became structural features of societies 
after 1930-45. 
Population growth12 took on the allure of a veritable explosion which 
was not peculiar to North Africa and the H o r n . This is observable in 
other regions of Africa and contrasts with the tapering off of population 
growth in Europe. 
T h e old population pattern lasted a long time, but its ending, which 
dates from the inter-war period, was spectacular. Until the middle of the 
twentieth century, birth and death rates remained high; famines and 
epidemics were receding, but they had not totally disappeared. 
However, the population censuses carried out in the inter-war period 
show birth and death rates diverging: whereas the death rate was falling, 
the birth rate remained high. T h e example of Morocco clearly illustrates 
the changing demographic pattern: whereas the death rate fell con-
siderably, the birth rates oscillated around 38 (average 1932-5) and 44 
(average 1941-5) per thousand.13 In northern Algeria, the birth rate was 
estimated at 38 per thousand between 1921 and 1925; it rose from 43 per 
thousand between 1926 and 1930 to 44 per thousand between 1931 and 
1935 and fell back to 42 per thousand from 1936 to 1940. T h e death rate 
fell from about 19.8 per thousand in 1921-5 to about 16.6 per thousand 
between 1936 and 1940.14 
T h e break in the old population pattern also occurred at different times 
in different countries. Libya and Morocco were close to the old population 
pattern; Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia already manifested a profoundly 
altered pattern. Libya, a lightly populated country, paid a high d e m o -
graphic price for its resistance to die Italian conquest. Guiseppe Volpi, 
appointed governor in 1921, decided to impose Italy's rights by force. 
T h e greatest loss of life occurred in Cyrenaica where military operation 
10. Collectif, 1966, p. 482. 
11. J. Ki-Zerbo, 1972, p. 462. 
12. All population figures in the inter-war period are relative. 
13. J. L . Miège, 1950, p. 55. 
14. C . R . Ageron, 1979, vol. 2, pp. 47Í-2. 
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took place last. Changes in the population structure were m u c h more a 
process of making up for the losses to get back to the pre-1916 level than 
a real growth. Morocco experienced the most rapid growth in the 
Maghreb: the birth rate was the highest in the region. 
T h e Tunisian population (Muslims and Jews) increased by 25 per cent 
between 1936 and 1946. Estimated at 2100000 in 1926, it reached 
3200000 in 1946.15 
Population changes recorded in Algeria by the end of the nineteenth 
century became clearer and more marked. By the 1880s, the Algerian 
population had recovered its pre-1830 level with some slight growth. T h e 
demographic upheaval, barely perceptible in 1921, stood out very clearly 
in 1931. T h e population rose from 4923 186 in 1921 to 6201144 in 1936, 
a growth rate of 1.53 per cent.16 
T h e Egyptian population rose from 13222000 inhabitants in 1920 to 
16887000 in 1940: an increase of 3665000, equivalent to an average 
annual increase of 183 000 persons. In 1945, the population was estimated 
at 18460000.17 
Population growth was one of the factors in urban growth. In some 
towns, foreign inflow from the outside added to this, but the urban 
explosion was overwhelmingly the result of a rural exodus. T h e formation 
of shanty-towns shortly before the Second World W a r was the visible 
sign of the influx of rural dwellers to the medium and coastal towns. 
Numerous factors pushed rural dwellers to move into the towns to 
look for work or to live on charity and assistance. Migrations that had 
previously been temporary became permanent with the arrival of families 
and their establishment on the outskirts of towns. In Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia, migratory movements extended overseas with the arrival in 
France of the first waves of immigrant workers. 
T h e migratory movements began in Morocco even before the estab-
lishment of the protectorate. T h e crisis increased the number of departures 
to the towns after 1931; they were particularly numerous during 1937 
because of the drought and typhus. T h e shanty-towns surrounding 
Casablanca had 85000 inhabitants in 1932; Ben Msir at the same time 
had 3000-3500 shanties.18 N e w shanty-towns were formed around Cas-
ablanca in 1935-6. 
T h e migratory movements in Tunisia and Algeria were similar; shanty-
towns came into existence at more or less the same date in both countries. 
T h e population of Tunis was growing by 1.04 per cent per a n n u m 
between 1921 and 1936. T h e suburbs and outlying areas were growing 
at a rate of 2.61 per cent per a n n u m during the same period. T h e 
15. P. Sebag, 1951, p. 151; A . Raymond, 1955, p. 44. 
16. A . Nouschi, 1962, p. 31. 
17. F. J. Tomiche, 1974, p. 14. 
18. R . Galissot, 1964, p. 73. 
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population of the countryside around Tunis rose from 172000 in 1921 to 
219578 in 1936. T h e agricultural crisis precipitated the dismissal of 
workers w h o became unemployed and settled in the shanty-towns. Bizerta 
and Sfax experienced the same phenomenon. 1 9 
T h e least rapid urban growth was recorded in Libya where the oases 
remained the economic centres and were doubled in some cases by Italian 
administrative centres. T h e sole large town was Tripoli, whose population 
grew rapidly, whereas the centres of colonization were of very modest 
proportions.20 
In Egypt, Cairo profited from the rural exodus m u c h more than the 
towns in the Nile delta: the Egyptian capital grew from 570 000 inhabitants 
in 1890, to 865000 in 1920 and 1 527000 in 1940.21 
U r b a n growth disrupted the old hierarchy a m o n g Moroccan towns 
more dramatically. Between 1931 and 1936 Casablanca became the city 
with the largest population (275 000 inhabitants in 1936 as against 163 000 
in 1931). Marrakesh marked time (190000 inhabitants in 1936) but towns 
with some commercial and industrial activity such as Rabat, Sale, Fez, 
M e k n e s , and Kenitra were the final destination of migratory currents.22 
In Algeria, the urban population, estimated at 508235 in 1926, rose to 
722293 in 1936 and 1129482 in 1948.23 
In the Horn of Africa, the population of the Sudan, estimated at 
3000000 at the beginning of the century, reached 6000000 in 1939.a4 
T h e most intense urbanization was recorded in Ethiopia between 1935 
and 1940. After the conquest of the country, the Italians attempted to 
develop it economically by establishing areas of colonization. Major 
expenditures financed the establishment of settlers, the creation of indus-
tries and above all the construction of modern roads and buildings. Addis 
Ababa swelled to over 100 000 inhabitants in 1935.25 Djibouti - which, 
following the building of the railway, replaced Zeiba as the outlet for 
Harar and Shoa - doubled its population, rising from 10 000 inhabitants 
in 1900 to 20000 in 1940, which was almost half the population of the 
territory. In 1936, a port with a jetty was built there; the town spread 
beyond the salines as far as the Amnbouli oasis.20 
19. M . Rouissi, 1977, p. 85. 
20. J. Despois, 1935, pp. 103-104; R . Raneiro, 1982. 
21. P. Léon, 1978, p. 479. 
22. R . Galissot, 1964, p. 117. 
23. C . R . Ageron, 1979, vol. 2, p. 473. 
24. Collectif, 1966, p. 472. 
25. ibid., p. 482. 
26. ibid. 
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Political crises 
In the political domain, the various countries had been put under the 
control of European powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, except for Ethiopia which was so only in 1935. Their political 
evolution in the years preceding the Second World W a r was as varied as 
it was in the economic and social domain. Challenges to the status of 
colony or protectorate occurred through a series of political crises which 
culminated in the years 1936-^7 and which were temporarily halted by 
the outbreak of the Second World W a r . 
The evolution of Egypt and Libya 
T h e political evolution of Egypt was in total contrast to that of Libya: 
the former w o n a considerable loosening of British control over its political 
life; the latter was integrated into Italian 'national territory'. 
At the same time as the second wave of emigration of 'Ventemila',27 
fascist policy pursued the integration of Libya into Italian national 
territory. A fascist Grand Council decree was promulgated: the four 
coastal provinces of Tripoli, Misuräta, Benghazi and Dera became 'part 
of the national territory'. T h e territories of the Libyan Sahara retained 
their status as a colony. T h e local government retained its full auto-
n o m y , the governor-general having under his full and direct authority 
the four coastal provinces and the Sahara. In the administration, 
only junior positions were open to Libyans. 'Special citizenship' was 
valid only in Libya where it was granted to Libyans able to read and 
write. 
In reality, the local population was excluded from administrative and 
political life. T h e sole political activity by Libyans was in Egypt. In 1923, 
Idrls took refuge there, where a small colony of Libyans had formed. 
With British support, they engaged in anti-Italian propaganda. 
Since the end of the First World W a r , Egyptian political life had 
been dominated by the complex interplay of the monarchy, the British 
representative and the political parties, notably the Wafd. Britain's concern 
with Italian propaganda in Egypt and their activity in Libya and Ethiopia 
m a d e possible the signing of the 1936 treaty and the conclusion of the 
Montreux conventions of 1937. 
T h e essential clauses of the treaty which was signed in London on 26 
August can be summarized as follows: the independence of Egypt was 
reaffirmed and Britain in turn committed itself to defend Egypt against 
any aggression and, in the event of war, Egypt was obliged to offer 
Britain every facility on its territory; the occupation was terminated and 
ambassadors were to be exchanged; Britain undertook to support Egypt 
in its desire to suppress the capitulations and enter the League of Nations; 
27. 'Ventemila': twenty thousand (Italian settlers). 
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no limit was put on the size of the Egyptian army, which was authorized 
to be stationed in the Sudan. 
T h e treaty was valid for an unlimited period but was to be reviewed 
after 20 years. It represented progress compared to the unilateral act of 
1929 but did not open up an era of true independence for the country. 
T h e British concessions were in fact minor and altogether formal. T h e 
security of lines of communication with the British empire was assured 
by British troops (limited to 10 000 soldiers) w h o were to leave the country 
and be stationed in the Canal Zone. British troops were authorized to 
occupy the whole country in the event of international tension or war. 
T h e status quo was retained in the Sudan. 
As agreed in 1936, with London's support, the Montreux conference, 
which was held in April 1937, abolished the capitulations; the mixed 
courts would be gradually phased out over a period of twelve years. T h u s 
the preferential regime enjoyed by the capitular powers was terminated, 
as were the consular courts and the mixed courts after a transitional 
period. All the powers and responsibilities of the consular and mixed 
courts devolved on national courts (the former native courts), with at 
their apex a court of appeal (after 1930) and an administrative tribunal 
or council of state (1946). Conversely, the personal status of Egyptians 
continued to come under religious courts. 
T h e abolition of the capitulations m a d e Egypt master of its financial 
legislation: in 1940, bilateral conventions signed with Britain and France 
put an end to the debt administration system. T h e signing of a similar 
agreement with Italy was rendered superfluous by the Second World W a r . 
Despite the minimal nature of British concessions in the 1936 treaty, 
its signing and the withdrawal of British troops into the Canal Zone 
marked the triumph of the Wafd , and Nahhas Pasha for the first time 
was in a position to maintain himself in power for a reasonable length of 
time and the Wafd remained in power until the end of 1937. King Farouk 
enjoyed great popularity in the early years of his reign. Hoping to play 
the same political role as his father, he dismissed Nahhas Pasha and 
dissolved parliament. T h e 1938 elections were a serious setback for the 
Wafd weakened by its internal divisions and the criticisms provoked by 
its period in government. 
The crisis of Franco-Maghrebi relations 
In the three countries of the classical Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) 
the coming to power of the Popular Front opened up the prospect of 
redefining relations with France. It was quickly followed by dis-
illusionment: and, after the fall of the Popular Front government, 
repression. In fact, in the decade 1930-40, Franco-Maghrebi relations 
experienced their first serious crisis. 
T h e League for Moroccan Action (al-Kutla al-lAmal al-Watänt), estab-
lished in 1933, drew up a plan for reforms which roundly criticized the 
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abuses consequent upon the protectorate regime and attempted, in a 
second part, to make a coherent doctrinal formulation around the principle 
of the inalienability of national sovereignty symbolized by Sultan 
M o h a m e d V . T h e Residency rejected the demands which were deemed 
incompatible with the French presence in Morocco and limited itself to 
implementing, belatedly, those that it felt were minor. 
T h e formation of the Popular Front government, which was welcomed 
by the nationalists, m a d e it possible to relaunch the demands through the 
despatch of a delegation to Paris and resort to mass action. T h e year 
1937 was marked by agitation all over the country (Meknes, Marra-
kesh, Khemisset) which was severely put down. After the fall of the 
B l u m government the repression worsened with the dissolution of the 
League for Moroccan Action (18 March 1937). At the end of the year, 
nationalism was leaderless. It had become increasingly radicalized and 
experienced a number of splits which were indicative of the debates 
going on inside it. Al-Wäzzani, competing with cAllal al-Fasi, created 
a new party: the National Movement (al-Haraka al-Kawmiyya); the 
section that continued to be led by 'Allai al-Fasi became the National 
Reform Party (al-Hijb al-Watäni li-tahkik al-Matälib). In the northern 
zone, an identical split gave birth to the Party of National Reforms led 
by c Abd al-Khalik Tares and the Moroccan Unity Party led by Mekki 
al-Nâsiri. 
In Tunisia, after a period of repression, the DestOrians put a lot of 
hope in the Popular Front. T h e 'first Franco-Tunisian experiment' began: 
Habib Bourguiba presented the new party's programme in a note delivered 
to P. Vienot on 28 August 1936, in a speech in Tunis on 11 September, 
and in articles published in the newspaper l'Action Tunisienne. 
P. Vienot's journey to Tunisia and his speech of 1 March 1937 marked 
a turning point. His journey was followed on 4 March by bloody incidents 
at the phosphate mine at Metlaoui. Indirectly, l A b d al-'AzIz Ta'albi's 
return to Tunisia (5 July 1937) precipitated the deterioration of the 
situation. 
In the short term, it gave a new impetus to the debates and struggles 
among the Destürians. T h e Destür, founded in the aftermath of the First 
World W a r , officially split at the Ksär Hellal congress (2 March 1934) 
into an Old Destür and a Neo-Destür in which Habib Bourguiba laboured 
to secure its position and disseminate its programme. Incidents continued 
to occur until the riot of 9 April 1938. T h e lifting of the state of siege 
on 18 August left a country in which the Neo-Destür was leaderless but 
had become the voice of Tunisian nationalism. Even more than in the 
two neighbouring countries, the advent of the Popular Front raised great 
hopes in Algeria that demands would be met. 
T h e elected representatives, the 'ulama and the communists, without the 
participation of the Etoile Nord-africaine, convened a Muslim Congress 
(7 March 1936) which drew up a 'Charter of D e m a n d s of the Muslim 
40 
The Horn and North Africa, 1935-45: crises and change 
Algerian People' which contained a series of demands for equality and 
respect for Muslim personal status. 
T h e B l u m government, which decided to meet some of the nationalists' 
demands, drafted a law to give the right to vote to the Algerian élite, on 
an individual basis and without their having to give up their Muslim 
personal status. S o m e 20000-25000 individuals would benefit from the 
proposed law which was denounced by Messali Hädj w h o wanted immedi-
ate independence. In fact, because of opposition from the settlers, the 
proposal was not examined by the National Assembly in 1937 or 1938 
and remained a draft. 
T h e atmosphere created by the Popular Front enabled the nationalist 
parties, for the first time, to achieve unity in demands and action. It 
enabled them to establish themselves in the towns and countryside above 
all by widely disseminating their ideas. 
The political evolution of the Horn of Africa 
T h e political evolution of the Horn of Africa was dominated by Anglo-
Egyptian disputes in the Sudan and the Italian military intervention in 
Ethiopia. 
T h e Sudanese political situation was complicated by the existence, at 
least formally, of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. F r o m the very 
beginnings of nationalism in the country, the question of relations with 
Egypt was the source of divisions a m o n g the nationalists. 
Religious-based uprisings were harshly put d o w n . T h e biggest of them 
was the one led by Wiad Halula in the Gezira. A follower of the Mahdf, 
he aimed at continuing his struggle by bringing his followers together 
and refusing to reply to a communication. After the assassination of two 
individuals, including the district commissioner, a military column quickly 
put an end to the attempt. T h e 'AiaAif's' successor was captured and 
hanged. 
At the same time, national feeling was spreading in educated circles. 
T h e secret societies which came into being almost all advocated the end 
of the condominium and independence or union with Egypt. T h e best 
constituted of them was the White Flag Society founded in 1924 by an 
officer, 'All ' A b d al-Latlf, w h o opted for the freedom of the Sudan and 
the unity of the Nile valley. 
In 1936, the agreement reached between Britain and Egypt restored to 
the latter rights that it had lost during political disturbances in Egypt 
and the Sudan. T h e Sudanese nationalists, not having been consulted, 
took up what they saw as a challenge. In 1938 a General Graduates' 
Congress was organized; it initially portrayed itself as a corporative and 
philanthropic organization in order to secure official recognition. 
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The Ethiopian war and its consequences
The Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 brought about the disappearance
of the last independent African state. It had a profound impact on African
nationalists, and among black Americans; in the Horn of Africa, the
consequences were direct and immediate. Italian expansion in north-east
Africa had been halted in 1896 by the decisive victory ofEmperor Menelik
at Adowa. Italian aims were reactivated by fascism. The treaty of friendship
only apparently masked colonial aims on Ethiopia, postponed until the
Italian troops had dealt with the SanOsiyya in Libya.
plate 2.1 The advance ofItalian troops in Abyssinia
A frontier dispute in the Ogaden between Somaliland and Ethiopia
served as a pretext for fascism. Skirmishes took place at Wal Wal. The
Arbitration Commission appointed by the League of Nations failed in its
mission. Britain and France supported Ethiopia but were not prepared
to prevent Italian aggression. Mussolini's troops advanced along previously
prepared routes from Adowa in the north and Mogadishu in the south¬
east. The fascist army of 400 000 men and with superior weaponry easily
took Tigre whereas Gugsa had been bribed. Addis Ababa fell in 1936
after intense bombardments which destroyed towns, villages and flocks.
The emperor had to take refuge in England.
Italy's East African empire became a reality for a few years. Ethiopia
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united with Eritrea and Somaliland constituted 'Africa Orientale Italiana'; 
the king of Italy took the title 'Emperor of Ethiopia'. 
'Africa Orientale Italiana' included the coastal deserts and the Ethiopian 
highlands and had 12000000 inhabitants. It was subdivided into five large 
provinces each with a governor, the whole being headed by a viceroy. A 
large number of fascist troops maintained a police state; military operations 
were necessary in the south-west where resistance activities occurred. 
War and peace, 1940-5 
Except for Egypt, nationalist demands in 1937-8 met with intransigence 
from the colonial powers and repression. F r o m 1940 to 1945, the evolution 
of the various countries was tied u p with that of the war in which they 
were involved. In the political domain, the pre-war crises gave way to 
real changes; more powerful and more demanding nationalism appeared 
by 1943. 
Countries at war 
T h e First World W a r appeared as a conflict between Europeans that was 
happening in Europe. T h e Second World W a r transformed North Africa 
and the Horn into combat zones; military mobilization affected far more 
people; economies were directed towards the war effort. T h e end of 
military operations led to m a n y economic and social difficulties. 
Participation in the conflict 
Between 1939 and 1945, die evolution of military operations and the 
participation in m a n y forms of the various African countries was more 
important for the outcome of the conflict than it had been in 1914-18. 
T h e various battle zones of the 'Africa W a r ' , from the Algerian-
Tunisian frontier almost to Alexandria, were closely interconnected and 
involved prodigious efforts for three years. For the British, Egypt was a 
vital strategic zone. It was considered a key zone not only because of the 
existence of the Suez Canal but also as a hinge in the conduct of the 
war. Churchill felt that Egypt had to be defended as if it were Kent or 
Sussex. A first Italian attack from Libya, led by Graziani, was repulsed 
by Wavell in December 1940. T h e second attack m a d e by the Afrika 
Korps led by R o m m e l was stopped by Auchinleck at al-'Alamein; on 23 
January 1943 British troops entered Tripoli, while the Leclerc column -
which had started out from Chad — arrived soon after and joined up with 
the Eighth Army. 2 8 
Italy also threatened Tunisia from Libya. T h e existence of a large 
Italian minority and old claims gave the country a special place in the 
28. I. S. El-Hareir, 1985. 
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plate 2.2 French soldiers in combat in the Tripolitania Desert
war. The Anglo-American landing accelerated German designs in Tunisia.
On 9 November 1942, a hundred German planes landed on al-'Awina
airfield near Tunis with a thousand men. They entered Tunis without
previous warning in the night of 13-14 November. The German occu¬
pation subsequently spread to all the large urban centres: Sfax, Sousse,
Gabès.
The counter-offensive was waged by allied troops from Algeria where
Anglo-American armies had landed - as also in Morocco. In November
1942 the British army began the Tunisian campaign with the crossing of
the Algerian-Tunisian frontier. After a series of operations, the Allied
High Command launched a general offensive on 22 April. The entry of
the British into Tunis and the Americans into Bizerta in May marked
the end of the Tunisian campaign.
In the Horn, as soon as they entered the war the Italians established
in Ethiopia occupied two frontier towns in the Sudan (Kassala and
Gallabät) and the whole of British Somaliland, where there were virtually
no troops.
In 1941, British troops reconquered the territories under Italian control.
In Tigre, General Piatt, starting out from the Sudan, won a victory at
Keren; in Somaliland, General Cunningham set out from Kenya and
reached Harar and then Addis Ababa. The two army corps met up on
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the A m b a Alaguir where the duke of Aosta surrendered. O n 5 M a y 1941, 
Emperor Haile Selassie was able to return to the Ethiopian capital. 
T h e countries of North Africa and the Horn, transformed into battle-
fields, also supplied soldiers for the various European fronts. U p to the 
armistice, North Africa alone provided 216000 m e n , including 123000 
Algerians. From 1943 to 1945, 385000 m e n from North Africa, including 
290000 Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans, took part in the liberation 
of France.29 T h e army of Africa took part in the liberation of Corsica 
(September-October 1943), the Italian campaign (entry into R o m e , 15 
June 1944) and the Provence campaign (August 1944) and then moved 
northward to join up with the main body of the French army. In Cairo, 
where he had taken refuge, Idrls approved the formation of battalions to 
wage a guerrilla war in the Djabal al-Akhdar as soon as the situation 
allowed. Britain, which asked for application of the 1936 treaty, did not 
expect real military assistance from Egypt. Diplomatic relations with 
Germany were broken as soon as war was declared, and with Italy on 12 
June 1940; but the declaration of war on Germany and Japan came m u c h 
later (26 February 1945). 
In the Horn of Africa, a large Sudanese contingent took part with 
British troops in the reconquest of Ethiopia. Ethiopian refugees in the 
Sudan were organized militarily by General Wingate with the n a m e 
'Gideon Force', which penetrated into Gojam. 
Along with the mobilization of m e n there was an economic policy to 
support the war eifort. In October 1939 the Moroccan economy was 
declared a 'war economy'. T h e approach of war precipitated a rise in 
mineral prices creating a degree of prosperity. T h e Algerian and Tunisian 
economies also strengthened the economic front. 
T h e Middle East Supply Centre, established in Cairo in the s u m m e r 
of 1941, was responsible with the regional resource mobilization office for 
reducing the dependence of the region on outside markets for imports 
by stepping up production and redirecting trade. Local industries were 
used to their full capacity for civilian and military needs. 
The economic problems of peace 
T h e war precipitated numerous economic and social difficulties. T h e 
disruption of transport had repercussions on external trade which col-
lapsed, and the price rises increased the cost of living and the development 
of the black market. T h e demand induced by the war was responsible 
for some industrial growth that was called into question by the resumption 
in 1945 of commercial links with Europe. 
T h e break in relations widi France and Britain and the needs of the 
war, promoted - m u c h more than in the past - the production of goods 
that had hitherto been imported. Egypt profited more than the other 
29. P. Léon, 1978, p. 557. 
45 
Africa since igj^ 
countries from the new situation. T h e agricultural expansion of the 1920s 
and 30s was interrupted by the war but industrial activity remained at a 
high level and industry diversified to meet rising demand. 
T h e increase in the size of the Egyptian army from 22 000 m e n in 1937 
to 45 000 in 1945, and the wages paid by the Allies to the 20000 civilians 
employed in the building and maintenance of military installations, 
increased the demand for manufactured goods; the markets of the region 
were open to Egyptian production. 
Investment that had been directed towards the land and property n o w 
turned to industrial activities. T h e Middle East Supply Centre played a 
major role by giving technical advice to factory managers or helping them 
procure raw materials. Production of textiles, processed food, chemicals, 
glass, leather, cement, petroleum and machines expanded. N e w industries 
came into being: canneries, rubber products, jute, the making of tools 
and, above all, a wide variety of pharmaceutical and chemical products. 
Industrial output increased by 38 per cent between 1939 and 1945.30 
In the Maghreb the war underlined the dependence in every domain 
on European economies. 
Tunisia was deprived of its sources of production of raw materials and 
faced difficult economic problems. T h e impetus was given for the mining 
of lignite. T o replace French products, the craft industries were revived 
where they had been replaced before the war by French imports of 
clothing, shoes and pottery. 
Numerous enterprises were set up in Algeria from 1940 onwards to 
make up for imports that had become rare or unobtainable. Several large 
enterprises opened branches (factories and workshops): Lesieur oil mills 
set up a large oil refinery; near Oran, a pottery works and a glassworks 
were opened by Niedwiller and Saint-Gobain potteries. Lafarge cement 
enlarged their Algiers factory (Pointe Pescade) and built a second one 
near Oran (Saint Lucien).3' 
T h e Moroccan economy was forced to make similar efforts at local 
production faced with the fall in exports. T h e volume of industrial 
investment between 1940 and 1945 equalled that of the previous 27 years: 
during the years 1939-45,53-3 P e r c e n t of capital was directed to industrial 
activities to develop already existing ones or build new ones. T h e Gouin 
soap and oil works opened a second oil refinery, and the Lesieur company 
came in in February 1942.32 
T h e restoration of peace called import-substitution industrialization 
into question and brought about a halt to industrial growth. T h e economic 
and social situation was aggravated by demobilization, the ending of war 
industries and an unfavourable agricultural climate. 
30. S. Radwan, 1974, p. 193. 
31. A . Nouschi, 1962, p. 102. 
32. R . Galissot, 1964, pp. 217-18. 
46 
The Horn and North Africa, 1935-45: crises and change 
T h e economic climate underwent profound changes at the end of 
hostilities. In every country, inflation led to very large price rises just 
w h e n the French and British armies were laying off workers that they 
had employed during the war. Unemployment and under-employment 
were widespread. 
T h e most pressing Egyptian problems were partly concealed by the 
voting of funds to help state workers and those laid off by the military 
administration. T h e most important problems were examined by inter-
ministerial committees and commissions, a large number of which were 
set up in 1945-6. A Higher Labour Council met for the first time on 23 
March 1945 to draw up a labour code. In order to m o p up unemployment 
a five-year plan for large-scale works was granted £25000000 in 1945 to 
finance the opening of roads, the digging of irrigation canals, the draining 
of marshes, the laying on of drinking water in provincial towns, the 
building of schools and hospitals, etc. M o r e than half a million feddäns 
of state lands were to be distributed to farmers on particularly advan-
tageous terms. These measures proved in fact to be insufficient to put an 
end to the social unrest which was prolonged in some countries by bad 
harvests. 
In Tunisia, after 1945, trade circuits resumed their pre-war pattern but 
the country was shaken for three successive years by famine. Following 
a persistent drought, catastrophic grain harvests, particularly in the centre 
and south, followed one after the other from 1944 to 1946. There were 
countless deaths a m o n g sheep and goats already weakened by the shortage 
of water and forage. Several tens of thousands of rural dwellers once 
again flocked northward to live by begging or work on public-works 
sites.33 
Industrial growth 
While a minority was able to get rich through various sorts of trafficking 
and the black market, the overwhelming majority of the population was 
subjected to harsh living conditions which continued in the post-war 
period. T h e European economies themselves were prey to difficulties and 
could be of no help despite the resumption of trade. 
Moroccan external trade resumed in 1943: average imports rose from 
936 000 tonnes before the war to 1280 000 tonnes, and exports from 
2500000 tonnes to 32000000 tonnes.34 In every country, commercial 
flows resumed their pre-war pattern. T h e small amount of capital invested 
and the mediocre quality of their products m a d e the enterprises set up 
during the war very fragile; several were obliged to close d o w n . Algeria 
had the advantage of an industrialization plan. T h e war had shown the 
important role as a rear base played by the protectorates and colonies in 
33. P. Sebag, 1951, pp. 163-4. 
34. J. L. Miège, 1966, p. 115. 
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the outcome of military operations. T h e 'imperial ideology' promoted 
industrial plans with a third world-war seen as inevitable in mind. T h e 
structural problems of the Algerian economy were tackled in a speech by 
General Catroux in 1944. A 20-year programme was drawn up affecting 
every area: crafts, education, housing, public health, infrastructure, rehous-
ing of Algerian farmers. After a rapid start, the five-year industrialization 
plan was abandoned. 
Political changes 
In 1948, the re-integration of North Africa and the H o r n into the 
international division of labour put an end to the economic progress 
achieved during the war. It was not the same in the political arena where 
the war had the consequences of weakening France and Britain, while 
Italy was a m o n g the defeated. After a short interruption of political 
activity, the war favoured nationalism which moved to action in 1943 and 
in 1945-6 challenged the return to the status quo ante as colony or 
protectorate. 
B y 1939, nationalism, which had experienced a period of intense activity 
in the years 1936-7, had tempered its demands. It took advantage of the 
n e w situation created by the war to raise its head once again as soon as 
political life resumed - even before the end of the conflict. 
F r o m the eve of the war, the Algerian nationalist parties were directly 
or indirectly affected by measures of repression. T h e Algerian People's 
Party was banned on 26 September 1939; its leader (Messali Hädj) was 
again imprisoned in October with several other leaders; militants were 
sent to internment camps. O n 28 April 1941, Messali Hädj and his 
companions were sentenced to forced labour or imprisonment by the 
Algiers military tribunal. T h e Algerian People's Party, disorganized, 
effectively disappeared from political life. T h e Communist Party was 
reduced to inactivity or underground activity as soon as war broke out. 
T h e lulamas ' press ceased appearing; Shavkh al-Ibrâhîmi was put under 
house arrest at Aflou during the winter of 1939-40 while Shavkh A . Ben 
Badis was not allowed to leave the city of Constantine without special 
authorization.35 
T h e nationalists drew their o w n conclusions about what was initially 
an external conflict which gradually came closer; they seriously altered 
their attitudes and revised their perspectives. O n the whole, and sometimes 
to the surprise of the 'métropoles', the nationalists, after a short period 
of wait and see, committed themselves to the Allied cause, issuing 
numerous statements to that effect and not opposing military mobili-
zation. 
They called for a rallying to the Allied cause and democracy. For 
35. C . R . Ageron, 1979, vol. 2, p. 548. 
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Ferhat Abbas, 'if democratic France ceased to be powerful, our ideal of 
liberty would be buried forever'.36 In a letter of 8 August 1942, Habib 
Bourguiba expressed his confidence in the victory of the Allies and his 
attachment to the democracies while 'leaving aside until after the war the 
problem of our independence'.37 O n 3 September 1939, the sultan of 
Morocco came out publicly in favour of France, to which he offered 
'unalloyed help'. Several nationalists were called up into the French army 
or joined up voluntarily. Generally, mobilization took place amid 'an 
admirable order and discipline' (Le Beau). 
A s the conflict continued there was an almost imperceptible shift in 
the 'public mind' and the attitude of the nationalists. General Weygand, 
m a d e governor-general of Algeria, noted that the population was 'undis-
ciplined, rude, sometimes insolent'.38 In 1940, taxpayers refused to pay 
their taxes. Several factors combined to lead to a resumption of and 
change in nationalist activity. 
T h e outcome of the fighting in 1940 had immediate effects: France 
and Britain lost the capital of fear they had built up over almost a century 
by their power and prestige. T h e nationalists drew extra power and 
mobilization from their weakening and also drew all the consequences 
from the French divisions manifest in Algiers, Rabat and Tunis and from 
the Anglo-American landing. 
W h e n the armistice was signed they stressed the participation of their 
countries alongside the Allies in order to get their demands accepted. 
T h e Egyptian m e m o r a n d u m presented by the Wafd to the British 
ambassador at the end of the war recalled, in support of demands for 
reform, 'the inestimable help' given by Egypt to the Allies during the 
war. T h e statement m a d e by Anthony Eden on 8 June 1942 to M P s 
explicitly referred to the contribution of Senoussi forces to the war which 
was being fought in Libya. O n 18 June 1943, General de Gaulle hailed 
'the faithful empire, the starting base for the recovery of the country'.39 
Apart from a few very limited successes, Axis propaganda did not 
succeed in detaching the nationalists and public opinion from their 
commitment to the Allies. Mussolini's Islamic policy and fascist and Nazi 
propaganda failed utterly in the Maghreb countries; they had some impact 
in Egypt.40 
T h e anti-colonialism of the great powers was on the contrary welcomed 
with a great deal of hope. Just as they had in 1918 Wilson's fourteen 
points, the nationalists hailed the Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941), the 
United Nations Declaration (1 January 1942) and the San Francisco 
36. R . Le Tourneau, 1962, p. 335. 
37. ibid., p. 96. 
38. Quoted by C . R . Ageron, 1979, vol. 2, p. 553. 
39. S. Vacono, 1974, p. 52. 
40. D . Grange, 1974 and 1976; J. Bessis, 1981, p. 403. 
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Charter. They relied on the positions taken by the great powers and 
interpreted their statements as meaning the emancipation of the colonial 
peoples. 
Britain and France manoeuvered to retain their basic positions but the 
nationalists took advantage of the conditions created by the war to achieve 
their objectives. 
Anglo-Egyptian difficulties derived from the 1936 treaty which Britain 
demanded should be applied. T h e Egyptian governments and opposition 
parties affirmed the principle of non-belligerence and sought to modify 
the treaty or even secure independence. In 1940, parliamentary circles 
demanded, immediately, substantial amendments to the treaty and the 
status of foreigners. T h e demands formulated by the Wafd in a m e m -
orandum handed to Sir Miles L a m p s o n and dated 1 April 1940 were 
even more radical.41 
T h e Libyan emigres in Egypt organized a debate on the fate of their 
country after the end of the conflict (conferences in Alexandria on 23 
October 1939 and Cairo on 9 August 1940). Assurances were sought from 
the British by Idrls on the future independence of Libya. Anthony Eden's 
statement was circumspect about the future, simply promising that the 
SanusT in Cyrenaica would in no circumstances come under Italian rule 
again. 
T h e French positions in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were less 
conciliatory. In the three countries, the pre-war crises resumed and were 
aggravated by a greater radicalization of demands. O n 11 January 1944, 
the Moroccan sultan, encouraged by his meeting with Roosevelt in 1943 
at Anpa , received, at the same time as the resident-general and the 
consuls-general of the United States and Britain, the 'Manifesto of the 
Istiklal Party' signed by 58 representatives. It condemned the protectorate 
regime unreservedly and called for the 'complete national independence 
of Morocco under the auspices of His Majesty Sïdl M o h a m e d Ben Y u s u f 
and 'the introduction of a democratic regime comparable to the system 
of government adopted by the Muslims in the east, guaranteeing the 
rights of all sections and all classes of Moroccan society and setting out 
the rights of each and all'.4* In the towns, the slogan of independence 
mobilized the populations while the French representatives expressed 
their firm opposition. T h e situation deteriorated in the night of 28-9 
January during which A h m e d Balafredj and M . L . Yäzidi were arrested 
in Rabat, and A . Ben Idrls and H . Filäli in Fez. Incidents erupted in 
Rabat on 29 January and were put d o w n by troops; the town of Fez was 
put under a state of siege at the beginning of February. T h e incidents 
continued all through the month, leaving at least forty dead and a hundred 
injured. 
41. M . Colombe, 1951, pp. 100-1. 
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T h e accession on 19 January 1942 of Bey Münsif transformed the 
beylicate into 'a symbol' of Tunisian nationalism and gave birth to 
'Monsifism'. In August 1942 Bey Münsif handed the resident-general for 
onward transmission to Vichy a m e m o r a n d u m in which he asked for major 
reforms, some of which affected the very structure of the protectorate. T h e 
attitude of Bey Münsif and the reforms that he wanted to secure led to 
the incident which brought him into conflict with Admiral Esteva on 12 
October 1942. Following a second incident in the Council of Ministers 
(30 December 1942), he formed a n e w ministry. For the first time since 
1882 a Tunisian ministry was formed without consultation with the 
resident-general. With his deposition (14 M a y 1943) and then his abdi-
cation (6 July), Münsif ceased to reign, Münsifism was born.43 T h e N e o -
Destur took up the baton, issuing a proclamation entitled 'For a Franco-
Tunisian bloc' and, in November 1944, drew up the 'Manifesto of the 
Tunisian Front' calling for internal self-government on a democratic basis 
and the formation of an assembly following a national consultation. 
In Algeria, the disappearance of the political parties created a favourable 
situation for Ferhat Abbas who , on 10 April 1941, sent Marshal Petain 
a m e m o r a n d u m entitled ' T h e Algeria of tomorrow'. T h e Anglo-American 
landing gave a new fillip to his action while at the same time enabling 
him to m a k e a serious shift in his political options. T h e first edition of 
the 'Manifesto of the Algerian People', dated 10 February 1945, was 
addressed to the United Nations and delivered to the governor-general. 
A second version, slightly toned d o w n , was officially delivered to Pey-
ronton on 31 March 1943. T h e essential principle of the right of the 
Algerian people to self-determination and the condemnation of colonialism 
was set out. T h e A d d e n d u m to the Manifesto called for the resurrection 
of the Algerian people through the formation of a 'democratic and liberal 
Algerian state' with 'a French right of oversight and military assistance 
from the Allies in the event of conflict'. Pending the end of hostilities, 
the A d d e n d u m suggested reforms that could be realized immediately. 
In the H o r n of Africa, after the military elimination of Italy, demands 
were addressed to Britain; these demands underwent changes in their 
form and content. Eritrea and Somalia were placed under military 
administration. In Ethiopia, the British also attempted to install a military 
administration for the duration of the war. Haile Selassie nevertheless 
succeeded in establishing his authority and safeguarding at least the formal 
independence of the country. 
In the Sudan, in 1942, the General Graduates' Congress submitted to 
the government a list of 12 social and political grievances, demanding, 
among other things, recognition of the right to self-determination for the 
Sudanese at the end of hostilities, the definition of a Sudanese nationality, 
the creation of a representative Sudanese body to be responsible for 
43. R . Le Toumeau, 1962, p. 105. 
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approving legislation for the country. T h e demands were rejected; the 
failure led to the formation of two groups in the Congress. T h e first led 
by the al-Ashikktf (the blood brothers) was m u c h the larger; it worked 
for a Sudanese government united with Egypt under the Egyptian crown. 
T h e second one, represented by the U m m a Party (People's Party), 
demanded independence in friendship with Britain and Egypt. T h e two 
parties rapidly came to depend on two religious figures. T h e U m m a 
Party lined up behind Sayyld l A b d al-Rahmän al-Mahdl and the Ansar 
Brotherhood, the heirs of the Mahdî and intransigent on total inde-
pendence. T h e Unionists were behind Sayyld 'All al-Mirghäni and the 
Khatmiyya brotherhood. 
In 1944, the Congress opposed the establishment of the Northern 
Consultative Council under the chairmanship of the governor-general with 
representation of the interests of the African and foreign communities. T h e 
members of the Congress feared that the exclusion of the south might 
mean that it was intended for separate independence or integration with 
Uganda. In addition, the Consultative Council, made up of officials and 
local chiefs, was considered to be unrepresentative and too dependent on 
the administration. 
The problems in 1945-6 
In every country, the Second World W a r caused an upheaval such that 
'the relations between the colonial powers and the colonies could no 
longer be after the peril what they had been before it'. T h e conflict had 
direct repercussions in the Horn and Libya where the Italian defeat made 
change possible. Elsewhere, the colonial powers, conscious of the power 
of nationalism, feared the loss of countries placed under their tutelage. 
They showed themselves ready to make alterations which must never-
theless be within the framework of their supremacy and their interests. 
T h e debate on the future status of Algeria and the neighbouring 
protectorates began in 1942; it was finally settled by the 1946 constitution. 
Nationalist activity resumed in the three Maghreb countries. In Morocco, 
where other political formations had come into being (Moroccan C o m -
munist Party, General Union of Confederated Trades Unions of Morocco, 
Democratic Independent Party), the Istikläl exercised a hegemony. It had, 
even more than before the war, the direct or indirect backing of Sultan 
Sïdï M o h a m e d Ben Yüsuf. O n 8 March 1945, it asked for the right for 
Morocco to sit in the United Nations and sent a report to the n e w 
resident-general, E . Labonne, without success. In August 1946, three of 
its representatives went to Paris where they held a press conference and 
made m a n y contacts. Labonne responded to the slogan of independence 
by economic and social reforms without calling the protectorate into 
question. 
In Tunisia the offensive began in June 1946 with the Kairouan incident, 
and the general strike launched at Sfax on 28 June by the U G T T . T h e 
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Tunisian National Front was formed on 10 August through the coming 
together of all the Tunisian parties including the Communist Party. O n 
23 August, a congress of the main political movements was broken up 
by the police to the cry of 'Independence, independence'. 
T h e most brutal confrontation was in Algeria where bloody 'incidents' 
erupted at Sétif on 8 M a y 1945. Demonstrations organized by the Friends 
of the Manifesto and Freedom turned into a riot, and repression continued 
over the following days causing a large number of deaths. In the short 
term, the events of 8 M a y 1945 led to a hardening of the attitudes of 
Europe and the French government, and to the radicalization of the 
nationalists. M a n y of them gave up any legal action to prepare for the 
armed struggle which seemed to them to be an inevitable outcome. 
In 1943-4, several French statements (declaration by the C F L N of 8 
December 1943, Constantine speech of 12 December 1943, Brazzaville 
conference of January-February 1944) held out the possibility of changes. 
Following the war, the 1946 constitution and the establishment of the 
French Union that it provided for in no way settled the question of 
relations between France and the Maghreb countries. 
T h e terminology used transformed the protectorates into associated 
states defined in Chapter 6. T h e y continued to be governed by 'the act 
that defines their relations with France' but they could however appoint 
representatives to the bodies of the French Union (High Council and 
Assembly). In fact, Tunisia and Morocco remained outside the French 
Union, retaining their status as protectorates without there being any 
revision of the treaties. 
T h e Constituent Assembly took no decision about Algeria; the National 
Assembly several times discussed proposals introduced by Algerian depu-
ties which rejected assimilation and demanded recognition of the Algerian 
personality in the framework either of an associated state or a republic 
or any other status which might be decided upon by an Algerian 
constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage. A H the proposals were 
set aside and the question of Algeria deferred to the following year. T h e 
law called the Algerian Statute, tabled by the government, was adopted 
on 20 September 1947. It defined the political and administrative situation 
of Algeria; its political stance ruled out any risk of autonomy and left 
control with the European minority.44 
T h e war had decisive consequences for Libya which was provisionally 
administered by the British and the French before international organ-
izations took up the 'Libyan question'.45 
T h e G e r m a n and Italian defeat enabled the British and French to 
divide up the administration of the country: Cyrenaica and Tripolitania 
were entrusted to the British, the Fezzän to the French. A military 
44. T . Chenntouf, 1969, p. 141. 
45. P. Pichón, 1945, p. 318. 
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occupation regime was established but the U S S R put forward a demand 
asserting its right to a share in the division of the former Italian colonies 
or at least their joint administration by the Allies. T h e Allies were unable 
to agree, so the question of Libya had to be put to the United Nations 
a year after the coming into effect of the treaty by which Italy renounced 
all its colonies. In principle, the U N had to pronounce by 15 September 
1948. 
Egyptian nationalism ran up against the position of Britain which 
nevertheless favoured the creation of the Arab League in the region.46 
T h e time seemed to have c o m e to obtain the complete independence 
of the country from Britain. T h e opposition parties did not wait for the 
end of hostilities to call on the government to take action. In July 
1945, the Wafd gave the British ambassador a m e m o r a n d u m on Egypt's 
aspirations. Five months later, the Nokrashi Pasha government asked for 
the opening of negotiations. T h e y were supported by the students and 
the press which were more radical (popular demonstrations in Cairo and 
Alexandria). 
T h e Anglo-Egyptian talks led to a draft treaty in October 1946. It 
marked the extreme limits of British concessions but was very ill-received 
in Egypt where there were demonstrations and new clashes in Cairo. O n 
27 January 1947, Nokrashi Pasha, w h o was not in a position to impose 
the treaty on the country, decided to break off the talks with London and 
take the Egyptian question to the United Nations. 
The creation of the Arab League 
Despite this setback, Egypt played a central role in the creation of the 
Arab League. T h e desire for the unity of the Arab countries went back 
to the end of the First World W a r , it was voiced in the late 1930s and 
then again after 1942 with the encouragement of the British. Britain's 
aims and the Arabs' aims were different and two successive drafts were 
supported by Britain before the draft backed by Egypt was adopted. After 
the Alexandria Conference (25 September-10 October 1944), the charter 
of the Arab League was signed on 22 March 1945 at the end of the Cairo 
Conference by Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia 
and Y e m e n . A n y n e w independent Arab state had the right to join; 
the Palestinians were represented by M ü s ä 'Alami. T h e principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference were reaffirmed and decisions taken by 
a majority bound only those states that accepted them. Cairo was m a d e 
the headquarters of the League and its first secretary-general was an 
Egyptian theorist of Arab unity. 
In the Horn of Africa, the consequences of the Italian defeat were the 
restoration of Ethiopian independence and resumption, with American 
aid, of the policy of modernization. In the Sudan, once again, the question 
46. Documentation française, 1947. 
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of relations with Egypt dominated political life, while in Somaliland a 
nationalism transcending territorial and political fragmentation emerged. 
Political demands were relaunched in the Sudan in 1946 on the occasion 
of Anglo-Egyptian talks for a review of the 1936 treaty. T h e two parties 
attempted a c o m m o n approach and sent a delegation to meet the Egyptian 
government to discuss a programme for a democratic Sudanese govern-
ment, united with Egypt and allied to Britain. After the negative response 
given to Egypt, the representatives of the U m m a Party left the country. 
Britain, which hoped to maintain a military and economic presence in 
the Sudan, encouraged Sudanese self-government. T h e 1948 constitution 
was drawn up; it provided for a legislative assembly elected by universal 
suffrage and an executive council with Sudanese ministers. T h e U m m a 
Party participated in the policy of self-government for the Sudan while 
the 'Ashikkä' Party boycotted the elections. Riots which it organized in 
the large towns were put d o w n and its leader, Ismail el-Azhari was 
arrested. T h e U m m a Party controlled the legislative assembly and enjoyed 
a majority in the executive council. However, by retaining the right of 
veto and a number of reserved matters, the governor-general kept close 
control of the political system. 
In 1945, Ethiopia recovered its position as the sole independent African 
state. T h e resumption of the policy of modernization barely concealed a 
difficult economic and political situation. T h e country, which had 20 
million inhabitants after the war, had a poor economic situation. Average 
national income in 1957 was U S $ 3 0 according to United Nations statistics. 
T h e population was overwhelmingly rural and agriculture accounted for 
75 per cent of production. Such progress as was recorded was in geological 
prospecting and hydro-electricity; processing industries like cement works 
grew rapidly. In the field of education, right after the war, new secondary 
schools opened in Addis Ababa with syllabuses and a teaching body based 
on the European model. Young Ethiopians were sent abroad to continue 
their studies. 
T h e question of Eritrea remained in suspense until 1952. It was placed 
under British administration during and after the war. Its final fate was 
the object of several proposals at the United Nations but the region was 
integrated into Ethiopia with a large degree of autonomy through a federal 
arrangement. 
T h e problem of territorial and political unity was even more acute in 
Somaliland. In 1946, the population was split between the northern 
province of Kenya, the provinces of the H a u d and Ogaden in Ethiopia 
and French, Italian and British Somaliland. 
T h e French Somali Coast became, after the elections, an overseas 
territory with a local assembly and parliamentary representation in Paris. 
T h e rest of Somaliland was administered by Britain. T h e Somali Youth 
League, formed after the war, drew its support from the towns. It called 
for the creation of a Greater Somalia which would embrace Italian 
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Somaliland, the Ogaden in Ethiopia, British Somaliland and French 
Somaliland. T h e proposal was supported by Britain but declined rapidly 
because of the attitude of the United Nations. 
In the genesis of contemporary Africa, the crises and changes of the 
ten years between 1935 and 1945 were decisive; their consequences in 
some cases are still with us today. In a long perspective, two basic features 
of contemporary Africa became increasingly apparent during the decade: 
underdevelopment and nationalism. T h e pre-war and war years were in 
no way the starting point either of underdevelopment or of nationalism, 
whose origins are older and more complex, but both became apparent 
and the processes forming them accelerated. 
57 
Tropical and equatorial 
Africa under French, 
Portuguese and Spanish 
domination, 1935-45 
M a j h e m o u t D I O P in collaboration with 
David B I R M I N G H A M , Ivan H R B E K , 
Alfredo M A R G A R I D O and 
Djibril Tamsir NI A N E 
Introduction 
Tropical and equatorial Africa under French, Portuguese and Spanish 
domination stretched from the Cape Verde Islands in the Atlantic to 
Mozambique in the Indian Ocean. T h e French colonies formed a con-
tinuous block surrounding various British enclaves of greater or lesser 
size. T h e Portuguese colonies included three pieces of territory on the 
continent and two archipelagos, all far distant from one another. T h e 
southern Spanish colony of the area linked the mainland Rio M u n i and 
the insular Fernando Poo, while the northern one controlled the Sanaran 
coast. 
T h e period between 1935 and 1945 has been called 'the golden age of 
colonization' and looked upon as the zenith of the colonial era, but these 
descriptions give a false impression of the real situation and this alleged 
'golden age' ended during the great economic crisis of the 1930s.1 W h a t 
is closer to the truth is that the years 1935 to 1945 constituted 'the golden 
decade' of right-wing extremism in Europe. These were the years of the 
triumph and subsequent collapse of fascist ambition. T h e colonies of four 
European imperial powers were profoundly affected by these fascist trends 
in the core but in very complex ways. T h e empires of Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and France experienced the traumas of Europe at war with itself -
but Africa was not a passive sufferer. 
A s indicated elsewhere in this volume, fascism in Italy resulted in the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia and Africa's resistance to that aggression 
(1935-41). However, it is to the empires of Portugal, Spain and France 
that this chapter addresses itself. 
Spain experienced in the mid-i930s a deeply divisive civil war. Portugal 
1. 'Everywhere, colonialism is in open crisis', as A . Sarraut wrote (1931, p. 219), quoted 
by J. Suret-Canale, 1964, p. 567. 
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consolidated in this period a fascist political order which was to endure 
from the rise of Salazar in 1932 until D e Spinola's military coup in 
Lisbon in 1974. France was occupied by a Nazi power in 1940 and the 
Vichy regime collaborated with fascism until France was liberated in 
1944. 
This chapter is partly about the nature of European imperialism in 
'the golden decade' of European fascism. H o w were the empires of 
Portugal, France and Spain aifected by the forces of right-wing extremism 
from 1935 to 1945? 
In Portugal a right-wing dictatorship was stabilized in this period. It 
aggravated what was already a particularly repressive colonial policy. T h e 
divided trauma of France under the Vichy regime created fluctuating 
allegiances in the African empire. T h e triumph of General Franco in 
Spain changed Spanish colonial policy in Africa from a policy of neglect 
(under the monarchy) to a more vicious form of exploitation. T h e racist 
factor in Spanish imperialism became more pronounced after the Spanish 
civil war. 
This chapter hopes to demonstrate that the fascist decade of 1935-45 
had a greater impact on African nationalism than on the nature of 
European imperialism. While the colonial policies of France and the 
Iberian peninsula did change for the worse under fascist rulers like 
Salazar, Franco and the Vichy regime, the bigger change was in Africa's 
response to those policies. The decade of 1935-45 was a greater turning 
point in the history of African liberation than in the history of European 
imperialism. T h e fascist era was just a n e w paragraph in the story of 
Europe's empires; but the same decade inaugurated a whole n e w chapter 
in the annals of African nationalism. 
But what was the nature of Africa's response to the fascist and imperial 
trends in this particular era? Africa's resistance had varied manifestations -
political, military, economic and cultural. Politically, the decade 1935-45 
witnessed the rise of modern nationalism, the emergence of new levels 
of political awareness, the beginnings of m o d e r n political organizations 
and the birth of such nationalist newspapers as Courrier du Golfe du Bénin. 
Militarily, Africans participated as soldiers against the fascist dictators 
of Europe - though as colonial subjects, Africans were often exploited by 
both sides in European conflicts. There were times w h e n Africans armed 
themselves against their o w n colonial masters as well. 
Culturally, African resistance had religious manifestations from time to 
time. W e shall later illustrate this religious tendency with the case of the 
Mourides in Senegal and the role of the followers of Shavkh Hamahülläh 
in the Sahel region. Both movements began in an earlier period but they 
expanded in the decade 1935-45. 
Islam was not the only religion which provided an African response to 
the era of fascism. Christianity and African traditional religion were 
also politicized from time to time. Particularly noteworthy was the 
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'androgynous' nature of indigenous creeds. Both priests and priestesses 
emerged to meet the pressures of social change. Under the economic 
difficulties of this fascist decade, the Joola (Dyola, Jola, Diola) of Basse-
Casamance were briefly led by the priestess, Aline Sitoé, in a rebellion 
against the colonial order: yet again, African culture was provoked to 
meet the challenge of imperial injustice. W e shall return to Aline Sitoé's 
rebellion later in the chapter. 
A s for Africa's economic resistance, this included the birth of modern 
trades unions and cooperative movements and Africa's insistence on a 
fairer share of the output of its o w n emerging economies. 
T h e Second World W a r was particularly relevant as a catalyst of 
fundamental change. T h e Africa which emerged from the conflict was 
quite different from the mirage of tranquillity seen by the colonizers. 
F r o m that perspective, the decade 1935-45 corresponded not to the zenith 
of colonialism but to the beginning of its decline. 
But what was the nature of colonial rule during this period? H o w were 
the different European empires organized? W h a t was the structure of 
imperialism? It is to these basic questions that w e must first turn. 
French colonial policy 
T h e French possessions in this period were grouped into two federations 
of colonies and two mandated territories. French West Africa, with an 
area of 4 633 985 sq k m included Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), 
French Guinea, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Côte d'Ivoire, D a h o m e y 
(now Benin), Niger and Mauritania; the federal capital was Dakar. French 
Equatorial Africa covered 2510000 sq k m with Brazzaville as its capital, 
and embraced the colonies of the Middle Congo (now Congo), Chad , 
Ubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic) and Gabon. T h e two 
mandated territories were Cameroon (432000 sq k m ) and Togo (57000 
sq k m ) ; these were possessions taken from Germany at the end of the 
First World W a r , divided between Britain and France, and placed under 
a mandate of the League of Nations. 
T h e French colonial system was based on centralized direct admin-
istration. At the head of each group of territories was a governor-general, 
representing the minister for the colonies; the mandated territories were 
administered by a high commissioner of the Republic. Unlike the colonies, 
these latter were not liable to conscription and France was obliged to 
submit an annual report on its administration to the League of Nations. 
For m u c h of this decade, the governors-general and the high c o m -
missioners governed by orders that they issued on their o w n initiative or 
to give force to decrees issued by the president of the French Republic; 
they were assisted by a Council of Government that was purely advisory. 
T h e other members of this Council were senior officials w h o were directly 
dependent on the governor-general or high commissioner and were close 
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collaborators, such as the secretary-general w h o acted for the governor 
w h e n he was absent, the officer commanding the colonial troops, the 
public prosecutor and the directors-general of federal departments 
(finance, health, education). T h e governor-general had very wide powers: 
' N o law or decree emanating from Paris, even one adopted especially for 
the group of colonies involved, could come into force until it had been 
promulgated by order of the Governor-General'.2 H e not only had 
complete control of the administration, but was also the supreme c o m -
mander of the army. H e m a d e appointments and dismissals as he wished. 
H e was truly a proconsul. 
In Dakar, Brazzaville, L o m é and Yaounde, the governors-general and 
high commissioners were assisted by a series of bureaux carrying out 
general services. T h e most important ones were the Directorates of 
Political Affairs, Finance, Public Works , Education, Economic Affairs and 
Health. These departments enabled the governor-general to keep an eye 
on the administrative life of the colonies. Equatorial Africa, with only 
four territories and fewer means of communication, tended to be treated 
as a single colony. Quite often, the governor-general also acted as governor 
of the Middle Congo; he appointed delegates or senior commandants to 
G a b o n , Chad and Ubangui-Chari. 
At the head of each colony, there was a lieutenant-governor under 
the orders of the governor-general. H e was assisted by a Council of 
Administration similar to the Council of Government. H e was the head 
of the administration of the colony which included the specialized 
departments corresponding to the federal departments. Within the 
country, he had under him administrative officers known as commandants 
de cercle, or district officers, as each colony was divided into a varying 
number of territorial units k n o w n as circonscriptions or cercles; West Africa 
had about 100 and Equatorial Africa about 50. In Cameroon and Togo, 
the territory was divided into 60 to 70 and ten circonscriptions respectively.3 
T h e administration was linked at the bottom of the ladder to cantonal 
and village chiefs. In theory, it was former ruling families that performed 
these functions, but in reality chiefs were mere auxiliaries whose job it 
was to carry out the orders of the commandant de cercle and they were 
not always chosen from the relevant ruling families. Before 1914, the 
theoreticians of colonization had thought they could set up a network of 
officials at all levels, thus eliminating indigenous village intermediaries. 
This project was abandoned when posts were closed during the war.4 
2. J. Suret-Canale, 1964, p. 388. 
3. T h e name cercles prevailed in A O F (French West Africa) and Togo while in 1934 
the 49 circonscriptions in A E F (French Equatorial Africa) were reduced to 20 and named 
départements; in Cameroon, the territory was divided into 15-20 regions including 60-^70 
sub-divisions. J. Suret-Canale, 1964, p. 391. 
4. ibid., p. 392. 
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T h e bureaucracy absorbed the majority of colonial administrators and, 
instead of serving in the field, they filled offices in the towns. In 1937, 
over half the 385 administrators were serving in towns. Bureaucratization 
spread to the districts and, instead of going on tour, administrators spent 
their time writing reports. Early administrators had been concerned to 
k n o w 'their' country and even to write books. After the First World W a r , 
administrators were trained in the 'Ecole coloniale' and given a theoretical 
education. T h e result was fewer specialists and more interchangeable 
bureaucrats 'applying the same principles to Agades as to Sassandra 
without bothering about local reality'.5 
T h e commandant de cercle was the principal representative of colonial 
power known to Africans. H e was the local despot in a despotic system. 
H e was at one and the same time the political chief, the administrative 
chief, the police chief, the chief prosecutor and the president of the 
indigenous court. H e set the head tax, he controlled duties and levies, he 
demanded forced labour, he extracted export crops, he mobilized people 
for compulsory work and he imposed military service. H e was judged for 
the profits he obtained for Europe and not for the services he offered to 
Africans. His concern was not to minister to the needs of the indigenous 
people but on the contrary to watch over the interests of chambers of 
commerce and large enterprises which could impose unorthodox methods 
on governors and administrators. 
A n administration that takes no account of the interests of its population 
m a y be liable to succumb to political oppression. T h e commandant de 
cercle and the canton chief caused profound traumas in rural areas. 
Collecting head taxes, recruiting soldiers and levying forced labour caused 
devastation in the countryside. Village chiefs became puppets and then 
the ruthless agents of exploitation. If they failed to levy tax, they were 
removed and imprisoned. If they were successful in colonial terms they 
were detested by the peasants w h o were their o w n people. 
T h e advent of the French Popular Front government in June 1936 
altered little in the colonial system. W h e n confronted with strong right-
wing tendencies all around, the socialist government did proclaim the 
need 'to extract the m a x i m u m social justice and h u m a n potential from 
the colonial system'.6 It recommended a few reforms but failed to provide 
the means to carry them out. B y the time the Popular Front fell, its 
modest reforming ideas had evoked no response in colonial Africa. 
T h e fundamentally dirigiste structure of colonial administration devised 
a system of consultation which, although democratic in outward appear-
ance, largely served to disguise its authoritarianism. T h e democratic 
system of communes mixtes (mixed communes) , communes indigènes (native 
5. ibid., p. 394. 
6. Minister for the Colonies, Marius Moutet, undated note, Archives nationales de 
France, Section Outre-mer, Aff. polit. P A 2 8 / 1 / . 
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communes) , conseils de notables indigènes (councils of native elders) and 
also the four urban c o m m u n e s of Senegal were systematically manipulated 
by the administration. Only a tiny minority of the population took part 
in consultations. T h e n u m b e r of electors in the famous c o m m u n e s of 
Senegal (Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque) barely exceeded 10 000. 
In rural areas the council of elders prepared census campaigns and 
collected head tax by authority of the government and not as rep-
resentatives of the people. 
Portuguese colonial policy 
Colonial policy in Portugal changed in 1930 while Antonio Salazar, the 
financial adviser to the military regime which had overthrown the liberal 
republic in 1926, was Minister for Colonial Affairs. O n e major step 
towards creating a semi-fascist civilian dictatorship called the ' N e w State' 
was to subordinate the economic interests of the colonies to the interests 
of Portugal itself. T h e crisis of the world depression and the loss of 
remittance from the overseas Portuguese in the Americas was partly met 
by a severe pruning of government services at h o m e and partly by 
imposing a harsh new policy of wealth extraction from Africa. Neither 
the state nor private enterprise had resources to invest in Africa so that 
colonial exploitation was based on the simplest but hardest policies of 
forced labour, compulsory crop taxes and the sale of migrant-worker 
contracts to South Africa. Lisbon determined the overall conduct of 
colonial policy. T h e system was similar to the French one, with an 
administrative hierarchy from the governor-general d o w n to the district 
heads, all subject to the laws and instructions decided on by the Lisbon 
government and endowed with powers similar to those of their French 
counterparts. Portuguese 'fascism', being autocratic and anti-democratic 
at h o m e , further strengthened the draconian methods in the colonies. 
Even before the fascist era, Portugal had commonly pursued a policy 
of segregation in Africa, especially after 1910, in which Africans were 
relegated to the bottom of the social hierarchy. A s in the French areas, 
the local people had few rights and were liable to a forced labour regime 
which was almost a continuation of slavery. T h e Portuguese colonies 
were particularly marked by a lack of innovation and intensification of 
exploitation. Outside the capitals of Bissau, Luanda and Lourenço 
Marques and a few other towns where some industrial development 
occurred, the hinterlands remained the main areas of extortion of labour 
recruitment, partly through the white merchants w h o bought peasant 
crops. 
T h e decade 1935-45 w a s thus marked in the Portuguese colonies by 
the economic crisis, by the hardening of the fascist regime and also by 
the Second World W a r . 
In the Cape Verde Islands, the repercussions of the Great Depression 
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took the form of the return of several thousand migrant workers, repatri-
ated by the U S A . T h e newcomers brought to the country the money 
they had saved in the N e w World. However, the archipelago was too 
poor and m a n y Cape Verdeans had once again to take the road into exile, 
their preference naturally being for the countries of Latin America, until 
such time as they could settle in the United States. Shortly before the 
beginning of the Second World W a r , following the drought which struck 
the islands, a current of migration began towards Dakar where the Cape 
Verdeans took jobs as shoe-repairers, scrap-dealers and barbers while the 
w o m e n became housemaids. A new drought in 1941-2 led to the death 
of 20000 people, out of a population of 180000. During this time, the 
Cape Verdeans were soon m a d e aware that they were not fully-fledged 
Portuguese, even though their country was not treated as a colony under 
the indigenat system. In the Portuguese army, they could not even be 
appointed corporal, despite the regulations. This army was stationed on 
the islands during the war and although it had large food stocks, did 
nothing to help the starving, w h o died with no help of any sort. A n 
ironical detail is that the construction of a concentration camp for the 
enemies of the Salazar regime at Tarrafal after 1936 provided employment 
to a good m a n y of the inhabitants. Nevertheless, their situation as 
Portuguese citizens, as well as their relatively high educational level, 
enabled Cape Verdeans to look for jobs in Portuguese Guinea and Angola, 
where some later played a special role in the liberation struggle. 
T h e Cinderella of the Portuguese colonies during this decade, Guinea, 
recorded little progress. T h e export of groundnuts grown by small farmers 
rose only slowly because of continual soil erosion. O n the other hand, 
the attempts to introduce forced labour were undermined by the flight 
of people to Senegal and French Guinea. T h e influence of Cape Verde — 
always more important than that of Portugal - showed in the emigration 
of Cape Verdeans not only as auxiliary servants of the administration but 
also as small farmers or craftsmen. 
In the Portuguese colonial system, the islands of Sao T o m e and Principe 
were the supreme example of plantation colonies; most of the cultivated 
lands belonged to some 30 companies and the colonial administration was 
simply their instrument, being concerned mainly with securing the 
necessary manpower. This problem was aggravated under fascist con-
ditions. T h e local population having no inclination to work on the 
plantations, labour had to be imported from Angola and other colonies, 
but with declining success: between 1920 and 1940, their numbers fell 
from 40000 to 30000. At the same time, the natural fertility of the 
formerly productive soils fell too, the result being a remarkable fall in 
cocoa exports, followed by the loss of the islands' special position on the 
world market for this product. It was a fine illustration of the inefficiency 
of the Portuguese regime. 
There was a similar situation in Angola and Mozambique: the fall in 
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the prices of colonial products was deeply felt by all, particularly by the 
African smallholders, but also by the big planters. Portugal under Salazar 
lacked the means to develop the economy: it left investments to big 
companies with supranational capital, especially in mineral exploitation. 
In Mozambique , the bulk of the income was derived from the manpower 
sent each year in tens of thousands to South Africa to work in the gold-
mines of the R a n d . 
T h e situation of colonial domination did not give Africans the least 
possibility of escaping the twin control of the administration and the 
settlers, w h o acted as one against the indigenous peoples. A s early as 
1933, the Minister for the Colonies, A r m a n d o Monteiro, had stressed the 
social importance of the colonies by suggesting that m u c h of the u n e m -
ployed white proletariat of Europe be m o v e d to Africa to save Europe 
from labour unrest, and, at the same time, to ensure the 'whitening' of 
Portuguese Africa. It was fascist philosophy with a n e w face. 
But this policy of immigration was hampered by the poverty of the 
settlers w h o had neither technical skills nor capital. They could only 
survive through the out-and-out exploitation of the indigenous peoples. 
T h u s it was that they came to occupy the lowliest jobs, blocking Africans 
from access to offices, the administration and even factories. T h e colonial 
situation thus put u p a powerful technical barrier between Africans and 
Europeans which strengthened and justified the colour bar. 
T o better secure its domination, the Salazar regime had to find allies. 
In 1939, the missionary agreement with the Vatican m a d e possible the 
establishment of a missionary concordat in 1940: this m a d e the Catholic 
missions an arm of the state in the education of the African population. 
T h e activities of the missions had no major or serious effects in Sao 
T o m e and Principe and Cape Verde, but led to constant difficulties in 
Guinea where tradition, strengthened by the strong presence of Islam, 
resisted the attempt to 'Catholicize' the colony. T h e missions received 
some grants from the state, but the task that they had to perform -
providing a minimal schooling — had to be paid for with the pennies 
obtained from believers. 
Spanish colonial policy 
In the Spanish colonies, the situation was scarcely more enlightened than 
in the Portuguese ones. Spain had no colonial policy adapted to tropical 
African territories. T h e old royal administration had long given preference 
to C u b a and later to Morocco. Before the Spanish civil war, equatorial 
Africa had no autonomous administrative existence and so lacked any 
political orientation of its o w n . T h e old monarchy's Africa policy was 
based on, at best, benign neglect. 
T h e situation of the various parts of Spanish Guinea varied, given that 
the islands of Fernando Poo practised an essentially export-oriented 
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agriculture, while mainland Rio M u n i (now Equatorial Guinea) produced 
tropical woods. Agricultural policy in Fernando Poo led to the estab-
lishment of cocoa plantations - inspired by Portuguese colonization in 
Sao T o m e - but was hampered by the refusal of the indigenous Bubi to 
work in them. Agricultural activity therefore depended on imported 
labour. After a 1930 scandal, and intervention by the League of Nations, 
the traffic in K r u workers from Liberia - a disguised form of slavery — 
was restricted and ultimately halted. 
During the civil war in Spain, the Republican government and Franco's 
fascist insurgents confronted each other both in the Sahara and in Rio 
M u n i . Once he had w o n power, Franco did make some budgetary changes 
in the administration of the colonies, thus giving Equatorial Guinea and 
Spanish Sahara financial autonomy. T h e Franco regime showed more 
interest in Guinea, leading to investment designed to extract profit from 
the colony and the imposition of a more oppressive and racist regime. 
T h e Spanish version of fascism was taking its toll in the colonies. 
The Second World War 
T h e Second World W a r broke the silence which shrouded colonial policy 
in the 1930s and threw Africa into a new turmoil. It accelerated the 
evolution of changing attitudes. It saw in particular the emergence of n e w 
policies in French Africa. Portuguese and Spanish domains came less to 
the fore since the Iberian peninsula did not participate directly. 
French subjects in the colonies again became liable to recruitment and 
conscription. France had had a long tradition of using black troops, and 
during the First World W a r , African soldiers had fought alongside France 
on every front. After 1930, 15000 m e n were recruited annually into the 
'Tirailleurs sénégalais', a n a m e used to describe all black soldiers in the 
French possessions whatever their origin. In 1939-40, an 80000-strong 
contingent was sent to France and, between 1943 and 1945, another 
100 000 crossed the sea to fight in Italy and beyond. This war effort was 
not limited to supplying soldiers. Black Africa had also to provide raw 
materials and staple foods secured from local populations in sometimes 
dramatic circumstances. 
France in Africa was divided by the war. T h e armistice of 22 June 
1940 ended the Third Republic. O n its ruins, a fascist-type state was 
formed in Vichy headed by Marshal Pétain in collaboration with the 
Germans. His rival, General Charles de Gaulle, launched an appeal to 
continue the war alongside Great Britain under the n a m e 'Free France'. 
It was precisely in black Africa that the confrontation between the Vichy 
regime and Free France took its most acute forms. West Africa and 
Governor-General Boisson declared loyalty to Vichy, while equatorial 
Africa, after m u c h hovering, gradually sided with Félix Eboué. H e was 
a black administrator from French Guiana and Governor of Chad. H e 
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announced his support for General de Gaulle, and gained support in 
Cameroon, the Congo and Ubangui-Chari. G a b o n reversed its initial 
solidarity and was reconquered by Colonel Leclerc in a conflict between 
Vichyites and Gaullists. British and Gaullist attempts to seize Dakar 
failed and equatorial Africa became the main territorial base of Free 
France with Eboué as governor-general. 
Neither of the French confederations prospered with the war effort. 
Restrictions cut them off from the centre, and the colonies received 
almost no manufactured goods except through a black market. In rural 
farming areas, peasants were forced to supply grains. In forest areas, 
it was the demand for rubber which desolated the countryside. Since 
hevea trees were not grown, people were obliged to go deep into 
the bush to seek vine-rubber. M a n y died victims of snakes and dis-
eases. Meanwhile in the towns, ration cards were issued to Europeans 
and acculturated blacks 'living in the European manner'. Consumer 
goods came occasionally from neighbouring British colonies. Discrimi-
nation affected producers as well, and Africans were paid 2.6 francs per 
kg for their cocoa, while Europeans received 4.5 francs. Furthermore, 
whites were exempt from forced labour while whole black villages could 
be requisitioned to work at road-repairing or on the white-owned planta-
tions. 
By way of example, here are the obligations falling on an administrative 
circle in Guinea: 
T h e circle at present supplies: 490 labourers for the Conakry-Niger 
railway line; 80 labourers for the Baro plantation (Kankan circle); 80 
labourers for the Delsol plantation; 15 labourers for the African 
banana plantation; 40 labourers for the Linkey banana plantations; 
200 labourers for the Kankan public works; 100 labourers for 
charcoal-burning at Conakry; 100 labourers for road-repair work; 
making a total of 1105 workers. This is a heavy burden on the circle; 
there are m a n y desertions, for the natives of the circle object to 
working for others even when paid and fed [sic], hence there are 
frequent complaints by the Conakry-Niger Railway C o m p a n y and 
the planters. All deserters caught are sent to the court of first instance 
(Article 28 of the native penal code).7 
In 1942, such extractions caused the Joola in Basse-Casamance to rebel. 
They were led by the priestess Aline Sitoé w h o protested that the 
commandant's agents were demanding from the peasants more rice than 
they actually produced. Troops were sent and several Joola were killed. 
Aline Sitoé was exiled to Timbuktu with her principal aides. She 
subsequently 'died' there.8 Here, as elsewhere, production fell. M a n p o w e r 
7. Archives de Kouroussa (Guinea), Rapport politique de 25 août 1942, quoted in 
J. Suret-Canale, 1964, pp. 580-1. 
8. L . V . Thomas , 1958, vol. I, p. 22 et seq. 
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was scarce because of recruitment and conscription and people fled to 
neighbouring British and Portuguese colonies to seek refuge from the 
agents of French colonization. 
In Senegal, groundnut exports, which had reached 580000 tonnes on 
the eve of the war, fell to 174000 tonnes in 1941. Navetane, seasonal 
workers, had to be recruited in neighbouring French Guinea and French 
Sudan for production to rise to 429000 tonnes in 1945.9 T h e war had 
one fortunate side-effect on Senegal. This was the creation of a vegetable-
oil factory as the prelude to modern industrialization. T h e French firm 
Lesieur obtained permission to build the oil works in Dakar and produced 
40000 tonnes in 1941. T h e government received requests from other 
industrialists for permission to open factories and, despite conservatism 
and red-tape, the ball was set rolling towards a new economic self-reliance. 
T h u s , 'in spite of opposition by French industrialists, oil works developed 
in Senegal as a result of the shortage of fats inherent in the state of war 
and because of lack of transport'.10 In the wetter countries along the coast 
some exports, such as bananas, collapsed while others, such as coffee and 
cotton, thrived. T h e purchasing power of Africans, however, was reduced 
by extremely low export prices and by high import prices. 
Economic exploifation was accompanied in West Africa by a stiffening 
of colonial policy. T h e fascist-oriented Vichy regime suppressed all 
'representative'-type institutions - the Colonial Council, the municipal 
councils, political parties, trades unions and representation in the French 
National Assembly. T h e penal code was m a d e more repressive. T h e fascist 
regime also introduced n e w racist measures hitherto not witnessed. There 
were different rations for Africans and Europeans, different coaches for 
black travellers and white, even different prices according to one's racial 
category. 
Political and social situation 
During the decade 1935-45, there were, if not changes, at least signs 
heralding upheaval. T h e lethargy that marked the economy of the 
Portuguese and Spanish colonies went hand-in-hand with social con-
servatism. Social structures were hardly changed; urban life, the harbinger 
of change, was practically non-existent in the small territories. Bissau or 
L a Praya were little more than big villages where old colonial quarters 
with a few whites or mixed-race people lived apart. Lourenço Marques 
and Luanda were quite different, but the thriving African urban life of 
the previous generation was muted. T h e rural areas had the highest level 
of colonial labour exploitation and produce extraction in almost the whole 
of Africa, but drew no benefit from it. In the islands of Sao T o m e and 
9. J. Suret-Canale, 1964, p. 592. 
10. J. Fouquet, 1958, p. 125, quoted by J. Suret Canale, 1964, p. 594. 
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Fernando Poo, large plantations brought immigrant workers from the 
mainland under a system that did not disturb the order established by 
the colonizer. 
In the French possessions, the signs of change were more perceptible. 
Even though the Popular Front government was short-lived and there 
was nothing radical about its colonial policy, it is nevertheless true that 
the coming to power of the socialists did have some effect on the life of 
the colonies. In the major towns like Dakar, Brazzaville or Cotonou, 
urban life experienced a degree of animation thanks to the évolués and 
the trades unions which had been legalized from 11 M a y 1937. While 
one cannot properly speak of a bourgeoisie in Senegal, traders, civil 
servants and a few rich merchants formed a category which was interested 
in the life of the colony. T h e workers there were numerous and organized 
enough to launch the railway workers' strike at Thiès in 1938. 
U p to 1939, the rural areas lived the traditional patriarchal life without 
any great change; but everywhere the war effort tore aside the veil. A 
slow population drift began towards the major towns and capitals. 
Everywhere, this effort m a d e the canton chiefs and commandants de cercle 
objects of hatred; the former were n o w perceived as wicked agents of 
colonialism. Thus m a n y chiefly families were discredited, and the colonial 
authorities were forced to dismiss or even imprison chiefs w h o had lost 
influence and prestige in the eyes of their people. T h e calling into question 
of the traditional structures was initiated under cover of complaints 
against chiefs; the appearance of political leaders was to hasten this 
process. 
T h e origins of some of the armed African resistance to French 
domination in this decade went back a long time. In the 1930s, the 
Moorish kablla continued to send raiding parties {ghazvpa) against the 
French forts and establishments in Mauritania. A s if to make the point, 
the Rikaybât (Reguibat) launched attacks in 1931-3 and terrified the 
French, w h o were defeated at Kuntusi. It was only in 1935 that motorized 
troops from the Maghreb occupied Tindouf, the last point still unsubdued, 
thus making the first land link between Morocco and West Africa." 
In colonial Africa, the colonial peace and growth of trade favoured -
against the colonizers' wishes - the expansion of Islam, at the same time 
as the missionaries were spreading Christianity. T w o Islamic movements 
deserve special attention - Mouridism in Senegal and Hamallism in 
French Sudan - even though they had their roots in the previous period. 
Mouridism linked to the Kädirlyya in Morocco was founded towards 
the end of the nineteenth century in Senegal by Shavkh A m a d u B a m b a , 
w h o was twice deported, once to G a b o n (1895-1902) and once to 
Mauritania (1902-7). H e was mainly active in Wolof country in Senegal, 
which was deeply affected by the upheavals of the conquest and the long 
11. J. Suret-Canale, 1964, p. 530. 
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European presence. T h e founder was non-violent; without challenging 
the colonial regime, his doctrine demanded from his disciples absolute 
obedience to the leader and those mandated by him. T h u s , a chain was 
established - a strict hierarchy; peasants and others living in the rural 
areas found patriarchal protection against the settlers w h o had replaced 
the traditional chiefs. A m a d u B a m b a asserted the sanctity of the labour 
of the believer in the service of the marabout. T h e authorities finally 
recognized that Mouridism was inoffensive. After A m a d u Bamba's death 
in 1927, Touba, Mouridism's holy city, became a populous town 'where 
the peasant was called to work the land and produce groundnuts in large 
quantities. . . . Patriarchal collectivism was revived, sanctified by a 
religious bond. Hard work was demanded, and in exchange an assurance 
of eternal salvation and of present survival in a difficult world was given'.12 
Mouridism thus appears as an adaptation to the system imposed by the 
colonizer; after disagreements following the founder's death, the new 
brotherhood settled d o w n comfortably in the colonial framework all the 
more easily because the Mouride chiefs were the biggest groundnut 
producers. In the 1930s, there was a veritable Mouride colonization of 
land in Djolof and Cayor where they founded crop villages, thus extending 
the groundnut-growing area. In 1936, there was a dispute between 
Mouride pioneers and Fulani clans in Baol: in spite of the verdict of the 
colonial court which recognized the Fulani as the legitimate owners of 
the land, the Mourides used force and destroyed the shepherds' villages. 
T h e administration let off the groundnut producers. 
B y 1945, there were an estimated 100 000 Mourides. They were 
producing one-third of Senegal's groundnuts. Touba had by n o w become 
a place of pilgrimage and attracted tens of thousands of pilgrims to visit 
A m a d u Bamba's tomb and offer their gifts directly to the head of the 
brotherhood. 
Hamallism came into existence at Nioro in present-day Mali in the 
Sahel. A mystic, Shavkh Hamallâh (actually Hamahülläh) attracted thou-
sands of disciples, and was the target of violent attacks from the established 
brotherhoods. Despite a few deviations, he was one of the leading 
propagators of the Tijjâniya in West Africa. At the same time, he fought 
for the dignity and identity of the peoples of Africa. T h e colonial 
authorities arrested him after incidents at Nioro in 1933, and interned 
him for two years. But the fights resumed between Hamallists and 
members of other brotherhoods. Even though these events looked like 
the result of theological differences, they concealed a profound disapproval, 
on the part of the Hamallists, of the position of colonial subjects and of 
those w h o had collaborated with the administration or remained passive. 
In 1940, supporters and opponents of Shaykh Hamallâh clashed over 
pasture rights; there were 400 casualties. T h e colonial government became 
12. ibid., p. 540; for a detailed study, see D . C . O'Brien, 1971. 
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alarmed and condemned the marabout to be deported, first to Algeria and 
then to France, where Shaykh Hamalläh died in January 1942.13 A n 
unanticipated consequence of this movement was the rectification of the 
border between Mauritania and French Sudan to the latter's loss, because 
of the desire to have the Hamallists in the H o d h under a single admin-
istration.14 
T h e first trade union movements and the new politics 
As w e have seen, it was in Senegal that the first political agitation 
appeared, in the Four C o m m u n e s under Blaise Diagne, w h o had been 
under-secretary of state for the colonies in 1931, and a sponsor of the 
Colonial Exhibition in Paris, and w h o died in I934-15 There had been 
opposition to him in the 1920s from the 'Young Senegal' movement led 
by Tïécouta Diop. T h e opposition denounced colonial exploitation, of 
which Blaise Diagne was perceived as an agent; but the fact was that 
those backing this opposition would happily have settled for Diagne's 
position and jobs. These political struggles took place strictly within the 
confines of the Four C o m m u n e s . Neither Diagne nor his opponents 
thought of the rest of Senegal, m u c h less of West Africa. In 1928, 
Galandou Diouf, the mayor of Rufisque, Diagne's right-hand m a n , turned 
against him and stood against his patron. H e was supported by the Dakar 
paper, Périscope africain. H e was initially defeated, but in 1934, on Blaise 
Diagne's death, he was elected deputy to the National Assembly. N o 
political programme really challenged the colonial system. 
D a h o m e y , at this time, was another French colony with a significant 
middle class. There were m a n y hand-printed newspapers. In 1936, a 
dozen of them had an ephemeral existence, of which the best-known were 
the Voix du Dahomey, Courrier du Golfe du Bénin, the Phare du Dahomey, 
and L'Etoile du Dahomey. 
Even more significant was the rise of African economic resistance and 
the development of collective bargaining. T h e first African trades unions 
were formed in the 1930s after the promulgation of the decree of 20 
March 1937 which introduced collective agreements and the election of 
staff delegates. T h e same year also appears as a turning-point because of 
the union-organized strikes in West Africa. French West Africa, and 
especially Senegal, had already had experience of this modern weapon of 
the labour movement in the second half of the nineteenth century, but 
it was in 1937-8 that strikes broke out on an unprecedented scale. T h e 
trades-union movement reached its peak with the railway workers' strike 
13. V . Monteil, 1964, p. 128. 
•14; O n Hammallism, see the excellent monograph by A . Traoré, 1983. 
15. O n Blaise Diagne and his policy, see U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, 
ch. 25, pp. 642-7. 
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at Thiès in 1938. Daily-paid workers on the Dakar-Niger railway protested 
energetically against their situation. T h e colonial government called in 
the army; six strikers died; 53 were wounded, but the strike ended in 
victory for the workers. This victory was marked by the government 
agreement that there would be no sanctions and no obstacles to the right 
of association, and that an inquiry would be set up to look into the 
demands and compensation for the families of the victims. 
According to surveys by the Ministry for the Colonies, there were 33 
strikes in French West Africa between 1937 and 1938: 13 in Dakar, three 
in provincial Senegal, two in French Sudan, seven in Guinea and eight 
in Ivory Coast. T h e most violent confrontation, with m a n y deaths, 
occurred at Thiaroye in 1944. This trades-union activity mainly developed 
outside the parties, though under the aegis of the Popular Front govern-
ment. In Senegal, however, the Senegalese Socialist Party was formed in 
193 5 by the lawyer Lamine Gueye w h o was fighting the deputy, Galandou 
Diouf, Diagne's successor. T h e French labour party also tried to put 
d o w n roots in Senegal at this time, taking advantage of the rise of the 
Popular Front.'6 T h e war, however, put an end to such political ambitions 
in Africa. 
T h e Brazzaville Conference 
After the Allied landing in Morocco and the defeat of the armed forces 
of the Axis powers in North Africa, General de Gaulle installed his 
French Committee of National Liberation in Algeria in 1943. At least in 
the French empire the era of fascism was coming to an end. O n e after 
the other, the French African colonies slipped away from the Vichy 
regime and declared for General de Gaulle. In order to save the French 
empire and extract new resources from it, the Committee convened a 
conference at Brazzaville in January-February 1944. This conference 
determined the principles of post-war politics at a time when the coalition 
of anti-Hitler forces had almost defeated fascism. 
T h e impact of this conference on the future of the colonies has been 
m u c h exaggerated. Fascist excesses came to an end, but the conference 
did not aim to inaugurate a n e w era for the colonized subjects. O n the 
contrary, it intended to make the colonial system more secure and preserve 
it from outside influences, especially American ones. It was called the 
Brazzaville 'French African Conference' - which throws light on the 
intentions of the organizers. General de Gaulle had understood that in 
order to continue to ask Africans for an ever-heavier war contribution, 
changes had to be promised. It was no longer possible to speak of liberty 
16. In 1938, the Senegalese Socialist Party fused with the S F I O (Section française de 
l'Internationale ouvrière), the French socialist party. 
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plate 3.1 The Brazzaville Conference, February ¡944: centre left, Governor-General Félix
Eboué; centre right, General Charles de Gaulle
and democracy while denying Africans these fundamental rights. He
declared:
In French Africa, as in all other territories where men are living
under our flag, there will be no real progress unless the inhabitants
benefit from it, morally and materially, in their native land; unless
they rise, stage by stage, to the level where they will be capable of
participating, within their own country, in the management of their
own affairs. It is France's duty to make sure that this comes to pass.
Such is the goal towards which we are set. We do not close our eyes
to the length of the successive stages.17
This statement by the head of Free France did not go so far as to
proclaim the right of peoples to self-determination, even if there are hints
of it, as in the phrase 'participating, within their own country, in the
management of their own affairs'.
It should be observed that the Brazzaville Conference was above all a
meeting of military men and senior officials. It was presided over by
17. La Confirence africaine française, 1944, p. 38, quoted by J. Suret-Canale, 1964,
pp. 597-8.
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M r Pleven, the commissioner for the colonies; it brought together the 
governors-general of French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and 
Madagascar, colonial notables, representatives of commerce and industry 
and the missions. Care was taken to exclude the communists. But the 
most significant fact was the total absence of African representatives. 
W h e n purged of direct fascism, European colonialism was still racist. 
T h e Brazzaville Conference set out as a principle: 
T h e aims of the work of colonization accomplished by France in the 
colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution 
outside the French Empire: the constitution of self-government in the 
colonies, even in the distant future, is to be excluded.1 
Nothing could be clearer: since the principle of colonial sovereignty 
remains eternally untouchable, Africans can never hope to attain self-
government or independence. T h e conference did, however, propose to 
endo w the colonies with a federal assembly. Although it advocated respect 
for African custom, it was against the use of African languages in 
education. 
It will simply be noted that the colonial authorities recognized the need 
for change, but that none of the participants in this conference could 
imagine the speed with which Africa was to erupt onto the international 
stage a few months after the end of the Second World W a r . Later, at the 
time of decolonization, the Brazzaville principles would become one 
of the most rigid obstacles preventing the French authorities from 
understanding what was really happening in Africa and the determination 
of the people to be rid of the colonial yoke. Not even its o w n trauma of 
occupation under the Nazis had succeeded in teaching France that 
imperialism was evil - at least, not yet. 
Conclusion 
H o w did fascist tendencies in Europe from 1935 to 1945 affect develop-
ments in the empires of France, Portugal and Spain? This chapter has 
sought to demonstrate that right-wing excesses in Europe only aggravated 
African problems and provoked an African response - but the basic nature 
of European colonialism had been racist and exploitative before the rise 
of European totalitarianism in the 1930s, and remained so after the demise 
of the fascist era. 
O n the whole, the impact of the decade 1935-45 was greater on African 
nationalism than on European colonial policies. European racism and 
imperial exploitation remained almost constant, but Africa became less 
and less ready to tolerate its o w n humiliation. N e w forms of African 
18. ibid., p . 45. T h e italicized section is printed in capital letters in the original; quoted 
by J. Suret-Canale, 1964, p . 599. 
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resistance were crystallizing in this period, including political movements, 
religious and cultural rebellions, n e w trade-union activism, readiness to 
go on strike, and the emergence of African political journalism. 
T h e Second World W a r was particularly important as a catalyst. T h e 
war did not teach Europe to be less imperialist; but it did teach Africa 
to be more nationalistic. Greater political consciousness in Africa was 
stimulated by the war. T h e peasant masses, exhausted by the war effort, 
would listen particularly attentively to the leaders w h o were to emerge 
w h e n the time came to elect black deputies to the French National 
Assembly. T h e colonial system became all the more intolerable because 
people had fought alongside the colonizer for liberty. T h e restlessness 
spread all through tropical Africa: upheavals, strikes, demonstrations and 
revolts revealed the character of the period that followed the war and 
which marked a sharp break from the lack of movement of the previous 
period. With the birth of political parties, such as F . Houphouët-Boigny's 
Rassemblement démocratique africain in 1946, tropical Africa entered 
abruptly into the cycle of liberation struggles, which began in the French 
colonies in 1945.19 T h e Portuguese and Spanish colonies, lagging behind 
in their social and economic evolution, gradually awoke from their 
lethargy, but the fascist regimes in Europe had eliminated any possibility 
of political or trades-union organization, and had thus practically closed 
off every possibility of learning the art of politics. T h e awakening of the 
peoples of these colonies would c o m e later, but with a suddenness that 
would shake the dictatorship in Portugal and contribute to the very 
liberation of the Portuguese people. 
19. T h e R D A {Rassemblement démocratique africain) came into being at Bamako (French 
Sudan, present-day Mali) in October 1946. It was preceded by the Union Voltaique, 
created in 1945, and the P D C I {Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire), which came into 
being in April 1946. 
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MICHAEL C R O W D E R * 
C a n British- and Belgian-dominated Africa be fruitfully 
examined together? 
At the outset, the task of comparing British and Belgian rule in Africa 
might appear a difficult, if not eccentric, enterprise, so apparently different 
were they in character. At best one might, in the way of university 
examinations, compare and contrast British rule in Nigeria with that of 
Belgian rule in the Congo (now Zaire). But Britain controlled 16 territories 
in Africa during the period 1935-45, if w e exclude South Africa, which 
was effectively independent after 1931, and Egypt, whose 'independence' 
was severely curtailed by the presence of British troops on its territory, 
particularly during the war. B y contrast Belgium had only one enormous 
colony, the Congo, and the tiny mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi 
(now R w a n d a and Burundi) under its rule. After 1925 it was administered 
as part of the Congo just as the British mandated territory of the Togo 
was administered as part of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) . 
Unlike France, which maintained a largely uniform system of admin-
istration for its 14 tropical African colonies, Britain devised a variety of 
administrative systems for the government of its African dependencies 
with the result that generalization becomes extremely hazardous. These 
ranged from Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) , where the white-settler 
community had gained control of its internal affairs since 1923, to the 
neighbouring Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana) where dikgosi, 
or 'chiefs' in colonial parlance, had considerable control over the day-to-
day government of their o w n people.1 
T h e problems of generalizing about British rule in Africa are further 
compounded by the fact that within one territory several different systems 
of rule might be operating simultaneously. T h u s Africans in the sparsely 
populated Bechuanaland Protectorate could be administered in any one 
* Deceased in 1988. T h e author wished to thank J. F. A d e Ajayi and N . Parsons for 
their comments on the first drafts of this chapter. 
1. For the methods employed by the British to administer their African subjects, see 
Lord Hailey, 1957, which is still invaluable. 
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of four ways depending on where they lived: indirect rule through a 
Tswana kgosi in the eight 'tribal' reserves; company rule in the Tati 
Concession; direct rule by a British magistrate in the C r o w n lands; and 
administration by settler justices of the peace in the various 'blocks' set 
aside for white farmers. In Nigeria, despite Sir Frederick Lugard's 
amalgamation of 1914, indirect rule in Northern and Southern Provinces 
of Nigeria involved in practice important differences, while the Northern 
Provinces successfully resisted central control by Lagos until the end of 
our period.2 
T h e administration of the Belgian Congo was no more uniform than 
that of Nigeria, having to take into account the diversity of social 
structures to be found within its borders and the differing needs of the 
large plantations and mining concessions, where special devices had to be 
developed for the control of Africans converted overnight from peasant 
farmers to wage labourers. Clearly a system of administration established 
for peasants working on their o w n account would not be suitable for 
labourers working on the Lever Brothers' palm-oil plantations or the 
copper mines of Katanga. Indirect rule, Belgian-style, had no place either 
in the n e w urban agglomerations like Léopoldville (now Kinshasa), an 
administrative and small-scale industrial centre, or Elisabethville (now 
Lubumbashi), a mining-company town, both of which began to expand 
rapidly during the Second World W a r . In the apparently similar provinces 
of Ruanda and Urundi, differences emerged. In the latter 'the authority 
of the chiefs was never directly threatened by the administration. S o m e 
chiefs in fact managed to arrogate to themselves absolute powers in their 
provinces. Whether they paid or did not pay taxes was entirely up to 
them'.3 In Ruanda, by contrast, Lemarchand shows that 'the cumbersome 
trinity of chiefs - land, cattle and army chiefs - was replaced by the rule 
of a single chief, with the result that the C r o w n became m u c h more 
important than in Urundi'.4 In the Belgian Congo large numbers of 
traditional chiefs had been removed and replaced by 'chiefs of the 
whites' in Governor-General Pierre Rykmans's memorable phrase. Yet the 
Belgians labelled their system of administration in both the Congo and 
their mandated territory as one of 'indirect rule'. 
Over and above die m a n y differences that can be distinguished between 
the administrations of the two colonial powers - let alone within their 
individual territories — from 1935 to 1945, both systems underwent 
considerable strains which were to have a profound impact not only on 
the patterns of colonial administration but on African responses to them. 
Major changes were caused by the Great Depression whose impact was 
felt throughout Africa after 1933. These were closely followed by the 
2. See J. White, 1981. 
3. R . Lemarchand, 1970, p. 70. 
4. ibid., p. 79. 
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Second World W a r which was to prove traumatic in a great variety of 
ways for both ruler and ruled in British and Belgian Africa, not least in 
the latter, where after the Nazi conquest of Belgium, the Congo became 
effectively an independent colony-state. 
In dealing with the history of British and Belgian Africa during 
1935-45, therefore, any attempt at neatly distinguishing between the 
administrative systems of the two powers and their respective strategies 
of exploitation has to be abandoned. Rather, it is necessary to sort the 
variety of administrative and developmental devices they both adopted 
into a spectrum of political and economic responses of ruler to ruled. 
T h e range of responses extended from a minimal devolution to the African 
of economic and political initiative, as in the case of Southern Rhodesia, 
to the very considerable African involvement in the political and economic 
process, at least by colonial standards of the day, that existed in the Gold 
Coast. 
Although this approach is principally concerned with the colonial 
superstructures, an essential question is h o w the different types of 
administration, irrespective of whether they were British or Belgian, 
affected the lives of the Africans they controlled - socially, economically, 
politically and culturally. It is here that the two major world events that 
had such dramatic consequences for Africans - the World Depression 
and the World W a r - serve as tools for understanding the differing 
impacts of colonial rule and the differing responses to it. T h e Second 
World W a r , hitherto largely neglected in the historiography of the colonial 
period in Africa, has latterly begun to receive the attention it deserves.5 
It was, until recently, a commonly accepted thesis that the Second World 
W a r was a turning point in Africa's colonial history as a result of which 
the French and in particular the British seriously began to envisage the 
devolution of political power to their African subjects w h o , in turn, were 
m o v e d by the war from a passive acceptance to an increasingly articulate 
rejection of the colonial dispensation. 
S o m e scholars, however, n o w argue that the roots of the changes 
leading to 'decolonization' and the rapid transfer of power to Africans in 
the British, Belgian and French colonies lie in the Great Depression as 
m u c h as in the war itself.6 Before the war the collapse of the world market 
m a d e it difficult for the colonial powers to deliver the goods to their 
subjects while the depression sapped their confidence in their imperial 
mission. Both within and outside the colonial offices of the various powers, 
5. See in particular the special issue of the Journal of African History, vol. 26, part 4 , 
1985; also, D . Killingray and R . Rathbone, 1986. 
6. French scholars have been particularly interested in the role of the depression in 
colonial African history. See in particular the special issue of the Revue française d'histoire 
d'outre-mer, vol. 63, nos 232-3, 1978. See also the Journal of African History (see fn. 5 
above) where several papers compare the impact of the depression and the war in Africa. 
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reformers began to gain access to the formulation of policy before the 
outbreak of war. Rather than initiate reform, it is argued, the Second 
World W a r gave impetus to reforms already envisaged or undertaken. 
T h u s in French-speaking Africa, the Brazzaville reforms had their roots 
in those introduced by the Popular Front government in 1937. Similarly, 
in British West Africa social and economic reform as envisaged by the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and the constitutional 
reforms elaborated during the Second World W a r all had pre-war origins. 
Conversely, the Great Depression, by reducing drastically the purchasing 
power of both rural and urban Africans, led to increasing popular 
anti-colonial discontent, expressed in m a n y areas by unrest, riots and 
demonstrations - the most spectacular of which, both from a political 
and economic point of view, was the Gold Coast cocoa hold-up of 1937. 
Other scholars, w h o view the reforms introduced by the British Colonial 
Office not as an act of anticipation but of response to growing nationalist 
pressure, point to the importance of the 'Abyssinian crisis' of 1936 which 
outraged so m a n y African intellectuals and heightened their demands for 
greater participation in their o w n affairs. 
T h e spectrum of political and economic structures in 
British- and Belgian-dominated Africa 
T h e colonial possessions of Britain and Belgium in the mid-i93os can 
each be placed on a spectrum ranging from one extreme, where the 
administration and the prevailing economic policies pursued were geared 
towards development of resources through the agency of white settlers, 
to the other, where Africans were seen as the principal agents of 
development. 
In the white-settler colony, such as Southern Rhodesia or the Katanga 
province (now Shaba) of the Belgian Congo, the immigrant Europeans 
were perceived as the main agents for the exploitation of its resources, 
with Africans as adjuncts in the process: mere labourers for the whites 
w h o had dispossessed them of their land. For such colonies, the inde-
pendent Union of South Africa, still closely associated with Britain as a 
Dominion in its Empire, served as a model to be emulated. A s far as 
Southern Rhodesia was concerned it was well on its way to successful 
emulation of the South African model: already by 1934 settlers 
owned 49 million acres or just over 50 per cent of the land, with Africans 
living on a mere 28.5 million acres, m u c h of which consisted of the agri-
culturally least viable areas of the colony.7 A s in South Africa, the areas 
inhabited by Europeans and Africans were strictly delimited by the Land 
7. See R . Palmer, 1977, for further discussion of the impact of land alienation on 
Africans. 
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Apportionment Act of 1930, while the pass system for Africans was 
entrenched by the Natives Registration Act of 1936. Little regard was 
paid to the traditional status of the chiefs and effectively Africans were 
under a system of direct administration where chiefs were the corporals 
of the administration with few powers or initiatives of their o w n . 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Swaziland were both considered 
by the British government as pre-eminently white-settler territories, 
though they still had far to travel on the road followed by Southern 
Rhodesia. In the case of Northern Rhodesia, the white-settler population 
was m u c h smaller than that of Southern Rhodesia and owned a m u c h 
smaller proportion of the land: a mere 7258 sq miles compared with the 
271 369 sq miles set aside for Africans. Furthermore, there were important 
white mining concerns on the Copper Belt whose interests did not always 
coincide with those of the white farmers. Politically the white settlers had 
m u c h less influence than they did in Southern Rhodesia and were 
effectively limited to the line of the railway and to the white farming 
blocks. T h e y had only a minority vote in executive and legislative 
councils which were dominated by officials. T h e majority of Africans were 
administered by British officials, w h o , for instance in the Barotseland 
Province, followed a policy of indirect rule not m u c h different from that 
obtaining in Swaziland in the patchwork of African-owned land that was 
under the rule of the Paramount Chief Sobhuza II. In Swaziland, where 
the majority of the best land had been alienated to white farmers under 
dubious concessions granted by earlier Swazi rulers and equally dubious 
legislation enacted by early British administrators, attempts by Sobhuza 
to regain control of some of these lands failed in 1924.8 Nevertheless, the 
contradictions in Britain's administration of its settler colonies were at 
their most acute in Swaziland. 
If Kenya was in most British minds that thought about colonies pre-
eminently a settler one, in fact the paramountcy of African interests had 
been proclaimed as early as 1923, albeit as a ploy against Indian demands 
for parity of representation in the legislative council with the white 
settlers. Nevertheless, the settlers by virtue of their position on the 
legislative council, with 11 elected seats, were able to put sufficient 
pressure on the colonial administration to ensure that policies inimical to 
their interests were not pursued until at least the mid-i930S. Only then, 
in the midst of the depression, did the administration prevent the 
wholesale restructuring of trade to protect the uncompetitive Kenya 
settler-farmers against the Kikuyu and Abuluyha maize-growers.9 This 
was in contrast to Southern Rhodesia where the settlers established a 
monopoly over the local market and were able to arrange a bargain with 
the Northern Rhodesian copper mines to supply them with their high-
8. See H . Kuper, 1978, especially ch. 6. 
9. D . Anderson and D . Throup, 1985, p. 328. 
80 
Africa under British and Belgian domination, 1935-45 
priced maize on condition that they guaranteed supplies of cheap migrant 
labour.10 T h e doctrine of 'African paramountcy', as w e shall see, came 
under renewed strain in the Second World W a r as the Kenyan admin-
istration had to make concessions to settler demands in pursuance of the 
war effort. But though from the point of view of the Kenyan Africans 
the doctrine of paramountcy of their interests must have appeared a 
hollow one, as they laboured under m a n y of the disabilities of their 
Rhodesian counterparts, at least they had an edge over the Northern 
Rhodesian African. In Northern Rhodesian in the 1930s the future was 
still seen as one in which settler interests were paramount, while such a 
status had at least been formally denied the Kenya settlers. 
Comparison between Northern Rhodesia and Kenya demonstrates just 
h o w difficult it is to place a colony exactly on this putative spectrum. In 
complete contrast with these settler colonies, were the four British colonies 
in West Africa - Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia -
where there had never been any doubt as to whose interests were to be 
paramount. There the African was seen as the chief agent of production, 
albeit on the account of merchant capital, and consequently alienation of 
land to Europeans for farming was forbidden, whether on an individual 
basis or for company-owned plantations." This was in fact the dominant 
policy in Uganda , itself a failed white-settler colony, and in the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan. Here again there were noteworthy exceptions to the 
rule. Mining interests were permitted to take over land for gold production 
in the Gold Coast, for iron and diamond mining in Sierra Leone, and 
for tin mining in Nigeria. In the Sudan, the administration sponsored 
the huge Gezira scheme, which involved the take-over of a million acres 
of land for the commercial cultivation of cotton. Similarly, in Nigeria the 
government took over land for coal mining to supply fuel for its railway 
system." 
In all these British West African colonies, the means of administration 
was indirect rule through the traditional rulers w h o became chief execu-
tives of local governments with responsibility for most of the business of 
a county council in Britain, with the difference that they were also 
responsible for the administration of justice in their o w n person. O n the 
other hand, they were m u c h more closely supervised by the agents of the 
central government than in Britain. Although the administrative officers 
were in theory advisers to the native authorities, as these units of local 
10. ibid. 
u . R . Shenton, 1986, has a very good discussion of the relationship of the merchant 
capitalists to the fortunes of the groundnut and cotton farmers in Northern Nigeria. 
12. Technically, all land in Northern Nigeria belonged to the British administration, 
but in Southern Nigeria land was held to be in 'native occupation' and the administration 
limited itself to measures designed to control the alienation of land by Africans to non-
Africans - though, of course, it did not include itself in this category! See Lord Hailey, 
1957, pp. 731-5-
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government were designated, in practice they often involved themselves 
in direct supervision of m a n y aspects of their conduct. Nevertheless, the 
traditional rulers of these territories retained a great deal of initiative in 
the administration of their subjects and it is noteworthy that chiefs w h o 
ruled under the indirect system survived the independence settlement 
while those w h o were agents of direct rule largely disappeared as a class. 
Whatever the reason for this phenomenon, the white m a n impinged m u c h 
less directly on the daily round of African life in territories administered 
under indirect rule. It would be a mistake, however, to consider that in 
these territories there were no elements of direct rule; w h e n it came to 
implementing colony-wide measures, the chief was told what was to be 
done and rarely was he consulted as to the wisdom or otherwise of such 
measures as the construction of territorial roads and railways or the 
control of epidemics. Here the chief became as m u c h an agent of the 
central administration as he was of the central government in French and 
Portuguese Africa, in all of whose territories rule was effectively direct.13 
In between these two types of colonies - those on the one hand where 
the European was the main agent of production, and those on the other 
where the African was - were those colonies whose agricultural and 
mineral resources were exploited by companies, both large and small, 
which controlled the administration of the day-to-day lives of their African 
employees as well as those of their families. T h e prime example of this 
type of colony was the Belgian Congo with its large-scale plantations and 
its huge mining companies. Even so, the Congo contained large tracts of 
land that were not under the control of concession companies and within 
these areas, since the visit of C r o w n Prince Leopold in 1933, it had been 
declared official policy to keep agricultural lands exclusively in the hands 
of African farmers and to prepare them to become landowners in the 
more or less distant future. 
In the areas outside company administration, the Congolese were under 
a form of rule not dissimilar from that of the French - although ostensibly 
it was modelled on British indirect rule. In the first place the Belgians 
tried to rationalize their chieftaincies by reducing their number to create 
more manageable units. T h u s in 1917 there had been 6095 chefferies but 
by 1938 these had been reduced to 1212 with 340 secteurs which grouped 
together a number of small chieftaincies into councils over which one of 
the chiefs involved presided. This of course was a procedure that had 
been adopted in the so-called 'pagan areas' of Northern Nigeria and in 
Tanganyika (now Tanzania). W h e r e Belgian differed from British 'indirect 
rule' was in the scant respect paid to tradition either in the appointment 
of chiefs or in the remodelling of the pre-colonial structures of the 
agencies of government. Although, w h e n confronted by peoples w h o 
13. T h e extent of interference by British administrators in the administration of one 
northern Nigerian emirate, G o m b e , is brought out very effectively in I. A . A b b a , 1985. 
82 
Africa under British and Belgian domination, 1935—45 
lacked centralized authority, as in parts of Eastern Nigeria, the British 
did create artificial 'Warrant Chiefs' w h o , because of their unpopularity, 
were replaced in the 1930s by councils which reflected as closely as 
possible the 'traditional' system of decision-making a m o n g the groups 
concerned. Belgian chiefs, on the other hand, were allowed little initiative 
of their o w n and were as closely supervised by their administrative officers 
as in the French system.14 Even where the Belgian system differed radically 
from the French, for instance in the introduction of British-style native 
treasuries, the chief had very m u c h less latitude in the control of 
expenditure than his counterpart in Nigeria. But even here, as Isa Alkali 
A b b a warns, w e must be wary of the orthodox view that 'indirect rule' 
in Northern Nigeria left considerable initiative to the emirs and district 
heads; his study of the district-head system in G o m b e shows that they 
were closely supervised by the British administration.15 Furthermore, the 
British by the 1930s had so restructured the system of local administration 
in the emirate that it bore little relationship to its pre-colonial counterpart, 
though it came to be accepted as 'traditional' by both the British and the 
people of G o m b e . 
Within the company concessions, whether it was a plantation or a 
mine, the life of the African worker was governed by the company for 
which he worked. T h e quality of their administration could vary widely. 
B y the 1930s, the huge Union minière in Katanga - which by the m i d -
19308 was contributing nearly a third of the colonial state's revenue -
had introduced a policy of labour stabilization which was to be copied 
by other mining and plantation companies in the Belgian Congo. T h e 
difficulties experienced with recruitment of suitable workers and their 
subsequent training led the Union minière to do all it could to keep its 
labour. T h u s developed the policy of company paternalism for which the 
Congo was renowned: workers were offered three-year contracts; they 
were encouraged to bring their wives and children with them; housing 
was provided along with generous rations; medical services were provided 
for workers and their dependents; daily hours of work were limited to 
eight or nine, and workers were allowed four free days a month. Workers 
lived in a cité des travailleurs under the supervision of a company-
appointed chef de camp w h o was responsible for settling disputes and 
listening to complaints. Africans were allowed little initiative in the 
management of their o w n affairs compared with the neighbouring Roan 
Antelope M i n e at Luanshya in Northern Rhodesia. T h e management of 
the Union minière was interested in the 'complete control of employees' 
lives in order to increase copper output' and they therefore created what 
Bruce Fetter has described as an 'oppressive total institution'.16 
14. See M . Crowder, 1970, pp. 320-50. 
15. See fn. 13. 
16. B . Fetter, 1976, p. 151. 
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O n the tea estates in Nyasaland (now Malawi), workers under the 
thangata system, whereby tenants on European-owned land had to work 
unpaid for one month to pay tax and another to pay rent, considered 
themselves as 'mere slaves'.'7 In the inter-war years, the lives of the 
workers - including w o m e n and children — were controlled by the planters 
with minimal interference from the local representative of the British 
administration, though as Robin Palmer has shown workers indulged in 
effective day-to-day passive resistance in the form of loafing, absenteeism, 
desertion and so forth.18 
T w o groups of colonies represent special cases during our period 
although both manifested similarities to the three categories of colonial 
rule w e have just described. T h e first comprised the three British 
High Commission Territories in South Africa whose long-term separate 
existence was always uncertain since their incorporation into the Union 
of South Africa was always a distinct possibility provided for in the South 
Africa Act of 1909.19 A s a result, British administration in these territories 
was ambivalent and without long-term goals since incorporation and the 
consequent abandonment of responsibility for these territories was always 
on the agenda. Conversely, African leaders both 'traditional' and 
'modern' - and often the two were one and the same - were politicized 
from an early stage through their determination to stave off any prospect 
of incorporation into the hated Union. So symbiotic was their relationship 
with the Union that they were administered by the British high c o m -
missioner or chief British representative to the South African government. 
His administration was invariably conducted with an eye to the possible 
response of the South African government to events within these terri-
tories. 
T h e other distinct group of territories was the former G e r m a n colonies, 
mandated to Britain and Belgium after the First World W a r under League 
of Nations supervision. Here again there were few c o m m o n features, either 
between Belgian and British administration of the mandates generally, or 
between the administration of the British mandates of Togo, Cameroons 
and Tanganyika. T h e only c o m m o n thread was their supervision by the 
League of Nations, but in practice the British and Belgian governments 
were barely accountable to that world body for the conduct of the 
administration of their mandates. While the Permanent Mandates C o m -
mission of the League of Nations did keep watch over questions of 
infringement of the 'open-door' policy for international trade in its 
mandates and abuses in the administration of their inhabitants, it had no 
means of enforcing change or reform on the part of the mandatories. It 
17. L. Vail, 1977, p. 365; and 1983, pp. 50-1. 
18. R. Palmer, 1986, pp. 119-21. 
19. South Africa Act, 1909: XI: N e w Provinces and Territories: Section 151. See 
G . W . Eybers, 1918, p. 554. 
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did not even conduct on-the-spot investigations of the territories for 
which it was responsible — as its successor, the United Nations, was to 
do. But the status of mandate did have some influence on the power 
exercising it. T h u s , the Belgians were m o r e protective of 'traditional' 
structures in Ruanda-Urundi than they were in the Congo; while in 
Tanganyika the British m a d e it clear that this East African territory, 
which had been a settler one under the Germans , was to have a future 
in which Africans rather than immigrant Europeans would be the principal 
agents of development. 
Tanganyika, the former G e r m a n East Africa, alone of the mandates, 
was administered as a separate entity. T h e British mandated territory of 
Togo was integrated administratively with the Gold Coast, the northern 
sector of the Cameroons mandate formed an integral part of the A d a m a w a 
province of Northern Nigeria; and dae Southern Cameroons was admin-
istered as a province of Southern Nigeria.20 T h e Ruanda-Urundi Trust-
eeship, though treated as a distinct administrative entity by the Belgians 
in that it was not subject to the same policies as those promulgated in 
the Congo, came under the overall authority of the governor-general of 
the Belgian Congo. 
It can be seen from the above that examination questions such as 'Were 
Africans better off under British or Belgian rule?' are difficult if not 
impossible to answer as there were so m a n y varieties of rule subsumed 
under both systems. Thus the tin miner in Jos in Nigeria, the colony of 
African production par excellence, lived a considerably more oppressed 
life21 than the Congolese farming on his o w n account or the worker for 
the paternalistic Union Minière. Nevertheless, in one respect there was a 
major difference between the Belgian and the British systems, whichever 
type of colonial administration prevailed. In the Belgian territories, 
Africans not only had no political rights, but during our period it was 
never envisaged that they should have them, even in a very remote future. 
In the British African territories, with the exception of the Rhodesias 
and the high commission territories, the implicit if very long-term goal 
of colonial policy was the devolution of political responsibility to Africans. 
In 1922 the n e w constitution introduced in Nigeria had m a d e provision 
for four elected African m e m b e r s on the legislative council. Even in 
Southern Rhodesia a limited number of Africans qualified for the vote, 
as they did up until 1936 in the Cape Province of the Union of South 
Africa. It is no coincidence that it was those British territories where 
Africans were earliest given a share of political power that were in the 
vanguard of the march to independence, and that these should have been 
the colonies in which Africans were the main agents of development. T h e 
20. In 1939, the Southern Provinces were divided into Eastern and Western Provinces, 
with the Southern Cameroons being administered as one of the Eastern Provinces. 
21. See B . Freund, 1981. 
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settler and mining-company presence proved a barrier throughout to 
political devolution, though as it turned out, with the exception of 
Southern Rhodesia, not a very great one. Kenya, after all, gained its 
independence a mere three years behind Nigeria. But the quality of 
independence clearly depended on the extent to which Africans had been 
given access to real forms of political power and education in the years 
preceding it. T h e fiasco of Congolese independence was the direct result 
of Belgium's failure to provide her African subjects with more than 
primary education and to offer them any opportunity of participating in 
the political processes of the colony, except very late in the day. 
Whatever the variety of administration under which Africans lived and 
whatever its differing impact on their daily lives, three events took place 
during our period that affected both ruler and ruled in British- and 
Belgian-dominated Africa and served to highlight African responses to 
their rulers: the Great Depression, the 'Abyssinian crisis'22 and the Second 
World W a r . 
The Great Depression 
T h e Great Depression that followed the Wall Street stock-market crash 
of 1929 had passed its peak by the beginning of our period, but its effects 
were to be felt well beyond it until the economic recovery stimulated by 
the Second World W a r . T h e impact of the depression varied from colony 
to colony, depending not only on the specific crops grown in particular 
regions, and the means by which they were cultivated, but also on h o w 
resilient subsistence agriculture or the industrial economy was. Similarly, 
the impact on mineral-based economies differed according to the mineral 
exported. While copper sales suffered drastically, gold experienced a 
b o o m . A s a result, although generally all sub-Saharan territories experi-
enced severe hardship as a result of the slump in world prices for primary 
products, South Africa secured its industrial base and laid the foundations 
of its economic hegemony over southern and central Africa. 
A s far as African peasant farmers engaged in the cultivation of crops 
for export were concerned, they n o w had to produce double or more the 
quantity in order to secure the same income. Groundnuts, which in 1929— 
30 were fetching £8 18s per ton, were by 1933-4 fetching only £2 13s 
per ton. T h e normal economic reaction to such a situation would be to 
reduce output in response to the lower price and concentrate on the 
cultivation of subsistence crops. But a number of factors militated against 
this. 
First, in the Belgian Congo the administration ensured that there would 
be no economic demobilization, to use Emil Bustin's phrase,23 by imposing 
22. See U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, ch. 28. 
23. E . Bustin, 1975, p. 101. 
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on the peasant compulsory production of crops both for export and 
domestic consumption, particularly for the mines, at prices fixed even 
below those obtaining on the market. Further, guaranteed supplies of 
cheap food for those workers w h o were retained during the worst years 
of the depression effectively reduced the cost of labour outside any 
reduction of wages and helped the large companies to survive.24 
Secondly, in all the territories under consideration Africans paid direct 
tax during our period. Whereas before the slump indirect taxation had 
provided the bulk of revenue for their colonial administrations with the 
notable exception of the three high commission territories, direct taxation 
n o w played a m u c h more critical role in the colonial budget. Despite the 
catastrophic fall in prices paid to peasants for their produce, they received 
no remission in their taxes. This meant that they had to produce more 
in order to pay them. In one instance in Northern Nigeria farmers were 
paying as m u c h as 70 per cent of their cash income to the state.25 
Thirdly, in colonies like the Belgian C o n g o where there was a large 
wage-earning workforce, its reduction in the face of the slump meant that 
m a n y workers had to return to their villages and take up farming to pay 
their taxes. Indeed over 125000 Congolese wage labourers lost their jobs 
between 1930 and 1932. 
Fourthly, m a n y Africans had become accustomed to purchasing 
imported goods which they did not treat as luxuries but as necessities -
such as clothing, cooking utensils and school materials for their children — 
and were prepared to cultivate more land in order to be able to continue 
purchasing them. T h e net result was that in most cases output of export 
crops increased and in some cases doubled, even though total revenue 
from them m a y not have risen from its 1928-9 level by the eve of the 
Second World W a r . 
B y and large, the Africans w h o suffered least as a result of the depression 
were those least directly involved in the world capitalist economy, namely 
those concerned exclusively with subsistence farming. Already accustomed 
to paying taxes, they were otherwise only marginally involved in the cash 
economy. D e m a n d for corn and yams did not fall,26 while there was some 
revival in traditional industries. But for those w h o had become dependent 
on the sale of export crops to purchase part of their family's subsistence 
requirements, the depression hit hard. 
T h e general effect of the depression on rural African producers was to 
instil in them discontent with a colonial system that hitherto, however 
marginally, had been paying them a price for their produce which, despite 
all the other exactions of the system, permitted m a n y of them to improve 
their life-style. This trend was dramatically reversed in the 1930s and 
24. B . Jewsiewicki, 1977, p. 328. 
25. R . Shenton, 1986, p. 102. 
26. See R . J. Gavin and W . Oyemakinde, 1980, pp. 506-^7, for example. 
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began to prepare for the nationalist politicians a seed-bed of rural 
discontent which in the 1940s they were able to fertilize. T h e war, despite 
the b o o m in prices for primary products, only exacerbated this discontent 
because governments limited the benefits the cultivators received for their 
crops. 
T h e effects of the world recession were acutely felt in the mining 
industry, particularly on the Katanga and the Northern Rhodesian copper 
belts, though in the case of the latter, it was more a question of laying-
off workers on the construction work involved in opening up the mines. 
Prices for copper fell by 60 per cent between 1930 and 1932. T h e Office 
central du travail au Katanga ( O C T K ) all but gave up recruitment as a 
result, and became more concerned with the repatriation of laid-off 
workers w h o m the administration was loath to have doing nothing in the 
urban centres.*7 But even in the villages, in the words of the director of 
O C T K , most of the laid-off workers accepted 'traditional authority only 
with the greatest difficulty. It will take some time before they are re-
adjusted to village life."8 
With the fall in prices for minerals there was a concomitant fall in 
wages for those w h o did not lose their jobs. T h e weekly income for 
workers in the Jos tin mines in Northern Nigeria fell from between six 
and seven shillings a week to three shillings and six pence. Although 
generally the mining industry began to recover in the mid-i930s it was 
not until the Second World W a r that its output reached pre-depression 
levels. T h e only exception was the gold-mining industry. In the Gold 
Coast, exports more than doubled between 1933 and 1938 in response to 
increased world demand accompanied by higher prices. In Tanganyika, 
gold came second in importance as an export to sisal; and in Kenya, a 
mini gold rush helped provide employment for some of the more 
marginalized white farmers w h o were put out of business by the 
depression. 
It was the gold b o o m in South Africa that had the most dramatic effect 
on the British territories in Central and Southern Africa. Such was the 
demand for labour on the Rand and in the industries that sprang u p in 
consequence of the b o o m that the Union government relaxed its ban on 
labour imports from north of 22°S, and recruited workers from as far 
north as Tanganyika. This provided jobs for m a n y w h o would otherwise 
have had difficulty in paying their taxes and provided some income for 
their families in the form of remittances. T h e income derived from these 
remittances became vital for Basutoland (now Lesotho), which had few 
resources of its o w n other than its manpower, and for the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, which was reeling under the weight restrictions imposed on 
27. E . Bustin, 1975, pp. 116-17. 
28. ibid., p. 117. 
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importation of its cattle into the Union2 9 and could n o w export labour 
from the large areas of the country lying north of 22°S. 
For plantation workers, the effects of the depression were the same in 
whatever territory they worked: dismissal or reductions in their wages. 
Not all the migrant agricultural labour was employed by white farmers 
or expatriate plantation owners like Lever Brothers. In the Gold Coast, 
Western Nigeria and Uganda , a class of prosperous African petty capitalists 
had developed, and they too had either to lay off labour, reduce wages 
or stop expansion of acreage planted.30 In the Gold Coast in particular, 
the prosperous cocoa farmers felt the pinch of the decline in cocoa prices, 
made more acute because it was a luxury commodity, and found greater 
difficulty in maintaining a life-style that had become heavily dependent 
on imported goods and oriented towards taking advantage of aspects of 
the Western way of life, particularly education, for which it became more 
difficult to pay.3' In Uganda wages for agricultural labour in some cases 
more than halved between 1929 and 1934, particularly affecting Ruanda-
Urundi whence a majority of migrants came. 
T h e most badly affected by the depression - in that they had no 
alternative livelihood to fall back on — were the settler-farmers and 
expatriate employees of plantation and mining companies w h o were either 
unable to survive the fall in prices for their produce or were dismissed 
by their employers. Certain mining towns like Elisabethville had one in 
three of their European-style houses empty as a result. Farms in Kenya 
were either left fallow as their owners sought alternative employment or 
were sold off to larger-scale farmers more capable of surviving the 
economic hard times. 
Commercial companies involved in the import and export trade were 
especially vulnerable to the economic situation in the 1930s. M a n y smaller 
houses went out of business or were taken over by more firmly established 
ones. Again, a large n u m b e r of white as well as African employees were 
laid off and in the latter case many of these were literate clerks with few 
other openings commensurate with their talents, though some did find 
employment as teachers. Again, they swelled the ranks of potential recruits 
for the political parties that were to protest against the colonial regime. 
Those w h o went back to their villages brought with them new values. 
As early as 1929-30 in the Makoni district of Southern Rhodesia, Ranger 
notes that returning migrants from towns within the country as well as 
South Africa, 'embittered by the collapse of employment opportunity, 
brought with them the ideas of the South African National Congress and 
29. See S . Ettinger, pp. 77-85. 
30. See, for instance, G . Austin, 1987; J. D . Y . Peel, 1983, ch. 7; and J. J. Jorgensen, 
1981, for the differing reactions to the impact of the depression by African petty capitalists. 
31. D . Brokensha, 1966, pp. 37-8 and p. 238. T h e situation in the Gold Coast was 
made worse in the late 1930s w h e n the cocoa trees were attacked by swollen-shoot disease. 
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the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), and also of the 
Young Manyika Ethiopian Society, which some of them had formed in 
the towns to express regional aspirations and grievances'.32 T h e few 
African businessmen w h o had survived on their o w n account into the 
1930s found the depression difficult to weather and became even further 
disillusioned with a colonial regime which once they had supported. 
O n e technique for survival employed by expatriate firms was the price-
ring, the most notorious of which was the cocoa agreement between the 
British buyers of the Gold Coast cocoa crop which provoked the cocoa 
farmers' hold-up of 1937, followed by similar hold-ups in cocoa and 
palm-produce sales in Nigeria. In Uganda where the ginning industry 
represented one of the few substantial manufacturing industries in the 
region under consideration during this period, ginneries enjoyed a fixed 
m i n i m u m return per pound whereas it was the grower w h o bore the 
brunt of the drop in world prices. A s the cotton-growers increased 
production to compensate for loss of revenue, so the ginneries, which did 
not increase in number, prospered.33 
For all the colonial administrations, whether Belgian or British, the 
depression meant a fall in their revenues from import and export duties. 
T h e immediate response of the administrations was to lay off personnel 
since there could not be any saving on debt-servicing which for m a n y of 
them was a major item in their budgets.34 Africans w h o were dismissed 
were being forced out into a very inelastic labour market which could 
not absorb any further educated or partially educated Africans. T h e 
diminution in the ranks of European personnel in the administration was 
sufficiently dramatic to recall the exodus of expatriates that took place 
during the First World W a r . 
T h e white exodus, however, did not evoke the belief on the part of 
Africans c o m m o n in French West Africa during the First World W a r 
that the whites were leaving for good,35 although the white population of 
the Congo was reduced from 25 700 in 1930 to 17 600 in 1934.36 Reduction 
in personnel also resulted in the reduction of the services the admin-
istration supplied to its African inhabitants, especially in the form of 
health, education and public works. T h u s the colonial state, more than 
ever before, was perceived as bankrupt by those Africans — the educated 
32. T . Ranger, 1983, p. 81. 
33- J- J- Jorgensen, 1981, pp. 147-50. 
34. Lord Hailey, 1938, pp. 1432-3. Excluding railways, Nyasaland devoted 15.8 per 
cent of its budget to debt-servicing in 1936-^7; Northern Rhodesia, 16.2 per cent; Nigeria, 
21.4 per cent. S o m e states had m u c h lower percentages, however: Gold Coast, 3.7 per 
cent; Sierra Leone, 7.2 per cent. T h e percentage of the budget devoted to administration 
could be as high as 50 per cent (Gambia, Zanzibar) and as low as 29.3 per cent (Nigeria). 
T h e Belgian Congo spent nearly half its budget on debt-servicing in 1934 (p. 1454). 
35. See M . Crowder and J. Osuntokun, 1986. 
36. E . Bustin, 1975, p. 129. 
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élite — w h o in an earlier generation had so enthusiastically supported it 
as a means to plucking the fruits of Westernization. 
While development had never been specifically on the agenda of the 
colonial powers, least of all as an obligation to their African subjects, 
m u c h that w e today would call developmental was undertaken by the 
local administrations in the form of road, railway, bridge and port 
construction - though of course they were mainly designed to facilitate 
the export of produce. T h e depression meant that m a n y of these projects 
had to be axed or indefinitely postponed. Indeed, in most territories, 
public works did not regain the level of activity of the late 1920s until 
the Second World W a r . Nevertheless, the British Colonial Development 
Act of 1929, drawn up before the depression, was aimed at stimulating 
productive projects in the colonies, although these were to be selected 
with a view to the stimulus they would in turn provide for the h o m e 
economy, particularly where jobs would be created. T h e amounts involved 
varied from territory to territory and were usually paltry. T h e major 
undertaking in our area was the opening of the M a r a m p a iron mine in 
Sierra Leone at a cost of £264000 and the Zambezi bridge.37 T h e projects 
undertaken were not always beneficial to the colony concerned. T h u s , as 
Vail has shown, the Zambezi bridge was built not with the interests of 
Nyasaland in mind but to provide orders for a stagnating British iron 
and steel industry. T h e net result for Nyasaland was that it was saddled 
with an enormous debt burden which prompted the authorities to permit 
recruitment of Africans for work in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.38 
T h e sums m a d e available by the Colonial Development Act of 1929 were 
minute in the context of the revenue lost by the colonies in the slump. 
T h e depression laid bare the bankruptcy of colonial policy in such a 
way that at least some of those involved in its implentation - like Sir 
Philip Mitchell, governor of Uganda from 1935 to 1940 - did not suffer 
from the myopia which seems to have affected the perception of later 
viewers of the colonial record. His confidential briefing to European 
colonial officials in 1939 put the situation starkly: 
If, resolutely shutting our minds to the effects of habit or the perhaps 
still lingering romance of the primitive and picturesque, w e look at 
modern East Africa as it really is, the picture is disturbing. 
Poverty is widespread and the people suffer from a great number of 
diseases, and generally from malnutrition as well. 
Employment for wages often means worse housing and food, while 
the wages themselves are low, and the level of effort and efficiency 
poor. 
37. See D . J. Morgan, 1980, vol. 2, for the general background; also S. Constantine, 
1984. 
38. L . Vail, 1975. 
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Education is still rudimentary and inefficient except for the favoured 
few . . . less than 5 per cent of the population attain the standard 
which is compulsory for every child in the United Kingdom. 3 9 
A n d so at the very time that African protests against the conduct of 
colonial rule, heightened by the depression, were gathering m o m e n t u m , 
similar criticisms were being raised by government officials and by 
politicians in Britain not only in the press and in parliament but in the 
corridors of the Colonial Office itself.40 A parallel development did not, 
however, take place in Belgium, although it did in France.4' 
T h e impact of the Second World W a r on British- and 
Belgian-dominated Africa 
T h e British and Belgian territories had led almost entirely separate 
existences during the depression years. W h a t contact there had been was 
limited to issues of c o m m o n borders and migrant labour between the 
Belgian territories and their British-ruled neighbours in East and Central 
Africa: Sudan, Uganda, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia. During the 
Second World W a r the destinies of the two sets of colonies were to be 
united, as they had been during the first, as once again Britain and 
Belgium faced a c o m m o n adversary in Germany. Belgium was overrun 
by the Germans in M a y 1940 so that her Congo colony became the locus 
of her independent existence, just as French Equatorial Africa did for 
Free France. B y contrast with French Equatorial Africa, however, the 
Belgian Congo operated as an effectively independent colony-state with 
the Belgian government-in-exile in London able to exert relatively little 
control over its administration or economic policies. Indeed the Belgian 
government-in-exile depended on the Congo for 85 per cent of its 
funding.42 Britain, of course, survived intact and the government was able 
to maintain as strong a control of her colonial dependencies as during 
peace time. But her fortunes became intimately intertwined with those 
of her African colonies on w h o m she depended for troops and carriers 
for her army, and agricultural products and minerals for her factories. 
This was particularly so after the fall of the European colonial empires 
in South-east Asia to the Japanese, which dealt a major blow to Britain's 
prestige in the eyes of her colonial subjects. 
It was this loss of the major source of tin, rubber and palm produce 
that was to link the role of the Belgian Congo with that of the British 
dependencies as together they became providers of these vital commodities 
39. Sir P. Mitchell, 1939, p. 29. 
40. R . D . Pearce, 1982. 
41. Fondation Louis de Brouckerie, Institut Emile Vandervelde, n.d., p. 20 ff. 
42. Académie royale des sciences d'outre-mer, 1983, p. 12. 
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for the Anglo-American war effort. Even before the Japanese victory in 
South-east Asia, there had been a major re-orientation of the trade of the 
Congo , with 85 per cent of her exports going to 'Britain, the United 
States, Rhodesia and South Africa in 1941 as against only 5 per cent in 
1939'.43 Because of its very importance to the Allied cause, the wartime 
administration of the Belgian Congo was at pains to safeguard its autonomy 
with respect both to the Allies and the Belgian government in London , 
and to preserve its economic independence by insisting on keeping open 
commercial relations with those clients w h o paid best.44 T h e impact of 
the demands of the Allies on the Belgian Congo for commodities pre-
viously obtained from South-east Asia was dramatic: tin production rose 
from 2750 tonnes in 1939 to 17300 tonnes in 1945; rubber from 1142 
tonnes in 1939 to 11337 tonnes in 1944; palm-oil from 89947 tonnes to 
144 271 tonnes.45 There were corresponding increases in other essential 
products such as zinc, cassiterite, coal, copper and timber. Similar 
increases in output were registered in British dependencies. Indeed, as 
R a y m o n d D u m m e t t has shown, Africa's mineral exports were indis-
pensable for the ultimate Allied victory. In particular, the manufacture of 
the atom b o m b , which brought the war against Japan to an abrupt end, 
was dependent on uranium supplies from the Belgian Congo. 4 6 
Such increases in production were not achieved without imposing 
strains on the labour resources of the colonies involved. In the first place, 
all the British territories were being tapped as a source of troops as well 
as labourers. In the Bechuanaland Protectorate, for instance, 10 000 m e n 
were recruited for the African Pioneer Corps out of a total population 
estimated at less than 250000. This represented an unusually high 
extraction of adult males from the agricultural and industrial workforce, 
but in all colonies where recruiting, voluntary or forced, was undertaken, 
heavy burdens were placed on those left behind as demands for increased 
production of food, rubber, timber and minerals were coupled with the 
requirements of public-works projects connected with the war effort and 
the increasing demand for labour in factories established, particularly in 
the Belgian Congo, to produce materials no longer available in Europe. 
T h e methods used to ensure production of the required increases of 
strategic raw materials varied from colony to colony. In the Belgian 
Congo, which contributed relatively few m e n to the Allied armies - a 
Congolese unit joined the expeditionary force which liberated Ethiopia 
from the Italians, while m e n were incorporated in South African and 
Rhodesian units - the civilian population was mobilized in an almost 
military fashion to increase production. Peasants were pressed into forced 
43. A . Lederer, 1983, p. 134. 
44. J . - C . Williame, 1983. 
45. R . Anstey, 1977, p. 144. 
46. R . Dummett , 1985, p. 392. 
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labour on the roads or detailed to collect wild rubber. Crops were 
requisitioned. L o n g before the war, it had been a cardinal point of Belgian 
policy in the Congo that male Africans living in 'customary society' 
should perform 60 days of obligatory labour - paid or unpaid - for their 
local community. This included the construction and maintenance of 
roads, and the production of subsistence and cash crops. This policy, 
which had been formalized in the decree of December 1933 and used to 
combat the effects of the depression, was n o w employed even more 
vigorously to prosecute the war. If Belgium could not fight, at least she 
could provide the wherewithal for the Allies to do so. B y 1944 the 
m a x i m u m number of days devoted to obligatory labour had increased to 
120. Those w h o failed to perform this work were brought before the 
tribunals de police so that the judicial arm of the state was employed to 
assist the administration to enforce its policy of increased production.47 
T h e main agents of this policy were, of course, the chiefs, whose 
unpopularity was thereby further increased. Overall, the increased burdens 
imposed on the peasants in the Congo during the war were, in the words 
of Jean Stengers, 'considérables et parfois très durs'.48 
In British Africa compulsory production was less widely used. T h e 
chief examples were the use of forced labour in the Nigerian tin mines,49 
and the conscription of workers for the sisal plantations of Tanganyika 
after the fall of the Philippines and Indonesia to the Japanese in order to 
meet demands for binder twine from America50 and from white farmers 
in Kenya w h o thus, as Arthur Creech-Jones protested at the time, 
'secured, under the cloak of war emergency, another concession at the 
expense of Africans'.51 But m u c h of the recruitment of soldiers and 
military labour was, if theoretically voluntary, in practice often compulsory. 
Again the chiefs were the principal agents for recruitment. W h e r e 
they had to use compulsion to ensure the numbers requested by the 
administration their unpopularity increased pari passu. O n e of the reasons 
for the unpopularity of Tshekedi K h a m a that led to his rejection by the 
Bangwato in 1949, after nearly a quarter of a century as their ruler, was 
the role he played in recruitment for the British.52 A n d yet, as David 
Kiyaga-Mulindwa has shown, this was undertaken with the best of 
motives - by delivering up all the m e n the British required into a military 
unit entirely separate from the South African army, he and his fellow 
chiefs hoped to create a sense of indebtedness to the Botswana on the 
47. R . Anstey, 1977, p. 147. 
48. J. Stengers, 1983, p. 11. 
49. See M . Crowder, 1980, p. 495, for the furore this caused in Parliament. 
50. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 343. 
51. Quoted in R . Smyth, 1985, p. 241. 
52. See M . Crowder, 1985a; also N . Parsons, 1985. 
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part of the British which would ensure their never being handed over to
South Africa.53
A major difference in the mobilization by the British and the Belgians
of their African populations relates to their approach. The Belgians,
who envisaged no future political role for educated Africans in the
administration of the colonial state, were not at particular pains to enlist
as distinct from require their support. In the British African colonies, even
in the white-dominated ones like Northern Rhodesia,54 considerable efforts
were made to persuade the African to participate in the war effort whether
by volunteering for military service, by increasing production, or by giving
contributions to wartime funds in return for promises of improvement in
economic, social and political conditions after the war. Africans were told
by poster and over the radio, through mobile cinema shows and infor¬
mation bureaux, that they were partners with their colonial masters in
the fight for democracy and that a brave new post-war world awaited
them.55 Colonial civil servants thus 'found themselves thrust into the
53. D. Kiyaga-Mulindwa, 1984.
54. R. Smyth, 1984, pp. 345-58.
55. See J. Cary, 1944.
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unfamiliar role of propagandists for empire. T h e y went out into the 
market place employing all the media channels to w o o public opinion'.56 
T h e n e w Colonial Development and Welfare Act, though it m a d e 
available only £5 million a year for the whole empire, was enacted at the 
very beginning of the war and marked an important departure in Britain's 
attitude towards the management of her colonies: development should 
n o w be undertaken not with an eye focused on the benefits it would bring 
the donor country but with respect to the immediate needs of the colony 
concerned; perhaps just as important, the colonial government should 
provide funds for the social welfare of the people whether in the form of 
increased educational services or hospitals; and, probably most significant 
of all, the old principle that colonies should pay for themselves was finally 
abandoned.57 Within the Colonial Office and in the Cabinet itself, debate 
had begun about the political future of the colonies, though it was not 
until after the war that a definite programme of 'decolonization' was fixed 
upon. During the war there was uncertainty as to w h o should be the 
eventual inheritors of power: the native authorities, or the educated élite, 
or a mixture of both. Certainly there was no timetable as to w h e n power, 
in whatever form, should be transferred to Africans. Nevertheless, in the 
West African colonies, promises were m a d e of political reform and 
significantly these, though very minor as it turned out, were elaborated 
in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast during the war, in each case reflecting 
the uncertainties as to w h o m power should in the long term be transferred 
to.58 
In the Congo, no such promises were m a d e by the administration. 
Even though the colony state was effectively independent during the 
war, and was economically involved with the British and Americans, it 
maintained the same rigid control of the African population as it had 
done when it was under the direct control of the Belgian colonial office. 
N o concession was m a d e to the idea of a political role for the African in 
the life of the colony, despite the growing signs of unrest and discontent 
that manifested themselves during the war.59 A s Stengers points out, for 
the Congo the war was not 'une période de transformations majeures. A 
aucun point de vue, dans l'évolution du Congo elle n'a representé un 
tournant'.60 After the war the former pattern of colonial rule under central 
control was reimposed. A n d for the immediate post-war years the Congo 
56. R . Smyth, 1984, p. 76. 
57. This was certainly the view of one colonial governor - Sir Bernard Bourdillon: see 
J. White, 1981, pp. 233-4. See also, S. Constantine, 1984, ch. 9. 
58. See J. Flint, 1983, pp. 389-411, also the reply by R . D . Pearce, 1984, pp. 77-93, 
for an interesting discussion about the debates on the future of the African colonies in 
the Colonial Office during the war, with particular reference to whether or not plans for 
decolonization were envisaged at that time. 
59. R . Anstey, 1977, p. 157. 
60. J. Stengers, 1983, p. 11. 
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became as vital for the reconstruction of the shattered Belgium as it had 
been for provisioning the Allied victory. A s Anstey put it, the 'economic 
and administrative policies of the war years were essentially developments 
of existing practice rather than n e w departures; continuity is also the 
hallmark of the post-war period'.61 It was not until after 1950 that Belgium 
began to contribute substantially to the economic and social development 
of the Congo. 
T h e impact of the war in the British African dependencies was very 
different. Generally the new concept of the obligation of the British 
government for the economic and social welfare of the colonies, itself a 
child of the depression, was nurtured during the war. Plans for the 
development of institutions of higher education in the African colonies 
were drawn up during the war, as were those for the development of 
trades unions. M o n e y was set aside for colonial research: a Colonial 
Products Research Council, a Colonial Social Science Research Council, 
a Medical Research Committee, and a Committee on Colonial Agricultural, 
Animal Health and Forestry Research were established. 
These tentative reforms were undertaken by Britain partly under 
pressure from her American allies w h o were not prepared to fight a war 
on her behalf merely to preserve her empire, partly in response to calls 
for reform both within and outside the Colonial Office, and partly to 
avoid a repetition of the disturbances in the West Indies in 1940 caused 
by the prevailing scandalous economic and social conditions. W h a t became 
clear very soon after the war, particularly in West Africa, was that the 
tentative programme of reform launched during the war was far from 
adequate. T h e war, despite the economic recovery that came in its wake, 
exacerbated rather than mollified the rural and urban discontent of the 
1930s. Farmers did not gain the full benefit of the revival in prices paid 
for their export crops since these were controlled by the administration 
during the war and the difference was held, in the case of Britain, in 
sterling balances in London that helped finance the purchase of war 
materials from the United States. T h u s in Tanganyika sisal was sold at 
less than half the price paid for it by the Americans and Iliffe has 
calculated that the British exchequer thereby gained £11 million before 
price control was ended.62 
In Kenya, the white farmers had a revival in their fortunes, particularly 
after the Japanese occupation of the Allies' Far Eastern colonies. Guaran-
teed prices were paid to them by the government for maize, and schemes 
of financial assistance were introduced for flax, rye and wheat as well. 
T h e guaranteed prices were often as m u c h as twice as high as those 
available to African farmers, w h o nevertheless experienced a b o o m which 
encouraged them to put more land under cultivation. This further 
61. R . Anstey, 1977, p. 159. 
62. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 344. 
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exacerbated the potential conflict of interests between the two groups of 
farmers.63 
While African farmers did not reap full or, in the case of compulsory 
cultivation, any benefit from the increase in the world market price, they 
had to pay higher prices for imported goods which were in short supply 
partly because of shortage of shipping space. T h e result was inflation that 
hit both rural and urban workers. In Tanganyika prices nearly doubled 
during the war and an enquiry undertaken in Dar es Salaam in 1942 
reckoned that 'some 87 per cent of Government employees . . . are in 
receipt of a wage on which they cannot possibly subsist without getting 
into debt'.64 T h e number of urban workers had increased substantially as 
industries were established to provide substitutes for unobtainable imports, 
and as construction projects were undertaken to improve the c o m -
munications route from West Africa to North Africa which became vital 
for the North African campaign or for the provisioning and refuelling of 
shipping on its way to India and the B u r m a campaign. In the Belgian 
Congo the exodus from the rural areas was stimulated by the war as 
Africans sought to escape the unrestrained recruitment policies of the 
government and its heavy quotas on agricultural production.65 
T h e growth of an urban proletariat was not accompanied by a c o m -
parable expansion of accommodation and m a n y of them lived in shanty 
towns in intolerable conditions. These and inflation m a d e them ripe for 
political indoctrination and strike action. There were numerous strikes 
for higher pay in British Africa during the war. Even in the m u c h more 
tightly controlled Belgian Congo, workers of the Union Miniere struck 
over the decline in their living standards in 1941 and they were only 
forced back to work after the army was brought in and seventy strikers 
were killed.66 
T h e war heightened the expectations of the educated élite, some of 
w h o m n o w found themselves incorporated into the colonial administrative 
and business structure as British officials and managers left for the front. 
In particular they were inspired by the Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 
by Franklin D . Roosevelt and Winston Churchill with its affirmation of 
'the right of all people to choose the form of government in which they 
live' and their expressed desire to see 'sovereign rights and self-government 
restored to those w h o have been forcibly deprived of them'. T h e sub-
sequent denial by the British prime minister that the charter applied to 
his country's African territories merely served to heighten nationalist 
frustration with the colonial regime. Here, there was of course a dramatic 
63. D . Anderson and D . Throup, 1985, p. 335 ff. 
64. Report of enquiry into wages and cost of living of low-grade African Government 
Employees in Dar es Salaam, September 1942, cited in J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 354. 
65. R . Anstey, 1977, p. 173. 
66. B . Fetter, 1976, p. 173. 
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contrast with Belgian Africa, which just did not have such an educated 
élite, since the highest level of education available for m o s t Africans w a s 
the primary school, with further education being limited to the Catholic 
seminary. 
It w a s not only the expectations of the élite that were heightened b y 
the war. Soldiers w h o had been taken from rural farms to fight in B u r m a 
or w o r k as labourers in the M i d d l e East or Italy learnt n e w skills and 
trades; m a n y were taught to read a n d write; large n u m b e r s of t h e m 
expanded their horizons as they sojourned in India where the nationalists 
were d e m a n d i n g that the British should quit their country, or in Italy 
w h e r e they s a w the i m m e n s e destruction one group of white m e n could 
visit o n another. W h e n they returned to their countries they did so with 
ambitions for themselves and their children that were utterly different 
from those they had w h e n they first stood before the recruiting officer. 
In the Belgian C o n g o aspirations engendered abroad were d a m p e n e d b y 
a strictly controlled system of administration w h e r e there w a s n o political 
outlet available to Africans. E v e n so, the w a r witnessed the first protest 
b y educated Africans against the colonial regime w h e n black n o n - c o m -
missioned officers enlisted their support in a poorly organized and easily 
suppressed conspiracy against the Belgians in Elisabethville.67 B u t in those 
colonies like the G o l d Coast and Nigeria w h e r e the n e w aspirations of 
the returned soldiers had avenues of expression open to t h e m , they 
b e c a m e supporters, if not leaders, of the political parties wh ich were n o w 
d e m a n d i n g self-government. 
Conclusion: British- and Belgian-dominated Africa on 
the eve of the struggle for independence 
In 1935 the possibility that m o s t of British and Belgian Africa w o u l d be 
independent within a quarter of a century w a s not even entertained. T h e 
colonial administration in Britain talked in terms of a m i n i m u m of three 
generations, the Belgians in terms of at least a hundred years as the 
earliest independence could even be conceived of. N o t even the m o s t 
optimistic political leader in W e s t Africa w o u l d have envisaged i960 let 
alone 1957 as a realistic target date. Indeed, in the 1930s independence 
w a s not a w o r d that appeared prominently in the vocabulary of African 
politicians. B y 1945 in m u c h of British Africa, if not Belgian, independence 
n o w seemed a realistic though still distant goal. T h e possibility of the 
G o l d Coast b e c o m i n g independent w a s being raised in the Colonial Office 
though it w a s considered that it w a s 'unlikely to be achieved in m u c h 
less than a generation'.68 T h e decade 1 9 3 5 - 4 5 , then, is a crucial one in 
67. ibid. 
68. Constitutional Development in Africa, m e m o , drafted by A . Cohen, Public Record 
Office, London, CO847/36/47238, cited in J. P. Hargreaves, 1985, p. 438. 
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colonial history, and the debate will no doubt continue as to what brought
about that change. The Great Depression and the Second World War
had a profound effect on the attitudes of both colonized and colonizer.
But certain developments had been taking place even before the Great
Depression - and certainly before the impact of the Second World War.
In the first place, the original investment of education in Africa,
particularly in British Africa, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning
of the twentieth century was starting to bear fruit in the growth of a
politically conscious élite and there was a direct correlation between the
size of the educated élite as a proportion of the population of a colony
and the growth of an effective nationalist movement. Thus the rich Belgian
Congo, where educational opportunities for Africans were minimal, lagged
behind the impoverished neighbouring Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (now
Sudan) where schools of law, engineering, veterinary science and agric¬
ulture, and medicine had all been opened before the war. Secondly,
whatever the system of colonial exploitation employed by the colonial
power concerned, by the mid-i930S most Africans were directly involved
in the colonial economy in one form or another and few were unaffected
by the policies of the colonial masters.
The Great Depression and the Second World War in their different
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ways both heightened the elite's perceptions of the injustices of the 
colonial system - in particular with regard to their participation in it by 
first denying them that participation and then by providing them with 
greater opportunities for doing so. Similarly, the Great Depression and 
the Second World W a r both heightened awareness of the farmers and the 
nascent proletariat of the colonial state through the hardships that the 
colonial economy could inflict and the opportunities it could present and 
frustrate. Together these left the colonial powers confronted by a very 
different Africa from that of the early 1930s. T h e British were prepared 
to accommodate themselves to these changes w h e n they recognized them 
as having taken place; the Belgians were not, with consequences of 
disastrous magnitude. 
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The struggle for political 
sovereignty: from içfâ to 
independence 
Seek ye first the 
political kingdom 
ALI A. M A Z R U I 
'Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto 
you." W h e n he said that, K w a m e N k r u m a h was convinced that political 
independence was the key to all other improvements in the African 
condition. Underlying the statement was a philosophy about the primacy 
of politics in h u m a n affairs - a radically different philosophy from economic 
determinism. H a d N k r u m a h been a thorough-going Marxist he would 
have been tempted to proclaim 'Seek ye first the economic kingdom - and 
all else will be added unto it.' 
A n d yet, in a colonial situation, K w a m e Nkrumah's political primacy 
was at least partially right. Colonial Africa did initially have to seek 
political sovereignty before anything else could be added unto it. W h a t 
N k r u m a h overlooked was a simple distinction in the science of logic -
the distinction between what was a sufficient condition and what was a 
necessary condition. Political sovereignty (or 'the political kingdom') was 
indeed a necessary condition before Africa could fulfil or realize any of 
her other fundamental aspirations. But by itself political sovereignty was 
not enough - it was not a sufficient condition. It was simply not true 
that 'all else would be added unto it'. 
B y the 1980s, in Nkrumah's o w n country, Ghana , the conditions 
seemed to testify to an opposite conclusion from what N k r u m a h had in 
mind. Ghana's situation in the early 1980s seemed cruelly to proclaim: 
'Seek ye first the political kingdom - and all else will be subtracted from 
it'. T h e economy was worse than it was on attainment of political 
sovereignty; the educational system had deteriorated; roads had dis-
integrated, railways rusted, telephones had gone silent and the rest of the 
infrastructure was in decay. A Ghanaian diaspora had come into being -
m a n y of the most gifted Ghanaians had scattered to the four corners of 
the world. Ghanaian cocoa was masquerading as Ivorian in search of 
greater returns. If there had indeed been a wager between Ghana's 
founder-president, N k r u m a h , and the Côte d'Ivoire's founder-president, 
Houphouêt-Boigny, concerning the value of their contrasting models, the 
1. K . Nkrumah, 1957, p. 164. 
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Ivorian seemed to have w o n . His were the credentials of diluting political 
sovereignty for the sake of higher economic returns. 
If N k r u m a h was right that Africa should first seek the political kingdom, 
and wrong in his assumption that it was a sufficient condition for 'all 
else' to be added unto it, what is likely to be the judgement of history 
on the two parts of Nkrumah's imperative? W h a t is the balance sheet in 
the search for the political kingdom? W h a t is the likely outcome in the 
struggle for 'all else' to be added to the African condition? These are 
some of the questions to be addressed in this chapter. 
Nationalism re-born 
T h e struggle for the political kingdom - or for political sovereignty - in 
colonial Africa had four phases which sometimes empirically overlapped, 
but were nevertheless analytically distinct. There was first the phase of pre-
Second World W a r élite agitation for greater autonomy. There was then the 
phase of popular involvement in the struggle against Nazism and fascism. 
There was, thirdly, non-violent popular struggle for full independence after 
the Second World W a r . Finally, there was armed engagement for the political 
kingdom - the guerrilla wars against white minority governments especially 
from the 1960s onwards. T h e chronological outcome of all these different 
struggles is summarized in Table 5.1 (pp. 108-11). 
S o m e of the earliest forms of élite organization were through cultural 
bodies and special-interest groups. In the period between the two world 
wars a variety of ethnic and kinship unions developed in different colonies -
partly inspired by a sense of solidarity among migrant workers in cities, and 
partly because of the wider sense of African alienation in conditions of 
colonial exploitation. T h e range of kinship organizations which emerged 
was from the Kikuyu Central Association in East Africa to the Urhobo 
Renascent Convention in West Africa. In Musl im Africa the cultural organ-
izations were sometimes linked to religion rather than ethnicity. In 1935, for 
example, Shavkh c A b d al-Hamid Badis in Algeria formed the Association 
of'Ulamä, partly in defence of Islam in a colonial situation. 
There were other forms of restlessness during the inter-war years. For 
example, in M a y 1935 there were African strikes and riots on the copper 
belt in Northern Rhodesia. A n d in Nigeria a variety of special-interest 
groups began to organize themselves. In Lagos alone this enthusiasm for 
organization resulted in the following explosion of associations:2 
Lagos Fishermen's Association 1937 
Alakoro Union W o m e n ' s Trading C o . 1939 
Farina W o m e n Sellers' Union 1940 
Lagos Wholesale Butchers' Union 1938 
2. See J. S. Coleman, 1963, pp. 212-13. 
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Taxi Drivers' Association 1938 
Lagos Canoe Transport Union 1938 
Lagos Night Soil Removers' Union 1942 
Lagos Union of Auctioneers 1932 
Palm Wine Sellers' Association 1942 
Other cultural and élite organizations a m o n g Africans and people of 
African ancestry were formed abroad. Pan-Africanism was also entering 
a n e w phase. Leopold Sedar Senghor and A i m é Césaire founded L'étudiant 
noir in France. A n d K w a m e N k r u m a h , J o m o Kenyatta and W . E . B . 
DuBois were active pan-Africanists in Britain and the United States. 
But although m a n y of these early movements were basically élite 
organizations, and m a n y of the interest-group associations were primarily 
urban, the beginnings of mass politics were at hand in the inter-war 
years. Habib Bourguiba organized a civil disobedience campaign in Tunisia 
which resulted in riots in Tunis. Bourguiba and others were court-
martialled. Their party (Neo-Destür) was officially dissolved but continued 
underground. 
Although the techniques used against imperialism at this stage were 
primarily non-violent and agitational, one of the exceptions was the 
Ethiopian struggle against Italian occupation. In February 1937, grenades 
were thrown at the Viceroy in Addis Ababa. In 1939 Ethiopian resistance 
managed to hold down 56 Italian battalions for a while. Native freedom-
fighters maintained the struggle until they were joined by a small British 
force in 1940. In March 1941, Britain invaded Ethiopia with the agreement 
of Emperor Haile Selassie. 
A s the Second World W a r unfolded, Africa as a whole had to choose 
between imperialism under bourgeois liberalism and imperialism under 
the n e w menace of Nazism and fascism. T h e dilemma became particularly 
acute in the French colonies — since France itself was occupied and was 
split. A s far back as 1938 France had recruited 20000 troops from French 
West Africa ( A O F ) of w h o m 7000 had been sent to France in addition 
to 18000 tirailleurs in A O F and 29000 already in France and North 
Africa. 
Dakar as the capital of A O F was initially under the Vichy regime. In 
June 1940, 130000 troops were recruited in A O F - the Germans treating 
them with cruelty and contempt. In September 1940, there was an Anglo-
French expedition to take Dakar, but this failed. However, in the previous 
month Niger and Chad had declared in favour of Charles de Gaulle and 
the French Resistance. In December 1942, French West Africa finally 
joined the Allies against the Nazi menace. 
African participation in the Second World W a r was of course extensive 
all over the continent. W a s Africa's involvement a case of collaboration 
with the existing colonial powers? O r should it be seen as a special phase 
of Africa's anti-colonial struggle? 
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T A B L E 5.1. Chronology of African independence 
State Date of 
independence 
Colonial Notes 
power 
Ethiopia 
Liberia 
South Africa 
Egypt 
Ancient 
26.7.1847 
31.5.1910 Britain 
28.2.1922 Britain 
Libya 
Ethiopia 
(Eritrea) 
Ethiopia 
(Ogaden) 
Sudan 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Morocco (part) 
Morocco (part) 
Ghana 
24.12.1951 
11.9.1952 
1955 
1.1.1956 
2.3.1956 
20.3.1956 
7.4.1956 
29.10.1956 
6-3-I957 
Italy 
Italy 
Britain 
Egypt 
France 
France 
Spain 
Britain 
Italian occupation 1935-41. 
Private colony 1822-47. 
(Suid Afrika) Union of four 
colonies, Cape Colony, Natal, 
Orange River Colony (Oranje Vrij 
Staat) and Transvaal (Zuid 
Afrikaansche Republick), the last two 
of which had been independent 
republics to 31.5.1902. 
T h e Union became a republic outside 
the British Commonwealth 31.5.1961. 
White minority rule. 
Unrecognized 'independent' 
homelands: 
Transkei 26.10.1976 
Bophutatswana 6.12.1977 
Venda 13.9.1979 
Ciskei 4.12.1981 
United with Syria as United Arab 
Republic ( U A R ) from 1.2.1958 to 
28.9.1961. Federated with Kingdom 
of Yemen from 8.3.1958 to 
26.12.1961. N a m e of U A R retained 
by Egypt until 2.9.1971. 
British (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) 
and French (Fezzân) administration 
I943-5I-
British administration 1941-52. 
Federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia 
1952. Full union 14.11.1962. 
Italian occupation 1936-41. 
British administration 1941-55. 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium. 
(Maroc) 
(Tunisie) 
(Marruecos) Spanish northern zone. 
International zone (Tangier). 
(Gold Coast) including British 
Togoland ( U N trust), part of former 
G e r m a n colony of Togo. 
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State 
Morocco (part) 
Guinea 
Cameroon 
Togo 
Senegal 
Mali 
Madagascar 
Zaire 
Somalia 
Benin 
Date of 
independence 
27.4.1958 
2.10.1958 
1.1.1960 
27.4.1960 
20.6.1960 
(20.8.1960) 
20.6.1960 
(22.9.1960) 
26.6.1960 
30.6.1960 
1.7.i960 
1.8.1960 
Colonial 
power 
Spain 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
Belgium 
Italy 
Britain 
France 
Notes 
(Marruecos) Spanish southern zone. 
(Guinée Française) 
(Cameroun) U N trust. Larger part of 
former G e r m a n colony of K a m -
erun. 
U N trust. Larger part of former 
G e r m a n colony of T o g o . 
Independent initially as 'Federation 
of Mali' with former French Soudan 
(Mali). Federation broke u p after two 
months . Joined with the G a m b i a as 
Confederation of Senegambia from 
1.1.1982. 
(Soudan Français) Independent 
initially as 'Federation of Mali' with 
Senegal. Federation broke u p after 
two months . 
(Malagasy; République Malgache) 
C o n g o Free State (Etat Indépendant 
du Congo) 2.5.1885 to 18.11.1908 
w h e n it became the Belgian C o n g o 
(Congo Beige, Belgisch Congo). 
N a m e changed from C o n g o on 
27.10.1971. 
U N trust. Union of two colonies. 
British Somaliland independent prior 
to union from 26.6.1960. 
N a m e changed from D a h o m e y on 
30.11.1975. 
Niger 
Burkina Faso 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Chad 
Central African 
Republic 
(CAR) 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
Gabon 
Nigeria 
3.8.1960 
5.8.1960 
7.8.1960 
11.8.i960 
13.8.i960 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
15.8.1960 France 
N a m e changed from Upper Volta 
(Haute Volta) on 4.8.1984. 
(Tchad) 
(Oubangui-Chari, République 
Centrafricaine) Central African 
Empire from 4.12.1976 to 
20.9.1979. 
(Moyen Congo) 
17.8.1960 
1.10.1960 
France 
Britain 
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State Date of 
independence 
Colonial Notes 
power 
Mauritania 
Sierra Leone 
Nigeria (British 
Cameroon 
North) 
Cameroon 
(British 
Cameroon 
South) 
Tanzania 
28.11.i960 
27.4.1961 
1.6.1961 
Zambia 
Gambia 
France 
Britain 
Britain 
1.10.1961 Britain 
9.12.1961 Britain 
Burundi 
Rwanda 
Algeria 
Uganda 
Tanzania 
(Zanzibar) 
Kenya 
Malawi 
1.7.1962 
1.7.1962 
3.7.1962 
9.10.1962 
10.12.1963 
12.12.1963 
6.7.1964 
Belgium" 
Belgium. 
France 
Britain 
Britain 
Britain 
Britain 
24.10.1964 Britain 
18.2.1965 Britain 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Mauritius 
Swaziland 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Morocco (Ifni) 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mozambique 
Cape Verde 
30.9.1966 
4.10.1966 
12.3.1968 
6.9.1968 
12.10.1968 
30.6.1969 
10.9.1974 
256.1975 
5-7-1975 
Britain 
Britain 
Britain 
Britain 
Spain 
Spain 
Portugal 
Portugal 
Portugal 
(Mauritanie) 
U N trust. Part of former G e r m a n 
colony of Kamerun. Plebiscite 
11/12.2.1961. 
U N trust. Part of former G e r m a n 
colony of Kamerun. Plebiscite 
11/12.2.1961. Union with Cameroon 
as United Republic of Cameroon. 
(Tanganyika) U N trust. Greater part 
of former G e r m a n colony of Deutsche 
Ostafrika. N a m e changed to 
Tanzania following union with 
Zanzibar 27.4.1964. 
U N trust. Ruanda-Urundi, divided 
at independence, was smaller part 
of former G e r m a n colony of 
Deutsche Ostafrika. 
(Algérie) 
Union with Tanganyika as Tanzania 
27.4.1964. 
(Nyasaland) Federated with 
Rhodesias 1.10.1953 to 
31.12.1963. 
(Northern Rhodesia) Federated with 
Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia 
1.10.1953 t 0 3 ! - I 2 I 9 6 3 -
Joined with Senegal as Confederation 
Senegambia from 1.1.1982. 
(Bechuanaland) 
(Basutoland) 
Comprises Rio Muni and Macias 
Nguema Biyogo (Fernando Poo). 
(Territorio de Ifni) 
Guine-Bissau formerly Guine 
Portuguesa. 
(Moçambique) 
(Cabo Verde) 
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State Date of 
independence 
Colonial Notes 
power 
Comoros 
St T h o m a s and 12.7.1975 
Prince Islands 
Angola 11.11.1975 
Western Sahara 28.2.1975 
6.7.1975 France (Archipel des Comores) Excluding 
island of Mayotte which remains a 
French Overseas Territory 
(Territoire d'Outre-Mer). 
Portugal (Säo Tomé e Principe) 
Seychelles 
Djibouti 
Zimbabwe 
Namibia 
26.6.1976 
27.6.1977 
21.3.1990 
Portugal 
Spain 
Britain 
France 
18.4.1980 Britain 
South 
Africa 
(Including Cabinda) 
(Rio de Oro and Seguit el Hamra) on 
Spanish withdrawal seized by 
Morocco . Occupation disputed by 
P O L I S A R I O , formed 10.5.1973. 
(Territoire français des Afars et des 
Issas formerly Côte Française des 
Somalis) 
(Rhodesia, formerly Southern 
Rhodesia) U D I in effect from 
11.11.1965 to 12.12.1979. Federated 
with Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 1.10.1953 to 31.12.1963. 
(South West Africa) U N trust. 
Former G e r m a n colony of Deutsche 
Südwestafrika. South Africa in 
dispute with U N . 
Source: I. L . L . Griffiths, An Atlas of African Affairs, 1989, Routledge, Chapman and Hall 
Inc, N e w York; and Routledge, London, pp. 182-5. Updated by U N E S C O as far as the 
date of Namibia's independence is concerned. 
Footnote by the Volume Editor. Although continental Africa is n o w wholly independent, a 
number of islands and small enclaves are still dependent territories. These include Madeira 
(under Portugal), Canary Islands and Spanish North Africa (under Spain), St Helena 
with Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (under Britain), Mayotte and French Indian Ocean 
Islands (under France). Reunion is an Overseas Department of France and Socorra is 
part of Yemen. 
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It is true that there was widespread ambivalence in Africa about the 
Second World W a r . But on the whole the philosophy which prevailed 
favoured the 'devils' which Africans already knew (especially Britain and 
Free France) rather than the n e w devils of Nazism and fascism. 
A n d those Africans w h o had experienced pre-Nazi G e r m a n rule (like 
Tanganyikans and Togolese) knew that the Germans were among the 
most brutal of imperial powers in Africa's experience. Hitler's demand 
for the return of G e r m a n colonies in 1936 had caused widespread 
consternation in those parts of Africa previously ruled by Germany. For 
example, the Tanganyika League was formed in 1938 - with its head-
quarters in Nairobi - to resist the return of Tanganyika to G e r m a n rule. 
White residents and black people were united in their opposition. During 
the war against the Axis (1939-45), 87000 Tanganyikan Africans served 
on the side of the Allies to prevent the return of the Germans. 
It is against this background of 'choosing between devils' that African 
participation in the Second World W a r must be seen. Africa's involvement 
was not a process of collaboration with imperialism but was a commitment 
against a worse form of hegemony. T o that extent, Africa's involvement 
in the war was, paradoxically, part and parcel of Africa's struggle against 
foreign exploitation and in search of h u m a n dignity. 
Indeed, the war itself played a part in weakening imperial powers on 
both sides of the conflict. France had been humiliated by the Germans . 
T h e French defeat helped to destroy the myth of France's o w n imperial 
invincibility. Britain was impoverished and exhausted by the war — and 
lost her will to hold on to too big an empire. Within little more than two 
years after the end of the global conflict, Britain was forced to let go of 
'the brightest jewel in the British crown' — her Indian empire. T h e war 
also helped to raise even higher the global roles of the United States and 
the Soviet Union - which from then onwards overshadowed imperial 
Europe. In their o w n different ways the n e w superpowers began to put 
pressures on European colonial pioneers to dismantle their empires. (The 
superpowers had different imperial designs of their o w n for the post-war 
years.) 
T h e birth of the United Nations in 1945 also contributed to the process 
of decolonization worldwide. As the world body became more truly 
representative of the h u m a n race, colonialism became less and less 
legitimate. Almost every new m e m b e r of the United Nations following 
India's independence was a voice against the old systems of empire. A n d 
the Trusteeship Council of the world body became a major lobby against 
colonialism at large. 
T h e very rationale of the war as a struggle against tyranny and conquest 
seemed to be incompatible with colonialism: after all, colonialism was 
itself a form of tyranny and conquest. W h e n Winston Churchill and 
Franklin D . Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, they 
were not only denouncing injustice in Europe - though Churchill was 
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more obsessed with Europe. Even without realizing it, they were also 
signing the death warrant of the whole idea of 'legitimate colonialism' for 
the rest of the twentieth century. 
But the Africans themselves were the most important force against 
colonialism in Africa as they gradually became better organized, more 
articulate in their demands, and ultimately better armed for the struggle. 
A number of different traditions of African resistance are discernible 
in this period. There was the warrior tradition, the djihäd tradition, the 
tradition of Christianity in revolt and the related tradition of non-violent 
mobilization. Finally, there was the tradition of guerrilla warfare. Let us 
take a closer look at each of these strategies of resistance, bearing in mind 
also that they were sometimes used to reinforce each other rather than 
as separate techniques of war. 
T h e warrior tradition of resistance 
This concept is linked to the Dar es Salaam School of African History 
and its emphasis on 'primary resistance'. T h e Dar es Salaam School used 
the term 'primary' in a chronological sense to m e a n resistance at the very 
time of European penetration and conquest. After all, m a n y African 
societies had decided not to take the colonial advance 'lying d o w n ' - but 
to fight it as it encroached. Resistance ranged from the Asante wars to 
the Matabele uprising. These are struggles which have been covered in 
earlier volumes of the U N E S C O General History of Africa. 
But there is another sense of 'primary resistance'. In this second sense, 
what is 'primary' is not necessarily what took place earlier in time, but 
what is more deeply rooted in the indigenous warrior tradition. This is 
a cultural meaning of 'primary' rather than a chronological one. T h e M a u 
M a u freedom-fighters challenged the British as late as the 1950s - but 
on the basis of Kikuyu values of warriorhood and related religious beliefs, 
with all the symbolism of indigenous combat cultures, including elaborate 
oathing ceremonies. T h e m o v e m e n t was 'primary' in this cultural sense. 
A similar kind of primordial symbolism was later discerned - in more 
subtle forms - in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Spirit 
possession was not unknown a m o n g the guerrillas. A n d Basil Davidson 
has drawn our attention to the fact that an oath taken by guerrillas in 
the names of the great spirits of Chaminuka and Nehanda used to form 
part of the continuities of struggle.3 
In the days before independence, Nathan Shamuyarira also drew our 
attention to the indigenous tone of Zimbabwe's struggle: 
In rural areas meetings become political gatherings and more . . . 
the past heritage was revived through prayers and traditional singing, 
3. B . Davidson, 1969, p. 255. 
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ancestral spirits were evoked to guide and lead the new nation.
Christianity and civilization took a back seat and new forms of
worship and new attitudes were thrust forward dramatically.4
Joshua Nkomo, the Zimbabwe freedom-fighter, was met at Salisbury
airport in 1962 by a survivor of the 1896-9 resistance. Nkomo had just
arrived from abroad. The older man presented Nkomo with a spirit axe
to symbolize martial succession and the transmission of the warrior torch.5
As the armed struggle gathered momentum some of the campaign
zones were named after senior spirit mediums. Indeed, some of the
mediums actually operated in the guerrilla camps. The link between the
warrior and the prophet was permitted to persist in the struggle for
Southern Africa. The ancestral warrior tradition had found a new incar¬
nation in a modern struggle.
But African resistance was sometimes inspired by other cultures at
work in Africa - including especially the force of Islam. It is to this other
culture that we must now turn.
4. N. M. Shamuyarira, 1965, pp. 68-9; see also T. O. Ranger and J. Weiler, 1975.
5. N. M. Shamuyarira, 1965; T. O. Ranger and J. Weiler, 1975.
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T h e (¡jihad tradition in African resistance 
Earlier volumes of the U N E S C O General History of Africa have already 
indicated how the djihäd tradition (meaning 'struggle in the Path of G o d ' ) 
was mobilized in the resistance to imperial penetration by the Sultanate 
of Sokoto in Nigeria, by the MahdTyya movement in Eastern Sudan and 
by the sacralized nationalism of Sayed M u h a m m a d 'Abdallah Hassan (the 
astonishingly sane 'Mullah'). 
T h e MahdTyya spirit persisted in Sudan and played a role against both 
British imperialism and Egyptian expansionism. T h e MahdTyya techniques 
changed over time but a basic anti-imperial tendency continued to be a 
feature of the movement. 
In Algeria, the tendency to refer to the indigenous population as 
'Muslim' reinforced the link between Islam and nationalism. Racialist 
laws m a d e by the Vichy regime in the s u m m e r of 1942 created a new 
form of apartheid in Algeria from which French Algeria never fully 
recovered. 'Muslims' were denied the use of markets, cinemas and bathing 
beaches at the same time as Europeans. At its worst, this Francophone 
apartheid even forbade 'Muslims' to sit next to Europeans. 
W h e n Algeria was 'rescued' from the Vichy excesses, improvements 
for the indigenous people were only cosmetic. Indeed, the year the Second 
World W a r ended was also one of the worst years of French repression 
in Algeria. In M a y 1945 a nationalist procession of Muslims in Setif 
clashed with the police. Riots broke out both in Setif and Kabylie. 
Repression by the French army and police resulted in some 10 000 deaths 
of Algerian Muslims. T h e spirit of the djihäd tradition could only be re-
kindled by this scale of martyrdom. By 1954 the National Liberation 
Front of Algeria was ready to inherit the djihäd torch from the nineteenth-
century Algerian hero, 'Àbd al-Kâdir al-Jazairi. T h e new Algerian rev-
olution had started. 
T h e Egyptian revolution of 1952 established a different kind of linkage 
with Islam. Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser, the leader of the revolution, interpreted 
Egypt as the centre of three circles — die circles of Islam, the Arab world 
and Africa. T h e struggle against imperialism was therefore to be seen in 
the context of uie three forces of Islamic resistance, Arab nationalism and 
pan-Africanism. 
A n d yet al-Nasser was cautious about what he regarded as the more 
'extreme' forms of Islamic fundamentalism - especially the movement 
k n o w n as the Musl im Brotherhood. H e outlawed the movement and 
imprisoned some of its leaders. In an age of increasingly competitive 
ideologies, Islam was indeed a potential ally in the struggle against 
imperialism - but also a potential danger to political stability among 
Egyptians themselves. 
G a m ä l 'Abd al-Nasser's o w n preference was for the political m o b -
ilization of pan-Arabism against both Zionism and Western imperialism. 
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Although his pan-Arabism had a military arm in the struggle against
Israel, the central force of the Egyptian revolution lay in non-violent mass
mobilization. Al-Nasser's refusal to permit the execution of King Farouk,
and his henchmen in 1952 was part of al-Nasser's vision that 'a revolution
born of blood will die in blood'.
Other African nationalists were much more directly influenced by the
Indian leader, Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi. It was all part of the wider
strategy of non-violent political mobilization, distinct from and yet sim¬
ultaneously reinforcing the forces of the warrior tradition and the legacy
of the djihäd.
The tradition of radical Christianity
Islam was not the only religion which rebelled against colonial rule. Even
more ironical was the revolt of Christianity against Western imperialism.
Outside North Africa and the Nile valley, Christianity had arrived in
Africa in partnership with European colonialism. In the nineteenth century
it was sometimes missionary groups which persuaded their own European
governments to colonize Africa. This was particularly true of the colon¬
ization of East Africa. The moral justification advanced by missionaries
in European capitals was the suppression of the Arab slave trade and the
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spread of the Christian gospel. Imperial reluctance was sometimes swept 
aside by missionary zeal and moral enthusiasm. 
T h e partnership between European imperialism and Christian mission 
deeply affected educational policies in the colonies. T h e division of labour 
between Church and state in the task of 'educating the natives' varied 
from colony to colony - but there was little doubt about the political 
partnership between organized Christianity and the state. Indeed, the 
immediate aim of colonial education was for a while to produce Africans 
w h o were 'fit to become either schoolmasters or religion teachers'. K w a m e 
Nkrumah's o w n initial aspirations included the ambition to become a 
Catholic priest.6 
Considering this partnership between European colonization and Chris-
tian mission, it was the more surprising that missionary schools produced 
some of the earliest African nationalists of the modern variety. T h e 
partnership between Christianity and colonialism turned out to be a 
dialectic almost in the classical Hegelian sense of contradiction at the level 
of the idea. T h e missionary schools helped to promote not just Christian 
spiritual ideas but also Western secular ideologies. African radical national-
ists w h o emerged from Christian missionary schools included such tower-
ing figures as Julius K . Nyerere, T o m M b o y a , Eduardo Mondlane, Robert 
M u g a b e , Leopold Sedar Senghor as well as K w a m e N k r u m a h . 
All these were relatively secular figures arising out of a religious w o m b . 
Indeed, K w a m e N k r u m a h said of himself: 'I a m a Marxist-Leninist and 
a non-denominational Christian - and I see no contradiction in that'.7 
However, European Christianity did not only produce secular African 
rebels, it also produced African religious rebels against the Euro-Christian 
order. A m o n g the most successful in this historical period was Simon 
Kimbangu. His followers argued that if G o d wanted to send a message 
to the black people, would he have chosen a white messenger? Kimbangu's 
message sought to reduce the role of the cross in Christianity - a 
'dangerous equivalent of the graven image'. Kimbangu's Africanization 
of Christianity in a matrilineal society also permitted female leadership 
in the Church well before the rise of feminist Western assertiveness in 
mainstream European churches. 
Simon Kimbangu paid a heavy price for his religious-cultural crusades. 
T h e Belgians arrested him in the Congo and locked him up. Simon 
Kimbangu spent almost as m u c h time in a Belgian cage as Jesus Christ 
spent on earth: for some 30 years Kimbangu languished behind bars.8 
B y the 1980s the Kimbangu Church had not only transcended col-
onialism, it had established enough international credibility to have become 
the first African denomination to be admitted to the World Council of 
6. See K . Nkrumah, 1957. 
7. ibid. 
8. See also Chapter 17 below, and U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII. 
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Churches. B y the 1980s the K i m b a n g u Church was some four million 
strong. It is worth remembering that such a figure constituted a bigger 
following than Jesus Christ had in the first three centuries of the Christian 
era. 
A s will be shown in Chapter 17, the whole phenomenon of separatist 
and millenarian churches during the colonial period was part of Africa's 
struggle to recover identity and defend its cultural dignity. S o m e m o v e -
ments were more moderate than others, but all of them have to be seen 
in the context of Africa's revolt against racism and foreign domination in 
the religious and secular spheres. 
W h a t about the role of mainstream Christian churches in the history of 
anti-imperialism? W a s the Christian contribution to decolonization limited 
to secular products of missionary schools (like N k r u m a h and M u g a b e ) 
and separatist religious movements (like that of S imon Kimbangu)? 
It is true that the mainstream Western churches were slow to join the 
struggle against racism and imperialism in Africa. But individual m e m b e r s 
of those churches stood u p against oppression from quite early. A n d later, 
Africa's first Nobel laureates were devout Christians in revolt against 
racism - Chief Albert Luthuli and Bishop (now Archbishop) D e s m o n d 
Tutu, both of South Africa. Even the Dutch Reformed Church of South 
Africa eventually produced some of the most eloquent voices against 
apartheid. Perhaps the most eloquent of all was the moral oratory of the 
Reverend Alan Boeasak, especially from the mid-1970s onwards. M u c h 
earlier, Hastings Banda, an elder of the Church of Scotland, led Nyasaland 
to independence as the n e w Republic of Malawi. 
In the light of these developments, w e m a y reaffirm that the Christian 
contribution to decolonization took three main forms - first, through 
secular products of mission schools (the Nkrumahist tradition); secondly, 
through Christian separatism (the Kimbanguist tradition); and, thirdly, 
through the radicalization of mainstream Christian leadership (like the 
tradition of Archbishop D e s m o n d Tutu). 
T h e strategy of non-violent political mobilization 
It was between 1906 and 1908 that a civil-disobedience campaign was 
launched in South Africa under the leadership of M a h a t m a M o h a n d a s 
Gandhi, directed against laws in the Transvaal which required Indians to 
carry registration certificates. T h e m o v e m e n t did initiate a distinct tra-
dition of resistance in South Africa and beyond. B y the 1950s the African 
and Indian Congresses in South Africa were trying to coordinate the 
efforts of Africans, Indians and 'Coloureds' in a mass campaign against 
the pass laws, the Group Areas Act on racial segregation, and the Bantu 
Authorities Act designed to promote the 're-tribalization' of Africans. 
T h e campaign was a success as an exercise in relative solidarity a m o n g 
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the oppressed - but a failure in terms of its actual objectives against the 
oppressors. 
K w a m e N k r u m a h in West Africa had also been fascinated by the ideas 
of M a h a t m a Mohandas Gandhi. His strategy of 'Positive Action' for 
greater freedom in the Gold Coast was directly inspired by Gandhian 
strategies of Satyagraha (soul force).9 
Also a self-conscious disciple of Gandhi during the colonial period was 
Kenneth Kaunda. K a u n d a admitted that in the racial and colonial 
conditions of Northern Rhodesia, violence was a tempting strategy of 
desperation for those denied alternative means of redress. But K a u n d a 
insisted on the need for passive resistance or civil disobedience: 
I could not lend myself to take part in any [violent] campaigns. / 
reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problem.10 
African opposition to armed struggle was also evident at the All-Africa 
Peoples' Conference held in independent Ghana in 1958. T h e Algerians -
w h o were at the time locked in an armed struggle against France - found 
it difficult to get pan-African endorsement of their struggle at the Accra 
conference. A combination of Gandhism and Francophilia a m o n g some 
of the participants was responsible for this rebuff of Algerian freedom-
fighters. 
O n the whole, the 1950s constituted the last decade of Gandhian 
strategies of liberation in Africa. After Algeria's independence in 1962 it 
became increasingly clear that the most difficult areas to liberate peacefully 
were going to be those which were either under Portuguese rule or under 
entrenched white minority rule. In neither category were Gandhian 
methods of civil disobedience likely to succeed. O n the contrary, such 
tactics would only result in ruthless suppression and even massacre of 
unarmed civilians. T h e massacre of Sharpeville in M a r c h i960 had already 
driven that lesson h o m e . Almost exactly a year later the n e w rebellion 
against the Portuguese in Angola began to unfold. T h e age of full armed 
liberation struggle had arrived in Southern Africa. It is to this modern 
tradition of armed struggle that w e n o w turn. 
T h e strategy of a r m e d liberation 
T h e most international of all strategies of decolonization in Africa have 
been those which have required sophisticated modern weapons. T h e 
warrior tradition (like the one which was at work in the M a u M a u war) 
could be based primarily on local self-reliance and h o m e - m a d e weapons. 
T h e djihäi tradition was more linked to international forces (in this case 
Islamic) - but within Africa, the djihäd was still relatively domesticated. 
9. See K . Nkrumah, 1957. 
10. K . Kaunda and C . Morris, i960, emphasis as in the original. 
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T h e strategy of Christian radicalism and of non-violent political m o b -
ilization, even w h e n influenced by Gandhi, was ultimately a national 
process within individual colonial territories. 
But when w e look at more modernized versions of armed struggle -
in the Portuguese colonies and Southern Africa, as well as in Algeria -
w e are dealing with highly internationalized conflict. M a n y external 
countries have been involved in these confrontations in ways which have 
ranged from contributing funds or weapons to actual participation with 
troops. If the Soviet Union and its allies had not been involved in the 
struggles in Southern Africa, African liberation there could have been 
delayed by at least another generation. T h e sophisticated weapons used 
by Africans in Southern Africa - including surface-to-air missiles in the 
Z i m b a b w e war - came overwhelmingly from socialist countries abroad. 
A s for the active participation of Cuban troops in the struggle to defend 
Angola's sovereignty, this marked the strongest level of external support 
in an African war of liberation. 
But external participation was not only on the side of liberation-fighters; 
it was also on the side of the colonial and racist oppressors. T h e North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization was for a long time, directly or indirectly, 
subsidizing Portuguese repressive stubbornness in its colonies. N A T O 
weapons were used against African liberation-fighters. 
A particularly symbolic comparison of external support would be a 
comparison between Cuba and Israel in their respective involvement in 
Southern Africa, especially from the 1970s onwards. Both countries were 
then pariah states in their respective regions - C u b a as the pariah of the 
Western hemisphere and Israel of the Middle East. Each country was 
closely allied to a superpower - C u b a to the Soviet Union and Israel to 
the United States. Both C u b a and Israel had been involved before in 
conflicts with global implications - John F. Kennedy came close to a 
nuclear war in the C u b a n missile crisis of 1962; President Richard Nixon 
ordered a worldwide nuclear alert in defence of Israel during the Middle 
East October war of 1973. Both Cuba and Israel were small countries 
which attained considerable global visibility; also, both had been involved 
in nearby conflicts a m o n g their neighbours. 
But although the two countries did share a number of characteristics, 
their respective roles in Southern Africa were in sharp contrast. C u b a 
helped train black freedom-fighters; Israel instructed South Africa's armed 
forces in counter-insurgency. C u b a provided extension services to Angolan 
farmers; Israel helped South Africa's nuclear programme, including the 
development of its nuclear b o m b . " In March 1987 it became increasingly 
a matter of public knowledge that Israel had maintained other areas of 
extensive military collaboration with the Republic of South Africa, in 
spite of the United Nations' ban on arms deals with the Pretoria regime. 
11. For South Africa's nuclear programme, see R . W . Walters, 1987. 
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T o summarize the comparison between C u b a and the Jewish state, while 
Israel had been a de facto ally of white supremacy, Castro's C u b a had 
been involved in black liberation. 
O n the whole, armed struggle in Southern Africa has worked well so 
far. Against the Portuguese, it was a war of attrition which finally resulted 
in a coup in Portugal in April 1974 - and the speedy collapse of the 
Portuguese empire soon after. In Z i m b a b w e it culminated in independence 
in 1980, and in Namibia in 1990. 
But will 'all else' be added to the 'political kingdom' in South 
Africa when it is finally achieved? Political sovereignty has certainly not 
necessarily led on to other achievements elsewhere in Africa. A s w e have 
indicated earlier, political independence was a necessary condition but by 
no means a sufficient condition for a fuller realization of African aspir-
ations. In economically ravaged countries like G h a n a , and in politically 
devastated countries like Uganda, it would be truer to articulate, as w e 
indicated, a more pessimistic imperative: 
Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will be subtracted from 
it. 
But here w e must pause and reflect. K w a m e N k r u m a h is on record as 
having said that the freedom of G h a n a would be meaningless if it was 
not accompanied by the freedom of the whole of Africa. B y 'the political 
kingdom' did he really m e a n just the independence of each separate 
African country? O r did Ghana's supreme pan-Africanist m e a n instead 
the full liberation of the African continent as a whole? 
In the context of K w a m e N k r u m a h ' s political philosophy as a whole, 
it seems more probable that he meant the following incremental stages: 
(1) The independence of each African country will help the independence 
of the next one, a stage-by-stage approach to political decolonization. 
(2) Only when the whole of Africa is decolonized will the 'political 
kingdom' of the whole continent stand a chance of having 'all else' 
added unto it. 
If the first shots have indeed been fired in the struggle for South Africa 
as the last bastion of white-minority rule, it is this final stage of the quest 
for the 'political kingdom' that w e must n o w examine more fully. 
Underlying the struggle is the changing relationship between racism and 
capitalism in Africa's experience. 
Revolution and the political k i n g d o m 
A central feature of this phase is that the alliance between racism and 
capitalism in South Africa m a y be on the verge of breaking up. Are 
capitalism and apartheid on a collision course? Yet while the break-up of 
the alliance m a y w o u n d apartheid mortally, capitalism in South Africa 
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m a y still remain intact w h e n the struggle is all over. T h e political kingdom 
m a y not have socialism added unto it. 
If what w e have witnessed in South Africa in the 1980s has been a 
revolution in its infancy, h o w quickly are w e to expect the maturation of 
the revolution? H o w near is victory? 
T h e optimist will see similarities with either the Ethiopian revolution 
of 1974 or the Iranian revolution of 1979 - both of which began with 
demonstrations in the streets and built up to a climax. Pre-revolutionary 
Iran and Ethiopia were each an alliance of domestic feudalism and 
international capitalism. In a sense, those two regimes of Iran and Ethiopia 
had lasted m a n y hundreds of years - and yet they were overthrown in a 
few months of demonstrations. T h e alliance between domestic feudalism 
and international capitalism collapsed speedily. 
As compared with the Shah and Haile Selassie, apartheid will last a 
few years longer - but racial supremacy is not invincible either. It will 
be overthrown - but neither by street demonstrations nor by external 
African armies. Apartheid can only fall as a result of organized struggle 
from within. External African armies m a y be organized but they are not 
from within. Street demonstrations are from within but they are not yet 
a case of organized struggle. African states can support and nourish 
and arm the internal liberation-fighters. Demonstrations can make the 
townships ungovernable. But without internal guerrilla fighters and sab-
oteurs, the struggle cannot triumph. 
But will international economic sanctions bring about the fundamental 
change? W e should distinguish between expressive sanctions or boycott 
and instrumental sanctions or boycott. Expressive boycott is a moral 
judgement, but instrumental boycott is intended to be a political tool. 
International sanctions will not in themselves lead to 'one m a n , one vote'. 
Expressive boycotts will boost up the morale of the oppressed. Western 
instrumental boycotts m a y help liberalize the regime - but they will fall 
short of 'one m a n , one vote'. A r m e d struggle from within will still have 
to be the core of the revolution. 
But what about South Africa's nuclear weapons? Will not they protect 
the apartheid regime? A quarter of a century ago, K w a m e N k r u m a h 
warned Africa about the two swords hanging over it - the sword of racism 
and the sword of nuclear power in hostile hands. At that time the French 
were testing their atomic devices in the Sahara. A n d so there was nuclear 
desecration of Africa in the north, and racial rape of Africa in the south. 
Later on France helped Israel to develop its o w n nuclear capability at 
D e m o n a . In turn, Israel subsequently helped South Africa develop its 
o w n nuclear weapons. But will they make any difference to the fate of 
apartheid} T h e answer is ' N o ' - or, more correctly, only a very small 
difference. 
South Africa's nuclear status can be used to intimidate neighbouring 
states or warn off countries like Nigeria. But South Africa cannot use 
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nuclear weapons in the streets of Soweto. T h e use of nuclear weapons 
within South Africa will cause one of the regime's two nightmares: not 
the nightmare of ' M o r e blacks are coming', but the nightmare of ' M o r e 
whites are leaving'. 
But if apartheid will not be saved by nuclear weapons, will it be saved 
by its alliance with capitalism? In fact, that alliance is already under 
severe stress. W h e n racism begins to interfere too m u c h with the laws of 
supply and demand, capitalism begins to feel betrayed. Alternatively, 
w h e n economic racism becomes inefficient, capitalism feels uneasy. It 
happened in the days of the slave trade. Capitalism once prospered on 
slavery. A n d then as technology became more efficient, slave labour m a d e 
less sense than wage labour. A n d so England, the leading slaving power 
of the eighteenth century, became the leading abolitionist power of the 
nineteenth. Similarly, an alliance between capitalism and apartheid has 
m a d e good (if narrow) economic sense until recently. W h y is that alliance 
n o w under stress? Capitalism m a y n o w gain by the demise of apartheid. 
First, black purchasing power is n o w ready to expand dramatically if 
the system was economically more equitable. Secondly, black skills have 
reached n e w levels and could make the productive forces more efficient. 
Thirdly, a better educational and training system for blacks could rapidly 
transform South Africa into a black Australia - rich and highly indus-
trialized. Fourthly, opposition to apartheid is creating instability which is 
unhealthy for capitalism. Fifthly, instability in turn creates uncertainty 
about the future - capitalist investment is a form of calculated planning 
which needs some degree of predictability. 
T h e n there is the fact that escalating repression in South Africa alienates 
important sections of public opinion in the Western world - and these 
outraged groups begin to put pressure on business firms and chain stores. 
Western businesses which have disinvested include I B M , General Motors, 
Barclays Bank, Coca-Cola and Kodak. M a n y institutions had previously 
closed their accounts with Barclays Bank. Nigeria led the way a few years 
ago. 
T h e n there is fear in business circles that prolonged struggle against 
racism could become a struggle against capitalism - as the activists get 
radicalized (as happened in Angola, M o z a m b i q u e and, to some extent, 
Zimbabwe) . Sooner or later capitalism has to cut its losses - and break 
its bonds with apartheid. Capitalism has to protect its interests in a 
changing situation. 
But what is the future of capitalism in South Africa once apartheid is 
defeated? C a n w e be sure that socialism will be added to the political 
kingdom? For better or worse, victory against apartheid will not necessarily 
m e a n victory against capitalism. There is after all a degree of capitalist 
development which, w h e n reached, makes capitalism almost irreversible. 
Karl M a r x thought that capitalism was a stage of development lower 
than socialism. W h e n capitalist development reaches its peak, it would 
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result in a socialist revolution. But more recent history demonstrates that 
there is a stage of capitalist development beyond which a c o m m u -
nist revolution is almost impossible — unless imposed from without. 
T h e U S A and most Western European countries have reached such a 
stage. 
But what would make a communist revolution impossible in an 
advanced industrial capitalist country? Marx's prediction of increasing 
enlargement of the proletariat has not happened in the leading capitalist 
countries. W h a t has happened is increasing enlargement of the bourgeoisie. 
Marx's prediction of increasing misery has not materialized. T h e workers 
have not got poorer - but richer. A n d the very poorest are not workers 
at all (lumpen militariat at best). Western workers have a lot more to lose 
than their 'chain' - they have cars, business shares, T V sets, boats, and 
so on. Class consciousness has not prevailed over national consciousness. 
O n the contrary, anti-communism is linked to working-class Western 
patriotism. M a r x underestimated capitalism's capacity to co-opt, convert 
and corrupt others in its o w n support. Prosperous capitalism can do just 
that. 
But has South Africa reached the stage of irreversible capitalism - the 
stage which most Western countries have reached? T h e evidence suggests 
that it has not. A n d therefore under black rule South Africa stands an 
even greater chance of either continuing as a capitalist system (but without 
racism) or embarking on a socialist path of development. 
Is there no hope of socialism being added to South Africa's political 
kingdom? If there is a chance, what in South Africa are the predisposing 
factors in favour of socialism after black majority rule? First, radicalization 
through prolonged struggle could turn black South Africa socialist. 
Secondly, class polarization as an off-shoot of racial polarization could 
help to socialize post-apartheid South Africa. Thirdly, a high degree of 
urbanization in South Africa is an asset for modern socialism. Fourthly, 
an enlarged black proletariat alongside an arrested embourgeoisement 
should help the cause of building socialism. Fifthly, the white man's 
prophecy that every black nationalist is a Marxist could at long last fulfil 
itself. A s for the atomic b o m b , South Africa under black majority rule 
m a y well become the first black nuclear power by the end of the twentieth 
century. 
T h e political kingdom in South Africa m a y have more 'added unto it' 
than almost anywhere else in Africa. T h e high level of industrialization 
built by black labour and Western technology, the enormous mineral 
wealth endowed by nature, the discipline arising out of prolonged African 
struggle for justice, and the n e w credentials of nuclear status, these are 
all bound to enhance considerably the meaning of South Africa's political 
kingdom under majority rule before the end of this century. 
Yet only w h e n all Africa's wealth is truly under Africa's sovereign 
control - from the Cape to Cairo, from D a r es Salaam to Dakar - will 
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w e be able to assess more definitively K w a m e Nkrumah's immortal 
imperative: 
Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto 
you. 
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North Africa and 
the Horn 
Ivan H R B E K * 
At the end of the Second World W a r no country of the region was free 
from foreign political and military control. Even in the formally inde-
pendent states such as Ethiopia and Egypt, there was a strong British 
military presence which exercised influence on political life. A further 
feature of the post-war period was the demise of Italy as a colonial power. 
All its former colonies - Somalia, Eritrea and Libya - were conquered 
during the war by the Allies and remained under British - and in the 
case of Fezzän in Libya, also French - military occupation. Their future 
had to be decided at an international level. 
The Maghreb 
Although in the three Maghreb countries under French domination, the 
defeat of France in 1940 had seriously weakened its position of authority, 
all the post-war French governments did their utmost to regain their 
hold; they even introduced a more oppressive regime after a war which was 
claimed to have been fought to liberate people from foreign domination. It 
was that rigid attitude that led to the disastrous colonial war in French 
Indochina (now Vietnam) whose people did not see any justice in the 
French claim to re-occupy a colony which they virtually had lost to the 
Japanese. Although in 1954 the military catastrophe at Dien-Bien-Phu 
led the French government to the conference table at Geneva where 
France bid farewell to its South-Asian colonial empire, the French 
politicians - like the Bourbons - did not learn the lessons of history." 
True, some cosmetic reforms were undertaken in the three Maghreb 
countries but the colonial situation of dependence, exploitation, lack of 
political liberties, and a special dose of French cultural arrogance in 
addition, remained unchanged. In Chapter 2 w e saw h o w the French 
colonial administration reacted against the wave of national protests in 
the last years of the war and in its aftermath. 
* Deceased in 1993. 
1. O n the history of the post-war Maghreb, R. Le Toumeau, 1962; and S. Amin, 1965; 
1970a and 1970b. 
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M o r o c c o 
Each of the three countries had to go through its o w n version of 
martyrdom before it attained independence. A fresh impetus to the 
Moroccan nationalist movement was given by a speech of Sultan M o h a m e d 
ibn Yosuf - later King M o h a m e d V - in Tangier in April 1947.2 T h e 
speech referred to the brilliant future of his country, its unalienable rights 
and its fidelity to Islam and the Arab world. Although the French general 
resident expected to hear some words of recognition and gratitude to 
France, no such compliments were heard. F r o m that time on the Sultan 
became the focus as well as the leading figure in the struggle for 
independence. There followed a wave of anti-colonial demonstrations and 
strikes. T h e strikes, which occurred between 1947 and 1952, showed that 
the working class had become well-organized and fully integrated into 
the nationalistic movement. 
During his visit to Paris in October 1950, the Sultan asked the French 
government for political and economic autonomy, the widening of the 
constitutional and political rights for the Shärifian government and the 
general revision of Franco-Moroccan relations, but without success. At 
that stage the six independent Arab states asked the United Nations to 
put the Moroccan question on the agenda of the Sixth General Assembly 
in 1951 and though they repeated their proposal in the following year, 
the colonial powers refused even to discuss the lawful claim of Morocco 
for independence. 
Recognizing the Sultan's role as paramount, the French decided in 
1953 to dethrone him; for that purpose they used the influence of the 
powerful Pasha of Marrakesh, T h ä m l al-GläwI, among the feudal leaders 
of some Berber kabtlas as well as the influence of a few religious leaders. 
O n 14 August 1953, that group — without any legal basis in Islamic or 
Moroccan law3 - declared M o h a m e d ibn Yüsuf unworthy of the throne 
and proclaimed his cousin, M o h a m e d ibn 'Arafa, an old m a n without any 
political background, the new Sultan. T h e conspiracy - engineered by 
the Residence, French colons in Morocco and high financial circles in 
Paris - did not attain its expected results: after the Sultan's deportation 
to Corsica and later to Madagascar, the whole country rose almost 
unanimously against the colonialists. 
National struggle took diverse forms. T h e Istiklâl Party founded an 
underground ''Organisation secrète'. T h e most important among other 
similar groups was the left-wing 'Black Crescent'. T h e strikes and street 
demonstrations in urban centres became more numerous; the Moroccans 
2. O n the Moroccan independence struggle, see A . al-FäsT, 1954; A . Ayache, 1956; 
D . E . Ashford, 1961; J. L . Miège, 1950; and J. Waterbury, 1970 and 1975. 
3. O n the legal incompetence of al-Gläwl as an owner of brothels, see the penetrating 
essay by L . Massignon, 1962, pp. 250-64. 
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began to boycott French products; people refused to attend Friday prayers 
where homage was expected in the n a m e of the French-appointed sultan. 
In the Rlf and the Middle Atlas, a 'Liberation A r m y ' was formed by the 
Berber rural population and started to attack French military posts and 
barracks. T h e years 1954 and 1955 marked a high tide in the Moroccan 
independence struggle. 
W h e n during 1955 the general violence increased, and the police and the 
counter-revolutionary groups of the French colons proved, with all their 
terrorism, incapable of stemming the liberation movement - which in turn 
was united in its unanimous demand for the return of the legitimate sultan -
the French government was forced to change its policy towards Morocco. 
In the meantime, the war in Algeria became a serious problem and the fresh 
experience of the defeat in Vietnam demonstrated the inability of the French 
army to cope with the wide popular movement. In August 1955 the first 
negotiations with various representatives of Morocco's political life, includ-
ing Istiklal, were opened in Aix-les-Bains, and General Catroux was sent to 
Madagascar to arrange for the return of the sultan. Events then moved 
quickly: M o h a m e d ibn 'Arafa was obliged to abdicate and al-Glâwï, being 
abandoned by his masters, issued in October an unexpected proclamation 
of loyalty to M u h a m m a d ibn Yüsuf. 
After a few weeks' stay in France where the terms for ending the 
protectorate were negotiated, M u h a m m a d ibn Yüsuf - from 1957, King 
M o h a m e d V - returned triumphantly to his homeland on 26 November 
1955, acclaimed by millions of his subjects as they rallied in Rabat. Sldl 
Bekkäi then formed the first independent Moroccan government which 
completed the negotiations with the French. T h e independence of 
Morocco was proclaimed on 2 March 1956. 
A month later, on 7 April, the Spanish protectorate over the north-
ern zone was abolished and the region integrated into the Kingdom of 
Morocco; in July of the same year, the international zone of Tangier 
followed suit. Thus all the parts of pre-colonial Morocco were united in 
one state with the exception of the Spanish enclaves of Ifni, Mellila and 
Ceuta. Whereas Ifni was reintegrated in 1968, the latter two remained 
for a time under foreign domination and were the subject of reiterated 
claims by Morocco to the Madrid government. 
Tunisia 
T h e independence of Morocco was soon followed by that of Tunisia. 
There was a certain parallelism between the course of the liberation 
struggle in the two countries. Both were conditioned by the same colonial 
power, disrupted by the presence of an influential French community 
and, last but not least, influenced by the international situation.4 O n the 
4. See H . Bourguiba, 1954; D . L . Ling, 1967; A . Kassab, 1976. 
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other hand, the dissimilarities were not negligible either. There was early 
participation by the trades unions - led by a brilliant organizer, Farhat 
Hashed. There followed the gradual steps from partial participation of 
the Tunisians in government to internal autonomy. But there was also a 
serious split in the leadership of the Neo-Destür Party between Habib 
Bourguiba and Saläh ben Yüsuf and the relative passivity of the bey, the 
formal head of the state. 
After the founding of the Tunisian National Front in August 1947 the 
pressure on the French was intensified through m a n y demonstrations and 
strikes in which the call for improved living conditions was accompanied 
by the demand for political independence. T h e years between 1945 and 
1955 witnessed also the worsening of the general standard of living a m o n g 
the masses; some parts of the country suffered from famine. In 1949, 
after Bourguiba's return from voluntary exile (1945-9), m e Neo-Destür 
leadership took a major step forward and elaborated a strategy for 
the Tunisian independence struggle. Although the achievement of full 
independence was the rallying point for all Tunisians, Bourguiba -
aware of the strength of the French opposition to immediate Tunisian 
independence - was prepared to compromise tactically and to gain his 
goal gradually. At first the French agreed to negotiate about the question 
of partial internal autonomy, and in August 1950 a new government under 
M u h a m m a d Chenik was formed, composed of an equal number of French 
and Tunisian ministers. But whereas the French considered this the final 
concession which would allow them to retain control of the country, the 
Neo-Destür Party soon increased its demands. A new crisis exploded in 
1951 when France rejected the demand for a Tunisian parliament. That 
rejection was due more to the pressure of the French settlers than to the 
French political will in Paris. This particular feature - the settlers' influence 
on French colonial policy during the Fourth Republic - was a recurring 
theme in all Maghreb countries. Its consequences were in every case most 
tragic for the oppressed people and, in the long run, catastrophic even for 
the white settlers themselves. At the beginning of 1952, France stopped 
further negotiations with Tunisian nationalists, banned the Neo-Destür 
party congress and arrested both the radical Bourguiba and the moderate 
Chenik, together with m a n y others. A few, among them Saläh ben Yüsuf, 
the second strong m a n of the Neo-Destür Party, escaped to Cairo. At the end 
of the same year, the trades-union leader Farhat Hashed was assassinated, 
probably by the settlers' secret terrorist organization, the Red H a n d . 
In spite of hardened French repression, demonstrations and strikes 
continued in towns. During the first quarter of 1954, general discontent 
with colonial rule spread to rural districts. For the first time in modern 
Tunisian history, the peasants formed themselves into armed groups, the 
fellaghas, to attack European colonists, to sabotage communications 
(cutting wires, derailing trains) and to fight smaller French units. These 
activities were not restricted to outlying districts. O n the contrary, they 
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concentrated on Cape B o n peninsula and the northern part of the country. 
Settler farms had to be protected by tanks; mass mopping-up operations 
by the French police and army failed to stop the insurrection. 
In the middle of the increasingly difficult situation, there came the 
shock of the French defeat of Dien-Bien-Phu (7 M a y 1954) and the 
French governmental crisis from which the Mendès-France government 
emerged. N e w policy-makers decided to reopen negotiations with Tunisian 
nationalists: Bourguiba and others were hurriedly set free and later 
returned to Tunisia. T h e French offered Tunisia internal autonomy, 
retaining for themselves control over the armed forces and foreign policy. 
Protracted negotiations were concluded as late as June 1955. Tunisia w o n 
internal autonomy but at the price of binding itself to safeguarding 
French interests and to retaining a close relationship with France. France 
continued to control foreign policy, defence and even internal security. 
That Franco-Tunisian Convention fell far short of the aspirations of the 
Tunisian people, but Bourguiba as a veteran politician knew that under 
the then-prevailing conditions it was impossible to gain more by nego-
tiations from France, and so he and the majority of the Neo-Destür Party 
agreed with it. T h e alternative view was represented by the left-wing 
group led by Saläh ben Yusuf w h o after his return from Cairo advocated 
the continuation of the armed struggle as a means of forcing France to 
recognize the full independence of Tunisia. In the ensuing clash, Bour-
guiba was able to win the majority of the Neo-Destür members . At the 
party congress in November 1955, Saläh ben Yüsuf was expelled from 
the party for his opposition to the Convention. Although the party 
congress expressed the view that the Tunisian people would continue its 
struggle until the achievement of full independence, the compromise of 
June 1955 and the expulsion of ben Yüsuf signalled that from then on 
the party would follow a moderate policy, rather than a radical one. 
In any case, the period of 'internal autonomy' did not last long. Under 
the impact of the events in Morocco and more so of the beginning of the 
Algerian war, France was ready to negotiate, in order to salvage as m u c h 
as possible of its interests, both economic and strategic. After a month 
of negotiations in Paris a protocol recognizing full Tunisian sovereignty 
was signed on 20 March 1956: after 75 years of colonial rule, Tunisia re-
entered the community of free nations of the world. 
T h e Algerian war 5 
A s already pointed out, the liberation process in Morocco and Tunisia 
was accelerated by the outbreak of the war in Algeria: one of the bitterest 
5. The most important works among the abundant literature on this theme are: F. Abbas, 
1962; A . Nouschi, 1962; M . Lacheraf, 1963; G . C . Gordon, 1966; Y . Courrière, 1968-^72; 
J. C . L . Vatin, 1974; C . R . Ageron, 1979; M . Kaddache, n.d.; A . K . Saadallah, 1981. 
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and longest anti-colonial wars ever waged in Africa. It owed these qualities 
both to the stubbornness of the French to retain the country and to the 
determination of the Algerian people to achieve liberty. In the case of 
Morocco and Tunisia it was possible for some French governments to 
compromise and to respond positively, even if belatedly and reluctantly, 
to the nationalists' demands. But to follow a similar policy in Algeria 
was for a long time out of the question for any French politician of 
any political colour. T h e dogma of 'Algérie française' was neither con-
tested nor even subjected to any critical consideration - it would have 
been close to sacrilege to deny that 'Algeria is France. . . . W h o 
a m o n g you would hesitate to use all means in order to save France?'6 
That myth was based on the presence of nearly one million French 
settlers (the so-called Pieds noirs, Black legs), on heavy investment 
of French capital in agriculture and mining, and on the dispropor-
tionate influence of the Algerian lobby in French political life. T h e 
myth that Algeria was French was given a new impetus by the discovery 
of oil and natural gas in the Sahara in the 1950s. For the first time 
in its history, France had oil wealth in considerable quantity on its 
o w n territory. T h e vision of being able at last to have an independent oil 
policy considerably coloured French decisions during the war of Algerian 
independence. 
T h e history of Algeria between 1947, the year of adoption of the 
Algerian Statute, and 1 November 1954, the date of the outbreak of the 
war, is a lesson on h o w a colonial administration, while solemnly adhering 
to democratic principles, can at the same time circumvent them. It was 
also a lesson in the futility of a moderate policy with such an adversary 
in a situation of steadily worsening misery and economic and social 
inequality. 
In 1954 the area of cultivable land in European hands represented 
23 per cent of the total, but it was to be found in the most fertile 
areas. That proportion should be compared with the demographic 
growth: between 1936 and 1954 the number of Muslim Algerians rose 
from 6.3 to 8.7 million, whereas the number of Europeans only rose 
from 946 000 to one million. Two-thirds of the Algerians lived in a sub-
sistence economy, forming not an independent peasantry but semi-
proletarians. T h e annual income of an Algerian employed in agriculture 
averaged 22000 old francs, in contrast with 260000 old francs for a 
European. In the countryside there were about one million unemployed 
or underemployed - resulting in out-migration to the urban centres or 
to France. In 1957 about 300 000 Algerians - that is, every seventh adult -
worked in France. 
6. F. Mitterrand, November 1954. T h e socialist, François Mitterrand, was at that time 
Minister of the Interior in the Mendes-France government. 
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T A B L E 6.1 
Non-Muslims 
Muslims 
rural 
non-rural 
Total 
The distribution of income in 
Population 
(millions) 
1.0 
5-3 
34 
9-7 
(96) 
10 
55 
35 
100 
Algeria in 19551 
Income 
(million 
francs) 
298 000 
117 000 
222 000 
637 000 
Percentage 
share of the 
national 
income 
47 
18 
35 
100 
T h e economic and social inequality was also reflected in the political 
sphere. T h e Algerian Assembly comprised 120 m e m b e r s , half of them 
French, half M u s l i m Algerians. T h e administration took care to ensure 
that the majority of Algerians elected were those whose loyalty to colonial 
rule was beyond doubt. A n d so all elections were cleverly rigged. N o 
wonder the Assembly neither represented Algerian public opinion nor 
discussed such serious national problems as the vote for M u s l i m w o m e n , 
the teaching of Arabic in schools, and Islamic cults.8 
All manifestations of Algerian nationalism, even the most moderate 
d e m a n d s for civil and political equality, were suppressed and repressed. 
T h e two main nationalist parties, the Union démocratique du manifeste 
algérien ( U D M A ) led by Ferhat Abbas , and the Mouvement pour le 
triomphe des libertés démocratiques ( M T L D ) led by the veteran Messali 
H â d j , were as yet not prepared to abandon their policies of negotiation. 
T h e former m a d e vain attempts to persuade the French to accept the 
autonomous but associated Algerian Republic, whereas for the latter the 
recognition of Algerian sovereignty was the prime condition. 
W h e n these policies failed, both parties went through crises: U D M A 
lost support a m o n g the better-off urban classes and the M T L D increas-
ingly came under the personal leadership of the erratic Messali H ä d j . It 
lost its popular appeal and began to take a typical petit-bourgeois line. T h e 
C o m m u n i s t Party of Algeria, supported mostly by the poorer classes of 
the European population, did not s h o w m u c h enthusiasm for the Algerian 
nationalist cause. 
In 1953-4 t n e M T L D split into three factions: the 'Messalists' w h o 
supported unconditionally the old leader (deported in 1952 to France), 
the 'Centralists' w h o wanted m o r e power to be given to the collective 
Central Committee , and the Comité révolutionnaire d'unité et d'action 
7. S. Amin, 1970b, p. 61. 
8. T . Chenntouf, 1969. 
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plate 6.2 Ferhat Abbas addressing a mass meeting in Casablanca, 9 July 1961, in the
presence ofKing Hassan II
(CRUA) preaching insurrection and revolution as the only means for
achieving independence when all constitutional and legal roads proved
ineffectual. CRUA was made up of one-time members of the Organisation
spéciale (OS), an offshoot of the MTLD founded in 1947. The nine
'historical chiefs' of the Algerian revolution - Ait Ahmed, Mohamed
Boudiaf, Ben Boulaid, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mourad Didouche, Rabah Bltat,
Larbl ben M'Hldl, Belkâsem Krïm and Mohamed Khider - decided to
start armed insurrection on 1 November 1954. For this purpose the whole
country was divided into five military districts (wiläyas) each of them
under a commander-in-chief. At the same time, three leading members
went to Cairo to assure the aid of Egypt in arms, money and propaganda.
In the first phase, the Armée de liberation nationale (ALN) amounted
to no more than 2000-3000 men, armed with rifles and knives. The first
actions took place in the Aurès Mountains and in Kabylie, but by the
summer of 1955 action had spread to eastern and central Algeria. Most
of the ALN fighters were peasants, but successively they were joined by
members of the urban classes as it became clear that the French - that
is, the colonial administration, the army and the European colonists -
were not making any distinction between those who were fighting and
those who remained passive - French reprisals were falling on all Muslim
Algerians indiscriminately. Although the French gradually increased their
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armed forces in Algeria from the initial 56 000 m e n to an impressive half 
a million in i960, they were unable to defeat the will of the Algerians 
for independence. 
T h e armed struggle had finally ended with the spirit of moderation 
that had characterized the preceding period. B y its call to the masses, the 
n e w struggle aroused their latent patriotism and turned them into active 
fighters. In the course of the war, the French myth of the non-existence 
of the Algerian nation finally crumbled, and with it the illusion inherited 
from the early twentieth century that with the police force and a strong 
army it would be possible to maintain a nation in French colonial 
subjugation for ever. M o r e and more Algerians joined the A L N which 
at the height of the fighting totalled some 130 000 members in the guerrilla 
groups. Equally important was the support given to the fighters by the 
civil population. 
A s early as M a y 1955 the Front de libération nationale ( F L N ) was 
founded as a supreme political organization of the Algerian people. T h e 
majority of Algerian political parties and groupings were successively 
dissolved and their adherents entered the F L N . A n exception was Messali 
Hädj w h o founded his o w n party and bitterly opposed the F L N in such 
a way that he joined the camp of the French collaborators. T h e Algerian 
Communist Party did not enter the F L N as it would have meant its 
dissolution, but from 1956 onwards it co-operated and subordinated its 
guerrilla groups to the central c o m m a n d of the A L N . 
In August 1956 the F L N held its first congress in the S o u m m a n valley 
in Kabylie; about 200 delegates discussed actual political and organizational 
problems as well as the prospects and future of Algeria. A radical line 
was taken: independence was not enough; the establishment of a socialist 
order with fundamental agrarian reform was needed. T h e congress again 
reiterated the Arab and Muslim character of the Algerian nation and its 
full right to self-determination. 
T h e Algerian problem n o w took on a new, international dimension. 
T h e Arab, Asian and socialist countries supported Algerian independence 
in the U N and m a n y of the progressive Arab regimes aided with weapons, 
military instructions and finance. Most prominent among them was 
Egypt - and in the Suez crisis of October 1956 one of the French goals 
was the overthrow of President al-Nasser because of his support of the 
Algerian revolution. 
In France itself, the Algerian war had a more radical influence. Opinion 
was divided between the progressive elements, w h o wanted to end the 
n e w 'dirty' war which had followed so soon after that in Vietnam, and 
the right-wing groups, w h o wished to escalate the war until the French 
achieved victory. T h e weak governments of the Fourth Republic, afraid 
of being accused of treason if they even contemplated negotiations with 
the 'rebels', were incapable of doing anything but give more and more 
power to the generals on the spot. T h e strategy employed by the French 
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military consisted of three main elements: the 'regrouping' of villages, 
intended to destroy the F L N ' s network of support; the psychological 
warfare of terror to isolate the F L N from the majority of the people; and 
then the erection of a wire barrier on the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers 
to stop supplies coming from the neighbouring countries. 
T h e 'regrouping' affected hundreds of thousands of peasants and 
uprooted them from their lands and their traditions without providing 
any alternative way of life. T h e regrouped villages became concentration 
camps and their inhabitants became vagrants. Their normal productive 
work practically ceased.9 T h e terror reached its height in 1957 with the 
'battle for Algiers', an attempt by the A L N to implant itself more deeply 
in the city. T h e French answered with a merciless campaign of persecution, 
jailing and torture, which indeed destroyed the A L N organization in the 
city, left a legacy of hatred and aroused a wave of indignation both in 
France and in the whole world where the methods of the French 
paratroops were compared with those of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany. 
In the same year of 1957 the Algerian-Tunisian border was sealed by a 
continuous electrically-charged wire barricade; it meant the total isolation 
of the Algerian guerrilla fighters from the outside world. But none of 
these measures succeeded in breaking the fighting spirit. T h e guerrilla 
operations continued even if on a smaller scale than before, and armed 
resistance lasted to the very end. 
T h e political crisis in France caused by the Algerian war was pre-
cipitated in M a y 1958 by the revolt of the French senior officers in 
Algeria w h o demanded the arrival of General de Gaulle, considered as 
the m a n w h o would be able to finish the war to the French advantage. 
T h e last government of the Fourth Republic abdicated and de Gaulle 
took over. T w o main political forces were behind him: the financial 
oligarchy and the French colonists in Algeria, supported by the officers. 
Gradually it became manifest that the interests of those groups were 
divergent and that de Gaulle had his o w n political concepts in mind (the 
increasing role of France in Europe, the establishment of a n e w relationship 
with the Third World, and so on). In fact, his aims were closer to the 
interests of the French financial and industrial oligarchy than to the 
interests of the colonists in Algeria, w h o clung to the obsolete colonialism 
of 'Algeria of papa'. But it took de Gaulle some time to evolve a more 
positive policy towards the Algerians and the war continued as before. 
T h e last attempt to win the Algerians back to the French side was the 
'Constantine plan' announced by de Gaulle in 1958: it proposed to 
rewaken the traditional countryside and to industrialize Algeria. But like 
m a n y other projects of the time, the plan proposed was to prove a 
9. A quarter of a million of these people preferred to flee from the country to Morocco 
and Tunisia; from these the reserves of the A L N were then recruited. 
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plate 6.3 On 20 September 1959, Messali Hädj approved General Charles de Gaulle's
declaration on Algeria
parody.10 Its consequences would have been to bring major advantages to
the French colonists but only very minor ones to the Algerians. The
agrarian 'reform' would have affected only about 250 000 hectares, leaving
on one side the fundamental problem of the 2.7 million hectares owned
by the colonists.
In answer to the changes in France, the FLN proclaimed in September
1958 the formation of the government-in-exile, the GPRA (Gouvernement
provisoire de la République algérienne), whose first leader was Ferhat Abbas.
In 1 96 1, the leadership of the government was taken over by the more
10. S. Amin, 1970b, p. 125.
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radical Yüsuf Ben K h e d d a . T h e provisional government was recognized 
de jure by all Arab and m a n y Asian countries and defacto by the socialist 
states. 
W h e n neither military actions nor the Constantine plan achieved the 
expected results, de Gaulle's government at last decided to negotiate. 
W h e n it became k n o w n what was about to begin, the fascists in Algiers 
rose in revolt in January i960; after the ' W e e k of the Barricades' it 
collapsed. In March of the same year de Gaulle for the first time employed 
the magic slogan ''Algérie algérienne'' throwing away - after more than one 
hundred years - the m y t h tíiat 'Algeria is as French as Brittany'. T h e 
negotiations were opened in the middle of the year but soon broke d o w n 
over m a n y crucial problems. Important was the fact that the French 
recognized the F L N and the G P R A as partners. T h e talks were the first 
political victory of the Algerians, and others were soon to follow. 
In April 1961 the 'ultras' in Algeria tried one last throw in the 
'Generals' Plot' led by four high-ranking generals. It failed but the ultras 
decided to continue their fight for the preservation of Algérie française 
through the terrorism of the O A S {Organisation armée secrète). 
T h e ensuing negotiations were protracted and hard; one main obstacle 
was the French insistence on the separation of the Sahara, with its oil 
wealth, from the territory of Algeria. Nevertheless, the firm refusal of the 
F L N to allow this, forced France to a compromise. In March the Evian 
protocol, announcing a cease-fire and proclaiming that the future of 
Algeria would be decided by a referendum, was signed. Organized on 
1 July 1962, die referendum resulted in a vote of 99.7 per cent for 
independence. 
T h e last months of colonial rule as well as the first weeks after 
independence were marked by the rampant sabotage of O A S fascists w h o 
in their powerless fury killed, destroyed and burned. B y their acts they 
also killed all chances for the European minority to remain in independent 
Algeria as provided in the Evian protocol. There followed a mass exodus 
of colonists: by die end of July about half a million left for France and 
by the end of the year fewer than 20 per cent of the Europeans remained 
in Algeria. O n the one hand, the mass and abrupt departure of the 
colonists — including almost all the technicians in the country - caused 
the young republic m a n y initial difficulties; on the other hand, it largely 
simplified the ethnic and social structure of Algeria and spared it otherwise 
inevitable racial conflicts. 
T h e proclamation of Algeria's independence brought to an end the 
period of French colonialism in the Maghreb. T h e cost of liberation was 
heavy: it is estimated that nearly one million Algerians lost their lives; 
another two million were uprooted; ten thousand houses and buildings 
were destroyed during the war, and subsequently by O A S terrorism. N o 
other African nation paid such a high and tragic price for its independence. 
But by their heroic fight, the Algerians objectively aided the political 
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struggle in the other French colonies. T h e Algerian war m a d e clear to 
the French public and their political leaders the futility of the old colonial 
system, and forced them to recognize the right of every nation to self-
determination. 
Libya" 
In Chapter 2 w e left Libya in 1948, still under military occupation, 
awaiting the decision of the U N as to its future fate. Britain and France 
were already established in the country. There n o w came the U S A with 
the establishment of a great air-base at Wheelus Field near Tripoli. All 
three Western powers n o w had vested interests in Libya and were rather 
reluctant to leave the country. It is therefore no wonder that Western 
interests soon clashed both with the wishes of the Libyan people and 
with the policy of the Arab, Asian and socialist countries. T h e British 
took the initiative with the Bevin-Sforza plan envisaging a British 
trusteeship in Cyrenaica, an Italian one in Tripolitania (where the majority 
of the Italian settlers lived), and a French one in Fezzän. Against that 
attempt to divide the country into three parts, the U S S R advocated a 
global collective trusteeship by the U N . T h e Libyan people expressed 
their opposition to the Bevin-Sforza plan by huge demonstrations; in 
Tripoli more than 40000 Libyans took part in them. T h e U N General 
Assembly rejected the plan in M a y 1949. In November 1949, the U S S R 
proposed immediate independence for Libya, the evacuation of foreign 
troops in three months and the closing of the foreign military bases. T h e 
proposal was not accepted; the U N then voted that Libya as a whole 
should be constituted as an independent and sovereign state not later 
than 1 January 1952. 
These international aspects should not be interpreted as meaning that 
independence came to the Libyan people as a gift from the U N . O n the 
contrary, it was the expansion of the Libyan anti-colonial struggle that 
m a d e world opinion aware of the Libyan question and then forced the 
hand of the U N . This patriotic movement worked under very difficult 
conditions, caused partly by history and partly by unequal social structures 
in diverse parts of the country. T h e problems were compounded by the 
British policy of exploiting the situation to disrupt the national liberation 
movement. F r o m the beginning the British preferred the head of the 
Sanûsïyya order, M u h a m m a d Idrïs - w h o , in 1947, returned to Cyrenaica 
from his Egyptian exile - as their chosen candidate for fulfilling a 
major role in Libyan politics. His known conservative attitudes aroused 
opposition a m o n g the Tripolitan nationalist bourgeoisie w h o wanted 
a democratic regime, the unification of the whole of Libya, close 
11. For Libyan history in the pre-revolution period see E . E . Evans-Pritchard, 1949; 
I. R . Khalidi, 1956; M . Khadduri, 1963b; J. N o r m a n , 1963b; N . I. Proshin, 1975. 
140 
North Africa and the Horn 
co-operation with the already independent Arab states and the evacuation 
of foreign troops. T h e Tripolitan opposition was afraid that Idrls would 
try to introduce the Sanüsl theocratic feudal system into Tripolitania; its 
leaders were also aware of his close collaboration with the British. 
Idrïs from his side distrusted the Tripolitan liberal bourgeoisie with its 
republican ideals and for some time preferred to be an absolute ruler in 
Cyrenaica than to share power with them over the whole of Libya. 
That dissonance was cleverly exploited by Britain to protract nego-
tiations about Libyan independence. In June 1949 Cyrenaica was pro-
claimed independent under Emir IdrTs: the constitution elaborated by the 
British safeguarded the emir's almost unlimited power, and established a 
parliament, half of whose members were to be nominated by the emir. 
T h e n e w regime did not correspond to the wishes of the progressive part 
of the Cyrenaican population w h o wanted more political participation. 
Strikes and demonstrations were suppressed by the emir with the help 
of British troops. 
But in spite of the clearly reactionary character of the Idrls regime, 
and in spite of the serious misgivings of the Tripolitanian politicians, it 
soon became clear that full Libyan independence could be attained only 
through unification under the leadership of Idrls. In the years 1949-51 
protracted and difficult negotiations were undertaken between both parties. 
Since the main aim of the Tripolitan leaders of the national liberation 
movement was independence and unity, they finally accepted a compro-
mise. Under British pressure and in accordance with the wishes of Idrls, 
Libya became a federation of three provinces - Tripolitania, Cyrenaica 
and Fezzän - with great provincial autonomy at the expense of a rather 
weak central government. O n 24 December 1951, the independence of 
the K ingdom of Libya was proclaimed; the former emir of Cyrenaica and 
the head of the Sanuslyya order, King M u h a m m a d Idrls I al-SanüsT, 
became the first ruler. 
Libya entered independence with a heavy colonial legacy, and with the 
legacy of wartime destruction and the presence of foreign troops. In 
economy and social structure, it belonged with the most underdeveloped 
countries of North Africa; in agriculture, the patriarchal feudal relations 
were dominant and a high percentage of the inhabitants still led a nomadic 
or semi-nomadic way of life. Industry was nearly non-existent; crafts were 
produced only for the local market. T h e Libyan bourgeoisie and proletariat 
were numerically weak and badly organized. T h e majority of the banks, 
wholesale shops and plantations, as well as foreign trade, were in the 
hands of non-Libyans. T h e educational level was low, more than 85 per 
cent of the Libyans being illiterate. 
T h e prospects were rather dim; a U N Commission in 1951 underlined 
the fact that Libya was 'without mineral resources or oil' (!) as until that 
time oil prospecting had shown only negative results. 
T h e activities of the surviving political organizations in Tripolitania 
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soon aroused the suspicion of the ruling group of feudal chiefs, comprador 
bourgeoisie, Sanusï leaders and members of the royal family. In 1952 all 
political parties were banned and other organizations, like trades unions 
and youth clubs, were strictly controlled. 
T h e general disappointment that long-awaited independence had not 
brought improved conditions led to an increase in mass demonstrations 
and protests, but with only negligible results. T h e Western powers used 
the economic difficulties of the n e w state to conclude 'aid agreements' 
with it. This meant n e w dependency. T h e United States, Britain and 
France obtained the right to maintain their military and air bases on 
Libyan territory, and also an open door for foreign capital. In 1957 the 
share of foreign capital in the Libyan economy was already 75 per cent. 
Both the economy and administration were virtually run by foreign 
advisers and the Libyan government proclaimed that it would confiscate 
neither the land of 15000 Italian settlers still remaining in the country 
nor the property of the Italian commercial companies. 
Between 1953 and 1956 the prospecting for oil showed surprising 
results and in the following years Libya granted concessions for oil 
extraction to various American, British, French and Italian companies 
under the proviso of 50-50 sharing of net profit. At the beginning of 
i960 commercial extraction on 15 oil-fields began, and in the next few 
years both the number of fields and the production increased rapidly; 
pipe-lines were built to the coast and oil harbours to facilitate transport." 
T h e oil b o o m proved to be an ambiguous gift: on the one hand, Libya 
became in a very short time one of the richest countries in Africa with 
increasing per capita income and abundant capital for development 
projects, but on the other hand the economy, being based on one single 
product, became dependent on world market fluctuations. Instead of 
giving Libya a freer hand, the b o o m m a d e its government even more 
subservient to foreign interests. Although the oil production offered m a n y 
jobs for Libyans, it was as unskilled labour only and it did not bring 
about any pronounced changes in the social structure. There was, of 
course, a partial exodus of the rural population to the oil-fields and towns; 
the skilled labour was supplied by the immigrants from other Arab 
countries so that a true Libyan working class was slow to develop. T h e 
b o o m was followed by inflation, felt mostly by the peasants, nomads and 
poorer classes. True, the government increased expenditure on the social 
services, health and education - but these lagged behind the needs of the 
population. Even worse, no real policy was elaborated for the diver-
sification of the economy, nor were investments in industry and agriculture 
contemplated. It is not an exaggeration to say that the royal regime was 
at a loss to k n o w what to do with the cornucopia that so unexpectedly 
showered on the country. 
12. See Libyan Oil, 1972. 
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After 12 years of experimentation with a costly and ineffective system, 
the federal structure was abolished in 1963; the three autonomous prov-
inces ceased to exist and Libya became a unitary state. In foreign policy, 
the close alliance with the Western powers continued, although there 
emerged a tendency to take a more independent position on some Arab 
issues. T h e passivity of the regime during the June 1967 war led to a lot 
of protests and demonstrations which forced the government to join the 
short-lived oil boycott and later to offer aid to Egypt and Jordan. T h e 
demonstrations were signs of the growing impact of Arab nationalism 
a m o n g the Libyan bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. In spite of the increasing 
discontent of those groups with the regime's internal and foreign policy 
there existed in Libya no civilian organized body capable of overthrowing 
the government, either peacefully or by violent means, and then inaug-
urating a policy more adequate to the opportunities offered by the oil 
wealth. 
It thus fell to a group of army officers led by Captain M u a m m a r 
Kadhaffi to effect a bloodless take-over of power on 1 September 1969, 
during a visit abroad by Idrïs I. Inspired by the ideas of pan-Arabism, 
Arab socialism and Islam, the n e w leadership inaugurated a political, 
social and economic revolution that was soon to change all facets of 
Libyan life. 
Egypt 
After the breaking-off of the Anglo-Egyptian talks in January 1947, Egypt 
decided to take the question of its relations with Great Britain to the 
United Nations. If the Egyptians really hoped to win their case in this 
international body, they were disappointed; after several sessions of the 
Security Council in which only the U S S R , Poland and Syria backed the 
Egyptian demands, and the U S A recommended a renewal of direct 
negotiations, no resolution was adopted and the Egyptian question was 
postponed indefinitely. 
In mass anti-British demonstrations, strikes and other manifestations, 
the Egyptians showed their discontent with both the British presence in 
the country and the Egyptian government's inability to overcome the 
impasse. 
At this juncture the Palestine problem - which later lay at the root of 
several Arab—Israeli wars, as well as of m a n y internal crises in the Arab 
world - appeared for the first time on the international scene. It would 
go beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter to try to discuss the 
complicated history of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, British policy 
during the Mandate, and Arab reactions between the wars and in the 
immediate after-war period. Stripped to bare facts, the problem was the 
colonization — against the will of the autochthonous population - of 
Palestine by people of European origin determined to m a k e the territory 
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their permanent h o m e on the grounds that 2000 years ago Palestine had 
belonged to their forefathers. It is beyond doubt that the Zionist idea of 
founding the state of Israel would not have been realized without the 
backing of the imperialist powers, first of Great Britain, later of the U S A , 
both of w h o m pursued their o w n political aims in the region.'3 
T h e creation of the state of Israel and the failure of the armed 
intervention of the Arab League (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon) 
on behalf of the Palestinians by the end of 1978 shocked the Arab world. 
This failure was attributed to the crisis of the system of political power 
in the Arab world. In Egypt, as well as in some other independent Arab 
countries, it was the army and its junior ranks w h o in the course of the 
war for the first time realized the failures, corruption and incompetence 
of the regimes of the ruling big bourgeoisie and the landlords. A m o n g 
other groups and classes the defeat led to the intensification of the struggle 
for total independence and definitive liberation from foreign tutelage. 
In the Egyptian elections of January 1950, the Wafd Party again came 
to power; by freeing a number of political detainees it gained a lot of 
sympathy but was unable to solve the economic crisis and to stop soaring 
prices and unemployment, or to calm general unrest.14 A wave of 
demonstrations and strikes combined anti-British slogans with social and 
economic demands. Under these pressures, the Egyptian government 
started new negotiations with Britain, demanding the evacuation of 85 000 
troops - instead of 10 000, as stipulated in the 1936 treaty - from the 
Suez Canal Zone not later than 1952, and the unification of Sudan and 
Egypt. W h e n Britain showed unwillingness, the Egyptian parliament on 
15 October 1951 abrogated unilaterally both the 1936 treaty and the 1899 
Agreement on Condominium in the Sudan. At the same time, fighting 
commandos began guerrilla warfare in the Canal Zone, which was 
answered by British troops with reprisals that cost hundreds of lives.'5 
Suddenly, on 25 January 1952 the accumulated anger exploded: hun-
dreds of thousands of Egyptians went into the streets of Cairo demanding 
a total boycott of the British, the sending of the Egyptian army to the 
Canal Zone, and the conclusion of a friendship treaty with the U S S R . T h e 
initial normal demonstration then turned into m o b frenzy by instigation of 
provocateurs directed from the royal palace; some elements began to loot, 
to commit arson and to assassinate Europeans and well-to-do Egyptians. 
Although h u m a n losses were small, the material damage was estimated 
13. O n the Palestinian question, the conflict between the Arabs and Israel, as well as 
on the international aspects, an enormous literature exists; see the bibliography by 
R . M . D e Vore, 1977; the best short introductions are the books by M . Rodinson, 1968a 
and 1968b. 
14. See M . Colombe, 1951; N . Tomiche, 1966; J. Berque, 1968; P. J. Vatikiotis, 1969; 
H . M a h m o u d , 1970 and 1973. 
15. O n Anglo-Egyptian relations, see J. Marlowe, 1954 and E . Monroe, 1963. 
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in several millions of pounds, over 700 buildings (villas, hotels, cabarets, 
banks, shops) having been destroyed. 
T h e Wafdist government fell but none of the succeeding governments 
in the remaining period before the revolution - despite severe measures 
against the strikers and demonstrators - achieved full control over events. 
T h e internal crisis, the defeat in Palestine and the failure in dealings 
with Britain, discredited the entire regime of political parties and m o n -
archy. N o political organization within or outside the established system 
was capable of doing anything to improve the deteriorating general 
situation. T h e initiative came from the Free Officers, an organization of 
middle-rank officers a m o n g w h o m the leading role was played by Lieuten-
ant-Colonel G a m â l c A b d al-Nasser w h o became k n o w n generally as al-
Nâsir, or al-Nasser. Their experience during the Palestinian war - the 
supply of faulty arms, in which m e m b e r s of the palace clique were 
implicated — turned them into enemies of the monarchical regime with 
its farcical parliament and democracy for pashas and landlords, with its 
corruption and inability to solve the most pressing problems. O n 23 July 
1952, the Free Officers supported by part of the army occupied the 
important places in Cairo, widiout bloodshed, seized power and on 26 
July forced King Farouk to abdicate. Although at diat time the officers 
did not propose any concrete programme - and it seems that none 
existed - the Egyptian people welcomed enthusiastically the departure of 
the king, the symbol of everything that was rotten in Egyptian society.16 
T h e full significance of the 1952 revolution was at first not recognized 
in Egypt itself, the Arab world or abroad. It was considered generally as 
a military take-over similar to those in Syria or to the Latin American 
pronunciamentos. It took some time before the anti-feudal and anti-
imperialist character of the revolution became apparent. T h e first agrarian 
reform in 1952 which confiscated the royal domains and limited land 
ownership in any family to 200 feddans, affected merely 10 per cent of 
the arable land and could not solve the basic problems of the Egyptian 
village. But even so it signified the first step in curbing the power of the 
feudal class which had for long dominated Egyptian political life. T h e 
old political parties including the Wafd , which was initially favoured by 
some members of the Revolutionary Council, were dissolved at the end 
of 1952 since they refused to collaborate. In June 1953 the Revolutionary 
C o m m a n d Council abolished the monarchy and Egypt was declared a 
republic, General Naguib becoming its first president. After two thousand 
years of foreign rule - since the time of the Ptolemais dynasty - Egypt 
was once again governed by a native Egyptian as the head of the state.17 
16. Three leading figures of the revolution published their accounts: G . VYbd al-Nasser, 
1954; M . Naguib, 1955; A . al-Sadat, 1957. See also J. and S. Lacouture, 1962; A . Abdel-
Malek, 1962; and C . Issawi, 1963. 
17. The Ptolemais were followed by Romans, Byzantines, Arabs and various Turkish, 
or Kurdish, dynasties; the dynasty of M u h a m m a d 'All was of Albanian origin. 
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Within the Revolutionary Council two groupings crystallized: one led 
by al-Nasser advocated more radical policies in internal as well as in 
foreign policy, whereas the group of Naguib considered that the aim of 
the officers was already achieved and wanted to return to civilian govern-
ment. In his conservative policy, which stressed Islam, Naguib was 
supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. T h e struggle for power continued 
during most of 1954 but when in October a m e m b e r of the Musl im 
Brotherhood attempted to kill al-Nasser, its leaders and several thousands 
of its supporters were arrested. O n 14 November 1954, General Naguib, 
accused amongst other things of being involved in the Muslim Brother-
hood conspiracy, was relieved of the office of president and placed under 
house arrest. Gamäl c A b d al-Nasser became the acting head of state. 
In those first years, the foreign policy of the Revolutionary Council 
concentrated on two issues: the Sudan and the Suez Canal. T h e Anglo-
Egyptian agreement signed in February 1953 ended the Condominium 
and offered the Sudanese the choice between independence or union with 
Egypt; at that time the unity of the Nile valley was m u c h closer to the 
hearts of the Free Officers than Arab unity, and Egypt expected that the 
Sudan would choose union with Egypt. Only when Sudanese politicians, 
disappointed by the overthrow of Naguib and the suppression of the 
political parties, decided against the union, did al-Nasser launch a more 
active Arab policy. 
After protracted negotiations an agreement on Suez was signed in 
October 1954; the British promised to withdraw their troops from the 
Canal Zone within 20 months. T h e agreement recognized the international 
importance of the Suez Canal but at the same time it described it as an 
integral part of Egypt. 
Under al-Nasser, Egypt began to play a more important role in world 
affairs. T o the three circles described by al-Nasser as forming the 
environment in which Egypt was involved - the Islamic, the African and 
the Arab — a fourth was added: the 'non-aligned' nations. This was the 
result of al-Nasser's participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 
where for the first time he came into contact with other Third-World 
leaders like Nehru, Sukarno and others. Egypt also led the opposition of 
certain Arab states to the Baghdad Pact which was seen as an attempt to 
conserve the vanishing influence of the West in the region.18 
During 1955 tension with Israel continued to be high and there were 
m a n y raids and counter-raids across the border of the Ghaza Strip. W h e n 
Egypt, alarmed by the incessant flow of weapons to Israel, asked the 
Western countries for similar aid, its demands fell on deaf ears. In 
September 1955, al-Nasser announced an arms deal with Czechoslovakia 
which was to supply large quantities of military equipment including 
18. See E. Lengyel, 1957. 
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tanks and aircraft in return for cotton and rice. This m o v e to free Egypt 
from a unilateral dependency on Western arsenals was acclaimed by most 
of the Arab and Asian states but aroused a wave of hysteria in the West 
and deepened the distrust and aversion to the Egyptian regime headed 
by al-Nasser. 
T h e immediate effect of this m o v e was the refusal of Britain, the 
United States and the World Bank to finance the High D a m project at 
Aswan. T h e aim of the project was to increase cultivable land and generate 
electricity for industrialization, in the hope of solving the country's 
increasing population problems. President al-Nasser's reply to this was 
his announcement on 26 July 1956 that the Suez Canal C o m p a n y had 
been nationalized and that revenue from the Canal would be used to 
finance the Aswan High D a m . T h e share-holders were to be compensated. 
Britain, France and the United States protested strongly against the action 
and furious propaganda was launched against Egypt, especially against 
President al-Nasser, w h o was depicted as a new Hitler.19 Various diplo-
matic manoeuvres to force Egypt to renounce its rights and to accept 
international control under another label failed. In October, Israel, Britain 
and France after reaching a secret agreement among themselves invaded 
Egypt. T h e c o m m o n goal of all three aggressors was the overthrow of al-
Nasser and his regime as well as making Egypt a dependent semi-colony 
again. 
T h e Israeli forces crossed into Sinai on 24 October and advanced 
towards the Suez Canal; the Anglo-French air operation against Egypt 
began on 31 October, but the paratroops and seaborne forces landed in 
the Port Said area only on 5 November. In the meantime, the U S S R and 
the United States proposed in the U N Security Council resolutions calling 
for immediate Israeli withdrawal - but these were vetoed by Britain and 
France. Later, the U N General Assembly called for a general cease-fire 
and ending of hostilities. T h e c o m m o n pressure of the U S A and the 
U S S R then forced Britain and France to cease hostilities at midnight on 
6 November. In the following month the aggressors' troops were with-
drawn from the Canal Zone to be followed later by the Israeli evacuation 
of the Sinai peninsula and the Ghaza Strip.20 
Thus Britain's last attempt to employ 'gun-boat diplomacy' in order 
to regain its former supremacy in the region ended in a total failure. For 
Britain and France it meant a further loss of influence not only in the 
Arab region but in the whole Third World. O n the other hand, Egypt 
19. T h e Western mass media intentionally confused the issue by stating that Egypt 
unilaterally nationalized the international waterway whereas in fact the Suez Canal had 
always been an integral part of Egyptian territory and Egyptian sovereign rights to it were 
never in doubt. B y nationalizing the Suez Canal C o m p a n y , Egypt was within its sovereign 
rights and in no way violated the international character of the Canal as a waterway. 
20. O n the Suez crisis and conflict see A . Nutting, 1967; and K . Love, 1969. 
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plate 6.4 The ruins ofPort Said, in the Canal Zone, that bore the brunt of the Suez war
in 1956
and President al-Nasser became symbols of a new attitude to the imperi¬
alists: for the first time in history a former colony did not retreat before
threats but offered a spirited resistance causing acute embarrassment to
the Western powers and even internal political crisis in both Britain and
France. The colonial and newly independent nations appreciated both al-
Nasser's bold move in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and his
resistance to armed aggression. It had been clearly demonstrated that
imperialism was not as strong as it used to be and that, by exploiting its
weakness, it would be possible for the oppressed nations in Africa and
elsewhere to achieve their independence.
The Sudan
The post-war history of the Sudan - still called Anglo-Egypt despite the
minimal Egyptian participation in its administration - was marked by
three principal issues: the struggle for independence, the relationship with
Egypt and ¿he emergence of the southern problem.21
21. See J. S. R. Duncan, 1957; P. M. Holt, 1961; M. 'Abd al-Rahmän, 1969.
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Even after the 1948 constitution was proclaimed which provided for a 
legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage and an executive with 
Sudanese ministers, the British governor-general retained the right of 
veto and m a n y other powers. T h e British preferred the U m m a Party led by 
the grandson of the Mahdï whose anti-Egyptian attitude and conservative 
inclination were more convenient than the policy of the Ashikka' Party 
which insisted on close union with Egypt under the slogan of 'Unity of 
the Nile valley' and whose membership was recruited from the more 
progressive segment of Sudanese society. 
T h e 1952 revolution in Egypt was positively accepted in the Sudan at 
first, partly because the unpopular King Farouk was deposed, partly 
because General Naguib had close links with the country, his mother 
being Sudanese. In November 1953 the new National Unionist Party, the 
successor of the pro-Egyptian Ashikka', w o n the elections. In its pro-
g r a m m e the party emphasized the liquidation of colonial rule in the 
shortest possible time; the deposing of General Naguib in Egypt and the 
negative attitude of al-Nasser to the multi-party political system had 
adverse effects even among the former adherents of the union. In 
December the respective leaders of the most powerful religious orders, 
the Ansärs (pro-British) and the Khatmiyya (pro-Egyptian), both of which 
commanded a large following, declared that they were prepared to 
collaborate for the achievement of total independence for the Sudan. 
Notwithstanding strong Egyptian pressures, even the National Unionist 
Party n o w steered towards independence without any ties with Egypt. 
O n 19 December 1955, the Sudanese parliament declared that the 
Sudan was to become an independent republic; then, on 1 January 1956 
independence was officially and solemnly proclaimed. 
T h e problem of the southern Sudan, which was to bedevil Sudanese 
history for several decades, emerged shortly before independence:21 in 
August 1955 the Equatoria Corps of the Sudanese army revolted against 
the gradual take-over of the administration and c o m m a n d posts by the 
northerners. Although the mutineers soon surrendered, disorder had by 
that time spread through the southern provinces and m a n y northerners 
lost their lives. T h e crisis was the consequence of the British policy to 
develop the south in strict separation from the north under the pretext 
that the Muslim Sudanese would subjugate the unsophisticated sou-
therners and subject them to slavery as they did in the last century. 
Proselytizing Islam was forbidden; Christian (mostly Catholic) missions 
were encouraged. In the missionary schools only English was used, 
whereas in the north Arabic was the vehicle of teaching and soon became 
the official language. 
T h u s there evolved two totally separate and mutually alien regions. 
T h e British, of course, did not invent the cultural and social distinctions 
22. See J. Oduho and W . Deng, 1963; and M . O . Beshir, 1968. 
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between the Musl im Arabic-speaking northerners and the Nilotic or 
Central Sudanic southerners of traditional religion - but they did every-
thing to perpetuate those differences and to sow deep distrust. During 
the early colonial period there were some indications that the relationship 
between the northerners and the southerners could have developed in a 
friendly way: the leader of the first national movement , the White Flag 
League, was c A b d al-LatTf, a Dinka (Jieng) from the south, and a m o n g 
his followers were people from both regions. Similarly, w h e n in 1924 the 
Egyptian troops were forced by the British to evacuate the Sudan, the 
Sudanese officers and cadets, the majority of w h o m came from the south, 
mutinied in protest, paying for their gesture of solidarity with m a n y 
dead.23 It was after these events that the British colonial administration 
m a d e the isolation between north and south even stricter. 
T h e northerners were not guiltless in the deterioration of relations: 
w h e n they began in 1954-5 t o t a ^ e o v e r t n e administration of the southern 
provinces from the British, they started hastily to introduce Arabic as 
the official language, paying no attention to the differences in cultural 
background and to the grievances of local people and their political 
leaders. It was from both the previous colonial policy and mutual 
incomprehension that the tragic conflict arose. 
The Horn of Africa 
T h e war of resistance, the Second World W a r , and the Italian occupation 
caused enormous losses to Ethiopia: more than 760000 Ethiopians lost 
their lives, 525000 dwellings were destroyed, nearly 14 million cattle 
perished. In all, the total material losses have been calculated at £180 
million.24 T h e defeat of the Italians did not m e a n that the country 
automatically recovered its independence and sovereignty. Great Britain 
only reluctantly allowed the reinstallation of the Ethiopian administrative 
machinery, which until the end of the war and some time afterwards was 
fully controlled by the British Occupied E n e m y Territory Administration 
( O E T A ) , run from Nairobi and headed by Sir Phillip Mitchell, an ex-
governor of Uganda. For some time the British even nursed plans to 
establish a kind of protectorate over the whole of former Italian East 
Africa.25 Although in the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement the freedom 
and independence of Ethiopia were declared, its various articles and more 
so the accompanying military convention preserved and legitimated a very 
substantial degree of British control. S o m e parts of Ethiopian territory 
like Ogaden, the H a u d and large stretches adjacent to French, British and 
23. See U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, ch. 23, pp. 589-92. 
24. R . K . Pankhurst, 1955, pp. 548-9. 
25. L . Mosley, 1964, p. 275. 
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Italian Somaliland were to remain under British military administration 
indefinitely. 
It took two more years of negotiations to reach at the end of 1944 a 
n e w agreement which abolished the unequal character of the previous 
one and resulted in the decolonization of the greater part of Ethiopia 
except for Ogaden and the Reserved Area which remained under British 
military administration. It was not until 1954 that those regions were 
returned to full Ethiopian jurisdiction and British troops were withdrawn.26 
Under the British military occupation that lasted until 1951 there 
emerged in Eritrea a number of political parties which reflected the 
complicated ethnic and religious situation. T h e Christian Tigre from the 
plateau founded the Unionist Party supported by the Ethiopian govern-
ment and church; it advocated a total union with Ethiopia. A Christian 
minority, afraid of Amhara supremacy, adhered to the Liberal Progressive 
Party, seeking the establishment of an independent Eritrea. T h e Musl im 
League followed a similar programme and both these parties (together 
with some smaller ones) formed the Independence Bloc, later re-named 
Democratic Bloc. 
T h e Fifth U N General Assembly in 1950 adopted the resolution about 
the creation of a federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea; the latter was 
endowed with its o w n constitution, legislative assembly and government. 
Foreign affairs, defence, finance and international communication were 
to be the responsibility of the federal government.27 
In M a r c h 1952 the first parliamentary elections were held: Musl im and 
Christian parties remained in equilibrum. In September of the same year 
the last British administrator handed over the administration of Eritrea 
to the Ethiopian crown. T h e federation meant victory for the Unionist 
Party which also became the ruling party in the government. M a n y 
leaders of the Independence Bloc left the country and went into exile 
(mostly to Cairo) where they continued to propagate the idea of Eritrean 
independence. 
F r o m the start there evolved an anomalous situation. Eritrea - with its 
political parties, elected parliament and a m o r e progressive constitution -
contrasted sharply with the political order in Ethiopia where the emperor 
still controlled all reins of power. Haile Selassie from the very start looked 
with suspicion on Eritrea and soon began systematically to abolish one 
democratic institution after another: in the 1956 elections no political 
parties were permitted to present candidates; in 1958 the Eritrean flag 
was abolished; in 1959 the Ethiopian codex was introduced; in i960 the 
Eritrean parliament - already purged of open opponents to the union 
with Ethiopia - changed the 'Eritrean government' into 'Eritrean admin-
istration'. That process found its logical conclusion in 1962 w h e n the 
26. See R . K . Pankhurst, 1981. 
27. See G . K . N . Trevaskis, i960; L . E . S. Pankhurst and R . K . Pankhurst, 1953. 
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Eritrean assembly voted first for the abolition of federal status and then 
for its o w n dissolution. Eritrea became an integral part of the Ethiopian 
empire. T h e seeds of future conflict were thus sown at that time, 
particularly when further opposition leaders went into exile and w h e n in 
the country itself armed guerrilla groups began the fight against the 
Ethiopian administration and troops, thus creating another grave problem 
for Ethiopia.28 
W h e n their attempts to recreate a British-controlled former Italian East 
Africa proved unrealistic, the British became ardent partisans of the pan-
Somali idea and proposed in 1946 a unification of all the Somalilands.29 
Naturally, the Ethiopians and the French were strongly opposed to the 
plan for a British trusteeship over all the Somalis and the project failed — 
but it helps to explain w h y Britain occupied the Ogaden for such a long 
time. However, it was during the period of the temporary unification of 
all the Somalis under British administration that pan-Somalism, as the 
most prominent component of Somali nationalistic ideology, took root 
among the young intelligentsia.30 
All these issues were connected with the liquidation of the Italian 
colonial empire. In the peace treaty of 1947 Italy renounced the ownership 
of its colonies but this did not m e a n that it had abandoned the idea of 
regaining them by some other means. T h e Italians aspired, as in Tri-
politania, to be given at least the trusteeship over Somalia. In 1948-9 w h e n 
the question was discussed in the U N , a wave of popular demonstrations in 
Mogadishu and elsewhere arose against the return of the Italians in any 
form. W o m e n organized by the Somali Youth League ( S Y L ) participated 
actively in the independence struggle and in January 1948 one of them, 
H a w a Ismen cAlî was killed as the first w o m a n martyr of the Somali 
national liberation movement. Although the anti-Italian feelings of the 
people were manifest even to various U N commissions, the three Western 
powers favoured the trusteeship under Italy while the Soviet Union 
supported a collective four-power control. O n 21 November 1949, the 
General Assembly decided to entrust Somalia for ten years to Italian 
trusteeship under U N tutelage. T h e immediate independence hoped for 
by the people of Somalia was thus postponed for a whole decade. 
Although the S Y L remained the leading political party, a position 
acquired during the British occupation, other parties founded on a clan 
28. O n the post-war history of Ethiopia, see R . Greenfield, 1965; J. Doresse, 1970; 
H . G . Marcus, 1972; P . Gilkes, 1975. 
29. See S . Touval, 1963; I. M . Lewis, 1965. 
30. Also, it should not be forgotten that in Italian schools in Somalia the period of 
risorgimento, i.e. of Italian unification in the nineteenth century, was explained as the most 
glorious part of national history. It was natural and easy for the young Somalis to draw 
a comparison between their present situation and that of the Italians in the past as both 
were confronted with a multi-national empire the overthrow of which, together with the 
liberation of compatriots, was considered to be progressive from all points of view. 
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basis had already emerged during that period. O n e major effect of Italy's 
return was the proliferation of political parties so that by March 1954, at 
the time of the first municipal election, there were 21 of them as against 
eight in 1950. This mirrored to a high degree the clan-based structure of 
Somali society. Although the clan-based parties accepted officially national-
ist and pan-Somali goals in their programmes, they nevertheless remained 
attached to the defence and promulgation of their o w n particular inter-
ests.31 T h e first three years of the decade were marked by Italian-SYL 
hostility as the party claimed more participation in administration and 
organized m a n y anti-Italian demonstrations. Between the municipal elec-
tion in 1954 in which the S Y L confirmed its lead, and i960, the former 
hostile attitude of the Italians towards the S Y L changed as it became 
clear that after independence it would be the leading party and the Italians 
did not wish to antagonize it unnecessarily. In the first general election 
to the legislative assembly in February 1956 the S Y L again w o n the 
majority of votes. T h e new assembly was given full statutory powers in 
domestic affairs and the first Somali government under Abdillahi Ise was 
formed. Nevertheless the head of the Italian Trust Administration retained 
the right of absolute veto and jurisdiction over military and foreign affairs 
and Italian councillors were attached to the Somali ministers. A s S Y L 
power increased and independence approached, these developments led 
to tensions and splits inside the party which, although claiming a pan-
Somali policy, was ridden with conflict between its Darood and Hawiye 
members . 
Political development in the British Somaliland Protectorate lagged 
behind that of Somalia.32 Britain did not permit any political party 
representation, recognizing only representation on clan lines. T h e legis-
lative council was established as late as 1957 and the franchise was 
extremely limited before i960. T h e few political parties founded before 
1950, the Somali National League ( S N L ) and the Somali Youth League 
( S Y L ) , although sometimes persecuted by the colonial administration, 
developed only minimal activity. Under the impetus of the 1954 agreement 
which transferred the Somali-inhabited H a u d and Reserved Area to 
Ethiopia, a new nationalist fervour was aroused. Massive demonstrations 
occurred throughout the protectorate and a national convention called the 
National United Front ( N U F ) was organized. It launched a vigorous 
campaign with the objective of recovering the H a u d and of obtaining 
independence. Although the H a u d campaign did not succeed, the issue 
of independence in the near future became the main concern of all parties. 
All of them also shared the aim of unification with Somalia. Under the 
growing nationalist pressure, the legislative council was reformed early in 
1959 to include 12 elected Somali members; a year later the reform 
31. See A . A . Castagno, 1966, pp. 512-59. 
32. See I. M . Lewis, 1965, pp. 148^55. 
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being considered insufficient, a new constitution with fuller Somali 
representation and providing for ministerial responsibility was introduced. 
T h e pace of events was accelerated by the approach of the date for 
Somalian independence. Already in 1959 the delegates from all political 
parties in Somaliland had participated in Mogadishu in the formation of 
the National Pan-Somali M o v e m e n t ; in April i960 all elected members 
of the n e w legislative council passed a resolution calling for independence 
by 1 July i960 and unification with Somalia. A delegation went to 
Mogadishu where an agreement was reached about the future united 
republic. British Somaliland then became fully independent on 26 June 
i960 and five days later Somalia followed suit; the two territories then 
immediately became united on the previously agreed basis. 
T h e tiny French colony called until 1967 Côte française des Somalis, 
and afterwards Territoire français des Afars et des Issus (TFAI) , possessed 
in French eyes the multiple assets of a good harbour, an excellent strategic 
position and the head of the only Ethiopian railway.33 France was therefore 
strongly opposed to growing local demands for independence even long 
after the majority of the continent became free. T h e existence in the 
country of two distinct and numerically almost even ethnic groups, with 
a slight preponderance of Somalis, gave the colonial administration a good 
pretext to postpone independence indefinitely;34 it seized every opportunity 
to exacerbate the rivalry. T h e nomadic Afar (also called Danakil) were 
systematically favoured against the more urbanized Somali. That policy 
was partly successful but it should be mentioned that before 1958 the 
two principal rivals on the political scene, M a h m u d Harbi and Hassan 
Gouled were both of Issa Somali origin and their following was recruited 
from both ethnic groups. T h e y differed in their political opinions - Harbi 
being a supporter of unification with independent Somalia, his opponent 
of a closer union with France. T h e first elections in 1957 brought victory 
for Harbi w h o became vice-president of the Council of Ministers; his 
pan-Somali inclination soon m a d e him unacceptable to the French and 
in 1958 he was forced to flee abroad. T h e de Gaulle referendum of 1958, 
which attracted only a minority of voters, resulted, as in all French 
African territories except Guinea, in further adherence to the French 
community. But whereas the intermediate period before independence 
lasted for only two years in other Francophone countries, the people of 
the Territoire français des Afars et des Issas had to wait for nearly 20 years 
before achieving their independence. 
During those years the political leadership fell to the Afar supported 
by the French administration; the leading Somali politicians were mostly 
33. See V . T h o m p s o n and R . Adloff, 1968; P. Oberlé, 1971; and R . Saint-Verán, 1977. 
34. See the commentary of Le Monde, 26 April 1964, that ' T h e administration reckons, 
not groundlessly, that that rivalry between the Afar and Somali is the best guarantee of 
stability': quoted in Politika Frantsii v Azii i v Afrike, 1965, p. 175. 
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in exile and the only officially recognized Somali party, Ligue populaire 
africaine pour l'indépendance (LPAI) did not emerge until 1972. M o r e 
radicalism was shown by the underground Front de la libération de la Côte 
des Somalis ( F L C S ) with headquarters in Mogadishu. In 1967 a n e w 
referendum for an 'enlarged autonomy' was held in the territory; in the 
new government, the Afar party - L'Union nationale pour l'indépendance 
(UNI) - led by 'All Arif Bourhan retained the dominant position under 
the slogan 'Unity and progress within the French community'. 
After the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 the liberation movement gathered 
m o m e n t u m . O p e n guerrilla actions against the French took place, organ-
ized by the F L C S , and the demands for independence were n o w voiced 
not only by the L P A I but within the ruling party, too. T h e issue of the 
country's independence came before the U N General Assembly in 1975, 
when a resolution of immediate granting of independence to the T F A I 
was adopted. 
In March 1977 the Somali-dominated L P A I and F L C S and some of 
'All Arif's former supporters formed the coalition Rassemblement populaire 
pour l'indépendance (RPI) under the leadership of Hassan Gouled. It w o n 
the combined elections and referendum and Gouled was elected president 
of the Council heading a government of ten ministers, half of them Afar. 
Finally, on 26 June 1977, the territory at last became fully independent, 
under the neutral title of the Republic of Djibouti. It was the last of the 
continental African countries north of the equator to become inde-
pendent - attaining its sovereignty even later than the majority of Southern 
African territories. T h e Republic of Djibouti became the forty-ninth 
M e m b e r of the Organization of African Unity and the twenty-second of 
the Arab League. 
T h e ideologies of the liberation struggle 
During the period under discussion - and, indeed, during all the colonial 
period - three main ideologies were present in the Arab countries of 
North Africa: Islam, nationalism and socialism. Their respective influence 
and impact were uneven at different times and places mirroring the 
changing social and political situation. Nevertheless, it could be maintained 
that the leading ideology in the region during the decisive stage of the 
anti-colonial struggle was Arab nationalism, tinged in various countries 
with variable doses either of Islam and socialism or both.35 
Let us at first examine the role Islam played in the decisive years of 
the national liberation movement. Islam had the advantage of being the 
oldest traditional ideology in the whole Arab region; it permeated the life 
of the great majority of the population, sensitizing their world view and 
attitudes towards actual political and social issues. Religious convictions 
35. A . Abdel-Malek, 1969, 1980; A . Laroui, 1967. 
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have always dominated the thinking of the peasant and middle and lower 
urban classes and at various stages provided fuel for the struggle against 
feudalism and foreign oppression. Islam often played an important role 
in mobilizing the masses and in a number of Arab countries Mus l im 
lulamff have participated in campaigns against colonialism together with 
the people, or have even led them. That was the case in Algeria where 
the 'Society of the Algerian 'ulama" and other groups did valuable work 
to prepare the ground for the liberation struggle and after 1954 took 
active part in the armed conflict. T h e national liberation movements 
against imperialism have often assumed the religious form of defending 
Arab-Musl im culture threatened by the invasion of Western culture and 
its values, sometimes diametrically opposed to the Musl im way of life 
and Islamic ethics. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the religious organizations whose 
passionate reassertion of fundamental Islamic beliefs, values and standards 
responded far more closely to the feeling of the suppressed lower classes, 
became more active. T h e y protested against both the Westernized ruling 
classes and imperialism. 
T h e most active a m o n g them was the Muslim Brotherhood - al-
Ikhpän al-Muslimm?6 Founded in 1927 by Hassan al-Bannä (1906-49), an 
Egyptian teacher, the movement grew steadily, gaining by its various n o n -
political, mostly humanitarian and social activities, large membership. 
Although claiming Islamic goals the movement was not strictly pan-
Islamic but rather an offshoot of Egyptian nationalism and its original 
programme aimed at the reform of the Egyptian society only. It offered 
rather simple and in m a n y ways nebulous prescriptions for social reform 
based on Islamic ethics and a strict adherence to the sharfa, and it 
protested vigorously against the secularizing tendency of liberal national-
ists. In the period between the end of the war and the advent of the 
military regime, the Musl im Brethren began to play a major and stormy 
role in Egyptian politics. S o m e groups within the organization sought to 
relieve their frustration by acts of individual terror aimed at the politicians 
and later on at the British occupation troops in the Suez Canal Zone . 
M a n y times officially denounced by the al-Azhar culamä\31 debarred by 
assassination or execution of their leaders - under both monarchy and 
military regime - the Brotherhood continues still to exist and to retain, 
if not increase, its influence among Egyptian petite-bourgeoisie, unemployed 
intelligentsia and junior ranks of the civil service. In the period under 
discussion the Brotherhood remained restricted to Egypt but later its 
branches or similar movements began to emerge in other Islamic and 
Arab countries. O n the ideological field as well as in the fight to win the 
36. O n this movement, see R . P. Mitchell, 1969; I. M . HusaynT, 1952. 
37. T h e 'ulamâ* accused the Brotherhood of having 'crossed the limits fixed by G o d 
in revelation between good and evil'; see P. Rondot, 1958, vol. 1, p. 253. 
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support of the masses, these fundamentalist movements are the most 
serious rivals to both the nationalists and the socialists. 
In the Arab nationalist movement there emerged two tendencies, 
sometimes complementary, sometimes competing: the pan-Arabic and 
particular (local) nationalistic trends existed side by side in most Arab 
countries, but their intensity was conditioned by actual conditions.38 T h e 
anti-colonial struggle in the inter-war period rather strengthened local 
nationalism; in North Africa particularly, pan-Arab ideology did not play 
any outstanding role and was limited to some groups of the intelligentsia. 
It developed there m u c h later than in the eastern part of the Arab world 
and found rather weak response. Only the Algerian liberation war brought 
changes - but restricted, however, to the Maghreb countries only. 
Neither Arab nationalism nor the idea of Arab unity became an 
important element in Egyptian policy. T h e Egyptian national movement 
was oriented towards achieving full sovereignty and liberation from any 
vestiges of British rule. Its efforts were concentrated on unification with 
the Sudan, to realize the 'Unity of the Nile valley', this idea being closer 
to Egypt's aspirations than that of Arab unity. Even for the military 
regime, the union with the Sudan remained until 1955 one of the central 
political issues.39 
T h e pan-Arab idea which emerged during the First World W a r in the 
Asiatic part of the Arab world was for a long time even ridiculed by m a n y 
Egyptian politicians and rejected by the majority of the intelligentsia.40 
Nevertheless, m a n y pan-Arab theoreticians, a m o n g them the influential 
Sâti* al-Husrï, emphasized Egypt's leading role in the anticipated process 
of unification.41 
Nationalism in the Arab countries expressed itself primarily as a 
reaction against foreign rule, and not as an expression of the economic 
growth of the local bourgeoisie; thus in the inter-war period it integrated 
groups which in Europe usually remained aloof from nationalism: religious 
clergy and feudal landlords. During and after the Second World W a r , 
parallel to the expansion of the bourgeoisie, the influence of these groups 
diminished and Islam became more a moral than a political factor. 
In the structure and content of Arab nationalism, Islam forms an 
integral and important part: the spread of Islam is the most glorious part 
of Arab history and their most valuable contribution to universal history. 
Arab culture and civilization were formed by Islam and the Islamic way 
38. S. G . Haim, 1962; J. Berque, i960 and 1964; M . Khadduri, 1970; a bibliography 
until 1959 is given by F. Qubain, i960. 
39. A . Abdel-Malek, 1969. 
40. Even the General-Secretary of the League of the Arab States, 'Abd al-Rahmän 
'Azzäm, proclaimed in 1950: 'Firstly we are Egyptians, secondly Arabs and thirdly 
Muslims': see S. G . Haim, 1962, pp. 52-3. 
41. H . Z . Nuseibeh, 1956. 
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of life bears m a n y specific features of its Arab origin. T h u s , Arab 
nationalists emphasize the importance of Islam and Islamic ethics for 
Arab nationalism, calling them 'the Arab high ideals'. 
T h e attitude of Muslim orthodoxy and traditionalists towards Arab 
nationalism has been negative and even the concept of a special unity 
between the Arabs and Islam was attacked. According to the traditionalists, 
Arab nationalism was destroying the unity of Islam by depriving it of its 
universal character and by contributing to the false idea that Islam is 
primarily an Arab religion. Every Musl im should be proud first of his 
being a m e m b e r of a supra-national community (timmd) — and thereby 
having achieved a higher stage in the evolution of mankind than individual 
nations.41 
Moreover, there are profound theological objections against national-
ism - a genuine Muslim should be loyal only to G o d and the Islamic 
umma whereas the nationalists put the Arab nation as the highest ideal. 
O n the other hand, Arab nationalists m a d e attempts to integrate Islam 
into their ideology and programmes but more as a cultural and social 
factor than as a pure religion. Those attempts have not been entirely 
successful and an ideological uncertainty about the role Islam has to play 
in Arab nationalism prevails. T h e nationalists had to reckon with the 
adherence of the Arab masses to the Islamic religion whereas the Islamic 
orthodox groups, theoretically averse to any kind of nationalism, had to 
reckon with the reality that in the majority of Arab countries the leadership 
of the anti-colonial movement remained firmly in the hands of the 
nationalists.43 
Although in the post-war period the pan-Arabic aims of nationalistic 
ideology in m a n y Arab countries were proclaimed even louder than in 
the preceding period, the actual anti-colonial movement was ideologically 
based and politically organized on concrete local - Egyptian, Sudanese, 
Tunisian, and so on — nationalism. A s already pointed out, the Egyptians 
especially remained for a long time quite impermeable to pan-Arabism 
and their actions against Britain were inspired by the old slogan of early 
nationalists - Egypt for the Egyptians. 
T h e disparity between pan-Arab nationalism and local nationalism 
deepened after the war. T h e local national movements were more concrete 
and sure in their aims and methods - being closely linked with the social 
and economic situation, which was underestimated by the theoreticians 
of pan-Arabism w h o often lived in a realm of wishful thinking. T h e y 
contented themselves mostly with nebulous ideas about the glorious future 
of the unified Arab nation but did not pay m u c h attention to the economic 
and social conditions necessary for its emergence. 
T h e people in the Arab countries in North Africa fought against 
42. See M . Berger, 1962. 
43. B . Dodge, 1965, pp. 94-119. 
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colonial rule neither for the restitution of an ideal Islamic state nor for 
some uncertain pan-Arab unity. Both the leaders and the masses realized 
that their fight was a struggle against the enemy w h o occupied their 
fatherland, and w h o selfishly oppressed its people politically, economically 
and culturally. National independence was to be achieved by and for the 
society living on the territory; that was the first goal to attain and it was 
for those practical reasons that the local nationalism in the Arab countries 
prevailed over the ideas of pan-Arabism, not to speak of pan-Islamism, 
as the rallying ideology of the anti-colonial struggle. 
T h u s the specific nationalism remained the predominant force both in 
politics and ideology. A characteristic feature of post-war anti-imperialist 
Arab nationalism was the deepening of its social content; nationalism 
confined itself not only to solving the national problem but put forward 
a social programme as well. 
Socialist ideas had already been k n o w n in the Arab countries of North 
Africa for a long time but were restricted to the narrow circles of the 
intelligentsia and — with the exception of Algeria at a later stage - did 
not feature in the nationalist programmes. T h e communist parties in 
Egypt and in the Sudan worked in illegality whereas in the Maghreb 
states their membership was, even after the war, predominantly E u r -
opean.44 T h u s neither those parties nor the working class were able to 
become preponderant in the national-liberation movement . 4 5 A Moroccan 
Marxist, cAzTz Belal, notes the main causes of this phenomenon: the 
numerical weakness of the workers due to industrial underdevelopment; 
illiteracy, the survival of traditional values, the lack of class consciousness; 
and the initial failure of the Arab Marxist m o v e m e n t to adapt to the 
socio-cultural and psycho-sociological context prevailing in the Arab 
world. Marxist parties appeared initially more as progressive ideal m o v e -
ments with 'European colouration', ill-adapted to national realities, and 
not as exponents of 'national thought' and the struggle for national 
affirmation.46 
But at the same time, the victory of the U S S R in the Second World 
W a r and its success in changing underdeveloped Russia into an industrial 
power, attracted m a n y Arab nationalists to socialism. There emerged 
various kinds of Arab socialism; this socialism adopted m a n y social and 
economic teachings of Marxism but refused to subscribe to the Marxist 
world view with its atheism and internationalism. 
In most variants of Arab socialism, capitalism is rejected not as a m o d e 
of production but only certain stages of its development - capitalist 
liberalism or laissez-faire attitudes. Socialism is interpreted not as a class 
outlook of the exploited, but rather as a set of technical and organizational 
44. M . S. Agwani, 1969. 
45. See A . Abdel-Malek, 1966. 
46. A . Belal, 1972, pp. 21-2. 
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methods for ensuring progress which are linked mainly with the activities 
of the government and with an expansion of its economic functions. 
Socialist slogans were pressed into the service of Arab nationalism. 
O n e of the founders of the Ba'th Party, Michel Aflaq, once said bluntly 
that socialism was just an appendage to the nationalist platform.47 Essen-
tially that approach is c o m m o n to m a n y ideologies of the national liberation 
movements. Since their representatives came to socialist slogans in the 
course of the struggle to win and assert political independence, they are 
inclined to understand socialism merely as a means of achieving national 
objectives and reconstruction.48 In such situations, socialism is the other 
face of nationalism. 
47. 'To us, socialism is a tool relating to our national needs and conditions, and 
consequently it cannot be a fundamental philosophy or outlook dominating our life . . . 
T h e Arab nationalist realizes that socialism is the best way to revive his nationalism and 
his nation'; quoted in S. A . Hanna and G . H . Gardner, 1969, p. 300. 
48. See O . V . Martyshin, 1978, p. 100. 
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Jean S U R E T - C A N A L E and A. Adu B O A H E N 
Introduction 
T h e end of the Second World W a r and the victory of the Allies could 
not fail to raise immense hopes in the peoples of Africa subjected to 
colonial domination. T h e defeat of fascism was the defeat of a doctrine 
which was based on racism, the exaltation of brute force and the denial 
of the right of peoples to self-determination; it was, implicitly, the 
condemnation of colonialism whose principles - or practice - rested on 
similar bases. Already in 1941, the Atlantic Charter had placed among 
the Allies' war aims 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live'. In the minds of the signatories, 
that was supposed only to apply to Europe; but the African peoples seized 
on it and demanded this right for themselves. In a m e m o entitled ' T h e 
Charter and British West Africa', Azikiwe of Nigeria demanded immediate 
reforms and representative government. G . E . M o o r e , a m e m b e r of the 
legislative council in G h a n a also in a speech in 1943 claimed that if it 
was 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they live it was a right to which the Africans share', while in the 
same year the Sherbro paramount chief, Albert George Caulker, demanded 
that after the war the colonial authorities would surrender sovereign 
power to the people of Sierra Leone in the spirit of the charter.1 Having 
taken part in the war in the name of these principles, providing both 
m e n and supplies (at least the French and British colonies), the peoples 
of West Africa were thus to challenge the colonial regime. 
T h e awakening of radical political forces in West Africa was assisted 
by other factors. T h e first was the anti-colonialism of the two great victors 
of the allied coalition, the U S S R and the United States, even if it rested 
on very different motivations. T h e second was the rise of the forces of 
the left in France and Great Britain signified by Socialist-Communist 
majority in the French Constituent Assembly of 1945 and the accession 
to power of Labour in Great Britain. 
1. P. O . Esedebe, 1971, p. 24; A . A. Boahen, 1986, pp. 141-2; A . A . Mazrui and 
M . Tidy, 1984, pp. 13-14. 
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T h e Second World W a r affected the political situation in West Africa 
in other ways which have been discussed elsewhere but which must be 
touched upon here briefly. First, the compulsory recruitment of so m a n y 
Africans for the war greatly aroused the anger of all classes of Africans — 
especially wives, mothers and grandmothers w h o could not bear to see 
their husbands, sons and grandsons being torn from them. M a n y of the 
Africans w h o were left behind suffered almost as m u c h as those w h o 
went to war - but of course in a different way. Secondly, those Africans 
w h o saw active service in B u r m a and India came into contact with the 
independence movements in these areas. T h e ensuing experience not only 
broadened their political horizons but also exposed them to the anti-
colonial strategies and tactics being applied at the time, some of which 
they would not hesitate to apply on their return h o m e . Thirdly, these 
soldiers returned h o m e after the war full of hopes of great rewards in the 
form of compensation, gratuities, employment and so on, which never 
materialized. This disappointment drove them into the ranks of the 
nationalists and some of them even became active leaders of the masses 
themselves. In all these ways, the war greatly strengthened anti-colonial 
and nationalist sentiments in West Africa. 
Economic and social changes 
T h e desire for a better and a different life manifested itself in the years 
1945-8 at times in an explosive manner because of the economic and 
political regime imposed during the war. This was marked by the excesses 
of the ' W a r effort' such as forced labour and compulsory deliveries of 
products, the shortage and sharp price rises leading to the 'black market' 
combined with wage freezes, and the authoritarian methods of the 
traditional rulers and the colonial authorities, all of which became intol-
erable when peace returned. In this context, the élites' desire to secure 
recognition of their rights and their entitlement to play an economic and 
political role rested on a profound popular movement in which economic 
demands were closely associated with anti-colonial demands such as the 
abolition of forced labour and racial discrimination and the granting of 
political rights. 
This apparent unity concealed divergences that were already reappear-
ing by the late 1940s, and did so especially after independence. For some 
bourgeois or would-be bourgeois strata, the goal was limited to taking 
the place occupied by the Europeans; for the masses, the desire for 
national liberation was inseparable from a desire for social liberation. 
S o m e leaders a m o n g the élite (the minority that had received a European-
type education) m a d e themselves the spokesmen of these popular desires. 
Following this path to the end assumed, to use Amilcar Cabral's celebrated 
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formula, these people agreeing to 'commit class suicide' and this route 
was not the one usually chosen.2 
In the years following the end of the war, the shortages continued, and 
the first 'plans' implemented in the colonies aimed at developing their 
role as suppliers of raw materials. These aims were later slightly modified, 
but remained centred on the development of primary production, and on 
associated essential capital investment such as in ports, airports, roads 
and power stations. Economic needs for a sufficiently skilled and healthy 
labour force and popular aspirations also worked together to produce an 
effect in health, education, and other sectors. 
T h e economic backwardness of West Africa, where the colonial preda-
tory economy (économie de traité) persisted, aggravated by the war years, 
m a d e essential a contribution to investment by the colonial powers, which 
had not generally been m a d e before the war. T h e word and the myth of 
'aid' m a d e its appearance. In the framework of the predatory economy, 
which lasted until the late 1950s, agricultural export crops developed, but 
so did the mining industries, which had been virtually non-existent before 
1949-51 in the French domain. Manufacturing industries began to 
develop - mainly in the ports, which doubled as capitals - in the form 
of import-substitution or the initial processing of exportable goods. 
Socially, more elementary schools were established during the period 
while a University College was opened at Ibadan in Nigeria and Legon 
in Ghana. Urbanization was also given a great boost as unemployed 
school-leavers left the rural areas in ever increasing numbers after the 
war and moved into the towns in search of jobs and entertainment. 
Moreover, after the war an increasing number of West Africans, educated 
and trained abroad as lawyers, doctors and engineers (but mainly the 
first), began to return h o m e , especially in British West Africa. 
T h e result of all these changes was a steady increase in the number of 
the professional bourgeoisie of lawyers, doctors, university graduates, civil 
servants and middle-level African businessmen and transport owners, and 
of a working class of teachers, mechanics, drivers, miners, railway-workers, 
store-keepers and small African businessmen; above all, it led to an 
increasing number of unemployed school-leavers concentrated in the few 
towns which served either as the capital, administrative or mining centres. 
In the rural areas, where the mass of the African people still reside, there 
was also a steady increase in the numbers of cocoa-farmers, groundnut-
planters, coffee-growers and labourers especially in Ghana, Nigeria and 
the Côte d'Ivoire. Compared with the French and Portuguese territories 
which surrounded them, the four British colonies were notably more 
developed. Economically, they had a more complex railway network while 
their agricultural and mineral production was m u c h higher. Socially and 
culturally, the population of Nigeria alone was larger than that of all the 
2. A . Cabrai, 1975. 
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French colonies put together, while they could boast of the already 
century-old existence of an Anglicized élite (lawyers, clergymen, teachers) 
and an African press that was almost a century old, too. 
It is against this background that w e should examine the phenomenal 
political changes that occurred in West Africa during the decade and 
right after the Second World W a r . These changes were indeed striking 
for - just as it took about two decades from 1880 for the European 
imperial powers to partition and occupy Africa - it took the same time 
for most African countries to regain their political independence and 
sovereignty after the war. During the period under review, of the 15 
Western African colonies, 11 had regained their political sovereignty by 
i960 of w h o m as m a n y as nine did so in the single year of i960, the next 
two between 1961 and 1965, and the last two in 1973 and 1974 respectively. 
O f these colonies, four were British - Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and 
the Gambia; nine were French - D a h o m e y (now Benin), Guinea, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta; and 
the rest were Portuguese — Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. O f the British 
colonies, Ghana was the first to win her battle for the overthrow of 
colonialism followed by Nigeria, then Sierra Leone and finally the Gambia. 
O f the French colonies, Guinea led in 1958 followed by die rest, all of 
which regained their sovereignty in the single year of i960. T h e last of 
the Western Africa colonies to overthrow colonialism were the Portuguese 
colonies of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. 
These bare facts pose a number of rather intriguing and interesting 
questions. T h e first of these is w h y was colonialism virtually ended in 
Western Africa in the decade and half after the Second World War? 
Secondly, w h y was a British colony the first to regain her independence -
not only in West Africa but throughout Africa south of the Sahara - and 
w h y was this colony Ghana? Thirdly, w h y did Guinea lead in French 
West Africa, and w h y did all the remaining French colonies gain their 
independence in the same year of i960? T h e final question is w h y were 
the Portuguese colonies the last set of colonies to regain their inde-
pendence? These are the questions that this chapter seeks to answer, 
beginning first with British, then French and finally Portuguese West 
Africa. 
British West Africa 
T h e liquidation of colonialism from British West Africa within two 
decades after the Second World W a r was the outcome of three main 
factors which are more or less equally true of all the other colonies. T h e 
first and easily the most important factor was what Mazrui and Tidy have 
termed 'the great upsurge of African nationalism'3 during the period 
3. A. A. Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 1. 
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under review; the second was the nature, objectives and activities of the 
political parties and nationalist movements that were launched; and the 
third was the actions as well as reactions and responses of the British 
colonial power to the activities and demands of the African nationalists 
and their supporters. 
A s has been amply demonstrated in Volume VII of this History, African 
nationalist or anti-colonial activities started from the very beginning of 
the imposition of the colonial system on Africa and grew in intensity and 
complexity with the years.4 African nationalism or anti-colonialism reached 
its xenophobic height during the decade following the end of the Second 
World W a r due to a number of factors. T h e first of them - which has 
been dealt with in the Introduction - was the impact of the war itself 
and the disappointment generated by the British government's attitude 
to the Atlantic Charter.5 
T h e second factor, which not only greatly stimulated but also radicalized 
nationalist activities in British West Africa in particular, was the Pan-
African Congress which was held in Manchester in 1945. This congress 
is discussed in Chapter 25 below, but some aspects which are of relevance 
here must be highlighted. T h o u g h there have been m a n y pan-African 
congresses since 1900,6 this one was unique and epoch-making in a 
number of ways. T o begin with, it was the first of these congresses in 
which Africans, such as K w a m e N k r u m a h of Ghana, played a leading 
role in its planning and running, and in which a far greater number of 
Africans attended. A m o n g them were Obafemi Awolowo, H . O . Davies 
and Jaja W a c h u k u of Nigeria; J. E . Taylor, A k o Adjei and D r R . G . 
Armattoe of Ghana; J o m o Kenyatta of Kenya; and Hastings Banda of 
Malawi. Secondly, it was this congress that for the first time not only 
called for 'complete and absolute independence' and a unified Africa with 
a socialist economy but also outlined the strategies to be applied. 'If the 
Western World is still determined to rule mankind by force' asserted one 
of the resolutions, 'then Africans, as a last resort, m a y have to appeal to 
force in the effort to achieve Freedom even if force destroys them and 
the world'. Another resolution, couched in Marxist terminology, also 
called on colonial workers, farmers and intellectuals to unite and form 
effective organizations to fight against imperialist exploitation and for 
independence, and recommended the use of such methods as strikes, 
boycotts and positive action, as well as other non-violent strategies.7 But 
what is particularly significant about this congress is that most of the 
Africans w h o were present soon returned to their respective countries 
and in the spirit of those resolutions launched or joined the ongoing 
4. U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, chs 3-10. 
5. P. O . Esedebe, 1971, p. 24. 
6. See U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, ch. 29. 
7. P. Gifford and W . R . Louis, 1982, pp. 57-87; A . A . Boahen, 1986, pp. 142-3. 
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campaigns for independence, the most notable of them being Nkrumah
of Ghana, Awolowo of Nigeria, Kenyatta of Kenya and Banda of Malawi.
It is important to note that no African from French, Portuguese or Belgian
Africa attended this epoch-making congress.
plate 7.1 Obafemi Awolowo ofNigeria, leader ofthe Action Group Party, founded in 1950
However, the factor that made the greatest contribution to the great
upsurge of nationalism was the sense of anger, disappointment and
frustration generated by the deteriorating economic and social conditions
as well as the inadequate reforms introduced by the colonial powers in
general and the British in particular after the war. The period immediately
after the war was marked by acute shortages and prohibitive prices of
consumer goods for which the colonial governments were held responsible.
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It was partly this frustration and anger which found expression in the 
strikes of workers in Nigeria between 1945 and 1948, and the d e m -
onstration by ex-servicemen followed by the boycott and looting of 
European goods in Ghana in 1948, activities in which all the classes listed 
above were involved8 and which further strengthened and diffused anti-
colonialism. O n the social front, the decision of the British colonial power 
to establish only a single university for the whole of British West Africa 
instead of one in each colony as recommended by a majority of its o w n 
Commission furtfier exacerbated feelings. N o r did the constitutional 
changes that were introduced after the war in any way meet with the 
aspirations of the educated élite in particular throughout British West 
Africa. This is evident from an analysis of the constitutions introduced 
into Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone in 1946,1946 and 1947 respectively.9 
T h e c o m m o n denominator of these constitutions is that though they all 
introduced unofficial African majorities in the legislative assemblies, a 
majority of the n e w m e m b e r s were to be either nominated by the 
governors or elected by the traditional rulers. In both Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria, these n e w proposals also meant the domination of the northern 
parts of the countries over the southern and more Westernized areas. A s 
would be expected, these n e w constitutions aroused the anger of the 
educated élite in all the British West African colonies and further 
intensified their resolve to bring about an end to the colonial system. 
Besides the intensification and radicalization of nationalism in British 
West Africa, the other factor which accounts for the overthrow of the 
colonial system was the nature and objectives of the political parties that 
emerged after the Second World W a r and the strategies that they adopted. 
This factor is of crucial importance because it explains w h y G h a n a rather 
than, say, Nigeria was the first British colony to attain independence, and 
secondly w h y in the rest of the colonies it was the northern rather than 
the more sophisticated southern parts that came to dominate and are still 
dominating the political scene. 
A whole host of political parties emerged in Africa in general and in 
British West Africa in particular during the first decade after the end of the 
Second World W a r . 1 0 These included the United Gold Coast Convention 
( U G C C ) , the Convention People's Party (CPP) and the Northern People's 
Party formed in Ghana in 1947, 1949 and 1954 respectively; the National 
Council for Nigerian Citizens ( N C N C ) , the Action Group ( A G ) and the 
Northern People's Congress ( N P C ) in Nigeria in 1944, 1950 and 1951 
respectively; the National Council of Sierra Leone ( N C S L ) and the Sierra 
Leone People's Party (SLPP) in 1950 and 1951 respectively; and finally 
8. D . Austin, 1964, pp. 49-84. 
9. C . M . Fyle, 1981, pp. 138-9; O . Ikime, 1980, pp. 524-8; D . Austin, 1964, pp. 84-
92. 
10. T . Hodgkins, 1961, pp. 179-209. 
167 
Africa since igj^ 
the United Party and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in the Gambia 
in 1951 and 1959 respectively. It was under the leadership of these parties 
that the battle for independence was w o n . T h e question then is w h y did 
these post-Second-World-War political parties and movements succeed 
while those in the period before failed. 
T h e first answer is the nature of the parties, associations and clubs of 
the post-war period. Unlike those of the pre-war period, these parties 
were not elitist parties confined only to the educated élite and to the 
urban centres but they were, by-and-large, mass parties with following 
in the urban as well as the rural areas. T h e y had the support, to varying 
degrees, of the ex-servicemen, the trade union congresses, students, 
w o m e n ' s organizations, farmers, traders, traditional rulers, and so on. 
Because of this support, these post-war parties could not be ignored or 
written off by the colonial authorities as the former parties were. T h e 
role of the trade unions, to be discussed below, should be emphasized 
here, for whereas in G h a n a the Trades Union Congress ( T U C ) gave its 
full support to the C P P and played a leading role in its campaigning, in 
Nigeria and the other colonies either because of its weakness or its 
divisions reflecting the regional divisions, the T U C was not a major 
participant. Secondly, unlike the former groups, these parties were not 
run on a part-time basis but were well-organized parties with offices, 
slogans and modern equipment such as propaganda vans, loudspeakers 
and presses - and, above all, they had full-time officers at national, 
regional and local levels. They were able therefore to put their views 
across and extend them to the remotest parts of their regions or countries 
with a consequent increase in their membership and strength. Thirdly, 
unlike the former parties, some of the parties were ready to use any 
strategies, peaceful or violent, constitutional or unconstitutional, local and 
international to achieve their ends. T h e peaceful and constitutional 
strategies included mass rallies, newspaper campaigns, participation in 
the m a n y elections, some of which were insisted on by the colonial 
powers, and appeals to international bodies such as the United Nations 
Organization and anti-colonial governments such as the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union. T h e violent and unconstitutional methods 
included boycotts, strikes, looting and attacks on colonial institutions and 
commercial establishments. Fourthly, most of the leaders of these parties 
were extremely charismatic and demagogic, which enabled them to capture 
and hold a mass following - the greatest of them being K w a m e N k r u m a h 
of Ghana and Azikiwe and Awolowo of Nigeria. Finally, and the most 
important of all, their objectives and slogans were very radical because 
they both reflected and provided blueprints for the resolution of social 
issues and were therefore very irresistible for the masses; the call was for 
'Self-government n o w ' or 'Self-government step-by-step' - but not, as 
in the 1930s, for a reform of colonialism. O f all the parties that emerged 
in British West Africa, if not in the whole of Africa, there was none that 
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was better-organized, better-disciplined, more dynamic and radical and
enjoyed more charismatic and demagogic leadership than the Convention
People's Party of Ghana - thanks principally to its founder and leader,
Kwame Nkrumah. It was obviously this unique status of the CPP that
partly explains not only why it gained the ascendency in Ghana but also
why Ghana was the first British colony south of the Sahara to win the
battle for independence.
However, structurally and in terms of mass following, the parties
differed in many important respects and it is these differences that further
explain not only the timing of the end of the independence struggle but
also the leadership of the independent country. In the first place, while
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some of these parties were truly national parties with branches and a 
following in all the regions of the country, others were essentially ethnically 
based and regional parties. This difference was the outcome primarily of 
the strength or weakness of the ethnic and religious polarization in the 
country. T h u s , in G h a n a where this polarization was very weak, two of 
the three parties, the U G C C and the C P P , were truly national parties 
with branches and support in all the regions of the country. In Nigeria 
and the other two British colonies where ethnic and Muslim-Christian 
polarization and confrontation were deep and bitter, the parties were 
essentially regional parties. T h u s the N C N C , A G and N P C of Nigeria 
were typologically and essentially Igbo, Yoruba and Fulbe-Hausa eth-
nically based and regional parties, dominant in the former Eastern, 
Western and Northern regions respectively. In Sierra Leone, the N C S L 
was the party of the Creoles in the south, while the S L P P was in reality 
the party of the Protectorate in the north though it enjoyed the support 
of a few Creoles. Indeed, the latter party was formed specifically to oppose 
the former." Similarly, in the Gambia , while the United Party was like 
the N C S L of Sierra Leone a party of the 'Colony', the P P P was essentially 
that of the Protectorate." Thus , while the parties of G h a n a readily agreed 
on the issue of independence as well as the date for it, both issues became 
subjects of bitter controversy a m o n g the parties in the other colonies. In 
Nigeria, for instance, while as early as 1951 the N C N C and A G agreed 
that Nigeria should be independent in 1956, the N P C vigorously opposed 
it with the slogan 'Self-government as soon as practicable', and it was 
not until 1959 that all the parties agreed on the fateful year of i960. In 
Sierra Leone, too, it was not until 1959 that consensus was reached on 
the date for independence. Is it surprising, then, that Ghana was first to 
break the independence tape, to be followed three years later by Nigeria, 
and four years later by Sierra Leone? Moreover, because in all the colonies 
other than Ghana, the northern or protectorate section was more heavily 
populated than the southern section, the outcome of the inter-party 
wrangling was the political domination of the latter by the former. Since 
in nearly all the cases, the southerners were economically, and in terms 
of Western education and modernization, more advanced than the north-
erners, this political outcome not only strengthened and deepened 
regionalism but it also led to a legacy of anger, impatience and frustration 
on the part of the southerners which has not been entirely eliminated to 
this day. 
There is yet a third factor to be taken into account in explaining the 
outcome of the independence struggle in British West Africa and this 
was the attitude of the British colonial power to the demands and activities 
of the nationalist parties and organizations. H a d the latter been met with 
11. P. O . Esedebe, 1971, p. 24; C. M . Fyle, 1981, pp. 138-9. 
12. T. Hodgkins, 1961, p. 188. 
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hostility and suppressed with brutality, as happened in Madagascar in the 
late 1940s, and, as will be seen below, in French West Africa and in 
Portuguese Africa, there is no doubt that independence would not have 
been achieved when it was, nor would power have been handed over to 
the nationalists as it was. F r o m their long experience with nationalist 
struggles and demands stretching as far back as the eighteenth century 
in the United States, Canada and Australia, and culminating with the 
events in the 1940s in Asia in general and India in particular, and of the 
rising intensity of the African nationalist tide, the British had accepted 
the principle of self-government as the inevitable end of all colonies. B y 
the early 1950s, if not late 1940s, both the Conservative and Labour 
parties as well as a majority of even the main expatriate firms operating 
in the West African colonies, or, as Fieldhouse puts it, a majority of 'the 
official as well as the unofficial mind ' had come round to that view with 
respect to those colonies.13 W h a t had not been agreed upon was the 
period of apprenticeship or 'preparation' for self-government. While some 
thought in terms of a period of 50 years, others even deemed that 
unrealistic. Nor , contrary to what scholars like Flint and Pearce have 
been arguing,14 did the British draw up any programme for so-called 
decolonization. O n the contrary, from the late 1940s onwards they rather 
reacted to the initiatives and pressures being exerted on them by the 
nationalist activities and demands in Africa. S o m e minutes taken by the 
officials in the Colonial Office, then debating the issues of indirect rule 
and of the constitutional changes to be introduced into the British colonies 
after the war, are very relevant here. Having secretly toured the colonies, 
Hailey submitted a report to the Colonial Office in 1942 in which he 
reported inter alia: 
There are forces both at h o m e and in the dependencies [author's 
emphasis] which will exert increasing pressure for the extension of 
political institutions making for self-government, and the fuller 
association of Africans in them. T h e strength of this pressure is 
likely to be largely enhanced as the result of the war. Unless w e 
have a clear view of the constitutional form in which self-government 
is to be expressed, the answer to this pressure will be ill-coordinated, 
and m a y lead to the adoption of measures which w e m a y afterwards 
wish to recall.15 
Supporting Hailey's advocacy of the change of the system of so-called 
indirect rule, the Colonial Office legal adviser, Sir H . G . Bushe, also 
minuted ' O n the other side of the picture there appears in an ever-
growing progression the educated African, and he views with extreme 
13. D . K . Fieldhouse, 1986, pp. 3-12. 
14. J. Flint, 1983; R . D . Pearce, 1984. 
15. Quoted in P. Gifford and W . R . Louis, 1982, pp. 250-1. 
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distaste the primitive, inefficient and in m a n y cases corrupt institutions 
of indirect rule. If, like the white m a n , he needs no more than worship 
them he might be content. Unfortunately, however, he finds that unlike 
the white m a n , he has to subject himself to them'. Not only did the 
assistant under-secretary, Sir Arthur D a w s e , accept this view but he also 
went on to state: 
I think that the truth of Sir G . Bushe's remark . . . is becoming 
increasingly realized. It is absurd to erect what is an ephemeral 
expedient into a sacrosanct principle. Things are moving so fast in 
Africa [author's emphasis] that the doctrinaire adherents of the 
indirect rule principle m a y find themselves out-moded, m u c h quicker 
than anyone would have thought possible a few years ago.16 
W h a t is clearly revealed by these minutes is that the Colonial Office 
was acting in response to or in anticipation of African nationalists' 
demands, and it is this which makes the terms 'decolonization' and 
'transfer of power' n o w being increasingly used by Eurocentric historians 
so misleading and so unacceptable. 
Confronted, then, with growing African nationalist activities which 
reached their intensity from the mid-1950s onwards, and free from any 
lobbying or opposition from any white settlers - as was the case in Eastern 
and Southern Africa - the British, unlike the French in the 1940s or the 
Portuguese, decided not to resist the nationalists. Rather, they opted to 
abandon their hitherto close allies and tools, the traditional ruling élite, 
and to concede to or bargain with the nationalists in each country, allowing 
the agreement or lack of it a m o n g them over such issues as independence 
itself, the nature of the independence constitution, revenue allocation, 
and so on, to determine the timing and outcome of the negotiations. 
Furthermore, unlike the French and the Portuguese, the British resorted 
mainly to peaceful and constitutional means in West Africa - though the 
use of force or violence was not entirely ruled out, as was evident in the 
shooting incident in G h a n a in 1948 or the imprisonment of N k r u m a h 
and m a n y of his followers in the early 1950s, or the suppression of the 
strike in 1955 and the anti-chieftaincy agitation in 1955-6 in Sierra Leone 
in which 100 people were killed. 
It was because nearly all the parties in G h a n a as well as a clear majority 
of Ghanaians - as is evident from the outcome of the elections of 1951 
and 1956 which were w o n by N k r u m a h and his party — had reached a 
consensus on those issues that the British fixed the date of 5 March 1957 
for the independence of Ghana . A n d it was because, after a series of 
constitutional conferences both locally and in Britain, all the parties in 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone agreed on the independence issues at stake in 
the late 1950s that Britain conceded their claims for independence. It 
16. Quoted in J. Flint, 1983, p. 395. 
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should be emphasized that, contrary to the recent claims of some Euro-
centric historians, the initiative in the struggle for independence lay with 
the West Africans themselves and not with the Colonial Office, the British 
parliament or British public opinion. 
French West Africa and Togo 
If the British did not decide the timing of the outcome of the struggle 
for independence in their West African colonies, the French certainly 
did. This is clearly borne out by the fact that while all the British West 
African colonies became independent at different times stretching from 
1957 to 1965, with the exception of Guinea and Djibouti, all the French 
colonies on the African continent became independent in the same year, 
i960! W h y then this rather interesting outcome in French West Africa? 
Here again the answers lie in the nature of the nationalist demands and 
activities, the nature of the political parties that emerged and, above all 
and most decisively, the reactions and responses of France and particularly 
of one single individual, namely General de Gaulle, to these activities. 
Whereas British West Africa was m a d e up of four distinct units, French 
West Africa, consisting until 1958 of a 'federation' of eight colonies -
termed Overseas Territories after 1946 - formed a single administrative 
unit under the authority of a governor-general w h o , in 1946, was renamed 
high commissioner [Haut-Commissaire de la République). T h e French part 
of the Togo , a trusteeship territory, had a separate status. 
Less populated and less well developed, French West Africa was behind 
in all areas compared to British West Africa. Outside the three full 
c o m m u n e s of Senegal, namely Dakar, Rufisque and St Louis, whose 
inhabitants, black and white alike, were French citizens and could therefore 
participate in politics and elections, the colonial regime had excluded 
most forms of political life from the colonial 'subjects'. In addition, both 
the public and the private sectors had to face competition even for low-
level employment from 'poor white' settlers w h o did not exist in British 
West Africa. 
T h e end of the war led to strong reactions, for the reasons mentioned 
above, but also as a result of a sudden transformation of political status. 
T h e French Africa Conference held at Brazzaville from 30 January to 
8 February 1944 which had brought together, before the liberation of 
France, governors and settlers, in no w a y opened the door to any sort of 
'decolonization' as legend has it. O n the contrary, it rather excluded 'any 
idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside the French imperial 
bloc' and specified that the 'constitution of "self-government" in the 
colonies, even in the distant future, is to be excluded'.17 It limited itself 
to promising, for an indeterminate future, a possible 'participation' by 
17. L a Conférence africaine française, 1944. This part is printed in capitals in the text. 
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Africans in the management of their o w n affairs. These remarks were 
taken literally by the Africans which subsequently provoked the ire of 
the settlers, as being intolerable. 
In 1945, the rise of the forces of the left had consequences in Africa. 
For the first time, in October 1945, a small minority of the subjects -
which for French West Africa consisted of 117 000 out of 16 million 
inhabitants - were to elect deputies to the French Constituent Assembly. 
This, along with the settlers, formed the 'First College' of electors and 
received a disproportionate representation in relation to their numerical 
importance. French West Africa was given five deputies - that is one for 
5000 people, as against one for 60000-^70000 in France. Through this 
colonial representation, General de Gaulle hoped to compensate for the 
predictable large vote for the left in France. T h e settlers were sure 
supporters; the ex-subjects would vote as the administration wanted. But 
things did not turn out that way: the election within the framework of 
the 'Second College' picked as deputies those w h o had campaigned for 
the end of the colonial regime. In Senegal - where the winning candidate 
from the First College, which was dominated by Africans, was the lawyer 
Lamine Gueye, a veteran of politics in the 'three communes ' ; and that 
from the Second College, the young agrégé de grammaire Leopold Sédar 
Senghor - the two winners joined the socialist party, Section française de 
l'Internationale ouvrière (SFIO); the winner from Guinea, Yacine Diallo, 
and D a h o m e y , Sourou Migan Apithy, affiliated with the socialist group. 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, elected from the Côte d'Ivoire, and Fily D a b o 
Sissoko, elected from Soudan-Niger, joined the communist group in the 
Assembly. 
Assimilation and persistence of the colonial regime 
T h e first Constituent Assembly had a left-wing majority m a d e up of the 
socialists and communists to which most of the indigenous members 
elected from overseas affiliated. T h e constitution, of which the deputy 
from Senegal, Senghor, along with Pierre Cot, had been one of the 
drafters, integrated the former colonies into the Republic and introduced 
the expression 'French Union1 but left the door open for an evolution 
towards independence. T h e Constituent Assembly also adopted the law 
of 11 April 1946 (the so-called Houphouët-Boigny law) abolishing forced 
labour, and the law of 7 M a y 1946 (the so-called Lamine Gueye law) 
granting French citizenship to all the colonial ex-'subjects'. Other 
measures abolished the much-hated indigénat, which allowed the admin-
istration to impose penal sanctions on 'subjects', and established freedom 
of the press and association. 
This constitution provoked a violent campaign of opposition from the 
right, represented in the government by the Social-Christian Popular 
Republican M o v e m e n t (Mouvement républicain populaire - M R P ) , in which 
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the Catholic Church, the Radical-Socialist Party, the settlers and de 
Gaulle himself (who had in the meantime resigned as head of the 
government) took part. T h e constitution was rejected in a referendum, 
and, in the second Constituent Assembly elected in June 1946, the left 
no longer had a majority. Compared with the previous one, the constitution 
of October 1946 - which became that of the Fourth Republic - contained 
major retreats. T h e abolition of forced labour and the granting of 
citizenship were not called into question as the settlers would have liked. 
However, the text of the constitution eliminated any possibility of 
evolution towards independence and left the door open to the maintenance 
of the 'dual college' and special representation for the settlers. 
W h y did the African deputies accept the 'assimilationism' of the two 
constitutions and did they all really accept it? Assimilationism had, it is 
true, deep roots - especially in Senegal. But above all, the African deputies 
feared, in the federalism advocated by the right, 'self-government' on the 
South African model. This would have given power to the settlers w h o m 
they hoped on the contrary to be able to fight with the support of a 'left-
wing' central government. But this hope was not realized. 
T h e development of parties 
It was in this 'assimilationist' context that political parties came into being 
in French West Africa. But it should be emphasized that unlike their 
counterparts in the British colonies, these parties were associated with 
French parties, sometimes as their direct scions. This was the case with 
the Socialist Party, whose Senegalese Federation dominated political life 
in Senegal up to 1948. After 1947, the Rally of the French People 
(Rassemblement du peuple français - R P F ) , created by de Gaulle, gained 
support mainly a m o n g Europeans and became identified-as the extreme 
settler party. In 1949, under the auspices of the M R P , which then held 
the Overseas France portfolio, a parliamentary group was formed k n o w n 
as the Overseas Independents, closely linked to the M R P but based on 
electoral committees rather than on one or several parties (except for 
Senghor's African Convention in Senegal). 
T h e Communist Party, whose principles ruled out the creation of 
overseas branches, had limited itself in the period 1944-50 to inspiring 
Groupes d'études communistes ( G E C ) , with the aim of uniting Frenchmen 
and Africans to create purely local 'anticolonialist front' parties or m o v e -
ments called 'Democratic' or 'Progressive' - such as the Democratic Party 
of the Côte d'Ivoire, the Niger Progressive Party, and so on. 
Faced with the counter-attack launched during the s u m m e r of 1946, a 
number of African deputies called for a conference of all political parties 
(Rassemblement) in B a m a k o in October 1946. T h e socialist Minister of 
Overseas France, Marius Moutet, gave instructions that this was to be 
prevented at all costs. H e pressurized the socialist deputies w h o had 
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centre, Félix Houphouët-Boigny; left, Gabriel d'Arboussier
signed the call for the rally not to attend, while the delegates from French
Equatorial Africa were unable to get there. The congress, however, took
place as planned and resulted in the establishment, under the leadership
of Houphouet-Boigny, of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (African
Democratic Rally, or RDA), federating local African parties on the basis
of the anti-colonial struggle. Its deputies (seven in the National Assembly
in November 1946) affiliated with communist groups in the various
assemblies.
The Cold War and the attempts at colonial restoration
The presence of African deputies in the French assemblies had scarcely
any influence on the local administration. The constitution had envisaged
first the establishment of local assemblies or 'general councils' and then
in 1952 'territorial assemblies'. However, except in Senegal, the elections
were made by the 'dual college' with a separate and excessive rep¬
resentation for the settlers. There was also an assembly at the federal
level, the 'Grand Council' elected indirectly by the territorial assemblies.
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Yet, the governor-general and governors retained all their powers intact 
while the powers of the assemblies were limited to a consultative role and 
the approval of the budget, which was largely predetermined by the 
'mandatory expenditure'. 
T h e removal of the communist ministers in France in M a y 1947 and 
the beginning of the Cold W a r were accompanied by what amounted to 
a policy of colonial restoration evidenced by the war of reconquest in 
Indochina, the repression of the nationalist movement in Madagascar, 
and so on. In French West Africa, the policy of repression was focused 
on the Côte d'Ivoire, the stronghold of the R D A , which, around 1950, 
had 850 000 members there out of a population of 2.3 million. T h e leader 
of the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI , an R D A section), Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, an African doctor from a reigning family in Baule 
country, a former chef de canton and a big planter, had in 1944 been the 
founder of the Syndicat agricole africain, bringing together African coffee-
and cocoa-planters. At the time they were locked in bitter conflict with 
the settlers, w h o had inherited exorbitant privileges from the Vichy 
regime - such as preferential buying prices and monopoly of the workforce, 
supplied by forced labour, and of equipment. T h e Ivorian agricultural 
bourgeoisie which he represented defended its class interest by demanding 
the abolition of racist priyileges and the abolition of forced labour which 
would give it access to the labour hitherto reserved for whites. But, in 
so doing, it was ipso facto defending the interests of the masses oppressed 
by the colonial regime, and awakened a profound mass movement of 
which the P D C I was the expression. 
In order to reduce the 'weight' of the Côte d'Ivoire, the Territory of 
Upper Volta, which was suppressed in 1932 and mostly annexed to the 
Côte d'Ivoire, was restored in 1947. Then , at the end of 1948, Governor 
Péchoux was sent with the mission of 'breaking' the R D A . In 1949 and 
1950, he resorted to violence and 'combing operations' (ratissages), during 
which villages were burned d o w n and peasants murdered. A n increasing 
number of bloody incidents occurred which were always attributed to the 
R D A . A m o n g the victims was Senator Victor Biaka Boda, w h o 'dis-
appeared'. Later, a few of his charred bones were found, along with his 
gold signet-ring. Almost all the territorial and local leaders were arrested, 
except for the deputies Houphouët-Boigny and Ouezzin Coulibaly. 
A s a result of these brutal and oppressive measures, Houphouët-Boigny 
gave in. Following contacts with François Mitterrand, a m e m b e r of the 
same group {Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance — U D S R ) as 
René Pleven, the minister of Overseas France, he decided at the end of 
1950 to disaffiliate from the communist groups, drop the radical demands, 
and join the government. T h u s , he voted for military supplies for the 
war in Indochina. T o the militants and members of the R D A , this about-
turn was at first presented as a 'tactical withdrawal' in order to put 
an end to the repression. T h e general-secretary of the R D A , Gabriel 
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d'Arboussier, and the Senegal and Niger sections refused to follow this 
change of course while the others, and notably those in Guinea and 
French Sudan, resigned themselves to it so as not to break the unity of 
the movement. 
Popular pressure and the m o v e to independence 
Despite Houphouêt-Boigny's about-turn, popular pressure persisted. 
Trade union action and strikes directed against the persistent measures 
of racial discrimination in wages, status, right to work, and so on, 
developed after 1951. In Guinea, the Parti démocratique de Guinée ( R D A ) , 
led by the trade unionist Sékou Touré, extended its support in the 
countryside by waging the fight against chieftaincy, a cog in the colonial 
administration. In French Sudan, the Union soudanaise ( R D A ) , led by 
M a m a d o u Konate and Modibo Keita, continued its resistance. T h e 
deterioration of the international situation and of the French colonial 
situation signified by the French defeat at Dien-Bien-Phu in Indochina, 
the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, and the beginning of the 
liberation war in Algeria obliged the French government to make a 
sacrifice and forestall the demand for total independence. T h e loi-cadre 
drawn up in 1956 by the socialist minister of Overseas France, Gaston 
Defferre, without the least consultation with the deputies or with the 
African assemblies, came into force in 1957. It granted the Overseas 
Territories 'semi-autonomy', with a 'council of government' presided over 
by the governor, with an African vice-president chosen from a m o n g the 
majority in the assembly as his deputy. But nothing similar was set up 
at the federal level. T h e French government, which had hitherto stressed 
centralization in the government-general, was preparing to break up 
the federations that were 'too big economically, administratively and 
politically'.'8 T h e aim was to associate and compromise the African 
political leaders with colonial policy, without giving them real responsi-
bilities. 
T h e loi-cadre could not stand in the way of the desire for independence 
expressed clearly for the first time by a new Marxist-oriented party, the 
Parti africain de l'indépendance, based mainly a m o n g students w h o had 
returned h o m e from France. Independence was further popularized both 
in France and Africa by students of the Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique 
noire en France ( F E A N F ) ' 9 and the Union générale des étudiants d'Afrique 
occidentale ( U G E A O ) . T h e desire for unity - after the failure of a merger 
with the R D A - led the groups deriving from the Overseas Independents 
18. P. H . Teitgen, former prime minister of the French Overseas Territories, quoted 
in F. Ansprenger, 1961, p. 245. 
19. For a detailed and interesting discussion of the role of African student movements 
in the political and social evolution of Africa from 1900 to 1975, see U N E S C O , 
(forthcoming). 
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and the Socialist Party to merge into the Parti du regroupement africain 
(PRA) . At its congress at Cotonou in July 1958, the P R A adopted a 
motion demanding immediate independence. 
Meanwhile, in M a y 1958, General de Gaulle had returned to power 
and buried the Fourth Republic. T h e new constitution which he had 
prepared - and which was to be approved in a referendum on 28 Septem-
ber 1958 in France and the overseas territories and départements — took a 
further step by granting autonomy to the territories, which became 
republics with an elected president replacing the governor. T h e 'French 
Union' was replaced by the 'French Community'; but the French govern-
ment retained a whole series of essential powers, and independence was 
explicitly presented as being incompatible with membership of the French 
Community. 
D e Gaulle submitted his n e w proposals to a vote in French Africa and 
the colonial administration succeeded in securing a 'yes' vote even in 
Niger, whose government, headed by the trades-unionist Bakary Djibo, 
had called for a 'no' vote, except in Guinea, where the 'no' vote totalled 
more than 80 per cent of the votes and which proclaimed its independ-
ence on 2 October. This choice sounded the death-knell of the 
French Community in the short run, despite Houphouët-Boigny's 
fierce opposition. By causing the disappearance of French West Africa 
( F W A ) as a political unit, the constitution had sanctioned the 'bal-
kanization' of French Africa. Senegal and French Sudan attempted to 
oppose it by creating a 'Federation of Mali', which initially included 
Upper Volta and Dahomey, but they soon left under Ivorian pressure. 
Reduced by two members, the Federation of Mali asked for its inde-
pendence in September 1959 and France had to resign itself to granting 
it on 20 June i960, at the price of an amendment to the constitution. 
T h e other states followed and their independence was proclaimed during 
August (for D a h o m e y on 1 August; Niger on 3 August; Upper Volta on 
5 August; Côte d'Ivoire on 7 August), but Mauritania's not until 28 
November i960. 
Togo, because of its status, had followed a path of its o w n . T h e Comité 
d'unité togolaise ( C U T ) , led since 1946 by Sylvanus Olympio, and the 
Juvento (Juventus Togo), created in 1951, had been calling for unity and 
independence since that date. Unity was ruled out by the referendum of 
9 M a y 1956 in British Togo, which voted by a majority of 58 per cent 
for annexation to Ghana. Independence (Ablode) remained the slogan, 
despite the election-rigging which enabled the French administration to 
ensure a majority for its supporters until 1958. T h e dual college was 
abolished in 1952, and a 'council of government' with five elected members 
out of nine was created in 1955. In July 1956, Togo was given the status 
of an 'Autonomous Republic'. The C U T w o n the elections held in 1958, 
and independence was proclaimed on 27 April i960, with Sylvanus 
Olympio as first president. 
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plate 7.4 Sylvanus Olympio, president of Togo, proclaims his country's independence, 27
April i960
It should be obvious from the above that unlike the situation in British
West Africa, the outcome and timing of independence in French West
Africa was really determined by the French government rather than the
African nationalists. In the first place, had the French government been
as tolerant to the political parties that emerged - especially the RDA and
later the Parti africain de ^independence (PAI) - as the British were to
theirs, the French West African colonies would probably have achieved
independence before the British colonies. But sticking to the illusionary
idea of the French Union and later the French Community, they com¬
pletely ruled out any idea of total independence until the accession to
power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958. And even then it was because Guinea
called de Gaulle's bluff, coupled with the political developments taking
place in the neighbouring Anglophone West African countries that de
Gaulle and his advisers accepted the inevitable and virtually handed
independence on a platter to almost all the French colonies in Africa in
that fateful year of i960 (the exceptions were Djibouti and the Indian
Ocean islands, whose independence came later).
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T h e labour m o v e m e n t and the trades unions 
T h e persistence of the économie de traite (predatory, economy) and the 
preponderance of smallholdings explain w h y , despite the advances of 
industry and services between 1946 and i960, the working class remained 
relatively small in West Africa. For F W A and Togo there were only 
245 538 wage-earners in 1947 and 412 810 in 1957, excluding civil servants 
and domestic servants, which represented only 2 per cent of the population 
in 1957. T h e proportion would be a little higher if civil servants, whose 
importance in the trade union movement was out of all proportion to 
their number, were included. T h e administrative 'élite', including teachers 
and government doctors, played a major role in the trade union movement 
and often provided its leaders. 
In the British territories, trade unionism was transformed in the 
tradition of the British Trades Union Congress ( T U C ) , often with the 
blessing of the administration and in a spirit of collaboration with the 
administration and employers. Nevertheless, they found it hard not to 
get caught up in the nationalist movement. In certain cases they were in 
fact the prime movers - for example, the railway unionists of Sekondi 
Takoradi in the Gold Coast, in the 1940s. 
In Ghana, the T U C soon established close ties with the C P P : in 
January 1950, it was to back the C P P ' s 'positive action' campaign that 
the T U C launched the general strike. 
In Nigeria, the close alliance between the Nigerian Trade Union 
Congress and die N C N C was not sustained after 1951. T h e Nigerian 
trade union movement remained marked by its fragmentation and division 
into rival bodies; radical elements never played a sustained major role in 
it. 
In the French territories, die trades unions were in the beginning, and 
remained until 1957, mostly affiliated to the French Confédération générale 
du travail ( C G T ) - the General Confederation of Labour - while enjoying 
considerable de facto autonomy under the leadership of a Comité de 
coordination des unions de syndicats confédérés de l'AOF. M a n y C G T union 
leaders were at the same time political leaders with the R D A , even after 
1950 - for example, Sékou Touré in Guinea and Bakary Djibo in Niger. 
T h e Fédération des cheminots de l'AOF (railway union) was autonomous, 
but left its m e m b e r unions free to affiliate as they wished. Thus in 1947, 
the Abidjan-Niger Railway Union of Côte d'Ivoire was affiliated to the 
C G T while the Benin-Niger railway union of D a h o m e y joined the 
Confidération française et démocratique du travail ( C F D T ) , which it left in 
1948 following pressure from French leaders of the Catholic unions to 
get them to abandon the strike. T h e Catholic unions, affiliated to the 
Confidération française des travailleurs chrétiens ( C F T C ) were in a small 
minority and only existed where the influence of the missions was felt, 
such as in D a h o m e y and coastal Guinea. T h e split in the trade union 
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movement in France in 1948 had little influence in Africa since the 
African unions remained almost all with the C G T ; Force ouvrière, the 
breakaway confederation, had an almost wholly European membership. 
T o the extent that the union struggle was directed essentially against 
the colonial administration and European employers, and its demands 
were aimed principally at eliminating racial discrimination in the areas of 
wages, status and social rights, this struggle was part and parcel of the 
general anti-colonial struggle and received the support of the whole 
African population. This was the case with the strike by African railway 
workers in Senegal in 1947-8, which could not have lasted five months 
without this linkage and in which the intransigence of the administration 
sought to break the union movement. T h e administration failed, however, 
and had to go back on its decision to sack the strikers. T h e strike 
movements of 1952, 1953 and 1955 for the adoption of the Overseas 
Labour Code had the same features, as did those after the passage of the 
Code through parliament, for its implementation. 
It was only in 1956 that, on the initiative of Sékou Touré, a Confédération 
générale du travail africain (General Confederation of African Labour) 
was established. It received a cool welcome as it appeared to be under the 
remote control of the leadership of the R D A . T h e colonial administration 
attempted to remove the unions from the influence of the C G T and get 
them to collaborate with the administration. T h e C G T then took the 
initiative of calling for the formation of an independent African central 
trade union organization bringing all the unions together. This appeal 
initially gained universal approval among the C G T , C G T A , autonomous 
railwaymen and Catholic unions except for the Force ouvrière. T h e Catholic 
unions, however, went back almost at once on their decision by creating 
a Confédération africaine des travailleurs croyants (African Confederation 
of Believing Workers, C A T C ) , a formula which they felt would enable 
them to attract Muslims. T h e call for a centralized union finally took 
concrete shape with the holding in Cotonou in January 1957 of the 
congress which created the Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire 
(General Union of Workers of Black Africa, U G T A N ) under the lead-
ership of Sékou Touré. T h e U G T A N did not survive independence, each 
state having moved quickly to remove the national central trade union 
organization from any external influence. 
T h e role of cultural and religious m o v e m e n t s 
T h e assertion of the African personality inherent in the anti-colonial 
struggle was bound to take on a cultural dimension. Paradoxically, and 
for reasons that have to do with both the colonial heritage and the material 
conditions flowing from it, this assertion took mainly a literary form and 
did so in the language of the colonizer. It was a n e w phenomenon in 
itself to the extent that, before 1946, this form of expression had been 
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extremely limited and channelled into forms acceptable to the colonial 
regime.20 
In Paris in 1947, the review Présence Africaine was launched by 
Alioune Diop, a Senegalese university graduate converted to Catholicism, 
temporarily a socialist senator from Senegal. This review, around which 
the Société africaine de culture was formed, was not politically aligned, but 
its assertion of an African cultural personality was in itself a challenge to 
the colonial ideology and fact of colonialism. It was in the same year that 
L . S. Senghor, a politician as well as a poet, published his first collection 
of poems. Subsequently, he developed the concept of négritude, borrowed 
from a formula launched in 1932 by West Indian writers and remodelled 
by Jean-Paul Sartre. This concept was at once strongly challenged by the 
revolutionary school led by Gabriel d'Arboussier in 1949. 
In contrast to this cultural self-assertion, which did not call into 
question the established order, a militant, vigorously anti-colonial poetry 
began to appear in the years 1947-50, in the columns of the Dakar weekly, 
Réveil, the organ of the R D A , written by such poets as Bernard B . Dadié, 
Jean Malonga and Keita Fodeba. T h e last-named continued this activity 
in 1950 by founding the Ballets africains which took his n a m e , creating 
a n e w form of cultural expression on an African foundation. Recordings 
of poems by Keita Fodeba accompanied on the guitar by Kante Faceli 
were banned in F W A as subversive. 
David Diop continued this trend in the 1950s, and it was also in the 
1950s that there appeared through the novel, in a less 'militant' but 
equally critical form, a satire of colonial reality. A m o n g these n e w novelists 
were M o n g o Beti, Ferdinand O y o n o of Cameroon and Sembene O u s m a n e 
of Senegal, plus the already-mentioned Bernard B . Dadié as the leading 
writers. Their elder, the Senegalese Abdoulaye Sadji, w h o was writing 
before 1940 but was only published later, limited himself to criticizing 
manners and customs. Cámara Laye was more equivocal: his folkloric 
and idyllic work entirely ignores the reality of colonialism. 
This anti-colonial stance can be found in Ghana in the writings of 
George Awoonor and de Graft-Johnson and, to a m u c h lesser extent, 
before i960, in Nigeria, where the work of A m o s Tutuola remained 
folkloric and the so-called Onitsha popular literature was more moralizing 
than political. 
Like cultural movements, religious movements both reflected social 
and political changes and, sometimes, actively accompanied them. T h e 
development of communication encouraged the advance of universalist 
religions at the expense of local creeds; Islam, less compromised than the 
Christian sects with die colonial regime, was the chief beneficiary of this. 
While the Senegalese Musl im brotherhoods, long under a cloud of 
suspicion, were n o w integrated into the colonial order, n e w ones came 
20. See Chapter 19 for a wider discussion of literary trends. 
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under suspicion. This was the case in French Sudan (now Mali) with 
Hamalism, in itself apolitical, which was driven closer to the anti-
colonialist movement (in this case the R D A ) by persecution. 
T h e Catholic Church, the one most involved, at least in the French 
possessions, in the colonial system, continued to be associated with the 
most colonialist elements until the early 1950s. It denounced the R D A 
as an agent of 'atheistic communism' , whereas most of the leaders of the 
R D A were practising Muslims or Catholics! 
T h e change came late, with the encyclical Evangeli praecones of 2 June 
1953. Faced with the rise of nationalism, the Catholic Church felt the 
need to modify the 'colonial structures of the missions', such as the 
division of the territory into 'fiefdoms' by the Congregations and slowness 
about promoting an indigenous clergy. In French Africa, the episcopal 
hierarchy was introduced in November 1955. While the Anglican Church 
had long had coloured bishops, it was only in 1956 that the first African 
bishops were promoted in D a h o m e y and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) 
and only in 1957 in G h a n a for the Catholic Church. 
Portuguese West Africa: Guinea-Bissau and the Cape 
Verde Islands 
While all the British and French colonies in West Africa had achieved 
their independence by 1965, it was not until 1973 and 1974 that Guinea-
Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands as well as the other two Portuguese 
African colonies, Angola and Mozambique , succeeded in overthrowing 
Portuguese colonialism. Furthermore, while the struggles for inde-
pendence in all the other West African colonies were by and large peaceful, 
taking the form of round-table conferences and inter-party wranglings, 
in Portuguese Africa it was a violent, bloody and protracted affair assuming 
the dimensions of wars of liberation. T h e key to the explanation of these 
unique features of the anti-colonial struggle in Portuguese Africa lies in 
the principles and practices of Portuguese colonialism as well as in the 
nature of the nationalist movements that emerged. 
Portugal, like France, from the very beginning considered its colonies 
(as has been amply demonstrated in volume VII) not as colonies but 
rather as overseas provinces of Portugal. While the French abandoned 
this erroneous and unrealistic policy in the 1950s, Portugal stuck to it -
and with increasing fanaticism and delusion - until the very end, in the 
face of and despite the increasing tide of African nationalism. T h u s , while 
France abandoned its repressive and violent reactions of the 1940s and 
resorted to peaceful negotiations and even the ballot box, the Portuguese 
maintained the policy of keeping their empire intact through any and 
every means. 
Another aspect of Portuguese colonialism was the state in which her 
colonies in Africa in general and those in West Africa in particular were 
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by the 1950s. Because of the features peculiar to Portuguese colonialism (a 
'sub-imperialism', itself dependent on outside powers since the eighteenth 
century) and to the fascism that had been ruling Portugal since 1926, the 
Portuguese colonies lagged considerably behind neighbouring countries 
in West Africa. T h e y had no capital investment, no railway, no roads and 
a primitive économie de traite (predatory economy) in the hands of a 
monopoly, that of the Companhia Uniào Fabril ( C U F ) . Officially regarded 
as 'Portuguese provinces' since 1930, these two colonies bore the stigmata 
of the most backward colonialism. Behind a façade of 'assimilationism' 
was concealed the most brutal discrimination. In the Provincia de Guiñe 
of the 1950s, out of half a million inhabitants and after 'five centuries of 
Portuguese presence', 8320 individuals (including 2263 whites and 4568 
of mixed race) enjoyed political rights - which in any case were purely 
formal - with the status of 'civilized'. Only 1478 Africans - 0.3 per cent 
of the population — enjoyed this status: the white m a n , even if illiterate, 
which was c o m m o n among the Portuguese, was 'civilized' ipso facto; the 
black m a n had to k n o w h o w to read and write Portuguese, be a practising 
Catholic and be in the colonizer's good books. 
In the Cape Verde Islands, overpopulated and ravaged by periodic 
famines, 20000 died in 1940-3 and 30000 in 1944-8 - out of a population 
of fewer than 150000 at the time. T h e population, which had originally 
come from the mainland, was wholly 'assimilated' and Portugal drew on 
it for subordinate colonial officials for the other colonies in Africa. With 
very limited educational facilities at the secondary and none at the tertiary 
levels, there was none of that upper-middle class or bourgeoisie class 
which would also have provided leadership and inspiration. A n d with the 
Portuguese determined and ready to suppress any anti-colonial agitation 
with the most extreme of means , it was not until the late 1950s that 
political parties began to emerge in Portuguese Africa. 
O n 19 October 1956, an agronomist of Cape Verdian origin but born 
in Guinea, Amilcar Cabrai, with his five companions, created the Partido 
Africano da Independencia da Guiñé e Cabo Verde ( P A I G C ) in Bissau. 
F r o m 1956 to 1959, its activity was concentrated in the towns, and it 
used peaceful means. However, when the illegal strike of dock-workers 
it organized in August 1959 was brutally suppressed with more than 50 
dock-workers killed and m a n y wounded, the P A I G C decided to abandon 
its peaceful methods in favour of armed struggle. It therefore not only 
shifted its activities from the towns to the bush but also there devised a 
n e w policy and political programme, the politics of liberation, calculated 
to win the masses of the countryside w h o were then apathetic towards 
independence or building a n e w nation. As Cabrai told his cadres, 'Keep 
always in your mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the 
things in anyone's head. T h e y are fighting to win material benefits, to 
live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the 
future of their children', therefore that they must 'practise revolutionary 
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democracy . . . hold frequent meetings . . . hide nothing from the masses
of our people . . . tell no lies . . . claim no easy victories'.21 Between 1961
and 1963, his young militants, who were mainly 25 years of age or even
younger, worked clandestinely in the villages, teaching the people that
their local grievances could only be solved by working and fighting to
get rid of the entire Portuguese colonial system.
plate 7.5 Armed women soldiers of the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da
Guiñé e Cabo Verde)
It was only after this education and organization that the PAIGC
launched its armed struggle in 1963. Beginning first with 'small guerrilla
groups in favourable zones of bush or forest', they next developed them
into 'large units but also non-localized units, available for rapid movements
over long distances, and capable of fighting wherever they were sent'.22
Actively supported and helped by the rural people, these mobile groups
increased in size and strength, learned the use of all sorts of weapons,
including even long-range missiles, even though they were mostly illiterate.
Whenever they liberated any area, they launched their politics of liberation.
On the one hand, they expelled all colonial officials and traders, abolished
all colonial taxes and exactions, and ended forced labour and the com¬
pulsory growing of crops. On the other, the more positive side, they
introduced a new trading system and established bush schools and clinics
21. Quoted by B. Davidson, 1980, pp. 10-11.
22. ibid., pp. 13-14.
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where there were none before, staffed with teachers and nurses from m e n 
and w o m e n often trained in Europe or in Cuba. W h a t was even more 
important, the P A I G C introduced true democracy into the liberated areas. 
T h e people were encouraged to elect representative committees which 
were assigned the responsibilities of local government. Cabrai s u m m e d 
up the strategy employed against the Portuguese as follows: 
In order to dominate a given zone, the enemy is obliged to disperse 
his forces. In dispersing his forces, he weakens himself and w e can 
defeat him. T h e n in order to defend himself against us, he has to 
concentrate his forces. W h e n he does that, w e can occupy the zones 
that he leaves free and work in them politically so as to hinder his 
return there.23 
Using these tactics as well as their politics of liberation and assisted 
by some people from the Cape Verde Islands, some African countries and 
above all the U S S R and Cuba, the P A I G C m a d e steady progress. In spite 
of the huge increase in the number of Portuguese soldiers from iooo in 
1961 to more than 30000 in 1967, the P A I G C could not be stopped by 
the Portuguese. Despite the active financial and military support for 
Portugal of all the major Western powers as well as the other members 
of N A T O , by 1967 the P A I G C had gained control of two-thirds of 
Guinea. Although the Portuguese subsequently increased the strength of 
their army there, they failed to defeat the Africans, and not even the 
callous assassination of Amilcar Cabrai in January 1973 could reverse the 
tide rolling in favour of liberation. O n 24 September 1973, the P A I G C 
proclaimed the independence of Guinea-Bissau. It should be pointed out 
that the humiliation and demoralization suffered by the Portuguese army 
not only in Guinea-Bissau but also in Angola and Mozambique, coupled 
with the ideas of liberation with which the Portuguese soldiers became 
infused in Africa, led to the overthrow of the oppressive Salazar regime 
in Portugal itself by some young officers of the Portuguese army in April 
1974. It was the new regime which not only confirmed Guinea-Bissau's 
independence but also conceded independence to both Angola and M o z -
ambique in 1975. 
T h e P A I G C called for the union of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands 
because of the origins of their populations. T h e geographical conditions 
of the islands ruled out a resistance of the same type as in Guinea - an 
attempted uprising at Praia, in 1962, ended in failure - but after the fall 
of Portuguese fascism the hitherto underground organization of the 
P A I G C took control of the country's destiny. It was Cabral's successor 
as secretary-general of the P A I G C , Artistides Pereira, w h o negotiated 
independence in September 1974 and became the first president of the 
Republic of Cape Verde. 
23. ibid., p. 14. 
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Liberia 
B y 1945, though one of only four independent states in Africa theoretically 
in control of its o w n destiny, Liberia had in practice become a neo-colony 
of the United States. T h e administration and resources of the country were 
entirely dominated by the relatively small Americo-Liberian community of 
the coastal districts of the country while the overwhelming majority of 
its citizens w h o lived in the interior were discriminated against, looked 
d o w n upon and m a d e to feel completely isolated and exploited by the 
small ruling oligarchy. 
Externally, Liberia - like the rest of the then independent states of 
Africa - was not in contact with the rising tide of anti-colonialism around 
it nor did it make any effort to provide leadership of any kind to the 
aspiring colonial states in Africa. Economically, the country was on the 
verge of bankruptcy by 1945 and, to quote Mazrui and Tidy, 'remained 
tied to the apron-strings of the United States, subject to a mightier 
economic imperialism than could be imposed in Africa by European 
colonial powers'.24 Fortunately, this rather grim situation underwent some 
far-reaching changes due to the efforts of one m a n , William Vacanarat 
Shadrach T u b m a n , w h o became president in 1944 and remained in power 
till his death in i97i.2S 
Adopting an open-door economic policy and anxious to break the 
stranglehold of the Firestone Rubber C o m p a n y on its economy, T u b m a n 
succeeded in attracting foreign investors, mainly from the United States, 
whose number rose from one in 1925, to 25 by i960 and 38 by 1966.25 
This resulted in the diversification of economic activities from solely 
rubber planting and manufacturing to the building of artificial harbours 
at Monrovia, iron-mining at B o m i Hills in the N i m b a mountains and 
other areas, and light manufacturing industries such as the production of 
cement. B y 1966, the export value of iron ore was $112 million as 
compared to $30 million of rubber. B y 1978, Liberia had become the 
leading producer and exporter of iron ore in Africa. All this led to the 
construction of a growing network of roads which greatly accelerated the 
opening up of the interior. According to Liebenow, this development 
brought 'a radical transformation in the way of life of tribesmen, w h o 
until recently were rigidly wedded to subsistence economies and able to 
afford few of the material luxuries of westernization'.27 T u b m a n also began 
to divert the trade of Liberia from exclusively American channels into 
others. Here again, some success was attained, and Liberian exports to 
the United States fell from 90 per cent in 1950 to about 60 per cent in 
24. A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 29. 
25. J. G . Liebenow, 1969, p. 73. 
26. J. B . Webster and A . A . Boahen, 1980, p. 373. 
27. J. G . Liebenow, 1969, p. 79. 
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plate 7.6 William Tubman, president ofLiberia (photographed in September 1956)
189
Africa since ig35 
the mid-1970s; and imports fell from about 70 per cent to less than 50 
per cent in the same period. 
While T u b m a n adopted an open-door policy in the economic field, he 
pursued the policy of integration and national unification in the political 
and social fields, with the primary objective of eliminating the centuries-
old cleavage and confrontation between the American-Liberian oligarchy 
and the indigenous mass of people. A s he stated: 
W e must destroy all ideologies that tend to divide us. Americo-
Liberianism must be forgotten and all of us must register a new era 
of justice, equality, fair dealing and equal opportunity for every one 
from every part of the country, regardless of tribe, clan, element, 
creed or economic status. 
H e himself set the example by taking an African n a m e , wearing African 
dress and encouraging and promoting indigenous art and dancing. H e 
brought the educated indigenous Liberians more and more into the local 
government system and by 1966, according to one authority, they had 
virtually taken over the running of their offices in the provinces. Those 
w h o were incompetent and corrupt were dismissed, even some of his 
close relatives. Furthermore, he extended legislative representation and 
suffrage to the indigenous people while the membership of the House of 
Representatives was increased to allow more of the interior people to 
enter the House. H e also steadily appointed qualified indigenous people 
to appropriate offices. Socially, greater educational facilities were provided 
for the interior people, especially with the opening of the Cuttington 
College by the Episcopal Church with the assistance of the Methodist 
and Lutheran missions at Gbarnga, more than a hundred miles inland, 
while elementary schools were established in other districts by the 
Lutherans, Methodists and Episcopalians. 
It should be obvious from the above that a great deal was accomplished 
in Liberia during the period under review. However, by i960, all was 
not yet well. Life in the country was still dominated by the Americo-
Liberian élite, while the policy of integration and national unification had 
really not been pushed far enough. T h o u g h the economy had improved 
significantly and had grown, this growth had occurred without real 
development, while the grip of international capitalism had become even 
tighter with mineral resources being exploited primarily to the advantage 
of foreign investors. In short, Liberia had by i960 still a long way to go 
even to catch up with the achievements of some of the newly independent 
states of Africa. Unfortunately, during the next two decades neither 
T u b m a n nor his successor succeeded in really forcing through the changes 
needed, the result being the military coup d'Etat of 12-13 April 1980 
which marks the end of an era, the era of the True W h i g Party. 
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Conclusion 
T h e period 1945 to i960 was indeed a turning-point in the history of 
West Africa in particular and Africa south of the Sahara in general. 
Beginning from a position where colonialism seemed impregnable and 
destined to last for ever, it ended a mere 15 years later with its liquidation 
from not only a major part of West Africa but also from substantial parts 
of Central and Eastern Africa. It is equally evident from the analysis 
above that in the case of British West Africa and Portuguese Africa, the 
initiative throughout lay with the Africans themselves. This was even 
true of French Africa until de Gaulle's accession to power. It is also true 
that the pace in West Africa was set throughout by the British colonies 
in general and G h a n a under N k r u m a h in particular, and in French Africa 
by Guinea under Sékou Touré. Not only did Ghana's victory inspire her 
neighbours from 1957 onwards but, together with that of Guinea, inspired 
and accelerated the independence revolution throughout the whole of 
Africa south of the Sahara. But for the courageous and defiant stand of 
Sékou Touré with the full support of the workers and the students, 
French Africa would have emerged quite differently from what it is today. 
Indeed, the role of students and the trade unions in the independence 
struggle in French Africa, in particular, is n o w being recognized. Another 
significant feature of the independence struggle is that it marks a transfer 
of power not to the traditional ruling élite, as the British in particular 
had piously envisaged, but rather to the middle-class nationalists and, in 
some countries such as Ghana, not even to the upper but rather the lower 
strata of that class — the class of 'verandah boys', standard-seven school-
leavers, junior civil servants, teachers and small traders. Finally, the 
independence struggle had a significant impact on Europe, which is also 
n o w being acknowledged. D e Gaulle's accession to power and the over-
throw of the fascist and racist dictatorship of Salazar in Portugal were 
the direct by-products of the anti-colonial struggle in Asia in general and 
in North-western Africa in particular, and these by-products, as Ali 
Mazrui has shown, have also changed the course of European history 
since the 1950s. 
Finally, to conclude this chapter as w e began, the independence struggle 
grew out of a world which had seen the defeat of fascism and Nazism, 
both based on racism and the denial of h u m a n rights and liberty. T h e 
successful outcome of the struggle therefore raised great hopes and 
expectations in Africa. H o w far, then, have these hopes and expectations 
been realized? Subsequent chapters in this volume will attempt to address 
this question. 
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ELIKIA M ' B O K O L O 
H o w m a n y paradoxes were strewn over the long 'combat course' of the 
decolonization process for equatorial Africa! H o w m a n y misunder-
standings, too, lay in wait, and h o w m a n y disappointments w h e n the 
seemingly hardest and most decisive stages were passed! 
First to fall under the colonial yoke, equatorial Africa was also one of 
the last parts of the continent to win free from it. Portugal's crafty seizure 
of the K o n g o kingdom and Angola dates right back to the period of the 
'discoveries'. A n d w h e n modern colonial imperialism came to flourish in 
the late nineteenth century, it was consolidated in the Congo basin with 
the setting up in 1885, at the close of the Berlin Conference, of that 
curious legal construction and inexhaustible source of profit k n o w n as the 
'Congo Free State'. O n the other hand, the emancipation of the region 
was not to be completed until 1975 - 15 years after the great wave of 
accessions to independence. 
Marked by unheard-of cruelties in the early days of colonization, 
equatorial Africa was to invent a wide variety of methods, techniques and 
ideologies to win its freedom. T h e turn of the last century is rightly 
remembered everywhere as the most distressing period. Anti-colonial 
protest 'blossomed here in a hundred flowers" and was m a d e apparent 
in all sorts of ways - peasant insurrections, politico-religious Messianism, 
political and parliamentary agitation, urban revolts and strikes, people's 
liberation wars. 
T h e n the misunderstandings. Seldom have colonial powers been so 
reluctant to release their prey. Brazzaville, for instance, a symbol of 
freedom during the war, was in 1944 the scene of one of the most skilful 
moves in French colonialism, for the authorities - meeting in the 'capital 
of Free France' - while stating their firm intention to make far-reaching 
changes in colonial practices, decided 'to rule out any idea of autonomy, 
any possibility of development outside the French empire bloc [or] of 
instituting self-government in the colonies, even in the distant future'.2 
1. Adapted from M a o Zedong's rallying-call: 'Let a hundred flowers blossom'; M . 
Zedong, 1966, p. 126. 
2. For further details, see E . M'Bokolo, 1982, pp. 190-3. 
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Seldom, too, have peoples felt so sorely balked of their victories and their 
hopes: scarcely had independence been w o n , therefore, w h e n they rose 
again to overthrow Abbé Fulbert Youlou's regime in Brazzaville and 
plunge the Congo (Zaire) into a terrible civil war, that lasted from i960 
to 196s.3 
Post-war disturbances and uncertainties 
T h e post-war years were marked throughout Central Africa by great 
popular excitement and, in some regions, by real political agitation. 
Seen from the outside, of course, Central Africa still appeared to be 
the <etnpire du silence\ to borrow the title of a book by O . P. Gilbert 
dealing with the Belgian Congo. 4 For example, no Central Africans were 
present at the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in October 
1945, and it was an intellectual from British Togoland, D r Raphaël 
Armattoe, w h o reviewed the economic, social and political situation 
obtaining in the Belgian, French and Portuguese colonies in that region.5 
But the silence only seemed to be such. T h e war years had in fact proved 
to be a time of particular distress (see Chapter 3). Everywhere more and 
more had to be produced and the colonial authorities did not hesitate to 
revert to the most brutal methods which had been employed at the end 
of the nineteenth century. T h e war effort bore particularly hard on French 
Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo. Moreover, those Africans w h o 
had taken part, voluntarily or under compulsion, in the military operations 
had had an opportunity of discovering n e w horizons and absorbing novel 
ideas - those from French Equatorial Africa in North Africa and Europe, 
those from the Belgian Congo in Ethiopia, Madagascar and B u r m a . 
T h e n e w climate was obvious to all in the towns, where the im-
poverished masses of the industrial proletariat, the downtrodden workers 
and the dissatisfied and impatient 'educated' African classes already 
represented a real political force.6 Revolutionary and reformist ideas from 
the outside world easily m a d e their w a y in and found a sympathetic 
3. F. Youlou (1917-72), ordained priest in 1946, entered politics in 1956 when he was 
elected mayor of Brazzaville. H e became prime minister in 1958, then president in 1960, 
only to be overthrown in 1963, following a popular uprising in Brazzaville known as the 
'Glorious Three' [days] on 13-15 August 1963. 
4. O . P. Gilbert, 1947. 
5. I. Geiss, 1974, p. 405. 
6. There is far from general agreement among specialists on Africa regarding the issue 
of social classes, and this is not the place to add to the debate. Suffice it to say, quoting 
Engels, that the term 'proletariat' is used here to m e a n the class of modern wage labourers 
who , having no means of production of their o w n , are reduced to selling their labour to 
live. (See the note by F. Engels in the 1888 English edn. of the Manifesto of the Communist 
Party; K . M a r x and F. Engels, 1955, p. 21.) T h e subproletariat comprised all those - for 
the most part recent urban immigrants - w h o had not yet found stable employment as 
wage-earners in industry. 
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audience in these strata of society. Angola received, mainly from Brazil, 
a great amount of literature about the Second World W a r , fascism and 
the national liberation struggles.7 In the trust territories - the Cameroons, 
Ruanda-Urundi - public attention concentrated mainly on the principle 
of the right of peoples to self-determination, laid d o w n in the Atlantic 
Charter, the United Nations Declaration and the United Nations Charter. 
In Brazzaville, Libreville and perhaps also in Bangui and smaller centres, 
communist study-groups were set up under the leadership of Europeans 
w h o were active members of the French Communist Party.8 It m a y be 
mentioned, incidentally, that the first political parties to be set up legally 
at this time in French Equatorial Africa clearly showed their allegiance 
to the parties of France: in the Middle Congo even before the Second 
World W a r there was a local branch of the S F I O (the French Section of 
the Socialist International) led by Jacques Opangault, while the Congolese 
Progressive Party, founded in 1946 by Jean Félix-Tchicaya, became after 
the B a m a k o Congress (October 1946) a m e m b e r of the R E ) A 
{Rassemblement démocratique africain), which was itself closely connected 
with the French Communist Party. T h e main Gabonese party, Jean 
Aubame's U D S G {Union démocratique et sociale gabonaise) obviously tried 
to keep very close to the French U D S R {Union démocratique et socialiste 
de la résistance) led by François Mitterrand. Only the M E S A N {Mouvement 
d'évolution sociale de l'Afrique noire), founded in 1949 by Barthélémy 
Boganda in Ubangui-Chari, was entirely independent of the parties in 
France, although its ideas were largely based on those of the Christian 
Democrats. In Angola, colonial domination combined with the Salazar 
dictatorship prohibited the legal constitution of political parties. It was 
as underground formations and on the initiative of the Portuguese 
Communist Party that three revolutionary movements led by young 
intellectuals were set up in Luanda round about 1948: the Comité Federal 
Angolano do Partido Communista Portugués, the Comissäo de Luta das 
Juventudes contra o Imperialismo Colonial em Angola, and the Angola 
Negra.9 
T h e most significant activities in urban areas were, however, attributable 
to the local efforts of the Africans themselves. In Angola, several very 
active groups which were formed in the inter-war period were to main-
tain their pressure after 1945: the Liga Nacional Angolana and the 
7. J. M a r c u m , 1969, p. 23. 
8. Interviews with Paul Lomani-Tshibamba, Kinshasa, September 1981. Paul Lomani-
Tshibamba (or Tchibamba), 1914-85, lived until the age of six in Brazzaville, where his 
father was a customs officer. His articles in La Voix du Congolais and his book Ngando 
got him into numerous difficulties with the Belgian colonial authorities and he went into 
exile in Brazzaville (December 1949-JuIy 1961) where he became a French citizen and 
for ten years edited Liaison, French Equatorial Africa's first intellectual review. See P. 
Hazoumé and P. Lomani-Tshibamba, n.d. 
9. J. Marcum, 1969, pp. 26-7. 
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A N A N G O L A {Associacäo Regional dos Naturais de Angola), both par-
ticularly influential among the Luanda mestizos. T h e former worked 
mainly for economic and social reforms, while the latter concentrated on 
cultural action. In 1948, under the auspices of the A N A N G O L A , a young 
poet, Viriato Francisco demente da Cruz, founded a literary movement 
whose members began to publish great numbers of anti-establishment 
poems in the review Mensagem. This poetry from the muceques, or poor 
districts of Luanda, was for long to represent the principal form of 
social criticism and nationalist demands.1 0 In the Belgian Congo, violent 
revolutionary movements came to the fore as early as 1944: the very 
serious unrest which was smouldering among the urban garrisons broke 
out on 20 February in the Luluabourg mutiny. T h e revolt was crushed 
but some of the mutineers managed to escape, to Katanga and Sankuru 
among other places, where they planted the seeds of further insurrection. 
Another mutiny broke out almost at the same time in Jadotville, while 
in Elisabethville the colonial administration managed only just in time to 
get wind of 'plotting among intellectuals' with the object of securing, in 
line with the Atlantic Charter, 'freedom of speech and of the press', 
'individual freedom, with the abolition of the chain and the whip, which 
reduce us to the condition of beasts of burden', freedom of movement, 
'provision of the education required for the intellectual progress of the 
native population' and the right to political representation." This violent 
radical trend was to continue in the ensuing years, with the strike of 
dockers in the seaport of Matadi in November 1945, marked by rioting 
and bloodshed (seven deaths according to official figures). 
At the same time, another, moderate and reformist trend gained ground 
among the 'educated' population of the Belgian Congo. As early as March 
1944, the 'educated' inhabitants of Luluabourg, taking advantage of the 
dismay caused by the mutiny of the garrison, presented to the district 
commissioner a m e m o r a n d u m demanding first and foremost 'that the 
government recognize the existence of a social class of educated natives, 
for the members of that class are convinced that they deserve a special 
status, or at least special protection from the government, which will keep 
them safe from certain measures or certain types of treatment which m a y 
be applied to people w h o have "remained ignorant and backward"'.12 
F r o m then on, the claim for 'special status' polarized the energies of the 
educated native population. It appears in most of the articles published 
in the very important review, La Voix du Congolais, founded in January 
1945, and in particular in the famous article ''Quelle sera notre place dans 
le monde de demain? ('What will our place be in tomorrow's world?') by 
Paul Lomani-Tshibamba, w h o suffered a long exile in Brazzaville as a 
10. J. Marcum, 1969, pp. 22-6; R . Pélissier, 1978, pp. 240-3. 
11. Memorandum quoted by J.-L. Vellut, 1983, pp. 504-6. 
12. M . M a k o m b o , 1977, p. 838. 
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result of it.13 T h e U N I S C O {Union des intérêts sociaux congolais), set up 
in 1945, took up the same theme. A n d in 1947 the senatorial mission 
sent to the Congo by the Belgian government received the same complaints 
from the educated inhabitants of Léopoldville and Paulis. 
In the Cameroons, it was mainly the French part and the south that 
suffered from the effects of the war - shortage of staple commodities, 
requisition of labour for the plantations, for the development of the 
Douala-Yaoundé-Abong highway, for the working of the rutile and gold 
mines, and for rubber-tapping. T h e hesitations of Governor Nicolas and 
the reactionary conservatism of the colonists were the root causes of very 
serious clashes. In August 1945 the town of Douala was the venue for 
the 'Colonial States General', attended by delegates of the colonists of 
French Equatorial Africa, French West Africa and Madagascar, which 
attacked all the constructive aspects of the Brazzaville Conference and 
rejected en bloc all the proposed reforms.14 O n the other hand, in July 
1945, a trades-union confederation, bringing together all the workers' 
organizations, had been set up and from the outset encountered combined 
opposition from the colonial administration, the Catholic clergy and the 
colonists belonging to the Chamber of C o m m e r c e and the A S C O C A M 
{Association des colons du Cameroun). T h e inevitable clash between these 
antagonistic forces occurred in September 1945 with the railwaymen's 
strike and the Douala riots. In the course of those riots, the railwaymen 
had support from the best-organized members of the working class - the 
very poorly-paid hired workers — and from the worst-exploited. Governor 
Nicholas authorized the European colonists to arm and to maintain law 
and order from 24 September to 9 October, thus legitimating a full-scale 
massacre. T h e judicial repression which followed was no less severe. In 
consequence it was not until 1948 that the first modern mass party was 
formed. This party, the U P C {Union des populations du Cameroun), was 
the creation of the trade unionist Ruben Urn Nyobe and his lieutenants, 
Félix M o u m i é , Ernest Ouandié and Abel Kingue. Though affiliated to 
the R D A , the U P C , through its newspaper La Voix du Cameroun, launched 
a m u c h more radical slogan than those of the R D A - 'Unification and 
immediate independence'. Appealing strongly to the working classes, the 
U P C gained a footing mainly among the lower strata of the urban 
population (in Douala and Yaounde) and among the Basa and Bamileke 
in the southern half of the country.15 
Little is yet known about the state of mind of the rural population, 
for want of sufficient research. W h a t seems to have prevailed everywhere 
is an attitude of passive resistance to the representatives and symbols of 
colonization - administrators, missionaries, agents of commercial and 
13. Reproduced in M . Makombo, 1977, pp. 842-53; see also fn. 8, above. 
14. J. Suret-Canale, 1972, pp. 44-50. 
15. R . A . Joseph, 1977, pp. 39-99. 
196 
Equatorial West Africa 
agricultural companies. This was the case, in particular, in the regions in 
which Messianic and syncretic movements had developed between the 
two world wars. In the Belgian Congo, for instance, the K o n g o populations 
remained faithful to the teachings of Simon Kimbangu (i88i?-i95i) 
despite the removal of the Prophet and his internment from 1921 onwards 
in Katanga, where he was to die. So too, as soon as it was founded in 1950, 
the Abako {Association des Bakongó) w o n the immediate, spontaneous, mass 
support of the population. In the Middle Congo, a similar movement had 
grown up under the n a m e of Amicalism, or Matsouanism, started by 
André Matsoua. After Matsoua's death in 1942 and the terrible repression 
launched against his supporters, the Lari populations, w h o had been most 
receptive to his message, turned in on themselves and refused to take 
part in any way in elections or in modern political life up to 1956. 
In places where Messianic movements did not spring up, there are 
plenty of signs of the opposition of the rural populations. In Gabon, for 
instance, the governor, w h o was worried by the growth of political interest 
in the towns, wanted to use the rural population and the customary chiefs 
against the town-dwellers. T h e first Pahouin Congress, convened for 
this purpose at Mitzik, 26-8 February 1947, backfired on the colonial 
administration: not only was it critical in its attitude towards the colonial 
power but by popular vote it recognized Léon M ' B a , the spokesman of 
the town-dwellers, as sole N'Zoe Fang (Chief of the Fang). This was the 
first indication of the alliance between townspeople and countrypeople 
which was to make the nationalist movements of Central Africa so strong 
during the 1950s.16 
Economic growth, social change and social tensions 
T h e decade that followed the Second World W a r was marked by a good 
overall world situation, the effects of which were felt in Central Africa. 
T h e colonial powers, in the process of rebuilding their economies, called 
still more on their empires. This led to quite remarkable and in some 
cases spectacular growth in the territories as a whole, though the colonial 
imperialist set-up designed for exploitation was not questioned in any way. 
In view of the inevitable discrepancies and inequalities in development, 
associated with the natural resources then known and the economic 
policies adopted, several types of growth and organizational structure have 
to be distinguished. 
Most of the colonies had predominantly agricultural economies up to 
the time of independence. T h e development of capitalistic production 
relations was very slow and insignificant except in the zones that were 
settled by European colonists, w h o confiscated the land and reduced the 
expropriated peasants to the status of permanent or temporary agricultural 
16. G . Balandier, 1963, pp. 198-203. 
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workers. T h e colonies were tied in with the international capitalist system 
through what has been described as 'l'économie de traité1 (predatory 
economy), that is to say, the linking up of a hegemonic commercial 
capitalist economy, dominated by the colonizers, with non-capitalist 
agricultural economies. In these circumstances, the territories concerned 
were confined almost exclusively to relations with the respective colonial 
powers. 
Small territories regarded as poor in mineral resources, such as Equa-
torial Guinea, the Sao T o m e and Principe Islands, R w a n d a and Burundi 
lent themselves best to this type of economic exploitation. Only the Sao 
T o m e and Principe Islands had a plantation (rocas) economy, dominated 
by European absentee landlords (roceiros) of large estates worked by 
contractual labour imported in great numbers from Cape Verde, Angola 
and Mozambique. Elsewhere production was in the hands of small farmers 
and their families.'7 Coffee, cocoa, bananas and oil-seeds were the principal 
exports from Sao T o m e , Principe and Equatorial Guinea. In the last-
named colony, these products were purchased by the Spaniards at high 
prices (double the world market price for cocoa, for example). Represented 
as generosity on the part of the Spaniards, this price system was actually 
due to Spain's desire to avoid the drain of foreign currency that would 
have resulted from the purchase of these products outside its empire. 
R w a n d a and Burundi were in a special situation owing to the very high 
density of their population. T h e efforts m a d e by the farmers finally got 
the better of the famines, the last of which occurred in Rwanda in the 
1916-31 period, and even produced exportable surpluses of Arabica coffee 
and tea. 
This agricultural economy was also to be found in the larger territories -
the Cameroons, French Equatorial Africa and Angola. T h e active pros-
pecting that the colonial companies had engaged in since the end of the 
war had not yet located any significant mineral resources except in Angola. 
A distinct improvement was brought about in the situation of French 
Equatorial Africa, which had been neglected by the state - 'the Cinderella 
of the French Empire' was M . Devèze's apt term for it18 - and literally 
bled white, if w e m a y put it so, by the concessionary companies. Following 
the schemes put forward at the Brazzaville Conference, a ten-year plan 
was drawn up, to be financed by the Overseas Territories Investment and 
Development Fund , F I D E S (Fonds d'investissement et de développement 
économique et social des territoires d'Outre Mer). Between 1947 and 1956, 
French Equatorial Africa received 51 3 4 4 m C F A francs, which were used 
mainly for the development of infrastructure.19 Foreign trade therefore 
continued to draw on the agricultural sector (wood in Gabon and the 
17. R . Pélissier, 1979, pp. 211-27. 
18. M . Devèze, 1948, p. 1. 
19. E . M'Bokolo, 1982, p. 195. 
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Middle Congo, cotton and coffee in Ubangui-Chari). T h e F I D E S was 
also active in Cameroon: although agriculture remained the basis of the 
economy (cocoa, 50 per cent of the country's exports; bananas and coffee, 
20 per cent, in 1955), small industry began to develop, based on the 
production of aluminium (the Edéa hydro-electric and metallurgical 
complex owned by Alucam, in which the French company Péchiney-
Ugine had a dominant 82 per cent interest) and on the processing of fats. 
At the time of independence, this emerging industry already represented 
10 per cent of the national product.20 A similar process was under way 
in Angola. Agriculture was still the principal source of foreign currency 
thanks to coffee (40 per cent of exports in 1962: the second-highest 
production in Africa, after that of the Côte d'Ivoire) and to various natural 
products (sugar-cane, oil-seeds, cotton, wood) . But the mining industry 
was steadily developing: besides diamonds, already mined before the war, 
iron and oil were mined after 1945. Portugal was, of course, anxious to 
remain the first to benefit by this tardy development: in i960, Portugal 
supplied 50 per cent of Angola's imports and the setting up of a c o m m o n 
market for the escudo zone in 1962 consolidated this integration still 
further. 
In Angola itself, the European sectors of the economy gained most 
from growth. White immigration increased significantly after the war; 
moreover, the number of Europeans living in Angola rose from 44 083 in 
1940 to 78826 in 1950, 172529 in i960, 290000 in 1970 and about 
335000 in 1974." M a n y of these people, of course, were originally from 
the lower classes - tradesmen, agricultural workers, small farmers; ignorant 
and illiterate and accordingly lacking in ambition and initiative. For them 
Angola was a land of unhoped-for material success. In the 1959-64 six-
year plan, three-quarters of the investments were accordingly allocated to 
the development of sectors controlled by the colonists. After the war, a 
measure of economic internationalization22 began to occur and was to 
develop further after 1962, with the investment of British, American and 
South African capital and increased trade with all the O E C D countries. 
In contrast to these predominantly agricultural countries, only the 
Belgian Congo had an economy that had already come fully into the 
20. R . A.Joseph, 1977, pp. 111-18. 
21. G . J. Bender, 1978, p. 229. 
22. T h e process known as 'internationalization' differs from 'dependence'. 'Dependence' 
refers to the particular process whereby African countries became part of the international 
capitalist economy. Beginning as early as the sixteenth century in parts of Central Africa, 
it became widespread during the colonial era. T h e economy of a colony was, therefore, 
first and foremost a dependent economy. In the context of the favoured relations between 
the colony and the colonial power, this dependence was defined in relation to such a 
power. In a few exceptional cases, the colonial power found itself obliged - for one reason 
or another — to yield to other capitalist countries in matters of investment and trade: a 
process here referred to as 'internationalization'. 
199 
Africa since 1935 
industrial age. A s early as 1930, the Congolese e c o n o m y s h o w e d the 
predominant features which were to remain the s a m e right u p to inde-
pendence: extraversion a n d disarticulation; concentration o n particular 
sectors (mining and transport - 70 per cent of capital investments) and 
regions (dynamic role of the mining provinces of Kasai and Katanga); 
capital investments in the colony controlled b y a very few financial groups 
(75 per cent of the capital being o w n e d b y four groups - Société Générale, 
Empain, Cominière a n d Brufina - including 60 per cent by the Société 
Générale alone); active participation b y the colonial state in the economic 
sector, both directly (through its o w n companies , particularly in the 
transport sector, and through its interests in the private sector) and 
indirectly (through the authoritarian mobilization of m a n p o w e r ) . 
T h e growth of the Congolese e c o n o m y , brought to a sudden halt b y 
the economic crisis of the 1930s, started off again with increased vigour 
as a result of the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r a n d , after 1945, of the overall 
international situation a n d that of the colony itself. A phase in which the 
colonial e c o n o m y w a s built u p , w a s succeeded by w h a t I have already 
suggested calling the 'phase of extended reproduction of the production 
structure'.23 This phase w a s m a r k e d b y three outstanding features: 
(1) a very substantial growth of the mining sector (index 100 in 
1950; 175 in 1959), enabling the big colonial firms to reach the 
stage of self-maintained growth as a result of the reinvestment 
of a fairly small part of their rising profits and to increase the 
real wages of the African workers;24 
(2) an appreciable development of the domestic market as a result 
of a general improvement in wages (Africans earned 5000 Fr. on 
the average in 1945 and 18000 Fr. in 1952; Europeans earned 
260000 Fr. in 1945 and 450000 Fr. in 1958),^ since the state, 
industries and plantations, prompted by social and political 
considerations, followed the example of the mining sector, c o m -
bined with a definite increase in farmers' incomes; and 
(3) the development of the industrial sector (index 100 in 1950, and 
260 in 1956), some industries being closely associated with the 
export sector (mines and plantations), while others were replacing 
imports, and still others, which had m a d e a hesitant appearance 
prior to 1930, were experiencing spectacular growth which 
triggered off development in m a n y areas (food, tobacco, textile 
and building industries). 
In 1958 cash-crop agriculture represented only 44.6 per cent of the gross 
domestic product, whereas mining represented 19.8 per cent, industry for 
23. E . M'Bokolo, 1981a, p. 5. 
24. J . -L . Lacroix, 1966, p. 22. 
25. F. Bézy et al., 1981, p. 38. 
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export 18.8 per cent and industry for the h o m e market 16.8 per cent.26 
Despite these achievements, the Congolese economy retained all the 
features imposed on it by the colonial regime - constant recourse to 
compulsion and very great inequalities between Africans and Europeans. 
In 1958, while Africans represented 99 per cent of the total population 
of the colony, they controlled only 5 per cent of capital investment and 
accounted for only 55 per cent of wages, 69 per cent of consumption and 
12 per cent of private savings.27 
T h e social changes accompanying these economic changes are, of 
course, too numerous for them all to be even briefly mentioned here. 
T h e economy is, in any case, not the only factor involved in change: the 
general development of schools and of government departments must also 
be taken into account. T h e very extent of these changes suggests that, 
besides the always uncomfortable experience of a reclassification of 
individuals in the new social registers imposed by colonization, the 
situation contains all the elements!of a real crisis.28 
O n e of the most spectacular signs of this crisis was the drift to the 
towns, which provided evidence of the old familiar crisis of agrarian 
societies while at the same time triggering the n e w crisis of urban societies. 
Urbanization was particularly rapid in the Belgian Congo , where the 
proportion of town-dwellers increased from 8.8 per cent in 1938 to 14.8 
per cent in 1945 and 24 per cent in 1955.29 Less sudden elsewhere, it 
was no less uncontrolled, leading everywhere to the formation of a 
working-class proletariat and, even more, a huge mass of exploited 
workers,30 which increased dramatically after the reversal of overall 
economic conditions in the mid-1950s. In Angola, for instance, in i960 
one African out of three lived in a makeshift dwelling in a town or its 
outskirts. T h e senzala or 'native quarter' of Lobito had a population of 
20000 in 1954, but there was only one tap with running water for 1200 
people, and in the two primary schools in these districts there were only 
250 places in all.31 T h e muceques or shore-side shanty towns of Luanda 
were still more wretched. 
In French Equatorial Africa, the proletarianization of the population, 
which was not very noticeable before the war because of the economic 
system in force, speeded up after 1945. Generally speaking, the number 
of wage-earners rapidly increased since, according to official estimates, 
there were 108600 in 1947; 189500 in 1949; 193000 in 1950; 155000 in 
26. J .-L. Lacroix, 1966, p. 31. 
27. F. Bézy et al, 1981, p . u . 
28. For the Belgian Congo, see the analysis by M . Merlier, 1962, pp. 89-103, 145-64 
and 231-49. 
29. ibid., p. 147 
30. See fn. 6, above. 
31. I. B . Kaké and E . M'Bokolo , 1979, p. m . 
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1952 and 1953; 135600 in 1954; and 190000 in 1958.32 T h e variations in 
these figures show just h o w vulnerable this social category is, affected as 
it is by the slightest veering of the overall situation. In these figures, 
manual workers and labourers are by far the largest group: in 1949 there 
were 39150 'semi-skilled workers and labourers' and 142500 unskilled 
workers; in 1958 these figures had dropped to 34600 and 98500 respect-
ively. There was considerable unemployment: 16000 of the 33000 male 
adults living in Brazzaville were unemployed in 1956. In the urban centres 
of the Cameroons and the Belgian Congo, the picture was the same. 
T h e drift to the towns, while bringing them manpower, also drained 
the country areas of their work-force and of their most dynamic elements, 
the young people. But conditions in the agrarian societies varied greatly 
from one region to another. There was, for instance, no comparison 
between the relative affluence of the Beti-Bulu cocoa-planters and the 
increasing poverty of the Basa farming community in Cameroon.3 3 Simi-
larly, in French Equatorial Africa about 1952, the average annual income 
of the majority of farmers fluctuated between no more than 1800 and 
2100 C F A francs, whereas that of an industrial worker was in the region 
of 36 000 francs.34 Only a few fortunately-situated regions were better off: 
the Woleu-Ntem region in Gabon, owing to the cultivation of cocoa, and 
above all the southern Congo , where the farmers could regularly dispose 
of what they produced to an exceptionally dense network of towns (the 
Pointe-Noire—Dolisie-Jacob-Brazzaville axis), with m a n y small shop-
keepers taking their produce and a good transport system (roads, C o n g o -
Ocean railway). So far as the Belgian Congo was concerned, a fraction of 
the farming community (about 2500 families in 1952) advanced from the 
stage of small-scale commercial production to that of small-scale agrarian 
capitalism, particularly in the Lower Congo, the Kasai and Kivu: m a n y 
had benefited from the measures taken by the colonial power to bring 
into being 'indigenous farming communities' (making private individual 
ownership of the land easier, providing financial and technical assistance).35 
T h e last major aspect, with lasting consequences, of this process of 
social change was the formation of a small black bourgeoisie.36 In some 
cases, the inequalities of economic development and educational policy 
resulted in the lower middle classes being drawn mainly from certain 
regions. For instance, in the seaboard countries, where relations with 
Europeans dated back a long way in the coastal districts, it was in fact 
the people from the coast, educated in mission schools or state schools, 
w h o largely supplied the lower middle class of salaried officials and clerks. 
32. E . M'Bokolo, 1981b, p. 401. 
33. R . A . Joseph, 1977, pp. 124-41. 
34. E . M'Bokolo, 1981b, pp. 398-403. 
35. E . M'Bokolo, 1981a, pp. 10-11; F. Bézy et al., 1981, pp. 41-5. 
36. For a general account and case-studies, see E . M'Bokolo, 1981a and 1981b. 
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This was the case with the Duala in Cameroon, the M y e n e from the 
Gabonese coast, the Vili of Loango and the blacks and mestizos of Luanda 
and Lobito (Angola). In the Belgian Congo, there was a similar disparity 
to the advantage of the southern savannahs (Bas-Congo, K w a n g o , Kwilu 
and Kasai in particular) as compared with the northern forest areas (the 
Oriental and Equateur provinces, especially the latter). In any case, the 
vocabulary of the period reflected the advent of this n e w class: the terms 
'literate' and 'educated', which were very fashionable in the 1940s, were 
replaced by expressions with more precise sociological connotations and 
a richer sociological content: 'middle classes', 'ruling class', 'bourgeoisie', 
and so on. It is by no means certain that the colonial authorities actually 
created this class. At all events, they tried to use it as a moderating 
element at a time of rising political tensions. It is in this sense that the 
recommendation that the colonists of the Belgian Congo m a d e to the 
colonial government is to be interpreted: 
A n educated native class must be organized, w h o will endorse the 
ideals and principles of our Western civilization and, with equal 
standing, will be our equals in rights and obligations; fewer in 
numbers than the native population at large, but powerful and 
influential, they will be the allies that w e need to find a m o n g the 
indigenous communities. These middle classes will be the black 
bourgeoisie that is beginning to emerge everywhere, which w e must 
help to grow rich and to become organized and jwhich, like bourgeois 
everywhere in the world, will be against any sort of upheaval either 
from within or from without. There will nq longer be any race 
differences but, as in all the countries of the world, there will simply 
be class differences, the classes remaining open to all.37 
Figures from which the real weight of this class can be measured are 
not yet available for all the countries concerned. In the Belgian Congo, 
where the services of the colonial power m a d e quite sound estimates, 
some sources reckoned that, in 1958, there were 176600 people out of a 
total population of 13 million belonging to these middle classes, comprising 
31642 'white-collar workers', n o 220 skilled and semi-skilled workers, 
2335 foremen, 1430 members of the liberal professions, 19 710 shopkeepers 
and 11259 self-employed craftsmen. Other estimates, however, put the 
figure at 300 000.38 O n perusal of these figures, nevertheless, it will be 
noted that the proportion of employees, possessed of the knowledge and 
skills dispensed by the colonial schools, greatly outweighed that of the 
entrepreneurs, whose initiative found no scope in the constricted and 
discriminatory system of colonization. These key personnel were to lead 
the independence movements. T h e conclusions already reached with 
37. A 'confidential' note, published in 1959 and cited by M . M a k o m b o , 1977, p. 187. 
38. E . M'Bokolo, 1981a, p. 3. 
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regard to the Belgian C o n g o and French Equatorial Africa are n o doubt 
significant with regard to the whole of equatorial Africa. Table 8.1, 
showing the occupational background of politicians in French Equatorial 
Africa ( A E F ) , demonstrates the undeniable predominance of the lower 
middle class. 
Colonial practices: continuity and breaks with the past 
A s soon as the war finished, the clearest thinkers a m o n g the colonizers 
appreciated that a n e w age had b e g u n . In the Belgian C o n g o , for instance, 
where there had not as yet been any question of decolonization, the 
governor-general, Pierre R y c k m a n s (1934-46), wrote in 1946: ' T h e days 
of colonialism are over'.39 This remark w a s echoed in French Equatorial 
Africa six years later in an important speech by G o v e r n o r Paul Chauvet 
to the G r a n d Council: 
W h e t h e r w e like it or not, these educated people will have gradually 
to take over from the old élites and customary authorities. If they 
d o not d o so with us and under our supervision, they will inevitably 
d o so without us and in opposition to us.40 
T h e s e statements recognized shrewdly enough the structural trans-
formations that had occurred in local societies and the irreversible changes 
that had c o m e about in the psychology, attitudes and aspirations of the 
c o m m u n i t y and of individuals. N e w policies adapted to this situation 
were, however, worked out piecemeal, with each colonial p o w e r taking 
action in terms of its o w n traditions, the internationally recognized status 
of the territory under its domination, the local balance of strength and 
what it believed to be the opinion of the 'natives'. 
T h e policy followed by the French in French Equatorial Africa w a s in 
keeping with its overall African policy, though with undeniable par-
ticularities. French Equatorial Africa had the advantage of the 'great 
emancipation laws'41 passed by the Fourth Republic in its early days: 
abolition of forced labour; recognition of trades unions and setting u p of 
an inspectorate of labour; abolition of indigenous rights of citizenship and 
granting of French citizenship to Africans without detriment to their 
personal status in their o w n countries; institution of local assemblies in 
G a b o n , M i d d l e C o n g o and Ubangui -Char i and of a G r a n d Council in 
Brazzaville, while French Equatorial Africa also sent several parliamentary 
representatives to the French National Assembly and the Council of the 
French U n i o n . Despite the fact that the majority of Africans did not 
have the vote and that the electorate w a s divided into two colleges u p to 
39. ibid., p. 6. 
40. E . M'Bokolo, 1981b, p. 400. 
41. Phrase used by P. Aujoulat, 1958, p. 263. 
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T A B L E 8.1 Politicians in French Equatorial Africa, occupational back-
ground 
Europeans 
Businessmen 
Planters, timbermen 
Civil servants 
Liberal professions 
Journalists 
Unspecified 
Africans 
Physicians (Dakar Medical School) 
Primary-school teachers 
Nurses 
Senior administrative personnel 
Clerks and administrative employees 
Technicians 
Secretaries of chiefs 
Chiefs and prominent members of 
the population 
Persons employed in the private sector 
Workers 
Shopkeepers, restaurant-keepers 
Planters, timbermen 
Journalists 
Other self-employed persons 
Ex-servicemen 
Clergymen, priests 
Students 
N o occupation 
Unspecified 
Total 
French Equatorial 
1952 
32 
13 
18 
6 
-
-
-
10 
9 
1 
33 
1 
-
18 
13 
-
9 
8 
-
1 
3 
1 
-
-
-
176 
Africa 
1957 
28 
3 
10 
7 
3 
1 
6 
34 
20 
7 
36 
8 
2 
H 
19 
2 
13 
11 
1 
1 
3 
2 
-
-
2 
233 
Middle 
Congo 
IÇ46-60 
12 
1 
8 
2 
4 
1 
2 
25 
5 
3 
18 
5 
-
4 
25 
5 
10 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
H 
157 
Note: In the case of French Equatorial Africa this covers members of the National 
Assembly and of the Council of the French Union, members of the Grand 
Council and of the territorial councils (1952) with the addition, for 1957, of the 
mayors and deputy mayors of the fully-fledged c o m m u n e s and members of 
government councils. In the case of the Middle Congo, the sample also includes 
unsuccessful candidates in election to these bodies and party leaders. 
Sources: Annuaire politique de VAEF (1952 and 1957); J. M . Wagret, 1963, 
pp. 233-47; a n d E . M'Bokolo , 1981b, p. 400. 
205 
Africa since IÇ35 
1956, effective political life began: political parties came into being and 
the parliamentary elections of 1946 and 1951 and the territorial elections 
of 1947 and 1952 gave rise to far-reaching democratic discussions a m o n g 
the different sections of opinion. 
These advances were not, however, achieved without difficulty and 
resistance. T h e colonists, of w h o m there were relatively large numbers 
in Gabon and Ubangui-Chari and w h o were efficiently defended by the 
chambers of commerce, were violently against the n e w policy. In 1946, 
the Bangui Chamber of C o m m e r c e had no hesitation about protesting 
formally to the governor-general in Brazzaville that: 
T h e measures just adopted are appropriate only for populations less 
backward than those of French Equatorial Africa. T h e abolition of 
forced labour is clearly interpreted here as legal recognition of the 
right to do nothing. . . . A swift drop in cotton production is to be 
feared. . . . N o one w h o knows these countries can believe that an 
enactment will be enough to bring about a sudden change in the 
mentality of the black m a n . 4 2 
T h e administration itself, in which there were still m a n y 'old colonials', 
was in no hurry to put the new measures into practice and continued to 
increase the humiliations imposed on both the people at large and the 
élites. These included the covert maintenance of forced labour; harassment 
of politicians thought to be over-independent, in particular the deputy 
for Ubangui-Chari, Barthélémy Boganda, w h o was sentenced in 1951 for 
'incitement to riotous assembly' and threatened with loss of rights; and 
support for moderates, like those w h o , in the Middle Congo, founded a 
short-lived section of the Gaullist R P F (Rassemblement du peuple français).*3 
In the Belgian Congo, the legendary paternalism of the colonial 
authority continued to be the backbone of policy in regard to the Africans. 
Until the mid-1950s, this policy was the joint product of three structural 
systems - the colonial administration, the big firms and the Catholic 
missions — so closely connected by such manifold and inextricably 
interwoven ties that they were dubbed, together, the 'colonial trinity'.44 
W e have already referred to the relations between the state and the leading 
companies, including the 'companies of 1906', the Union minière du Haut-
Katanga, Forminière and the B C K (Bas-Congo-Katanga railway) which 
dominated the economy of the colony. T h e Catholic missions, for their 
part, continued to enjoy the benefit of the agreement signed in 1906 
between Leopold II and the Vatican. T h e weight they carried in the 
colony was considerable, as attested by the 1958 figures: 669 mission 
stations; 6000 European missionaries, assisted by 386 brothers and 745 
42. Quoted by P. Kalck, 1973, p. 475. 
43. E . M'Bokolo, 1982, pp. 198-200. 
44. C . Young, 1965, pp. 10-32. 
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sisters of the teaching and nursing orders; 25 560 black catechists. T h e 
chief prelates of the colony, M g r Roelens and M g r de Hemptine, were 
the busiest architects of the colonial ideology, while the missionaries were 
over-represented in the 'Colonial Council' which, from Brussels, master-
minded the framing and application of colonial policy. T h e influence of 
the missions was further increased by the existence of m a n y associations 
of former pupils which continued to keep a firm hold on the modern 
élites well after their school-days were over. O n e of the main associations 
of this kind, the A D A P E S (Association des anciens élèves des Pères de 
Scheut), which was founded in 1925, had some 15000 members in 1950.45 
T h e missionaries kept very closely in touch with the work of these 
associations since, in the absence of parties, which were prohibited by 
law, they really served as a laboratory in which most of the future leaders 
of the national movement were produced. 
Following the disturbances of 1944-5 a n d the demands made by the 
'educated natives', the colonial authority conceded a few reforms. These 
reforms, which disregarded the political aspect of post-war agitation, 
changed only minor aspects of life and society: recognition of trade 
unions; establishment of bodies for contact between employers and their 
black workers (indigenous works councils, local committees of indigenous 
workers, participation in regional and provincial commissions concerned 
with indigenous labour and social progress); setting up of a welfare fund; 
and, in particular, the granting of 'civic merit' cards and the system of 
registration which enabled card-holders (1557 'civic merit' and 768 
'registered' cards in 1958), after humiliating probationary tests, to enjoy 
certain privileges reserved for Europeans.46 Nothing fundamental was 
otherwise changed despite the appointment of black representatives to 
the provincial councils and the government. T h e Belgians continued to 
apply their max im ' N o élites, no trouble!'. It was not until 1952 that a 
black m a n from the Congo was authorized for the first time to attend a 
Belgian university. 
T h e regimes established by the Portuguese in Angola and Sao T o m e 
and Principe and by the Spaniards in Equatorial Guinea fell between the 
Belgian and the French practice, for while people were theoretically 
treated on the same footing, there was in fact no m o v e away from narrow 
paternalism and the status quo in any respect. T h e official doctrine of the 
Portuguese, first expressed in 1912, proclaimed that 'Angola must be 
considered a Portuguese nation rather than a colony'.47 Salazar's Estado 
Novo was to reaffirm this in the 1930 Colonial Act and the constit-
ution of 1933. T h e act distinguished between the 'non-assimilated' and 
the 'assimilated'. T h e latter, w h o enjoyed all the rights pertaining to 
45. M . M a k o m b o , 1977, p. 54. 
46. ibid., pp. 83-135. 
47. I. B . Kaké and E . M'Bokolo, 1979, p. 78. 
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Portuguese citizenship, in particular the right to vote, were required, 
among other obligations, to be able to read and write Portuguese, to give 
up the communal way of life, to be loyal to the state and, if they were 
mestizos, to have been born in wedlock. T h e number of assimilados 
remained very small; there were 91548 (24221 Africans, 23244 mestizos, 
44 083 whites) out of 3 737 947 inhabitants, including 3 665 000 blacks in 
1940; and 135250 (30089 blacks, 26335 mestizos, 78826 whites) out of 
4145163 inhabitants, including 4037000 blacks in 1950.48 While all 
whites and 90 per cent of the mestizos had the status of assimilados, that 
privilege was extended to barely 1 per cent of the blacks. T h e other 99 
per cent were indigenatos and therefore subjected, among other things, to 
forced labour since, under the terms of the Labour Code of 1899, blacks 
were 'under a legal and moral obligation to earn by their work the means 
of subsistence and of improving their social condition'.49 T h e Spanish 
patronato de indígenas system was little better. Devised in 1904 and 
reformulated in 1938, it was based on the conviction that blacks were 
morally, mentally and legally under age. Hence, a long series of restrictions, 
such as the rule that blacks could not without authorization engage in 
transactions involving more than 2000 pesetas. Emancipation cards were 
issued by the Curadoría but, despite the fact that almost everyone received 
basic schooling, the number issued remained very small. 
T h e situation of the mandated territories was clarified and in theory 
improved after the end of the war, with the founding of the United 
Nations which, though taking over from the League of Nations, did not 
simply carry on with the mandate system unchanged. T h e territories 
formerly held under mandate became 'trust territories' and Article 76 of 
the United Nations Charter provided that the powers concerned should 
'promote . . . their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence'. B y means of the 'visiting missions', U N supervision was 
more closely exercised and open encouragement was given to the sending 
of petitions or delegations by Africans. But the pace and pattern of actual 
change varied from one territory to another. In Cameroon, the French 
part received the social and political reforms granted by France to the 
whole of its part of Africa; but progress towards autonomy was slower 
there than in Togo, which was made an 'autonomous republic under 
trusteeship' by the basic law of 23 June 1956, while Cameroon had to 
await a vote to this effect by a majority of its legislative assembly on 28 
January 1957.50 In Western Cameroon, which was administered by the 
United K i n g d o m , the change took a long time to materialize since the 
British had joined the territory with Nigeria and it was not until 1954, 
when a federal government was established in Nigeria, that there was any 
48. G . J . Bender, 1978, p. 151. 
49. I. B . Kaké and E . M'Bokolo, 1979, p. 78. 
50. R . A . Joseph, 1977, pp. 171-201. 
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clear prospect of internal autonomy.51 In their 'trust territories' the 
Belgians carried on their pre-war policy, the avowed objective of which 
was to 'rationalize' and 'modernize' political structures by regrouping 
chieftaincies, turning traditional leaders into civil servants and d e m o -
cratizing the councils of the kings of R w a n d a and Burundi. T h e effect of 
these often somewhat clumsy measures was to increase the tension in 
both countries between the Tutsi and the Hutu. 5 2 
Progress towards independence 
T h e diversity noted in the political.practices of the colonial powers was 
echoed in the ways in which independence was gained. For while in three 
cases - French Equatorial Africa, Spanish Guinea and the Belgian 'trust 
territories' - decolonization was effected amicably, following more or less 
arduous political bargaining, in the two cases of Cameroon and Angola it 
took a war of liberation to force the colonial powers to negotiate. T h e 
Belgian Congo represents an intermediate situation, with decolonization 
negotiated between the opposing political forces, though the negotiations 
were possible only as a sequel to scattered uprisings which were prevented 
from turning into a full-blown revolutionary war by the actual opening 
of the discussions. 
In French Equatorial Africa, the gradual m o v e towards independence 
was controlled throughout by the French authorities, the main local 
parties in most cases merely following the process as onlookers.53 This 
was due to the sociological features of the local political formations, drawn 
mainly from among clerical workers and civil servants; in short all the 
categories of the emerging lower middle class, which succeeded only to 
a very limited extent in mobilizing the masses. T h e only notable exception 
was the M E S A N , founded in Ubangui-Chari by Barthélémy Boganda. 
T h e 'educated natives' had misgivings about that party, which earned 
them a m o n g the public at large the scathing nickname of mboundjou voko 
('white Negroes'). Drawing its leaders and active party members from 
among lower-paid employees, the urban masses and the farming popu-
lation in the bush, the M E S A N was obliged to provide itself with a 
relatively elaborate ideology, particularly in the economic and social fields, 
where at a very early stage it proposed the formation of co-operatives.54 
T h e African parties of equatorial Africa nevertheless enjoyed real popular 
support, partly on account of their affiliation (except in the case of the 
M E S A N ) to the R D A , whose alliance with the French Communist Party 
51. T . Eyongetah and R . Brain, 1974, pp. 123-42. 
52. R . Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 118-79 a n d 315-23. 
53. See E . M'Bokolo, 1981b and 1982, for further details. 
54. See P. Kalck, 1977. 
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was regarded as the surest sign of a progressive attitude,55 and partly 
because of the particularly reactionary line taken by the French colonists, 
w h o long demanded nothing but the maintenance of quite outdated 
structures and practices. 
T h e high commissioner Paul Chauvet, whose government (1951-8) 
covered this crucial period, was adroit enough to take the most appropriate 
steps to break 'White racism . . . still as deplorable and dangerous for 
the maintenance of law and order'56 and to win over the African elites. 
These measures included banning the familiar 'fa' habitually used by 
Europeans w h e n addressing blacks, inviting prominent Africans as a 
matter of course to official and private ceremonies, liberally awarding 
study grants, and systematically recruiting young people with secondary 
and higher education for local positions of responsibility in French 
Equatorial Africa. As a result, w h e n the basic law was passed in 1956, 
the African élites enthusiastically accepted political autonomy but without 
any hostility towards France and without any desire to break the structural 
relationship with the former colonial power. In August 1958, a few weeks 
before the Gaullist referendum instituting the 'Community' , on which 
they recommended an affirmative vote, these élites sent a long petition 
to General de Gaulle in which they extolled the 'civilizing work' of 
France in French Equatorial Africa and the principle of 'independence 
in freely accepted interdependence' for the former colonies. They reserved 
the right ultimately to call for independence, essentially because, they 
said, they 'suffered from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the former British 
colonies which had become independent States'.57 O n e of the essential 
questions then was whether, after independence, the federal institutions 
would or would not be maintained. Barthélémy Boganda became the most 
ardent, and at once the most perceptive and the most visionary advocate 
of the federalist scheme. A s the president of the Grand Council of French 
Equatorial Africa, he proposed more than a very close federation between 
the four former'French colonies. That federation, under the n a m e of the 
'Central African Republic', was to be the first step towards what he called 
'the United States of Latin (or Central) Africa', including also the Belgian 
Congo, Cameroon, Angola, R w a n d a and Burundi. T h e scheme came to 
nothing largely because of G a b o n , which reacted in the same way as the 
55. T h e R D A was less strong and its policy more fluctuating in French Equatorial 
Africa than in French West Africa. Its firmest allies were the Parti progressiste tchadien of 
Gabriel Lisette (Chad) and the Mouvement mixte gabonais of Léon M ' B a (Gabon). Founded 
in 1946, these two parties from the outset formed sections of the R D A . In the Congo, 
the R D A had as its section the Parti progressiste congolais led by Jean Félix-Tchicaya from 
1946-57 and, from 1957 on, the Union démocratique de défense des intérêts africains led by 
Abbé Fulbert Youlou. Concerning Cameroon, see note 65, below. 
56. These views, expressed in 1954, thus related to an evil recognized very late; see 
E . M'Bokolo, 1982, p . 203. 
57. Petition published in full in Marchés Tropicaux du Monde, 6 September 1958. 
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Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa had done a short time previously and as 
Kenya in East Africa was later to do: being the least poor country, Gabon 
was afraid of having to shoulder the financial burden of the future 
federation. Boganda's death in a mysterious plane crash on 29 April 1959 
sounded the death-knell of all the federalists' hopes. T h e territories 
of French Equatorial Africa consequently advanced separately towards 
independence.58 
T h e later independence of Equatorial Guinea and that of Sao T o m e 
and Principe also came about under the fairly close supervision of the 
colonial powers, Spain and Portugal. In Equatorial Guinea, nationalist 
demands first began to be voiced in 1950, when the Cruzada Nacional de 
Liberación was founded. Led by Acacio M a n e , a planter from the Bata 
region, its members comprised the agents of the colonial administration, 
in particular the teachers w h o , since 1945, had been calling in vain for 
an improvement in their salaries. Spain's sole response was to maintain 
a stone-walling, repressive attitude, designed to preserve the status quo. 
After Spain joined the U N in 1955, it was the subject of repeated attacks 
by the Afro-Asian group, but was protected by the veto constantly 
exercised by the United States of America. A terrible wave of repression 
culminated in the assassination of the two most prominent nationalist 
leaders, Acacio M a n e (1958) and Enrique N v ó (1959); hundreds of 
Guineans fled into exile in G a b o n and Cameroon. As a result, the two 
major parties formed in 1959, the M O N A L I G E {Mouvement national de 
libération de la Guinée Equatoriale) and the I P G E (Idée populaire de Guinée 
Equatoriale), had their most active officers and rank-and-file supporters 
abroad, particularly in Cameroon. T h e establishment of these bases abroad 
also helped, incidentally, to foster the annexationist claims of certain 
Nigerian and Cameroonian parties on the Rio M u n i and in Fernando 
Poo. After i960, the support given by the newly independent states to 
the Guiñean parties proved decisive. Faced in addition by growing social 
unrest, particularly on the part of civil servants, Spain gradually gave 
way. In 1963, it recognized the political parties, before conceding self-
rule in 1964. T h e constitutional conference which met in 1967-8 agreed 
to the need to grant independence, which was proclaimed on 12 October 
1968. 
T h e accession to independence of the major Central African states 
stimulated in turn the process of emancipation of Sao T o m e and Principe, 
where the first major mass movement to emerge had been put d o w n 
harshly in i960. In 1964, the O A U recognized the Liberation Committee 
of Sao T o m e and Principe, which eight years later was transformed into 
the M L S T P (the Liberation M o v e m e n t of Sao T o m e and Principe). After 
the bloodless coup of 25 April 1974 (the 'Revolution of the Carnations'), 
58. T h e Congo on 15 August i960; Gabon on 17 August i960; and the Central African 
Republic on 13 August i960. 
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Portugal negotiated a timetable of emancipation with the M L S T P , and 
independence was proclaimed a year later, on 12 July 1975. 
In R w a n d a and Burundi, at that time united under the name of 
Ruanda-Urundi, the United Nations, as the trusteeship authority, played 
its role to the full. T h e complications which marked the final colonial 
decade saw growing ethnic tensions that colonial practice had inevitably 
encouraged and was unable to contain.59 In Rwanda , the educated Hutu 
élites took advantage of the change in attitude of the Catholic missionaries 
about 1955 to launch an attack on the Tutsi, w h o not only made up the 
political aristocracy but had also been systematically placed by the Belgians 
in responsible religious and administrative posts. T h e Catholic newspaper, 
Kinyamateka, which had been published in Kinyarwanda since 1933, 
became their mouthpiece after Grégoire Kayibanda (Hutu) succeeded 
Alexis K a g a m e (Tutsi) as editor-in-chief in 1957. H e made 'Hamitic neo-
feudalism' his favourite target. In March 1957, shortly before the arrival 
of the U N 'visiting mission', nine H u t u intellectuals published a forceful 
and widely noticed Manifesto of the Bahutu, Note on the social aspect of 
the indigenous racial problem in Ruanda.60 Its content, which was hostile 
to the 'political, economic, social and cultural monopoly of the Tutsi' and 
favourable to the 'genuine advancement of the Bahutu', supplied the 
ideology of the parties then coming into being, A P R O S O M A (Association 
for the Social Promotion of the Masses) and P A R M E H U T U (Party of 
the Hutu Emancipation Movement) . T h e Tutsi reacted by clinging on to 
their privileges, which gave rise to the very serious clashes that took place 
in November 1959, sparked off by the Hutu (with 200-270 killed, over 
1200 arrests and some 7000 other disaster victims). These ethnic tensions 
were no less real in Burundi but did not there erupt into violence. 
T h e political parties, founded from 1958 onwards, were formed along 
ideological rather than ethnic lines. This at least is what was overtly 
suggested by their names: the Party of Unity and National Progress 
( U P R O N A , with its motto ' G o d , King, Burundi'), the Association of 
Burundi Democratic Progressives, the Rural Democratic Party, and the 
African National Union of Ruanda-Urundi, founded by expatriates 
returning from Tanganyika and modelled on T A N U . 
It was not until 10 November 1959 that the Belgian government, 
affected by events in the Congo, specified the stages which were to lead 
the two trust territories to emancipation.6' Far from easing the tension, 
this statement by the Belgian government merely whipped up passions 
59. R . Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 118-96 and 324-42. 
60. This group was coordinated by Grégoire Kayibanda. For the text of the Manifesto 
and a full list of its authors, see Ruanda Politique, içs8-iç6o, i960, pp. 20-9. T h e 
expression 'Hamitic neo-feudalism', very m u c h in vogue at the time, was popularized by 
the sociologist Jacques Maquet. 
61. Rwanda and Burundi, 1 July 1962. 
212 
Equatorial West Africa
in Rwanda. The period from November 1959 to July 1962 was marked
by very serious clashes, particularly at the time of the June i960 and
August 1 96 1 elections, each leaving scores of dead and driving thousands
into exile. An additional complication came from the Belgian government,
which, breaking with its traditional policy, started systematically backing
the Hutu, while the United Nations was torn between these contradictory
positions. The local government elections of June-July i960 were a
triumph for the Hutu (with 2390 seats out of 3125 for PARMEHUTU
and 233 for APROSOMA) and a crushing defeat for the Tutsi RADER
Party (Rassemblement démocratique mandais, 209) and UÑAR (Union
nationale ruandaise). The government formed in the following October
reflected that ratio with six Hutu and two Belgian ministers out of the
total of eight). On 20 January 1961, the Belgian government, prompted
by the United Nations General Assembly, decided to postpone indefinitely
the elections scheduled for 28 January. The people's response was the
'Gitarama coup d'Etat1 carried out on that same 28 January: the elected
communal representatives, accompanied by some 25000 people, met at
Gitarama and proclaimed the deposition of Mwami Kigeri V (who had
already left Rwanda in May i960), the establishment of the republic, the
i
plate 8.1 Mwami Kigeri V, the last king ofRwanda
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immediate election of a government and a head of state, and the adoption 
of a constitution. T h e general elections, which were held in September 
1961 under U N supervision, subsequently legitimized the coup d'Etat. 
U p o n independence, R w a n d a separated from Burundi, where the Belgian 
government was glad indeed not to have to contend with ethnic tensions. 
This did not prevent the administrators on the spot from increasingly 
engaging in delaying tactics. At the local government elections in i960, 
for example, U P R O N A , which was feared for its uncompromising 
nationalism, was in all probability sabotaged and w o n 19 per cent of the 
seats. But it w o n a sweeping victory in the general parliamentary elections 
of September 1961 (with 56 seats out of 62) held under U N supervision. 
Internal autonomy was granted by the Belgians in December 1961 and a 
United Nations commission prepared the way for independence but did 
not succeed in preserving the union between R w a n d a and Burundi, which 
had been desired by the U N but was unanimously rejected by the 
governments of the countries concerned. 
In the Congo, once the violent uprisings of the immediate post-war 
period were over, the need to become organized was felt still more acutely. 
But political parties were still banned. T h e Congolese consequently 
adopted two specific forms of organization which were to have lasting 
effects on the country's political and social future: the associations of 
former pupils and the traditional societies. Those associations, already 
long established, such as A D A P E S (Association des anciens élèves des Pères 
de Scheut), A S S A N E F (Association des anciens élèves des Frères des écoles 
chrétiennes) or the Cercle Saint-Benoît of Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), 
then entered their golden age: the young Congolese élites, thus kept 
under the constant patronage of the missionaries, contracted the very bad 
habit of approaching the consideration of society — and later of policy -
by proxy, handing the whole business over to obliging advisers. T h e 
colonial authorities also tolerated the existence of ethnic cultural associ-
ations, which were essentially inoffensive to them since their membership 
was limited and they maintained or accentuated divisions among the 
Congolese. N e w associations of this kind included A B A K O (Association 
des Bakongo) and the Lulua-Frères. Colonial practice nevertheless ran into 
serious difficulties from about 1955 onwards, when the secular policy of 
the n e w minister for the colonies, Auguste Buisseret, broke the alliance 
between state and Church, causing the latter to criticize the colonial 
undertaking, albeit in moderate terms. T h e language dispute between 
Flemings and Walloons also spread to the Congo and so brought the 
divisions among the colonizers to public notice. 
T h e African élites nevertheless continued to believe in the colonialist 
ideology and, in particular, in the doctrine, still formulated as a promise, 
of Belgian-Congolese community, as can be seen from the book written 
by Patrice L u m u m b a at that time, Le Congo terre d'avenir est-il menacé} 
(Is the Congo, land of the future, threatened?). It was a relatively obscure 
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academic, Professor A . A . J. Van Bilsen, w h o , no doubt involuntarily, set 
the debate going again and prompted some Africans to adopt radical 
positions, by publishing the very soon famous Plan de trente ans pour 
l'émancipation politique de l'Afrique belge (Thirty-year plan for the political 
emancipation of Belgian Africa) in December 1955-January 1956.62 T h e 
Congolese immediately responded by two manifestos: that of the Catholic 
group, Conscience africaine, which accepted the statement of the problem 
and the timetable set out in the Plan; and that of A B A K O , from then 
on led by the former seminarist Joseph Kasavubu, which bluntly concluded 
that 'Since the time has come, emancipation must be granted forthwith 
rather than delayed for another thirty years'.63 T h e colonial government 
m a d e the concession of organizing local elections in December 1957 in 
the major cities. But by skilfully imposing restrictions on these elections 
in the indigenous districts, it saw that the Congolese were left engaged 
in a profitless debate in which they had to fight a m o n g themselves and 
not against the colonizers, the effect of which was to accentuate ethnic 
divisions. Political parties nevertheless began to emerge on that occasion. 
In October 1958, Patrice L u m u m b a founded the Mouvement national 
congolais ( M N C ) , which was the only major party that had a truly national 
base. A m o n g the people at large, the social crisis, which had been 
simmering since the situation drastically worsened about 1957, exploded 
in the insurrection of the African quarters of Léopoldville (Kinshasa), 4 -
7 January 1959. Despite the severe repression, colonial rule collapsed. 
T h e Belgian authorities, w h o had never seriously contemplated de-
colonizing their empire, hastily improvised and pushed through the 
emancipation of the Belgian Congo. A 'round-table' conference held in 
Brussels in January i960 set the date of independence at 30 June of that 
same year. T h e Congolese élites were nevertheless sharply divided on 
m a n y points: less on the future structure of society than on the form of 
the state and the policy line of the regime. O n these bases - and largely 
without regard for the people's aspirations — regionalists and nationalists, 
federalists and unitarians, moderates and radicals confronted one another. 
T h e solution adopted, a shaky compromise, did no more than temporarily 
stave off major conflicts. T h e head of state, Joseph Kasavubu, represented 
the regionalist, federalist and moderate trends, while the head of the 
government, Patrice L u m u m b a , embodied the nationalistic, unitarian, 
radical and pan-African aspirations. T h e inevitable conflict broke out 
immediately after independence, giving rise to frustration a m o n g the 
people at large and a very long civil war. 
In Cameroon and Angola, wars of liberation brought h o m e to the 
colonial powers the necessity of granting independence. 
T h e U P C {Union des populations du Cameroun) incited and spearheaded 
62. T h e text of the Plan can be found in A . A . J. Van Bilsen, n.d., pp. 164-202. 
63. These two manifestos are reproduced in Congo igsç, pp. 9-21. 
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plate 8.2 From left to right: Joseph Kasavubu, president of Congo, Prime Minister. Patrice
Lumumba, and King Baudouin ofBelgium, in Léopoldville, Congo, June i960
plate 8.3 Three of the leaders of the UPC (Union des populations du Cameroun): from left
to right, Ernest Ouandiê, Félix Roland Moumié and Abel Kingue
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the national struggle in Cameroon . 4 T h e French administration was 
unsuccessful in its efforts to encourage the emergence of rival formations, 
which were both short-lived: a Bloc démocratique camerounais, holding 
Christian-Democrat views, founded in 1951, and a Union socialiste came-
rounaise, which came into being in 1953. T h e U P C was a front rather 
than a monolithic party, as regards both its membership (intellectuals, 
trades-unionists, downtrodden workers in the towns, poor farmers from 
the Sanaga region, well-to-do Bamileke planters and shop-keepers) and 
its ideology, since the doctrine of its founder, Urn Nyobe, was mainly 
nationalistic, while that of Félix M o u m i é and Ernest Ouandié was Marxist-
inspired.65 T h e party was also able to broaden its following through its 
close links with the Union des syndicats confédérés, close to the French 
Confédération générale du travail ( C G T ) , and its o w n 'mass organizations', 
the Union des femmes du Cameroun ( U D F C ) and the Jeunesses démocratiques 
du Cameroun ( J D C ) in particular. T h e setbacks suffered by French 
colonialism in 1954, with the defeat at Dien-Bien-Phu and the outbreak 
of the Algerian revolution, prompted the U P C to launch a vast offensive 
the following year, which culminated in the 'bloody week' of 22-30 M a y 
1955. T h e repression was severe, the number of dead being put officially 
at 25, though in fact five times as many were killed. T h e U P C and its 
subsidiary organizations were dissolved,66 but they continued none-the-
less, with Urn N y o b e taking to the bush 'like M a o Tse-tung and H o Chi 
M i n h ' , while Félix M o u m i é was active in arousing international opinion. 
T h e small moderate parties that the legal action of the U P C had prevented 
from developing took advantage of its dissolution, winning the 1956 
elections, which the U P C had called upon people to boycott. Cameroon, 
which was promoted to the status of an 'autonomous republic under 
trusteeship' in 1957, then had a government headed by Mbida with 
A h m a d o u Ahidjo as vice-president. In the same year, Ahidjo founded the 
Union camerounaise, to which several regional parties rallied but which 
kept its hard core in the north, from which he came. T h e U P C , which 
had been pronounced dead, sharply reminded people of its existence by 
launching a fresh insurrection in September 1957, first in the Sanaga 
coastal area and subsequently in the Bamileke region. France was called 
upon to intervene and 11 months of 'pacification' were needed before 
Urn Nyobe was arrested and executed. T h e security situation then seemed 
good enough for a proclamation of independence (1 January i960). But 
64. R . A . Joseph, 1977, pp. 171-331; see also J. F. Bayait, 1979, pp. 54-108, and 
M o n g o Beti, 1972. 
65. After the break between the R D A and the French Communist Party in October 
1950, relations between the U P C and the R D A became purely nominal. However, the 
U P C was not excluded from the R D A until 2 July 1955, at the meeting of the R D A 
Coordinating Committee. See R . A . Joseph, 1977, pp. 186-8 and 190-2. 
66. T h e R D A also took the opportunity to repudiate the U P C and break all ties with 
it. 
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the U P C ' s underground resistance groups were still active in the Bamileke 
region, and attacks even took place frequently in Douala and Yaounde. 
Furthermore, the legal opposition was active, since the new constitution, 
put to a referendum, was accepted by 800000 voters but rejected by 
another 530 000. It took the intervention of five French battalions, the 
assassination of Félix M o u m i é in i960, and a plot discovered at just the 
right time in 1962, to reduce the underground resistance and get rid of 
the legal opposition. But the end of the civil war was not proclaimed 
until 1972 and the compulsory pass for travel between towns was abolished 
only in 1975. Meanwhile the reunification with the southern part of the 
British Cameroons had taken place. T h e Cameroon National Democratic 
Party of John N g u Foncha w o n the 1959 elections in the south of the 
British territory and got the United Nations to organize a referendum in 
February 1961 throughout the British trust territory. T h e north then 
voted to unite with Nigeria while the south opted for reunification with 
the former French Cameroons. This was made official by the constitution 
of 1 October 1961 establishing the Federal Republic of Cameroon.67 
In Angola, the post-war movements were quickly muzzled: the news-
paper Mensagem, with its highly nationalistic motto 'Vamos descubrir 
Angola' ('Let us discover Angola'), was banned, along with the 
A N A G O L A , which published it, and the other cultural and political 
associations. In Portugal itself, however, a number of young intellectuals, 
m a n y of them close to the Communist Party, such as Mario de Andrade, 
Francisco Tenreiro and Agostinho Neto, kept the nationalist flame alive. 
These various underground groups gradually grew into true political 
parties: the U P N A (Union of the Peoples of North Angola), founded in 
1954, subsequently becoming the U P A (Union of the Angolan Peoples) 
and later the F L N A (National Liberation Front of Angola); the M P L A 
(People's Liberation Movement of Angola), set up in 1956 by activists, 
m a n y of w h o m came from the Angolan Communist Party and from the 
Party of the Struggle of the Africans of Angola.68 T h e first serious 
disturbances broke out in 1959 and i960, following the convulsions of 
the emancipation process in the Belgian Congo, where many Angolan 
emigrants or exiles were living. T h e very violent repression resulted in 
mass arrests, admirably described in the fine short story by Luandino 
Vieira, The True Life of Domingo Xavier. In 1961, rebellion erupted in 
several places: at Luanda on 4 February; at the Congo (Zaire) border in 
the north on 5 March; and in the Baixa de Cassange at about the same 
67. T . Eyongetah and R . Brain, 1974, pp. 128-66. 
68. As they were clandestine, the number of these parties, apparently large, is uncertain 
and their early history m u c h disputed; see, for example, J. M a r c u m , 1969, pp. 27-30 for 
the M P L A , and R . Pélissier, 1978, pp. 259-96 for the F N L A and the 'ethnic-nationalist' 
groups. J. M a r c u m (pp. 347-9) gives a deliberately incomplete but representative and 
clear table of the main nationalist movements between 1944 and 1962. 
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time. T h e Portuguese reacted with extreme violence and their repression 
left a great many victims: between 30000 and 50000 dead, and 150000-
200000 Angolans, mostly from the north-west (Bakongo), forced into 
exile in the Congo (now Zaire) in the space of a few months.69 Following 
this setback the military front became stabilized: while the Portuguese 
army was getting bogged down in the economically and financially 
ruinous70 repression of an interminable guerrilla war, the differences 
between the nationalist movements grew and were even brought out into 
the open for all to see. Despite the growing support for Portugal from 
its N A T O allies,71 however, this war, added to those in Guinea-Bissau 
and Mozambique, eventually undermined the Portuguese economy and 
Portuguese society and created a political malaise which exploded into 
the bloodless coup of 25 April 1974, 'the Revolution of the Carnations'. 
This broke the stalemate, since the A r m e d Forces Movement , n o w 
wielding power in Portugal, was determined to speed up the process of 
decolonization. 
A m o n g the Portuguese imperial possessions, however, the case of 
Angola was particularly complex. W h a t was to be done about the 335 000 
Portuguese, including some 172 000 colonists, a third of w h o m had been 
born in the colony and for w h o m the Portuguese economy, far less 
advanced than those of its European neighbours, could not provide jobs? 
T o which African movement should power be transferred? T h e three that 
existed were deeply divided and the differences in their membership, 
sociological composition and ideological standpoints were compounded 
by ethnic tensions. Led by the lower middle classes of the towns, the 
F L N A and U N I T A (National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola, founded in 1966 by F L N A dissidents) had gained a footing 
mainly in rural areas and along distinctly ethnic lines, the former appearing 
as the spokesman of the Kongo and the latter as that of the Ovimbundu. 
With its m u c h broader social coverage and firmer roots in the towns, the 
M P L A alone had a national base. Furthermore, the country's resources 
in agriculture, mining and oil - the latter concentrated in Cabinda and 
the source of a strong local identity - aroused the cupidity of the great 
powers. It was only on 15 January 1975 that the Alvor Agreement, signed 
between the three movements and the Portuguese government, fixed the 
date for independence.72 But disagreements immediately re-emerged. 
From February to July 1975, the 'Battle for Luanda', w o n by the M P L A , 
enabled the M P L A to drive its rivals out of the capital. Independence 
69. For a full account, see R . Pelissier, 1978, pp. 301-664. 
70. See M . de Andrade and M . Ollivier, 1971. 
71. J. M a r c u m , 1969, pp. 181-90; M . de Andrade and M . Ollivier, 1971, pp. 93-122. 
72. 11 November 1975 — i.e. at roughly the same time as Mozambique (25 June 1975) 
and Sao T o m e and Principe (12 July 1975), but later than Guinea-Bissau (24 September 
1973)-
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was proclaimed on the scheduled date, but in the greatest confusion - at 
Luanda by the M P L A and at H u a m b o by the F L N A and U N I T A . Civil 
war took over from the war of liberation. T h e O A U , which was divided 
(22 voting in favour of the M P L A and 22 against, with Ethiopia and 
Uganda abstaining), was a passive spectator of the fratricidal struggle. 
After a series of military successes (January-March 1976), the M P L A 
made the People's Republic of Angola a member of the O A U (11 February 
1976) and of the United Nations (November 1976). But several regions 
were still outside the control of the central authorities. 
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T h e struggle for 
political sovereignty in 
Eastern Africa, 1945 
to independence 
Michael T W A D D L E in collaboration with 
Lucile R A B E A R I M A N A N A and 
Isaria N . K I M A M B O 
'Eastern Africa' for the purposes of this chapter includes not only the 
former British-ruled colonies of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania (then the 
separate territories of Tanganyika and Zanzibar), Malawi (then Nyasaland), 
and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia), but the great island of Madagascar 
previously administered by France along with the Comoro Islands and 
Reunion, and also the islands of Mauritius and the Seychelles formerly 
governed by Britain. During the Second World W a r , Kenya became the 
centre of Britain's East African empire, especially after the fall of Singapore 
to the Japanese, and differences between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' 
increased dramatically as the country's importance as a source of raw 
materials and food for Britain's wartime effort increased. These growing 
internal differences were to be a crucial cause of the single most important 
example of anti-colonial insurgency to erupt anywhere in tropical Africa 
against British colonial rule: the M a u M a u rebellion. But five years before 
that particular rebellion broke, the French colonial presence on the great 
island of Madagascar suffered a shock - also intimately influenced by the 
global crisis of the Second World W a r - in the shape of the insurrection 
of M a r c h 1947. 
Madagascar1 
There had been organized resistance in Madagascar to French colonization 
from its very beginning, and some southern areas of Madagascar did not 
lay d o w n their arms until some ten years later. Before the First World 
W a r a secret nationalist society was founded in Tananarive, the Vi Vato 
1. This section is based upon an initial draft by M . Twaddle, one based upon original 
research by L . Rabearimanana, and a final precis and revision by M . Twaddle: the views 
expressed are essentially those of L . Rabearimanana. T h e section depends primarily upon 
J. Tronchon, 1983; L . Rabearimanana, 1980a and 1980b; R . Litauen, 1975; C . Cadoux, 
1969; P. Boiteau, 1982; A . Spacensky, 1970; and R . W . Rabemananjara, 1952. 
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Sakelika or W S , the Malagasy initials for 'iron-rock-greenstem'.2 In the 
inter-war period, the national movement concerned itself mainly with 
demanding equality of rights between Malagasy subjects and French 
citizens. T h e French were prepared to offer full citizenship rights to 
selected Malagasies m u c h more generously than was then customary in 
neighbouring British colonies on the African mainland. However, as the 
survival of W S and its transformation after the Second World W a r along 
with other secret associations into something politically m u c h more serious 
indicates, while French assimilative policy succeeded temporarily in 
creating a pliable Malagasy collaborating élite, as a long-term strategy it 
failed. Indeed, French colonialism in Madagascar stimulated cultural 
nationalism amongst the indigenous people paralleled in intensity in 
British-ruled areas on the African mainland perhaps only amongst M a u 
M a u insurgents in Kenya. But the French were not working purely by 
themselves in this endeavour; they were unwittingly building upon the 
earlier cultural renaissance of nineteenth-century Madagascar discussed 
in Chapter 10 of Volume VII. It was the Second World W a r , however, 
that enabled élite nationalism in Madagascar to fuse with mass discontent. 
This happened for several reasons. Global war was a traumatic experi-
ence affecting all European colonies in Africa, but on Madagascar the 
traumas of war were further radicalized by the indignities of defeat. In 
1940 the French administration there declared for Vichy, and immediately 
Madagascar became a target for the British and the Free French. In 1942 
the great island was successfully invaded and, while governor-generalship 
of Madagascar was handed over to a Gaullist nominee, the British in fact 
remained on Madagascar until 1946. This was deeply damaging to French 
colonial prestige. Amongst ordinary islanders, post-Vichy rhetoric also 
clashed with the hard facts of post-Vichy life. All European colonies in 
Africa suffered from shortages of imported goods during the Second 
World W a r and the consequent inflation, and Madagascar's position as 
an occupied island after 1942 created further problems of foreign exchange. 
In 1943-4 there was a serious famine. T h e price of rice, the staple food, 
went sky-high. T h e Office du Riz became extremely unpopular, some 
farmers paying enormous prices to buy back food they themselves had 
grown and earlier sold at lower prices. While there was m u c h talk about 
a better deal for colonies after the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the 
Brazzaville Conference of 1944, it was easy for nationalist leaders on the 
great island to argue persuasively after the war that 'colonization was 
simply exploitation'.3 
2. Vi vato: i.e. iron and stone, symbols of the purity and steadfastness desired for the 
organization by its founders, combined with the fact that the society is divided into 
sakelika, i.e. branch or section: thus the acronym W S . See U N E S C O , General History 
of Africa, vol. VII, pp. 221-48. 
3. Quoted by J. Tronchon, 1983, p. 125. 
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Admittedly, immediately after the war the hated indigénat system of 
forced labour was abolished, and political representation in Paris accorded 
to Madagascar along with other French colonies. In this the French were 
far more generous than their British counterparts in Eastern Africa (it is 
difficult to conceive of J o m o Kenyatta, for example, being elected to 
London at this time as a parliamentary representative for Kenya!). 
However, while prepared to go further within the more generous traditions 
of a Greater France, there was a point beyond which metropolitan 
Frenchmen became exceedingly intransigent compared with British - the 
point of total independence, which the British had already accepted. A n d 
it was independence which Malagasy delegates to the French parliament 
demanded after the Second World W a r . T h e Saintenay-Ho Chi M i n h 
Accord of March 1946, which 'recognized the Democratic Vietnam 
Republic as a free state, having its o w n government, parliament, army 
and finances, as part of the Federation of Indo-China within the French 
Union', prompted the two Malagasy deputies to Paris also to table a bill 
making Madagascar into 'a free state', having its o w n government, 
parliament, army and finances, within the French Union.4 T h e bill was 
immediately attacked as 'anti-constitutional' and lost during the dis-
solution of the first constituent assembly. But it was a precedent. It was 
also an example of French intransigence which convinced m a n y Malagasy 
nationalists that all the reforms of the immediate post-war period were 
really a fraud, a mere 'patching-up' {^replâtrage') of earlier French col-
onialism.5 
T h e local context and the international situation following the Second 
World W a r therefore led to a decisive stepping-up of nationalist demands, 
and from 1945 until i960 the nationalists campaigned for independence. 
This ambition was not confined to the politicians of Tananarive or other 
cities but spread into the heart of the country and the coastal regions and 
was shared by both upper- and lower-income groups. Above all, it found 
expression in a political party: the Mouvement démocratique pour la 
rénovation malgache ( M D R M ) . 
T h e M D R M had come into being in Paris in February 1946, under 
the leadership of the two deputies elected to the French National Assembly 
in 1945 by the second electoral college - that is, by the indigenous voters 
in Madagascar, voting rights being dependent upon a property qualification 
at this time. Nonetheless, the M D R M spread rapidly throughout M a d -
agascar in urban and rural areas and a m o n g all social classes. Its success 
was principally due to its programme being presented as immediately 
realizable. However, a rift developed gradually between the rank-and-file 
and the M D R M leadership as the deputies started talking about a 'free 
4. N . Heseltine, 1971, p. 174; J. Tronchon, 1983," p. 127. 
5. J. Tronchon, 1983, p. 12% K L'Union française n'était donc qu'un "replâtrage" de l'empire 
colonial français'. 
223 
Africa since IÇ35 
state' within the French Union, as already noted. This caused some 
M D R M militants to join secret societies - the J I N Y 6 and the Malagasy 
national party ( P A N A M A ) . These were organized by the nationalists w h o 
were convinced that France would not easily grant independence, thereby 
making its achievement by force inevitable. Nevertheless, this did not 
prevent the M D R M from achieving increasing electoral success through-
out the island, which caused concern to the leading figures in the coastal 
areas attached to France and to the existing regime. In July 1946 they 
founded the Parti des déshérités de Madagascar ( P A D E S M ) . 
T h e P A D E S M drew its members from the leading citizens of the 
coastal areas and it opposed the M D R M most vigorously. It deliberately 
identified the M D R M with the Hova, in other words with most of the 
people living closest to Tananarive, and m a d e its appeal to the seventeen 
other ethnic groups of Madagascar, excluding the Hova. It recruited 
members on an ethnic basis. T h e French administration, worried about 
the rise of Malagasy nationalism in its M D R M form, m a d e haste to give 
its active support to the P A D E S M . 
In late 1946, following the election of three deputies to the legislative 
assembly, all of w h o m were from the M D R M , measures began to be 
taken against the party. Newspapers were curtailed. M D R M members 
and leaders were arrested on the flimsiest excuses. Also throwing them-
selves into the fray, French settlers in the coastal areas ill-treated workers 
belonging to the M D R M and had no scruples about harassing its local 
leaders. T h e provincial elections of January-February 1947 thus took 
place in an explosive atmosphere. Tension was further increased by the 
colonial authorities' interference in the proceedings. Nonetheless, despite 
this, most of the elected provincial councillors came from the M D R M . 
Conflicts between differing shades of political opinion became fiercer. 
Rumours of an imminent uprising abounded. W h e n it actually occurred, 
on 29 March 1947, the French authorities and the Malagasy people in 
general were only half surprised. 
O n 29 March uprisings occurred in the eastern part of the island, in 
Moremanga, Manakara and elsewhere. However, in cities like Tananarive, 
Fianarantsoa and Diego Suarez the movement was ineffectual. But in the 
eastern upland region insurrection spread rapidly, the rebels continuing 
to gain ground until July 1947 and controlling a large part of the Tanala 
and Bezzabozano area. However, because of difficulties of communication 
between them and the fact that they were surrounded, the insurgents 
were forced into a more defensive position after August. T h e uprising 
was only finally suppressed by French colonial troops in November 1948, 
well over a year later. 
6. T h e Jiny is a night bird. T h e fact that its n a m e was given to a secret society founded 
during the war clearly indicates a determination to escape surveillance by the French 
authorities. 
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There were m a n y reasons for the uprising in Madagascar in 1947, 
a m o n g them the experiences of wartime which not only increased trie 
sufferings of the people but also persuaded Malagasy nationalists that 
independence could be demanded and obtained for the island with 
foreign (especially British and American) help.7 T h e principal explanation, 
however, was the unstoppable growth of the desire for independence 
amongst an ever-increasing number of Malagasy people after the Second 
World W a r , and their membership of the M D R M . 
T h e political success achieved by this political party, and the uneasiness 
its success aroused in French colonial officials were such that, at the start 
of the insurrection, French officials declared that the M D R M was behind 
it. This belief was also shared by the French settlers and the P A D E S M . 
T h e inhabitants of the Tananarive area, the Hova , too were attacked as 
being behind the insurrection; only the Hova really wanted independence, 
so it was believed, and the insurgency in the coastal areas was simply the 
means by which power was to be seized. This flew in the face of the 
facts, and disregarded the yearning for independence that by n o w was 
widespread amongst Malagasies from every social and ethnic background. 
M a n y white settlers in rural areas n o w took the law into their o w n hands. 
Immediately the insurrection erupted, however, M D R M deputies declared 
that they could not be held responsible for either the preparation or the 
outbreak of unrest. Similarly, nationalist newspapers defended the Hova 
people and pointed out that they had always served the cause of colon-
ization, too. T h e y were also quick to point out h o w attached Malagasies 
were to French culture.8 
A spirit of repression quickly spread throughout Madagascar soon after 
the insurrection began. T h e leaders and even ordinary members of the 
M D R M were arrested, and the party itself was dissolved on 10 M a y 
1947. In addition, all other parties (including the P A D E S M ) were 
proscribed. Court hearings were held throughout the island. T h e Tan-
anarive trial of November 1948, the most notorious of all, resulted in six 
death sentences, two of them for former M D R M deputies Joseph Raseta 
and Joseph Ravoahangy, and several terms of hard labour for life. 
W h o was really behind the insurrection? T h e colonial administration, 
French settlers and the P A D E S M all believed that it was the M D R M . 
M D R M members themselves, and French supporters of the party in 
France, considered the events of 1947-8 to have been due to provocation 
by a colonial administration bent on doing everything it could to get 
rid of that troublesome party. O n the other hand, the view of those 
actually involved in the insurrection, as recorded by the historian Jacques 
7. J. Tronchon dwells at length on the causes of the insurrection. C . Guérin du 
Marteray's unpublished thesis (Nice, 1977) on the longer-term causes of the insurrection 
is also valuable for insight into the severe character of colonial exploitation in Madagascar. 
8. See L . Rabearimanana, 1980a, p. 143. 
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Tronchon, was that it was a genuine nationalist movement that arose out 
of the firm resolve of some Malagasies to throw the French out of 
Madagascar - Malagasies, moreover, w h o were convinced that only armed 
struggle would enable them to achieve this end. 
It is commonly held that Malagasy nationalism was stamped out by 
this colonialist repression, which caused the death of close to 100 000 
Malagasies,9 but this is untrue. T h e insurrection of 1947 was a bitter 
failure, but Malagasy nationalists did not give in. Even between 1948 and 
1956, a period w h e n repression was especially harsh, the ambition to 
achieve independence persisted and found expression principally in news-
paper articles published in the capital. They demanded, not only that the 
country should be granted the desired status, but also that an amnesty 
should be declared for the numerous victims of post-insurrection 
repression. 
Those demanding the status of 'free state' were few in the immediate 
aftermath of the insurrection, but as the local political situation became 
calmer and the French regime less repressive an increasing number of 
Malagasies supported it. France's setbacks elsewhere within the French 
Union - in Vietnam and North Africa especially - also contributed to 
renewed boldness by Malagasy nationalists. T h e most spectacular support 
n o w given to Malagasy nationalism was undoubtedly that of the R o m a n 
Catholic hierarchy, which in November 1953 officially recognized the 
legitimacy of popular demands for independence. This declaration was 
followed by direct support for the nationalist movement , given to the 
moderate wing of it so as to frustrate its communist sympathizers. 
Increasingly thereafter the nationalist movement followed a haphazard 
course. There was no single unifying organization. Politicians were divided 
more by personal rivalries than by ideological differences. However, in 
1956 the situation changed again as an outcome of the war in Vietnam, 
the beginnings of the national liberation struggle in Algeria, the influence 
of the 1955 Bandung Conference, and the coming to power of a socialist 
government in France. It was after the 'framework law', passed as a result 
of these influences, that a number of differing political parties were 
founded locally. 
Prominent a m o n g the moderate parties founded at this time was the 
Parti social démocrate (PSD) , established in Majunga in December 1956 
by Philibert Tsiranana and André Resampa. It spread first to the western 
and northern parts of Madagascar and soon had sections all over the 
island thanks to the goodwill of a colonial administration ready to help a 
left-wing offshoot of the P A D E S M and the satisfaction with the insti-
tutional changes introduced by the 'framework law'. There was also 
Antoine Zafimahova's Union démocrate et sociale de Madagascar ( U D S M ) 
9. This is the figure given by High Commissioner de Chevigne at a press conference 
in 1949. 
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whose following was in the south-east and the Fianarantsoa area. It was 
a party with very moderate political demands, mostly concerned with the 
social measures needed in coastal areas. 
Between 1956 and i960 there was a broad political spectrum in 
Madagascar. This m a d e inter-party rivalry more violent, and election 
campaigns more heated. T h e formation of the Rev. R . Andrianamanjato's 
A K F M (Ankotonny Kongreiny Fahaleovantenan Madagasikara) in 1958 as 
one of the most radical parties increased the inter-party militancy of the 
period.10 T h e local colonial authorities constantly said that they had no 
intention of interfering in elections, but nonetheless irregularities were 
widely committed by lower-level French officials, while those thinking of 
voting communist were threatened with excommunication. Nationalists 
nonetheless w o n a majority of seats in a few places such as Tananarive, 
Tamatave, Diego Suarez and Talear. At the provincial elections in March 
1957, however, they lost ground. Responsibility for this can unquestionably 
be attributed to the French colonial administration, religious authorities 
and white settlers; but disunity amongst nationalists themselves also 
contributed to their downfall. 
W h e n General de Gaulle organized a referendum on continued m e m -
bership of the French Communi ty in September 1958, the 'ayes' tri-
umphed in Madagascar. T h e 'nays' were in a majority in the capital and 
well-represented in Tamatave and Diego Suarez also, but the pressure 
brought to bear by the French administration and moderate politicians 
was so great that the advocates of complete independence from France 
were defeated. In June i960, w h e n Madagascar finally became inde-
pendent, the party which gained most from it was the Parti social démocrate 
of Philibert Tsiranana. Those w h o had fought for complete independence 
from France earlier n o w found themselves in the parties of opposition, 
amongst them the Parti du congrès de l'indépendance11 and the Mouvement 
national pour l'indépendance de Madagascar.12 
T o evaluate fully the struggle for political sovereignty in Madagascar 
requires a more detailed picture within which not only the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of Malagasy nationalism and French colonialism 
m a y be examined adequately, but also one within which their successive 
interactions m a y be analysed intelligently. Here, despite some useful 
work,13 m u c h further research needs to be undertaken in Madagascar as 
10. In the inter-war period, the A K F M had been associated with the Communist Party 
in France, and during the Second World W a r both parties were suppressed. T h e 1958 
A K F M , though radical, tried to avoid being called a Marxist party. See V . M . Thompson 
and R . Adloff, 1965, p. 87 and p. 105. 
11. This party is commonly called A K F M after the initials of its Malagasy name. 
12. This party was founded in November 1958 by Monja Jaona. Originally based in 
the south, it subsequently spread throughout the country. 
13. In addition to the sources already cited, there has been research on the Jiny secret 
society, conducted at the University of Tananarive. See also, R . Archer, n.d. 
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well as on the immediately adjacent African mainland and islands. 
Forces for change in British-ruled areas 
Immediately after the Second World W a r , Britain had a Labour govern-
ment committed to sweeping socialist reforms at h o m e as well as change 
in the colonies. Like their socialist and communist counterparts in France 
at this time, the British Labour Party saw no contradiction between these 
two objectives.'4 In retrospect, matters appear differently. T h e sheer scale 
of the economic and social plans for post-war development in East and 
Central Africa have been described by two British historians as amounting 
to a 'second colonial occupation' of the area,'5 and can be seen to have 
had a far more disruptive effect upon the stability of British colonial rule 
there than the token representation of one or two Africans in local 
legislative assemblies of which British politicians m a d e so m u c h at the 
time. For, while the British in East and Central Africa did not have the 
problems of defeat and loss of prestige to cope with that the French 
encountered in Madagascar, they too had problems of economic dev-
astation at h o m e as a consequence of the Second World W a r . East and 
Central Africa, therefore, had considerable importance for Britain's post-
war economic recovery, in bridging the dollar gap through the sale of 
colonial produce and raw materials on the world market.16 
Uganda17 
Uganda in 1945 differed from Madagascar in several ways. Besides being 
a land-locked territory rather than an island, it was governed not only by 
a victorious European colonial power but also one whose policy had been 
to preserve rather than to destroy the leading pre-colonial polity within 
its borders, the Buganda kingdom. Uganda and Buganda were of course 
not geographically the same, there being several smaller kingdoms and 
peoples in the western section of the Uganda Protectorate, not to mention 
the m a n y kingless societies in the north and east of the territory. But the 
British in Uganda had based their rule upon Buganda, recognizing its 
quasi-autonomy and introducing an unusual form of quasi-freehold land 
tenure through the Uganda Agreement of 1900, and they based their 
administration of m a n y other areas of the Uganda Protectorate upon 
Buganda intermediaries. 
Ugandan nationalism as it developed in reaction to British colonialism 
had therefore what seemed to be a contradictory character, sometimes 
14. See D . Goldsworthy, 1971. 
15. D . A . L o w and J. M . Lonsdale, 1976, p. 12. 
16. See M . Cowen, 1984, pp. 63^75. 
17. C . Gertzel, 1976, provides fuller narrative and references. 
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identifying with the greater glory and autonomy of the Buganda kingdom, 
at other times reflecting the multifarious grievances of ethnic groups 
occupying other areas of the British protectorate. Wartime rhetoric about 
defending the rights of oppressed nationalities in Europe, like the Poles, 
served to enhance the force of these ethnic demands for a status comparable 
to Buganda. But the greatest impact of the Second World W a r upon 
Uganda probably lay less in the ideological fillip given to local cultural 
nationalism than in the more obviously material grievances to which 
global conflict gave rise in both urban and rural areas. 
T o understand fully these tensions within Uganda in the 1940s, one 
has to take into account the various interest groups which were created 
by the colonial system itself. T h e y reflected the fragmented character of 
the élite - or the petite-bourgeoisie - in Uganda. Its three main fragments 
had particular interests which tended to be in harmony only over the 
short run and, in terms of forming nationalist struggle, also tended to be 
complicated by ethnic and religious divisions. T h e first fragment consisted 
of the civil servants whose main grievance was racial discrimination in 
pay scales when compared with their British and Asian counterparts. T h e 
second group was that of cash-crop farmers w h o were full of resentment 
against cotton-ginners (who were mainly Asians) and state marketing 
boards for creaming off a substantial part of their surplus product. T h e 
diird fragment consisted of the traders w h o were demanding an end to 
state-protected monopoly privileges granted to certain Asian and British 
companies. Over and above these fragments of the petit-bourgeois class, 
were the urban workers w h o were demanding higher pay. All these 
interests coalesced in the historic mass opposition to colonial order in the 
1940s.18 
In January 1945 there were serious riots in several Ugandan towns over 
low wages and rising costs of living caused by wartime inflation. Tensions 
associated with the austerity programme, introduced by the Buganda 
provincial government during the 1930s depression, also led to the 
assassination of its chief minister later in 1945 as well as further c o m -
plicating the riots earlier in the year. T h e British response to these 
disturbances was repression which proved severe enough to arouse wide-
spread sympathy for those detained unjustly, but which was insufficient 
to destroy their political credibility to any serious extent because - unlike 
in Madagascar after the 1947-8 disturbances - these particular political 
detainees were released comparatively speedily. In 1949 m a n y of them 
were associated with further disturbances in the Buganda kingdom, caused 
mainly by excessively low prices paid to local cotton-growers compared 
with those that the British Treasury was benefiting from on the world 
market, and in 1952 m a n y were associated also with the founding of the 
18. For more detailed information, see M . Mamdani, 1976, ch. 7; D . W . Nabudere, 
1980, ch. 8. 
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Uganda National Congress ( U N C ) by Milton Obote and its policy of 
'self-government now'. 
T h e formation of the U N C was the first attempt to create a nationalist 
movement (with mass support) uniting m a n y sections of the élite in 
Uganda. Yet, although leadership came from Buganda, the U N C gained 
strength in regions of Uganda where there was a cash-crop-growing 
peasantry but which had no significant segment of rich farmers (kulak 
formation), such as in Teso, Bukedi, Lango and Acholi. T h e main leaders 
were traders, teachers and civil servants. But in 1955 territorial nationalism 
in Uganda received a paradoxical setback. Andrew Cohen, the new 
socialist governor w h o has been seen by some historians as the architect 
of political independence for Britain's West African colonies,'9 quarrelled 
with the Kabaka of Buganda over the future development of Uganda as 
a unitary state; the Kabaka was deported to Britain; and overnight the 
Kabaka became the hero of anti-colonial resistance in Uganda rather than 
(as during the 1949 riots) one of its local allies. T h e Buganda farming 
élite turned to the U N C in large numbers between 1953 and 1955, when 
the restoration of the Kabaka m a d e the alliance between different interests 
in the U N C disintegrate and gave birth to Kabaka Yekka ('the king 
alone') as the main political organization of Buganda. 
But what kind of nationalist hero was Mutesa II to become — one for 
Uganda as a whole, or only for the Buganda kingdom which had enjoyed 
a specially privileged position within the Uganda Protectorate through 
the 1900 Agreement? T h e Uganda Peoples' Congress ( U P C ) was formed 
partly as successor to the U N C . Although it tried to reunite the nationalist 
forces this aim was never to be achieved. In 1962, when Uganda finally 
attained independence from Britain as a single entity under the prime 
ministership of Milton Obote, it did so under a coalition government 
between the royalist Kabaka Yekka movement and the U P C of Milton 
Obote. T h e U P C had received almost all its electoral support from outside 
Buganda - even before Buganda started electing its o w n M P s to the 
Uganda National Assembly indirectly through the Buganda Lukiko. It 
was an uneasy alliance and in 1966-7 Obote called in the Ugandan armed 
forces to integrate Buganda forcibly into national politics. Before Obote 
agreed to Buganda's demands for indirect elections in 1962, however, 
Uganda had briefly enjoyed a government in 1961-2 under the control 
of the Democratic Party (DP) of Benedicto Kiwanuka. 
T h e formation of the D P can be seen as an attempt to organize certain 
groups which fell outside the existing forums. T h e rich farmers in 
Buganda had successfully organized themselves under the traditionalist 
K Y ; the traders had rallied under the U N C / U P C succession. Other social 
forces at national level that had felt left out were to be mobilized by the 
expansion of D P which had originally started in Buganda using a religious 
19. R . Robinson, 1980, pp. 50-^72. 
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plate 9.1 King Mutesa II, the Kabaka ofBuganda, in exile in London
base. Historically, Catholic chiefs had found themselves with less privileges
in Buganda and, using this religious base, they started the organization.
But the religious ideology was mainly used as a rallying point in trying
to create a rival nationalist movement, attracting civil servants and other
educated élite who found themselves left out of the Protestant-dominated
UPC. DP support came from both inside and outside the Buganda
kingdom in geographical terms. Furthermore, despite its ideological
starting point, the DP may be said to have made a considerable effort in
creating a pan-Ugandan political movement. It has enjoyed considerable
support from trade unions besides the Catholic Church.20 In the final
pre-independence elections of 1962, the DP came second to the KY-
UPC coalition.21 On the whole, however, the rise ofnationalism in Uganda
does display ideological and regional divisions which made it difficult for
20. See S. Karugire, 1980, pp. 144-69; M. Twaddle, 1978, pp. 255-66; and D. A.
Low, 1 97 1.
21. See D. Rothchild and M. Rogin, 1966, pp. 337-440.
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the petite-bourgeoisie to emerge as an integrated and unified class in fighting 
against colonialism, unlike what happened in neighbouring Tanganyika. 
Tanganyika2 2 
If wartime inflation and artificially-low producer prices laid the ground-
work for mass nationalism in U g a n d a after 1945, and ineffectual British 
repression of G a n d a intellectuals thereafter enabled Ganda nationalism to 
first fuse with popular discontent and then fatally divide it along ethnic 
lines, in Tanganyika it was massive intervention by Britain in the 
organization of African agriculture which led to the first widespread local 
protests against British colonial rule. T h e first effect of these protests was 
to encourage the trend D r John Iliffe called 'tribal aggregation'.23 Colonial 
policies had led to socio-economic change that 'accentuated regional 
differentiation and rivalry' a m o n g educated groups for faster development 
within their ethnic areas. A s a result, a number of ethnic-based associations 
were formed which in turn were used to articulate opposition to unpopular 
policies. In some areas the process led to successful demand for paramount 
chiefs to strengthen ethnic unity, as was the case of the Chagga in the 
north-eastern part of the country. But the effect of this ethnic aggregation 
movement was to weaken the territorial organization, the Tanganyika 
African Association ( T A A ) . Having started in the late 1920s as a welfare 
organization of civil servants,24 during the 1930s T A A stimulated the 
formation of provincial branches and, from time to time, the central 
organization was to be strengthened by their vitality. 
In the post-war period, the country-wide protests organized on ethnic 
lines tended to weaken the territorial organization of T A A but, ironically, 
the protests against colonial policies were to become one of the pillars on 
which the territorial organization was to be revitalized and eventually on 
which a strong political party, the Tanganyika African National Union 
( T A N U ) was to be built. T h e revitalization stimulus came from the Lake 
Province, an area of Tanganyika roughly equal to Nyasaland but providing 
approximately half the value of Tanganyika's total agricultural exports. 
In this province, as in m a n y other areas, post-war British reforms in local 
government m a d e it, in one scholar's words, 'easier to impose unwelcome 
agricultural policies from above than for the participation in democratic 
institutions from below'.25 Widespread popular protest erupted in the 
22. This section is based principally upon J. Iliffe, 1979, and R . C . Pratt, 1976. O n 
U T P , see A . Ross, 1977, pp. 519-35 and 1981. 
23. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 487. 
24. See U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, pp. 671-2. 
25. A . Maguire, 1970, p. 643. 
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plate 9.2 Julius K. Nyerere, president ofTANU (the Tanganyika African National Union)
province and the provincial branch of the TAA was quick in taking up
the grievances, thus linking the urban welfare association with articulation
of rural problems. This was the beginning of the transformation of the
TAA into a political movement. The Lake Province branch did three
remarkable things: it penetrated the countryside; it articulated the attack
on the colonial regime, and finally, it demanded strengthening of the
central organization and convening of a national conference. Among
the well-known prominent leaders of this revival were M. Bomani,
B. Munanka and S. Kandoro.
In the central office in Dar es Salaam, the immediate post-war activities
had come from a combined effort of civil servants and educated townsmen
who had fought in Burma during the war. But by late 1952 the momentum
had faded as articulate leaders had been transferred from Dar es Salaam
and the association seemed to have no president and held no meetings. The
Lake Province leaders had even considered transferring the headquarters to
Mwanza. It was at this point that a new leader appeared on the scene to
coordinate the revitalization efforts, and within two years TAA had
transformed itself to a formidable political party which adopted the name
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) on 7 July 1954.
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T A N U took over power from Britain in 1961. Its effective founder, 
apart from the Lakes Province branch, was a teacher from one of the 
smallest ethnic groups in the territory, Julius Nyerere. Returning from 
studies in Britain in 1952, Nyerere has been described as 'racially sensitive' 
at this time - he 'hated foreign rule', John Iliffe tells us, 'feared 
Conservative (Party) complicity with settler ambitions, and knew that 
Africa was moving towards conflict and liberation'.25 It was also his 
achievement to make m a x i m u m use of Tanganyika's international status as 
a trust territory of the United Nations in order to hasten its decolonization. 
In 1946 Britain had been unhappy about the terms under which its 
former mandate in Tanganyika under the League of Nations had been 
transformed into a U N trusteeship territory. Anti-colonialism was already 
a powerful sentiment at the United Nations, and it proved a most effective 
platform upon which Tanganyika grievances could be publicized. T h e 
M e r u land case,27 which involved the removal of about 3000 W a m e r u 
from Engare Nanyuki to give place to European settlers, demonstrated 
this in 1952, but three years later, within a year of the T A A ' s trans-
formation into T A N U , not only had Nyerere's prestige been raised 
considerably by a visit to N e w York but paid-up membership of T A N U 
shot up too. In 1956 Edward Twining, the very unsocialist governor of 
Tanganyika, persuaded most of the unofficial members of the legislative 
council (all of w h o m were of course nominated, not elected, at this time) 
to form a rival political party, the United Tanganyika Party ( U T P ) . But 
the U T P soon faded into Utupu, 'nothingness' in Kiswahili. In September 
i960, T A N U w o n 70 of the 71 seats in the first contest for the legislative 
council in which it was electorally possible for Africans to win a majority. 
Nyerere immediately became chief minister of an internally self-governing 
Tanganyika, and in December 1961 it became the first British dependency 
in East and Central Africa to attain full independence. 
Explanations for the speed with which Tanganyika gained full inde-
pendence - before both Kenya and Uganda - customarily include the 
leadership qualities of Nyerere; the organizational vitality of T A N U 
(originating as a trans-ethnic urban voluntary association and developing 
very differently thereafter from both the Uganda National Congress and 
its various Ugandan successors on the one hand, and all its counterparts 
in Kenya, which basically were all tactical coalitions of ethnically-based 
notables); the absence of major regional cleavages in Tanganyika; its status 
as a U N trust territory; and the dramatic change in the strategic importance 
attached to Tanganyika as well as Kenya w h e n the Suez imbroglio of 
1956 led Britain to reappraise very radically its defence commitments east 
of Suez. In other words, a mixture of local nationalist assertion and 
conscious political disengagement on the British side, customarily serve 
26. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 509. 
27. See ibid., p. 500; K . Japhet and S . Japhet, 1967. 
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as explanation for Tanganyikan independence, scholars differing only over 
the precise balance of factors within differing paradigms. Nonetheless, 
whatever particular framework of interpretation is adopted, crucially 
important too in speeding up the British retreat from formal empire 
throughout East and Central Africa was the M a u M a u rebellion in Kenya. 
Kenya28 
Unlike the French in Madagascar, the British in Kenya at the close of 
the Second World W a r did not feel at all insecure. T h e y had w o n the 
war. There were therefore to be no unnecessary political reforms in 
Kenya. Admittedly, there was to be token African representation in the 
Kenya Legislative Council - of Eliud M a t h u from 1944, the first African 
to be nominated to Legco anywhere in British-ruled East and Central 
Africa; but there was to be no idea whatsoever of telling white settlers 
h o w to behave as regards labour recruitment (the outlawing of the indigenat 
recruitment system, by contrast, sharpened settler attacks upon the 
M D R M in Madagascar). T o be sure, development was in the air, and 
the British administration in Kenya did have considerable plans for 
improvements in African agriculture, but the white settlers were expected 
to help with this rather than have their o w n ways unduly disturbed. 
Indeed, the white settlers of Kenya had never had it so good. Besides 
producer prices boosted by Kenya's wartime role as supplier to the Middle 
East as well as to troops nearer to hand, Nairobi had been the nodal point 
of production and distribution throughout Britain's East African empire 
and white settlers were entrenched in innumerable committees. So power-
ful indeed did white settlers seem to be in post-war Kenya that Sessional 
Paper 210, which increased unofficial representation in the Kenyan Legco 
by providing for the election of an additional m e m b e r by the whole 
council, became symbolic with élite Africans of a scheme to give Europeans 
a permanent working majority there. 
Shortly after the M a u M a u emergency itself was declared in October 
1952, the Kenya African Union ( K A U ) wrote to the British Colonial 
Secretary, arguing that: 
M u c h of the present trouble is due to the fact that Africans are not 
adequately associated with the machinery of Government to make 
them feel that they are a real part or partners in the Government 
of the country. This has the two-fold effect of denying to the 
Government the benefit of considered African opinion in the making 
of Government policy; and on the other hand of creating an 
28. This section is indebted to the pioneering account by C . G . Rosberg and 
J. Nottingham, 1966; see also J. Spencer, 1985, and D . Throup, 1985, pp. 399-433. Also 
helpful are A . Clayton, 1976; F. Furedi, 1974; and the special issue of the Kenya Historical 
Review, 1977, dealing with the M a u M a u . 
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PLATE 9.3 Jomo Kenyatta, president ofKAU (the Kenya African Union), photographed in
1946-7
impression in the minds of the people that the Government, because
of its composition, does not work in the interests of Africans. During
the last thirty years, while the requests of the European community
have been conceded, the requests of the African community have
been consistently ignored. This has led the ordinary African to
believe that only if he has a government of his own can he benefit
and not otherwise.29
However, by this time the principal officers of the KAU had all been
detained on account of their suspected complicity in organizing the Mau
Mau. In retrospect, this does not seem to have been any more the case in
Kenya than in Madagascar. Indeed, ifanything, the gap between the African
nationalist élite and the men of violence seems to have been much greater
in Kenya. Originally founded as an extra-parliamentary support group for
Eliud Mathu in 1944, the KAU quickly proved to be very moderate. Jomo
Kenyatta became its president in 1947, a year after his return from self-
imposed exile in Britain and, briefly, in the Soviet Union. But Kenyatta was
29. Quoted by R. Frost, 1978, p. 213, and forming part of a memo from the provisional
committee of the KAU, signed by W. Odede and J. Z. Murumbi.
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n o w no Bolshevik. T h e British might remain intensely suspicious of him, 
but by October 1952 Kenyatta, along with most other K A U notables had 
been repudiated by the m e n organizing M a u M a u oathing. 
W h o these people were it is still difficult to say with certainty, and the 
whole question of the organization of the M a u M a u is still a matter of 
political controversy in Kenya. That m a n y of them were younger m e n 
associated with trade union activity and with Nairobi seems clear. That 
M a u M a u itself was a violent conspiracy to oust the British as well as to 
regain control of 'stolen lands' also seems clear. There were oathing 
campaigns amongst the Kikuyu people throughout the post-war period, 
but it was not until 1951 that the violence associated with oathing seems 
to have got out of hand: riots against rinderpest regulations as well as 
compulsory terracing in that year, followed by arson against white-settler 
farms, the maiming of their cattle and, at the start of October 1952, the 
murder of the leading Kikuyu loyalist, Chief Waruhiu, by armed g u n m e n 
in broad daylight. F r o m subsequent memoirs published by M a u M a u 
insurgents w e know that preparations were being m a d e for eventual armed 
revolt in the forests by thefts of arms. But it is probably the declaration 
of a state of emergency at the end of October 1952 by a newly-arrived 
British governor, acting under white-settler pressure, that caused the M a u 
M a u to go off at half-cock. 
In terms of sheer territory taken over, M a u M a u insurgents were less 
impressive than their earlier counterparts in Madagascar, w h o within a 
few months had taken over a sixth of the island. Very few M a u M a u 
fighters had been equivalents of anciens combattants during the Second 
World W a r ; no whole townships were seized; no significant stretches of 
cultivated land were ever completely controlled; and fewer European 
civilians were killed by insurgents throughout the whole M a u M a u 
emergency than died through traffic accidents in Nairobi during this 
period. Admittedly m a n y Africans died," and m a n y scholars today consider 
that the M a u M a u was principally a Kikuyu civil war; but even most of 
these murders took place after the British security forces launched their 
counter-insurgency campaign, after they had started detaining M a u M a u 
suspects without trial, and after compulsory villagization had been intro-
duced in order to separate forest fighters from rural as well as urban 
supporters. 
W h a t , then, was the M a u M a u ? O n present evidence it seems to have 
been a number of separate things, sometimes overlapping, at other times 
going off in different directions: a squatters' revolt; resistance against 
enforced agricultural improvement policies; a cultural revival; an internal 
war; and an anti-colonial movement that echoed earlier primary resistance 
against the imposition of British colonial rule half a century earlier.30 
30. R . Buijtenhuijs, 1982, provides a review of contrasting interpretations. See also D . 
Throup, 1985, 1987; T . Kanogo, 1987. 
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T o begin with, the M a u M a u was a squatters' revolt. W h e n white 
settlers first established farms in the White Highlands of Kenya in the 
early twentieth century they were frequently assisted by Africans w h o 
exchanged their labour services for herding and cultivation rights, but 
with the economic b o o m that began at the end of the 1930s m a n y white 
farmers became increasingly specialized and mechanized and as a result 
threw many squatters off their farms. S o m e ex-squatters were settled by 
the colonial administration at Olenguruone in the Rift Valley, but at the 
end of the 1940s m a n y of these were expelled for disobeying agricultural 
instructions. A n d it was at Olenguruone that secret oathing was widely 
employed as a form of popular solidarity and resistance. 
Oathing also erupted in the Kikuyu Reserve, where land consolidation 
was also proceeding apace as a result of population growth as well as the 
continuing b o o m in commodity prices; the Kikuyu Reserve being unusual 
in white-settled Africa in being comparatively central as regards roads 
and railways for an African reserve, and in having good soils. 'It was 
this double peculiarity of the Kikuyu', comments John Lonsdale, 'land 
consolidation at h o m e and a farm tenantry outside, which determined 
that they, and they only, would be the seat of a violent agrarian revolt 
which not only set Africans against whites, but Kikuyu against Kikuyu 
too'.31 
In Nairobi, by 1952 a city of nearly 100 000 people, and in other urban 
areas of upland Kenya such as Nakuru were other Africans, frequently 
called 'spivs' in British documents of the time, w h o provided passive 
support and supplies for the forest fighters until Operation Anvil in 1954 
completely cleared them out of Nairobi. It has been suggested that this 
alliance of workers and peasants against imperialism provides evidence of 
a growing proletarian consciousness in colonial Kenya,3 2 but such evidence 
as there is from contemporary M a u M a u h y m n s and subsequent memoirs 
suggests more a protest by recently displaced peasants against pro-
letarianization than proletarian consciousness itself. 
O n yet another level, the M a u M a u must be seen as cultural assertion. 
But here w e must be careful. T h e British colonial government saw oathing 
and opposition to terracing as back-looking conservatism, w h e n it did not 
consider these things to have been deliberately provoked by 'agitators' 
such Jomo Kenyatta. Oathing was obviously loaded with 'culture'. T o be 
sure, some of the most bizarre evidence about the cultural aspects of the 
M a u M a u comes from Europeans of the time concerned sometimes to 
project their o w n fantasies onto Africans themselves.33 Nonetheless, 
31. J. Lonsdale, 1982, p. 6. 
32. R . Buijtenhuijs, 1982, pp. 157-62. A leading advocate of this view is S. Stichter, 
1982. 
33. R . Buijtenhuijs, 1982, p. 104, quotes the comment of D . L . Barnett: ' W e feed our 
o w n "needs" for the obscene and the orgiastic when w e read deep meanings into the 
oathing abnormalities of the Kenya peasant revolt'. 
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through all the M a u M a u oathing ran certain irreducible cultural elements 
which appear to have acted as effectively as deterrents to recruitment of 
activists amongst non-Kikuyu as they assisted it amongst Kikuyu. In M a u 
M a u h y m n s too there were cultural elements which have led Professor 
Ogot to argue that 'because of their exclusiveness they cannot be regarded 
as the national freedom songs which every Kenyan youth can sing with 
pride and conviction'.34 
Finally, the M a u M a u must be seen as an anti-colonial movement , 
albeit a regionally paradoxical one. T h e areas of Kikuyuland most affected 
by colonial penetration and 'stolen lands', namely K i a m b u and its environs, 
were ones displaying the least overt support for the insurgents, while 
other areas away from Nairobi like Nyeri and Fort Hall proved m u c h 
more militant though m u c h less disrupted by either British colonialism 
or white settlers. But Robert Buijtenhuijs points out that Fort Hall and 
Nyeri were also areas of Kikuyuland where the British colonial entry at 
the start of this century was very brutal. K i a m b u by comparison was 
pacified m u c h more gently.35 If this is so, Ali Mazrui m a y well also be 
right to call the M a u M a u 'the first major resurrection of the warrior 
tradition in recent East African history'.36 
Nevertheless, resurrection or regression, what most concerned British 
politicians in the 1950s was the difficulty of keeping such a tumultuous 
area under colonial control. T h e British probably overestimated the actual 
military threat posed by the M a u M a u rebels, as well as underestimating 
the extent to which the British reaction itself would lead to m a y h e m and 
murder in which 'private property was left to the care of thieves and 
Providence'.37 But violence was violence, and the sheer expense of 
continuing to support white settlers could not be continued indefinitely 
within the British political tradition.38 A n d so it was that, after the 
Conservative Party w o n its third election in a row in Britain in 1959, Iain 
Macleod was appointed colonial secretary and the M a u M a u emergency 
was ended and a constitutional conference arranged. 
This conference led to a 65 -member legislative assembly in Kenya, 33 
of them elected from open seats. T h e K A U was resurrected as K A N U 
(the Kenya African National Union) and w o n 67 per cent of the votes in 
the ensuing election with a still-detained J o m o Kenyatta as the national 
president, Odinga as vice-president, and M b o y a as general secretary. 
K A N U was opposed by K A D U (the Kenya African Democratic Union), 
formed by an alliance of coastal politicians and up-country notables from 
34. B . A . Ogot, 1977, p. 286. 
35. R . Buijtenhuijs, 1982, pp. 200-1. 
36. A . A . Mazrui, 1975b, p. 77. 
37. E . N . Wanyoike, 1974, p. 190. 
38. See the comment of the British colonial secretary of the time, Lord Chandos, 1964, 
P- 397-
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the smaller ethnic groups. However, it was not until after his release from 
detention (August 1961), a second Lancaster House conference, and a 
landslide victory for K A N U in the M a y 1963 general election, that 
Kenyatta became prime minister and, six months later, leader of a fully 
independent country.39 
At independence in Kenya, m a n y white farmers were bought out by a 
massive British-funded aid scheme. Sometimes in retrospect this has been 
considered a neo-colonial masterstroke, consciously designed together 
with earlier measures like the Swynnerton Plan to create a pro-British 
black bourgeoisie in post-colonial Kenya. Certainly the British tried to 
create such groups in several British African colonies, but the African 
middle classes tended to produce leaders of revolt as well as supporters 
of the status quo. For Kenya this tendency is graphically illustrated by 
the complaint of the white-settler politician, Michael Blundell, that 'go-
ahead better farmers' there had a paradoxical tendency to vote for 'the 
more extreme and radical candidates . . . [with views] quite contrary to 
their o w n interests as property owners' and, w h e n asked w h y , said that 
such candidates were 'the only people capable of dealing with the British 
colonial system'.40 A black middle class was built up in colonial Kenya, 
but its origins must be sought m u c h further back in time than the 1950s. 
It was in the early colonial-government employment and farm income;41 
and anti-colonial nationalism in Kenya was a m u c h more complicated 
phenomenon than simply political action by an emergent black bourgeoisie 
acting independently of both the wider and the local context. 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia42 
In Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), 
increased British interference in African agriculture aroused considerable 
unrest in the immediate post-war period,43 but it was the imposition of 
the Central African Federation ( C A F ) in 1953 which caused a really 
explosive political convergence of élite nationalism and mass discontent 
in both these British-administered territories. 
W h y did the imposition of federation cause so m u c h African discontent? 
For years die white settlers of Southern Rhodesia - self-governing, it 
should be remembered, since 1923 - had toyed with the idea of 'amal-
39. G . Bennett and C . Rosberg, 1961, pp. 21-2. 
40. Sir M . Blundell, 1964, p. 208. 
41. Several papers of M . Cowen, published and unpublished, are of crucial importance 
here; see, for example, M . Cowen, 1981. See also the synthesis by G . Kitching, 1980. 
42. This section is indebted to several authors, most notably P. Gilford, 1982; 
R . Tangri, 1975, pp. 254-81; and J. Van Donge, 1985, pp. 265-77. 
43. R . Tangri, 1975, p. 262. T h e case study analysed by J. Van Donge suggests that 
this unrest is best understood by seeing the nationalist movement as 'a rapidly shifting 
set of alliances being determined by the wider political setting'. 
241 
Africa since ig35 
gamation' with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; both then administered 
by the British Colonial Office along with Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; 
and both with European minorities living in them. Immediately after the 
Second World W a r the new socialist government in Britain vetoed 
amalgamation but looked more favourably upon 'federation' as an aid to 
economic development as well as possibly creating a political buffer against 
infiltration by Afrikaners from South Africa. However, protests from élite 
nationalist associations such as the Nyasaland African Congress (founded 
1944) and its Northern Rhodesian counterpart (founded 1948), and others, 
were sufficient to stop anything actually being done before October 1951, 
when a British Conservative government came to power in London. 
This government was m u c h more closely tied to business interests and 
white settlers favouring federation. T h e federal idea was also supported 
by civil servants (such as Andrew Cohen, before he went to Uganda and 
deported the Kabaka) for more bureaucratic and developmental reasons. 
In 1953, federation was finally imposed upon both Nyasaland and North-
ern Rhodesia despite considerable local African protest.44 In Southern 
Rhodesia, needless to say, it was welcomed by the white electorate there 
because of the economic potentialities of Northern Rhodesian copper. 
For a time, African resistance to the Central African Federation was 
muted after its actual imposition. In Northern Rhodesia the influential 
African mine-workers' union ignored the 'two days of prayer' called, 
Gandhian-fashion, by Congress, and Congress itself suffered from lead-
ership disputes which were never resolved. Finally in 1958 Kenneth 
Kaunda broke away to form what later became the United National 
Independence Party ( U N I P ) . A year before, however, the C A F authorities 
had gone too far, attempting to entrench white privilege further by 
establishing a new federal citizenship which Nyasaland Africans, for 
example, could purchase for £5 and by signing away their existing rights 
as persons 'protected' by the British Colonial Office. T w o electoral rolls 
were envisaged, the only clear thing about their otherwise complicated 
provisions being that Africans, as the poorest citizens materially, would 
have enjoyed the worst benefits under it politically. 
There were n o w political storms. In mid-1958, Hastings Banda, a 
medical doctor w h o had acted for the Nyasaland Congress in London 
before going off to work in Ghana, returned as candidate for the Nyasaland 
African Congress presidency. U p o n confirmation, there began a campaign 
of non-cooperation which culminated in full independence from Britain 
six years later. A state of emergency was declared in 1959, and under 
Operation Sunrise, Banda and 200 other Congress activists were detained. 
T h e commotion caused by these arrests and the associated violence and 
use of white troops from Southern Rhodesia led to the appointment of a 
commission of inquiry by the British government in London. 
44. P. Gifford, 1982, provides fuller details. 
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T h e Devlin Commission embarrassed both the local governor and the 
authorities in Britain. 'Nyasaland is - no doubt temporarily - a police 
state', in which it was unsafe for anybody publicly to express support for 
the Congress leaders, Devlin reported. Devlin also said that most of the 
violence that occurred during this particular emergency (in which 52 
Africans had been killed) was the result of government activity.45 
T h e British colonial secretary and Nyasaland governor of the time both 
said that Devlin was misleading. Harold Macmillan, the British prime 
minister, was evidently not so sure and subsequently despatched another 
fact-finding commission to Central Africa, the Monckton Commission. 
F e w Africans would talk to it, certainly neither of the two African 
Congresses in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. S o m e 'moderate' 
Africans did talk, however, and on the basis of their comments Monckton 
reported that opposition to federation throughout Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland was 'almost pathological . . . widespread, sincere and of long-
standing'. H e advised that 'immediate political advances' be m a d e there 
in order both to promote 'true partnership' and greater economic develop-
ment.46 Nyasaland might be a comparatively unimportant economic back-
water for Britain, but Northern Rhodesia was crucial for Britain's copper 
supplies. 
Before Monckton left for Central Africa, Harold Macmillan had 
appointed Iain Macleod as colonial secretary. Macleod, w h o was a skilled 
bridge-player, devised some extremely complicated electoral arrangements 
for both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia as well as for Kenya. T h e 
political results of these were, for Malawi (as Nyasaland was henceforth 
to be called), a Congress victory in all the seats it fought in the 1961 
election and, after a further conference, full independence in July 1964; 
and, for Zambia (as Northern Rhodesia n o w became), a victory shared 
between U N I P and the r u m p of the former Northern Rhodesian Congress 
in the elections of late 1962 and, after the first election under full adult 
suifrage in 1963, 55 out of 65 main-roll seats for U N I P , and full 
independence in October 1964. 
Zanzibar 
Zanzibar is a m u c h smaller island than Madagascar, with just under 
300000 people on Zanzibar Island and P e m b a in 1958. During the 
nineteenth century, Zanzibar had been the centre of an extensive trading 
network in the East African interior under an O m a n i dynasty. In 1890 
Zanzibar passed under British colonial protection, and in December 1963 
it passed out of it. A month later there was an unexpected and bloody 
revolution, designed, so its principal instigator said shortly afterwards, 
45. Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, 1959. 
46. Report of the Advisory Commission, i960. 
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'to liberate the African people of Zanzibar from the yoke of Arab 
colonialism'.47 
Racial opposition between African and Arab on Zanzibar was partly a 
hangover from the slave trade of the nineteenth century, partly the result 
of British stereotyping during the colonial period, partly a consequence 
of capitalist penetration of the clove industry which created an Arab 
landlord class and an African underclass as well as further entrenching 
local Asian financiers.48 After the Second World W a r these racial categories 
were given enhanced political meaning by British reforms in local govern-
ment (which because of the smallness of Zanzibar assumed correspond-
ingly greater territorial significance) and the onset of independence. 
M o r e a by-product of political developments on the East African 
mainland than of any urgent desire for it on Zanzibar itself, the onset of 
independence prompted the Arab landlord class - through the Arab-
dominated Zanzibar National Party ( Z N P ) - to seek to remove British 
overrule before the African underclass became mobilized sufficiently to 
seize power for itself through the Afro-Shrazi Party (ASP) led by Abeid 
K a r u m e , president of the local African Association since 1953. T h e 
smallness of Zanzibar and the face-to-face character of its politics lent a 
complexity and violence to this struggle that still have to be fully 
disentangled.49 Nonetheless, by December 1963 it looked as if the trick 
had worked. T h e Z N P and its allies in the Zanzibar and P e m b a Peoples' 
Party (ZPPP) - a pro-Arab splinter group from the A S P - together gained 
more seats than the A S P in the immediate pre-independence elections, 
and together took Zanzibar into full independence from Britain on 10 
December 1963. But then came the revolution of 12 January 1964. 
While recognizing the election tricks under which the A S P with its 
majority votes was prevented from getting majority seats, scholars have 
given two explanations of what happened on the revolution night, both 
of which reveal acceptance of the A S P ' s alleged inability to organize the 
upheaval. First, they see the split of the U m m a Party under Abdul 
R a h m a n M u h a m m a d Babu from the Z N P to join the A S P as an asset to 
the latter. They insist that the U m m a Party m a y well have been planning 
their o w n coup against the Z N P had it not been proscribed just a week 
before the so-called Okello's Revolution. For it was from members of the 
U m m a Party that the A S P obtained organizational ideas for the rev-
olution.50 Secondly, the real catalyst for the revolution was the Uganda-
born John Okello ' w h o used a small personally-enlisted force, in which 
U m m a supporters were prominent, to topple the vulnerable ruling 
47. Uganda Argus, 4 April 1964. 
48. See F. Cooper, 1980. 
49. See M . F. Lofchie, 1965; and A . Clayton, 1981. 
50. See the two perceptive articles by K . Kyle: 1964a and 1964b; and M . F. Lofchie, 
I9^J, PP- 36-42-
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regime'.51 John Okello himself has tended even to claim the whole credit 
for the revolution. A s an independent house-painter in Pemba , he was 
able to step in and organize local policemen - w h o were disgruntled by 
the replacement of their British superiors by Arab officers at inde-
pendence — into the stormtroopers w h o successfully seized power in 
Zanzibar town during the night of 11-12 January 1964.a2 
Perhaps the facts about the Zanzibar revolution are still too con-
temporary to be available to researchers. A lot of the information is still 
confidential and the participants, most of w h o m are still active in politics, 
are unlikely to disclose all the facts. Nevertheless, recent research is 
beginning to reveal that Okello's claims were probably somewhat over-
stated.53 It is n o w more evident that the events of the revolution night 
were more closely supervised by Abeid K a r u m e , the A S P president, and 
his Committee of Fourteen than previously recognized. According to this 
view, Okello was deliberately used by the A S P within the Committee as 
one of the coordinating members . His main asset was his powerful voice 
which was used in making announcements. But his personal claims soon 
m a d e him unacceptable to the party leadership and he had to leave 
Zanzibar. It is claimed that Okello was eventually lured away from 
Zanzibar on 20 February and never allowed to return. B y then, K a r u m e 
had managed to form Zanzibar into a one-party state under the A S P and 
was in a position to negotiate amalgamation with Tanganyika to form the 
United Republic of Tanzania on 26 April 1964. 
N e w states and old colonies 
Political independence in Eastern Africa was intimately connected with 
the development of nationalism in colonies established as a result of the 
nineteenth-century European scramble for landed territory. Sometimes 
this nationalism was that of some pre-colonial territorial entity like 
Madagascar or Zanzibar. M o r e frequently it was the conscious creation 
of nationalists organizing an anti-colonial movement within the arbitrarily 
defined boundaries of some European colony like Tanganyika for, as 
Nyerere has remarked: 
until w e were colonized this 'nation' did not exist, different laws 
operated among the constituent tribes and there was conflict between 
them. It was the colonial power which imposed a c o m m o n law and 
maintained it by force, until the growth of the independence m o v e -
ment put the flesh of an emotional unity on the skeleton of legal 
unity.54 
51. A . Smith, 1976, p. 211. 
52. Okello's o w n account was published in 1967. 
53. See B . F . M r i m a and W . Mattoke, 1980; and A . Sheriff and E . Ferguson, 1991. 
54. J. K . Nyerere, 1967a, p. 271. 
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During actual independence struggles there was also frequently a pan-
African dimension, especially after Ghanaian independence in 1957: 
evidenced by such things as the clear inspiration both Kenneth Kaunda 
and Hastings Banda received for their fight against the Central African 
Federation by attendance at the Accra All-African Peoples' Conference 
in 1959;" or in the ultimately abortive attempt to create from below an 
East African Federation by Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania during the early 
1960s.56 O n Zanzibar there were traces of pan-Arabism too.57 A n d , insofar 
as all these territories were British-ruled, independence struggles were 
also affected by the examples of previous movements towards self-
government within the British Commonwealth , of India and Pakistan as 
well as Canada and Australia. 
But with France, the framework was different. With France there was 
a longing for a greater France progressively transforming dominance into 
equality by administrative integration into the métropole. In Madagascar 
after the Second World W a r , too little was offered too soon after the 
Vichy defeat for the policy to be accepted without insurrection. But the 
old colony of Reunion was another matter. 
Reunion5 8 
Originally Reunion had been settled by French seamen and African slaves 
in the seventeenth century. During subsequent centuries it developed as 
a sugar colony, with further influxes of African slaves during the early 
nineteenth century and then, for another third of a century, of indentured 
labourers from India. B y 1946, three-quarters of the island's cultivable 
surface was devoted to sugar, and the local communist party was as eager 
as the French Communist Party to attack the local plantocracy by fully 
incorporating it into the French state and thereby raising poorer people's 
living standards as well. Living standards did rise in the next quarter of 
a century, but not as m u c h as in France itself. T h e economic stagnation 
which had afflicted this volcanic outcrop 700 k m east of Madagascar ever 
since the Napoleonic Wars , was however ended when Reunion (along 
with the French West Indian colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and 
Guyana) was turned into an overseas département in 1946. 
Thenceforth, Reunion became a very different model of decolonization 
for the still British-ruled islands of the Seychelles and Mauritius to con-
sider alongside the various mainland models already discussed. However, 
with the triumph of the Gaullists in France in 1958, local communists 
switched to a policy of autonomy for Reunion; and should this policy 
55. R . I. Rotberg, 1966, p. 292. 
56. See J. S . N y e , Jr, 1966. M u c h more work needs to be done on this subject. 
57. See A . Clayton, 1981, p. 40 and p. 46. 
58. O n Reunion, I a m indebted to J. Houbert, 1980, pp. 145^71 and 325-47; and 
M . Robert, 1976. 
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ever turn into a popular Réunionnais demand for full independence from 
France, pressure m a y well arise for Reunion to follow the more customary 
path to national sovereignty within the international system. 
C o m o r o Islands59 
Ethnographically, the Comoro Islands are more akin to Zanzibar and 
other areas of the East African Coast than to the Creole and cosmopolitan 
inhabitants of Reunion, Mauritius and the Seychelles. They are 
Kiswahili-speaking. Mayotte became a French colonial possession by 
purchase (from a local sultan) in 1841, and the rest followed during 
the European scramble for colonies at the end of the century. During 
the colonial period, the Comorian islands were not a focus of any great 
French interest. Anti-colonial nationalism did not really arise there until 
1968, w h e n French paratroopers and legionaries brutally suppressed a 
school strike and people came onto the streets to demonstrate. T h e first 
political parties were then formed and, as a by-product of political 
turbulence in nearby Madagascar shortly afterwards - following the 
overthrow of the Tsiranana government, the subsequent ending of French 
military bases on Madagascar and the nationalization of leading French 
companies there - a popular demand arose for full independence for the 
C o m o r o Islands too. 
T h e French held their customary referendum, but as the island of 
Mayotte (the least Islamized and most influenced by Christian Malagasies) 
voted against the general trend of other islands in the group and demanded 
continuing ties to France, another set of referendums were held, this time 
island by island. All the islands apart from Mayotte declared U D I 6 0 from 
France in July 1975. Mayotte alone continues to call itself French. 
Mauritius and the Seychelles6' 
Mauritius, like Reunion, lies several hundred miles off the east coast of 
Madagascar and developed as a classic sugar-growing colony during the 
nineteenth century, with former slaves from Africa and then indentured 
labourers from India doing most of the work on the island while a Creole 
French-Mauritian plantocracy enjoyed most of the profits. Like other 
'old colonies' growing sugar in the West Indies as well as in the Indian 
Ocean, Mauritius was badly hit by the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
which left a bitter legacy of strikes and labour unrest. Politics in post-
1945 Mauritius were mostly preoccupied with the rights of workers on 
59. This account is derived principally from H . Chagnoux and A . Haribu, 1980; and 
T . Flobert, 1976. 
60. U D I : Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
61. O n Mauritius and the Seychelles, I a m indebted to J. Houbert, 1980; and 
L . Favoureu, 1970, which has a good bibliography. 
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the sugar plantations and in the docks, as against those of the plantocracy, 
with self-government from Britain being very m u c h a secondary issue for 
some time. Indeed, in the light of Reunion after 1946, closer association 
with Britain seemed a m u c h more attractive objective to work towards. 
That, however, was never really on the agenda. T h e struggle in Mauritius 
was therefore for the best terms possible in the light of Britain's efforts 
during the 1960s to enter the European Economic Community at the 
very same time that Mauritius itself was moving towards independence. 
Independence was w o n in 1968 by the Mauritian Labour Party, most 
consistently nationalist of all the parties representing the predominantly 
Hindu proletariat of the island. There was, however, another catch. In 
1965 certain islands associated hitherto with Mauritius or the Seychelles 
were amputated by Britain and grouped into the British Indian Ocean 
Territory, a n e w oceanic colony which shortly afterwards became the 
setting for an American nuclear-submarine base at Diego Garcia. M a u -
ritian independence was clearly conditional upon acceptance of this set 
of amputations.62 
Independence for the Seychelles was also delayed for a time by strategic 
considerations associated with a tracking station as well as Diego Garcia. 
But, to begin with, neither the Seychelles Peoples United Party ( S P U P ) 
of Albert René nor the Seychelles Democratic Party ( S D P ) of James 
M a n c h a m were primarily concerned with independence from Britain. 
Rather it was control of government positions and policy in a desperately 
poor small island colony that formed their major preoccupation, and it 
was only w h e n a quarrel arose between the S D P and the British over 
control of the island police before full independence, and the designation 
of the S P U P as a national liberation movement by the O A U , that 
independence became a serious issue. Eventually M a n c h a m allied with 
René to gain the independence that Britain, newly eager to divest itself 
of all its remaining colonies as quickly as possible, was only too willing 
to grant to the Seychelles in 1976. 
Colonialism had thus turned full circle since the eighteenth century. 
At that time island colonies such as the Seychelles, Mauritius and Reunion 
were crucial links in an essentially maritime set of European empires. 
T h e n , with the invention of the steam combustion engine, came the 
conquest of the great land masses such as sub-Saharan Africa and 
Westerners became the masters of land-based and densely populated 
tropical empires too. T h e global crisis of the Second World W a r under-
mined m a n y of these empires, and what the war itself did not do, over-
ambitious colonial development projects, 'uncaptured peasantries' and 
nationalist parties finished off within a generation. But with the advent 
of the thermonuclear age, oceanic colonialism has again come into its 
o w n , with a m u c h more ominous importance. 
62. See J. Madeley, 1982. 
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Introduction 
In 1935 Southern Africa was already the most economically important part 
of Africa in a global perspective. In the last third of the twentieth century 
Southern Africa has also increasingly become the most strategically 
important sub-region of Africa at the same time. T h e economic pre-
eminence arose primarily out of mineral wealth, vital for the West's 
industrial civilization. There was also large-scale agriculture and local 
industrialization. T h e strategic pre-eminence has been a combination of 
the wealth of the region and the rising importance of the Cape route for 
sea-traffic between Asia and the Western world, including the traffic of 
oil-tankers from the Gulf. 
But there has been a third superlative which has profoundly affected 
the history of the sub-region. This third vital force has been race. A part 
of Africa which has been richest in mineral wealth (see Figure 10.1), and 
increasingly critical in strategic location, has also been the most deeply 
affected by the issue of race relations in this period of world history.1 
This chapter is about that interplay between economy, strategy and race 
in the fate of Southern Africa. But each of these forces in turn has 
involved sub-themes. In the economic domain, the story of Southern 
Africa is partly about land, especially the struggle for the best and most 
fertile land. T h e story is also about labour, both voluntary and forced -
both sedentary and migrant. Thirdly, the economic history of Southern 
Africa is of course also about extractive capital - in the sense of capital 
primarily derived from, or related to, mining activities. W e shall address 
these three economic sub-themes, and h o w they have affected this 
particular period of Southern African history. 
T h e strategic importance of Southern Africa and the area's location 
1. For a general introduction to the history of Southern Africa in this period, see 
E . H . Brookes, 1968; B . Davidson et al., 1976; W . R . Duggan, 1973; J. Duffy, 1962; 
G . M . Gerhart, 1979; R . H . Green et al, 1981; R . Gibson, 1972; P. Keatley, 1963; 
C . R . Hill, 1964; and R . P. Stevens, 1967. 
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FIG. 10.1 Major mineral resources in Southern Africa
also have their sub-themes for our subsequent consideration. What should
be remembered is that if there is any part of Africa for which the Western
world would be prepared to go to war to ensure Western access to its
resources, that part is indeed Southern Africa and Zaire. The strategic
importance of these areas rests on a combination of economic and geopolitical
factors.2
2. For further details, see D. Chanaiwa, 1976a; M. Morrell, 1971; C. Kadalie, 1971;
W. M. Macmillan, 1963 and 1970; and T. Karis and G. M. Carter, 1977.
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A s for the issue of race in Southern Africa, the sub-region is the last 
great battlefield of racial confrontation on the continent.3 But underlying 
the story of a sub-region of Africa is a global saga - the strange history 
of the reincarnation of political evil. O n the one hand, the years 1935 to 
1945 marked a successful global struggle against fascism and racial 
repression in Europe. O n the other hand, the year 1948 marked the rise 
of a n e w version of fascism and racial repression in Africa - a version 
called apartheid. T h e defeat of Hitler and Mussolini in the first half of 
the 1940s was indeed a major blow against 'Aryan supremacy' and 
genocidal policies in Europe. T h e triumph of the National Party in South 
Africa in 1948, by contrast, was a victory for 'white supremacy' and for 
potential genocide in the southern portion of Africa. Hitlerism was being 
reincarnated on African soil. 'The Fuehrer is dead; L o n g live the Fuehrer!' 
Needless to say, Africans were not going to take this with resignation. 
There is a sense in which the final armed crusade against 'fascism' and 
'Nazism' is today being waged in Southern Africa. In that sense, the 
struggle against apartheid is part of the unfinished business of the Second 
World W a r . This chapter is partly about that moral crusade, in all its 
political and religious forms.4 
This chapter has also been designed to provide historical perspectives 
of the political economy of European colonialism and African responses 
in Southern Africa.5 A major theme will be the historical relationship and 
mutual interdependence between the economic bases, interests and classes 
and the political ideologies, structures and institutions of colonial Southern 
Africa. 
Background to the age of apartheid 
In both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the overriding issue was 
the European struggle to maintain economic monopoly over land, minerals, 
jobs and social services, and to repress African competition and national-
ism. In particular, white rural bourgeoisie and urban working classes 
looked up to settler political vigilance and state capitalism to protect 
their racialist economic privileges against real and imaginary African 
competition.6 
O n the one hand, settler farmers wanted the state to m a k e laws that 
would eliminate any competition with Africans over land, minerals, 
agricultural produce and extension services, while simultaneously assur-
3. D . D . T . Jabavu, 1920. See also P. Duignan and L . H . Gann, 1973; and G . S. P. 
Freeman-Gren ville, 1973. 
4. For details of separate churches and Ethiopianism, see B . Sundkler, 1961; also 
D . Chanaiwa, 1980, pp. 9-39. 
5. See P. Duignan and L . H . Gann, 1973. 
6. See, for example, G . Arrighi, 1970, pp. 393-426. 
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ing them of cheap African labour. O n the other hand, white miners, 
technicians, drivers, civil servants and professionals wanted the state to 
m a k e laws that would eliminate any competition with African workers, 
perpetuate the scarcity of skills and increase their wages, collective 
bargaining and political strength; while simultaneously subsidizing their 
high standard of living by passing the tax burden to the Africans. 
B y the 1930s, both settler states had passed an array of segregationist 
laws, such as the Natives' L a n d Act, the G r o u p Areas Act and the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of South Africa and the L a n d Apportionment 
Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, T h e Natives Registration Act, and 
the Masters and Servants Act of Southern Rhodesia, for the purposes of: 
(1) expropriating African land and minerals; 
(2) procuring cheap African labour; 
(3) controlling the deployment and m o v e m e n t of African labourers; 
and 
(4) eliminating inter-racial competition. 
T h e Industrial Conciliation Acts of both South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia were labour-relations laws covering all industries, sectors and 
workers of the economy. But they did not recognize African trade unions 
nor African workers as employees. Instead, they authorized industrial 
councils consisting of white employers and workers to negotiate on wages, 
conditions of work and benefits on behalf of the Africans. Africans were 
not allowed into apprenticeship programmes, and had no right to strike 
or to collective bargaining. U n d e r the W o r k m e n ' s Compensation Acts 
of both countries, Africans were excluded from retirement benefits, 
hospitalization schemes and occupational-safety measures. 
T h u s , in the political economy of Southern Africa, whites did not vote 
as capitalists, farmers, employers or proletarians but as whites. White 
workers formed all-white railway-workers' and mine-workers' unions as 
well as labour political parties. All high-paying, skilled and supervisory 
jobs were reserved for whites. There were numerous statutory para-statal 
marketing boards for milk, meat, maize, tobacco, cotton, minerals, and 
so on for whites which deliberately boycotted African products in order 
to eliminate competition from African farmers and manufacturers. 
T h e division of the countries into European and African lands was 
systematically designed to destroy the African's resources and ability to 
maintain self-sufficiency, by restricting him to barren rural reserves 
and urban locations. Through the deliberate process of peasantization, 
ghettoization and, thus, impoverishment, the settlers created the necessary 
underdevelopment and dependency to force the Africans to work for the 
white m e n just to survive. 
B y the eve of the Second World W a r , there was in existence a well-
established centre-periphery, interdependent relationship between the 
settler colonies and the British high commission territories of Basutoland, 
252 
Southern Africa since igfö 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland; the British protectorates of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and, 
especially, Mozambique . B y both politico-economic designing and geo-
graphical location, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were econ-
omically the first peripheral 'bantustans' of South Africa.7 
Basutoland was completely surrounded by South Africa; it had a tiny 
European population consisting primarily of government officials, traders 
and missionaries; and it had a peasant agriculture and animal husbandry 
on eroded land. Bechuanaland was essentially an expanse of desert 
dependent on cattle-ranching and migrant labour. Swaziland was the most 
viable of the three territories because of its fertile soils, rich mineral 
deposits of iron ore, asbestos and tin, and corporate development in 
forestry and irrigation. But m u c h of the rich land had been alienated to 
Europeans. 
T h e Portuguese colony of Mozambique was economically dependent 
on an export-oriented agricultural plantation economy of state farms and 
private estates; on customs duties and tariffs obtained from the Rhodesian 
use of the road, railway and port of Beira and the South African use of 
the port of Lourenço Marques; and from labour.8 T h e British protectorate 
of Nyasaland was the beautiful 'Cinderella of the protectorates', but was 
also poor and overpopulated. Most Europeans there were government 
officials, traders and missionaries, and they totalled a mere 2000 in 1937. 
There was no settler need for land and cheap African labour; so there 
were neither African reserves nor pass laws. Northern Rhodesia was 
dependent on a single-industry, export-oriented mining economy centred 
on the Copper Belt. T h e few Europeans there were primarily mining 
technicians, government officials, traders and missionaries, without the 
intention of permanent settlement. However, due to the possibility of 
inter-racial rivalry for jobs and services, there were, to a lesser extent 
than in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, African reserves, pass laws 
and the importation of migrant labour from Nyasaland, Tanganyika and 
the Belgian Congo. 
Migrant labour 
Undoubtedly, there were various causes that led thousands of African 
males and females to leave their homelands for labour migration to the 
mines, farms and factories of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.9 T h e 
7. For the historical relationship of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with South 
Africa, see R . P. Stevens, 1967; J. E . Spence, 1964, pp. 221-46; and Migrant Labour in 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1961. 
8. Migrant Labour in Africa South of the Sahara, 1961; J. Duffy, 1962; J. Sykes, 1971; 
C . F. Spence, 1951; and L . B . Serapiao and M . A . El-Khawas, 1979. 
9. Migrant Labour in Africa South of the Sahara, 1961. 
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most c o m m o n and universal explanation is, of course, economic 
motivation, deriving from the general underdevelopment, unemployment, 
low standard of living and the poverty of the countries of origin, w h e n 
compared to the economic b o o m and development, to high employment 
opportunities, high standard of living and the social thrills of the countries 
of destination. But in Southern Africa, the migrant-labour system was 
one of the most highly regulated forms of inter-territorial relations. 
There were in Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Mozambique , 
Angola and Nyasaland numerous recruitment agents w h o deliberately 
enticed the illiterate peasants with advance payments and goods and with 
glamorous advertisements of urban life in South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia. There were transit camps in the out-migrating countries where 
the job-seekers were housed, fed, interviewed, examined, attested and 
then escorted to the mines, farms and factories. After 12-18 months of 
work, the migrant labourer was provided with the same transport services 
for repatriation. There also were economic incentives for the labour-
exporting colonies in the form of licensing, passport and attestation fees, 
as well as in deferred payments and hut tax, all of which earned foreign 
currency. 
T h e Portuguese in Mozambique actually used brutal force in recruiting 
Africans for migrant labour.10 T o facilitate this naked exploitation of the 
Africans, the Portuguese signed the Mozambique Convention (1928) with 
South Africa, and the Tete Agreement (1934) with Southern Rhodesia.11 
It is difficult to estimate the total number of m e n , w o m e n and children 
w h o were involved and affected by the migrant-labour system in the 
countries of origin and destination. At its peak, South Africa employed 
around 600000 and Southern Rhodesia around 250000 migrant workers 
annually. Nyasaland led the list with over 280000, followed by M o z -
ambique with around 220000, Basutoland with 210000, Botswana 60000, 
Zambia around 40000 and Swaziland 30000 official emigrants annually. 
These official figures do not take into account the people w h o died in 
the transit camps and, especially, the m a n y w h o entered South Africa 
and Southern Rhodesia through unorganized, clandestine routes and 
methods. 
T h e migrant-labour system has had very significant impacts on 
Southern Africa. O n the one hand, it gave the sub-region distinct and 
c o m m o n cultural-historical development and character. O n the other 
hand, it led to the intensification of the centre-periphery dependency of 
out-migrating countries on the countries of destination. In the countries 
of origin, there were general social disorganizations characterized by 
broken families, illegitimate children, divorce, and underdevelopment due 
10. ibid.; also, J. Duffy, 1962; and J. E . Spence, 1964. 
11. Migrant Labour in Africa South of the Sahara, 1961. 
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to the lack of balance in the population caused by the continued absence 
of a large number of able-bodied m e n . 
T h u s , on the eve of formal apartheid, Southern Africa was already 
characterized by the politics of inequality, racism, exploitation and 
oppression; by mass poverty in the midst of minority affluence and 
supremacy. T h e coalition of white workers and the rural bourgeoisie were 
already entrenched in Southern Rhodesia. 
In South Africa the coalition of white workers and the rural bourgeoisie, 
consisting mainly of Afrikaaners, had formed the Nationalist Party" to 
challenge the United Party of the urban white bourgeoisie, the pro-
fessionals and international capitalists, most of w h o m were English-
speaking. English-Afrikaaner differences over the most effective methods 
of maintaining white supremacy over the Africans culminated in the 
election victory of the Nationalist Party under D r Malan in 1948. 
Simultaneously, African responses to colonialism in Southern Africa 
were characterized by political parties such as the African National 
Congress of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; by self-help, self-
reliant welfare organizations; by trades unions such as the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; and 
by separatist and Ethiopianist churches.13 
T h e leaders of the African political parties were mission-educated, 
Christian élites w h o were deeply committed to the ideology of indi-
vidualism, capitalism, non-racialism, non-violence and universalism. Their 
major objective was 'Equal rights for all civilized m e n , irrespective of 
race and colour'; their means were constitutional resolutions, delegations, 
telegrams, sermons, pamphlets and assemblies; and their allies were white 
liberals and missionaries. They erroneously perceived settler colonialism 
mainly as a humanistic tragedy instead of a worldly, deliberately orches-
trated racio-economic system. In South Africa in particular, they mis-
judged the political rivalry between English and Afrikaaner colonists as a 
clash over humanity and, therefore, overlooked their underlying ideological 
consensus on white supremacy. 
African trade-unionists, on the other hand, were preoccupied with 
bread-and-butter issues of wages, conditions of work, housing, racial 
discrimination, and the right to strike and to collective bargaining. In 
spite of the legal injunctions, African workers went on strike to force 
resolution of their grievances. S o m e mission-educated preachers and 
laymen broke away because of the racism and paternalistic authoritarianism 
of white missionaries, and set up their o w n separatist churches along the 
same Christian doctrine and liturgy. 
12. S. Trapido, 1970; W . R . Duggan, 1973; W . M . Macmillan, 1963; G . Carter, 1959; 
T . D . Moodie, 1975; and J. H . P. Serfontein, 1979. 
13. See, for example, D . Chanaiwa, 1976a; C . Kadalie, 1971; P. Walshe, 1971; and 
E. Feit, 1967. 
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Another set of African preachers and laymen not only broke away from 
the missionaries, but also Africanized Christianity to include such elements 
as: 
(i) polygamous marriages; 
(2) communalism; 
(3) puritanism on matters of drinking, smoking, dancing and dress; 
and 
(4) general condemnation and boycott of Western culture and values. 
This religious m o v e m e n t is k n o w n as Ethiopianism,14 and the followers 
are generally called Vapositori. 
O n the other hand, the 1948 general election between Smuts's United 
Party and D r Malan's Nationalist Party in South Africa was fought on 
economic issues, on the Black Peril and on pro-British and pro-dominion 
versus pro-Nazi and pro-republican sentiments. Malan and his Nationalist 
Party w o n and, therefore, instituted official apartheid and republicanism. 
South Africa withdrew from the C o m m o n w e a l t h and declared itself a 
republic in 1961. 
Economically, the Second World W a r had brought a n e w era of 
economic growth and b o o m , following the depression and stagnation of 
the 1930s. T h e military and economic destabilization of Europe and the 
Japanese occupation of European colonies in Asia created insatiable 
demands for: 
(1) raw materials of food, textiles, minerals, and timber; 
(2) manufactured goods for military supplies and provisions; and 
(3) training, refuelling and recovery facilities in tropical Africa. 
With its established infrastructure in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, 
its migrant-labour system and favourable climate, Southern Africa was 
most capable of meeting the n e w demands. 
While the war brought economic growth, wealth and employment, it 
also led to n e w class formations and, therefore, rivalries. A m o n g the 
whites of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the war increased the role 
of international capitalism, represented by Anglo-American, Tanganyika 
Concessions, the British South Africa C o m p a n y , Lonhro and m a n y others, 
which had not only intensified mining operations in South Africa, 
Rhodesia and Katanga, but also had expanded into agro-business with 
sugar and fruit estates, cattle ranches and forestry. T h e war changed the 
urban manufacturing sector from the small-scale to a large-scale, syn-
dicated and automated industry and increased the socio-economic role of 
the urban bourgeoisie against that of the traditional rural bourgeoisie. 
T h e white urban bourgeoisie was then also manufacturing local, low-
cost, import-substitute goods such as mean-meal , sugar, oils, clothes, 
14. B. Sundkler, 1961. 
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shoes, sweets, bread and jam for the emerging African middle class, the 
urban proletariat and rural peasants. Unlike the rural bourgeoisie which 
was export-oriented, the urban bourgeoisie was interested in skilled 
African labour and in African purchasing power. There was the possibility 
of an effective alliance between the urban white bourgeoisie, the African 
middle class, and the African urban proletariat against the traditional 
alliance of the rural white bourgeoisie and the white working class. 
A m o n g Africans, the war increased the numbers and significance of the 
emerging African middle class consisting of businessmen, professionals, 
teachers, preachers, as well as owner-manager farmers, carpenters and 
builders. This class was still responsive to urbanism, Westernism, con-
stitutionalism and non-racialism. T h e war also created a larger urban 
proletariat class of workers and war veterans w h o were then more 
politically conscious and more pressing for better wages, working con-
ditions, benefits, collective bargaining and basic h u m a n rights. Given the 
lack of social security, workers' compensation, and retirement benefits, 
however, the urban proletariat maintained close ties with their rural 
relatives as an insurance against sickness, loss of job and old age. T h e 
vast majority of the Africans still were rural, subsistence-level peasants. 
Southern Africa from 1948 to i960 
T h e winds of change 
T h e post-war decade in Southern Africa was dominated by the conflict 
and change brought about by the militant confrontation between African 
and European nationalisms. T h e advent of what has been called orthodox 
African nationalism was a continental post-war phenomenon. F r o m the 
Cape to Cairo, Africans were demanding the end of foreign rule, racism 
and imperialism, and the implementation of political independence based 
on majority rule, universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy. They 
were forming mass-based organizations that included the urban proletariat 
and rural peasants, and using the tactics of civil demonstrations, boycotts 
and strikes. T h e y were espousing the doctrines of pan-Africanism and 
négritude, and were advocating a United States of Africa. 
In Southern Africa, the dominant African organization was the African 
National Congress ( A N C ) whose most eloquent and popular spokesman 
was the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Chief Albert Luthuli.15 T h e A N C still 
stood for the same objectives and means it had espoused during the inter-
war period, but was more militant in its demands and demonstrations. It 
was, however, being challenged by more militant African members of the 
South African Communist Party and the A N C Youth League. T h e Youth 
League was formed in 1943 by A ton Muziwakhe Lembede and it consisted 
15. See, for example, P. Walshe, 1971; and A . Luthuli, 1962. 
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of Africans w h o had become disillusioned with the A N C ' s alliance with 
white liberals and with the lack of clear commitment to majority rule and 
universal suffrage. 
In 1949 the A N C formed a Congress Alliance with Indians, coloureds 
and white liberals and, together, they formulated a Nation Building 
Programme. In 1952 the A N C and its allies organized a nationwide 
Defiance Campaign during which 8500 people were arrested. In 1955, a 
Congress of the People, representing Africans, coloureds, Indians and 
whites adopted a 'Freedom Charter for the Democratic South Africa of 
the Future' which advocated a free, united and non-racial South Africa 
and a bill of basic h u m a n rights. 
In the face of black unity and militancy, the Nationalist government 
decided to apply repressive and reactionary measures such as prohibition 
of meetings, police surveillance and harassment, banning of political 
parties, and the torture, banishment and imprisonment of individuals. 
With the tacit support of the United Party and the Progressive Party, the 
all-white parliament passed successive repressive laws such as: 
(1) the Group Areas Act of 1950 which required the classification 
of all South Africans by race; 
(2) the Supression of C o m m u n i s m Act (1950) which categorized any 
person or organization that criticized apartheid or advocated n o n -
racialism and civil liberties as a communist. T h e C o m m u n i s t 
Party itself was also banned in 1950; 
(3) the Native Labour (Settlement of* Disputes) Act (1953) which 
legally abolished the rights of freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining for African workers; 
(4) the Criminal L a w A m e n d m e n t Act (1953) which m a d e it an 
offence to protest or support any campaign against any law; and 
(5) the Mines and W o r k s Act (1956) which prohibited Africans from 
doing skilled work in the mines. 
W h e n it became clear that repressive laws and police violence alone 
were failing to break u p African determination, the Nationalist government 
under Prime Minister Verwoerd appointed the Toulinson Commission 
(1954) to seek alternative means. T h e Commission recommended the 
notorious bantustan policy which led to the Bantu Self-government Act 
and the Bantu Investment Corporation of 1959. U n d e r the Act, Africans 
were divided into black homelands corresponding to the traditional ethnic 
groups of the Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana , Tonga and Venda in which 
they were to develop separately under some measure of self-government. 
Matters of defence, internal security, foreign affairs and the budget were 
controlled by white South Africa though the administrator. 
T h e bantustan policy was basically a 'divide and rule' technique 
designed to balkanize African nationalism and to buy time while con-
solidating white supremacy. T h e idea was to revive and revitalize ethnic 
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rivalries of the Mfecane era by reversing the unifying factors of pan-
Africanism, education, intermarriages, urbanization and nationalism. Sim-
ultaneously any redundant worker and any political 'agitator' would be 
banished to his/her respective bantustan. Legally, all Africans in 'white' 
South Africa became temporary sojourners, without title to civil liberties 
and property ownership. Squatter and tenant-labour problems as well as 
personal disputes and housing shortages were resolved by forced resettle-
ment in the bantustans. 
T h e bantustan policy failed to destroy African nationalism. It also 
further divided South Africa itself by creating n e w factions among the 
ethnic and racial groups. It created a new type of leadership and 
nationalism in the bantustans. S o m e of the leaders, especially Chiefs 
Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei and Gatsha Buthelezi of the K w a 
Zulu bantustan, achieved national and international fame. They became 
interested in complete independence which white South Africa could not 
aiford to grant. Economically, the bantustans turned out to be modern 
versions of the old African reserves, characterized by overpopulation, 
over-stocking, erosion, underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty and 
despair, and leaving the young males with no alternative but to offer 
themselves to the white m a n for low-paid jobs. 
A s Nelson Mandela had stated in his presidential address at the A N C 
convention of September 1953, there was going to be ' N o easy walk to 
freedom' for the Africans of South Africa. Another peaceful demonstration 
of 1956 led to the famous Treason Trial of 156 leaders which dragged 
on until March 1961. As with most protracted and complex historical 
struggles, the A N C leadership began to differ over the correct and most 
effective means of confronting white violence and repression, and, as a 
result, the Pan African Congress ( P A C ) was born in April 1959. 
A s stated in the Africanist by Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, the founding 
president, the P A C regarded South Africa as an African country and was 
committed to the overthrow of white domination and to pan-Africanism. 
It was opposed to multi-racialism and to white leadership because it 
regarded all whites 'as shareholders in the South Africa Oppressors 
C o m p a n y (Pty) Ltd'. Simultaneously, the all-African Federation of Free 
African Trades Unions of South Africa ( F E F A T U S A ) was also formed 
due to the disillusionment with the multi-racial South African Congress 
of Trades Unions which supported the A N C . O n the whole, the A N C 
and P A C drew their membership from the same middle class, proletariat 
and peasant groups on an individual basis. But the students and progressive 
intellectuals tended to join the P A C . 
T h e P A C declared i960 as the 'Year of destiny, positive action, African 
independence and self-determination', and for its inaugural issue it chose 
a 'Positive, decisive campaign against the Pass Laws ' , beginning on 21 
March i960. According to the instructions issued by Sobukwe in the 
P A C circular, Calling the Nation^ African males in every city and village 
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plate 10.1 Robert Sobukwe, president-founder of the PAC (Pan-African Congress), photo¬
graphed in 1963
were to leave their passes at home, join demonstrations and, if arrested,
offer 'no bail, no defence, no fine'. The circular demanded total abolition
of the passes and a national minimum wage of £35.
The campaign, which took place in several locations throughout South
Africa, ended in the tragedy of the Sharpeville Massacre where a line of
white policemen, armed with guns and tear gas, opened fire upon an
'unarmed, amiable, well-mannered and unaggressive' crowd of between
10 000 and 20000, killing 72 and wounding 186 others - including 40
women and eight children.
Predictably, the government blamed communist conspirators for the
demonstrations, and banned the PAC and ANC. Nelson Mandela, Walter
Sisulu and others in the ANC formed an underground movement called
Umkonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation) centred at Rivonia near
Johannesburg which was raided in 1963 and, after the famous Rivonia
Trial, the leaders were imprisoned for life at Robben Island. The PAC
also organized another underground movement called POQO and it too
was soon destroyed. The PAC and ANC were forced to go underground
and operate from outside South Africa, while the only meaningful internal
260
S
outhern
A
fric
a
since
1945
0
0
3IàMuH2261
Africa since 1Ç35 
African opposition came from Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness 
M o v e m e n t . 
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were federated for 
ten years from 1953 to 1963, from an admixture of factors and interested 
groups.16 T h e British government wanted the federation to counter the 
anti-British, republican sentiments and apartheid of the Afrikaaners in 
South Africa by a neighbouring pro-British and multi-racial domination. 
British and South African international capitalists wanted the federation 
as an alternative area of investment to escape possible nationalization by 
the Afrikaaners. T h e English-speaking, white minorities of the two 
Rhodesias and Nyasaland, having ruled out the possibility of joining 
Afrikaaner-dominated South Africa, wanted the federation to contain 
African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia and prevent the impending 
independence of the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
which they perceived in terms of creeping c o m m u n i s m and nationalization. 
Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland generally were opposed 
to the federation because they realized that it would lead to the dominance 
of the settler colonialism of Southern Rhodesia, and therefore rob them 
of their protectorate status and independence. Africans of Southern 
Rhodesia generally had mixed feelings about the federation because they 
thought that the avowed federation policy of multi-racial partnership 
would possibly ameliorate settler colonialism and racism in their o w n 
country. 
T h e federation consisted of the federal and three territorial assemblies; 
matters dealing with African affairs, such as housing, pass laws and lower 
education, were reserved for territorial assemblies. African interests in 
the federation were represented by a multi-racial African Affairs Board. 
A s an entity, the federation was characterized by remarkable post-war 
economic development, with tremendous foreign investment and white 
immigration. Between 1946 and i960, the white population in Southern 
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland rose from 82 000 to 223 000, 
and from 22 000 to 76 000, and 2400 to 9000 respectively. T h e federation 
built the world-famous Kariba d a m for hydro-electricity, the University 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, several technical colleges and greatly expanded 
the communication systems. 
But the economic bonanza was in sharp contrast to the African feelings 
of betrayal and, therefore, disillusionment because most of the wealth, 
jobs and wages were going to whites while the colonialist and racialist 
laws were continuing. In retrospect, the federation was moribund because 
of the incompatibility between settler colonialism and multi-racial part-
16. See, for example, P. Keatley, 1963; D . Chanaiwa, 1976b; and L . B o w m a n , 1973. 
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nership. Through concerted effort, the Nyasaland African National C o n -
gress under D r Hastings Banda, the Northern Rhodesian African Congress 
under Harry N k u m b u l a and Kenneth Kaunda, and the Southern Rhodesia 
African National Congress under Joshua N k o m o , Ndabaningi Sithole and 
Robert M u g a b e soon mobilized strong African opposition against the 
federation. T h e British appointed the Monckton Commission which 
inquired into the federation and concluded that 'partnership was a sham'. 
In 1963 the federation was dissolved and Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia became independent Malawi (1963) and Zambia (1964) respect-
ively.17 
In Southern Rhodesia the post-war urban white bourgeoisie had 
attempted to contain militant African nationalism of the urban African 
proletariat and rural peasants by partial incorporation and assimilation of 
the emergent African middle class, through the policy of partnership, 
voting rights determined by educational and property qualifications, and 
preferential treatment in areas of education, housing, health, businesses 
and farming. T h e urban bourgeoisie failed because its assimilationist 
strategy came too late and offered too little. W h e n the African middle 
class joined forces with the masses, the white urban bourgeoisie became 
vulnerable to the political opposition of the white rural bourgeoisie and 
the white working class w h o rallied behind the Dominion Party and 
played upon the racio-economic interests of the white electorate. 
In frustration, the urban bourgeoisie decided to destroy African 
nationalism and to stay in power by appeasing the whites.18 A s in South 
Africa, the white parliament passed successive repressive laws, such as 
the notorious L a w and Order (Emergency Powers) Maintenance Act. In 
1957 Prime Minister Garfield T o d d was ousted because he was considered 
'negrophile'. In 1959 Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead conducted an 
Operation Sunrise raid, imprisoned 500 officials of the African National 
Congress, and banned the party. Africans formed the National Democratic 
Party ( N D P ) on 1 January i960 under the same constitution, tactics and 
leadership. 
In a last-ditch attempt to placate African nationalism, the British 
government, the settler government and African leaders agreed on the 
1961 constitution which advocated a legislative assembly of 50 white and 
15 African members , a cumbersome A - and B-roll voting mechanism, a 
constitutional council and a bill of rights. T h e African leaders, however, 
had to withdraw their support because of formidable opposition by the 
masses. A massive 'Build-a-Nation' and 'Claim-your-Vote' campaign by 
the Whitehead government failed to break up African opposition to the 
constitution. Consequently, the N D P was banned on 9 December 1961. 
17. P. Keatley, 1963. 
18. See, for example, L . Bowman, 1973; D . Chanaiwa, 1976b; G . Arrighi, 1970; and 
E . Mlambo, 1972. 
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In the 1962 general election the United Federal Party urban bourgeoisie 
was defeated by the Dominion Party (rural bourgeoisie and working class) 
led by Winston Field. T h e Dominion Party was renamed the Rhodesia 
Front and Field was replaced by Ian Douglas Smith. 
The Africans formed the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union ( Z A P U ) -
under the same N D P constitution, leadership and tactics - which was 
banned on 19 September 1962. T h e period between September 1962 and 
June 1963 was characterized by the leaderlessness, confusion and frus-
tration which resulted in the formation of the Zimbabwe African National 
Union ( Z A N U ) . Briefly, the causes of the Z A P U - Z A N U split, like that 
of the A N C - P A C , were: 
(1) the long-range frustration over the lack of progress towards 
independence; 
(2) the inevitable scape-goating syndrome; 
(3) the differences over non-violence versus armed struggle, and 
internal struggle versus government-in-exile; and 
(4) a general disillusionment with the leadership, especially N k o m o ' s . 
Simply put, the N k o m o faction at that stage was inclined to be more 
cautious, non-violent, and pro-government-in-exile, while the Sithole-
M u g a b e faction wanted a more radical, underground struggle. 
Between August 1963 and August 1964, Z A N U and Z A P U were 
engaged in a fierce membership drive which was accompanied by violence 
and intimidation on both opponents and neutrals. Predictably, the Smith 
regime, which was preparing for its Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence ( U D I ) from Britain, took full advantage of the fratricide to 
further divide the Africans and to turn the colony into a police state. O n 
26 August 1964, both Z A N U and Z A P U were banned and both leaderships 
were put under detention which lasted until December 1974. Like the 
A N C and P A C , Z A N U and Z A P U were forced to go underground and 
into exile in Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania where they began the armed 
struggle under the acting leadership of Herbert Chitepo and James 
Chikerema respectively. T h e Smith regime moved swiftly with an all-
white referendum on U D I in N o v e m b e r 1964, a general election in M a y 
1965 and U D I on 11 November 1965. 
Mozambique 
T h e post-war period in M o z a m b i q u e was characterized by a vigorous 
Portuguese drive to turn the colony into a settler economy similar to 
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Politically, Portugal had no intention 
of ever granting independence to its colonies. Instead, it wanted to draw 
them into a complex relationship with itself. It propogated the m y t h of 
a n e w missao civilizado, under which Portugal was allegedly a unitary, 
264 
Southern Africa since ig4f¡ 
universal state without colonies. Mozambique was supposedly a province 
and the Africans were Portuguese citizens.19 
Economically, Portugal wanted to take advantage of the post-war 
economic b o o m in its colonies to solve its o w n problems of unemployment, 
overpopulation and need for raw materials and markets. Mozambique 
continued to prosper after the war. Railways, roads and hydro-electric 
dams like Cabora Bassa were being built. Colonies consumed 25-30 per 
cent of Portuguese exports and contributed 20-25 P e r c e n t °f Portugal's 
national revenues. 
Portugal's strategy was to intensify European settlement in both Angola 
and Mozambique. O n an average, 4000-7000 Portuguese were exported for 
resettlement annually. T h e settler populations of Angola and Mozambique 
jumped from 44 000 to 250 000 and 27 000 to 130 000 respectively between 
1940 and i960. 
Consequently, Angola and Mozambique increasingly resembled the 
settler colonies of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, except for the 
historical constraints of the lack of sufficient capital for investment, 
ineffective colonial administration and economic dependency on the 
British capitalists. T h e bulk of the settlers were illiterate peasants or from 
the unemployed proletariat, and were not known for their cultural or racial 
tolerance. T h e resettlement scheme, therefore, led to the intensification of 
racism and the exploitation of African labour.20 
As a result, the first political parties were formed in exile. Mozambique 
started off with the National Democratic Union of Mozambique 
( U D E N A M O ) under Adelino G w a m b e which was formed in Salisbury 
(Harare) in i960 and the Mozambique African National Union ( M A N U ) 
under C . Mahal which was formed in M o m b a s a , Kenya, in 1961. In June 
1962, U D E N A M O and M A N U combined into the Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique ( F R E L I M O ) under D r Eduardo Chivanbo Mondlane. 
Beginning with the formation of these political parties in Angola and 
Mozambique and following the banning of the A N C and P A C in South 
Africa and of Z A N U and Z A P U in Rhodesia, there was a transformation 
from orthodox nationalism to the liberation movement, and from militant 
demonstrations to armed struggle, which w e shall discuss later. 
High commission territories 
O n e of the major concerns of Africans in post-war Basutoland, Bechu-
analand and Swaziland was their constitutional status, especially their 
possible transfer to the Union of South Africa. T h e 1956 Tomlinson 
Commission on bantustan policy actually included the high commission 
19. See, for example, L . B . Serapiao and M . A . El-Khawas, 1979; J. Sykes, 1971; 
T . M . O k u m a , 1962; D . Barneet and R . Harvey, 1972. 
20. For further details, see International Labour Organization, 1962. 
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plate 10.3 Dr Eduardo Chivanbo Mondlane (in the centre), founder and first president of
FRELIMO (the Frente de Libertaçào de Moçambique), photographed in 1962
territories among the proposed bantustans. Another issue was the dual
role between the resident commissioners and traditional kings. The third
question was on the nature and functions ofdistrict councils and hereditary
chiefs. Then there was the perennial problem of economic development
and migrant labour.
Through concerted opposition by Africans and the British dis¬
appointment with Afrikaaner republicanism, the territories were never
transferred to South Africa. The remaining domestic issues were resolved
constitutionally. Administrative proclamations, constitutional conferences,
national referendums, or orders-in-council changed the traditional kings
into constitutional monarchs, and made district councils the primary
organs of local governments.
In Swaziland a Constitutional Committee report of 1963 was rejected
by the people, and after another constitutional conference in London, the
country was first granted self-government in 1966 and then independence
in 1969. For Basutoland, there were constitutional negotiations in London
in 1958 and in Maseru in 1959, followed by orders-in-council in i960
which led to self-government consisting of an executive council, a national
legislative council of 80 members and elective district councils. On 4
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plate 10.4 Seretse Khama, exiled chiefofthe Bamangwato (Bechuanaland) with his English
wife, Ruth Williams, and their 20-month-old daughter, England, March 1952
October 1966 the territory became independent Lesotho.
The post-war constitutional history of Bechuanaland was complicated
because of two issues. The first was the conflict between the high
commissioner, who wanted to exercise more power over the appointments
of chiefs and over local government, and Tshekedi Khama, the Ngwato
paramount chief, who wanted to preserve his traditional powers and
culture. On the basis of the Native Administration Proclamation of 1943,
the high commissioner appointed the African and European advisory
councils, and thereby injected racism into local politics.
The second issue was the lengthy dispute (1949-56) over the marriage
of Seretse Khama, the heir-designate, to an English woman which led to
his forced exile in England and his permanent banishment from the
chieftainship for him and his heirs. The high commissioner was under
pressure from apartheid South Africa which did not want a black ruler
married to a white woman as a neighbour.
After 1956 the territory resumed its normal constitutional course. The
two advisory councils were joined into a joint advisory council, there was
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a legislative council in i960; and the first political party - the Bechuanaland 
Peoples' Party - was formed in i960. After the Lobatsi Conference of 
1963 led to self-government, the territory became independent Botswana 
on 30 September 1966. 
Southern Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s: the armed 
struggle 
T h e dominant theme of Southern African history of the 1960s and 1970s 
was the revolutionary tide of liberation movements and the armed struggle 
in the settler colonies of South Africa, Rhodesia, M o z a m b i q u e , Angola 
and Namibia." B y then Africans had finally accepted the failure of middle-
class liberalism and orthodox nationalism, and of militant demonstrations 
in the face of settler power and intransigence. Furthermore, historical 
hindsight derived from the disappointing performance of most inde-
pendent African states had taught Africans about the futility of political 
decolonization and independence without accompanying economic and 
cultural emancipation. 
It had become clear that true independence in a settler-colonialist 
and multi-ethnic society like South Africa and Rhodesia would require 
structural dismantling of the existing institutions, as well as the modes 
of production, ownership and class formations. It would necessitate a 
proletarian economic democracy of mass-controlled resources, means and 
goals of production, distribution and services, in order to satisfy basic 
h u m a n needs, end economic exploitation and insecurity, and promote 
social justice. 
Liberation movements , therefore, were rooted in a comprehensive, 
emancipatory ideology, the dominant components of which were: 
(1) an uncompromising commitment to anti-imperialism, anti-
colonialism, anti-racism and sometimes anti-capitalism, as 
well as to national self-determination, to pan-Africanism, n o n -
alignment and basic h u m a n rights; 
(2) a bias towards the urban proletariat, rural peasants and pro-
gressive intellectuals w h o were perceived as the vital revolutionary 
vanguard in the liberation process; 
(3) the adoption of, in some cases, scientific socialism along Marxist-
Leninist principles in the areas of economic production, dis-
tribution, consumption and social relationships; and 
(4) the prevention of external links of dependency and subordination 
and the promotion of militant solidarity with the other liberation 
movements and oppressed peoples of the world. 
21. See, for example, E. Mlambo, 1972; T. M . Okuma, 1962; N . Mandela, 1965; 
B. S. Biko, 1972; G . M . Gerhart, 1979; and U N E S C O , 1981b. 
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T h e protracted armed struggle was launched around 1964. Internally, 
the liberation movements received political and material support from the 
urban and rural masses, and from progressive intellectuals, civil servants 
and businessmen. Externally, they obtained diplomatic and material 
support mainly from the Liberation Committee of the Organization of 
African Unity ( O A U ) , from non-aligned nations and from the U S S R , 
China and other socialist countries; as well as from the Scandinavian 
countries and humanitarian and solidarity groups in the Western world. 
T h e movements themselves co-operated and assisted each other with joint 
intelligence networks and military operations. T h e operational bases and 
training camps were located in the frontline states of Tanzania, Zambia 
and, later, Angola and Mozambique. 
Conversely, the white settlers of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and 
Mozambique obtained diplomatic and material support from Western 
governments, mainly the United States, Britain, France and West 
Germany. Regionally, South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese forces 
assisted each other with joint intelligence and anti-guerrilla operations. 
T h e Portuguese and Rhodesian governments placed the Africans in 
operational zones into strategic concentration camps which they euphem-
istically called 'protected villages', in order to isolate and starve the 
freedom-fighters. 
T h e first successes of the armed struggle were in the Portuguese 
colonies. In Angola, the M P L A gained control of a large territory around 
Luanda; the U P A was operating in the north from Kinshasa; and U N I T A 
in the east from Zambia. In Mozambique , F R E L I M O gained effective 
control of the northern districts of Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado. In 
defence, the Portuguese intensified the 'protected-village' system and 
resorted to brutal methods of torture, massacres, banishments and assassin-
ations. For example, D r Mondlane was assassinated in February 1969. 
H e was succeeded by Samora Machel. 
Despite the massive support from Western governments, the colonial 
wars soon became too burdensome for Portugal. B y the late 1960s, 
Portugal was spending nearly half its annual budget on colonial wars, and 
although the conservatives, senior army officers and financiers wanted to 
continue the wars, the general public had given up. General Antonio de 
Spinola wrote a book, Portugal and the Future, which advocated the end 
of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. T h e n on 25 April 1974, the army 
overthrew the government of President Caetano and installed Spinola as 
head of the junta. 
T h e liberation struggle had forced the Portuguese to look inwardly and 
critically at their o w n economic underdevelopment and dependency and 
at the political dictatorship of Salazar and his successor, Caetano. T h e 
new interest in domestic issues and the increasing deaths and expenses 
from the wars, left the Portuguese with no option but to negotiate for 
the quickest end to colonialism. O n 8 September 1974, they signed the 
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Lusaka Agreement with the liberation movements, which set up interim 
self-governments for Angola and Mozambique and established the mech-
anisms for conducting general elections. In 1975 Angola and Mozambique 
became independent under the M P L A and F R E L I M O respectively. 
T h e independence of Angola and Mozambique had an irreversible 
effect on the armed struggle in Southern Africa, especially in Rhodesia 
and Namibia. It stabbed the settlers of South Africa and Rhodesia and 
their Western allies in the back and left them diplomatically and militarily 
vulnerable. They were no longer insulated by Mozambique and Angola. 
T h e United States' foreign policy on Southern Africa, which, as stated 
in the National Security M e m o r a n d u m 39 of 1969, was designed to 
support and promote white-minority regimes, was suddenly invalidated. 
Ian Smith, the prime minister of Rhodesia, w h o previously had sworn 
that Africans would not obtain independence in a thousand years, had to 
reckon with impending African rule in his lifetime. T h e Western powers 
had to change their pro-white policy to one of détente with the frontline 
states, while promoting for a while pro-West and neo-colonialist African 
regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia. T h e settlers were pressured to negotiate 
with African leaders for internal settlements. 
Meanwhile, independent Angola and Mozambique provided the lib-
eration movements of Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia with tremen-
dous advantages in the form of their proven legacy of military organization 
and tactics. T h e two former Portuguese colonies also placed their former 
bases and training camps at the disposal of their oppressed neighbours. 
With the frontline hospitality of Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, 
Tanzania and Zambia, Z A N U , Z A P U , the South West Africa People's 
Organization ( S W A P O ) , the A N C and P A C were able to intensify the 
armed struggle. 
For ten years (1964-74), the Zimbabwean freedom-fighters had waged 
the armed struggle from Tanzania and Zambia, under their acting leaders -
Chitepo for Z A N U and Chikerema and, later, J. Z . M o y o , for Z A P U . 
T h e target was the illegal U D I of Smith and his fellow cowboys. Britain 
had not recognized the U D I and had persuaded members of the United 
Nations to apply economic sanctions in the hope of forcing Smith into a 
negotiated internal settlement. T h e sanctions had not been effective 
because the settlers had found allies in South Africa and the Western 
world w h o assisted in breaking them. Meanwhile Britain had sponsored 
several 'peace talks' with both Smith and the moderate elements among 
the African and white bourgeoisie. 
Internally, the United African National Council ( U A N C ) had been 
formed under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in response to 
the power vacuum and the British-sponsored peace talks. T h e U A N C 
was the replica of the past orthodox nationalist organizations like the 
N D P , aiming at decolonization through militant demonstrations. T h e 
goals and tactics of the U A N C were, of course, tailored to the internal 
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realities of settler power and repressive laws, and some internal followers 
of Z A N U and Z A P U also belonged to the U A N C . 
T h e independence of Mozambique gave new hope and vigour to 
Z A N U , Z A P U and the U A N C , and made Smith receptive to a negotiated 
settlement.22 Under pressure from South Africa, Britain and the United 
States, Smith agreed to release the detained African leaders for con-
stitutional talks in a train stationed over the bridge at Victoria Falls in 
1974. Following the abortive conference, N k o m o , Sithole, Mugabe and 
Muzorewa attempted to form a c o m m o n organization under the umbrella 
of the U A N C and the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa which never 
materialized. Then N k o m o and M u g a b e formed a c o m m o n Patriotic Front 
which intensified the armed struggle with Z A P U operating from Zambia 
and Z A N U from Mozambique. 
T h e Victoria Falls conference was followed by other abortive con-
stitutional conferences in Geneva, Salisbury and Malta on the ways and 
means of transferring power from the white minority to the African 
majority. Then, after three months of negotiations, Smith, Muzorewa, 
Sithole and a traditional chief called Jeremiah Chirau, agreed upon the 
Internal Settlement on 3 March 1978, the terms of which were: 
(1) an African majority rule based on universal adult suffrage of 
citizens of 18 years and above; 
(2) an Independence D a y on 31 December 1978; 
(3) removal of racialist legislation; 
(4) a bill of rights; 
(5) a 100-member parliament of which 72 would be Africans and 
28 whites; and 
(6) a transitional government consisting of an executive council and 
a ministerial council in which Africans and Europeans would 
share power equally. 
T h e Patriotic Front boycotted the negotiations, denounced the Internal 
Settlement as 'a political and legal swindle', and continued the armed 
struggle against the Smi th-Muzorewa government. 
T h e deadlock was finally resolved at the Lancaster House Conference 
of 1979 at which Smith, M u z o r e w a and the Patriotic Front agreed to the 
Lancaster House Constitution which set the terms for a British-monitored 
general election, for a parliament of 80 Africans and 20 whites, for a bill 
of rights, universal suffrage and independence in 1980. At the election, 
ZANU-Patriotic Front w o n 57 seats, Z A P U w o n 20 seats, the U A N C 
w o n 3 and ZANU-Si tho le failed to win a single seat. Robert M u g a b e , 
president of Z A N U - P F , formed his government with him as prime 
minister and Reverend Canaan Banana as president. O n 18 April 1980, 
the former colony of Rhodesia became the independent state of Z i m b a b w e . 
22. UNESCO, 1981b. 
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plate 10.5 From left to right: Sally Mugabe, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, President
Rev. Canaan Banana and Vice-President Simon Muzenda, photographed in ¡980, the year of
Zimbabwe's independence
The problem of Namibia
Namibia has had a very complicated constitutional history.23 Under
European colonialism, it started off as the German colony of South-West
Africa until 1920, when it became a mandated territory of the League of
Nations to be administered by Britain. Britain delegated the responsibility
of administration to the then pro-British Union of South Africa. When
South Africa became an Afrikaaner-dominated republic, it continued to
rule Namibia practically as its own province. The apartheid laws and
practices of South Africa were applied to Namibia.
Economically, Namibia became South Africa's captive source of raw
materials and migrant labour. The Namibian economy consisted of:
(1) mining (diamonds, uranium, copper, zinc and lead);
(2) agriculture (cattle and sheep); and
(3) fishing.
More importantly, it is typically a neo-colonialist, externally-oriented
economy based on a selective exploitation of natural resources for export.
23. For example, see R. H. Green et al., 1981.
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Over 90 per cent of domestic production (100 per cent for minerals, 99 
per cent for fish, 100 per cent for karakul and 90 per cent for cattle) is 
for export. T h e bulk of the exports go to South Africa for processing, or 
through South Africa for re-exporting. Furthermore, ownership of the 
means of production, as well as the top management and the technicians, 
are foreign. Mining is dominated by the South African-based Anglo-
American Corporation, the American-based Metal Cl imax-Newmont at 
T s u m e b and the British trans-national corporation, R T Z , at Rossing 
uranium mine. 
Legally, Namibia became a trustee territory of the United Nations, 
which succeeded the League of Nations. T h e U N General Assembly 
resolved in 1966 that South Africa's occupation and rule over Namibia 
were illegal. T h e U N Security Council passed the same resolution in 
1969 and, after a protracted trial, the International Court of Justice ruled 
in favour of the United Nations in 1971. T h e U N then established the 
United Nations Council for Namibia as the de jure governing authority, and 
acknowledged S W A P O as the 'authentic representative of the Namibian 
people'. But, for economic, political and military reasons, South Africa 
refused to leave Namibia in defiance of the world community. Thus , de 
facto power remained in the hands of South African police, soldiers and 
administrators. 
T h e independence of Angola and Mozambique radically changed the 
course of the armed struggle in Namibia and South Africa. Being afraid 
that Angola and Mozambique would be used as springboards for carrying 
out the armed struggle, South Africa decided to destabilize the newly 
independent states by providing arms, training and mercenaries to U N I T A 
under Savimbi in Angola and to the so-called Mozambique National 
Resistance Movement . In Namibia, South Africa pursued a dual strategy 
of intensified exploitation of natural resources, especially minerals, and 
consolidation of a pro-South African puppet leader and government. 
Under South African sponsorship, the white Republic Party led by 
Dirk M u d g e and the South West African National Party consisting of 
a n t i - S W A P O puppet chiefs, bourgeoisie and their followers, held a 
conference at Turnhalle in Windhoek. T h e participants formed the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance under the leadership of M u d g e and agreed 
on peripheral reforms designed to remove only petty apartheid. 
Like most reformist developments in colonial situations, the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance came too late and offered too little. It was denounced 
by S W A P O , the frontline states, the O A U and the U N . T h e United 
Nations initiated its own plan which advocated a cease-fire, a U N peace-
keeping mission, and a UN-monitored general election leading to the 
independence of Namibia. Furthermore, Angola brought in Cuban troops 
which assisted its forces in resisting Savimbi and South Africa; and 
the U S Congress temporarily refused to continue financing American 
mercenaries in Angola. 
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plate 10.6 A SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization) detachment on patrol
For a while South Africa rejected the UN plan because it still wanted
a puppet government and its soldiers in Namibia, and it insisted on
keeping the port of Walvis Bay as leverage over independent Namibia.
With the connivance of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany
and Canada, who constituted themselves into the so-called Western
Contact Group, South Africa adopted the strategy of appearing to be
interested in a settlement in order to deflect international criticism, while
consolidating its neo-colonialist plan in Namibia. In December 1978,
South Africa sponsored the election of 50 puppet members of the
Constituent Assembly under martial law during which the entire internal
leadership of SWAPÓ was arrested. Consequently, the Namibian conflict
became a multi-pronged struggle with SWAPO, the frontline states, the
OAU and the UN on one side, and South Africa, the Turnhalle Alliance
and the Western Contact Group on the other. However, by 1989, the
independence of Namibia and the electoral victory of SWAPO seemed
certain. Namibia's political dawn was at last about to break.
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South Africa 
Following Sharpeville and withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the 
Nationalist Party moved swiftly to consolidate the apartheid system and 
to turn South Africa into a fully-fledged police state, by passing additional 
repressive and racialist laws. For example, in M a y 1963, it passed the 
General L a w A m e n d m e n t Act which authorized policemen to detain a 
person incommunicado for 90 renewable days. T h e Criminal Procedure 
A m e n d m e n t Act of 1965 authorized policemen to detain a court witness 
incommunicado for 180 renewable days. T h e Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act of 1968 made it illegal for any political party to have 
inter-racial membership. T h e Liberal Party decided to disband, while the 
Progressive Party complied with the law. 
In spite of South Africa being a police state, with its arsenal of 
weapons, soldiers, tear gas and police dogs, the liberation struggle actually 
intensified. Internally, the struggle was spearheaded by students and 
trades-unionists. O n e of these students was Steve Biko, a medical student 
at Natal University, w h o experienced profound frustration and dis-
illusionment with the racialist politics of the multi-racial National Union 
of South African Students ( N U S A S ) . H e wrote Black Souls in White 
Skins which was a PAC-type treatise on multi-racialism and white 
liberalism.24 In July 1969, Biko became the founding-president of the 
South African Students Organization ( S A S O ) , because black students 
wanted to 'do things for themselves and all by themselves'. 
Biko and S A S O finally brought h o m e the pan-Africanism of George 
. Padmore and K w a m e N k r u m a h , the négritude of Leopold Senghor and 
A i m é Césaire, the revolutionary philosophy of Franz Fanon, Malcolm X 
and Amilcar Cabrai, and the socialism of Sékou Touré and Julius Nyerere 
to the African masses of South Africa. Their ideology, which became 
known as Black Consciousness, exposed the weakness of the orthodox 
African nationalism of the past and popularized the liberation movements 
and the armed struggle. 
T h e Black Consciousness M o v e m e n t resulted in a student-worker 
alliance among S A S O , the Black Allied Workers' Union, the Black 
People's Convention (BPC), and the Soweto Students Representative 
Council. Together, these organizations revived the pre-Sharpeville tactics 
of militant demonstrations. W h e n industrial strikes became widespread 
and forceful, the government used the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1967 to 
arrest Biko and the executives of S A S O and B P C . Biko died in detention 
on 12 September 1977, having been mortally beaten and tortured by the 
police. 
24. For further details, see B . S. Biko, 1972; G . M . Gerhart, 1979; and T . Thoahlane, 
1975-
275 
Africa since igjs 
Nevertheless, both organized and spontaneous opposition continued 
the struggle against apartheid inside South Africa. F r o m June to December 
of 1976, a tide of demonstrations and strikes rocked the cities of South 
Africa, exemplified by the students' riots in Soweto at which the police 
killed 23 people and wounded 200 others. In the same year the Azanian 
African People's Organization ( A Z A P O ) was formed for effective political 
mobilization. 
Predictably, the Nationalist government responded with stern police 
action and bannings. O n 19 October 1977, S A S O and 16 other organ-
izations, including the B P C and the Soweto Students Representative 
Council, were banned. T h e African newspaper, The World, was banned 
and its editor, Percy Qpboza, was imprisoned. In November, the whites 
held their general election and the Nationalist Party was returned with 
an even greater majority. But the liberation versus repression cycle inside 
South Africa, and the armed struggle waged by the A N C and the P A C 
with the support of the frontline states, the O U A , the U N and the vast 
majority of the world community continued with greater intensity into 
the 1980s. B y the election of 1989 white consensus in South Africa was 
beginning to crack from both the right and the left. Afrikaanerdom was 
less of a monolith than it had ever been. 
Global strategy and regional geopolitics 
In this period of African history, three primarily external conflicts helped 
to boost the strategic value of Southern Africa. These were, first, the 
Second World W a r ; secondly, the Cold W a r between the Western world 
and the Soviet alliance; and, thirdly, the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
T h e industrial value of the minerals of Southern Africa for Britain and 
its empire rose to new levels of importance under the challenge of the 
Axis during the Second World W a r . Strategic metals vital for the factories 
of the Commonweal th and its allies were at stake. At the beginning of 
the war there was some anxiety about Italy's capacity to strike southwards 
from the H o r n of Africa, capture the important eastern seaport of 
M o m b a s a , and then endanger traffic to and from the mineral transit points 
of Southern Africa. But Italy during the Second World W a r turned out 
to be a paper tiger from quite early. M o m b a s a was only briefly imperilled. 
T h e second external military threat to Southern Africa was potentially 
from African colonies whose European imperial powers were under Nazi 
occupation. Madagascar, for example, was for a while under 'hostile' neo-
Vichy control. In was not until M a y 1942 that the British invaded the 
island - and General Charles de Gaulle's authority was at last recognized. 
T h e third external military threat was potentially from Japanese battle-
ships or war planes. But the level of technology in the 1940s necessitated 
more refuelling stops than were accessible to the Japanese for such 
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long-distance adventures, though the resources of Southern Africa were 
profoundly tempting to the mineral-poor Japan. 
But in m a n y ways the most important threat to Commonwealth control 
of South Africa was internal. It was within the Union of South Africa -
in the form of considerable Nazi sympathies among the Boers. Almost 
immediately after Britain declared war on Hitler's Germany, Hertzog 
attempted to have South Africa declare itself neutral. T h e parliamentary 
motion was defeated by 80 votes to 67. O n 5 September, Smuts formed 
a coalition government - and declared war on Germany. In February 1941 
riots broke out after a pro-Nazi Ossewabrandug meeting in Johannesburg. 
But there were enough Afrikaaners in agreement with English-speaking 
whites to ensure support for the Allies. Major harbour improvements in 
Table Bay were undertaken soon after the declaration of war. In the 
previous year the South African Air Force had been enlarged - and 
preparations for munitions factories in Pretoria were initiated. 
In July 1940, Smuts broadcast to Britain and the United States about 
an 'international society of free nations'. A n d in August, General Smuts 
was gazetted field-marshal. In July 1943, Smuts w o n the general election 
in South Africa. T h e pro-Nazi forces in the country were temporarily 
subdued. For the rest of the Second World W a r , the strategic worth of 
Southern Africa for the industrial democracies was protected. 
T h e world war closed with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. A new strategic value was n o w added to Central and 
Southern Africa — the presence of uranium. For a while Zaire was the 
most important source of uranium in the southern hemisphere - and 
prospecting for other sources further south was soon under way. T h e 
nuclear age had dawned upon the world — and Central and Southern 
Africa were part of the new era, for better or for worse. T h e strategic 
calculus of the area had become more complex. 
Meanwhile, a new and more pervasive rivalry had descended upon the 
post-war world - the Cold W a r between the Western powers and the 
Soviet alliance. It is to this second conflict affecting the strategic value 
of Southern Africa that w e must now turn. T h e Soviet Union had of 
course been an ally of the Commonwealth and the United States in the 
Second World W a r . While the paranoia about 'communism' in Southern 
Africa was basically unabated even during the global conflict, the open 
denunciation of the Soviet Union was temporarily muted from about 
1942 to 1945. 
Once the Cold W a r got under way following the end of the Second 
World W a r , both anti-communism and hostility to the Soviet Union 
resumed their ascendancy in Southern African politics. B y February 1956 
the Pretoria government was ready to close d o w n Soviet consulates in 
the Union of South Africa. T h e tendency to equate domestic communism 
with 'treason' became a feature of the paranoia of the regimes in Southern 
Africa. In South Africa this resulted in a number of highly publicized 
277 
Africa since igjs 
'treason trials' and trials against communism. These included the mass 
'treason' trials of anti-apartheid Africans, Asians and Europeans. W e have 
also referred earlier to the celebrated martyrdom of Nelson Mandela; and 
in March 1966 Abram Fischer, Queen's Counsel, was tried for c o m m u n i s m 
in Pretoria and sentenced to life-imprisonment. 
But as the Soviet Union was losing even its symbolic presence in 
Southern Africa, it was soon gaining a new diplomatic status north of 
the Zambezi. O n e African country after another - newly independent — 
established diplomatic relations with the U S S R . T h e Soviet diplomatic 
presence in the continent in this period started to m o v e relentlessly 
southwards. By the middle of the 1960s, the Soviet Union was represented 
in Lusaka - becoming part of the 'frontline'. B y the middle of the 1970s, 
the Soviet diplomatic presence had moved even further south - and 
gained a higher profile than ever before. Maputo and Luanda became for 
a while two of the staunchest African friends of the U S S R - and 
self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist republics, however tentative. F r o m a 
Western point of view, the strategic importance of Southern Africa as a 
whole was under a n e w challenge. 
T h e strategic rivalry between East and West was at its most dramatic 
over the issue of the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola. T h e war 
between the governing M P L A and U N I T A under Jonas Savimbi was 
internationalized — as Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the ruling 
party and South Africa and the United States subsidized and attempted 
to strengthen U N I T A . T h e fortunes of Namibia were caught in between — 
especially when South Africa and the United States declared Namibia's 
independence to be dependent upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. T h e ruling party, the M P L A , regarded that condition as 
a challenge to its sovereignty. A n d the South-West African People's 
Organization ( S W A P O ) naturally insisted that Namibia's right to self-
determination could not be held hostage to superpower politics in neigh-
bouring Angola. Throughout most of the 1980s a stalemate continued 
between the issue of Namibia's independence, on one side, and, on the 
other side, the strategic chess-game between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, played out in Southern Africa. It was Mikhail Gorbachev's 
policies of perestroïka and the policy of defusing regional conflicts, 
combined with the persistence of Chester Crocker of the United States, 
which finally helped the parties to reach agreement in 1988-9. 
T h e political e c o n o m y of location 
So far w e have discussed the Second World W a r and the post-war rivalry 
between East and West as two supreme conflicts which have highlighted 
the strategic value of Southern Africa. But there has been a third area of 
conflict which has had a similar impact on the significance of Southern 
Africa. This third area of international dispute is the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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B y a strange twist of destiny, Israel and the apartheid regime of the 
National Party of South Africa were born in the same year - 1948. A s 
the Zionist state was coming into being in the Middle East, the Afrikaaners 
were taking over power in South Africa. T h e historical interaction between 
these two troubled regions of the world was to be long-lasting and 
sustained. 
Part of the strategic interplay between the two regions arose from the 
fact that well endowed in underground riches as Southern Africa was, 
there was one subterranean wealth which the region more or less lacked -
petroleum. A n d yet oil was precisely the wealth which the Middle East 
had in abundance. This geological accident was to play a remarkable role 
in the strategic interaction between the two regions. 
Related to the geopolitics of oil is the fact that the Suez Canal and the 
Cape of Good H o p e have been for a long time alternative routes for the 
oil traffic and other central commodities of international trade, especially 
between Asia and the Western world. S o m e of the minerals of Southern 
Africa needed the Suez Canal to reach m a n y of the Mediterranean 
seaports. A n d some of the oil of the Middle East needed the Cape route 
to reach the Western world at large. 
Under ideal conditions this complementarity would have served both 
regions well. W h a t has periodically disturbed the equilibrium has in fact 
been the Arab-Israeli conflict and its wider global implications. 
T h e first major shock came in 1956 with Egypt's nationalization of the 
Suez Canal C o m p a n y . T h e Western world regarded the m o v e as a major 
threat to the international traffic through the canal - including the all-
important traffic in oil. T h e Suez crisis later exploded into the tripartite 
invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France. President al-Nasser 
deliberately blocked the canal by sinking junks and dilapidated boats. T h e 
canal was well and truly incapacitated. 
Perhaps for the first time in the twentieth century, the Cape route 
resumed supremacy in the calculations of the international trade of the 
Western world. T h e shock of Suez also resulted in long-term planning 
in favour of giant oil-tankers more suited to the Cape route than to the 
narrower Suez lifeline. 
It is true that shortly after the Suez war, Egypt obtained the help 
of the United Nations for clearing the canal. But in reality the shock 
of the Suez war was to tilt the balance of reliable seaworthiness in fav-
our of the Cape route for decades to come. This calculation was re-
affirmed by the repercussions of the Six-Day Arab—Israeli W a r of June 
1967. T h e Suez Canal was once again incapacitated - this time for a 
longer duration. T h e strategic value of the alternative Cape route for the 
oil-tankers and other international traffic was once again dramatically 
enhanced. 
But the politics of the Middle East and of Southern Africa had other 
areas of interaction. W i m the death of al-Nasser in Egypt, and the rise 
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of Henry Kissinger as power-broker in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union 
sustained setbacks in the Arab world. Particularly serious was Egypt's 
m o v e to the right under A n w a r al-Sadat and the increasing deradicalization 
of Sudan under Gaafar Nimeiri. 
This had repercussions in Southern Africa. T h e decline of Soviet 
influence in North Africa in the early 1970s was a major motive behind 
the Soviet Union's bid for greater influence in Southern Africa from the 
mid-1970s onwards. T h e game of strategic compensation between the 
superpowers was at work. It was not as crude as the exchange of Soviet 
patronage of Somalia for American patronage of Ethiopia within the same 
period. But there is little doubt that Soviet setbacks in North Africa were 
part of the story of Soviet determination to establish a foothold in 
Southern Africa. T h e strategic stakes of Southern Africa were of course 
further enhanced by superpower rivalry. 
T h e final factor to be borne in mind in the interaction between the 
Middle East and Southern Africa concerns Afro-Arab political solidarity. 
A m i n i m u m political alliance involves sharing enemies. In relations between 
black Africa and the Arab world, solidarity has entailed declaring apartheid 
and Zionism as joint foes. In the course of the 1970s, opposition to 
Afrikaaner nationalism and opposition to Zionist nationalism became joint 
political forces in the politics of both the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity. There were two dramatic diplomatic 
manifestations of opposition to Zionism. O n e was the almost complete 
African diplomatic break with Israel, especially in 1973. T h e other was 
the successful passing of a United Nations resolution in the General 
Assembly declaring Zionism as a form of racism in 1976. T h e quid pro 
quo in Afro-Arab relations involved continuing Arab support in all areas 
of the struggle against apartheid. S o m e rightist African countries also 
expected the bonus of Arab m o n e y for their o w n domestic development. 
T h e more leftist regimes in Africa regarded it as adequate that Africans 
should support the crusade against Zionism in exchange for Arab support 
in the liberation war against apartheid. T h e strategic equilibrium between 
South Africa and the Middle East was once again affected by the wider 
realities of international politics. But when Egypt under al-Sadat signed 
the C a m p David accords and recognized Israel, the united Afro-Arab 
front against Israel was weakened to some extent. Yet Israel's friendship 
with South Africa remained relatively strong. 
Conclusion 
W e have sought to demonstrate in this chapter that the three forces which 
have affected Southern Africa in this period of African history have been 
economy, strategy and race. O n the economic side w e have scrutinized the 
politics of land, labour, and the extractive capital of minerals. O n the 
strategic side w e have investigated the impact of the Second World W a r , 
280 
Southern Africa since 1945 
the repercussions of the Cold W a r between East and West, and the 
strategic interplay between the Middle East and Southern Africa in 
relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
A n d yet the most politicized aspect of the Southern-African experience 
has been the transient problem - the racial tensions of the sub-region. 
T h e range of racial experience in Southern Africa has been from the 
colour politics of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the 
controversial marriage of Seretse K h a m a and Ruth Williams, and from 
the political culture of mulattos in Mozambique to the political economy 
of 'bantustans' in South Africa. Racism in Southern Africa in this period 
has permeated every factory, defined every policy, affected every school, 
penetrated every religion, and disturbed the peace of mind of every family. 
In the final analysis, Southern Africa m a y well be the last great 
battleground of the h u m a n struggle against the more blatant forms of 
racism. T h e economic and strategic value of the sub-region is a long-
term asset, but the racial malaise is probably a temporary liability. 
A prophecy has already been proclaimed that the most disadvantaged 
blacks of the twentieth century m a y well become a m o n g the most 
privileged of the twenty-first. T h e people of Southern Africa — the 
'untouchables' of m u c h of this period of African history - stand a chance 
of becoming Africa's economic 'brahmins' of tomorrow.25 It will be up to 
them to respond to this unique opportunity. 
25. See Chapter 1 above; also R . W . Walters, 1987. 
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SECTION III 
Underdevelopment and the 
struggle for economic 
independence 
Economic changes in 
Africa in the world 
context* 
Catherine C O Q U E R Y - V I D R O V I T C H 
The crisis of the 1930s not only upset the economy of the West, by 
emphasizing the crucial role to be played henceforth by the United States, 
but it also marked a decisive turning-point in the sense that economic 
phenomena took on a global dimension. F r o m then on, everything that 
happened at the centre had repercussions all over the periphery, usually 
through a strengthening of the economic ascendancy of the West. 
T h e Second World W a r revealed the strategic importance of the 
continent of Africa which had become a key, and hastened the spread of 
the concept of the right to self-determination a m o n g the colonized peoples. 
T h e euphoria of post-war reconstruction, with its plethora of infra-
structure investment conducive to industrialization, and the world crisis 
that followed the Korean W a r (1951-2) and the Suez crisis (1956), were 
followed in turn by a more difficult restructuring stage punctuated by 
decolonization. T h e general recovery of the mid-1960s gave a momentary 
impression of a 'miracle', but the drastic reversal of the situation that 
followed in the 1970s brought about a further crisis in North-South 
relations, whose outcome is not yet foreseeable. 
Coming out of the Great Depression 
T h e 1930s crisis, which represented a major upheaval for the economy of the 
West, gave the signal for a fundamental restructuring of the world economy. 
T h e cushioning role of the colonial system 
T h e restructuring began with a defensive strategy, with colonial pro-
tectionism being momentarily strengthened. 
France had not waited for the crisis to occur before introducing, in 
1928, a colonial 'Customs Union' that facilitated falling back on the 
empire: this involved reciprocal exemption from duty between the colonies 
and the mother country and the application of at least the same customs 
tariffs to foreign goods.1 T h e same thing happened in Great Britain where, 
* Chapter written in 1986. 
1. L a w of 30 March 1928. See K . Hoffher, 1939, p. 55. 
TÏ T 
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after the First World W a r , the determination at all costs to get the pound 
sterling back on to the gold standard (1925) had led to a deflation 
that left Britain vulnerable to competition from those countries whose 
currencies had depreciated. T h e result was disastrous for growth: between 
1913 and 1937 its exports fell by 30 per cent, a m u c h greater rate than 
the contraction in world trade. Britain fell back on the Commonwea l th 
(which from then on held over 50 per cent of British total foreign 
investments); and this reflected a state of crisis, which was borne out by 
recourse to the defensive protectionism Great Britain had always hitherto 
rejected: through the Imperial Economic Conference held at Ottawa in 
1932, it clutched at the 'lifeline of empire trade'. Salazar's Portugal for 
its part had in 1933 adopted the course of colonial corporatism tightly 
controlled by the state, and in 1937 extended to the colonies the social 
and economic organization of the mother country. Based on authoritarian 
planning and the organization of state corporations and compulsory 
producers' associations (or gremios), this was designed to direct and control 
production and regulate foreign trade.2 
Empires were all the more at the mercy of the economic context 
because their credit markets were quite uncontrolled: total freedom of 
transfers to and from the mother country meant that the colonies were 
open to capital transfers, currency operations and dealings in stocks and 
shares. T h e more open a colony was to the Western world, the more it 
was affected by the international financial implications of the crisis - this 
was particularly the case in Morocco, which because of its protectorate 
status carried on less than 50 per cent of its trade with France (as against 
70-89 per cent for Algeria, roughly as m u c h for Tunisia and French West 
Africa, and even more for Madagascar). 
But the financial crisis itself, so acute in the West, had a limited impact 
in the Maghreb and in tropical Africa because the credit market was still 
in its infancy. T h e colonies most closely linked to the mother country 
were the ones that stood up best to the depression. 'Falling back on the 
Empire' played its cushioning role to the full, in both directions: the 
mother countries absorbed relatively easily primary products that in most 
cases represented only a small proportion of world output and, in return, 
the overseas territories served as the mother country's outlet for its least 
competitive products, such as textiles, iron and steel. This was apparent 
in France with the introduction in 1931 of a policy of major public works 
financed by loans raised at h o m e , which ensured that the products of the 
steel industry were disposed of in the colonies despite being more 
expensive than elsewhere. This approach above all m a d e it possible to 
support the most archaic (and hence the most depressed) sectors of the 
economy - chief a m o n g them being the textile industry, which turned to 
the colonial market on a large scale. France, which in 1913 was selling 
2. See M . Cahen, 1984, pp. 10-13. 
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18000 tonnes of cotton goods to Africa (including Madagascar), had 
almost doubled that figure by 1936 (34000 tonnes). It was the same for 
Great Britain, whose manufactured goods the outside world had less and 
less need of, while it needed more and more foreign foodstuffs: in 1935 
the balance of payments surplus disappeared, and a regular structural 
deficit became an established feature. This was a decisive turning-point 
in British economic history. Although, thanks to devaluation, which had 
become inevitable, the British economy recovered between 1931 and 1939 
rather sooner than elsewhere, it was at the cost of a system of controls, 
quotas and 'empire preferences' which reduced competition and hence 
tended to increase rather than diminish the country's technical back-
wardness.3 
Recovery and the world system 
T h e 1930s crisis ushered in the planned economy. This was the inner 
meaning of the New Deal in the United States and the Front populaire in 
France (to say nothing of Salazar's colonial corporatism). For Africa, the 
result was an acceleration of the penetration of capitalism, which brought 
these 'colonial reserves' into the realm of contemporary imperialism. 
T h e accent overseas was on the need for economic reforms based on 
productive investments, particularly in energy and mining; starting with 
the short-lived recovery of 1936-8, efforts were stepped up, particularly 
after the interlude of the Second World W a r , by the implementation of 
these new trends, and m a n y grandiose projects of this type were to be 
counted. They mostly fell victim to their disproportionate size and 
unsuitability to the environment. A typical example on the French side 
was the investment in the Office du Niger, which was first set up in 1931 
and was taken up and expanded under the Economic and Social Investment 
Development Fund (FIDES) after 1946. 
Social reforms designed to produce a modernized work-force were also 
introduced. T h e colonial practice oí forced labour tended to give way to 
the establishment of a free labour market, in the form of the payment of 
wages in exchange for the labour of an admittedly overexploited but 
voluntary work-force.4 Here the 'Belgian paternalism' exemplified by the 
labour policy of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga is a case in point: 
the company, which provided workers and their families with employment, 
schooling, recreational facilities and a standard of living far less under-
privileged than elsewhere, ended up by acting as 'chief, father and 
maternal uncle' all rolled into one, in exchange, of course, for total 
submission.5 
3. See C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976b. 
4. International Labour Office, 1931. 
5. B . Fetter, 1973. 
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T h e official abolition of forced labour (in 1946 in French Africa) 
certainly seems to have been the culmination of this restructuring process, 
which had given a flying start to n e w cash crops such as coffee, cocoa 
and timber and had m a d e forced labour obsolete. This was in the context 
in which the mechanism of worker migration had been set in motion 
once and for all, boosted as it was both by the impoverishment of the 
rural areas and by the growing b o o m in the labour market. 
In the light of the above, the subdivision of the stages of African 
dependence varies widely from one area to another according to h o w 
longstanding the colony was, whether or not capital had been invested 
early on, and so on. B y and large, the development of South Africa can 
be regarded as being nearly a century ahead of that of West Africa, and 
the intensive accumulation of capital in Zaire (Belgian Congo) at least a 
generation ahead. Nevertheless, even for South Africa, it was also in the 
1930s that there was a change of regime, from the usual type of colonial-
imperialist exploitation (mainly British) to a type of white national-capitalist 
exploitation. T h e latter became established politically in the 1920s, but 
only carried the day economically with the gold b o o m of the 1930s. 
T h e South African gold b o o m , which was triggered off in 1933, m a d e 
it possible for the country not only to counteract the effects of the world 
economic crisis but also to stimulate the restructuring of the economy by 
promoting the expansion of the industrial sector in the towns. T h e 
number of firms rose from 6500 to 10 000 between 1933 and 1946; 
industrial production increased by 140 per cent between 1933 and 1939 
(and by as m u c h again during the Second World W a r ) and G N P tripled. 
T h e main problem, which was once again racial, became that of a rapidly 
expanding black urban proletariat; the number of Africans employed in 
the towns doubled between 1933 and 1939. In 1946, one African in four 
in South Africa was living in a city and blacks outnumbered whites in 
the towns.6 
Tropical Africa and even North Africa had not yet reached this stage. 
But there also the impact of the Great Depression took the form of a 
deep internal social crisis: for though the colonial economies - that is, 
the interests of expatriate firms - on the whole got through the Great 
Depression more easily than their counterparts in the mother countries, 
the downtrodden peasants were the main victims of the upheavals taking 
place on all sides. 
A set of specific processes n o w came into play: the impoverishment of 
the countryside, the beginning of the flight to the towns and, thirdly, 
rapid differentiation into social classes. O n the one hand, a small section 
of the indigenous population became 'well-off'; on the other, the lot of 
indigenous workers deteriorated in relative terms, collapsing by c o m -
parison with that of the European work-force. This introduction of 
6. See, among others, R. Cohen, 1979; and D . O'Meara, 1974. 
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'unequal exchange' led, at the international level, to an accelerated flow 
of profits to the mother country, and points to the emergence of the 
typical features of present-day underdevelopment. 
The Second World War 
With the Second World W a r , the continent of Africa became a major 
prize contended for by the world powers and was briefly split between 
the British-held area and the ambitions of G e r m a n y and Italy. 
T h e ambitions of the Axis countries7 
Italy claimed the Mediterranean area as its sphere of influence. T h e 1937 
Munich Agreement between Hitler and Mussolini abandoned southern 
Europe and, further afield, North Africa to Mussolini. Italy had already 
colonized Libya, and Italian troops had been in occupation of Haile 
Selassie's Ethiopia since 1936. Together with Somalia, which had been 
Italian since 1885, and Eritrea, which had been under Italian rule since 
1890, the conquest of Abyssinia was expected to ensure the formation of 
an Italian East Africa (Fig. 11.1). Mussolini meant to link this with North 
Africa, hence his designs on Egypt, which brought about the conclusion 
of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty by way of reaction, and on Tunisia, 
at the expense of France. 
However, the realization of Italy's claims presupposed complete victory 
over Britain and the consent of Italy's G e r m a n partner, but these designs 
conflicted with those of Germany itself, not to mention the demands of 
Vichy France and Spain. 
T h e Third Reich's interest in Africa had started long before the war. 
Towards the end of the 1930s, a precise statistical survey had been carried 
out by German industrialists and the government bureau of statistics. 
T h e German authorities noted that in 1938 Africa held the first place on 
the world market for cotton, groundnuts and palm nuts, second place for 
cocoa, tea, tobacco and bananas, and an exceptional position in respect 
of its mining output (diamonds, gold, cobalt, vanadium, uranium and 
phosphates). Lastly, Africa possessed 40 per cent of the world's reserves 
of hydraulic energy.8 Germany realized h o w little profit its trade was 
making out of the wealth of Africa; hence the idea of a planned economy 
in a great G e r m a n Empire, in which Africa was seen as 'Europe's natural, 
historic area of influence . . . Consequently, its most important parts 
(mainly French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo and South-West 
7. This section was drafted after consultation of the following works: J. Bessis, 1982; 
A . K u m ' a N ' D u m b e III, 1980; R . H . Romero, 1986, pp. 213-18; and U N E S C O , 1985b. 
8. See M . Schmitt, 1942. 
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fig. 1 1.1 Italy's territorial claims in Africa (1940 plans) (Source: adapted from A. Kum'a
N'Dumbe III, Hitler voulait l'Afrique, Editions l'Harmattan, Paris, 1980)
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Africa) would have to be brought directly or indirectly under G e r m a n 
control'.9 
After the defeat of France in 1940 various projects for the 're-
colonization' of Africa south of the Sahara were accordingly tabled by 
either business circles or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
America's reaction 
North Africa was coveted at one and the same time by the Germans, 
w h o wanted to set up military bases there, by the Italians and also by 
the Spaniards, w h o wanted to extend their colonial possessions. Vichy 
France did its best to obtain some assurance; but until the end of the 
war North Africa remained very m u c h a disputed area between all the 
powers. 
This is w h y the president of the United States, in his message to 
Pétain, justified his country's entry into the war, with the consequential 
landing of American troops in North Africa, in the following terms: 
Today, with covetous eyes on the empire that France has so labori-
ously built up, G e r m a n y and Italy plan to invade and occupy French 
North Africa in order to implement their plans for the domination 
and conquest of this whole continent . . . It is of course obvious 
that an invasion and occupation of French North Africa and French 
West Africa would represent for the United States and the American 
republics the gravest of threats to their security . . .I0 
Above all, the war decisively established America's economic supremacy. 
It triggered off an unprecedented industrial mobilization in the United 
States. Even before Pearl Harbor, the machinery of a planned economy -
introducing price and wage controls — had already been set in place. 
Between 1934 and 1944 this made possible the creation of new jobs for 
some 9 million unemployed. Industry, 40 per cent of which was given 
over to military objectives, took a technological leap forward; for example, 
substitute products such as synthetic rubber were developed. 
O n the international scene, the key intervention technique used by the 
Americans was k n o w n as lend-lease, which consisted of providing the 
Allies with a variety of goods, subsequent repayment for which was 
negotiated on very liberal terms, without there being any question of war-
debts. This system was accordingly prompted less by economic necessity 
than by strategic considerations. 
9. J. Rohrbach (Director of the Colonial Department), 1940, p. 10. 
10. Telegram of 8 November 1942 from Roosevelt to Pétain, quoted by A . K u m ' a 
N ' D u m b e III, 1980, p. i n . 
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T h e C o m m o n w e a l t h bastion" 
Great Britain based her war effort largely on the Commonwealth, which 
it made a 'sterling area' (with the exception of Canada and Newfoundland). 
This was institutionalized in 1939-40 and covered almost one-third of all 
world trade. Full exchange control in dealings with countries outside the 
area was exercised by London. Hence, this self-contained economic 
Commonwealth defrayed the bulk of the military expenditure incurred 
in local currencies. That enabled it to pay its dollar reserves into a 
c o m m o n pool managed by London which, in exchange, credited the 
m e m b e r countries with 'sterling balances' that were not convertible 
into currencies outside the area. T h e system was primarily geared to 
guaranteeing imperial 'self-sufficiency' in respect of foodstuffs and raw 
materials. 
Colonial economic policies 
T h e Second World W a r was of decisive importance for black Africa. 
Unlike the previous war, it did not merely step up the pressure on the 
colonies through more intensive production and forced labour in the n a m e 
of the 'war effort', or make use of their manpower (about 160000 m e n 
were recruited in French West Africa between 1914 and 1918, and as 
m a n y again in North Africa, but only half this number was mobilized by 
the French between 1943 and 1945; on the other hand, the strength of 
the British West African Frontier Force rose from 8000 to 146000: over 
160000 Kenyans were enlisted as porters, and East Africa as a whole lost 
nearly 50 000 m e n ) . T h e war speeded up the spread of an anti-colonial 
mentality in Europe and Africa which soon made obsolete a regime that 
had formely been regarded as sacrosanct.12 
After having been widely employed outside the continent, African 
troops brought back h o m e with them the new ideas which they had 
gleaned from their contacts with Europeans and Asians. T h e superiority 
of the white m a n was dispelled once and for all; the African élite was 
quick to grasp the advantage offered by Soviet or American anti-colonialist 
propaganda. At the same time, however, the continent's economic role 
was reinforced. Owing to supply difficulties, the Allies were compelled 
to step up local production of strategic materials, such as iron from Sierra 
Leone and tin from Nigeria, and above all to develop processing industries. 
Between 1938 and 1946, British West Africa's foreign trade doubled, from 
£44 million to £86 million.13 T h e idea of considering granting the Africans 
political, economic and social rewards for the effort they had m a d e during 
11. See D . J. Morgan, 1980; also E . R . Wicker, 1958, pp. 170-92. 
12. UNESCO, 1985b. 
13. M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 481-513. 
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the war came to take root. That effort had been mobilized through 
the interventionist economic approach of the mother countries, which 
represented the only way of providing support for a strict policy of 
investment and industrialization. 
British policy: the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) 
W h e n the war broke out, the British set up bodies for overseeing the 
large firms. These were the forerunners of the marketing boards, whose 
reserves were expected to offset the risks entailed by a fall in the 
purchasing prices paid to producers in the event of production rising. 
In particular, they broadened the scope of the 1929 Colonial Develop-
ment Act, which had for the first time sought to distinguish between 
'development work' and 'ordinary administrative work', which was alone 
financed out of a colony's normal revenue. Apart from 'physical-develop-
ment' schemes, the former already included public health (with the aim 
of ensuring an efficient work-force) and initiatives in the educational field. 
Despite the limited sums m a d e available between 1930 and 1940, 30 
per cent of all funds went into transfer infrastructure, 16 per cent into 
health and 10 per cent into water-supply systems. Yet neither scientific 
research nor agricultural development ever received more than 7 per cent 
of the total. 
T h e 1940 Act provided for credits at the still very modest level of 
£50 million for the following ten years (though they rose to £120 million 
in 1945). It widened the scope of development, which became 'planned 
development' and was organized with the backing of a sizeable admin-
istrative structure geared to both planning and implementation. 
Nevertheless, planning was delayed by shortage of staff, which had 
been mobilized for the war. Yet the key point had been reached: the 
principle was officially proclaimed that laissez-faire policies were no longer 
acceptable where the colonies were concerned. 
French planning policy: from Vichy to the Free France 
Despite political differences, the French attitude was altogether similar. 
Colonial economic planning, which was unquestionably in the wind, was 
not a new idea. It had already been put forward in 1934, in the middle 
of the crisis, by the Conference économique de la France métropolitaine et 
d'outre-mer, this introduced the idea of the state's role not only in financing 
but also in planning. Supplementing the already-acknowledged principle 
of developing infrastructure was the more novel one of stimulating 
industry by setting up a Comité des industries de l'Empire. Nevertheless, 
the idea of not competing with interests in the mother country was still 
firmly entrenched. 
At the time of the Front populaire, colonial economists had taken up 
the question again. They suggested a consistent economic programme 
that was both modernist and reformist and was based on a 'planned 
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economy in the public interest', as opposed to exclusively private enter-
prise under free competition. For the first time, the need was stressed 
for developing productive activities in the colonies, first of all domestically, 
thereby giving rise to an industry-oriented approach as part of an 
'economic decentralization' that would 'develop' the territories - a newer 
term than the 'improvement' hitherto advocated.14 However, the Front 
populaire colonial programme ran out of time, and the colonial empire 
accordingly entered the war more or less as it had been since it was first 
set up. 
It was under the Vichy government that a team of 'technocrats' went 
to work. In the middle of the Second World W a r , they drew up the first 
French economic plans - including one for the colonies. Admittedly, the 
Ten-Year Plan (1942-52), which was never actually ratified by the 
country's o w n government, m a d e only modest provision for the colonies, 
amounting to only 84 billion francs or 11.8 per cent of the total. In any 
case, this was a purely notional figure, since the state was required to 
intervene only if private enterprise was unable to cope (only 40 per cent 
of the work was regarded as profitable).15 
Although the intention was not to set up productive capacity in the 
colonies that would be liable to compete with the mother country 
(industrial investment overseas, including the Maghreb , represented only 
7.5 per cent of that for metropolitan France), as a matter of 'imperial 
solidarity' the problem was posed in a n e w way: 
T h e colonies and the mother country form a community . . . Since 
the colonies are bound to gain access to modern technology, their 
industries will develop either with our support or . . . against us, 
which is to be avoided.16 
T h e prime aim was to protect the foreign trade of the French empire by 
guaranteeing it markets outside occupied France. T h e African Economic 
Conference held in Vichy in 1942 accordingly decided to set up the 
Thomson-Houston Radio and Electrical Appliance C o m p a n y in North 
Africa, to treat French and colonial vegetable oil mills on an equal footing, 
and to institute a co-ordinating committee for the textile industries of 
the French empire. 
T h u s Vichy's modernism stemmed from the thinking of an admin-
istrative élite which had taken advantage of the exceptional circumstances 
of the war to draft, in close collaboration with business circles converted 
to industrialization, a plan that was to remain after the war the framework 
of an ambitious colonial economic policy.17 
14. L . Mérat (Adviser to Marius Moutet, Minister for the Colonies), 1936. 
15. See C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1979, pp. 69-94. 
16. P. Le Cacheux, n.d., p. 58. 
17. See J. Marseille, 1984, pp. 340-2. 
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F r o m the post-war years to the period of decolonization 
At the end of the war, the mother countries set out to incorporate Africa 
into the international capitalist system. T h e instruments of 'acculturation' 
were n o w within the reach of the n e w élites; and it was finally accepted 
by all that Africa was getting ready to open itself up to the rest of the 
world. 
Internal crises and conflicts 
But this opening-up did not move off all that smoothly. After five years 
of relative commercial isolation, the re-establishment of peacetime relations 
with the West brought about violent internal economic and social traumas. 
T h e standard of living had declined dramatically. In addition to the 
wage-freezing during the war, import prices had rocketed following 
wartime inflation in Europe. O n the French side, the creation of the 
colonial or C F A franc with a value double that of the French franc (which 
correspondingly increased the value of raw-material exports) was not 
enough to offset the high cost of imported consumer goods18 and in 
retaliation for its settlers' lukewarm support for the Free French, North 
Africa did not enjoy the benefit of this measure. 
A n urban sub-proletariat was coming into being all over Africa, swollen 
by the influx of jobless people driven out of the rural areas by the war 
effort, with its forced labour, compulsory crops and heavy taxation: they 
consisted of ill-paid workers, roodess individuals from here, there and 
everywhere, and the unemployed. Temporary accommodation became 
permanent, with hardly any roads, public services or sanitation. 
Until then, the colonial authorities had been careful to check the 
formation of any working class, whether black or white, especially in the 
mining areas and the ports. T h e war broke d o w n this 'empire of silence'. 
Disturbances broke out in many different places; and because of the 
severity and repressive nature of the administration, they mainly took the 
form of the 'spontaneous' uncontrolled outbursts. T h e towns became the 
prime focus of the clashes. In 1944, the first sign was the uprising at 
Thiaroye (Senegal) which was sparked off in the c a m p of a colonial 
infantry regiment awaiting demobilization.'9 
In 1945, a riot in Douala brought together the trades unions and the 
sub-proletariat.20 In 1947, a populist 'agitator', Lamine Kaba, held the 
town of Kankan, in Guinea, for 48 hours.21 
18. 1 C F A franc = 1.70 F F in 1946-^ 7, and 2 F F the following year as a result of the 
French devaluation. 
19. M . Echenberg, 1978, pp. 109-28. 
20. R . A . Joseph, 1974, pp. 669-87. 
21. J. Suret-Canale, 1972, vol. 3, pp. 14, 18 and 27. 
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During the same period, major insurrections broke out in the Algerian 
département of Constantine in 1945 and in Madagascar in 1947, along 
with strikes in Abidjan and Dakar and disturbances in Elisabethville and 
Brazzaville, where 'abject poverty' was rife. There were also strikes in 
Nairobi and Accra coinciding with the return of K w a m e N k r u m a h , not 
to mention the wholesale stoppage of work by miners on the Rand in 
1946. 
African trades-unionism was thus moving from inter-racial class con-
sciousness to nationalist rebellion. While the severe repressive measures 
meted out helped to give a political complexion to these movements, they 
also drove some of them back into traditional forms of resistance rep-
resented by such messianic movements as Kibanguism, Matswanism and 
Hamallism. T h u s an explosive mixture was being formed by groups cut 
off from the mainstream in both towns and rural areas. This gave rise, 
in the 1950s, to the rebellion fomented by the Union des populations du 
Cameroun ( U P C ) in Cameroon and to the M a u M a u insurrection in 
Kenya. 
T h e situation in the W e s t 
T h e period from 1946 to 1971 was by and large one of rapid economic 
recovery especially in the first stage before the recession that followed 
the end of the Korean W a r (1951-2). 
T h e revival was backed by American aid grounded in anti-
communism and the reconstruction of the pillars of capitalism, first 
of all in Europe. This strategy hinged on two main programmes: the 
Marshall Plan, introduced in 1947, which was the sequel to lend-lease 
and part of which France managed to use for the promotion of its 
empire; and the Atlantic Pact concluded in 1949. T h e International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( IBRD) and the International 
Monetary F u n d (IMF) were established to regulate the economy of 
the non-communist world. T h e outcome was under the impetus of a 
state-controlled sector, ever swifter modernization, driven forward by 
nationalizations and technological and biogenetic revolutions. All this 
led to increased interdependence among the industrialized countries: 
each nation became more sensitive to the situation of its neighbours. 
It is true that African countries derived some benefit from 'technology 
transfers' and the expatriation of a number of industrial plants on the 
look-out for cheap raw materials and/or labour. But the main feature 
was an accentuation of both solidarity and dependence: on highly 
export-oriented multi-national corporations, and on countries producing 
raw materials, above all energy, and especially imported hydrocarbons -
whence the scale of the oil shock of 1973. 
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Colonial economic policies
The new turning was taken almost before the war was over: the Brazzaville
Conference was held in the French empire in 1944 and was followed in
1946 by the abolition of forced labour and the creation of FIDES (Eco¬
nomic and Social Investment Development Fund) to finance investment
in black Africa and Madagascar. An attempt was also made to launch the
industrialization of Algeria with a grandiose 'Constantine Plan' that was
interrupted by the war of liberation. The British Colonial Development
Fund was reorganized in 1945, followed by the independence of India
in 1947. The result in Africa was an upsurge in industrialization, with
emphasis being placed on transport infrastructure and increased production
for the mother countries. France in particular broke new ground in the
planning field. The first plan (Monnet Plan, 1946-52) included the
overseas territories: it focused mainly on reconstruction, with the stress
on capital investment, modernization and industrialization, and gave
importance to mining and energy production (with the first hydro-electric
schemes for Africa). The second plan (Hirsch Plan, 1954-7) included
a separate capital investment plan for the French Union: it aimed at pro¬
ductive development designed to identify in the colonies the new resources
needed to speed up their integration with the home economy.22
22. Commissariat général au plan, 1954 and 1955; Ministry of Overseas, 1954; Ministry
of Cooperation, n.d.
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In constant-value terms, French investment in Africa, accentuated by 
the transfer of the colonial interests lost in Indo-China, was at its height 
during this period, peaking in 1951-2 (Fig. 11.2); between 1950 and 1954, 
imported capital goods accounted for over half the gross fixed-capital 
investment. T h e main channel was public investment (70 per cent to over 
80 per cent of the total in French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon); the 
same was true even in French West Africa, despite the relatively higher 
contribution from the territories' domestic budgets.23 
• F IDES /FAC (Fund for Assistance and Co-operation) alone 
• F A C plus French international aid 
• Caisse centrale de la France d'outre-mer, then Caisse centrale de coopération 
économique (CCCE) 
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FIG. ii.2 The financing of capital investment in French-speaking black Africa and Mada-
gascar, 1946-73, in billions of IQ6O constant CFA francs (Source: C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
'L'impérialisme français en Afrique noire: idéologie impériale et politique d'équipement, 
1924-75', Relations internationales, 7, 1976, pp. 261-82) 
Great Britain adopted a more flexible type of planning, refusing to 
direct everything by remote control from London for two main reasons: 
first, because it was absorbed in the immense task of reconstruction at 
h o m e and, secondly, because excessive centralization ran counter to the 
principles of a process leading towards earlier self-government. 
T h e Fund was therefore broken d o w n , with an Office for Development 
and Reconstruction for each territory. T h e plan for Nigeria, for example, 
stood at £ 5 5 m , of which £ i 3 m were provided by the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Fund . T h o u g h regarded as quite inadequate by the 
élite, such an amount would have been unthinkable a few years before. 
Above all, it was difficult to implement, not so m u c h on account of the 
23. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976a, pp. 261-82, and 1982, pp. 237-52. 
298 
Economic changes in Africa in the world context 
shortage of funds as of the shortage of capital goods, since Great Britain 
was unable to provide the materials needed (particularly steel). British 
aid was far more differentiated than French aid: half the total funds 
(1946-58) went into social investments (education, health, water supply 
and housing), 20 per cent into agriculture and (unlike France) only 20 
per cent into transport infrastructure. Nevertheless, productive effort was 
also sharply focused on the raw materials necessary to the mother country, 
whence the particular emphasis on oilseeds of which there was an acute 
shortage in the post-war West. In every case, the dominant ideology of 
industrialization as the key to development ran up against the over-
ambitious scale of the projects, shortage of staff and ignorance of local 
ecological constraints. T h e failure of the large-scale groundnut schemes 
(the British Tanganyika Scheme 2 4 and the Compagnie générale des oléagineux 
tropicaux in Senegal) still symbolizes these obstacles. 
Planning and industrialization were not the preserve only of the liberal 
mother countries. With quite another aim - to maintain its grip on the 
colonies at all costs - Salazar's Portugal took similar action: the first six-
year plan goes back to 1953. Portugal had little capital, but American 
banks took an interest in its African colonies early on, through shared 
interests with South Africa. Great Britain and the United States had long 
been Portuguese Africa's main customers after the mother country; though 
American interests only became important with early attempts to find oil 
(1948 in M o z a m b i q u e and 1957 in Angola), and above all with the 
beginning of Angola's and Mozambique's wars of liberation. It was in 
fact only then - that is, in the 1960s - that Portuguese colonial possessions 
began to 'modernize' rapidly. 
In the Belgian Congo, after a very Eurocentric first plan (1950-60), it 
was only at the end of the colonial period that the administration drew 
up an economic and social expansion plan based on a n e w strategy:25 it 
laid emphasis particularly on peasant agriculture and greater government 
intervention in the industrial sector, the aim being to process the country's 
raw materials locally, avoid imports and increase employment. It remained 
a dead letter, however. After Mobutu had come to power and the 
presidential authority had become extremely centralized, a planning 
department came into being that was initially remarkably competent. But 
the 'brains trust' of advisers did not manage to stay, and the gap between 
plans and their execution remained as wide as ever. T h e 1979 plan, 
supported by massive foreign financial aid, had only a very limited success; 
for the state had not the means to implement a plan and still less to get 
the private sector to fall in with it. In Zaire as elsewhere the main reason 
for this is still the lack of a real political will to plan, which is the prime 
feature of a nation's determination to develop. 
24. J. S. Hogendorn and K . M . Scott, 1981, pp. 81-115. 
25. See F. Bezy et al., 1981. 
299 
Africa since 1Q35 
Decolonization in black Africa 
This took place in the context both of a temporary slowing-down in 
growth, accentuated by the crises of 1951-2 and 1956 (Suez) and also by 
the repeated American recessions of 1953-4, 1957-8 and 1960-1. 
T h e short but acute recession that followed the 1951-2 world crisis 
came at a time w h e n dominance-dependence relationships were being 
radically questioned. It marked the beginning of the decolonization process 
in black Africa which from then on was accepted and even advocated by 
the business circles concerned, particularly in France: it thus appears that 
political decolonization which, in Algeria, ran directly counter to French 
nationalist traditions had been preceded in the mother country by a 
strictly pragmatic economic decolonization. F r o m the 1950s onwards, the 
downturn in the underlying trend of the profits curve (Fig. 11.3), which 
had been growing steadily since the beginning of the century, makes it 
possible to explain the parallel rise of a current of nationalistic anti-
colonialism which was early on expressed by the specialized economic 
press as part of a conservative approach which favoured decolonization 
on the grounds of the rationality of sound economic management. T h e 
big firms such as the Société commerciale de l'Ouest africain ( S C O A ) , the 
Compagnie française de l'Afrique occidentale and Unilever therefore observed 
a prudent neutrality: since the regime was no longer in a position to 
guarantee special profit margins (and was even liable to reduce them to 
nought by political action if there were to be a war of liberation), n e w 
working relations were called for. 
T h e main currents of opinion opposed to the loosening of the mother 
country's grip had been expressed elsewhere before (in the case of France, 
at the time of the Indo-Chinese and Algerian wars). In black Africa, both 
French and British colonial officials were aware of the escalating cost of 
aid, and soon came up against the difficulty of mobilizing both the 
necessary local potential and work-force without seeking the help of local 
political leaders, w h o for their part were aspiring to take over the running 
of operations without breaking with the mother country.26 
Independence brought the African states into the field of competition 
of international imperialism; and this meant a revision of operating policy, 
which hastened both the intensification and the internationalization of 
capital. T h e decisive step for industrializing tropical Africa, often with 
advanced technology, was taken at this time (mining in G a b o n , Guinea 
and Nigeria and manufacturing industry elsewhere). 
26. See J. Marseille, 1984. 
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FIG. 11.3 SCOA'sprofits, igio-óo (Source: C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'L ' impact des intérêts 
coloniaux: S C O A et C F A O dans l'ouest africain, 1910-1965', Journal of African History, 
16, 1975, PP- 595-62') 
Independence 
T h e n e w states had to contend with the disjointed structures of under-
developed economies on inherited colonial lines, with production geared 
for export and with a very limited domestic market. N o w independence 
came at a bad m o m e n t , when the price of raw-material exports, their main 
source of income, was perceptibly falling, causing a marked deterioration in 
the terms of trade. Public revenue and expenditure suffered accordingly, 
while at the same time an unprecedented population explosion was 
gathering speed. This inevitably affected the growth of per capita G D P 
(Table 11.3, p. 315). 
But worldwide growth soon recovered in the second half of the 
decade, and for a while it seemed as though the 'miracle' whereby 
underdevelopment was conquered had come true in a few cases (Côte 
d'Ivoire, for example). 
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Relations between the E E C and the A C P (African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries)27 
Initially, the transfer of economic power took place without apparently 
too serious a shock. T h e salient feature was the trend towards multilateral 
relations within the European Communi ty . This started with a French 
initiative at the time of the Treaty of R o m e (1957). Despite opposition 
from G e r m a n y and the Netherlands, France insisted that the whole 
C o m m o n Market be opened up to the French and Belgian colonies in 
Africa. Since the existence of the European C o m m u n i t y was, of course, 
unthinkable without France, the latter got its way, barely a m o n t h before 
the signing of the treaty. This was less a desire for decolonization than 
a political action, aimed initially at favouring Europe by giving it reliable 
extra supplies of raw materials as the period of post-war shortages was 
drawing to an end, whereas the African colonies, thus opened up to wider 
trade and investment, were to be content with a few limited objectives. 
In fact, the system was to prove a flexible mechanism encouraging the 
transition from tight colonial links to a network of multilateral relations. 
T h e Preamble to the Treaty of R o m e affirms 'the solidarity which binds 
Europe and the overseas countries', and the desire of m e m b e r states 'to 
ensure die development of their prosperity, in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations'. T h u s the w a y was paved 
for an African c o m m o n market, based on three points: 
(1) the gradual opening of the markets of'associated' African coun-
tries to the exports of all E E C m e m b e r states, without dis-
crimination; 
(2) the opening of E E C markets to the produce of the associated 
countries, under special preferential arrangements; and 
(3) the inauguration of an economic and social investment pro-
g r a m m e in die overseas countries, financed by the E D F 
(European Development F u n d ) . 
Initially, the gains were more theoretical than real; opening up to die 
whole of Europe went slowly, but the diversification of markets had 
become possible, especially since tariffs were reduced more quickly than 
was provided for in the treaty. T h e associates' entry into the E E C had 
been negotiated by the mother countries, but at the beginning of the 
1960s no questions were asked - least of all by the n e w states, w h o 
confined themselves to confirming dieir acceptance of the commitments 
the mother countries had m a d e on their behalf - about the advantages 
arising out of the special multilateral relationship: that was left to Yaounde 
I and II (1963 and 1969) and then to L o m é I, II and III (1975, 1980 and 
1986). 
27. See C . Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978; F. Long, 1980; and C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
1988b, pp. 105-34. 
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For the African states the objective was to re-negotiate advantages at 
least equal to those guaranteed by the Treaty of R o m e . T h e y needed help 
from the E E C in transforming their economies, particularly in the 
industrial sector. They wanted to negotiate on a footing of parity and equal 
representation, and to obtain an export-price stabilization programme. But 
Europe, n o w rebuilt and confident of having organized its o w n self-
sufficiency, was not too keen to grant further advantages. It only agreed 
to preferential tariffs on tropical products, but without shutting itself off 
from Asian and American markets. 
T h e L o m é Conventions, in particular, marked a major turning-point 
in European policy: the number of partners rose from 18 states (17 of 
them French-speaking) to 46 (including 21 Commonweal th countries), 
and later to 69. T h e n e w aim was, starting with the A C P (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific) countries, to cover all co-operative relationships 
with the Third-World countries 'in a spirit of international solidarity'. 
F r o m then on, the problem went far beyond the case of the former 
mother countries alone. T h e setting up in 1975 of S T A B E X , which to 
some extent stabilized commodity prices, especially of agricultural produce 
(plus iron), within the limits of available funds - in 1980, $138 million 
out of $261 million recoverable - and then in 1980 of S Y S M I N , intended 
in principle to play a similar role for mining products, began to lend an 
air of reality to demands for a 'new international economic order', which 
had been called for by all the underdeveloped countries since the 
U N C T A D Conference in 1974. 
B y virtue of their economic characteristics, the African states accord-
ingly joined the ranks of Third-World - and particularly Fourth-World -
countries: underprivileged countries mostly without either minerals or 
oil. 
T h e crisis of the 1970s and African poverty 
Once again, the blow suffered by die centre of the system is entailing a 
recasting of the structural features of dependence in the periphery. T h e 
countries of black Africa, which include two-thirds of the world's 25 
poorest countries, hold even fewer trump cards in the North-South 
confrontation than those of North Africa. Buffeted as they are by natural 
catastrophes such as drought, the dubious legacy of the precolonial and 
colonial past, and the constraints of the world market, those countries 
are first calling for a n e w international economic order, a prerequisite for 
any internal restructuring, whereas their partners from the North are 
making 'internal structural adjustment' a prerequisite for any further 
assistance. With very few exceptions, such as Namibia and Zimbabwe, 
black Africa seems to be struck in a rut: Africa as a whole is the continent 
attracting the lowest volume of foreign investment and it accounted for 
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T A B L E i i.i Direct foreign investment in the continent of Africa, ig6^-8j 
Annual average value of flows in $bn Percentage of total 
19^5-9 1970-4 1975-9 1980-3 1965-9 1970-4 1975-9 1980-3 
Industrial 5.2 11.0 18.4 31.3 79 86 72 63 
countries 
Africa 0.2 0.6 1 1.4 3 S 4 3 
Source: World Bank, 1985, p. 126. For all the developing countries taken together, the 
nominal value of direct investment grew during the period by 10 per cent a year, but the 
real value remained virtually unchanged. 
only 3 per cent of the world total between 1965 and 1983 (Table 11.1). 
Virtually all sub-Saharan countries, apart from Zaire, Ethiopia and Nigeria, 
have a relatively small population, often ranging between 2 and 8 million 
inhabitants, with a very low purchasing power. There are few oil-
producing countries, and what few there are, are not very important. N o 
country can compare with Libya, except Nigeria. T h e production of 
Gabon, Angola and Congo hovers around the 10 million tonne mark. 
T h e oil resources of Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana, Benin and other 
countries are still no more than forecasts. T h e oil companies, especially 
following the recent fall in oil prices, tend to regard the oil deposits south 
of the Sahara as being in the nature of a 'reserve' to be drawn in the 
event of need, and exposed to political risks. 
T h e early 1980s saw a disturbing worsening of the situation, accelerated 
by the drought which between 1983 and 1985 affected over 20 countries 
and some 35 million people. At present, the fall in per capita income and 
unchecked domestic deficits are such that public savings, which were still 
15 per cent (of G D P ) ten years ago, have fallen to the extremely low rate 
of 6 per cent. At the same time, the net flow of outside capital is falling 
dangerously.28 
Despite an increase in debt reschedulings (14 countries had to have 
recourse to this in 1984-5), the proportion of export earnings devoted to 
debt repayment rose from an average of 18 per cent in 1980 to 26 per 
cent two years later and to 38 per cent for the poorest countries. Neither 
the present and no doubt transient b o o m in coffee prices nor the fall in 
oil prices will right a situation whose seriousness was again, in 1985, 
illustrated by a fall of nearly 3 per cent in G N P per head of population. 
W h a t is to be done? T h e first thing is to stop financing dubious large-
scale projects whose only impact is political. T h o u g h these schemes are 
getting rarer, such a measure is easier said than done, for it depends not 
only on awareness by the African governments but also, and perhaps 
above all, on the m a n y donors, w h o must co-ordinate their actions so as 
28. World Bank, 1986, quoted in Le Monde, 15 April 1986. 
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to avoid waste and agree to fit them into programmes laid d o w n by the 
Africans themselves. 
A modest growth hypothesis would just about m a k e it possible to 
reverse the declining trend in sub-Saharan Africa; this would entail, 
according to the World Bank, no less than $35.2 billion a year in external 
resources to cover debt-servicing and ensure a m i n i m u m quantum of 
imports. T h e equation is simple: estimating in 1985 export earnings at 
$20 billion a year, the lightening of the debt burden by periodical 
rescheduling at $2.3 billion, and the combined inflows from concessional 
aid, multilateral credits, and loans and investments at market rates at $9.5 
billion, there is still a shortfall of $2.5 billion. T h e combined efforts of 
institutions such as the World Bank, the I M F and the regional develop-
ment banks should produce an extra $1 billion. Hence, $1.5 billion 
remained to be found, representing a 20 per cent increase in the bilateral 
aid programmes currently envisaged between 1985 and 1990. 
A s a working hypothesis, the above calculation puts the ball right back 
into the court of the industrial countries. However , the better able Africa 
is to solve its o w n difficulties, the less dependent Africans will be on 
emergency aid, which is sometimes vital but whose destabilizing effects 
have been amply illustrated in recent years. 
T o round off this depressing picture, it should be added that almost 
one half of the world's refugees are Africans. 
T h e n e w forms of imperialism 
It is therefore understandable that in Lagos in April 1980 the secretary-
general of the Organization of African Unity, the Togolese E d e m Kodjo, 
shouted: 'Africa is dying . . . there seems to us no future in the future'.29 
T h e main feature of contemporary Africa is more than ever its 
dependence on the West. This dependence is, of course, due to poverty; 
but also to the recent colonial past, which has brought about a very special 
relationship with the former mother countries. 
This dependence is undoubtedly the West's doing; but it is also an 
internal, accepted, interiorized feature because culturally-speaking the 
model is still European. T h u s in terms of cumulative investment, France 
is only third (with 16 per cent of the total), behind Great Britain (39 per 
cent) and the United States (21 per cent); but it is at present the leading 
net exporter of capital to Africa, and overall (though the Federal Republic 
of G e r m a n y is hard on its heels) remains Africa's prime trading partner 
and main supplier of technical assistance. Contrary to a widely-held belief, 
penetration by the United States is still relatively limited. Admittedly, 
with nearly 15 per cent in North Africa, 45 per cent in tropical Africa 
and 40 per cent in South Africa, American investment is fairly evenly 
29. Quoted by l'Express, 14-20 M a r c h 1981. 
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distributed over the whole continent, whereas France's is mainly in the 
north and Great Britain's in the south. But apart from oil (57.5 per cent 
of capital invested in 1976) and mining (19.2 per cent), its impact is still 
small (only 9.3 per cent in the industrial sector). 
T h e result is that the Western model of economic and social develop-
ment is put forward as the only positive explanation of the movement of 
universal history; the keystone of the system is the idea of progress, but 
diminished by being identified only with scientific and technological 
progress; development is reduced to catching up with the West through 
'modernization' - that is, through ever-closer integration into the Western 
market. 
This is what gives rise to the model of economic success, and likewise 
that of the analysis of social classes. Local revolutionary Marxists (whose 
Western training initially directed their attention to the Soviet model) are 
nonplussed by the difficulty of advocating the doctrine of the pre-
eminence of the working class in countries where it hardly existed. Only 
Tanzania has sought to define a socialism rooted in home-grown values 
and potentials. 
This dependence has another consequence c o m m o n to all the countries 
and peoples of black Africa: a deep social distortion between the masses 
and the 'élites'. T h e élite (only some 5 per cent of the population on 
average) aspires to Western living-standards. But this consumption model 
(at least four times higher than for the ordinary citizen) is just what the 
hinterland is incapable of supporting. T h e very fact of integrating the 
privileged minority into the world system presupposes the marginalization 
of the masses in the form of a rural or urban sub-proletariat; instead of 
concentrating, in a very narrow domestic market, on the distribution of 
very cheap consumer goods, the tastes of the social minority require that 
trade be outward-oriented and reduce the economy to a subordinate, 
fragmented appendage of the international market. 
In this context, the injection of capital and the transfer of technology 
take place mainly for the benefit of certain national oligarchies or multi-
national corporations. For instance, Zaire's G E C A M I N E S , which, in 
principle, controls the production of copper and other non-ferrous metals 
and is the country's leading enterprise as far as foreign exchange and tax 
earnings are concerned, has, in fact, contracted out the processing and 
marketing of its copper to two firms controlled by the Société générale de 
Belgique. Broadly-speaking, the main banks, which exercise control over 
foreign investments in conjunction with the government departments 
responsible for finance and diplomacy in the countries of the North have, 
as their essential motivation, the making of a profit from their operations, 
whatever their repercussions m a y be locally, upstream or downstream. 
Results on the ground are not insignificant. But they are mediocre as 
far as the domestic market is concerned. T h e most striking factor is thus 
the constant decline in savings, which has become more marked since the 
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FIG. 11.4 Investment and savings in Africa, 1960-83, excluding oil-exporting countries 
(Source: World Development Report, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 49) 
early 1980s (Fig. 11.4). T h e deficit on current account, coupled with the 
low inflows of foreign investment, makes it imperative to resort to 
borrowing, but such a course only adds to the debt-servicing problem 
(Table 11.2). 
T A B L E 11.2 Evolution of the debt burden in low-income Africa, ig^o-84 
igjo 1974 1976 1978 ig8o 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Ratio of debt to 
G N P 17.5 23.5 27.7 26.9 39.8 43.4 47.7 52.0 54.5 
Ratio of debt to 
exports 75.2 99.5 135.3 l 6 2 -3 !75-8 216.5 260.5 279-5 278-i 
Debt service ratio 6.1 8.6 8.5 9.6 12.5 13.8 15.7 16.5 19.9 
Source: World Bank, 1985, p. 24. 
Furthermore, favouritism and corruption often give rise to systems in 
which the state is run as if it were the property of its leaders: those 
managing the economy and those managing the state seem to be concerned 
only with sharing out the national cake — for their o w n benefit and their 
respective regional clientèles. 
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T h e economic policy of the socialist countries 
In the triangular pattern of relationships between the South, the West 
and the East, the third partner stands virtually on the sidelines. In African 
eyes, the 'North' chiefly means Western Europe. It was only with the 
M o s c o w Economic Conference in 1952 that the Russians decided to 
extend the scope of their financial, commercial and technical co-operation 
beyond the Eastern bloc. In 1956, Khrushchev promised to provide the 
newly-decolonized countries with Soviet aid without any quid pro quo. O n 
the other hand, Vice-President Nixon m a d e several visits to Africa; an 
African desk was set up in the State Department, and the leading 
American foundations provided funding for work on Third-World issues. 
This is because policy in regard to Africa very quickly became enmeshed 
within the context of the 'Cold W a r ' , and continued until only recently 
to be marked by imperative strategic considerations, as evidenced by the 
massive Soviet interventions in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. 
China, in its turn, came onto the scene, often in a bid to counter the 
action of the Soviet Union, as in the case of Somalia;30 she undeniably 
offers an alternative to Africans responsive to the original nature of the 
Chinese experiment. S o m e features, such as the emphasis placed on 
the peasantry and agriculture, particularly reflect African conditions. 
Independent of ideological considerations, m a n y African states thus take 
advantage of Chinese expertise in everything to do with rice. 
T h e role of international organizations 
Although international organizations are unwieldy machines that are often 
looked upon as being excessively bureaucratic, they nevertheless perform 
a real job. In the first place, they have amassed an enormous quantity of 
technical and scientific studies and reports, not to mention the action in 
which they have engaged in the field in combating illiteracy ( U N E S C O ) , 
epidemics ( W H O ) , drought and hunger ( F A O ) , and so on. Those organ-
izations are supported by the United Nations Development Programme 
( U N D P ) , the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) , 
whose priorities are determined by the sacrosanct criterion of profitability, 
a criterion not easily accepted by the beneficiaries of their action, especially 
in U N E S C O ' s fields of competence (education, science and above all 
culture). This is w h y the United Nations has endeavoured to promote a 
n e w body, the International Fund for Agricultural Development ( IFAD) , 
with a view to 'increasing food production and improving the nutritional 
level of the poorest populations'. T h e F u n d placed emphasis on the food 
crops grown in local communities and on the rechannelhng of agricultural 
credit to small-scale farmers, for w h o m , failing the existence of a mortgage 
30. See J. Herzog, 1979. 
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plate 1 1.2 Bernardo Vieira, president of Guinea-Bissau, meets with M. A. Qureshi, senior
vice-president of the World Bank, in October ¡988
or other collateral, the lender accepts the venture as being viable. In an
endeavour to avoid ruinous expenditure on bureaucracy, IFAD intends
to make as much use as possible of the channels of existing institutions.
It has thus opened up a new approach, in the face of an unavoidable
observation: it is impossible to find a narrowly economic answer to
problems that are eminently social in character, such as malnutrition,
hunger, health and employment in the continent of Africa.
The reaction of Africans
The Africans' first reactions to international pressure were non-alignment
and the establishment and strengthening of relations with the developing
regions of the world, with the Arabs, the Asians, Latin Americans and
the peoples of the Caribbean, which are fully discussed in Chapter 28.
This stemmed from the profound conviction, born of experience, that
underdeveloped countries can exert very little influence on the outcome
of the North's problems, in either the Western or Eastern blocs, whether
within those blocs or in the event of conflicts between them.
Non-alignment actually came into being at the time of the Cold War
and the most acrimonious confrontations between East and West. Set up
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on the initiative of three undisputed leaders, Tito, Nehru and al-Nasser, 
it quite soon became the rallying point of all Third-World countries: at 
the 1979 Havana Conference they numbered 95. In Africa, non-alignment 
developed early on because of the failure of the Afro-Asian movement 
following the 1955 Bandung Conference. It was explicitly written into 
the Charter of the O A U (1963). But the criterion for non-alignment -
'to follow an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence' - is vague 
enough to be interpreted flexibly; and this, by satisfying everybody, 
crucially weakens its meaning because it is enforced more and more 
slackly - thus the prohibition on concluding a bilateral military alliance 
with a great power is n o w as little-observed on the Western side as on 
the Eastern.31 
But what remains is a general grievance against the 'North'. It originated 
in U N C T A D , the Conference on Trade and Development set up by the 
United Nations in 1964 under pressure from the developing countries. 
At that time, it was attended by nearly 150 states, 77 of which - since 
known as the 'Group of 77', though they had become 96 by 1971 and 
122 by 1982 - constitute the joint mouthpiece of the Third-World 
countries in opposition to 'Group B ' composed of the industrial states. 
Their proceedings led in 1974 to a Declaration and C o m m o n Programme, 
calling for the unjust order of the present international division of labour 
to be replaced by a 'new economic order based on equity, sovereign 
equality, interdependence, c o m m o n interest and co-operation between all 
States'. 
Needless to say, since then the North-South dialogue has by no means 
lived up to expectations, and the African partners are bitterly disappointed. 
T h e establishment of industrial 'free zones', like the one at Dakar, enables 
E E C countries in particular to protect their exports. T h e main demand 
of the A C P countries is still for an inflation-indexed increase in the price 
of their raw-material exports. This is the thing that would enable them 
to finance the massive importation of advanced technologies needed for 
the next stage in their industrialization. T h e n , perhaps, like some Asian 
countries, they would be able freely to take advantage of the combination 
of suitable natural resources and plentiful cheap labour to export large 
quantities of manufactured goods to the developed countries. W e are a 
long way from that. 
Self-reliance for Africa, in the shape of a vast integrated pan-African 
entity for which K w a m e N k r u m a h strived so hard, is still only a pious 
hope, despite the m a n y bilateral or multilateral economic agreements 
within the continent (Fig. 11.5). These are still hampered by a two-fold 
obstacle: on the one hand, the powerful push-pull effect, both to and 
from the industrialized countries and, on the other hand, intra-African 
political rivalries, which prevent the drive towards unity from being fully 
31. See E . Berg, 1980. 
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A D B TTie African Development Bank 
B C E A O Central Bank of West African States 
B E A C Bank of Central African States 
B O A D West African Development Bank 
C E A O West African Economic Community 
C P C M Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee 
E A C East African Community 
E A D B East African Development Bank 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
Economic Community of West African States 
Council of the Entente States 
Organization for the Development of the Senegal River 
Central African Customs and Economic Union 
Union of Central African States 
West African Monetary Union 
West African Clearing House 
FIG. 11.5 Regional and sub-regional organizations for co-operation and integration in Africa 
(Source: U N C T A D , TD/B/609/Add J, vol III, 1976, pp. xi-xii) 
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effective. T h e world recession holds out little prospect of significant 
progress in the short term. 
N e w factors 
South Africa 
O n e of the keys to the future of the African economy will be the w a y in 
which the South African problem is resolved. Until very recently, South 
Africa was the embodiment of imperialism in the region. A s the West's 
strategic base in Africa and a secure h o m e for its investments, it was the 
focus of all the various types of protest:32 
(i) anti-colonial protests because of the intolerable dependence it 
imposed on Namibia and the Africans of Azania; 
(2) anti-imperialist protests, because of the economic and military 
sovereignty it symbolizes in Africa; and 
(3) anti-racist protests, because of the iniquitous apartheid regime 
enshrining the unacceptable belief that whites are superior to 
blacks. 
T h e fact that Western imperialism is 'ditching' the Afrikaner nationalist 
is likely to bring about a radical change in the situation in a short space 
of time. 
T h e rise of the proletariat and trade unionism 
Despite the great nationalist upsurge of decolonization, there has been 
no real subsequent large-scale identification of social demands with 
political determination. 
In Portuguese Africa, industrialization pressed ahead relatively strongly 
from the 1960s onwards, both in the mines of Angola and the main ports 
of M o z a m b i q u e ; but the risk of proletarianization was curbed by the 
setting up of national corporative unions reserved for skilled (educated) 
workers. These mainly worked to the benefit of the n e w Portuguese 
immigrants. 'Native' status was abolished in 1961, but Africans ineligible 
for union membership were nevertheless restricted to carefully supervised 
'professional associations for natives'.33 
In French-speaking black Africa, railway and civil-service trades unions 
became relatively powerful. But the idea of assimilation, which was not 
really consistent with the struggle of the working class, was deep-rooted 
32. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1986, pp. 347-67. 
33. M . Cahen, 1984, pp. 10-13. 
312 
Economic changes in Africa in the world context 
both in political circles and a m o n g workers with a foothold in the money 
economy. T h e French political and trades-union tradition as regards the 
colonies, including the C G T (Confederation générale du travail} and the 
Communist Party, reinforced this tendency to confine working-class 
demands to the traditional framework of economic and social trades-
unionism. 
In English-speaking Africa, the reformist traditions of the trades unions 
put wage negotiations firmly before violent action. T h e example of Nigeria 
is particularly illuminating: each wave of strikes led to arbitration by a 
committee of inquiry, which usually ended in wage increases. Even so, it 
is questionable whether it is possible to speak in terms of a 'labour 
aristocracy'. Nigerian industrial workers are undoubtedly proletarians. 
Not far from Lagos, tens of thousands of workers are concentrated around 
some 50 factories; they work in various high-capital-investment and high-
productivity sectors. T h e workers are experienced and organized, but 
professional mobility is non-existent and wages soon reach the top of the 
scale. T h e workers are capable of taking industrial action for a specific 
local concession and are quite ready to speak of imperialist exploitation 
in general and the flagrant inequalities of Nigerian society, but their petit-
bourgeois ambition is eventually to become small independent businessmen. 
Their strategy is one of reaching an accommodation with the existing 
system, reinforced in general by the fact that m a n y political regimes have 
put trades unions under state control.34 This situation is almost universal 
in North Africa, paralysing workers' self-expression despite the fact that 
their numbers are high. 
Here again, the decisive impetus m a y c o m e from South Africa, which 
is n o w dominated by the major social fact that the urban and mining 
proletariats m a k e up the vast majority of the African population.35 This 
observation, obvious in the case of blacks, is also true, although to a lesser 
degree, for coloured (13500 employers for 700000 workers) and Indians 
(17000 for 160000). In South Africa it is the peasantry and the middle 
classes that are n o w dependent on the working class and not the other 
way round. Admittedly, since the explosion of strikes in Durban in 1973 
and the renewed agitation of the 1980s, the violence of the repression has 
so far managed to contain workers' uprisings. But the quite recent setting-
up (again in Durban) of a Trades Union Federation encompassing nearly 
all trades-union organizations has n o w produced a political and economic 
pressure group that could become decisive: the African National Congress 
has already drawn a lesson from this by including the workers' basic 
demands in its charter for freedom. 
34. O n the entire sub-Saharan working-class evolution in English and French-speaking 
regions, see C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988c, chs 12 and 13. 
35. See D . Dutoit, 1981. 
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T h e demographic and urban revolution 
T h e increase in population that began at the end of the nineteenth century 
in North Africa but got underway in black Africa only in the 1930s, has 
everywhere since the Second World W a r and still more since independence 
turned into an unprecedented explosion. T h e 'demographic transition' 
stage is unlikely to be reached before about 2015. 
This fact is a major feature of Africa's contemporary economy; but its 
long-term implications cannot be precisely gauged because population 
growth and economic growth m a y react on each other in contradictory 
ways depending on other political, social and cultural variables. 
In the short term, the situation is agonizing. Despite real growth in 
G D P (though this has slowed d o w n greatly since 1973) growth in G D P 
per head of population shows a lasting fall (Table 11.3). But though there 
are at present overpopulated areas (especially given die low profitability 
of farming), the continent as a whole is far from being overpopulated. In 
the long term, population growth has economic advantages that have been 
experienced elsewhere, though none of these parameters has operated yet 
in Africa, where economic development has so far undoubtedly been less 
successful than in the rest of the world.36 Population growth makes it 
possible to widen the domestic market and increase production and 
economies of scale; it speeds up the replacement of generations of illiterate 
workers by educated young people readier to adapt to the modernization 
of farming methods and industrial employment. 
At present what is more significant is the spectacular trend-reversal Africa 
is experiencing as between town and country. F r o m 1950 to 1980 total 
African population growth led to a tripling of the population (from 219 to 
560 million), and nearly two-thirds of this growth took place in the country-
side (still 85 per cent of the population in 1950; barely 60 per cent by 1980, 
but still over 70 per cent in black Africa). However, over the same period, 
the urban population increased almost five-fold (from 32 to 133 million), 
which is the highest rate of urban growth in the world.37 T h e result will be, 
around the year 2000, a population that not only will have doubled in 23 
years but will have become predominantly urban (55 per cent), and nearly 
two-thirds of total growth will be in the towns. It should be noted, however, 
that these forecasts do not take account of such post-1980 trends as the slow-
d o w n in urban growth and die dreadful depletion due to A I D S . T h e second 
half of the twentieth century will have seen the urban population of Africa 
increase ten-fold, for the same push and pull reasons as in other continents: 
poverty in the countryside, landlessness and social marginalization on the 
one hand; the mirage of money, freedom and the Western model in the 
towns on the other hand. 
36. See E . Boserup, 1985. 
37. See United Nations, 1981. 
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T h e pressure of numbers is not spread equally over each of the 55 
states of Africa, whether those with the highest populations, such as 
Nigeria (90 million) or Ethiopia (31 million); the largest, such as Zaire 
or Sudan; the least densely populated, such as Mauritania, Niger or 
Gabon; or R w a n d a and Burundi, which remain densely-populated small 
rural states. But the majority of African countries are feeling the full 
impact of an unprecedented wave of urbanization. 
Today, African cities are the focal point for political and social con-
frontation and the melting-pot for n e w forms of adaptation to the 'modern' 
world which are difficult to categorize and are roughly covered by the 
trite but vague term 'the informal sector'. Attention has been rightly 
drawn to the extraordinary capacity for adaptation, evidence of real 
ingenuity, shown by small producers in this informal sector; so far from 
being stagnant and unproductive, this sector is probably capable of 
producing structural changes by revolutionizing the jobs available to the 
urban and rural masses. 
In the short term, however, the situation is likely to be m u c h gloomier: 
all the signs point to an ever-growing influx of idle hands in the towns, 
compelled to use increasingly fragile stratagems to eke out an existence 
in a labour market that is virtually stationary or growing infinitely more 
slowly. T h e absorption of workers through the development of the modern 
sector is illusory in countries where the population growth rate is over 
2.5 per cent. For newcomers on the labour market to be fitted into 
industrial society there would need to be paid jobs for 50 per cent of the 
active population, whereas in most cases the percentage is barely 10-20. 
There in a nutshell is the tragedy of Third-World towns, which are 
evolving in a very different way from the industrial centres of nineteenth-
century Europe. W h e n all is said and done, it is a matter of sharing out 
increasingly inadequate opportunities in terms of work (and hence of 
resources and markets) among a fast-growing and increasingly-deprived 
mass of people. Hence the formulation of the pessimistic economic 
concept of urban involution — the virtual impossibility of escaping from 
a vicious circle of poverty except by emigration. 
T h e point to be remembered from n o w on is that the turbulent flood 
of uncontrolled or ill-controlled urban growth is bound to become, in 
black Africa as elsewhere, the main vector of possible upheavals. F r o m 
n o w on the towns are where people, employment and organizational 
structures are concentrated; economic and cultural influences are brought 
to bear, and political power is determined: in short, where tomorrow's 
decisive social pressures are destined to be deployed. 
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Maxwell O W U S U 
Introduction 
Agricultural policy and rural development in Africa have been distorted 
in a variety of ways by the whole legacy of the colonial experience. Rural 
effort and output have been hampered by a number of biases in policy 
and process. 
T h e bias which has been discussed the most is the export bias in African 
agriculture. This chapter will examine the nature of this distortion in 
production. T h e emphasis on cultivating crops for export has sometimes 
resulted in dessert and beverage economies — economies which are based on 
crops like tea, coffee, sugar and cocoa for the dessert confectionaries of 
the Western world, while the African people themselves are short of such 
basic foods as grain, meat and root crops. T h e export bias in African 
agriculture was created during the colonial era, sometimes under white-
settler control in places like Algeria and Kenya. But the bias has persisted 
in post-colonial Africa partly because of the need for foreign exchange 
with which to import other products. 
At its worst, Africa produces what it does not consume — and consumes 
what it does not produce. Within the agricultural sector on its o w n that 
generalization m a y not be fully valid, since the continent does produce 
m u c h (but by no means all) of the food it consumes. But the trend has 
been towards importing a larger and larger percentage of the food needed 
by the continent. 
A number of factors are responsible for the expanding need for food 
imports. These factors include expanding population (more mouths to 
feed), changing consumption patterns (more wheat and rice being con-
sumed than before), the deteriorating infrastructure for agricultural pro-
duction (shortage of spare parts and decaying roads), and inadequate 
incentives for local farmers either to produce more of the old food crops 
(such as maize and root crops) or to start producing the n e w crops (rice 
and wheat). 
T h e cash crops are still the royal family of African agriculture — 
attracting a disproportionate share of attention, reverence and resources. 
T h e export bias in rural development is still triumphant. 
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T h e second perfidious distortion in African agriculture is the urban 
bias. At a more general level, this has been a policy which has subordinated 
the needs of rural folk to the requirements of the city-dwellers. In per 
capita terms, the cities have had a bigger share of the revenues of the 
state than the countryside. This has been true of hospitals and schools, 
roads and railways, electricity and gas supplies, housing projects and other 
facilities. 
In terms of actual agricultural policy, a major consequence of the urban 
bias has been the tendency for African governments to subsidize the city 
consumer rather than the farmer. M a n y African governments have become 
virtual prisoners of this policy even w h e n under external pressure from 
the World Bank or, more often, the International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) . 
T h e I M F has often championed a switch of emphasis from subsidizing 
the consumer to motivating the farmer. But removal of food subsidies 
has sometimes resulted in bloody riots in cities as different as Tunis and 
Ndola, Cairo and Monrovia. Food subsidies in Africa tend to hurt farmers 
and benefit consumers. Essentially they are part of the urban bias in 
Africa's agricultural priorities. 
But the urban bias has been served by other factors as well. A s w e 
shall later indicate in this chapter, the entire colonial educational system 
seemed almost designed to produce rural misfits. Peasants themselves felt 
betrayed if their educated offspring did not turn their backs on country 
life on the farm. Education was supposed to be a process of liberation 
from physical work, especially from farm labour. S o m e of the best minds 
of Africa were systematically insulated from productive effort in the 
countryside. Educated Africans - born in the villages - were irresistibly 
diverted to the lure of city life. It was in such ways that the African 
school was conscripted to wage war against African agriculture. This 
was one of the most pernicious aspects of the urban bias in Africa's 
development. 
Sometimes the bias took the form of seeking foreign aid for local 
cultivation of a crop like wheat, consumed mainly by city folk. O n e of 
the more dramatic examples of this kind of urban bias was the agreement 
between Canada and Tanzania to produce wheat under conditions of 
advanced technology not far from the snows of Kilimanjaro. It m a y be 
true that ' m a n does not live by bread alone', but in that part of Tanzania 
m a n did not live by bread at all. A n d yet a major project was brought to 
fruition by the Canadians. T h e Hannan plains yielded an impressive 
tonnage of wheat - destined for the distant bread-eaters of the towns of 
Tanzania. Locally in the plains there was 'heavy cost - partly h u m a n and 
partly ecological'. T h e h u m a n cost was borne by the pastoral Barabeg 
people, w h o were pushed away to worse pastures than ever as a result of 
the wheat project. T h e ecological cost was borne by the soil of the place — 
volcanic and exposed to more torrential downpours than the prairies of 
Alberta. T h e result of the Canadian wheat project in the Hannan plains 
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of Tanzania has been devastating soil erosion. Once again, the urban bias 
in Africa's strategies of development had carried significant casualties in 
its wake. 
W e shall see later that the third distortion of colonial agriculture 
concerned the role of the state. Para-statal bodies in agriculture have, 
paradoxically, prospered under bodi colonial bureaucracies and post-
colonial socialist and other experiments. Government intervention in the 
production of cash crops has been particularly marked. T h e cultivation 
of basic foods outside the subsistence sector has also felt the nearness of 
the state. In the post-colonial era, marketing boards for agricultural 
produce have tended to expand dramatically in terms of personnel - and 
to deteriorate in efficiency. Marketing boards became one more area of 
'jobs for the boys'. 
O n e major casualty of over-bureaucratization of agriculture was inevi-
tably the farmer. T h e farmer subsidized the bureaucracy - the reverse of 
European strategies of government subsidies for the farmer. T h e over-
blown para-statal bodies in Africa have indeed eaten away into the farmer's 
profit margin - and m a y have undermined the farmer's motivation as a 
producer. 
President Ibrahim Babangida's decision to dissolve Nigeria's marketing 
boards in 1987 no doubt had political reasons, as well as economic ones. 
But the economic ones certainly included the quest for greater efficiency 
and the desire to improve both the profit margin and the overall incentives 
for the farmer. Symbolically, the dissolution of marketing boards was also 
a form of decolonization - a case of the government reducing the size of 
its o w n para-statal bureaucracies. W e shall return to some of these themes 
later in the chapter. 
T h e fourth major distortion in the legacy of colonial agriculture was 
the male bias. M u c h of traditional African agriculture had involved w o m e n . 
Indeed, w o m e n were often the majority of the farmers in African societies. 
T h e colonial impact did not end the numerical preponderance of w o m e n , 
but it did contribute to their marginalization. In the traditional setting, 
w o m e n had considerable say in determining the value of commodities. 
With the coming of the cash economy, w o m e n could still be the main 
determinants of prices for the local market in the hustle and bustle of 
conventional bargaining and exchange. But a number of colonial changes 
helped to shift the balance in favour of the men, especially in determining 
the value of agricultural produce. O n e factor consisted precisely of the 
marketing boards, which in personnel were overwhelmingly male. T h e 
buffer institutions between the producer and the consumer were a 
masculine preserve which marginalized w o m e n in the allocation of value 
to agricultural produce. 
A related aspect concerns the internationalization of African economies. 
T h e traditional local economies gave w o m e n considerable leverage in the 
processes of exchange. But as soon as African economies demanded distant 
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contacts with buyers in Japan, Europe and the Americas, the boards of 
directors of African firms consisted overwhelmingly of m e n . 
T h e modernization of agriculture has also increased the role of credit 
facilities for the purchase of seeds, fertilizers, equipment and for the 
construction of storage facilities. T h e expanding role of credit, in both 
the colonial and post-colonial periods, has often resulted in the expanding 
role of m e n . Partly because of indigenous constraints on w o m e n owning 
land, and partly because of more universal banking prejudices concerning 
the credit-worthiness of w o m e n , monetized agriculture in Africa has 
contributed to the marginalization of the female cultivator. 
T h e very promotion of cash crops helped the male bias in African 
agriculture. African w o m e n were often in control of the cultivation of 
y a m , cassava and maize. But in the cultivation of tobacco in Southern 
Rhodesia, or sugar in Uganda, or sisal in Tanganyika female expertise 
began to give way to masculine calculation and planning. Admittedly, 
female labour was still needed even in cash crops. Tea-picking in Karicho, 
Kenya, is overwhelmingly done by w o m e n . O n the other hand, tobacco 
work in Z i m b a b w e and rubber-tapping in Liberia are overwhelmingly 
male jobs. O n balance, cash-crop cultivation has tilted the balance in 
favour of male labour. 
W h a t is at least as significant is the managerial shift in favour of m e n 
on issues of cash crops. Decision-making about traditional food production 
allowed for a m u c h bigger female role than decision-making about cash 
crops. Production, processing, pricing and export functions in cash crops 
have basically been taken over by m e n . 
These then are four of the major distortions which the colonial 
aftermath has inflicted on African agriculture and on patterns of African 
development. This chapter examines the basic trends in the agricultural 
history of this period in the context of this colonial legacy and its 
distortions. Pre-eminent a m o n g them are the export priority, the urban 
emphasis, the state focus, and the primacy of the male. But the chapter 
will also draw attention to the other forces affecting the pace and direction 
of African agriculture. 
African peasant production and plantations 
It has been estimated that 60 to 95 per cent of the labour force of African 
countries are engaged in subsistence (farming and pastoral) or cash-crop 
agriculture or both. At least 80 per cent of the half a billion Africans 
m a k e their living from agriculture with m u c h of the planting, weeding, 
harvesting, simple processing and marketing being done by w o m e n . 1 
1. C I D A (Canadian International Development Agency), 1984, p. 12. 
3 2 0 
Agriculture and rural development since 1935
plate 1 2. 1 Woman agricultural worker, Morocco
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In a comparative estimate of the relative importance of subsistence 
agriculture in underdeveloped countries, Abercrombie points out that in 
Africa, exports account for a higher proportion of total agricultural 
production than in the Near or Far East, but domestic market sales were 
less in Africa than in the former two regions.2 This is consistent with the 
well-known fact that colonialism drastically re-oriented the African rural 
sector toward export cash-crop production and overseas, as opposed to 
internal markets. 
In Algeria, Kenya, Angola and Mozambique, the settler plantation as 
a dominant form has more or less died with independence. However, in 
Kenya and particularly in Tanzania, sisal, coffee, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum 
and rubber plantations were still employing, in the 1960s, about one-
third of the total labour force. O n Zanzibar, the clove and coconut 
plantations owned by Arabs and Indians are still important. In Zambia, 
a great part of commercial agricultural production is still provided by 
hundreds of settler farms spread along major railway lines. 
Plantations are noted for their research and efficient production w h e n 
properly managed and capitalized. However, they have not contributed 
m u c h to the alleviation of rural poverty in Africa, nor have they promoted 
equity-oriented national developments, as the example of the Firestone 
Tire and Rubber C o m p a n y of Liberia shows.3 
After the Second World W a r , farming by public corporations, a n e w 
development of plantation agriculture, emerged in a number of West 
African countries. There are some indications that multi-national agro-
business will become increasingly an important form of agricultural 
production in some African countries.4 
Agricultural and settlement schemes and co-operatives 
O n e of the first major and successful settlement schemes in colonial Africa 
was, of course, the large-scale, irrigated and mechanized Gezira project 
in the Sudan for the production of cotton for export, already discussed 
in Volume VII. T h e project began full-scale operation in 1925 and until 
1950, when the management was taken over by the Sudan Gezira Board -
a government organization - it was operated on a partnership basis 
between the government, African tenant cultivators and two commercial 
companies acting as managers. Considered 'the backbone of the Sudan 
economy' it involved in 1958 about 26000 Sudanese tenant farmers.5 
O n e of the most grandiose and disastrous of such schemes was the 
East African Groundnut Scheme undertaken by the British Overseas 
Food Corporation in 1946. 
2. K . C . Abercrombie, 1961. 
3. R . L . Curry, 1971; G . L . Beckford, 1972. 
4. C . Windstrand and S. Amin, 1975. 
5. U N E S C O , General History of Africa, vol. VII, pp. 455-6; D . H . Reader, 1964, p. 34. 
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Elsewhere in Africa, colonial governments faced with the problems of 
overpopulation, pressure on land, soil erosion and exhaustion due to land 
over-exploitation caused by colonial measures, resettled Africans under 
improved agricultural conditions, as occurred in the Eastern Province of 
Northern Rhodesia.6 T h e French in French West and Equatorial Africa 
and the Belgians in the Congo established m a n y paysannat settlement 
schemes aimed at improving the stabilizing peasant cultivation and at 
developing commercial crops. 
At the close of the colonial period, a large number of marketing, 
servicing and credit co-operatives were operating to handle problems of 
supply and the distribution of farm products a m o n g smallholder farmers. 
T h e evolution of cocoa-growing in Ghana and Nigeria and coffee in 
Tanzania by Africans was greatly advanced by co-operatives which a m o n g 
other things provided marketing, storage, pulping, transport and credit 
facilities (Table 12. i). In French West Africa, the Société indigène de 
prévoyance helped to educate farmers in better cultivation methods. 
Since independence in m a n y parts of Africa, governments and public 
corporations have been intervening in agricultural development along 
modern capitalist (and a few along socialist) lines, as government-con-
trolled co-operatives have mushroomed everywhere. N e w settlement and 
irrigation schemes have been established to promote agricultural trans-
formation and rural development. T h e y have varied greatly in size, aims, 
methods and results from small pilot projects intended to test the 
adaptability of agricultural machinery and n e w techniques in African 
ecological and agronomic conditions, to large-scale commercial ventures 
such as the A s w a n High D a m of Egypt which has resettled 180000 
fishermen and farmers in A s w a n , and has m a d e possible perennial 
irrigation and has tripled land use.7 
Tanzania initiated the ujamaa villagization project to regroup the 
dispersed rural population in order to make various improved agricultural 
and other services easily accessible to farmers on a collective basis.8 In 
the early days of independence, one of the most popular modes for the 
development of settlement schemes in East and West Africa was that of 
the Israeli tnoshav, which involved small-scale individual farms with 
centralized services for cultivation, marketing and social welfare. In 1959 
in Western Nigeria farm-settlement programmes were consciously based 
on the tnoshav model. In Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana, Israeli advisers 
played a crucial role in the planning of settlement schemes.9 
In several countries, mechanized farming schemes to bring larger areas 
under cultivation and to achieve higher levels of productivity were 
6. W . Allan, 1965. 
7. The Economist, 25 May- i June 1984, p. 42. 
8. J. Nyerere, 1967b. 
9. L . Cliffe and G . Cunningham, 1973. 
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T A B L E 12. i Number and volume of trade of consumer and marketing 
societies in selected territories, 1954 and 1957 
Number* Trade (value in £iooos) 
Territory* 1954 1957 1954 1957 
Consumer societies 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 
Nyasaland (Malawi) 
Kenya 
Tanganyika (Tanzania) 
Uganda 
Zanzibar (Part of Tanzania) 
Gold Coast (Ghana) 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
Marketing societies 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 
Nyasaland (Malawi) 
Kenya 
Tanganyika (Tanzania) 
Uganda 
Zanzibar (Part of Tanzania) 
Gold Coast (Ghana) 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
* Present-day name given in brackets. 
* At end of year. 
bi955-
cLess than £1000. 
Source: Co-operative Information Circular for the Colonial Territories, November 1955, 
January 1957, February 1958 and March 1959 (issued by the Co-operative Union Ltd, 
Manchester, England). 
established; in Western Nigeria, agricultural resettlement p r o g r a m m e s 
were implemented to counteract the drift of school-leavers to towns;10 
while in K e n y a , the 'Million Acre' settlement scheme w a s m e a n t to 
redistribute European farms to landless African farmers. According to 
C h a m b e r s , very few of the settlement schemes in Africa involved the 
establishment of c o m m u n a l forms of land tenure." Since the 1970s, with 
the assistance of the W o r l d B a n k and other development agencies, such 
10. D . Olatunbosun, 1967. 
11. R . Chambers, 1969. 
24 21 
16 12 
17 17 
4 5 
" 5 
2 2 
16 6b 
50 37 
2 1 
80 138 
48 70 
297 425 
231 462 
991 1373 
1 2 
363 376" 
S38 1105 
133 216 
490 2 020 
36 124 
3787 4510 
26 35 
128 S3 
2 9 
27" 
41 500 
16 
3638 4 578 
68 83 
12264 18491 
7830 10360 
2619 4112 
c 
6059 7457 
2188 4331 
138 218 
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as U N A I D and C I D A (the Canadian International Development Agency), 
a host of poverty-oriented integrated rural development programmes have 
been initiated throughout Africa, including irrigation works, livestock 
development, soil and water conservation, credit, infrastructure develop-
ment - all designed to increase agricultural output and rural incomes to 
alleviate rural poverty, both absolute and relative.12 
Agricultural produce marketing and the price mechanism 
T h e dualistic colonial and neo-colonial character of African agriculture 
and rural development is nowhere more evident than in the system of 
marketing of agricultural produce and the prices peasant farmers face in 
the principal markets, which determines their income and hence partly 
their standard of living. 
Since the Great Depression and especially the Second World W a r , 
colonial governments, in assuming a n e w initiative for economic and social 
development in their African territories and, with the attainment of 
political independence, centralist African governments, in their pursuit of 
a policy of import-substitution industrialization involving the estab-
lishment of local food processing and other industries, have systematically 
intervened in the market for agricultural commodities - export crops as 
well as basic foodstuffs for domestic consumption. 
A m o n g the mandated objectives of such official intervention in produce 
marketing by marketing boards have been the stabilization of producer 
prices and hence of incomes of peasant farmers and the use of surpluses 
for the benefit of peasant farming communities, and the general develop-
ment of African countries. Marketing remains one of the major bottlenecks 
to successful agricultural development in Africa. 
T h e problem of marketing stems in part from the colonial legacy where 
pre-independence departments of agriculture and the marketing boards 
and marketing agencies which were created expended their greatest 
energies on export crops for external markets.13 A s a result of this, the 
market sector of the rural economy in the majority of African countries 
has tended to depend for most of its cash earnings on the conditions of 
supply and d e m a n d in the overseas markets in industrialized core coun-
tries, and on officially fixed and controlled prices. 
Apart from the effects of official controls, the inherited pattern of 
marketing and price movements is influenced by several other factors 
which include notably poor physical infrastructural facilities (in m a n y 
countries in Africa, agricultural products are still transported to the 
12. See R . L . Ayres, 1983. 
13. See, for example, S. La-Anyane, 1970 and 1971. 
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market by head loads, hand-pulled carts, canoes, bicycles and camels), 
poor storage and inefficient harvesting, processing and packaging facilities, 
limited or poor access to credit and capital, low and uncertain crop yields, 
poor market and price information associated with poor communication, 
extension and other institutional networks. 
T h e institutional and infrastructural networks inherited from the col-
onial period by African states were for the most part created to facilitate 
the colonial export-import trade - that is, to connect areas of plantation 
and cash crops to the cash-crop-producing centres for sale. In 1957, a 
quarter of all exports from tropical Africa originated, according to some 
estimates, from within 161 k m of the coast, and of agricultural exports a 
m u c h higher proportion were drawn from this zone.14 
T h e infrastructure and institutionalized framework were not designed 
to facilitate the sale of locally produced commodities for the domestic 
market. For instance, no durable road network criss-crossing the country-
side was constructed to transport bulky (low value per unit weight) 
foodstuffs produced on remote and scattered farms to urban market 
centres. Adequate transport and storage facilities to preserve foodstuffs 
in transit do not exist in most tropical African countries, so that a 
high proportion of surpluses spoil. T h e F A O (Food and Agricultural 
Organization) estimates post-harvest losses of cereal crops at 10 per cent 
and losses for fruits and vegetables at 30-50 per cent. This compares 
unfavourably with losses in the industrialized countries of 2-3 per cent. 
Those reaching the urban market thus tend to be relatively expensive in 
spite of price controls, contributing to the high cost of living for urban 
consumers.15 
In m a n y African countries, problems of unreliable markets both for 
producers and consumers, fluctuating and differential prices of basic food 
crops exist - in spite of, even because of, the high degree of official state 
control exerted over the marketing of foodstuffs. A n d state control was 
supposed to stabilize prices and m a k e them uniform. L o w farm-gate prices 
that obtain as a result of government intervention, coupled with price 
uncertainties, often compel farmers to produce primarily for their sub-
sistence needs. Young school-leavers, especially in West Africa, get 
discouraged about taking up farming as an occupation, thus contributing 
to labour shortages on farms. 
Increasingly, the African smallholder producer produces simultaneously 
for export, for the domestic markets (peripheral markets, mining townships, 
urban markets) and for subsistence, the last being dominant in m a n y 
African countries. This fact partly accounts for changes in the volume of 
domestic food supply. 
14. D . Grigg, 1970, p. 81. 
15. See F A O , 1977. 
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Marketing boards, co-operatives and price control 
Since the 1930s, three principal methods have been adopted for solving 
nearly all marketing problems in Africa, namely marketing boards and 
agencies, co-operative marketing and price controls. In East, Central, 
South and North Africa, where European settler-farmers were dominant, 
the production and marketing of high-value agricultural products were 
controlled by a system of legal or quasi-legal monopolies from which 
Africans were excluded. In Kenya, for example, the quasi-co-operative 
Kenya Farmers Association purchased and sold grain and distributed 
seeds, and so on, and built up a near-monopoly of grain-milling, while 
the Kenya Co-operative Creameries controlled and secured the profitable 
domestic markets for dairy products and bacon by a system of protective 
tariffs, coupled with legislation to fix prices in the pre- and post-war 
years. In Algeria, by a 1947 French decree, most of the highly profitable 
colon agricultural production (wine, cereals, vegetables, fruit, tobacco, 
cotton, figs, olives, sugar beet) was marketed through 449 co-operatives -
notably the Office algérien interprofessionnel de céréales ( O A I C ) and the 
Coopérative d'achat des fabricants algériens ( C A F T A ) which were heavily 
subsidized by settler and metropolitan government and credit agencies, 
such as the Caisse algérienne de crédit agricole mutuel (CACAM).16 Elsewhere 
in colonial Africa, before the Second World W a r , the export trade in 
agricultural produce was dominated by expatriate companies which in 
West Africa employed local (African) middlemen - in some countries 
they included Lebanese and Syrians, and in East Africa, Asians — to 
purchase from the farmers and transport to the chain of stores and sheds 
of the companies. T h e largest of these companies in British Africa was 
the United Africa group. 
In African countries like Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria where African 
small-scale peasant agriculture was the basis of development, there existed 
African co-operative societies mostly for the principal export of cash 
crops, but their annual share of the crop as a percentage of the total crop 
for the pre- and post-war periods tended to be small. For instance, in 
1939-40, in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) , then the world's leading 
producer of cocoa, there were 395 co-operative societies with a total 
membership of 10282. T h e societies handled 3971 tons of cocoa that 
year, a mere 2.2 per cent of the total Gold Coast crop. But nearly 98 per 
cent of the total output was controlled by 13 expatriate firms. B y 1952-
3, co-operative cocoa had increased to only 19.2 per cent of the total 
Gold Coast crop (Tables 12.2 and 12.3 for details). B y the end of colonial 
rule, a very high proportion of all the major agricultural exports from 
British territories in Africa — including practically all exports produced 
by Africans - was handled by state export monopolies, namely marketing 
16. See T . L . Blair, 1970. 
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T A B L E 12.2 Progress of Gold Coast co-operative societies 
Year Number of 
societies 
Total 
membership 
Tons of cocoa Co-operative cocoa as 
a percentage of total 
Gold-Coast crop 
1939-40 
I940-1 
1941-2 
1942-3 
1943-4* 
1944-5" 
1945-6 
i946-7c 
1947-8 
1948-9 
1949-50 
1950-1 
1951-2 
1952-3 
'Department 
395 
285 
265 
253 
254 
150 
97 
106 
134 
160 
179 
199 
225 
291 
10282 
6539 
6375 
6149 
6439 
6102 
6712 
7948 
11919 
13 133 
14612 
16355 
18398 
26287 
of Co-operation established in i 
bGold Coast Co-operative 
cGold Coast Co-operative 
Federation formed 
Bank Ltd register« 
3971 
6736 
9924 
9446 
12420 
16765 
14604 
14451 
21942 
27720 
29468 
31 617 
28818 
47423 
[944. 
1 in November 1944 
:d in October 1946. 
2.2 
2.8 
4.0 
4.6 
6-3 
7-3 
7.0 
7-5 
10.6 
IO.I 
11.6 
12.1 
137 
19.2 
Source: J. C . DeGraft-Johnson, 1958, p. 78. 
T A B L E 12.3 Progress of Nigerian cocoa co-operative societies 
Year Number of 
societies 
Total 
membership 
Tons of cocoa Co-operative cocoa as 
a percentage of total 
Nigerian crop 
1939-40 
1946-7 
1947-8 
1948-9 
1949-50 
1950-1 
138 
242 
283 
276 
309 
319 
9346 
18594 
20585 
19404 
21299 
19529 
5915 
13253 
11090 
12918 
9697 
10908 
5-24 
"•95 
14.68 
11.96 
965 
9.01 
Source: J. C . DeGraft-Johnson, 1958, p. 95. 
boards, which controlled the purchase and sale of the controlled c o m -
modities. A similar development occurred in m u c h of Francophone 
Africa.17 
T h e marketing boards accumulated large surplus balances which 
17. See R . Dumont , 1966; R . H . Bates, 1981; and P. T . Bauer, 1981, for detailed 
discussions of marketing boards and agencies. 
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resulted from high world demand and prices for commodities, especially 
in the late 1940s and 1950s. Between 1940 and 1962, at least ¿ 7 0 0 m was 
withheld from the producers in the form of marketing-board surpluses 
and high export taxes. These levies, which fell mostly on small-scale 
peasant producers, represented on average between one-third and one-
half of the commercial value of the output. T h e heavy taxation of 
producers of cash crops imposed by marketing boards in colonial and post-
colonial Africa has 'inhibited the spread of cash crops, the accumulation of 
private capital, and the development of a prosperous peasantry and an 
independent middle class'. l8Again after independence, the large sums 
accruing to African governments and their agencies through the state 
export monopolies promoted large-scale political and administrative cor-
ruption as these sums were divested for national urban-based development 
and the control of these funds became a major prize of political power, 
as West African examples clearly demonstrate.19 
Since the export surpluses of Uganda and West Africa were held in 
sterling during the colonial period, this represented an enforced transfer 
of resources from the colonies to Britain. 
Apart from state intervention in the marketing of export crops, African 
governments have directly intervened in the marketing of staple foodstuffs, 
with profound effects on the marketing of export produce and foodstuffs. 
In countries like Ghana, Zambia, the countries of the Sahel, Tanzania 
and Kenya, the governmental role of food marketing has greatly increased. 
For example, between 1971 and 1976 the Tanzanian government, through 
its monopsonistic marketing agencies, offered to farmers prices for the 
main cereals that ranged from one-fifth to one-half of the then-current 
world prices.20 Thus these government marketing agencies - legalized 
monopsonies — buy produce at officially-fixed, lower prices and sell food 
products through price-controlled marketing outlets in town. In several 
African countries, m a n y agricultural products are subject to official price 
controls. 
T o maintain lower consumer food prices in urban markets, the marketing 
agencies import food, thus in effect competing with local producers in 
supplying the urban market, thereby lowering the price obtained by the 
farmers for their products, a policy which tends to worsen rural poverty. 
T h e imports are subsidized by overvalued exchange rates which lower 
the perceived price of imported food supplies, especially when the 
domestic price exceeds the world price. Increasingly, since the 1970s, the 
policy of African governments of subsidizing basic food prices has m a d e 
food imports a major item in the balance of payments of several African 
countries. Since the militancy of organized urban workers has been k n o w n 
18. P. T . Bauer, 1981, p. 180. 
19. See, for example, V . L e Vine, 1975. 
20. R . H . Bates, 1981, pp. 39, 85. 
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to topple African governments following demonstrations and food riots 
associated with high food prices and cost of living, governments have 
developed a vested interest in keeping food prices low, despite the 
detrimental effects of official price controls and in spite of the fact that 
the policing of the marketing and distribution of food crops has been 
costly and largely unsuccessful.2The major results of official food-prices 
policies include falling domestic food production and the growth and 
spread of illicit marketing and smuggling as a means by which producers 
evade or counter the marketing monopoly of state agencies and seek to 
increase their returns on what they produce, even though the government 
m a y have heavily subsidized the inputs — fertilizers, seeds, mechanical 
equipment and credit for farmers' use. Smuggling of both food and export 
crops (the prices for which are also fixed by marketing boards) to 
neighbouring countries where they usually fetch better prices has reached 
massive proportions which in several countries armed border patrols and 
border guards are unable to eliminate and/or check. Notable examples 
are the cocoa, kola nuts, and foodstuffs smuggled from Ghana to Côte 
d'Ivoire and Togo, the food and cash-crop smuggling which goes on from 
Guinea to Sierra Leone, from Nigeria to Benin, and from Tanzania to 
Zambia and Kenya. 
Moreover, the marketing of nearly all agricultural products still encoun-
ters serious problems in most countries of Africa. T h o u g h on the whole 
the well-established cash or export crops handled by the marketing boards 
tend to be more efficiently marketed, after the physical take-over of such 
produce by the boards, than the marketing of food crops, both face similar 
problems. T h e problems w e have noted include those associated with the 
pattern of production itself— such as the scattered, wide spatial distribution 
of farms and producers, making them not easily accessible, and the 
technical marketing problems of storage, transportation and physical 
facilities and information — making produce-marketing very costly and 
risky. However, foodstuff-marketing has its o w n special problems. First, 
it is characterized by a large number of buyers and sellers, linked by a 
host of middlemen with a very complex system of distribution and 
arbitrage - not to mention the producers w h o often sell directly to 
consumers on farms and by road. At least six distinct categories of 
distributors have been identified in Africa - namely, farm-gate middlemen; 
non-commissioned agents; commissioned agents; co-operative agents; 
wholesalers; and retailers — all of them at one time or another carrying 
out various marketing functions either as individual entrepreneurs or in 
association with others.22 While wholesalers tend to be oligopolists and 
ologopsonists in dealing with retailers and consumers, retailers generally 
function within a highly competitive structure. Prices therefore tend to 
2i. See M . Owusu, 1972. 
22. Q : B . O . Anthonio, 1973, pp. 251-2. 
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a great extent to be market-determined, though price fluctuations stem-
ming from high transportation costs, high losses from poor and ineffective 
storage, the high degree of risks involved and haggling are c o m m o n . 2 3 It 
is worth pointing out that the bulk of the marketed food production 
in Africa is distributed through 'unofficial' marketing channels. T h e 
overwhelming problems that exist in the marketing of local foodstuffs and 
the inflationary tendencies in the domestic urban market for foodstuffs 
c o m m o n in m a n y African states are themselves reflections of the dualistic 
and underdeveloped economies African governments inherited from the 
colonial period, characterized by the dominance of non-market subsistence 
activities and peripheral markets.24 
Ecological and social constraints on agricultural 
production 1960-80 
Broadly, the principal ecological (physical environmental) constraints 
which significantly account for the poor performance of African agriculture 
and for the worsening of rural poverty observed between i960 and 1980 
have included the following: cyclical droughts - such as the Sahel drought 
of 1968-^74, the advance of the desert, soil degradation and deforestation. 
S o m e of these are the direct result of misguided colonial economic and 
land policies. Other constraints are the abject poverty, poor health, disease, 
malnutrition, illiteracy and under-employment of the farming population; 
all characteristic features of underdeveloped economies. M a s s migration 
of the male adult work-force from rural to urban-industrial and service 
centres leading to uncertainties and fluctuations in agricultural labour 
supply; an education system that encourages the youth to seek non-farm 
employment; traditional values, beliefs and cultural practices; land-use 
and land-tenure practices, rapid population growth and pressure on land; 
civil strife and political instability have all been major social constraints 
on agricultural production. For instance, during the 1970s, refugees, 
mostly farmers and pastoralists, fleeing across national frontiers as a result 
of liberation struggles, coups d'Etat and civil wars, rose from 750 000 to 
over 5 million - accounting for nearly half of all refugees world-wide.25 
Between i960 and 1980, the population of tropical Africa increased by 
63 per cent to a total of 344 million. During the 1970s, the average 
increase was 2.7 per cent per a n n u m in Africa as a whole. Mos t of this 
population growth has been concentrated in rural areas, creating severe 
pressures on land in parts of Kenya , Ethiopia, R w a n d a , Tanzania and 
23. V . C . Uchendu, 1967, pp. 37-50. 
24. See R . H . Bates, 1981; J. Heyer et al., 1981; P. Bohannan and G . Dalton, 1965, 
pp. 1-32, on African economies and markets. 
25. United States Committee for Refugees, 1981. 
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Egypt. Only a few of these ecological and social constraints can be 
discussed here because of limitations of space. 
Between i960 and 1980, a comparison of 35 African countries, occu-
pying a variety of ecological and mini-climatic zones, on the basis of their 
agricultural production trends in relation to population yields a paradoxical 
picture: a handful of countries such as Swaziland (middle-income), Côte 
d'Ivoire (middle-income), Cameroon (middle-income), Burundi (low-
income), R w a n d a (low-income) and Malawi (low-income), greatly 
increased both their total agricultural and food output per capita; a 
number of them, such as Botswana (middle-income) and Sudan (low-
income), managed to raise their production above the level of population 
growth; and the great majority of tropical African countries, notably G h a n a 
(middle-income), Nigeria (middle-income), Congo (middle-income), Chad 
(low-income), and Tanzania (low-income), experienced stagnation or even 
a decrease in agricultural production.26 
For some African countries, particularly the countries of the Sahel -
Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Senegal, Gambia, Upper Volta, Niger - the n e w 
agrarian crisis associated with a rapid succession of unanticipated droughts 
from 1968 to 1974 and during 1977-8 accounts in great part for the 
decline in the growth rate of agricultural production (crops and livestock); 
for the stagnation of agricultural exports and the shares in world trade 
for several commodities; for the rapid growth of commercial imports of 
food grains - wheat and rice - and for the increase in food aid and for 
aid dependency (Table 12.4).27 
Ecological constraints: natural and m a n - m a d e 
Most of Africa's soils are naturally thin, delicate, deficient in organic 
materials and moderately fertile and require careful management. It 
has been suggested that the pace of environmental destruction and 
desertification in Africa has been accelerated rather than retarded by 
the introduction, especially in the humid tropics, of advanced farming 
technology in colonial and post-colonial periods.28 
Specialists agree that the African climate is becoming increasingly 
variable, a fact which limits the choice of crops or livestock production, 
contributes to radical environmental deterioration, especially in the arid 
and semi-arid belts, and makes long-term planning of agricultural pro-
ductivity extremely difficult. It is estimated that approximately 55 per 
cent of Africa is threatened by the desert's advance (Fig. 12.1) and 45 
per cent is subject to severe drought.29 T h u s over half the continent and 
26. See J. Hinderink and J. J, Sterkenburg, 1983; and the World Bank, 1982, for 
detailed discussions. 
27. See Accelerated Development, 1983, pp. 46-50 and Table 6. 
28. J. Omo-Fadaka, 1978, p. 48. 
29. S. Galal, 1977; F A O , 1977. 
332 
Agriculture and rural development since IÇJS 
T A B L E 12.4 Percentage 
Country 
Nigeria 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Sierra Leone 
Senegal 
countries in 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Food as 
percentage 
of total 
value of wheat and food imports for selected 
West Africa, IÇ68-78 
Wheat as 
percentage 
of total 
commodity food 
imports 
7-4 
8-3 
7.6 
8.1 
9.6 
10.3 
8.9 
8.0 
8-5 
10.5 
12-5 
11.7 
12.6 
12.4 
14.1 
175 
148 
12.0 
10.8 
11.7 
" • 3 
175 
16.4 
21.5 
19.2 
175 
24.0 
22.3 
34-8 
31.6 
26.1 
29.2 
25-7 
341 
26.7 
22.0 
imports 
24.1 
41.2 
26.6 
23-5 
23-5 
29-5 
32.8 
18.4 
22.1 
12.9 
H-5 
11.4 
15-5 
5-6 
10.7 
105 
6.4 
8.8 
143 
12.3 
" • 3 
10.3 
12.0 
12.5 
134 
14.8 
18.0 
135 
9.0 
11.9 
16.9 
H-5 
11.8 
11.0 
8-5 
16.8 
Country 
Mali 
Upper Volta 
Niger 
Chad 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Food as 
percentage 
of total 
Wheat as 
percentage 
of total 
commodity food 
imports 
18.0 
14.2 
26.9 
25.6 
20.2 
no data 
54-3 
19.4 
16.4 
18.7 
16.9 
17-3 
17.6 
191 
22.4 
31.0 
17.4 
8.4 
94 
10.6 
9.6 
12.6 
156 
17.9 
9-3 
6.4 
10.3 
16.3 
15-7 
156 
20.9 
24.7 
20.7 
imports 
18.0 
14.2 
26.9 
25.6 
20.2 
no data 
54-3 
19.4 
16.4 
18.7 
16.9 
17-3 
17.6 
19.1 
22'4 
3I.O 
174 
159 
IO.4 
25.6 
15-7 
7-1 
9.6 
5-2 
7.6 
6.2 
394 
14.2 
10-9 
152 
12.5 
153 
155 
Source: D . E . Vermeer, 1983, pp. 74-83; reprinted with permission of the Helen Dwight 
Reid Educational Foundation; published by Heldref Publications, 4000 Albermarle St, 
N . W . , Washington, D . C . 20016. 
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fig. 12.1 The risk of desert advance in Africa as recorded after the UN conference on
desertification, 1977 (Source: adapted from UNEP, Studies, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 7)
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approximately one-quarter of the population, mostly in the rural areas, is 
threatened.30 About 10 million sq k m in a total of 21 countries is tsetse-
fly-infested and therefore cannot sustain livestock (Fig. 12.2 on page 
338).31 T h e negative implications of this development for agricultural 
production are obvious. 
Throughout Africa most of the fanning population (outside the Eur-
opean, company or state modern large-scale mechanized farms) are 
engaged in rainfed agriculture. In North Africa irrigated agriculture is 
T A B L E 12.5 Land use in North Africa 
Cultivated area including fallow land 
(in 1000 ha) 
Country 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Libya 
Morocco 
Mauritania 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Total 
7000 
2650 
2520 
7040 
263 
960 
7800 
3SOO 
Rainfed 
6750 
10 
2395 
6590 
260 
800 
6240 
33 6 ° 
Irrigated 
250 
2640 
125 
450 
3 
160 
1560 
140 
Rainfed as 1 
of the total 
96.40 
0.03 
95.00 
93.60 
98.90 
83-30 
80.00 
96.00 
Source: A . Arar, 1980, p. 13. 
dominant only in Egypt (Table 12.5). T h e African environment is 
generally not favourable to the development of irrigation because of 
inadequate water supplies and good soils and salinization. Only about 
one-third of the continent receives over 1000 m m of rain a year. In Africa, 
north of the Sahara, 90 per cent of the rainfall occurs between October 
and M a y ; south of the Sahara, rainfall is concentrated in the s u m m e r 
months. About one-third of the continent gets under 250 m m of rain a 
year. Well-watered areas m a k e up only about 25 per cent of tropical 
Africa. T h e unreliability and poor distribution of rainfall over the year, 
along with high temperatures and evaporation, severely limit the type of 
crops and livestock, if any, which can successfully be raised. In East 
Africa, for example, it has been estimated that 760 m m is the m i n i m u m 
annual requirement for successful cereal production, and that a farmer 
can expect one crop failure in every three years.32 
30. U N E P , 1981. 
31. C . Ayari, 1983. 
32. D . Grigg, 1970. 
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In Algeria, a combination of overstocking and drought led to a severe
reduction of livestock from 8 million head to 2 million in 1945 following
a few years of drought.33 Again during the drought of 1968^74 it is
estimated that by December 1972, Mauritania had lost about 1.6 million
cattle (80 per cent of its total). Before the 1968^74 drought, exports of
livestock and livestock products (meat and hides) accounted for about
half the total export income for some countries in the Sahel - exports
which naturally suffered during the drought years. In some parts of the
Sahel livestock numbers fell by 90 per cent.34
plate 12.2 Drought in Algeria in 1947: sheep at an empty water trough
According to estimates, in the early 1960s, there were about 1 million
pastoralists, 12 million cattle, 25 million sheep and goats and 1 million
camels in the Sahel. The massive destruction of livestock in the Sahel
during the drought years forced thousands of nomads, along with peasants
existing symbiotically whose economic base has been utterly ruined, to flee
to urban centres, compounding problems ofpoverty and unemployment in
these areas.
It must be pointed out that the spread of settled farming, partly
encouraged by the development of cash crops for export, has accentuated
33. J. Omo-Fadaka, 1978.
34. N. Twose, 1984, p. 1 1 15.
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the traditional competition for land and water between pastoralists and 
settled farmers, compressing pastoralists and their herds into even smaller 
areas in the Sahel. T h e crucial flexibility of the traditional methods 
designed to cope with the cyclical patterns of good and bad years of rain, 
and allowing skilful local migration or judiciously selling off surplus 
livestock, has become extremely limited, forcing a decline of pastoralism. 
T h e installation of an increasing number of water holes on pasture lands 
for various flocks by various national and international agencies between 
i960 and 1980, especially in West Africa, has led to overgrazing, wide-
spread trampling and soil erosion. 
Another set of constraints in the African environment affecting crop 
and livestock production are the famous enemies - rodents, birds (such 
as the keleo-kelea), insects (notably locusts) and the cryptogramic virus 
diseases. In the well-watered humid tropics the presence of tsetse fly 
prevents die raising of cattle and the development of mixed farming (Fig. 
12.2). T h e amount of damage caused to crops and livestock varies with 
the insect or disease and zone in question, but as w e have seen it is 
generally significant. 
Apart from unbalanced diet and hunger, one should mention bacterial 
and parasitic diseases ( W H O - World Health Organization - has identified 
12 main ones), including malaria, influenza and dysentery, which have a 
debilitating effect upon h u m a n energy and economic productivity.35 
Social constraints o n production 
A m o n g the leading social constraints on agricultural production in Africa 
are the cultural practices of African farmers. In North Africa, the 
traditional practices of dry farming - deep ploughing, frequent disc 
cultivations and fallow rotation which occupies about 40-50 per cent of 
arable land for an average of 15-18 months - tend to lead to the 
degradation of the soil structure and poor yields. In m u c h of Africa, 
fragmentation and the small size of holdings (the average seems rarely to 
exceed 10 hectares, in m a n y areas the norm is less than 2 hectares) 
associated with land-tenure practices have m a d e the application, where 
appropriate, of improved practices which could bring about increase in 
productivity almost impossible. 
T h e communal or family ownership of both land and cattle is a 
factor making improvement in methods of cattle and land management 
problematic.3 It prevents, for instance, selective breeding and renders the 
control of disease rather difficult. T h e African attitude to cattle is 
often cited as a factor contributing to low productivity. M a n y African 
35. See P. Richards, 1983, for an intelligent critical review of ecological constraints on 
African agriculture. 
36. G . Kay, 1965. 
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1 000 miles
I
1600 km
FIG. 12.2 The distribution of cattle in Africa, with an inset map showing the main tsetse
areas (Source: adapted from R. S. Harrison-Church et al., Africa and its Islands, Longman,
London, 1971, p. 91)
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communities are generally still more concerned about the size rather than 
the quality of the herd. A large herd enhances social status, prestige and 
wealth and pays the bride price. 
In m u c h of Africa, especially West Africa, pure c o m m u n a l tenure has 
been modified or has disappeared as a result of commercialization of 
agriculture. But despite its traditional advantages - shifting cultivation 
and rotational bush fallowing - the dominant type of farming in tropical 
Africa is becoming less and less efficient, particularly where population 
density exceeds the critical threshold of 60 per sq k m of usable land.37 
At this critical level, soil fertility is difficult to sustain because of shortened 
fallows and the opportunity to raise productivity is hence decreased. T h e 
reduction in fallows associated with pressure on land is leading to rapid 
soil exhaustion and declining yield in m a n y parts of Africa. 
Again, where land is c o m m u n a l and can only be acquired from a local 
chief, as is the case in m a n y parts of tropical Africa, it m a y be difficult 
for n o n - m e m b e r s of the appropriate kin group to acquire land. This m a y 
prevent the exploitation of unsettled or unused land w h e n the potential 
farmers are 'strangers' or outsiders. 
Throughout Africa, as the andiropological evidence shows, religious 
beliefs and practices m a y be inimical to sustained increase in agricultural 
productivity. In m a n y parts of West Africa, for example, agricultural 
work, including fishing, is forbidden on certain days in deference to 
certain spirits.3 
T h e negative attitudes of the non-farming community to farming is 
largely responsible for the lack of progress in African agriculture as a 
whole. In most African countries, mainly because of colonial education 
which stressed (and still does) academic subjects and a reward structure 
which has favoured urban employment, very little respect is accorded 
farming as an occupation and farmers by the rest of contemporary African 
society. In most areas of Africa, farmers encourage their educated sons 
and daughters not to take up farming.39 T h e result has been that 
individuals w h o would perhaps prove m o r e efficient and m o r e successful 
in the development of the agricultural industry and therefore in the 
improvement in the quality of life in rural areas are not attracted to 
farming. Tanzania is one of a few African countries which has been 
making a serious effort to integrate schooling and agriculture in the 
countryside.40 
There is a close relationship between education and agricultural 
development especially as reflected in the provision of extension services 
37. D . Grigg, 1970. 
38. See J. C . de Wilde, 1967, vol. II, for examples. 
39. See, for example, N . O . A d d o , 1974. 
40. See J. K . Nyerere, 1968c. 
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to educate farmers in n e w practices.41 However, in m a n y parts of tropical 
Africa, m a n y of the older illiterate farmers are inherently convinced that 
their traditional farming practices are in most cases better and more 
rewarding and that they are more knowledgeable about farming than 
young educated agricultural officers and extension workers, yet their 
professional knowledge and expertise is frequently undervalued by donor 
agencies and government extension officers. Their belief has often been 
confirmed by several cases of field disasters resulting from rec-
ommendations m a d e by extension officers.42 
It is noteworthy that African farmers, though mostly illiterate, tra-
ditional and ageing, have as a whole been willing to accept and apply 
innovations w h e n they m a k e better sense. During the post-war period, 
they have accepted n e w production methods, n e w (improved) crops and 
modern inputs, new processes of cropping and storage and n e w marketing 
systems. But most of these changes instead of leading to improvements 
in the quality of life of peasants have rather deepened rural poverty. This 
suggests that one of the most critical constraints to agricultural pro-
ductivity in Africa is rural socio-economic inequality and peasant exploi-
tation. 
Agriculture and class disparities in post-colonial Africa 
Whatever the exact nature and dynamics of 'social classes' in rural Africa 
in the post-colonial period,43 the subject deserves systematic ongoing 
research - the extent of poverty and prosperity a m o n g the peasantry and 
within peasant communities at any given time has varied a great deal 
from country to country and from region to region (for example, North 
Africa as compared with tropical Africa or with apartheid South Africa). 
T h e origins of accumulation and rural inequities 
T h e development of rural inequality and rural class disparities in Africa 
have continued to be shaped by the politics of agriculture in general.44 
Political patronage, the pricing and marketing policy of state marketing 
boards (discussed above) m a y subsidize and hence enrich large capitalist 
farming, as has been the case in Kenya and Southern Africa, or m a y 
exploit smallholder producers by reducing their income.45 Trans-national 
41. D . Grigg, 1970, p. 152. 
42. See S. La-Anyane, 1970 and 1971; J. Heyer et al., 1981 and P. Richards, 1983, for 
critical discussion of the problems of innovating agricultural practices. 
43. See, for example, P. C . Lloyd, 1974; A . Manghezi, 1976; G . Kitching, 1980; 
R . Stavenhagen, 1975; P. Waterman, 1983; L . Cliffe, 1976. 
44. J. Barker, 1984; G . Dharam and S. Radwan, 1983. 
45. C . Leys, 1975; M . Morris, 1976. 
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agro-industrial capitalist firms, international agencies (such as the World 
Bank) and government boards m a y dictate — often to the detriment of a 
vast majority of smallholders — the conditions and terms on which peasant 
smallholders can cultivate or sell export or industrial crops.46 Illustrative 
examples of these are 'group' farms (Uganda); 'block' farms (Tanzania); 
contract-tenant and 'outgrower' production (Sudan); collective villages 
(Mozambique, Tanzania) and large centrally-managed settlement schemes 
found throughout Africa which directly compete with smallholder pro-
duction for high-potential land, water and pasturage. 
Not only has capitalist penetration and commodity production led to 
the rise of a small but growing group of rural capitalists,47 but it 
has simultaneously generated an on-going process of peasantization and 
proletarianization in rural Africa.48 In Central and South Africa, the need 
for a substantial and guaranteed labour force for expanding mines, settler 
estates and plantations produced land, labour and fiscal legislation which 
has created and institutionalized a large, low-wage impoverished rural 
proletariat of farm workers and tenant and male-migrant seasonal labourers 
(Fig. 12.3), m a n y of w h o m are landless.49 In West Africa and parts of 
East Africa, the development of African commercial export agriculture 
(cocoa, coffee, tea), has long stimulated a similar rise of seasonal migrant 
agricultural wage-labourers.50 In Nigeria, the petroleum extraction enclaves 
have attracted peasants from neighbouring villages w h o abandon their 
farms for unskilled and semi-skilled daily-wage industrial employment.51 
T h u s regional disparities of economic development reflected in the 
geographical concentration of the means of production related to both 
the uneven regional natural-resource endowment and to the strong export 
orientation of colonial and neo-colonial African economies, and the fact 
that frequently the distribution and location of colonial and post-colonial 
agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprises has had little bearing 
either on social-equity considerations or on the current or future needs 
of rural African populations, have all directly contributed to the different 
forms of rural inequality and rural class formation in m u c h of Africa. 
In areas where semi-feudal forms of land-tenure or landlordism have 
prevailed, as in parts of North, West and East Africa (but with exceptions 
such as post-revolution Ethiopia), commodity production has transformed 
powerful landlords overnight into wealthy capitalist farmers w h o use their 
political connection and influence to dispossess the poor, indebted and 
46. C . Windstrand and S. Amin, 1975; S. Bernstein, 1978; M . S. Halfani and J. Barker, 
1984; J. Loxley, 1984; L . Freeman, 1984. 
47. P. Hill, 1970. • 
48. G . Arrighi and J. S. Saul, 1973; K . Post, 1977. 
49. M . Morris, 1976; G . H . T . Kimble, i960. 
50. See, for example, A . L . Mabogunje, 1972; P. Hill, 1970; R . Stavenhagen, 1975. 
51. E . Chikwendu, 1983. 
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BELGIAN CONGO K J ZANZIBAR
BECHUANALAND
UNION Of
SOUTH AFRICA
Numbers in thousands
NOTE Except in the case of Zanzibar, where the
birthplaces of all Africans have been tabulated,
figures refer to number of migrants officially
reported (the great majority of whom are temporary
) and do not include illicit migrants and
exclude migrant dependants
fig. 12.3 Patterns of international labour migration in Africa, 1946-52 (Source: G. H. T.
Kimble, Tropical Africa: Vol. 1, Land and Livelihood, Twentieth Century Fund, New York,
i960, p. 584)
defenceless tenant farmers and sharecroppers of their land, thus creating
a huge class of landless and exploited agricultural labourers.52 High-value
cash-crop production and male labour migration as a dominant form of
capitalist penetration have had a profound and negative impact on the
sexual division of agricultural labour and have seriously undermined the
traditional household economy in which men and women shared tasks,
especially in Southern and East Africa, by imposing an unequal and heavy
52. See A. Richards, 1982, on Egypt, for example.
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T A B L E 12.6 Division of labour between men and women in rural Africa 
Task Percentage of total labour 
Land clearing 
Turning the soil 
Planting 
Hoeing and weeding 
Harvesting 
Transporting crops from farm to home 
Storing crops 
Processing food crops 
Marketing excess crops 
Trimming tree crops 
Carrying water and fuel 
Caring for domestic animals 
Hunting 
Feeding and caring for children, m e n and aged 
Men11 
95 
70 
50 
30 
40 
20 
20 
10 
40 
90 
10 
50 
90 
5 
Women* 
5 
30 
50 
70 
60 
80 
80 
90 
60 
10 
90 
50 
10 
95 
"With or without some help from children. 
Source: I L O , 1985, p. 120. 
burden on w o m e n agricultural producers, driven to work longer hours 
(Table 12.6) without male help, and leading to the 'feminization of 
poverty' in rural areas, deepening gender stratification.53 W o m e n ' s jobs 
and incomes are also threatened in other ways - home-brewed traditional 
beer, for example, is in s o m e African countries n o w facing competition 
from the products of m o d e r n large-scale breweries.54 
Class a n d planned rural poverty 
Since independence African governments, socialist and non-socialist ori-
ented, have in co-operation with international agencies ( U N F A O , U S A I D , 
C I D A , the World Bank, and so on) and foreign governments embarked 
upon a variety of agricultural and rural development projects as part of 
their national development plans. 
T h e part played by foreign aid in the provision of investment capital 
and advice in planned agricultural and rural change has been tremendous.55 
For instance, under M c N a m a r a , the World B a n k between 1973 and 1980 
provided $2.4 billion out of about $5 billion in aid flows into African 
53. G . Gran, 1983; B . Brown, 1983. 
54. R . Dauber and M . L . Cain, 1980. 
55. R . E . Clute, 1982. 
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agriculture.56 But on the whole, as studies have shown, agricultural credit 
and institutional support have been concentrated largely on export crops, 
and international and state assistance in the form of inputs, credits and 
marketing has largely been seized by a few rich peasants - large 'pro-
gressive' farmers, w h o are already privileged. It is significant, for example, 
that hardly any of the m a n y World Bank projects in Africa were designed 
to reach the growing impoverished rural landless, the tenant farmers, 
sharecroppers or squatters.57 
S o m e countries, including Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tanzania 
and Z imbabwe , have adopted measures with the objective of reducing or 
eliminating rural inequities and exploitation.58 S o m e of these measures 
have been socialized agriculture (Tanzania, Mozambique , Ethiopia, 
Algeria, Ghana); land-tenure changes; land redistribution; and the abol-
ition of sharecropping, landlordism, rural-debt payments, and so on 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya). 
In m a n y countries state farm enterprises have collapsed (as in G h a n a ) , 
socialized agriculture has been an economic disaster (Tanzania, G h a n a , 
Mozambique) , co-operatives have been weakened by excessive bureau-
cratic or state control, and in m a n y areas of Africa peasant agricultural 
production has declined. In countries like Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, M o z -
ambique and Angola, civil war continues to disrupt peasant agriculture, 
undermining any immediate hope for increased food self-sufficiency and 
the alleviation of mass rural hunger and starvation. 
At the heart of the various policy measures designed by African 
governments and international agencies to improve agriculture and rural 
welfare has been a concern for exercising control over the peasants' 
productive process, and for the extraction of the peasants' marketed 
surplus by privileged, powerful public and private agencies and groups.59 
T h e privileged and powerful individuals and groups in rural Africa 
vary from country to country with respect to their social origins, their 
incomes, standard of living, farm size, size of annual crop yield and so 
on. Everywhere, the commercial farming class is internally differentiated, 
and in some countries, like Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda and 
Kenya, the differentiation is very marked. However, throughout Africa, 
two broad rural classes are distinguishable, namely the richer peasants 
(and cattle-ranchers) - the exploiting classes - and the poorer peasants 
(and pastoralists) - the exploited classes.60 T h e richer peasants consist of 
56. World Bank, 1981, p. 47. 
57. C . Payer, 1982; R . L . Ayres, 1983. 
58. For Algeria, see K . Pfeifer, 1981, and T . L . Blair, 1970; for Morocco, see Z . D a o u d , 
1981; for Ethiopia, see R . Lefort, 1983; for Egypt, see A . Richards, 1982; for Tanzania, 
see I. G . Shivji, 1976; J. K . Nyerere, 1967b; B . M . de Gennaro, 1981; and for Zimbabwe, 
A . Astrow, 1983. 
59. J. Heyer et al., 1981. 
60. K . N k r u m a h , 1966; G . Kitching, 1980. 
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the large landowners and producers of cash crops (such as cocoa, coffee 
and tea), w h o m a y include government officials, military officers and big 
business people with ready access to credit and funds to invest (North 
and East Africa) or traders, traditional chiefs and religious leaders, w h o 
have easy access to n e w technology, credit and services and to the ruling 
class in regional and national capitals. 
T h e poorer peasants (and pastoralists) m a y be tenant sharecroppers, 
debt farmers of the richer peasants, or landless rural labourers. It is 
noteworthy that in a 1977 government Integrated Rural Survey in Kenya 
(a middle-income richer African state) over 40 per cent of smallholder 
farming families had incomes scarcely sufficient to provide for basic 
necessities of life. T h e Kenyan government was forced to admit that not 
all groups shared equitably in Kenya's economic development, and ident-
ified five target groups as needing special attention, including small 
farmers, pastoralists, the landless and squatters - about a third of the 
Kenyan population.6' 
In 1971, the annual rural per capita income in Kenya was estimated 
at only $58, which was slightly above the conditions of absolute poverty -
an annual per capita income equivalent to $50 or less. Rural incomes in 
most African countries remain abysmally low, and the general quality of 
rural life, as measured by the percentage of the population with reasonable 
access to a safe water supply or waste-disposal facilities, is very poor. In 
Africa only 21 per cent of the rural population had access to such a water 
supply and only 28 per cent to waste-disposal facilities.62 Survey after 
survey in several countries has shown that class and income disparities 
are growing. In Zambia half to two-thirds of rural households have 
'incomes that are so far below official wages that malnutrition and seasonal 
famine is a constant fear and too frequent a reality'. Seventy out of every 
hundred Africans are eidier destitute or on the verge of poverty. 
Throughout rural Africa, sharp class inequities and peasant exploitation 
continue,63 worsened by the world recession and the oil crisis of the 
1970s, the decline in world commodity prices, foreign exchange constraints 
of African governments, natural disasters and political instability. T h e 
alleviation of rural poverty in Africa definitely requires a n e w international 
economic order and a radical redistribution of power which would truly 
permit the rural masses genuine control over decisions affecting their 
livelihood and socio-economic well-being. 
61. See P. D . Little, 1983, pp. 91-108. 
62. W H O , 1976. 
63. See, for instance, Z . Daoud, 1981, pp. 27-33, o n Morocco; and T . L . Blair, 1970, 
on Algeria. 
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African agriculture in the world economy since 1935: 
from dependent colonies to dependent neo-colonies 
African countries entered the global capitalist economy mostly as colonies 
of rival European imperialist powers. Colonial policies of economic 
development through international trade relied on an international division 
of labour based on a doctrine of comparative advantage. T h e exploitative 
doctrine forced African countries to devote their resources to the pro-
duction of primary products for export and to use their export earnings 
to import manufactured goods and any deficit food requirements from 
abroad. This in effect legitimized the dependence of African economies 
on monocultures, and their export orientation. 
Over 80 per cent of exports from developing Africa consist of primary 
products such as coffee, cocoa, tea, tobacco, sugar, groundnuts and cotton, 
and minerals such as petroleum, copper and phosphate rock.64 
At the time of the First World W a r , compared with commodity exports 
from Latin America and Asia, Africa's exports were negligible, though 
palm oil and cocoa were already important African export crops. B y 1935, 
according to one estimate, Africa was producing 65 per cent of the total 
world commercial production of palm oil coming from the colonies; 63 
per cent of groundnuts; 90 per cent of olive oil; 54 per cent of sesame; 
56 per cent of cotton; 87 per cent of wool, and 88 per cent of cocoa 
(Table 12.7). Africa's agricultural exports began to rise in the inter-war 
period, and for a number of commodities increased at an even faster rate 
after the Second World W a r (Tables 12.8-12.15). Africa's share of total 
world commodity exports rose from 8 per cent in 1938 to 10 per cent in 
1948 and 14 per cent in 1965.65 T h u s at the time of independence m a n y 
African countries had become important world suppliers of several primary 
products. 
T h o u g h Africa is dominant in the world production of strategic minerals 
(Fig. 12.4), the continent remains principally an agricultural producer 
(Figure 12.5). Africa continues to produce about two-thirds of the total 
world production of palm oil, sisal and cocoa. Since the war, Africa's 
share in the world market for coffee — produced by 21 African countries -
has tripled, and in the 1970s accounted for about 30 per cent of the world 
totale 
T h e rate of expansion of African agricultural production in the 1950s 
and 1960s was particularly high for cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas, groundnuts 
and cotton. This rapid expansion was m a d e possible by the development 
of infrastructure by colonial and post-colonial governments, the supply 
of government-subsidized modern inputs, such as insecticides, chemical 
64. C . Ayari, 1983, pp. 8-11. 
65. W . A . Lewis, 1969. 
66. A . M . Kamarck, 1972. 
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T A B L E 12.7 Colonial commercial production of raw materials and foodstuffs 
expressed as a percentage of world commercial production 
Commodity Percentage 
Ram materials of world 
IQ34 or latest commercial 
available data) production 
(colonial) 
Principal sources of colonial commercial 
production with their production expressed 
as a percentage of world production in 
African territories 
African territories' 
commercial 
production as 
percentage of world 
commercial colonial 
production 
Palm oil 
Tin ore* 
Phosphates 
Graphite 
Groundnuts 
Copper* 
Manganese ore 
Chrome ore 
Olive oil 
Sesame 
Gold 
Asbestos 
Cotton' 
Wool 
Zinc* 
Foodstuffs 1933 
Cocoa 
Maizee 
Citrus fruits' 
Tobacco 
Coffee 
98.8b 
5 6 . 9 d 
52.0 
46.0 
28.5b 
21.3d 
137 
I2.3b 
I2.9h 
8.of 
9-2-
9.5" 
2-5f 
2.3" 
74.0" 
24.1" 
9.7" 
4-8b 
7.6" 
Nigeria (42.9), Belgian Congo (13.9), 65.0 
French West Africa (6.1), Angola (1.2). 
Nigeria (4.4), Belgian Congo (3.7). 14.0 
French North Africa (34.6), French 80.0 
Equatorial Africa (7.2). 
Madagascar (7.5). 16.3 
French West Africa (13.2), Nigeria (4.8). 63.0 
Northern Rhodesia (12.3), Belgian 98.0 
Congo (8.6). 
Nigeria (12.4)' 90.5 
Southern Rhodesia (8.6). 70.0 
French North Africa (11.2), Libya (?o.4). 90.0 
Sudan (2.2), Congo (?o.8), Nigeria (1.3). 54.0 
Southern Rhodesia (2.8), Gold Coast (1.3), 60.0 
Congo (1.4). 
Southern Rhodesia (9.0). 95.0 
Uganda (0.9), Sudan (0.5). 56.0 
French North Africa (2.0). 87.0 
Northern Rhodesia (1.4). 74.0 
Gold Coast (40.6), Nigeria (11.3), French 88.0 
West Africa (6.8), French Cameroons 
(2.8), British Togo (1.9), 
French Togo (1.1), British Cameroons (0.6). 
French West Africa (5.9) 24.0 
Algeria (1.0). 10.0 
Nyasaland (o.3).k 0.6 
British East Africa (0.7), Madagascar (0.6). 17.0 
"Metal content. 
»1931. bi934-5. 
1.933- 1934-
'Ginned. 
'Net exports. 1933-4. 
k A considerable amount of tobacco is n o w being grown in the Rhodesias (now Zambia 
and Zimbabwe) . 
Since these figures were compiled, for the year 1934, there has been, owing to rising 
prices, increased production of m a n y raw materials, notably of tin, rubber, copper, gold 
and zinc. If, therefore, a table for 1936 could be compiled, there might be material 
differences in the percentage of world production provided by individual colonies. 
Source: T h e Colonial Problem. A Report by a Study Group of members of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1937, p. 290. 
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T A B L E 12.8 Africa's 
Year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
share 
Source: F A O , 1961a, p. 115. 
T A B L E 12.9 Africa's 
Year 
1934-38 (average) 
1948-52 (average) 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
share 
of world palm-products production 
Oil equivalent 
1000 tonnes) 
920 
870 
940 
900 
940 
930 
920 
of world coffee 
(in 
production 
Thousand tonnes 
140 
280 
390 
510 
510 
540 
610 
670 
730 
Percentage of 
world production 
77 
78 
79 
79 
80 
81 
79 
Percentage of 
world production 
6 
13 
16 
18 
20 
17 
17 
15 
18 
Source: F A O , 1961b, pp. 145 and 161. 
fertilizers and disease-resistant seedlings, and by improved production 
techniques, good rainfall and the rapid spread of commercial agriculture -
all at the expense of food production. In 1966 the contribution of 
agriculture to the gross domestic product ( G D P ) in African countries was 
as high as 53.9 per cent for West Africa and 41.2 per cent for East Africa 
(see Tables 12.2 and 12.6). 
But despite the rapid growth, the value of agricultural exports declined. 
Between 1953-4 and 1971-2 the commodity terms of trade declined from 
126 (1953) to 86 (1971) or from 138 (1954) to 84 (1972). T h e terms of 
trade dropped significantly for 23 out of 28 commodities indexed by 
U N C T A D (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 
m a n y of them major sources of foreign exchange for African countries.67 
For example, in 1954-5, Ghana's production of cocoa was 210000 tonnes, 
nearly half of Africa's total, and her export earning from cocoa was £85.5 
67. U N C T A D , 1976; A. G . Frank, 1980. 
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TABLE 
Year 
1948-52 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
Source: 
TABLE 
Year 
1934-8 | 
1948-52 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
12.10 Africa's 
(average) 
F A O , 1961a, p. 118 
12.11 Africa's 
[average) 
(average) 
share of world groundnut production 
Unshelled weight 
(in thousand tonnes) 
2440 
4100 
3630 
3520 
4080 
share of world cocoa production 
Thousand tonnes 
490 
500 
490 
530 
580 
460 
570 
660 
840 
Percentage of 
world production 
26 
30 
26 
29 
29 
Percentage of 
world production 
66 
66 
60 
64 
64 
60 
62 
65 
76 
Source: F A O , 1961b, pp. 145 and 161. 
million. In 1964-5, with an estimated crop of 590000 tonnes, the estimated 
external earning dropped to about £77 million!68 T h e fact is that prices 
of primary commodities, which are controlled not by producers but by 
the consumers - the industrial countries - are subject to wide swings. 
T h e wide fluctuations in price are hardly offset by increasing the quantities 
produced - as the case of cocoa mentioned above illustrates. 
Since the foreign exchange needed by most African governments for 
development derives from taxing exports in one way or another, export 
price fluctuations directly lead to fluctuations in total receipts from year 
to year. Between 1950 and 1965, for instance, the fluctuations in price 
for sisal, Tanzania's principal foreign-exchange earner, averaged over 26 
per cent,69 making implementation of development plans extremely diffi-
cult. T h e low income elasticity of demand for most of the primary 
products of African countries as compared with manufactures of industrial 
countries exacerbates the problem. A fairly constant relationship exists 
68. K . N k r u m a h , 1966, p. 10. 
69. A . M . Kamarck, 1972. 
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T A B L E 12.12 Africa's 
Year 
1934-8 (average) 
1948-52 (average) 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
Source: F A O , 1961a, p. 14Í 
T A B L E 12.13 Africa's 
Year 
1934-8 (average) 
1948-52 (average) 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Ï957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
share of world natural-rubber production 
Thousand tonnes 
10 
60 
115 
"S 
HS 
145 
share of world sisal production 
Thousand tonnes 
160 
225 
290 
300 
310 
325 
350 
370 
375 
Percentage of 
world production 
1.0 
3-6 
5-8 
6-3 
7-1 
7-1 
Percentage of 
world production 
62 
70 
69 
65 
63 
65 
68 
64 
64 
Source: F A O , 1961a, p. 145. 
between world industrial production and world trade in primary c o m -
modities, with the former growing at a faster rate than the latter. In other 
words, the terms of Africa's incorporation into the global capitalist market 
since colonial days have up till now condemned Africa to the production 
of agricultural export commodities of little or no immediate use in Africa, 
which promotes African underdevelopment, and which by its very nature 
also promotes hunger and starvation as subsistence output is neglected in 
favour of export production. 
T h e colonial pattern of the flow of trade between Africa and the world 
has not radically changed, as the trade-bloc patterns between Africa and 
industrialized capitalist countries show. Trade with Western Europe — 
that is, with the former colonial powers - is still the most important for 
Africa. Indeed nearly two-thirds of Africa's total trade is with Western 
Europe; about 12 per cent with the United States; 10 per cent with other 
African countries; and 10 per cent with Eastern Europe. Indeed, no other 
Third-World primary-producing area is so heavily dependent on trade 
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T A B L E 12.14 Africa's 
Year 
1934-8 (average) 
1947-51 (average) 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
share of world t 
Thousand 
651 
627 
787 
813 
962 
953 
876 
:otton production 
tonnes 
Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, 1961, 
permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's 
T A B L E 12.15 Africa's 
Year 
1934-8* 
1948-521 
i9S6b 
i958c 
1959e 
1960 e 
Table 31. 
Percentage of 
world production 
"•3 
11.9 
II.O 
12.0 
13-5 
12.5 
11.9 
Reproduced with the 
Stationery Office. 
share of world sugar production 
Thousand 
1100 
1560 
2230 
2555 
2675 
2400 
tonnes Percentage of 
world production 
74 
7.9 
8.9 
8.8 
9.0 
7.6 
Sources: * F A O , 1956, p. 73. 
" F A O , 1958, p. 71. 
c F A O , 1961a, p. 73. 
with Western Europe,70 a point worth remembering when considering the 
obstacles facing the demands by the Third World for a new international 
economic order. 
T h e virtual collapse during the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s of the 
agricultural sector, especially in tropical Africa - on which about 80 per 
cent of African population depends and which is the main source of 
foreign exchange and public revenues for a majority of African countries -
has been aided and abetted by the deep and prolonged world recession 
and imported inflation, related sluggish world demand and severely 
depressed prices for most groups of export commodities, unfavourable 
exchange-rate movements, increasing debt burden, the decline of agri-
cultural-export subsidies by principal trading (industrial) countries, and 
restrictions on imports of agricultural and other labour-intensive products 
from African (and Third-World) countries. It has also been exacerbated by 
70. A . M . Kamarck, 1972, pp. 93-124. 
351 
Africa since 1935
fig. 12.4 Major mineral workings in Africa (Source: adapted from R. S. Harrison-Church
et al, Africa and its Islands, Longman, London, 1971, p. 99)
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fig. 12.5 The distribution of cash crops in Africa (Source: adapted from R. S. Harrison-
Church et al, Africa and its Islands, Longman, London, 1971, p. 87)
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the excessive external dependence of African economies on monocultures. 
T h e character of world agriculture has changed phenomenally since 
the 1950s. In the industrialized countries, agricultural production and 
marketing have been revolutionized by the application of the results of 
scientific research, along with increased use of industrial technology, 
chemical fertilizers and machinery. Africa has not benefited from this 
revolution in agriculture, the elements of which are not easily transferable 
to African ecological and socio-economic conditions. T h e lack of adequate 
investment in research on the dominant rainfed crops and root crops, 
particularly in tropical Africa, and the lack of technological improvements 
suitable for African agronomic environments have also been major con-
tributors to Africa's poor agricultural performance in the 1970s and 1980s. 
T h e annual rate of growth of agricultural output in Africa declined 
from 2.7 per cent in the 1960s to 1.3 per cent in the 1970s, but the rate 
of population growth accelerated. These changes meant that output per 
capita grew at 0.2 per cent a year during the 1960s and fell by 1.4 per 
cent a year in the 1970s. Part of the decline is related to the slow-down 
in production of non-food crops, tropical beverages and fibres. T h e growth 
of food output per capita also changed from a small increase in the 1960s 
to a decline of - 1 . 1 per cent in the 1970s (Table 12.16). 
T A B L E 12.16 Percentage growth rates of agriculture and food output in 
Africa 
Total Per capita 
ig6o-jo iQjo-80 ig6o-jo igjo-80 
Agricultural output 
Africa 2.7 1.3 0.2 - 1 . 4 
Developing countries 2.8 2.7 0.3 0.3 
Food output 
Africa 2.6 1.6 0.1 —1.1 
Developing countries 2.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 
N O T E S : Production data are weighted by world export unit prices. Decade growth 
rates are based on midpoints of five-year averages, except that 1970 is the average for 
1969-71. 
Source: F A O , 1982a, p. 41. 
Since the Second World W a r , various institutions, such as the World 
Bank, the I M F (International Monetary Fund) , G A T T (General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade) (1948), the I F C (International Finance 
Corporation), I D A (International Development Association), U N C T A D 
(1964) and S T A B E X (1975), to mention some of the most influential, 
have been established in part to regulate trade in commodities ( G A T T ) , 
or to provide some form of external economic aid to poor countries. This 
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is provided indirectly through increasing their share of the market for given 
commodities; their participation in commodity agreements negotiated 
periodically which distribute market shares to signatories and stabilize 
fluctuations in price and/or provide a higher average price than would 
result from uncontrolled market forces (for example, the recent inter-
national coffee agreements); a system of general tariff preferences in a 
growing market, à la U N C T A D , to promote manufacturing in developing 
countries; and 'compensatory' or 'supplementary' finance to offset fluc-
tuations or unanticipated shortfalls from expected export earnings.71 Direct 
aid from the World Bank and the I M F is in the form of long-term and 
short-term loans. 
All these are aimed at providing some relief, not cure, for Third-World 
primary producers w h o continue to suffer severely from the ill-effects of 
the cyclical fluctuations in the economies of the industrialized countries. 
T h e y are, in other words, aimed at perpetuating neo-colonialism, 'paying 
the raw material exporting countries for remaining exporters of raw 
materials rather than turning to higher levels of processing, or . . . 
becoming more self-reliant'.72 
It is estimated that Third-World producers obtain not more than 15 
per cent of the value of their export commodities, as paid for by the 
consumers - industrial countries. A s long as Third-World producers (of 
w h o m Africans constitute some of the poorest) remain price-takers rather 
than price-setters (price-setting is the privilege of the consuming nations); 
continue to have scarcely any control over processing, shipping and 
marketing, which are monopolized by the trans-national corporations of 
industrial countries; and continue to be discriminated against by a pattern 
of protection in the industrialized countries, which directly contravenes 
G A T T rules - that is, as long as the crisis of the old international 
economic order survives in its present form — Third-World countries, 
particularly African countries, have little hope of climbing out of their 
mass poverty. For instance, according to World Bank estimates, if the 
dominant industrialized countries - especially the 24 O E C D m e m b e r 
countries, which constitute the major export markets for African coun-
tries - were to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports from 
developing countries, these countries could add some 33 billion to their 
foreign-exchange earnings.73 
It is in terms of these considerations outlined above that the urgent 
demands of the Third-World countries for the establishment of a n e w 
international economic order - which would restructure trade, produc-
tion, monetary system, surplus allocation and decision-making, and thus 
71. For example, S T A B E X ; see O . H . Kokole, 1981, on S T A B E X , pp. 441-59. 
72. J. Gaining, 1976, p. 40. 
73. J. F. R w e y e m a m u , 1978, p. 36. 
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eliminate the gross inequities and discrimination against Third-World 
countries - should be assessed and supported.74 
It has been pointed out that the existing terms of international trade 
tend to deteriorate for the exporters, notably Africa, of primary c o m -
modities and agricultural products, as against those of manufacturers; that 
is, the terms of trade tend to deteriorate for poor as against rich countries. 
T o reverse these abuses, Third-World countries are asking for the 
stabilization and enhancement of international prices for the primary 
products exported by them, either through fairer and more comprehensive 
international commodity agreements or, if necessary, by exploiting the 
potential commodity power of producers, as was demonstrated in 1973— 
4 and 1979-80 by O P E C (Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries). T h e establishment of the U N Conference on Trade and 
Development ( U N C T A D ) in 1964 and its ICP is designed to prevent the 
effects of the failure of international markets to be fair to the primary-
commodity exports of Third-World countries. A C o m m o n F u n d was 
established by U N C T A D as a means of financing ICP. T h o u g h accepted 
in principle by Western industrial countries, they are yet to ratify it. 
Meanwhile, following the Plans of Action adopted by the O A U Special 
Economic S u m m i t held in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1980,75 African governments 
are m a d e to accept full responsibility for Africa's agrarian crisis, for not 
according the necessary priority over the years to agriculture - especially 
food production for domestic consumption - both in the allocation of 
scarce resources, and in paying sufficient and systematic attention to 
policies for promotion through the provision of adequate incentives of 
productivity and general improvement of rural life. African governments 
should have the courage to implement the programme of action designed 
to ensure a beneficial income-distribution impact on the rural poor, and 
a radical reduction, if not total elimination, of the widening gaps in 
income and standard of living between the rich and the poor in rural 
areas. In the decades ahead, this will mean the reversal of the flow of 
massive investments away from urban areas and into the rural areas of 
Africa in the form of rural industries, the provision of health posts and 
clinics, good all-weather feeder roads, better sanitation and so on. Poor 
farmers should be guaranteed access to credit and new, improved, appro-
priate farming technology. This, after all, would be a fair and reasonable 
return of a portion of the enormous taxes that are appropriated by the 
state from the farming population. 
74. See W . Brandt, 1980. 
75. See International Institute for Labour Studies, 1982. 
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Introduction 
This chapter sets out to show that industrial development in Africa 
inherited a heavy burden as a result of the unbalanced relations existing 
between the continent under colonial rule and dominant Europe. It is 
difficult n o w to turn that heritage to Africa's advantage on account of a 
host of objective and subjective inhibiting factors and impediments that 
are both internal and external in origin. Thereafter, against the background 
of the present-day urban explosion, it attempts to highlight some of the 
reasons w h y the industrialization and urban growth of Africa are not 
synchronous, or are only seldom so. This has the effect of further tilting 
the social imbalances that are among the factors preventing genuine 
economic development. 
T h e questions w e shall examine one by one will accordingly be: 
industrialization policies in Africa since the 1930s; the main features of 
industrial development in terms of both production and consumption; 
and the part played by industrialization in the process of urban growth. 
Industrialization policies in Africa from 1930-5 to 1980 
Patterns of industrial development in Africa, at least from the 1930s to 
1980s, were bound up with the implementation of industrialization policies 
that had been more or less well thought out; overall, they bore some 
relationship to the nature of external economic relations and to the general 
goals of the continent's economic development. While the former changed 
little, the latter brought out the contrast between the colonial period and 
the post-colonial era, having regard to the ambiguous status of countries 
that were theoretically independent but whose economies were subject to 
external control. 
In terms of industrial development, it can be seen from an analysis of 
policies and actual trends over the period from 1935 to 1980 that modern-
style industry in Africa was initially fostered in the mining sector, followed 
by different levels of agricultural processing. T h e continent's role was 
seen as being that of a supplier of primary commodities in their more or 
1 
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less raw state. W h e n manufacturing appeared at a later date, the idea was 
to bring light industrial output closer to its African customers. 
Colonial policies from 1930 to 1960-5 
Although colonial economic policies displayed the same features every-
where, in that they were designed to exploit the colonies primarily for 
the benefit of the metropolitan countries against the background of a 
capitalist system operating on a worldwide scale, the individual colonial 
powers, under pressure from colonial business interests, evolved specific 
policies for their o w n empires, in some cases right d o w n to the local 
level. Hence , industrial development did not occupy the same place in 
these policies in every instance. Despite their differences and similarities, 
three main cases call for brief consideration: these are the examples of 
the British, French and Belgian areas of influence in Africa. 
Industrial policy in British Africa 
T h e works on the economic history of Africa provide little evidence of a 
comprehensive industrial policy on the part of the relevant authorities in 
London or in their colonial territories in Africa. Official development 
policy in British Africa can best be grasped, especially for the period 
before the Second World W a r , from the sectoral measures taken or, more 
often, from the approach adopted in local situations. 
Believing as it did in free trade, the Colonial Office in L o n d o n was a 
strong supporter of entrepreneurship in the colonies; it held to the 
doctrine that the main task of the state was to ensure freedom of m o v e m e n t 
and the protection of businessmen in the colonies. A s a result, until the 
Second World W a r , industry remained basically the province of private 
enterprise, without the authorities becoming involved in the mobilization 
of capital. Since the colonial powers had been hard hit by the economic 
crisis from 1930 onwards, a policy of falling back on the empire was 
advocated by the Imperial Conference in Ottawa in 1932. That policy 
was applied in British Africa over the period from 1935 to 1939. However , 
it was not accompanied by official measures geared to attracting some of 
the free-floating capital of the time to Africa for its industrial development, 
despite the creation of the Colonial Development F u n d in 1929. A second 
period started to take shape during the war years from 1939 to 1945, and 
gathered strength especially after the victory. This saw the discreet 
intervention of the state, which passed the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act in 1940. 
It was only after the war that Britain started to take a serious interest 
in the industrial future of its African territories. T h e idea was to mobilize 
imperial funds to assist in the 'modernization' of the colonies. T h e 
commissions of inquiry set up for the purpose stressed the need for 
official incentives for industrial activity in British black Africa. However , 
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it was generally acknowledged that the setting up of a genuine capital-
goods industry (except in Southern Rhodesia) was a pipe-dream. All that 
was needed was to promote a consumer-goods industry adapted to local 
income levels and needs. It was not meant to be an export industry, 
except for primary commodities, and the influence of British interests, 
especially in the settler colonies like K e n y a and Southern Rhodesia, was 
expected to be paramount. In this regard, the case of Southern Rhodesia, 
a settler colony par excellence, is revealing. Close as it was to South Africa, 
and largely dominated by the business circles that had been instrumental 
in its creation, this colony had, from 1946-7 onwards, an industrial policy 
that was more systematically in line with the concerns of the British 
settlers living there, w h o were anxious to soften the impact of South 
African competition. 
In s u m , industrial policy in British Africa during the colonial period 
remained broadly inspired by the classical pattern whereby Africa supplied 
industrial raw materials and consumed large amounts of imported m a n u -
factured goods, the whole exercise being conducted through a form of 
capitalism purged of all idealism and all direct intervention by the state. 
The French colonial areas 
For m a n y years until the beginning of the 1930s, the industrial develop-
ment of the colonies and protectorates in Africa had not been an issue 
in official circles. In line with the Sarraut doctrine on the 'development 
of the colonies', industry was a matter for the private sector alone. It was 
not until the crisis of 1930 that the topic came to be raised in those 
circles. In 1934, the 'Economic Conference of Metropolitan and Overseas 
France' for the first time specifically and clearly set out the n e w thinking 
on the subject. Stressing the role of the state in the process of indus-
trialization in the colonies, this conference introduced the concept of 
'industrial impetus' in the colonies. T h e idea was not to create or develop 
a colonial industry that would compete with that of the métropole, but 
merely to set up , in the vicinity of the production regions, industries 
'making it possible to enhance unusable raw materials'. 
In business circles, the modernist current favourable to the idea of 
industrializing the colonies to some degree (P. Bernard, L . P. Morard, 
Maspétiol, and so on) was gaining ground. Its influence can be seen in 
the draft Ten-Year Plan (1942-52) drawn up by the Vichy regime, which 
even envisaged the promotion of semi-finished products from the in situ 
processing of raw materials. 
In 1944, the Brazzaville Conference proposed that the industrialization 
of French Africa should 'as a general rule, be carried out by private 
enterprise'. However, it m a d e a recommendation to the effect that the 
colonial administration should contribute to the success of such ventures 
by defraying the cost of pilot factories, supporting vital industries that 
'appear to be incapable of paying their way' , and by creating testing and 
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research centres ' m a d e available to industrialists for studies or quality 
controls'. This line of thinking marked a breakthrough in the traditional 
outlook of colonial business circles, which were attached to the colonial 
predatory economy (économie de traite). It also broke with the fear of 
possible competition with metropolitan industrial output. 
T h e establishment, in 1947, of F I D E S (Fonds d'investissement pour le 
développement économique et social — Investment F u n d for Economie and 
Social Development) was designed to give substance to official policy. 
T h e need to reconstruct the métropole, the enormous magnitude of the 
needs of the colonies and protectorates - industry there was only in an 
embryo state in 1946 — and the priority given to strategic expenditure on 
transport and infrastructure against the background of the Cold W a r in 
the 1950s soon showed up the modest scale of those public investments 
and the reticence displayed by the private sector. 
In i960, despite significant progress compared with the situation in 
1935,1 the French-governed areas were still severely under-industrialized 
and had not been prospected sufficiently even to become suppliers of 
industrial raw materials. Only commercial agriculture offered a few 
products of that type (coffee, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton). A s in the British 
colonial areas, industry was by no means one of the typical activities of 
these colonies. 
Belgian policy in the Congo 
In 1935, as indeed since 1908, Belgium remained generally faithful to the 
heritage left by King Leopold II of always working hand-in-hand with 
big business for the development of the Congo. 
It was mainly in the industrial sector, and especially in mining, that 
the state chose to work in partnership with business circles. Its involve-
ment, which was more clearly spelt out in the mining legislation adopted 
in 1935, took the form of the ownership of a significant shareholding in 
most of the mining companies. T h e close 'linkage' between private 
enterprises and the state until 1956-^7 left little room for an industrial 
development policy guided by the aim of establishing the colony's 
industrial independence. 
Between 1935 and i960, however, it should be noted that the restrictions 
imposed by the 1939-45 w a r seem to have fostered the timid establishment 
of a local consumer industry, as in the British and French areas. In the 
1950s, in a bid both to cater for an increase in African and European 
consumption - there were between 25 000 and 30 000 Europeans - and 
1. Over the period 1946-58, industrial investment was 27.6 per cent of total private 
investment - as against 13 per cent for 1900-40. In 1942, capital investment in industry 
accounted for only 0.01 per cent of the works carried out with borrowed funds in French 
black Africa since 1935. In the Maghreb, the situation was m u c h the same, although 
industrialization began there at an earlier date. 
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to take account of the major interests of Belgian industry, this consumer 
industry received the bare m o d i c u m of public encouragement necessary 
for its share of the local market to rise from 30 per cent in 1950 to 44 
per cent in 1958. This m a d e the Belgian Congo on the eve of independence 
one of the continent's most 'industrialized' colonies. 
T o conclude on the subject of the industrial policies of the colonial 
powers between 1935 and 1960-5, it can be seen that they all produced 
the same results: in the first place, respect for the doctrine that the colony 
should never compete with metropolitan industry and the continuing 
maintenance of metropolitan control through the movement of capital 
and patterns of technological dependence; secondly, and above all from 
the time of the Second World W a r , the creation of a light industry that 
just about satisfied the needs of the domestic market for consumer goods. 
Even in instances where a strong mining industry existed - which was 
in varying degrees the case, depending on the colonial areas concerned -
it was the policy never to encourage a true industrial framework in the 
colony that would threaten the metropolitan monopoly. 
Does this mean that the 'colonial pact' was a permanent feature? T o 
some extent, it was, provided that it is understood as being the mani-
festation of an international division of industrial labour to which the 
colonial authorities subscribed. T h e case of the 'semi-colonies ' in Africa 
is a partial illustration of this development between 1935 and i960, 
depending on the country. 
Industrial policy in the 'semi-colonies'; the cases of Egypt, Liberia 
and South Africa 
A few countries in Africa that were already independent in 1935 were 
theoretically in c o m m a n d of their industrial development policy before 
the Second World W a r . Apart from the period from 1935 to 1941, w h e n 
Ethiopia was occupied by Mussolini's Italy, the governments of these 
countries each drew up their o w n industrial development policy. Indeed, 
the impact of external interests, local collusion with those interests in 
some instances, the volume of resources available and the strategic issues 
with which the evolution and future of these countries were bound up, 
all severely limited the room for manoeuvre of the governments and 
influenced those industrial policies. W e shall mention briefly three cases: 
Egypt prior to al-Nasser, Liberia and South Africa: each reveals a certain 
level of dependence of their industrial policy in the mid-twentieth century. 
The Egyptian example from IÇJO to ig$2 
In the 1930s, two features marked the place occupied by industry in the 
Egyptian economy: the fact that the industrialization process was already 
long-established and the considerable influence of external interests, 
coupled with the country's overall debt. 
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O n the first point, recent studies have shown that, in the follow-up to 
the Westernization movement begun by M u h a m m a d cAlï, it was primarily 
in the 1890s that modern industrialization1 got under way. With the crisis 
of 1929, the decline in foreign investment and the adoption of a vague 
protectionist policy prompted the emergence of n e w features in Egyptian 
industry. O w i n g to its limited financial and technological resources, local 
capital turned towards import-substitution industry, geared to meeting 
the demand for consumer goods and intermediate goods. 
T h e Second World W a r accentuated these trends as a result of the 
sharp drop in European imports. However, between 1945 and 1954, this 
evolution did not prevent the country from resorting to foreign capital, 
at least for the extension of manufacturing ventures.2 T h e Egyptian 
governments of King Farouk, beholden as they were to their foreign 
creditors, had to tread very carefully w h e n drafting and following up an 
industrial policy that was resolutely favourable to the national middle 
class. Hence, it is understandable that in the case of the European colonies 
and because such an industrialization policy posed little threat to the vital 
interests of European capitalism, import-substitution industry should have 
developed in Egypt between 1930 and 1954. T h e deliberate policy pursued 
by President al-Nasser after 1956 marked a break with the industrial 
policy of Farouk's Egypt. 
Liberia 
T h e oldest republic in black Africa had been in a period of financial 
difficulties since the beginning of the century and by 1935 it was 
ruined and virtually bankrupt, so m u c h so that the European chanceries 
considered placing the country under a League of Nations mandate. After 
1945, under the presidency of William T u b m a n , private investment, 
chiefly with American capital, took off again. It was directed towards the 
exploitation of the country's mineral wealth in the form of high-grade 
iron ore from M o u n t N i m b a and of bauxite, and was offered considerable 
incentive by a policy very largely designed to grant all sorts of privileges 
to foreign enterprises. 
This industrial policy long remained subject to two constraints: first, 
the need to set up the m i n i m u m amount of infrastructure required to 
hold out any hope of industrial development; and, secondly, the need to 
cater for the demand for manufactured consumer goods from a population 
of African American origin living virtually in a world of its o w n . At the 
beginning of the 1960s, Liberia was just starting to m o v e towards the 
setting-up of a small consumer-goods industry in the shape of brickworks, 
a soap factory, breweries, and so on, under the very limited control of 
the local middle class, which had no control at all over the mining 
industry. 
2. See C . Issawi, 1982, p. 72. 
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South Africa 
In contrast to Liberia, and to a greater degree than Egypt on account of 
its fabulous mineral wealth, South Africa in 1935 was intent on making 
the most of the 1929 depression to equip itself with a true industrial base. 
T h e already long-standing application of a policy of discrimination in 
industrial employment was an added factor that was not unconnected 
with the results obtained. 
T h e revolution in the mining industry which began in the 1860s had 
m a d e it possible from a very early date to build a basic infrastructure 
before the 1920s. Despite a decline in mining production between the 
end of the First World W a r and 1921-2, industrial growth was relatively 
buoyant as a result of the operation of the goldfields. At the end of the 
1920s, a n e w industrial policy began to take shape: in a bid to curb undue 
dependence on the production of precious metals, there was a m o v e to 
diversify the industrial sectors. T h e Great Depression provided the 
opportunity for stepping u p this trend, if need be with state participation. 
Until the Second World W a r , industry continued its growth3 and was 
easily able to adapt to the fall in imports of manufactured goods. 
However, although local investment was encouraged - its share of the 
mining industry rose from 15 to 40 per cent - the financial impact of 
foreign interests (above all British, but also American from the 1920s 
onwards) was still very significant in 1945. In the post-war period, there 
was a further growth in the hold exerted by foreign capital over the fast-
growing manufacturing industry. 
While the country's industry was geared to import-substitution catering 
for the consumer needs of the black population, it was also, in the wider 
context, an industry producing intermediate goods, and even capital 
goods, with the support of foreign capital, which was anxious to take 
advantage of local raw materials and to circumvent a customs-tariff policy 
that had been growing increasingly protectionist since the 1930s. 
T h e outcome was that, by 1945, South Africa had already emerged as 
the leading industrial power on the continent, thanks to a repressive social 
policy and also to its natural advantages. However, this situation, which 
went back to the 1930s, was the result of a purposeful industrial policy, 
firmly based on the promotion of a diversified local industry. That 
policy was increasingly sustained by foreign capital, in some instances in 
partnership with local capital, although not in others. 
Although the connection with such a policy is by no means obvious, 
the industrial development policies of independent Africa have, to varying 
degrees, followed a similar pattern. 
3. Between 1939 and 1945, the value of manufacturing output increased by 116 per 
cent at current prices. See D . H . Houghton, 1971, p. 36. 
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'Industrializing nationalism' and the industrial policies of 
independent states 
General considerations 
It was less against the industrial policies of die colonial powers than 
against economic exploitation in general that the 'fathers of African 
independence' directed their main criticism, especially after the Second 
World W a r . However, in the early 1950s, the idea gained ground that the 
economic development of the colonies also entailed 'gradual industrial 
development'. At die time, everybody realized that it would take time to 
attain the goal of industrialization and that the support and assistance of 
the former colonial powers and foreign capital would also be needed. 
However, that attitude gradually came to be compounded by another 
idea, particularly at a time when political demands were beginning to 
prove successful. This was that industrial development was not merely 
one of the habitual tasks of the state, but was a mandatory condition of 
sovereignty and genuine national independence, as K w a m e N k r u m a h was 
already asserting in 1945.4 
These were the foundations of 'industrializing nationalism' in Africa 
which developed with African political independence. In every instance, 
it involved a more clear-cut industrial policy than at die time of colonial 
or semi-colonial rule. But over and above the experiences and statements 
of intent, the industrial policies of the independent states have to be split 
into two broad categories, leaving aside the particular case of South 
Africa, especially after 1948. O n the one hand, there were the 'non-
capitalist' policies and, on the other, the policies of countries with a 'free-
enterprise' economy. 
The policies of countries opting for a 'non-capitalist economy' 
Nkrumah's Ghana and Boumedienne's Algeria opted for an industrial 
policy on the 'socialist' model. 
In 1957, Nkrumah's Ghana entered the post-colonial era widi a 
rudimentary economy. Although he had been leading his country since 
1951, K w a m e N k r u m a h had to make allowance for the domestic balance 
of power and he did not really begin to put his ideas on industrial 
development into practice until after 1959, with the adoption of Ghana's 
Second Five-Year Plan. In this view, the basic objective was to carry 
dirough an 'economic revolution' which would gradually make it possible 
to break with capitalism; this revolution entailed die widespread indus-
trialization of the country carried out mainly by the state as the owner 
of die bulk of die means of production in local industry. T h e private 
sector could continue to exist; but die effort of will by the state should, 
in due course, ensure that the public sector would occupy pride of place. 
4. See the first edn of K . N k r u m a h , 1945 (republished in 1962). 
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N k r u m a h also defended the idea of systematic vocational training and 
the planning of the industrial development effort. T h e Second Five-Year 
Plan (1959-63) and the First Seven-Year Plan (1964-70) illustrate this 
industrial strategy quite clearly, in that 72 per cent of the budget credits 
in 1959-63 and 61 per cent in 1964-70 were earmarked for industry as 
against 38 per cent in 1951-7 (the period of the First Development Plan). 
B y 1965, 10-12 per cent of all industrial production was coming from a 
public sector that had virtually not existed prior to 1961. 
T h e fall of N k r u m a h in 1966 and the successive changes of regimes 
and economic options made it impossible to pursue this policy, which 
had largely drawn its inspiration from the anti-capitalism and radical 
nationalism of K w a m e N k r u m a h . 
Algeria emerged from the colonial period with an industrial sector that 
accounted for only a very small proportion of G N P . Neither the application 
of the policy of imports without state protection, which had been in effect 
since 1943-5, n o r t n e implementation of the much-vaunted 'Constantine 
Plan' of 1954, which, in the industrial sector, was mainly instrumental in 
initiating oil-exploitation policy, had really had any significant effect on 
the country's progress towards industrialization. T h e industrial sector was 
still very weak in 1962 and largely under French control, despite the 
Evian Agreements. 
Before independence, the F L N was already developing theses heralding 
what w e have called 'industrializing nationalism'. G . D . de Bernis recalls 
this very aptly w h e n he says that 'Industrialization was to be achieved 
through the creation of cooperatives working for heavy industry'.5 This 
meant that the state was to play a pre-eminent role as a deliberate act of 
policy; the socialist model was to be adopted through the creation of co-
operatives; and heavy industry was to be established. These were the 
main thrusts of a doctrine which Algeria was to put into effect, especially 
.from Boumedienne's time onwards. 
T h e country had considerable natural advantages: it had iron and, 
above all, oil, and it was the rise in the price of oil that was to provide 
the resources for embarking on a systematic policy. O n the basis of 
these F L N theses, three broad lines prevailed, especially after 1969: the 
investment of state resources, with or without nationalization, in giant 
enterprises (often turnkey projects) with a significant knock-on effect on 
the structuring of an industrial economy; the m a x i m u m enhancement of 
natural resources and the decentralization of industrial plants in an 
endeavour to foster the integration of regions that had been left to their 
o w n devices during the colonial period, and hence combat regional 
imbalances in industry. 
But the policy of priority for 'industrializing' industries did not rule 
out state support for the private sector, which was geared to the production 
5. See G . D . de Bernis, 1975, p. 26. 
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of consumer goods. This was the last broad thrust of this industrial 
development policy which was pursued, with correctives here and there 
irrespective of the limits, after the death of Houari Boumedienne. 
A s to the question whether the cases of G h a n a and Algeria are special, 
it could be answered that they are perhaps not altogether special, for the 
deliberate 'industrializing' approach, the idea of planning without the 
accompanying anti-capitalist and socialistic discourse and the important 
place occupied by the public sector in industry were to be found in the 
policies of a number of n e w states with a 'free-enterprise' economy. 
T h e policies of countries opting for a 'free-enterprise' e c o n o m y : 
Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria 
Despite a weak industrial base at the time of independence, and although 
the years 1955-60 were a m o n g the most intense periods of African 
nationalism, several countries in Africa refused to ascribe their under-
industrialization to the strategies of international capitalism since the 
colonial era. T h e y opted for free-enterprise capitalism in the economic 
field; their evolution towards an industrial economy was to be consonant 
with market forces. But an analysis of their individual policies reveals a 
number of nuances and even differences, some of which are illustrated 
by the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. 
In i960, Côte d'Ivoire, an agricultural country where the colonial-style 
trading economy flourished as it did in neighbouring G h a n a , had very 
little industry, despite a positive external trade balance. In 1959, the 
decision had deliberately been taken to remain within the framework of 
a market economy. In the case of industry, while it was recognized that 
there was a need for more conspicuous development, it was decided to 
let the burden be borne primarily by the private sector and above all by 
calling on foreign capital. This was at the origin of one of the earliest 
investment codes on the continent to grant highly favourable terms to 
foreign enterprises (cf. the law of 3 September 1959), in the form of a 
variety of tax exemptions, the repatriation of profits, guarantees against 
nationalization or social demands, and other facilities. 
O w i n g to the low level of industrial potential at the outset - there was 
little k n o w n natural wealth and vocational skills were of a low standard -
and in order to respect the industrial strategy adopted prior to i960, 
emphasis was placed in the first instance on a policy of producing 
substitutes for imports of mass-consumer goods. T h e state was m u c h 
more concerned with its policy of diversifying and increasing agricultural 
production (especially of agricultural primary commodities), and it hardly 
intervened in this sector. However, as M o h a m m e d Diawara, the then 
minister of planning and industry, recognized in 1972, this policy resulted 
in securing 'substantial profits for the entrepreneurs, but not always for 
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the community'.6 T h e incentives offered to export industries and to 
enterprises expecting to benefit from the 'manpower ' factor, but above 
all the policy of promoting domestic investment in this area of activity 
from 1970 onwards, were then aimed at giving fresh impetus to industrial 
development. 
Lastly, the third broad thrust featuring in the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan 
was directed at the enhancement of local resources chiefly through 
the promotion of export-oriented agro-industry. In this case, the state 
intervened directly through state-owned companies producing palm oil, 
sugar, cotton and other commodities, in the n a m e of a theory of 'state 
capitalism' by way of a transition to 'conventional capitalism'. Pending 
the emergence of a national middle class, the state would ensure that the 
country participated in industrial investment and would later sell off its 
shares to Ivorians capable of pursuing the effort. T h e entrepreneur-state 
was only intended to perform that role as a temporary measure. 
Alongside this Ivorian policy which some analysts praised as being 'the 
Ivorian miracle' or strongly, criticized by labelling it as 'growth without 
development', there was the case of Nigeria. In Nigeria, there was 
m u c h the same free-enterprise stance based on a policy of increased 
diversification and decentralization of industrial production, and a more 
active role for the private sector, especially after the civil war from 1967 
to 1970. Indeed, in i960, industry was a negligible quantity in the 
Nigerian economy and received only a small share of the planned 
investment (7.66 per cent of that investment in the 1955-60 Five-Year 
Plan). Between i960 and 1967, borne along by its free-enterprise options 
and its recourse to foreign capital, the federal government scarcely 
intervened, except mainly to provide incentives to the oil industry. T h e 
political crisis of 1966 and the civil war of 1967-70 narrowed d o w n the 
state's margin of manoeuvre even further. 
T h e end of the civil war and the need to build up the economy again 
after its disruption by that crisis, coupled with the oil-price rises between 
1973 and 1980 and the resulting increase in the revenue of the federal and 
state governments, provided the basis for a more far-reaching industrial 
development policy. This was centred on three main themes: the selective 
liberalization of imports of industrial goods which, by providing greater 
facilities for the import of raw materials and machinery, m a d e it possible 
to support and protect the increasingly sophisticated import-substitution 
industry; the more or less direct support by the state for the capital-
goods industry, as awareness grew of the considerable dependence on 
technology as a consequence of the progress m a d e by import-substitution 
industry; and lastly, at the same time as it provided incentives for the 
processing of local raw materials, the so-called 'Nigerianization' policy 
6. See Colloque international de Dakar sur le développement industriel africain, 1972, 
P- 133-
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gave nationals priority in particular sectors of activity and government 
contracts, and offered facilities for forming partnerships with foreign 
capital. Nigeria was to be a 'giant' of African industry. 
In s u m , whether it be in states declaring themselves to be 'socialist' or 
in 'free-enterprise' economies, industrial development policies in inde-
pendent Africa display one feature in c o m m o n , in that they all set out to 
wage an effective struggle against the under-industrialization of the 
colonial era in order to ensure a degree of industrial self-sufficiency. But 
Africa in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was starting from too far behind 
and was saddled with a variety of handicaps, not the least of which were 
the strategies evolved outside the continent to maintain or preserve an 
international division of labour that was progressively imposed on Africa, 
especially under cover of the years of economic crisis from 1930 to 1935 
and from 1973 to 1980. A n analysis of the features of African industry 
since 1935 reveals its structural weaknesses and vulnerability, in spite of 
the efforts of the post-colonial period. 
General features of industrial development in Africa, 
1935-80 
T h e evolution of industrial production and of industry's share in the 
G D P of African countries shows quite clearly two main periods: the first 
from 1935 to 1960-5 and the second from i960 to 1980. In order to see 
each of these periods in finer detail, due account has to be taken of local 
structural crises and the results achieved by the sub-regional or territorial 
industrial policies already mentioned. 
E m b r y o n i c industrialization before 1960-5 
Whether it be the level of production, the rate of industrial growth or 
the share of industry in the African economy before 1960-5, the modern 
industrialization of the continent had scarcely begun. 
The evolution of production and the industrial growth rate 
T h e statistical data by country or colonial area for the period 1935-60 
are irregular, sometimes unreliable, and often piecemeal. Hence it is not 
possible to obtain a continuous overall picture of the scale of production 
and the industrial growth rate of the entire continent. At first sight, 
however, the available figures point to a positive evolution of industrial 
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TABLE 13.1 
Country 
Egypt 
Belgian Congo 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Indices of industrial production 
59/60 
1939 
49 
30 
1945 
67 
58 
35 
1950 
98 
100 
100 
f r certain 
1954 
106 
190 
147 
57 
countries, 1939-
1960 
161 
235 
278 
71 
N O T E S : Base 100 set at 1950-2; for South Africa, base 100 set at 1963, and indices 
are for the years 1948, 1953 and 1958. 
Sources: S. Radwan, 1981, p. 200; J. L . Lacroix, 1966, pp. 295-6; U . E . Okeke, 1985, 
pp. 36-^7 (reproduced by permission of African Review of Business and Technology, formerly 
known as African Technical Review) and United Nations, 1970. 
production, with the post-war period marking a distinct acceleration. 
Table 13.1 relates to three countries that were relatively 'industrialized' 
at the time; it shows a distinct progression in i960 compared with the 
situation in 1939, while the 1950s were the period when production 
virtually doubled. 
However, these figures are deceptive for in absolute terms they relate 
to industry on a very modest scale. Except in South Africa (with a figure 
of more than £75 million already by 1938, excluding the mining sector), 
the value of industrial production in most countries in i960 seldom 
exceeded U S $ 2 0 0 m (Egypt). It stood at $160 million in Nigeria, $128 
million in the Belgian Congo, $120 million in Southern Rhodesia, $94.7 
million in Ghana and barely $140 million for the whole of French 
black Africa (French West Africa, French Central Africa, Madagascar, 
Cameroon and Togo). In the Maghreb, the level was not m u c h higher, 
even counting mining production. 
T h e industrial growth rates, very uneven from sector to sector (mines, 
consumer goods, intermediate goods), show that the industrial policies 
then being implemented were virtually ineffective. Apart from mining, 
they were relatively mediocre (between 0.5 and 3 per cent depending on 
the country and year) and in some instances there was a lengthy period 
of stagnation (for example, in North Africa between 1948 and 1954). 
The share of industry in the African economy 
T h e place occupied by industry is an even more eloquent pointer to die 
level of industrialization of the continent at that time. 
Despite differences in estimates, all the studies carried out acknowledge 
that industrial activity still played a very minor role in Africa in the late 
1950s. Indeed, to a greater extent than Table 13.2 shows, it was even 
altogether marginal in many countries (2.6 per cent in D a h o m e y , 3 per 
cent in Tanganyika, 4 per cent in Togo). It was primarily agriculture, 
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T A B L E 13.2 Percentage share of industry in the national income of selected 
African countries, igs6-6o 
Year Belgian Congo FWA Nigeria Rhodesia-Nyasalandh 
1956 8.0a 2.0 2.0 11.0 
i960 14.0 5.5 4.5 1^0 
"Figure for 1958. 
bSouthern Rhodesia only for i960. 
Sources: United Nations, 1959, p. 15; P. Kilby, 1975, p. 472; United Nations, 1970. 
often using rather rudimentary methods, that was the main driving force 
behind the economy in cases where there was absolutely no mining 
industry at all. S o m e writers7 have sought to relate this fact to the n u m b e r 
of European settlers. In point of fact, this is not at all relevant. In the 
Maghreb, for example, despite a long-established and large French-settler 
population, the share of industry in the G D P of that part of the continent 
was not any more substantial. In Algeria, in 1962 - on the eve of 
independence - industry accounted for only 9.36 per cent of G D P (23.8 
per cent including the mining industry). Industry was of little importance 
in the colonial economy except in its primary form, such as mining, and 
it employed few workers, as w e shall see. This was certainly not because 
production methods were more highly automated than anywhere else, but 
it was rather the mark of under-industrialization. 
All this explains Africa's modest share in world production - except 
for raw materials - and in the consumption of manufactured goods. 
Africa's place in world production and consumption 
T h e image of Africa as a major supplier of industrial raw materials was 
not something new in 1935 - quite the contrary, for that image already 
dated from the distant past. T h e place occupied by South Africa in the 
world production of precious metals, the proven quality of the iron-ore 
deposits in Liberia, with their 65 per cent metal content, the industrial 
production of bauxite in Guinea and copper in the Congo or Northern 
Rhodesia, even before those countries became independent, all lent 
credence to that idea as far as the period from 1935 to 1965 is concerned. 
However, apart from a few mineral raw materials — precious metals in 
South Africa, phosphates in Morocco and non-ferrous metals elsewhere — 
there had still been too little prospecting activity for Africa to occupy a 
leading place in this sector. While more extensive prospecting was carried 
out after 1945, the colonial h o m e countries or the dominant powers (such 
as Great Britain in Egypt and Libya, France in Egypt, or the United 
7. J. D . Durand's (1967) estimates are merely an extrapolation from previous estimates, 
such as those of W . F. Wilcox (1931). As such, they have to be treated with caution. 
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States in Liberia) imposed a virtual monopoly on such mineral production, 
exclusively in favour of metropolitan companies at least until the mid-
1950s. . . . . 
T h e production of industrial raw materials was thus largely sub-
ordinated to the interests and strategies worked out by metropolitan 
capital which regulated its development. For example, oil production in 
North Africa (Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) rose from 7 
million barrels in 1940 (almost entirely from Egypt) to 17 million barrels 
in 1950 (out of which Egypt accounted for 94 per cent) and 91 million 
barrels in i960 (72.5 per cent for Algeria and 26.4 per cent for Egypt), 
representing less than 1 per cent of the production of the Middle East. 
In Algeria, the search for oil only really got under way after 1957 (541.6 
million fr. being spent over the years from 1952 to 1956 compared with 
679 million fr. in 1958 and 917 million fr. in 1962). 
Africa thus occupied a position in the production of industrial raw 
materials that was incommensurate with its natural potential. But what 
is more, in manufacturing industry, Africa's share of world production 
was marginal. This accounts for the very large proportion of manufactured 
goods in African imports. T h e breakdown of these imported manufactured 
goods shows h o w m u c h most countries depended on the outside world 
for their consumption (Table 13.3). Thus , in the best cases (the Belgian 
Congo, for example), black Africa, excluding South Africa, was in the 
1950s, some 70-75 per cent dependent on the outside world for consumer 
goods. In the case of capital goods, it was virtually 100 per cent dependent. 
This situation did not change until between i960 and 1965, depending 
on the country. 
T A B L E 13.3 Percentage breakdown of Egypt's imports of manufactured 
goods, IÇ4S-60 
Consumer goods 
Intermediate goods 
Capital goods 
1945 
43-3 
40.7 
16.0 
1952 
34-9 
36.7 
28.4 
1957 
54-3 
27.7 
18.0 
IQ6O 
22.1 
44-3 
33-6 
Source: S. Radwan, 1981, p. 216. 
T h e post-colonial era in Africa accordingly started out under a major 
handicap: people had become accustomed to consuming manufactured 
goods while the African economy was still largely in the pre-industrial 
age. It was, as w e saw above, a challenge which had to be taken up by 
the 'fathers of independence'. 
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Post-colonial developments, 1960 /65 -80 
Advances in production and consumption 
Whether one looks at the production of industrial raw materials or of 
manufactured goods, there can be no doubt that industry in Africa m a d e 
progress in quantitative terms between i960 and 1980. However, this 
progress was uneven in terms of both time and space (Table 13.4). This 
at times spectacular increase in industrial production (for example, it 
amounted to 400 per cent in Egypt between 1956 and 1971) brings out 
two main features. O n the one hand, in m a n y countries there was a 
significant growth in the production of industrial raw materials - of oil, 
of course, but also of strategic ores and metals. O n the other hand, there 
was a widespread growth of consumer-goods industries to cater for 
domestic demand, but also with the aim of winning foreign markets 
both through intra-African trade and by exporting to the industrialized 
countries, especially in the case of the products of agro-industry from 
countries like Côte d'Ivoire. 
T A B L E 13.4 Indices for African exports of manufactured goods, igjo-8 
Geographical and trading igjo ig/j igjj igj8 
areas 
North Africa 
of which, 
Maghreb 
M e m b e r s of E C O W A S 
of which, 
Côte d'Ivoire 
South Africa 
N O T E : Base 100 set at 1976. 
Source: U N C T A D , 1980, pp. 108-29. 
Even so, while the diversification of production was still scarcely in its 
infancy in m a n y countries, it was already well under way in others like 
Egypt, South Africa and Algeria. However, this African industry 
accounted for only a small proportion of the consumption of manufactured 
goods, which was growing at a m u c h faster rate: in 1978, imports of 
manufactured goods represented over 60 per cent of the total imports of 
most countries on the continent (including South Africa), whereas exports 
of manufactured goods generally amounted to less than 10 per cent of all 
exports. 
Export figures grew not only for energy products but also as a result 
of the demand generated for finished or semi-finished goods. Hence, there 
was some progress, although this was by comparison with the period of 
39 
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140 
-
132 
157 
163 
183 
-
122 
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T A B L E 13.5 Structure of manufacturing industry in Nigeria, 1958-78 (in 
percentages) 
. 1958 1963 1965 1972 1975 1978 
Consumer goods 92.3 90.6 84.2 93.3 90.9 80.9 
Producer goods 7.7 9.4 15.8 6.7 9.1 19.1 
Source: P. N . C . Okiglo, quoted by U . E . Okeke, 1985, p. 46. 
early industrialization rather than in relation to the ever-growing needs. 
Since a capital-goods industry was a rare feature or was virtually non-
existent in some countries, the idea of what constitutes progress in this 
sector has to be severely qualified. Even so, industry could no longer be 
said to be a negligible quantity in the national economies. 
The share of industry in the post-colonial economy 
Despite shortcomings in the statistical data in m a n y countries, notably as 
regards the precise areas covered by the traditional-crafts sector and by 
modern industry, the share of industry in G N P has risen steadily since 
the late 1950s. In the former European colonies - in instances where a 
measure of relative political stability allowed it - the post-colonial period 
even m a d e it possible to step up the process, and thereby enabled a 
number of small-scale industries to be integrated into the world market. 
However, apart from the fact that the tempo varied from country to 
country (Table 13.6), this was often the result of the more rapid growth 
of local processing industries even though, in overall terms, the share of 
industry seems to have grown faster than that of agriculture in m a n y 
countries. T h e idea that the outcome of this growth in industry's share 
in G D P amounted to genuine industrialization accordingly needs to be 
treated with caution. 
T A B L E 13.6 Evolution of the percentage share of industry in the G D P of 
three countries, 1960-74 
Years Nigeria Algeria Côte d'Ivoire 
i960 4-5 - 5-3 
1963 7.8 23.8 
1965 8.6 25.0 19.0 
1968 i3_Li 29.0 23.8 
Sources: Government of Côte d'Ivoire, 1976 (the last figure is that for 1970); Compíes 
économiques, icój-igóa, quoted by G . D . de Bernis, 1975, p. 52; Nigerian Federal Office 
of Statistics, quoted by U . E . Okeke, 1985, p. 37. 
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Africa in world industrial production: the limits of industrializing nationalism' 
between 1960-5 and 1980 
It has to be asked whether independent Africa can be said to have 
occupied a stronger position in manufacturing in 1980, as it emerged 
from a period that had been particularly marked by a deliberate drive for 
industrialization. It is difficult to change everything in some 15 to 20 
years of independence, and Africa then accounted for only 0.9 per cent 
of the world manufacture of finished goods. At the same time, there can 
be no doubt that its share in the production of industrial raw materials 
was greater than before 1960-5. Hence, all things considered, Africa was 
still the planet's least industrialized continent and to judge from the 
analysis of world trade flows, it was a continent that was mainly a supplier 
of industrial raw materials to the industrialized countries of Europe and 
America. T h u s , in 1980 it was still the underdeveloped continent par 
excellence. 
Such a situation raises the question of identifying the limits of what 
w e have called 'industrializing nationalism' as both the continuation and 
instrument of the policy of independence. Neither 'anti-capitalist' nor 
'free-enterprise' policies have so far succeeded in breaking the vicious 
circle of the continent's economic dependence and under-industrialization. 
In an endeavour to explain that fact, the arguments put forward have 
been both political (such as misguided decisions in a climate of chronic 
political instability that frightens off private investors) or technical (such 
as low standards of vocational training, for example, or the low level of 
domestic savings that cannot be properly or readily channelled into 
industrial development). Other arguments will be needed to fill out these 
analyses. W e feel that m a n y of the 'fathers of independence' did not pay 
sufficient heed to the structural vulnerability of African industry as it 
emerged from the colonial era. This vulnerability had increased by 1980. 
T h e vulnerability of industrial development 
A m o n g other, probably more secondary aspects, this vulnerability is bound 
up with four factors: the absolute dependence on foreign investment; the 
illusions entertained about a possible transfer of technology by the trans-
national corporations operating on the continent; low productivity in what 
is above all a primary-industrial sector; and the low level of integration 
of industrial enterprises in a market that is severely inhibited by under-
population and generally low incomes. 
Industrial investment in Africa: dependence on the outside world since 1935 
N o one can deny the considerable place occupied by the outside world 
in the modern industrialization of the African continent, at least since 
1935. Until recently it even accounted for the bulk of the capital invested 
in industry in the form of direct public investment (or of indirect public 
375 
Africa since 1935 
investment with foreign 'assistance') or else of private investment or 
investment through the international lending agencies. In the case of 
French-speaking black Africa, especially before i960, the metropolitan 
country (public investment) and the French private sector accounted for 
95-8 per cent of all industrial investment, while in the economy of the 
Belgian Congo, the share of foreign (especially Belgian) holdings and 
interests in 1958 was 95 per cent (and almost 100 per cent in industry). 
Above all in the mid-1960s, recourse to public capital and the nation-
alization of private (very often non-African) enterprises and the so-called 
'indigenization' policy in industry (like the 1974 and 1977 decrees in 
Nigeria), were instrumental in reducing the influence of outside interests 
in industrial investment. In reality, however, since foreign capital had to 
be attracted for financing n e w industrial projects, whether by indirect 
means or some other device, dependence on the outside world was still 
largely an unavoidable fact of life. It is this dependence that explains the 
main trends that industry has taken in most countries. 
Indeed, already back in the 1930s and right up to 1950, the bulk of 
industrial investment went into the mining industry which, together 
with plantations, was more profitable for European enterprises than 
manufacturing industry. According to J. Marseille, the yield from French 
colonial enterprises in 1938 was 5.6 per cent for industry as against 24.9 
per cent for mines and 15.2 per cent for plantations; in 1954, the figures 
were 6 per cent for industry, 9.7 per cent for plantations and 8.6 per cent 
for mines. With varying shades of difference, similar trends could be 
found in other instances, as a result of the main goals pursued by the 
industrial holding companies of Europe or America. 
Today, the situation has changed little except in particular cases: in 
1965, 67.18 per cent of the investment approved in the states of French-
speaking black Africa for the period 1965-70 was allocated to the mining 
industry; in 1976, an examination of the various development plans of 
these same countries showed that the range was between 60 and 75 per 
cent. 
Did this situation arise from the need for those countries to secure a 
m i n i m u m volume of resources for financing a more sophisticated industrial 
sector? That m a y well be true, but it was above all the outcome of the 
strategies dictated mainly by trans-national corporations regardless of the 
countries' wishes. 
The role of trans-national corporations since the Second World War and 
illusions about the transfer of technology 
Before the Second World W a r , the trans-national corporations were not 
very active in Africa, other than in the mining sector. It was between 
1946 and 1955 that the main ventures came to be established, either as 
8. J. Marseille, 1984. 
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a result of restructuring exercises based on the take-over of large colonial 
trading companies or through direct, though hesitant, action. However, 
it was only after most of the countries had gained their independence 
that these companies were more clearly perceived as having become 
established in a big way, either by increasing the number of intermediate 
branches or primary firms or else by setting up 'national' subsidiaries. 
A m o n g the factors that m a d e this development possible after the early 
1960s were the terms offered by the n e w states' investment codes and 
the desire to minimize production costs by moving closer to the raw-
material-producing regions with their cheap labour supply. W e have 
already shown that, in the case of South Africa, there was also a need to 
circumvent a body of regulations that had become decidedly protectionist 
from the mid-icßos onwards. U p to 1980, the same situation prevailed 
in most of the independent countries of black Africa. T h e growth of the 
multi-nationals' industrial activities was governed by the need for them 
to secure markets and the protectionist measures taken by the state offered 
them that guarantee. 
But, in addition to the fact that most of these enterprises concentrated 
on import-substitution and mining, they were by no means the main 
channels for the transfer of industrial technology to the African countries: 
their contribution to vocational training was infinitely less than that of 
the states or even that of smaller enterprises. T h e technology used in 
their production units was strictly confined to the plants belonging to the 
parent company and had to be used in accordance with its instructions. 
In Côte d'Ivoire, as in the case of m a n y other African countries, there 
was neither 'any widening of the conditions of supply through the 
production of n e w goods promoting n e w industrial sectors nor any 
introduction of n e w manufacturing techniques leading to the increased 
productivity of labour'. All this had a further adverse effect on the already 
low or relatively low (in such countries as South Africa and Egypt) 
productivity that is one of the features of African industry. 
This has been one of the main grounds for disappointment with the 
role played by the multi-nationals, compounding as it has done the trans-
national strategies of these enterprises which, by disregarding international 
boundaries and 'national' industrial development policies, perpetuate the 
vulnerability of industry and m a y even weaken it further. 
Industrial integration and the relative failure of the pan-African organizations 
It has n o w become commonplace to speak of the very limited size of the 
markets of the individual African countries: the main reasons for this are 
the under-population of vast areas of the continent and above all the low 
income levels. It was in a bid to make up for this handicap that the idea 
of more far-reaching economic integration and more effective har-
monization of industrial policies began to gain ground at the end of the 
1960s. T h e increase in the number of sub-regional or pan-African 
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organizations was also consistent with that goal. S o m e n e w ventures even 
saw the light of day (such as C I M A O - Cement C o m p a n y of West 
Africa - which was set up in 1974 to develop Togolese clinker with the 
participation of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), and the Lagos Plan of Action 
(1979) put forward by the O A U strengthened these views. 
It has to be recognized, however, that a number of impediments stood 
in the way of such a policy of harmonization and industrial integration, 
such as sensitivity over exercising sovereignty in economic matters, the 
extremely wide differences in regard to financial policies and industrial 
strategies, the absence of an industrial-technology policy based on the 
needs of populations having to contend with the challenges of under-
development, and so on. In short, the failure of inter-African organizations, 
such as the O A U , E G A (Economic Commission for Africa), E C O W A S 
(Economic C o m m u n i t y of West African States) and U D E A C (Union 
douanière des états de l'Afrique centrale), in this area is clear for all to see. 
O n e of the factors in the weakness of African industry in 1980 lay in 
its inability to withstand competition from imported goods, other than 
under the protection of government subsidies or high customs duties. 
Since African industry was less well organized (despite exceptional cases 
of industrial enterprises in some countries) and was marked by low 
productivity, it still could not, without running major financial risks, 
m o v e on to the stage of exports except through so-called intercontinental 
co-operation agreements - such as the E E C (European Economic 
C o m m u n i t y ) / A C P (Africa/Caribbean/Pacific) conventions - whose fin-
ancial or commercial advantages in respect of primary commodities or 
goods produced by import-substitution industries did not really m a k e up 
for the drawbacks inherent in the continent's main role of 'supplier' of 
industrial raw materials. 
W h a t is more — and this would tend to be borne out by a detailed 
analysis of every one of the attempts at industrial integration - modern 
industry in Africa did not bring out the sectoral linkage between its 
different component parts, owing to its total dependence on foreign 
capital and intermediate goods. It was accordingly difficult to establish a 
complementary relationship between geographical sectors, with a view 
to their integration. F r o m the industrial standpoint, the fact that the 
individual countries were constantly taking the independent initia-
tive of stepping up their trade outside the continent, whether this 
involved capital, mining products or agricultural raw materials, was the 
corollary of such a situation. This accounted for the vulnerability of 
African industry, since it was unable, by its o w n means, to cope with 
a balance-of-payments crisis or a decline in investment from outside 
Africa. 
Lastly, the fact that links between industry (both capital goods and 
processing) and agriculture were weak, w h e n they should have enhanced 
industrial performance and broadened the agricultural base, resulted in 
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African industrial output being less competitive than non-African goods, 
even within the individual countries themselves. 
T h e circle of dependence and under-industrialization was still there in 
1980. 
T h e above comments call for considerable qualification, however. Since 
1935, if not earlier, the industrial geography of the African continent has 
shown two broad types of imbalances that are historically linked in the 
case of m a n y countries, namely the imbalances between geographical 
sectors that were industrialized long ago and geographical sectors that 
were initially mainly agricultural and were only latecomers to industrial 
activity, and the imbalances, especially within the individual countries, 
between the port areas through which goods transit and areas of industrial 
production. These imbalances have significant effects on spatial organ-
ization and land-use planning, as well as on the industrial policy pursued. 
T A B L E 13.7 Geographical concentration of industries in French-speaking 
Africa in igjo 
Urban centres and 
countries 
Dakar (Senegal) 
Abidjan (Côte 
d'Ivoire) 
Bouaké (Côte 
d'Ivoire) 
Douala 
(Cameroon) 
Yaounde 
(Cameroon) 
Pointe-Noire 
(Congo) 
Brazzaville (Congo) 
Libreville and 
Port-Gentil 
(Gabon) 
Cotonou (Benin) 
L o m é (Togo) 
Niamey (Niger) 
Ouaga and Bobo 
(Burkina Faso) 
Bamako (Mali) 
Ségou (Mali) 
Percentage 
°f 
enterprises 
750 
695 
5-6 
51.8 
10.2 
36.1 
40.9 
75-0 
69.0 
85.0 
450 
89.0 
53-0 
10.0 
Percentage 
of industrial 
investment 
79.6 
62.2 
7-1 
44.9 
6-5 
324 
20.1 
81.1 
80.4 
90.0 
564 
55-7 
17.0 
23.0 
Percentage 
of industrial 
employment 
81.8 
46.S 
9.2 
44-7 
4.9 
25-5 
25-9 
81.1 
78.1 
96.8 
50-3 
73-5 
? 
? 
Percentage 
of turnover 
80.9 
68.5 
7.6 
61.7 
6.4 
27.6 
28.9 
93-7 
714 
87.6 
17-3 
65.6 
? 
? 
Source: J. Suret-Canale, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 482-3. 
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T h e pattern of industrial location in 1935 and 1980 shows five sub-
regional groupings which are distinguished by the age and extent of the 
industrial fabric, the level to which the installations are integrated and 
their variety. These are the Egypt-Maghreb grouping; the East-Central 
grouping; the Southern sub-region; Central-West Africa; and West Africa. 
B y way of conclusion to this review of the general features of industrial 
development, it should be mentioned that the inadequate industrialization 
of Africa reinforced the nature of the continent's underdevelopment and 
dependence in 1980, despite undeniable progress since 1935. T h e forms 
assumed by industrial development created, or helped to accentuate, 
imbalances which contemporary urban patterns reflect very imperfectly, 
as w e shall see below. 
Industrialization — a secondary factor in urbanization in 
Africa between 1935 and 1980 
T h e history of the continent's urbanization shows that there have been 
'generations of cities'. These differ according to whether they are related 
to the time when they were founded — that is, whether they are pre-
colonial or colonial settlements, or n e w cities dating from the post-colonial 
era - or to the prime function they fulfil as ports, trading stations, mining 
settlements or administrative centres. History has already shown that the 
twentieth century is a period when there can be said to have been an 
'urban revolution' in Africa. 
However, regardless of whether the issue is one of the relationship 
between the evolution of the industrial population and urban growth or 
of the patterns of urbanization since 1935, it would be going too far to 
establish a direct link between the two phenomena in the case of Africa, 
even though in some instances, urban growth has contributed to industrial 
development to some extent, as in the case of the mining towns of Tarkwa 
in Ghana , Ndola in Zambia and M w a d u i in Tanzania or the townships 
of Mauritania, Niger and South Africa. 
U r b a n growth since 1935 and the evolution of the industrial 
population 
There is often some inconsistency in the figures used for estimating both 
the total urban population and the proportion of the active population 
engaged in manufacturing production. This is as m u c h a problem of 
methodology (varying criteria are used to identify what constitutes a town 
and different statistical approaches are used) as a problem of docu-
mentation (sometimes incomplete censuses are available for different 
years). A s a result, it is difficult to determine precisely the real scale of 
urban growth and the proportion of that growth accounted for by 'the 
380 
Industrial development and urban growth, jgjj-80 
industrial population'. W e shall often have to be content with estimates. 
Statistical data on population and urban growth from 1935 to 1980 
Before the Second World W a r , which was the pre-statistical period par 
excellence, urban-population estimates are far from reliable. Little interest 
was taken in systematically counting that population throughout the 
country. Only a few territories were interested in doing so and those were 
mainly in North Africa and Southern Africa. Hence it is known that the 
urban population of South Africa rose from 25.1 per cent of the country's 
total population in 1921 to 31.4 per cent in 1935 and 38.4 per cent in 
1946. In North Africa, the growth in the urban population was equally 
striking: in Egypt, which had 13 million inhabitants in 1920 and 16 
million in 1938, the urban population had risen from 6.3 to 9 million by 
the eve of the Second World W a r . In the countries of the Maghreb, the 
urban population was likewise growing apace. 
Elsewhere, figures are less readily available. Even so, to take the example 
of French West Africa before 1939, in several of the colonial outposts 
founded by France in a number of pre-colonial towns useful to the 
colonists, the population not only levelled out but, especially in territories 
such as Côte d'Ivoire, had, in fact, been rising since 1923-5.9 In the 
neighbouring Gold Coast and in Nigeria prior to 1935, the increase in 
the urban population can be seen from the censuses conducted at the 
time: for example, the population in Gold Coast towns of at least 5000 
inhabitants rose from 5 per cent in 1921 to 9.3 per cent in 1931. 
After the Second World W a r , the figures become more accurate and 
w e have a clearer picture of the population explosion in African towns 
right up to 1980. For the continent as a whole, it is estimated that the 
urban population rose from 31.8 million in 1950 to 49.5 million in i960 
and 132.9 million in 1980, with an average annual rate of increase of 4.8 
T A B L E 13.8 The urban population as a percentage of the total population 
of Africa, 1950-80 
1950 
Eastern Africa 5.50 
Middle Africa 14.57 
Northern Africa 24.51 
Southern Africa 37.27 
Western Africa 10.15 
T O T A L A F R I C A 14.54 
i960 
7-54 
18.10 
29.77 
41.70 
13.48 
18.15 
1970 
10.69 
25.16 
36.61 
43-76 
17.27 
22.85 
1975 
13.20 
29.66 
40.12 
44.81 
19.58 
25-67 
1980 
16.14 
34-37 
43-83 
46.49 
22.29 
28.85 
Source: United Nations, 1981, p. 159. 
9. See P. Kipré, 1985. 
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per cent between 1950 and 1980. T h e pace was stepped up primarily 
from i960 onwards.10 
Not every country or every town was affected to the same extent. 
Indeed, despite its very rapid growth, the proportion of the urban 
population in the total population of Africa was still relatively low, 
although it was higher in some parts of the continent (the Maghreb, for 
example) (Table 13.8). 
It has to be asked whether the occupational distribution of the popu-
lation, and above all that of the towns, makes it possible to establish a 
correlation between the population working in industry and the urban 
population. 
Trends in the occupational distribution of the urban population 
T h e figures are even more fragmentary in this case. However, by extra-
polating the available figures, a number of features can be identified. 
In the 1930s, if the active population employed in the mining industry 
is excluded, the proportion of the urban population working in industry 
rose above 20 per cent only in the case of South Africa. Everywhere else, 
only a very small proportion of town-dwellers was employed in factory 
work: in 1938, 1.58 per cent of the Egyptian urban population worked 
in industrial enterprises with more than five employees, while in French 
West Africa the proportion was below 1 per cent in the period immediately 
after the end of the Second World W a r . 
Later, especially after 1950, the proportion of city-dwellers employed 
in the secondary sector (not including traditional crafts) increased relatively 
quickly, but it was always well below the rate of urban growth (Table 
13.9). In the case of Algeria, for example, the country recorded a striking 
growth of urban industrial employment between 1970 and 1980 (from 
117 000 jobs in 1967, it rose to 347000 in 1977 and 400000 in 1980). 
However, it can be seen that, with an annual average growth rate of 4.3 
per cent between 1966 and 1977, the country's urban population rose 
from 4.16 million in 1966 to 6.57 million in 1977. Industry continued to 
lag far behind service activities and the tertiary sector in general. 
A s Table 13.9 shows, the relationship between urbanization and indus-
trialization is far from obvious: there is a tendency for this relationship 
to diminish between 1950 and 1970, thereby clearly showing that the two 
phenomena were not synchronous during the period under review. 
T h e African urban population began to increase steadily even before 
the continent had really embarked on developing an industrial economy. 
In the years 1965-80, the attraction of a job in industry could serve as 
the pretext for migrating to the towns. At the same time, however, 
improvements in preventive medicine encouraged the natural growth of 
the towns, while the very considerable rural exodus after the Second 
10. See United Nations, 1981. 
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T A B L E 13.9 Relationship between urbanization of the population and 
industrialization of the labour force, 1950-70 (in percentages) 
Eastern Middle Northern Southern Western 
Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa 
1950 
Industrial manpower 3.66 5.87 10.44 24-56 
(1) 
Urban population (2) 5.50 14-57 24.51 37-27 
Ratio (1/2) 66.54 40.29 42.59 65.90 
1970 
Industrial manpower 6.32 9.54 15-75 26.35 
(1) 
Urban population (2) 10.69 25.16 36.61 43.76 
Ratio (1/2) 59 - 1 2 37-92 43-02 60.21 
Source: United Nations, 1981, p . 19. 
World W a r was triggered off not so m u c h by competition between the 
secondary sector and agriculture as indeed by the actual crisis in agri-
culture, which was finding itself increasingly ill-equipped to cope with 
the money economy. 
M o d e r n industrial employment is not the only temptation of such a 
money economy; in broader terms, it lies in the desire for a regular cash 
income and in the collective and individual ability to withstand the decline 
in the terms of trade for agricultural produce. This was particularly true 
of countries like Algeria, Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, where European 
settlement gave rise to land pressures a m o n g African communities from 
a very early date, as well as those countries hard hit by ecological calamities 
like those of the Sahel and Ethiopia, where the question was merely one 
of struggling to eke out an existence. T h e main factor accounting for 
urban growth, at least from 1935 onwards, was more the crisis in African 
agriculture than the prospect of finding industrial employment in urban 
areas. 
With minor sub-regional or local differences, the same mechanisms can 
be found at work everywhere in Africa, although they differ in intensity 
and follow differing patterns, depending on whether w e are dealing with 
the colonial period, at least from the 1930s onwards, or the post-colonial 
period (at least between 1960-5 and 1980). 
Patterns of urbanization and urban growth in the colonial period 
F r o m 1935 to 1960-5 in the case of all the dependent African countries, 
and from 1935 to 1980 at least in the case of South Africa, colonial labour 
policies and the functions performed by urban areas in the colonial 
6.10 
10.15 
60.10 
11.30 
17.27 
65-43 
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economy were both instrumental in setting in motion a pattern of 
urbanization that was quite different from that of the pre-colonial period. 
This gradually altered the actual manner in which urban areas were 
developed. 
Colonial labour policies and trends in African migration 
Before the crisis of 1930, colonial labour policies can all be epitomized 
as consisting of the wholesale mobilization of manpower for the develop-
ment of the natural wealth controlled by the colonialists in the shape of 
mines, plantations, forests, and so on. There was scant concern with 
promoting a higher level of skills among the labour force; on the contrary, 
the idea was to make up for the relatively low level of capital investment 
by an input of labour which gave rise to a variety of abuses. At the same 
time, the pressure of taxation and the development of a wage-labour 
force, which was very slow in some territories, were further powerful 
factors at work in this policy. 
In some instances, the crisis of 1930 hastened the process, while in 
others it broke d o w n the precarious balance between the manpower 
resources of the rural areas and the requirements of labour policy. In 
1935, labour policy paid little heed to this crisis in the rural areas, which 
drove thousands of peasants on to the road and into the towns. It was 
the starting point of the rural-exodus phenomenon that is still going on 
to this day. For example, the population of Cairo rose from 800 000 in 
the mid-i920s to 1400000 in 1938. T h e increasing overcrowding in the 
towns was compounded by growing poverty. Claude Liauzu has shown 
in the case of Tunisia that the urban population was growing faster than 
production (starting from a base of 100 in 1925-9, the population index 
rose to 122 in 1935-9 a n d to 136 in 1940-4, while the production index 
stood at 106 in 1935-9 a n ^ had fallen to 65 in 1940-4." During this same 
period, urban unemployment became a structural feature in Tunisia." T h e 
same conclusions have recently been reached in studies of the towns of 
the Maghreb and former French West Africa. 
In South Africa, it was the migration of white farmers ruined by the 
crisis, as well as of their African workers, and the controls on the African 
population leaving the reserves that were responsible for the increase in 
the urban population. In this connection, however, it should be pointed 
out that the policy of residential segregation, that had been slowly evolved 
since about 1910, fostered a policy whereby the African population was 
debarred from the towns but not from entering the mines. Moreover, by 
as early as 1935, Portugal had already introduced in Mozambique and 
Southern Angola a 'temporary-contract labour system' for African workers 
sent to the South African mines. Except in South Africa where, after 
11. C. Liauzu, 1978. 
12. ibid. 
384 
Industrial development and urban growth, IQ35-80 
1948, the policy of apartheid underscored the trends already visible before 
1935, the years from 1945 to 1960-5 represented a period w h e n the 
authoritarian labour policy was slackened. Stress was laid to a greater 
degree on allowing the unskilled labour force to m o v e about more freely. 
T h e urban centres of the 1950s were towns that were sometimes the 
focal point for small-scale light industry, but were more frequently trading 
towns at nodal points fostering the development of various services such 
as domestic servants and labourers. They accordingly acted as reception 
centres for an overwhelmingly rural population that was being pro-
gressively uprooted: in 1954,50 per cent of all non-agricultural occupations 
in Algeria were in trade, construction and a variety of services. Employ-
ment of this type was very often only of a temporary nature (47 per cent 
in Algeria in 1954) and had to cater for an urban population that was 
growing to an ever-increasing extent as a result of a surplus of rural 
migrants (in the Maghreb, this surplus accounted for 44-53 per cent of 
the population increment before i960), in instances where those migrants 
were not leaving Africa altogether (the number of Algerians in France 
rose by 180000 between 1947 and 1955). 
Urban growth in Africa between 1935 and i960 was thus fuelled by a 
rural exodus born of the crisis in the rural areas rather than being the 
outcome of industrial development. It is this situation which accounts for 
the emergence, from 1930-5 onwards and especially after 1945, of the 
squatter-settlement phenomenon in the urban centres of the continent. 
The pattern of urban development and the beginnings of 'squatter' settlements 
In 1935, Africa already displayed a variety of different situations as regards 
the pattern of urban development. Since at least the beginning of the 
twentieth century, two main cases were to be found: on the one hand, 
there were ancient pre-European towns, numerous in North Africa, 
Sahelian West Africa, Ethiopia and Yorubaland (Fig. 13.1); while on the 
other hand, there were the towns created by the colonialists, in some 
instances, although not always, from pre-colonial African villages. D e p e n d -
ing on the case, the patterns of n e w development in the towns were 
marked by the more or less obvious imprint of government authority that 
was typically European in essence (in the case of the colonies) or else had 
merely undergone European influence (in the case of the North African 
protectorates). 
In 1935, the state (the colonial power or the local government) was the 
main agency responsible for the creation of more-or-less planned areas 
that were allocated to the inhabitants for building purposes (dwellings or 
work-places). A s a result of the role played by the state in this regard, 
living space had already started to show signs of social segregation in 
most towns and it also pointed to the nature of the ties of political and 
economic dependence by which the African population was bound. In 
North Africa, for example, the medinas and souks came to be increasingly 
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To Ife To Idanre
The location of the residences of the
Oshemawe's major dignitaries:
1. Concession of the Lisa
2. Concession of the Jomu
3. Concession of the Odunwo
4. Concession of the Sashere
5. Concession of the Adaja
6. Concession of the Ogbosere
7. Concession of the Sara
8. Concession of the Odofin
9. Concession of the Orogbo
10. Concession of the Olotu Omoba
1 1 . Concession of the Ayadi
fig. 13. 1 A pre-colonial city: Ondo (Source: C. Cámara, 'Une ville précoloniale au Nigeria:
Ondo', Cahiers d'études africaines, No. 51, vol. XIII, 1973, p. 431, Mouton, Paris, The
Hague); © Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris
contrasted with the new residential quarters for Europeans and a section
of the indigenous population belonging to the higher and more-or-less
'Europeanized' social classes. In black Africa, especially in those urban
areas created by the colonialists, the contrast was even more marked
between the 'European towns' and the 'African townships' and was
evidence of a segregation that was both racial and social.
Since the early years of the century, this had become systematic policy
in South Africa. However, as a result of the crisis of 1930, the situation
was made even worse by urban growth that, as we have already seen, was
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largely fuelled by the exodus of impoverished country-dwellers into the 
towns. These new town-dwellers, unable as they were to pay the rising 
rents or the cost of urban property, and not earning enough to purchase 
building materials such as cement, corrugated sheeting or tiles, were 
compelled to go and crowd into the medirías and souks. Increasingly by 
the early 1930s, it was the unplanned urban areas outside the state's 
control, such as rubbish d u m p s , marshes, disused cemeteries and so on, 
that were sought out by these town-dwellers to build their homes out of 
anything that came to hand. In Tunis, where the French term bidonville 
for squatter settlement or shanty-town was used for the first time in 1931 
(in an article by D r Materi in the Voix du Tunisien of 6 November 1931), 
the number of such shanty-dwellers thus rose from 2000 in 1935, to 5000 
in 1938 and 10 000 in 1941; by the beginning of the war, Tunis was 
ringed by squatter settlements. It was also between 1935 and 1945 that 
squatter settlements began to appear in Abidjan, Accra, Lagos and Douala. 
In British East Africa (Nairobi, for instance) or Central Africa, and above 
all in South Africa, successive Land L a w s and the 1923 Native Urban 
Areas Act were instrumental in enforcing the colour bar, but they failed 
to prevent the progressive spread of the townships by the late 1920s 
onwards. T h e official doctrine was based on the fact that 'the Africans 
were not by nature town dwellers and they had not yet m a d e a success 
of city life', as the Native Affairs Commission put it in 1921. 
After 1945, the squatter-settlement phenomenon took on greater pro-
portions and litde-by-little, above all in the 1950s, spread to virtually 
every town on the continent. Each crisis in the colonial economy, each 
period of drought or failed harvests (1945-6, 1951-3) brought its quota 
of country-dwellers to the towns and their rising rents. Despite efforts 
to produce new, planned urban layouts or to cater more effectively for 
the growing demand for decent housing, the colonial powers and the 
national authorities never succeeded in controlling the 'squatterization' of 
African towns that has n o w become a permanent feature of the urban 
scene in Africa. 
T h e question is whether there was any change in the patterns of urban 
growth and its effects with the relinquishing of the colonial ties. 
U r b a n growth and its effects since independence 
In the first 20 years of African independence, there were no fundamental 
changes in the causes and effects of the rural exodus or in the gap between 
urban growth and urban employment, or indeed in the patterns of urban 
development, in spite of the more acute awareness of the phenomena 
involved and a greater determination to solve the problems they posed. 
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plate 13.2 Squatter settlements: above, in Lagos; centre, Mathare Valley in Nairobi; below,
Belcourt in Algiers
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The crisis in African agriculture and the acceleration of the rural exodus 
In the 1960s, if the superficial effects of political instability in some of 
the countries of Africa are disregarded, African agriculture can be said 
to have largely withstood the population drain to the towns, subject to 
minor variations from one country to another. 
However, since the beginning of the 1970s, drought and poor harvests 
have led to a succession of bad years (1972-4, 1979-81) and famines, 
mainly in Sahelian and Sudanic Africa stretching from Senegal to the 
Horn of Africa. T h e unsuitability of the farming methods used and the 
somewhat rash agricultural policies adopted also explain why, by 1980, 
there were few African countries where foodstuffs accounted for less than 
10 per cent of their total imports. T h e crisis in agriculture was thus even 
more acute and was the impetus behind the massive rural exodus to an 
even greater extent than before i960. In Algeria, for example, the urban 
population nearly doubled between 1966 and 1977, rising from 370000 
to 6800000; the urbanization rate rose from 25 per cent in 1954 to 41 
per cent in 1977, with the annual growth rate averaging 4.3 per cent 
between 1966 and 1977. In Côte d'Ivoire too, the same phenomenon can 
be observed, with annual growth rates varying from 6 to 9 per cent for 
towns with 100 000 inhabitants and 11 per cent for Abidjan. 
A n even more revealing pointer to the important role of the crisis in 
the countryside was the urban growth in Sahelian Africa, where the urban 
population was growing at rates ranging between 3.5 and 5 per cent, as 
a result of a surplus in the balance of migration between towns and 
countryside, with the balance invariably working out in favour, of course, 
of the towns. T h e population of Ziguinchor, an old colonial and trading 
town in Casamance (Senegal), had barely doubled between 1951 (15700 
inhabitants) and i960 (31000 inhabitants).13 However, owing to the crisis 
in the groundnut sector, which grew worse just at a time when monetary 
needs were rising, notwithstanding the crisis of an urban economy 
dominated by trade and lacking any industrial base, the urban growth 
rate rose sharply to reach 8 per cent a year after 1961. T h e population 
rose to 40000 in 1966 and 70000 in 1971. It was composed primarily of 
young people w h o had severed their roots in the rural areas, and was 
largely underemployed (structural unemployment). It was compelled to 
survive by finding accommodation that was as cheap as possible. T h e 
same situation arose in Rufisque, which had had a growth rate of 6-6.5 
per cent a year since 1968-^70. Here, as in numerous African towns, there 
was an unprecedented surge in 'spontaneous housing' after independence. 
Spontaneous housing and urban development: the spread of slums 
T h e existence of squatter settlements around or within African towns, 
which has now become a c o m m o n feature, appears to have increased after 
13. See P. X . Trincaz, 1984; and A . Dubresson, 1979. 
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i960. Describing Mathare Valley, one of the most famous squatter 
settlements in Nairobi, W a - G i t h u m o had this to say in 1983: 
Obviously, there are m a n y slums in Nairobi; Mathare Valley is the 
largest and represents one of the classic examples of the slums which 
have become a citadel of poverty, underdevelopment and other 
manifestations of h u m a n sufferings. Rat-ridden shanties, sheds, stalls 
and other slum-type shelters in Mathare are either rented or owner-
occupied, either legal or illegal. Hundreds of thousands of families 
live in over-crowded, unsanitary and substandard shelters.14 
This description of Mathare Valley is not so far removed from that which 
V . S. Naipaul gave in 1980 of some areas of Kinshasa in The Return of 
Eva Peron: 
W h e r e does the sense of responsibility, society, the state, begin? A 
city of two million, with almost no transport, with no industries 
(save for those assembly plants, sited, as in so m a n y 'developing' 
countries, on the road from the airport to the capital), a city detached 
from the rest of the country . . . It doesn't have to work; it can be 
allowed to look after itself . . . w h e n it is hot the gutters smell; 
in the rain the streets are flooded. A n d the unregulated city 
spreads . . . 
These descriptions raise the key problem of urban policies in post-colonial 
Africa, as well as that of the solutions to the urban housing crisis dreamed 
up by town-dwellers. T o a greater extent than in the colonial period -
and this tends to be borne out by the surveys being carried out in 
Côte d'Ivoire - the 'candidates' for spontaneous housing were not only 
newcomers but also a high proportion of long-standing inhabitants: 
outsiders or local people ruined by economic crises, the unemployed, 
social and other marginals, people on the fringes of the market economy 
and the n e w consumer society, were all to be found there, living from 
hand to mouth, sometimes by dealing in wooden shacks or waste materials. 
Faced as they were with this situation, the authorities can be said to 
have become aware of it at a relatively early date (see the 'developmentalist' 
ideology in the official speeches in the period immediately after 
independence). However, the solutions and the facilities needed to put 
them into effect came too late. Urban planning agencies and city master-
plans only m a d e their appearance and grew in number in the 1970s in 
most African countries, at least in those cases where the colonial powers, 
which had been primarily concerned with the big cities, had left nothing 
behind them. B y 1980, the very limited resources available for development 
had not yet enabled the state to come to grips with a phenomenon that 
was becoming increasingly entrenched. 
14. See Wa-Githumo, 1983, pp. 126-48. 
390 
Industrial development and urban growth, 1935-80 
T h e so-called 'informal' sector, which m a y represent the sole means 
of survival in African towns, especially in black Africa, became the main 
form of urban economic activity for the bulk of the population - to a 
greater degree than industry was capable of becoming. Studies of this 
aspect of the urban economy are still very recent, but they already show 
the marvels of ingenuity to which m a n y town-dwellers on the continent 
are driven in order to survive in present-day African towns, on the fringes 
of the industrial economy that was still not sufficiently developed in the 
Africa of 1980. 
Not all countries on the continent, nor indeed all African cities, were 
in the same predicament or were affected in the same way. There were 
sub-regional differences. There were contrasting situations between those 
countries with high earnings from oil or agricultural commodities, which 
were accordingly capable of financing their industrial development and 
of thereby increasing the scope for urban employment, and those countries 
that had to contend with a more serious economic crisis and were therefore 
less able in 1980 to exercise control over all the parameters of economic 
development. But these were more differences in the degree of under-
development than differences in kind. Although Africa was moving very 
fast towards greater urbanization in 1980, there were very few countries 
on the continent that could be described as industrialized. 
General conclusion 
If, despite all w e have said above and by comparison with the precolonial 
period, it were nevertheless necessary to speak in terms of an 'industrial 
revolution' in Africa, it would have to be m a d e clear immediately that it 
was a revolution that was having to contend with difficulties in the worst 
possible conditions at least from 1935 onwards, on account of the 
unfavourable international situation, the control and increasingly inhibiting 
influence exerted by trans-national corporations standing in the way of 
genuine industrialization, and the sluggishness inherited from the state 
of colonial dependence and perpetuated by the muddle or errors of post-
colonial industrial policies. Not the least of the impediments was the fact 
that the towns were growing faster than industry. It might almost be 
asked - and this is what some well-meaning people are asking today -
whether any useful purpose is served by industrializing a continent that 
is barely able to feed itself. 
Yet the industrial development of Africa is a necessity, indeed an 
obligation, both for its o w n sake and for the sake of the rest of the world. 
For itself, it is a w a y of laying the foundations for a self-directed economy 
and of fitting itself out with technological resources suited to its real 
development. It is also a way of creating, through the improved linkage 
of agriculture and industry, the conditions for the more rational deploy-
ment and mobilization of manpower . It m a y also afford it the opportunity 
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of providing itself with the means of imparting a n e w and authentic lease 
of life to African cultures, strongly marked as they still are by their pre-
scientific features. 
For the rest of the world, the point is that, by exercising m o r e effective 
control over its immense potential, Africa should m a k e that potential 
available to all the nations of the world rather than for merely serving 
the purposes of a handful of individuals or trans-national enterprises; the 
contradiction between 'dependent economy' and 'self-directed economy' 
must be overcome. 
T h e question is h o w this can be achieved at a lower political, economic 
and social cost than at present. Perhaps the answer chiefly lies in: 
(i) genuine inter-African co-operation and the increased integration 
of industrial utilities and policies (the outlook should be less 
towards the seaboard than towards the interior of the continent); 
(2) less ostentatious industrial choices (giant turnkey factories are 
primarily geared to producing goods for export outside Africa); 
and 
(3) investment designed to accommodate technological innovation 
to the true needs of the peoples of Africa. 
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Comparative strategies of 
economic decolonization1 in 
Africa 
Adebayo A D E D E J I 
A s soon as their countries became independent, African governments 
were genuinely desirous of improving the standard of living of their 
people by increasing their incomes and providing essential social services 
and infrastructural facilities. All were virtually convinced that the most 
rational way to bring about these changes was through economic planning. 
Indeed, before African independence, the development literature had 
featured debates as to whether or not to plan. However, in immediate 
post-independence Africa, these debates were w o n hands-down by the 
planners as post-independence governments came out soon after the 
demise of colonial rule with a plan document responding to the perceived 
development needs of the country and its people. But these plans, which 
were more often than not prepared by foreigners with relatively little 
experience of the countries concerned, were 'lacking in real control, 
political support or potential for implementation'.2 It is therefore not 
surprising that at least during the first independence decade, the decisions 
as to the grand areas of development strategy or ideology were not 
normally within the province of the planners. W e must look elsewhere 
for the pursuit of major strategic changes of direction. However, except 
in the case of very few countries, concrete evidence is hard to come by 
of a clearly articulated and coherent strategy of economic decolonization -
in contrast to that of political decolonization to which all African countries 
subscribe and which is pursued vigorously. 
Yet, it should have been clear to all, even in those early days of 
independence, that Africa marching toward the future hand-in-hand with 
its colonial economic inheritance has no dignified future at all. Indeed, if 
the truth must be told, the economic crisis that has engulfed the continent 
since the second half of the 1970s has been largely the cumulative result 
of the continued operation of the African economies within the framework 
of the inherited colonial economic legacy. Unfortunately, it has taken the 
1. W e define 'decolonization' as the dismantling of colonial institutions and the 
minimization of foreign control and power. Decolonization is not a gift from the imperial 
powers: it needs the initiative of the oppressed. 
2. G . K . Helleiner, 1972, p. 333. 
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first few decades after independence to realize that as long as Africa 
continues to nibble at the colonial economic system so long will it continue 
to fail to achieve any breakthrough in socio-economic engineering and so 
long, indeed, will it continue to be 'part of the lowest caste in the 
international (economic) hierarchy' with its 'place at the bottom of that 
hierarchy continuing to threaten to be rigid'.3 Without doubt, effective 
strategies for the economic decolonization of Africa are a necessary 
condition for achieving high rates of growth and diversification and an 
increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustainment. 
Unfortunately, for virtually all of Africa and for the overwhelming 
majority of its citizens, the rapid economic transformation which had 
been hoped for on independence, failed to materialize. Instead, the African 
economy m o v e d from one crisis to another; the revolution of rising 
expectations gave w a y to the revolution of rising frustrations with the 
consequent waves of military revolts and political upheavals in different 
parts of the continent. W h y did Africa fail to achieve the economic 
promise of independence? W h e r e did it go wrong? T o answer these 
questions in any scientific manner, w e must first and foremost begin with 
an analysis of the economic strategies pursued by independent African 
countries in the early 1960s. 
T o w a r d a socialist strategy of decolonization 
A s w e have already pointed out, post-independence development plans 
in Africa failed to articulate a coherent development strategy or ideology. 
M o r e often than not, they concentrated on the major classical and 
neo-classical economic parameters: increase in gross domestic product; 
increased investments and mobilization of savings; provision of social 
overhead capital; expansion of social services; foreign aid and private 
foreign investment and incentives for attracting the latter. M a n y of them -
implicitly, if not expressly - endorsed the inherited colonial economic 
policies and strategies. 
For example, the first development plan4 of post-independence Côte 
d'Ivoire which covered the period i960 to 1970 considered essential the 
maintenance and even the increase in the flow of foreign factor inputs on 
the grounds that national investment resources were insufficient and that 
the Ivorian economy lacked k n o w - h o w . O n e of the plan's principal 
objectives was the diversification of agricultural production for export, 
thereby intensifying the external dependence of the economy. T h e plan 
gave the state a pivotal role in the control of the development process. 
A n d while this Ivorian model was found in m a n y newly-independent 
countries of Africa, most of the former French colonies went further and 
3. A . A . Mazrui, 1977, pp. 17-18. 
4. Côte d'Ivoire, Government of, 1967. 
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took measures to strengthen their economic links with France. T h u s , 
for example, while the other African countries established independent 
monetary institutions, all former French colonies, except Mali and Guinea, 
retained monetary links with France in a c o m m o n monetary zone. 
In contrast to this neo-colonial development strategy, a few African 
countries embarked, immediately after independence, on policies and 
programmes which they considered would decolonize their economies. 
But most of these countries associated economic decolonization with the 
desire to direct their societies towards socialist goals. Although the term 
socialism was given different connotation and qualifications such as 
'African socialism',5 'democratic and cooperative socialism',6 'neo-Destur-
ian socialism',7 or 'realistic and common-sense socialism',8 the social and 
economic content was very similar. Unlike the countries following a liberal 
neo-colonial economic strategy, the objective of these countries was not 
only to increase the level of well-being of the population but also to 
achieve fundamental change in the very structure of society and in the 
colonial economic structure by developing the domestic processing of 
primary products and by pursuing an import-substitution industrialization 
strategy. 
O n e of the remarkable features of these early socialist experiments was 
the rejection of any massive expropriation of foreign or private property. In 
fact, the various governments were more anxious to emphasize the creation 
of new capacity rather than nationalization as the spring-board of their 
socialist dreams. But one country which differed markedly from this 
approach was Mali. While countries such as G h a n a accepted a mixed 
economy as a transitional stage in the construction of a socialist society, 
Mali set out to put under direct state control and monopoly most of the 
modern sector, particularly the foreign-trade sector. This latter step was 
particularly important from Mali's perspective since the control of foreign 
trade was seen as a key instrument in controlling the commodity-export 
surplus. Following Marxist economic theory, Malian planners saw in the 
foreign trade companies the conduit through which surplus value was 
exported; and while the other ex-French colonies signed a monetary 
agreement with France, giving them a c o m m o n currency guaranteed by 
the French treasury, Mali created its o w n independent currency, the Mali 
franc. 
Algeria, after its independence in 1962 following a long and bloody 
war of liberation, also chose a socialist path to development. In the words 
of the Algerian liberation leader and first prime minister, Ben Bella: 
5. Ghana, Government of, 1964, p. 15. 
6. Mali, Government of, n.d., p. 6. 
7. Tunisia, Government of, 1962, p. 8. 
8. Madagascar, Government of, 1964, p. 9. 
395 
Africa since iQ3¡ 
W e are adopting the economic analysis of Marxism because w e think 
it is the only one of value for the development of our country, but 
without espousing its ideology, because our action is guided by 
Algerians w h o are Muslims and Arabs.9 
In a way, this choice was imposed on post-independence Algeria as the 
country was faced with a void caused by the mass exodus of the European 
population w h o abandoned farms, factories and real estate. T h e abandoned 
property was taken over spontaneously by Algerian farm labourers, 
workers and population. T h u s was established the unique feature of 
Algeria's economic structure: the self-managed agricultural sector. These 
self-managed farms became collective organizations run by workers' 
assemblies which elected the administrators. T h e occupation was soon 
legalized by nationalization which covered practically all the former 
European farms - or around 2.3 million ha producing 65 per cent of total 
cereal production. T h e nationalization process was progressively extended 
to the manufacturing, mining and petroleum sectors, so that by the end 
of the 1960s the public sector - excluding self-managed firms - represented 
more than a third of total output. 
All these several species of socialism have, of course, multiple objectives. 
These are: 
(1) economic decolonization; 
(2) pervasive state intervention in the development and control of 
the economy; 
(3) a striving for the equalization of economic and social oppor-
tunities; and, 
(4) limitation of the role of the private sector and of private invest-
ment and property. 
But on this last point, there appears to be an ambivalence in the attitude 
of some governments. M a n y did not want to abolish private property and 
investment. Rather, they sought to control it and to harmonize the efforts 
of the private sector with those of the public sector in order to achieve 
the social and economic objectives. A s the Ghana Seven Year Development 
Plan 1963/'64—1Q6Ç/' jo vividly puts it, 'any suggestion that vigorous 
state and private sectors within the same economy are incompatible is 
unacceptable. Ghana's policies will be so designed to obtain m a x i m u m 
contribution from each sector towards the overall growth of the econ-
omy' .* 0 
It was, however, in Tanzania that socialism was given the most articulate 
expression as the basis for overcoming poverty, reducing the country's 
external dependence and reorganizing fundamentally production, power 
9. Translated from Le Monde, 23 January 1965; a speech m a d e to the Union générale 
des travailleurs algériens. 
10. Ghana, Government of, 1964, p. 3. 
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and social relations within Tanzanian society. True enough, Tanzania, 
immediately after independence in 1961, followed the liberal development 
strategy being pursued by other African countries with, of course, some 
variations on the theme. It emphasized production for export. It actively 
searched for foreign factor inputs, particularly foreign aid, and con-
centrated on the rapid expansion of infrastructure. But unlike most other 
African countries, Tanzania began to expand the ideology of self-reliance. 
However, until the Arusha Declaration of 1967, Tanzania was following 
the path of other African states. A s Joel Samoff has succinctly put it: 
T o the socialists, it became increasingly clear that Tanzania was 
following the path of other African states. There were m a n y more 
schools and hospitals, a number of senior positions had been African-
ized, there were some beginnings of local industry, substantially 
improved m i n i m u m - w a g e rates had been established, and the 
economy was expanding. But so were dependence and the inherited 
external orientation of the Tanzanian political economy. A n analysis 
of the failure of the liberal hope led to and informed the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967." 
T h u s the failure of the liberal hope which had guided policy from 1961 
to 1967 unmasked socialism. It brought about an institutionalized pervasive 
socialism and a whole series of institutional changes. A one-party system 
was formally adopted, along with the commitment to increase democratic 
participation within the n e w framework. Above all, a radical development 
strategy was promulgated. Its main features were the nationalization of 
major economic institutions, particularly banks, insurance business, 
foreign trade and manufacturing enterprises and large agricultural estates; 
restrictions on consumption by the affluent bourgeoisie principally through 
the imposition of progressive taxation; decolonization of the school 
curriculum; greater attention to economic diversification and indus-
trialization; and a well-publicized commitment to self-reliance." 
But the most radical aspect of the n e w socialism of Tanzania was the 
ideology of ujamaa vijijini or village socialism which was based on the 
policy of self-reliance. Socialism was to be based on the traditional values 
of the village, emphasizing the group and mutual support in contra-
distinction to the individualistic and exploitative values of capitalism. T h e 
leadership code which emphasized moral values, hard work, austerity, 
self-denial and dedication to the community forbade the cadres from 
engaging in private business and from owning more than one house. B y 
this measure, incomes from rent were eliminated and the nationalization 
measures were extended even to small businesses. B y the mid-1980s, over 
80 per cent of economic activity was in the public sector. 
11. J. Samoff, 1981, p. 289. 
12. See J. K . Nyerere, 1968a, and also J. Samoff, 1981, p. 289. 
397 
Africa since igjs 
But in spite of its radicalism, Tanzania has remained as dependent 
on foreign assistance for financing its development as ever. Economic 
decolonization has continued to elude it. Self-reliance has become a will-
o'-the-wisp. But even more seriously the economy had for years ceased 
to grow; on the contrary it had for some years stagnated with recurring 
negative rates of growth. T h e cumulative effect of all this is that Tanzania 
has been classified by the United Nations as a m o n g the least-developed 
of the developing countries ( L D C s ) - one of 27 such least-developed 
countries in Africa. Yet, ironically, Reginald Green could in 1977 assert 
that 'the transition to socialism in Tanzania could be said to be nearly 
accomplished'.13 
In Senegal, the African socialism formulated by prime minister 
M a m a d o u Dia (1957-62) and Leopold Senghor stressed building a 
socialist society based on traditional communitarian values and through 
the development of the co-operative movement and the regrouping of 
Senegalese villages into self-governing rural c o m m u n e s . T h u s , both Dia 
and Senghor envisaged that village-based multifunctional co-operatives 
would constitute the basic economic unit of an agrarian socialist society 
in Senegal. Needless to say, Senegal is as ever a classic example of a 
dependent economy, and in spite of more than 25 years of independence, 
most of its foreign trade is! still with France, which for years has also 
been supplying over two-thirds of Senegal's public development capital 
and nearly all its foreign technical and financial assistance needs. French 
investors provide more than four-fifths of the country's private capital, 
while the French treasury for years was covering Senegal's foreign-trade 
deficits. 
However, Senegal's African socialism has had very significant impacts. 
First, it has discouraged the emergence of large-scale capitalist enterprises 
in the countryside and has fostered the development of rural co-operative 
structures. Secondly, African socialism has been used to justify massive 
state intervention in regulating and controlling key sectors of the Sen-
egalese economy. Thirdly, Senegalese socialism welcomed foreign capital 
and private capital. This is not altogether surprising as Senghor has been 
a great advocate of Euro-African, or even Euro-Arab-African, dialogue. 
It was therefore easy for his socialist government to collaborate with 
foreign capital and the Senegalese private sector. A n d not surprisingly, 
the economic dependence of the country has persisted. 
Sectoral strategies for economic decolonization 
A sectoral analysis of the early post-independence macro-development 
strategies and policies pursued by African governments will give us more 
insight into the efforts at economic decolonization. O u r focus will be 
13. R . H . Green, 1977, p . 24. 
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the two directly-productive sectors of agriculture and industry and the 
indigenization policy of bringing the modern sector of the African 
economy under African control. 
In colonial Africa, two distinct structural agricultural models m a y be 
said to have existed. O n e is traditional subsistence agriculture which 
constituted both a w a y of life and an economy in which disposal of 
produce by sale was incidental, depending on the availability of marketable 
surpluses and the need for cash to pay for imported commodities and 
taxes imposed by the government. T h e other is modern commercial 
agriculture which was entirely within the m o n e y economy. In certain 
African countries, these two types of agriculture were represented by the 
co-existence of African farming - which was predominantly traditional 
and subsistence - and non-African farming, which was dominated by the 
expatriate settler community which predominantly produced for export 
on a large-scale plantation basis. In some parts, particularly in West 
Africa, this dual classification does not hold as the peasant farmers also 
dominate the export-crop production. 
Invariably, production for export was favoured by the colonial govern-
ment because it was the most important source of foreign-exchange 
earnings and of public revenue. Even today, in countries which are neither 
oil exporters nor mineral exporters, export crops account for as m u c h as 
80 per cent of foreign-exchange earnings and public revenue. Technical 
inputs, such as high-yielding seedlings, fertilizers, credit facilities, research 
support and extension services, were not available to food-crop farmers. 
Almost all of the products of modern agriculture were marketed through 
agricultural co-operatives. During the Second World W a r years and 
immediate post-war years, these developed into marketing boards or 
caisses de stabilisation in French-speaking countries, which were given the 
monopolistic power of being the sole buyers and exporters of these 
commodities with the authority to fix the producer prices every farming 
season. In the settler colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa, colonial 
policy forbade the indigenous farmers from growing export crops in order 
to protect white settlers from competition. Indeed, the foundation of 
excessive external dependence of the African economy rests upon this 
dichotomy. It was the beginning of the dualistic monocrop economy 
where a fairly advanced, largely foreign-owned modern export sector 
existed side-by-side with a large, low-productivity subsistence sector in 
which the majority of the population were engaged. Colonial Africa 
emerged into independence with an economy that devoted a considerable 
proportion of its resources to the production of export commodities for 
which there was little domestic d e m a n d and depended on extra-African 
countries for the supply of its basic needs, even including most of its 
food requirements. Such an evolution had nothing to do with the theory 
of comparative advantage. It was only the cumulative consequences of 
imperial policy that looked to the colonies for the supply of raw materials. 
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Under such circumstances, what decolonization strategy was pursued 
after independence in the field of agriculture? T o what extent did 
the governments of independent Africa attempt to change the colonial 
framework of their agricultural sector, with its over-emphasis on export 
production and with its excessive focus on foreign-exchange earning? A s 
Ali Mazrui wrote, 'a n e w juju has cast its spell [on Africa], mesmerizing 
the ambitions, titillating the greedy, spellbinding the acquisitive. T h e n e w 
juju is called foreign exchange, the availability of convertible currency as 
a form of international power."4 Regrettable as it is, it is not surprising 
in such circumstances that independent Africa pursued, more vigorously 
than ever before, the development of export-crop production. Scant 
attention continued to be paid to food production. T h u s , between i960 
and 1965, while export crops registered a global 23.3 per cent increase, 
food crops expanded by only 6.7 per cent. Right from the beginning of 
independence, African governments appeared to have ignored the advice 
that 'the most certain way to promote industrialization . . . is to lay the 
foundation it requires by taking vigorous measures to raise food production 
per person engaged in agriculture'.15 Indeed, as Fig. 14.1 graphically 
demonstrates, per capita food production continued its downward trend 
throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
T h e poor performance of the food sector is indeed symptomatic of the 
overall poor performance of the agricultural sector. O n the whole, this 
sector has persistently lagged behind and performance has worsened 
progressively since independence. For example, between 1971 and 1980, 
agricultural production increased at an annual average rate of 1.7 per cent 
compared with 2.1 per cent in the 1960s. T h e reasons for this deteriorating 
performance are apparent from Table 14.1. African governments have not 
been backing their avowed agricultural development strategy with 
adequate allocation of public resources. Available data indicate that on a 
per capita basis, public expenditure in agriculture has been declining in 
real terms in all the sub-regions, the sharpest decline being in Central 
Africa, which also has the lowest internal capital flow per capita for its 
agricultural population. 
Worse still has been the fact that the extremely limited resources 
available for investment in agriculture have been invariably unwisely and 
uneconomically spent. There has been too great a reliance on heavy capital 
investment and over-capitalization through extensive mechanization. Most 
public projects have built into them very expensive welfare provisions 
with little thought given to the capacities and needs of the African farmer. 
Although between 80 and 90 per cent of the agricultural producers are 
small-scale peasant farmers - the majority of w h o m especially a m o n g the 
food-growers are w o m e n — yet they are starved of vital agricultural inputs. 
14. A . A . Mazrui, 1980a, p. 65. 
15. A . Lewis, 1953. 
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FIG. 14.1. Trends in per capita food production: the world, the LDCs and Africa (base 
1974-6) (Source: F A O , Production Yearbook, FAO, Rome, 1982) 
T A B L E 14.1 Average annual growth rates of total public expenditure for 
all sectors and for the agricultural sector, at constant prices 
Agriculture 
1979 1980 JÇ8I 1982 Average 
1979-82 
Area of All sectors 
Africa 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
1979-82 
North 
West 
Central 
West 
Central 
East and 
Southern 
6.1 4.0 - 6 . 0 3.6 1.8 
9.1 - 1 5 . 7 - 1 8 . 4 - 1 . 7 - 7 . 3 
20.3 - 3 . 0 3.1 - 8 . 8 2.4 
HS •3.9 - 1 1 . 0 - 1 8 . 7 - 5 . 5 
- 6 . 3 2.2 - 0 . 3 - 5 . 8 - 2 . 6 
- 1 0 . 4 18.9 - 5 . 4 8.0 2.1 
68.7 - 7 . 5 - 3 4 . 2 - 3 4 . 5 - 9 . 5 
- 1 3 . 5 - 4 8 . 6 10.0 39.1 - 0 . 2 
27.O 4.9 —I.I - 3 O . 7 - 2 . 2 
N O T E : The data in the table are based on 24 countries. 
Source: F A O , 1983. 
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Agricultural extension services are conspicuous by their inadequacy; 
modern varieties of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides are commonly unavail-
able; feeder roads and other infrastructural facilities are woefully inad-
equate; virtually no effective and efficient facilities exist for the storage 
and/or preservation of food grains; there are few systematic efforts to 
organize the supply of food items from the countryside to urban centres or 
between different rural areas, with the result that a very high proportion -
between 20 and 45 per cent — of the food produced is wasted from lack 
of access to markets; and producer price policy, by keeping prices low 
and reducing the income of farmers, has adverse effects on agricultural 
productivity. 
T h e Lagos Plan of Action underlined this systematic neglect of the 
smallholder peasant farmer, stating that 'at the root of the food problem 
in Africa is the fact that m e m b e r States have not accorded the necessary 
priority to agriculture, both in the allocation of resources and in giving 
sufficient attention to policies for the promotion of productivity and 
improvement of rural life'.16 T h e plan went on to add that 
for an improvement in the food situation in Africa, the fundamental 
prerequisite is a strong political will to channel a greatly increased 
volume of resources to agriculture, to carry through essential re-
orientation of social systems, to apply policies that will induce small 
farmers and members of agricultural cooperatives to achieve higher 
levels of productivity, and to set up effective machineries for the 
formulation of relevant programmes and for their execution.17 
A s for the industrial sector, industrialization was seen by the newly-
independent African countries as a major instrument for decolonizing their 
economies. Manufacturing activities had been discouraged by the colonial 
governments w h o saw the role of the African economies as being sup-
portive of those of the colonial powers to w h o m they supplied raw 
materials and for whose manufactured goods they provided captive 
markets. As is shown in Table 14.2, manufacturing activities accounted, 
at independence in i960, for only 7.6 per cent of the G D P , compared to 
12 per cent in South-east Asia, 13 per cent in the Middle East, and 22 
per cent in Latin America. Pre-independence industrial activities were 
limited to the processing and semi-processing of agricultural and forest 
products and minerals, and to the production of light consumer goods. 
Consequently, after independence, the governments paid special attention 
to the development of manufacturing industry. 
However, the general pattern for establishing manufacturing industries 
was very m u c h on an ad hoc basis without any plan for linkages within 
sectors or with other sectors of the economy. Appropriate strategies 
16. Organization of African Unity, 1981. 
17. ibid., p. 11, para. 18. 
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TABLE 
Countries 
Major oil-
exporting 
i960 
1970 
1980 
Non-oil-
exporting 
i960 
1970 
1980 
Least-
developed 
i960 
1970 
1980 
Developing 
Africa 
i960 
1970 
1980 
14.2 
Agri-
Sectoral composition 
percentages 
Manu-
culture facturing 
431 
30 .2 
16.3 
42.4 
35-1 
27.7 
59-2 
50 .6 
44.2 
42 .6 
334 
22.8 
5-5 
5-2 
6.4 
8.6 
11.7 
12.4 
5-3 
8.7 
8.1 
7.6 
9-5 
9.8 
Elec-
tricity 
1-3 
0.7 
0.9 
14 
14 
1-7 
1.4 
1.1 
1-3 
1-3 
1.2 
1-3 
Min-
ing 
3-8 
18.5 
8.6 
4.6 
54 
5-1 
0.8 
0.9 
1-3 
44 
9.8 
6.6 
of GDP 
Con-
struction 
8.4 
6-3 
14-3 
4.0 
4-7 
54 
4.6 
3-8 
4.2 
54 
5-2 
9-3 
at constant igjo prices, in 
Com-
merce 
193 
24.8 
24.2 
155 
17.7 
19.2 
154 
17-5 
17.7 
16.7 
20.1 
21.4 
Trans-
port 
5-5 
3-2 
6.6 
5-9 
6.2 
7-2 
4-3 
50 
6.9 
5-8 
5-2 
6.9 
• Public 
adminis-
tration 
7-5 
8-3 
195 
8.9 
94 
12.8 
7.8 
7.0 
10.0 
8.4 
9.0 
15-7 
Other 
5-6 
2.8 
3-2 
8.7 
8.4 
8.5 
1.2 
54 
6-3 
7.8 
6.6 
6.2 
N O T E : Sectoral growth for 1960-^70 is based on data for 39 countries of developing Africa 
data are available, while for 1970-80 sectoral as well as overall G D P growth are based on 
African developing countries. 
Source: E C A Secretariat. 
for which 
all the 50 
for making industry contribute significantly to economic and social 
development were lacking. Right from the start, industries were set up 
in partnership with foreign enterprises or under total foreign ownership 
which operated them primarily for their o w n interest. Virtually all the 
factor inputs and the raw materials were imported. T h u s industrialization 
opened another dependency door in Africa. Instead of becoming a 
major source of foreign-exchange savings and, possibly, earnings, industry 
became the principal source of foreign-exchange leakages. 
Although, as will be seen from Table 14.3, the manufacturing sector 
developed faster than any other sector except mining, commerce and 
public administration in the 1960s, and a little faster than the G D P in the 
1970s; the industrial sector even today is still partly a small foreign enclave 
and partly a small urban enclave in a vast sea of rural backwardness. Relative 
to world manufacturing output, Africa had a share of manufacturing 
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TABLE i 4-3 
Countries Agri-
i 
Major oil-
exporting 
1960-70 
1970-80 
1960-80 
Non-oil-
exporting 
1960-70 
1970-80 
1960-80 
Least-
developed 
1960-70 • 
1970-80 
1960-80 
Developing 
Africa 
1960-70 
1970-80 
1960-80 
Average annual growth at constant 
Manu-
culture factoring 
5-6 
14 
6-5 
1.2 
- 3 - 6 
1-7 
3-7 
1-3 
8.8 
IO.I 
12.0 
4.2 
154 
2.4 
7-1 
5-5 
Elec- Min- Con-
tricity ing struction 
3-1 
6.6 
8.9 
54 
8.9 
IO-5 
4.6 
4.2 
28.3 6.3 
1.1 11.4 
10.2 10.2 
31 51 
5.2 12.6 
7-3 171 
17-3 6.3 
7-3 4 1 
Com-
merce 
12.2 
5-8 
10.0 
44 
12.2 
7.6 
9.1 
3-2 
igjo prices, in 
Trans-
port 
3-5 
8-3 
9.0 
5-1 
9.9 
16.1 
51 
6.4 
Public 
adminis-
tration 
10.6 
11.2 
9.1 
6.8 
13.6 
17-5 
7-2 
6.9 
percentages 
Other 
1.8 
4.8 
11.1 
3-8 
12.8 
9.6 
4-3 
6.2 
GDP 
94 
7-9 
8.7 
4-3 
3-8 
4.0 
4.8 
31 
4.0 
5-8 
5-2 
5-6 
N O T E : Sectoral growth for 1960-70 is based on data for 39 countries of developing Africa for 
which data are available, while for 1970-80 sectoral as well as overall G D P growth are based on all 
50 African developing countries. 
Source: E C A Secretariat. 
value added of only 0.9 per cent in 1980 compared to a share of 2.7 per 
cent and 6 per cent for South-east Asia and Latin America respectively. 
T h u s , by 1980 Africa was still the least-industrialized region of the 
world. A s indicated in the E C A and Africa's Development ¡083-2008: A 
Preliminary Perspective Study, 
except for the production of a narrow range of intermediate goods, 
the sector is characterized by light industries producing consumer 
goods and by a crude and relatively weak degree of processing and 
semi-processing of mineral and agricultural raw materials, mainly 
for export. Further, the existing production structure is based o n 
small size plants with little in terms of economies of scale. H e a v y 
industries are rudimentary and have been attempted coherently in 
only a few countries. Therefore, the production of capital goods has 
remained marginal and as a result, Africa remains one of the world's 
major importers of capital goods with imported equipment and 
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machinery accounting for over 35 percent of the total annual invest-
ment of the region.18 
T h u s , although post-independence African governments saw indus-
trialization as having six major objectives, viz: 
(1) the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population; 
(2) the exploitation of local natural resources; 
(3) the creation of jobs; 
(4) the establishment of a base for developing other economic sectors; 
(5) the creation of the basis for assimilating and promoting tech-
nological progress; and 
(6) the modernization of society,19 
regrettably none of these have been realized during the past two or three 
decades. Rather, 
because of the heterogeneous character of the manufacturing industry 
in Africa, their interminable need for subsidies in one form or 
another, the considerable dependence of m a n y of them on imported 
factor inputs and their failure as a whole to mitigate unemployment 
or to provide a dynamic thrust to the African economy, the industrial 
sector has become a crisis sector and the crisis of industrial stagnation 
should n o w be added to the growing list of crises affecting our poor 
beleaguered continent.20 
Consequently the failure of the industrialization strategy together with 
the cumulative neglect of agriculture has no doubt accounted for the 
intensification of Africa's economic dependence. 
T h e strategy of indigenization 
W e shall conclude our analysis of the major sectoral approaches to 
economic decolonization by evaluating the economic indigenization strategy 
pursued by m a n y African governments in the late 1960s and 1970s. A s 
pointed out in The Indigenization of African Economies, 
the economy of the typical African state by the time of independence 
consisted of three levels: Europeans at the top, commanding the 
large industries, major mercantile concerns and plantation farming; 
Asians and Lebanese in the middle, controlling medium-level indus-
trial activities and wholesaling as well as the larger retail outfits; and, 
Africans at the bottom, engaged in peasant farming, petty trading 
and labour services.21 
18. Economic Commission for Africa, 1983, p. 11. 
19. Organization of African Unity, 1981, p. 20. 
20. A . Adedeji, 1984, p. 5. 
21. A . Adedeji, 1981, p. 29. 
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T h e situation in the civil service was not m u c h different either. Africans 
were in the clerical and messengerial classes, while the Asians were in 
the executive, middle-level technical grades, with Europeans in top-level 
administrative and professional classes. Although better in British West 
Africa (particularly in Nigeria and Ghana) , this situation was the order 
of the day at the time of independence in British East and Southern 
Africa and in the French, Belgian and Portuguese territories. Indeed, 
m a n y of these countries came to nationhood with only a handful of 
indigenous college graduates and a couple of hundred high-school gradu-
ates. 
Consequently, a priority for independent African countries was the 
Africanization of their civil services. It has been estimated that in 1958, 
the number of European civil servants in Africa was about 100 000." 
This figure, which does not include university personnel, missionaries, 
Europeans hired by local authorities and U N personnel, gives an idea of 
the magnitude of the Africanization of the civil services in purely 
quantitative terms. It was not simply the exchange of Africans for n o n -
Africans. T h e Africanization of the civil services was seen as the process 
of transforming the inherited colonial type of public service into indigen-
ous public services. 
In a way, the Africanization or indigenization of the key sectors of the 
national economies is an extension of the very successful Africanization 
of the public services. T h e indigenization policy assumes m a n y forms. At 
one extreme is nationalization, which is the wholesale take-over of 
enterprises; and at the other extreme is the government policy of linking 
and supervising the extent of expatriate participation in various activities. 
A s Leslie L . Rood indicated, 
most of the takings of foreign property in Africa fall into one of 
three categories: the nationalization of large extractive industries 
owned by multi-national corporations; the nationalization of small 
branch enterprises of multi-national corporations, typically banking, 
insurance, and petroleum distribution; and, the indigenization of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises owned by alien residents. 
However , there are some takings which do not fall neatly into these 
categories: nationalization in the socialist countries has included 
manufacturing, buildings and plantations; and indigenization in the 
free-enterprise countries has touched some fairly large European-
owned companies. Each kind of taking can be blunt or sophisticated, 
compensated or uncompensated, voluntary or compulsory.23 
According to a United Nations study,24 between i960 and 1974, there 
were more nationalizations and take-overs in sub-Saharan Africa than in 
22. N . A . Shaath, 1975, p. 99. 
23. L . L . Rood, 1976, pp . 430-1. 
24. United Nations Secretary-General, 1974. 
406 
Comparative strategies of economic decolonization in Africa 
other regions. O f the 875 cases of nationalization in 62 countries of the 
world reported during this period, 340 (or 39 per cent) were in black 
Africa. T h e region led in all categories of industry except petroleum, and 
the total values of the indigenized enterprises ran into several billions of 
U S dollars.25 
A s the case-studies on the impact of indigenization on the economies 
of Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and the Southern African countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
clearly indicate, while some measure of control has passed into African 
hands, the dominance of foreign capital, expertise, technology and entre-
preneurship is still there in all African countries.26 T h e indigenization 
policy has therefore had very limited success. But 
h o w successful can the indigenization policy be in a country whose 
economy is stagnated? H o w m u c h can a country overburdened by 
external debt attempt to indigenize its economy? A country that is 
overly dependent on external trade and on a vulnerably narrow 
spectrum of primary export commodities, and where there is a 
sharp bifurcation between the traditional and modern sectors of the 
economy with a circumscribed and fractured industrial base, cannot 
truly be indigenized. Africa must therefore see indigenization not 
merely as the taking over of ongoing expatriate concerns, but as a 
challenge to transform its present colonial economy to an auth-
entically self-reliant African economy with an internally-generated 
and self-sustaining process of development.27 
T h e strategy of intra-African penetration and pan-African 
integration 
A s already indicated, the partition of Africa and the granting of political 
independence occurred with complete disregard for history, culture, 
economic and political viability. Thus , at independence Africa was a 
patchwork of a large number of minuscule states. Furthermore, the nature 
of the colonial legacy was such that contiguous political units existed as 
separate and isolated entities with m i n i m u m structural links between 
them. African states were consciously structured to produce primarily 
for, and trade exclusively with, their respective colonial powers. T h e 
national markets that resulted were too small and fragmented for industrial 
products. 
U n d e r the circumstances, the pursuit of national goals of economic 
decolonization was seen to be dependent on a strategy of regional economic 
25. It is estimated that some $4bn of the property of U S nationals alone was nationalized 
world-wide in the period 1960-73; this suggests the magnitude of the total values involved. 
26. A . Adedeji, 1981, pp. 45-327. 
27. ibid., p. 389. 
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integration and the establishment of multi-national institutions to promote 
development and undertake joint co-operative efforts. 
A s a matter of fact, regional economic co-operation and integration were 
recognized as essential components of strategies of economic decolonization 
long before the attainment of political independence. They actually started 
off as aspects of the pan-Africanist movement which aimed at the unification 
of African forces against imperialism and colonial domination. T h u s , one of 
the earliest calls for economic integration was m a d e at the Fifth Pan-African 
Congress held in Manchester, England, in 1945, when , with great foresight, 
the congress recommended the establishment of a West African Economic 
Union as a means of combating the exploitation of the economic resources 
of the West African territories and for ensuring the participation of the 
indigenous people in the industrial development of West Africa. T h e 
Bandung Declaration of 1955 also m a d e reference to the need for economic 
co-operation among African countries. 
Because of this link with pan-Africanism, strategies for regional inte-
gration adopted in the early post-independence period favoured all-
embracing regional organizations. T h u s , in 1958, the First Conference of 
Independent African States, which was held in Accra, Ghana, resolved 
to set up an Economic and Research Committee within each country and 
a Joint Economic Research Committee composed of representatives of all 
independent African countries. Their task was to consolidate the economic 
development policies of the states, promote trade and a c o m m o n industrial 
policy, and co-ordinate economic planning among the different states with 
a view to achieving an all-African economic co-operation arrangement. 
Later, in i960, the independent African states of that time recommended 
the creation of an African Council for Economic Co-operation, an African 
Development Bank and an African Commercial Bank. It was recommended 
that a system of preferential tariffs among independent African countries 
should be established. It was largely as a result of this collective fervour 
for economic integration that the Monrovia, Casablanca, Brazzaville, and 
Maghreb groups were formed. These in turn made various rec-
ommendations for the creation of an African C o m m o n Market, an African 
Payments Union and an African Bank for Economic Development. 
But the actual establishment of all-embracing multi-purpose regional 
organizations encountered various obstacles. Foremost amongst these was 
the newness of the states which m a d e it difficult for national leaders to 
divest themselves of their newly acquired authority in favour of collective 
decision-making. T h e lack of adequate interstate infrastructure, par-
ticularly transport and communications links, also circumscribed intra-
state trade and movement. A third obstacle arose from the differences in 
political ideologies adopted by the emergent states. There were also the 
strong bilateral links with the former colonial powers which continued to 
militate strongly against intra-African connections. 
N o all-embracing multi-purpose regional organization existed before 
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the formation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
( E C A ) in April 1958. Five years later, the Organization of African Unity 
( O A U ) was established. T h e E C A was entrusted right from its inception 
with the primary task of initiating, facilitating and participating in the 
economic development of Africa, including its social aspects; and for 
monitoring and strengthening the economic relations among African 
countries and territories and with other countries of the world. T h e 
objectives of the O A U were principally political, but they do include the 
co-ordination and intensification of co-operation to achieve a better life 
for the peoples of Africa; eradication of all forms of colonialism; and 
promotion of international co-operation. While both organizations were 
requested to co-operate very closely with each other, the primary responsi-
bility for promoting economic co-operation and integration in Africa rests 
with the E C A . 
Early in the 1960s, the E C A realized that the most viable approach to 
regional integration was one that was gradual and embraced narrower 
geographical areas as opposed to an all-embracing continental arrangement. 
T h e African region was therefore divided into four sub-regions: Eastern 
and Southern, Central, West, and North Africa. Sub-regional offices were 
established in each of these four sub-regions. Their main function was 
to provide backstop services that would facilitate collective decisions and 
actions at the grassroots level by undertaking relevant studies, participating 
in the programming and implementation of multi-national projects and 
provision of on-the-spot technical assistance on a continuous basis. 
However, the sub-regional offices were soon found to be not as effective 
as expected in getting African states to form co-operation arrangements; 
first, because they were plagued by a dearth of resources, and secondly, 
because there were no provisions to ensure the participation of govern-
ments in the activities and work programmes of the offices. T o enhance 
the E C A ' s role as a catalyst for regional integration, United Nations 
Development Advisory T e a m s ( U N D A T s ) were created to improve the 
operational capability of the sub-regional offices. It was, however, soon 
realized that what was needed was not simply advisory bodies, but more 
operational instruments for the promotion of economic co-operation. 
T h e U N D A T s were therefore replaced in 1977 by the Multi-national 
Programming and Operational Centres ( M U L P O C s ) . Today, there are 
five M U L P O C s in the various sub-regions of the continent (Fig. 14.2). 
Their operation holds great promise for the future of regional economic 
integration in Africa. 
At present, there are several economic communities organized along 
sub-regional lines and at various stages of integration (Fig. 14.3). In West 
Africa, the Economic Communi ty of West African States ( E C O W A S ) 
exists (Fig. 14.4) and embraces the membership of other communities, 
such as the West African Economic C o m m u n i t y ( C E A O ) , the Council 
for the Entente and the M a n o River Union. In Central Africa, the latest 
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1600 km
fig. 14.2 MULPOC regionalgroupings in Africa (Source: adaptedfrom Economic Commission
for Africa, Addis Ababa)
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A Offices of ECOWAS, ECCAS and PTA
Offices of ECWA, MRU, ECGLC,
CACEU, SADCC, SADCC and IOC
Note: Rwanda and Burundi are members of
ECCAS and PTA; Angola. Botswana.
Madagascar. Mozambique and Seychelles
have observer status with PTA.
fig. 14.3 Regional economic groupings in Africa (Source: adaptedfrom Economic Commission
for Africa, Addis Ababa)
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of the economic communities established by the E C A in 1983 - the 
Economic Community of Central African States — has brought together 
the five states that constitute the Union douanière des Etats d'Afrique 
Centrale ( U D E A C ) , namely the Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, 
G a b o n , and the United Republic of Cameroon, into what will eventually 
become a Central African C o m m o n Market. T h e Economic Communi ty 
of the Great Lakes Countries ( C E P G L — Communauté économique des pays 
des Grands Lacs) comprising Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire has also been 
established. In East Africa, the East Africa Economic Community estab-
lished in 1967 between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania has since collapsed 
(July 1977). T h e E C A , using its M U L P O C for Eastern and Southern 
Africa, succeeded in establishing the Eastern and Southern African 
Preferential Trade Area with provisions not only for the liberalization of 
trade, but also for co-operation and inter-country specialization in the 
development of basic and strategic industries, the production of food 
crops and livestock, the development of science and technology, the 
exploitation and utilization of natural resources, h u m a n resources develop-
ment and the creation of transport and telecommunications networks 
(Fig. 14.5). In North Africa, a Permanent Consultative Committee was 
established in 1964 between Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Cutting across the membership of these multi-purpose organizations 
are about 130 inter-governmental, multi-sectoral economic organizations 
that are meant to promote technical and economic co-operation in Africa. 
In addition, there are institutionalized conferences of ministers and officials 
in a number of specific areas. 
Despite their multiplicity, the effectiveness of m a n y of these organ-
izations in promoting co-operation is yet to be proved. Intra-African 
penetration has been constrained by, first and foremost, the inadequacies 
in understanding the objectives and modalities of economic co-operation. 
Far too often, assumptions which are obtained in advanced countries, but 
which are untrue as far as developing African countries are concerned, 
have been brought to bear on the formation and operation of economic 
groupings in Africa. These assumptions include the existence of m a n y 
units of production, each producing and selling a relatively small share 
of the national output; an economy operating at near full employment 
with plants expected to operate at the margin so that new investment is 
also marginal compared to current productive capacity; an ample supply 
of highly-motivated entrepreneurs with an extensive knowledge of markets 
for financing inputs and products w h o are capable of exploring new 
economic opportunities as they arise at h o m e and abroad; and the benefits 
of co-operation which are usually distributed fairly a m o n g the co-operating 
countries because the capacity to derive benefits from co-operation are 
fairly equitably distributed.28 
28. Economic Commission for Africa, 1976, p. 50. 
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1000 km
fig. 14.5 Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area: Highway Master Plan
(Source: adaptedfrom a map provided by the Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa)
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Conditions obtaining in Africa are by contrast characterized by: 
(i) an inadequate supply of competent entrepreneurs in both the 
public and private sectors; 
(2) scarcity of skilled manpower; 
(3) limited familiarity with the sources of raw material supply; 
(4) limited range of choice of technology; 
(5) limited inter-industry integration; and 
(6) limited domestic markets in relation to plant sizes. 
Given these conditions, the objectives and m o d e s of co-operation should 
differ fundamentally from those co-operation arrangements organized 
amongst the industrialized countries. 
In other words, economic co-operation arrangements in Africa should 
not be oriented solely to trade facilitation but to production as well. C o -
operation should lead to the creation and utilization of n e w productive 
capacity, especially in the production of goods and services for use as 
further inputs for other industries or consumption.29 T o achieve this, it 
will be necessary to integrate national economies and to reorient con-
sumption and production patterns towards satisfying domestic require-
ments and to promote national self-reliance. But often, the various sectors 
in an African economy are only tenuously linked. 
Another major problem has been that of reaching acceptable formulae 
and procedures for sharing the costs and benefits of economic co-
operation. O f particular importance in this respect has been the concern 
of participating states over the possibility of loss of income from export 
and import taxes as a result of trade-liberalization measures implicit in 
c o m m o n - m a r k e t arrangements. 
This problem is closely linked with considerations of equity and 
of balance within economic groupings whereby certain countries have 
progressed at slower rates than they would have done outside the 
groupings. T h e formulation of generally acceptable equalization measures 
to redress the imbalance has however constituted one of the most 
intractable problems facing economic groupings, since such measures 
usually must cover 'not only losses of revenues on duties forgone but also 
benefits from the imponderable unquantifiable "dynamic" factors such as 
improvements in the efficiency of the country's factors of production 
attributable to economic integration, operation of external economies, 
expanded employment'.30 
Another obstacle to effective economic co-operation in Africa has been 
the over-consciousness on the part of m a n y African countries of their 
national sovereignty. T o o often, the political leadership has been reluctant 
to surrender national sovereignty over crucial areas of economic policy. 
29. For further development of this point, see A . Adedeji, 1976. 
30. ibid., p. 45. 
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T h e inadequacy of infrastructure and the absence of appropriate 
institutional frameworks to promote economic co-operation have also 
constituted real constraints on regional co-operative efforts. T h e most 
critical gaps include the lack of modern transport and communications 
links a m o n g m e m b e r states; the absence of intra-African clearing-house 
arrangements and of c o m m o n currency and payments arrangements; and 
the absence of multi-national development institutions with the capacity 
for project identification, preparation, investment promotion and con-
sultancy services. In this connection, the setting up by the E C A of the 
West African Payments and Clearing House, and the Central African 
Payments and Clearing Arrangements, and by the P T A of a P T A Clearing 
and Payments Arrangements should help considerably. T h e United 
Nations Transport and Communications Decade for Africa, initiated by 
the E C A , has started to lay the foundation for networks of transport and 
communications at regional and sub-regional levels. 
Growing differences, such as between socialist and capitalist states, in 
political ideology and economic orientations have also taken their toll on 
co-operative arrangements. Under the prevailing circumstances, the criti-
cal issue has been h o w to devise institutional mechanisms that would 
minimize conflict and maximize the area of co-operation. 
A final source of constraint has been the ambivalence in attitudes 
towards economic co-operation. Apparently, political initiatives and 
declared collective goodwill have too often not been matched by practical 
action. There is also the tendency for actions at the national level to be 
completely at variance with declarations m a d e in international fora. 
Spurred by the Final Act of Lagos which was one of the outcomes of 
the African Economic S u m m i t held on 28 and 29 April 1980, in Lagos, 
by which the heads of state and government committed themselves to 
the setting up of an African Economic C o m m u n i t y by the year 2000, the 
E C A , in collaboration with the O A U , has been intensifying its effort to 
streamline and strengthen existing regional economic groupings and to 
establish others in the regions where they do not exist, so as to cover the 
continent as a whole. With the signing on 21 October 1983 of the treaty 
establishing the Central African Economic C o m m u n i t y by ten m e m b e r 
states of Central Africa, there have n o w emerged in sub-Saharan Africa 
three major regional economic co-operation arrangements which will be-
c o m e the main instrument for pushing forward the strategy of intra-
African penetration and providing the framework for pan-African inte-
gration. T h e y are 
(1) the 16 m e m b e r states of the Economic C o m m u n i t y of West 
African States ( E C O W A S ) , whose establishment preceded the 
Final Act of Lagos by five years; 
(2) the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa 
( P T A ) , which is expected to have 22 m e m b e r states and which 
came into existence in December 1981; and 
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(3) the ten-nation Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) . 
Deteriorating African economic conditions, the 
persistence of neo-colonial economic systems and of 
economic dependence 
In spite of all the various strategies for economic decolonization pursued 
by African governments both at macro and sectoral levels, the African 
economy has still retained its colonial pre-independence structure (Table 
14.4) and has m a d e a rather insignificant positive impact on the living 
conditions of the people. T h e strategies were unsuccessful in engineering 
the expected socio-economic transformation; at best, they only achieved 
marginal structural changes. 
Between i960 and 1980, the combined G D P of African countries about 
tripled, reaching in 1980 some U S $ 8 6 billion (at constant 1980 factor 
cost) which implies an annual growth of 5.6 per cent on the average (see 
Table 14.2). In per capita terms, average incomes rose from US$133 m 
i960 to U S $ 2 4 3 (or U S $ 7 4 0 at 1983 prices). While this rise looks 
impressive, in relative terms the 1980 regional average income is only 7.6 
per cent of the U S $ 9 6 8 4 average current income for the industrial 
countries, underscoring the magnitude of African underdevelopment. 
Growth performance has been unstable and sometimes erratic. T h e facts 
that agriculture is the most dominant sector and that African economies 
are open to the vagaries of climate and international trade, help to explain 
most of this instability and relatively modest growth. Thus , the up-swing 
in G D P growth during 1965-70 was due essentially to the record 
performance in agriculture and the improved demand for exports. Simi-
larly, the slowing d o w n of growth to 4.5 per cent during the subsequent 
five years was again due primarily to the unprecedented fall in the growth 
of agricultural production to 1.4 per cent a year and the recessionary 
conditions following the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-4 which stifled 
demand for the region's exports, which grew by a mere 0.5 per cent a 
year in real terms. T h e slight recovery in the 1975-80 period, however, 
followed primarily from the picking up of demand for non-petroleum 
products after a short period of adjustment to the costlier energy regime 
in the developed countries. But the situation took a dramatic sharp d o w n -
turn immediately afterwards with the n e w rises in oil prices and the 
cumulative impact of an assortment of problems, ranging from protracted 
droughts to falling export demand and prices to unprecedented foreign-
exchange squeezes. In 1981, regional growth plummeted to a negative 
rate of —3.0 per cent (at 1980 prices), its first in recent history. All in 
all, G D P growth in the 1960s at 5.8 per cent was slightly better than the 
average of 5.2 per cent a year achieved during the 1970s. 
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Africa since 1Q35 
T h e search for a new national, regional and international 
economic order 
It had become crystal clear to most African states by the beginning of 
the 1970s that if Africa was to get out of its low-level economic trap and 
lay the foundation for any significant process in economic decolonization, 
n e w national, regional and international economic strategies had to be 
formulated and rigorously pursued. Such strategies, at the national level, 
involve the installation of a n e w economic order based on the firm 
principles of self-reliance and self-sustainment; at the African regional 
level, on the concentration of efforts leading to the achievement of an 
increasing measure of collective self-reliance a m o n g African states; and 
at the international level, on the establishment of a new international 
economic order. 
In this search for a more effective and realistic strategy for economic 
decolonization, the place of honour must be accorded to the E C A ' s 
Africa's Strategy for Development in the igjos which its Conference of 
Ministers adopted in February 197131 and to the O A U ' s African Declaration 
on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence adopted by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the tenth anniversary of 
the organization in M a y 1973.32 But before the E C A and O A U declarations 
could be put into operational forms, the world was confronted with a 
decision of fundamental importance which was to have devastating impact 
on the economic and political relations between the industrialized countries 
and the Third World. 
T h e announcement by the Shah of Iran, on 23 December 1973, that 
henceforth a barrel of light crude oil would sell for US$11.65 rather than 
the then prevailing price of U S $ 5 . 0 4 shook the international economy, at 
least for some time, to its very foundations. This single decision of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) was hailed as a 
critical point in history for it enabled some O P E C m e m b e r states, such 
as Algeria, to take advantage of the opportunity to pursue the strategy of 
counter-penetration of the industrialized countries by leading the demand 
for the establishment of a n e w international economic order ( N I E O ) . T h e 
O P E C action was seen as a practical illustration of what the developing 
world could do. 
T h e sixth special session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1974 thus provided an opportunity for Third-World solidarity 
in their demand for a n e w international economic order. However, the 
impact of the oil-price rise on the fragile economies of oil-importing 
African countries, particularly on their foreign accounts and their pro-
31. E /CN/ i4 /493 /Rev .3 of 6 February 1971. 
32. C M / S T . 1 2 (xxi). 
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auction costs, led to disillusion a m o n g them, especially as the O P E C 
example had failed to create a model for correcting the prices of other 
raw materials. Other primary commodities continue to be priced on free 
international markets which are, m o r e often than not, subjected to 
severe fluctuations both in demand and price and where multi-national 
corporations invariably have the upper hand. In spite of all the attempts 
which have been m a d e and continue to be m a d e for the cartelization of 
other export commodities and minerals, the economic fundamentals are 
unfavourable. T h e industrialized countries which import these c o m -
modities have open to them m a n y possibilities for substitutes which 
amount to a form of countervailing power against producer cartels. 
Consequently, all that was m a d e of the O P E C successful price coup was 
to use it as the springboard for intensifying Third-World agitation for a 
n e w international economic order which concentrated on seven issues. 
These are 
(i) commodity stabilization; 
(2) discrete treatment of Third-World debts; 
(3) restructuring of international trade and removal of protectionist 
policies in the industrialized North to Third-World countries; 
(4) halting the reverse resource flows from poor to rich countries 
and increasing Official Development Assistance ( O D A ) to 0.7 
per cent of the G N P of the industrialized economies; 
(5) easy access to Western technology; 
(6) redeployment of world industrial production capability in favour 
of Third-World countries; and 
(7) the reform of the international monetary and financial system, 
i.e. the World B a n k and the International Monetary Fund. 3 3 
Although Africa joined hands with the rest of the Third World for a 
N I E O , and indeed played a leading role in the various abortive nego-
tiations, it was soon increasingly realized that the most economically 
backward and underdeveloped region in the world, Africa and particularly 
sub-Saharan Africa, would not be able to participate on an equal and 
equitable basis in any N I E O should it ever emerge, unless it first put its 
o w n economies in order at the national level and at the regional level and 
adopted a truly economic decolonization strategy. 
It is for this reason that the Economic Commission for Africa ( E C A ) 
deemed it necessary to initiate a series of actions from the second half of 
1975, which led to the eventual adoption of the Development Strategy for 
Africa for the Third United Nations Development Decade** and the Lagos 
33. A . Adedeji, 1983, p. 7. 
34. E C A Resolution 332 (xiv) contained in document E / C N . i 4 / I N F / i o o / R e v . 1. This 
E C A Resolution later became known as the Monrovia Strategy, following its adoption in 
July 1979 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O A U . 
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Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa IQ8O-20OO.3S T h e 
theoretical and intellectual foundation of both was, of course, the basic 
document adopted by the E G A . in 1976 entitled the Revised Framework 
of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order 
in Africa, iÇ7&-ig8i-ig8sz6 which challenged conventional wisdom in 
the field of development economics as it applied to the African economy 
and systematically exposed the inappropriateness of the different strategies 
being pursued for bringing about the economic decolonization of Africa 
and its transformation into a self-reliant and internally-self-generating 
and self-sustaining dynamic economy. After noting that the available pool 
of knowledge and experience of h o w economies grow and h o w socio-
economic changes can be managed was limited, the E C A argued in the 
Revised Framework that because economic policy-making in Africa took 
the form, in most cases, 'of successive responses to diagnoses of social 
and economic ills originating outside the region, both the diagnoses and 
prescriptions were greatly influenced not only by a firm belief in the 
efficacy of international trade and associated economic relations as an 
engine of desirable economic growth and social change but also by strong 
adherence to a particular interpretation of the genesis of international 
trade'.37 T h e E G A also put into doubt the 
conventional linear thinking by which economic growth is regarded 
as a semi-mystical process, the outcome of which is measured by 
increases or decreases in the G D P or G N P and which is the result 
of a semi-mystical input called investment which consists mainly of 
resources received by means of foreign exchange. In such a con-
ventional approach, the role of indigenous factor inputs is hardly 
examined or, if examined at all, is not given a central role in the 
development process. Because of national or multinational pro-
grammes for the production of such indigenous factor inputs, w e 
have had to rely heavily on foreign exchange as a means of c o m -
manding these factor inputs. Hence the vital importance of our 
monoproduce exports, and the net flow of foreign private investment 
and our willingness to 'beg' for foreign aid and loans to supplement 
these two. O f course, our greatest weakness as a people is the lack 
of any visualization by our political, social, and community leaders 
and by our captains of industry as to what they would like to see 
our countries become individually and as a group in, say, twenty-
five years from n o w . It is this image of one's self in the future that 
is a condition of policy-making and strategy design in every developed 
or semi-developed country. Without it, no reliable path towards the 
future can be followed either by individuals, communities, countries, 
35. Economic Commission for Africa, 1981. 
36. Economic Commission for Africa, 1976. 
37. ibid., pp. 6-7., 
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or groups of countries. A n d it becomes easy to go astray or be led 
astray.3 
T h e Lagos Plan of Action was therefore seen by the E G A , which had 
prepared the Monrovia Strategy three years after the adoption of the 
Revised Framework, as Africa's economic M a g n a Carta and as the basis 
for the economic decolonization of the continent. Both the Strategy and 
the Plan focus on the achievement of an increasing measure of self-
reliance and self-sustainment. T h e one means the internationalization of 
the forces of demand which determine the direction of development and 
economic-growth processes and patterns of output; increasing substitution 
of factor inputs derived from within the African economy for those 
derived from outside; and increasing the participation of the mass of the 
people in the production and consumption of the social product. T h e 
other - that is, increasing self-sustainment - means the deliberate instal-
lation of the patterns and processes of development and economic growth 
in which different components mutually support and reinforce each other 
so that w h e n related to the internationalization of the forces determining 
demand and supply, the whole system develops its o w n internal d y n a m -
ics.39 
Only a development strategy which is based on the principles of self-
reliance and self-sustainment can bring about a complete departure from 
the colonial economic past of Africa and lead the continent along the 
path of normative development. Such a strategy, being inward-looking 
rather than externally-oriented, does not m a k e a sacred cow of foreign-
exchange earnings and therefore does not attach excessive importance to 
foreign trade as the basis for initiating development, particularly the type 
of foreign trade with which Africa has been engaged both before and 
since independence. T h e development strategy espoused in both the 
Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action accordingly puts the 
domestic market, including African sub-regional and regional markets, 
rather than external foreign markets at the heart of the development 
effort.40 T h e challenge which therefore faces Africa is to put into oper-
ational terms at the national, sub-regional and regional levels the essence 
of both the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action. It is only 
by doing so that economic decolonization can become realizable. 
But decolonization m a y require more than reducing alien power on 
African economies. It is likely to require increased African power on the 
world economy. African resources can be more than just a basis of 
dependency. They can become the foundations of Africa's counter-
leverage on the global system. In this quest for counter-power, solidarity 
with other developing countries is more vital than ever. 
38. A . Adedeji, 1983, p. 9. 
39. ibid., p . 10. 
40. ibid., p. 11. 
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Strategies of solidarity and counter-power41 
T w o forms of solidarity are critical for Africa and the Third World if the 
global system is to change in favour of the disadvantaged and of final 
decolonization. 
Organic solidarity concerns South-South linkages designed to increase 
mutual dependence between and among African or Third-World countries 
themselves. Strategic solidarity concerns co-operation among Third-World 
countries in their struggle to extract concessions from the industrialized 
North. Organic solidarity concerns the aspiration to promote greater 
integration between Third-World economies. Strategic solidarity aspires 
to decrease the South's dependent integration into Northern economies. 
T h e focus of organic solidarity is primarily a South-South economic 
marriage. T h e focus of strategic solidarity is either a North-South divorce, 
a new marriage settlement or a new social contract between North and 
South. T h e terms of the North-South bond have to be re-negotiated. 
W e start also from the additional basic observation that economic flows 
are in any case far deeper between North and South than between South 
and South. O n the whole, Southerners do far greater trade with the 
North than with each other, and have more extensive relations of 
production with industrialized states than with fellow developing coun-
tries. But those economic relations between North and South are distorted 
by a tradition of dependency involving unequal partnership. T h e structural 
links give undue advantage and leverage to the North - and leave the 
South vulnerable and exploitable. 
W h a t then is the way out? H o w can these two forms of solidarity help 
to ameliorate the Third World's predicament of dependency and its 
persistent economic vulnerability? 
O n e of the more neglected areas of co-operation is humanpower and 
humanpower training. A start has been m a d e in humanpower exchange 
between some Third-World countries and in the field of humanpower 
training across Third-World boundaries. But the importance of this area 
has been grossly underestimated. 
It is not often realized that the most obstinate line of demarcation 
between North and South is not income (criteria of wealth) but technology 
(criteria of skill). T h e entire international system of stratification has come 
to be based not on 'who owns what' but on ' w h o knows what'. Libya and 
Saudi Arabia m a y have a higher per capita income than some of the 
members of the European Economic Community , but Libya and Saudi 
Arabia are well below Western Europe in skills of production and economic 
organization. Indeed, members of O P E C do not even have adequate skills 
to control or drill their o w n oil. 
41. This section has been drafted by A . A . Mazrui, and is indebted to his previous 
work on counter-penetration, including that for the F A O . See also A . A . Mazrui, 1986. 
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Nowhere is this demonstrated more clearly than in Southern Africa 
and the Middle East. S o m e five million whites in South Africa have been 
able to hold to ransom a black population in the region ten times their 
o w n . They have held neighbouring blacks to ransom both economically 
and militarily. T h e main explanation is not simply because South Africa 
is rich, but because that wealth has been extracted through African labour 
and European expertise. South Africa's neighbours have African labour 
too. S o m e of them are also rich in minerals. W h a t the blacks have 
lacked indigenously is the superior technology of production and the 
accompanying culture of efficient organization. 
T h e Middle East is a clearer and more staggering illustration of the 
power of skill over income. At least since the 1970s, m u c h of the Arab 
world has become significantly richer than Israel in sheer income. Indeed, 
the Israeli economy would have suffered complete collapse but for the 
infusion of billions of dollars from the United States and from world 
Jewry. A n d yet, in spite of being out-numbered and out-wealthed, the 
Israelis have retained the upper hand militarily against the Arabs. T h e 
supremacy of skill over income and numbers has been dramatically 
illustrated in one Middle-East war after another. 
In both South Africa and Israel the cultural variable is critical. H a d 
Israel consisted entirely of Middle-Eastern Jews, the Arabs would have 
w o n every war. Indeed, it would not have been necessary to have more 
than the 1948 war. After all, Middle-Eastern Jews are not very different 
from their Arab neighbours in culture and skill. In a war against fellow 
Middle-Easterners, the numerical preponderance of the Arabs would 
have triumphed against Jews long before the numerical advantage was 
reinforced by Arab petro-wealth. 
W h a t has m a d e the Israelis militarily pre-eminent is not the Jewishness 
of 80 per cent of the total population, but the Europeanness of less than 
half of that Jewish sector. It is the European and Western Jews w h o have 
provided the technological foundations of Israel's regional hegemony. 
If then the ultimate basis of international stratification is indeed skill 
rather than income, what is Africa to do in order to ameliorate the 
consequences of its technological underdevelopment? 
T h e more obvious answer is for Africa to obtain the k n o w - h o w from 
the Northern hemisphere as rapidly as possible. But there are difficulties. 
Countries of the Northern hemisphere are often all too eager to transfer 
certain forms of technology, especially through trans-national corporations, 
but the South's need for certain technological transfers only helps to 
deepen relationships of dependency between the two hemispheres. 
O n the other hand, there are other areas of technology which the North 
is not at all keen to transfer. Pre-eminent a m o n g the taboos is the transfer 
of certain branches of nuclear physics and technology. T h e computer is 
part of the phenomenon of dependency through technology transfer; the 
nuclear plant or reactor is a symbol of dependency through technological 
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monopoly by the North. T h e trans-national corporations are often instru-
ments of Northern penetration of the South through technological transfer; 
nuclear power, on the other hand, is a symbol of Northern hegemony 
through technological monopoly. 
T h e dual strategy for Africa and the Third World is both to learn from 
the North and to share expertise a m o n g each other. Those aspects of 
technology which are being freely transferred by the North should be 
'decolonized' and stripped of their dependency implications as fast as 
possible. Those aspects of technology which are deliberately monopolized 
by the North should be subjected to Southern industrial espionage in a 
bid to break the monopoly. 
A new international economic order would be void without a n e w 
international technological order. Africa needs strategies of solidarity to 
realize both. But although the power of skill is at the m o m e n t still 
overwhelmingly in the hands of the North, there are other areas of power 
which the South possesses but which the South has under-utilized. 
O P E C is an illustration oí producer power. F r o m 1973 to 1983, O P E C 
grossly under-utilized its leverage. Instead of using that golden decade to 
put pressure on the North for fundamental adjustments in the patterns 
and rules of the world economy, O P E C concentrated almost exclusively 
on the prices game, a game of short-term maximization of returns. 
There is a crying need for other 'producer cartels', no matter h o w 
weak in the short run. Cobalt has more promise as a mineral of leverage 
than copper, and would involve fewer countries. Experimentation in a 
cobalt cartel could pay off if Zaire asserted itself a little more decisively 
as an independent power. After all, Zaire has the credentials of being the 
Saudi Arabia of cobalt w h e n the market improves in the years ahead. 
T h e Third World has also under-utilized its consumer power, regionally 
specific and patchy as it is. T h e Middle East and African countries like 
Nigeria are especially important as consumers of Western civil and military 
hardware, technology and household products. Occasionally Nigeria or 
individual Middle-Eastern countries flex their muscles and threaten to 
cancel trade contracts or to refuse to renew them. But such muscles are 
flexed usually for relatively minor issues - like protesting against the 
television film Death of a Princess or w h e n an Arab or African delegation 
is diplomatically snubbed by a Western power. T h e consumer power of 
Africa and the Middle East could be used as leverage for more fundamental 
changes in the exchange patterns between North and South. 
T h e fourth form of power currently under-utilized by the South is 
debtor power. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, upon being elected chairman 
of the Organization of African Unity in November 1984, identified 
development, debt and drought as the three leading concerns of the current 
African condition. O f course, African debts are modest as compared with 
those of Latin America, but Nyerere identified debt as a source of power 
and not merely as a source of weakness. At the first press conference 
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after his election, Nyerere lamented that the Third World was not utilizing 
the threat of defaulting more efficiently to induce Western banks to m a k e 
more fundamental concessions to the indebted.42 
In reality, Tanzania would still be vulnerable unless there was substantial 
strategic solidarity a m o n g both African and Latin-American countries. 
T h e utilization of debtor power requires considerable consensus a m o n g 
the indebted. T h e Western banks have evolved a kind of organic solidarity 
of their o w n as well as mechanisms of almost continual consultation. T h e 
creditors of the North are united - but the debtors of the South are in 
disarray. Africa and Latin America need to explore the possibility of 
creating a strategic solidarity of the dispossessed and the indebted — to 
help induce the creditors of the North to m a k e concessions on such issues 
as rates of interest, schedules of payment, methods of payment, and the 
conditions for a moratorium or even total debt relief where needed. 
Fundamental as all these areas of strategic solidarity are, they are no 
substitute for organic solidarity in terms of greater trade, investment and 
other interactions a m o n g Third-World countries themselves. Here, the 
least developed countries ( L D C s ) are caught up in one of several con-
tradictions. In their relations with the North, the L D C s need to diversify 
their economies. But in their relations with each other, the L D C s need 
to specialize in order to increase mutual complementarity. Uganda could 
revive its cotton industry and sell the fibre to Kenya to process into a 
textile industry. This specialization would help the two countries develop 
in the direction of complementary specialization. But the imperatives of 
Uganda's relations with the world economy as a whole dictate diver-
sification of Uganda's industry rather than specialization. This is an acute 
dilemma which Third-World countries need to resolve as a matter of 
urgency. They need to find a suitable balance between diversification for 
North-South relations and specialization in South-South trade. 
Related to this is the imperative of finding alternative methods of 
payment in South-South trade. T h e principle of using Northern cur-
rencies for South-South trade has been very stressful. T h e bogey of 
'foreign exchange' has bedevilled Southern economies. Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe have been exploring possibilities of reviving barter as a 
basis of at least some aspect of their economic relations. Nigeria, in 
the 1980s, has experimented with 'counter-trade' - exchanging oil for 
manufactured goods. T h e n e w detente between Kenya and Tanzania also 
envisages areas of barter trade between the two countries in the years 
ahead. A n d if Uganda's cotton did feed Kenya's textile industry more 
systematically in the future, it would not be unrealistic for Kenya to pay 
back Uganda in shirts and processed military uniforms, rather than in 
hard foreign exchange. 
42. T h e Voice of America's African Service broadcast a recording of both Nyerere's 
speech and his press conference; one such broadcast was on 24 N o v e m b e r 1984. 
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Another area of organic solidarity among Third-World countries con¬
cerns the issue of sharing energy. There have been years when Kenya has
needed to get a third of its electricity from the dam at Jinja in Uganda.
Uganda is still a major supplier of power to Kenya.
plate 14. i Jinja Dam in Uganda
The Akosombo Dam on the Volta River in Ghana was also designed
to be a major regional supplier of electricity in West Africa. Unfortunately,
the level of water has been so low that far from supplying power to
neighbours, Ghana has periodically had to ration power domestically.
Ghana has sometimes needed electrical co-operation from the Côte
d'Ivoire. Southern African dams like Kariba have had more successful
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regional roles. They all symbolize a kind of pan-Africanism of energy -
organic solidarity through interlocking structures of hydro-electric power. 
A n integrated European steel complex once served as midwife to the 
birth of the European Economic Communi ty (EEC) . Indeed, the inte-
grated steel industry was envisaged as an insurance against any future 
fratricidal war in Europe. If European steel production was interlocked, 
industrial interdependence was at hand - and separate military aggression 
in the future would therefore be less likely. 
In the same spirit, interlocking electrical systems between Third-World 
countries should deepen mutual dependence — and create incentives for 
co-operation in other areas. 
T h e struggle for a more integrated Africa has encountered m a n y 
setbacks - from the collapse of the East African Communi ty of Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania to the substantial drying-up of the Akosombo D a m . 
A n experiment worthy of Africa's attention and study is South-east 
Asia. T h e struggle for a more integrated South-east Asia is more of a 
success story - as the Association of South-east Asian Nations ( A S E A N ) 
has emerged as a major economic and diplomatic force in the affairs of 
the region. T h e struggle for a more integrated Arab world is a mixed 
story - ranging from the positive promise of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
to the negative internecine squabbles of Arab politics. Libya and Egypt 
are often close to conflict. 
In Latin America, regional integration is also a mixed record. Central 
America in the 1980s was tense under the clouds of war. O n the other 
hand, Chile and Argentina — through the mediation of the Vatican — 
diffused the sensitive issue of the Beagle Channel. Economic co-operation 
has had its ups and downs throughout the region, but the ideal of greater 
integration is still a live flame. Africa should watch this distant political 
laboratory with fascination. 
T h e Northern hemisphere, as a whole, has been divided between two 
economic blocs which coincided with the ideological divide. T h e split 
was of course between the socialist world of C O M E C O N (Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance/CMEA), and the capitalist world of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) and the European C o m -
munity. 
Africa, as a Southern region, on the other hand, is still in multiple 
fragments. It is n o w in search of the elusive secret of putting the fragments 
together. It is in search of the secret genius of cohesion. 
Strategies of solidarity are but the means to an end. T h e goal is distant 
and difficult - but Africa's reach should exceed its grasp, or what's a 
heaven for? 
Philosophers have distinguished between negative freedom (freedom 
from control) and positive freedom (freedom to participate). W h e n African 
slaves were 'emancipated' in the Americas they were at best given negative 
freedom (freedom from ownership by others). O n e hundred years later, 
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plate 14.2 Above: Akosombo Dam in Ghana; below: Great Kariba Dam in Zimbabwe
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Africans in the diaspora are still looking for positive freedom (freedom to 
participate effectively). 
Similarly, negative decolonization is like emancipation from slavery — 
freedom from being owned by others. But real positive decolonization will 
only arrive when Africans are effective participants in the world economy 
and have commensurate share in global power. It is indeed not enough 
to reduce alien power on our economies - vital as that stage is. It is 
urgent that w e seek ways of increasing African power on the world 
economy at the same time. Africans must m o v e from being pawns in the 
games of others to becoming true players on the chessboard of global 
destiny. 
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Socio-political change since 
independence 
Nation-building and 
changing political structures 
J. Isawa E L A I G W U 
in collaboration with 
Ali A. M A Z R U I 
Africa's supreme political struggle in the post-colonial era can be reduced 
to two paramount longings - a striving to give greater coherence to 
African nationhood, and a striving to lend greater stability to African 
statehood. T h e crisis of nationhood is a crisis of flawed collective identity. 
T h e crisis of statehood is a crisis of unstable authority. T h e two dramas 
are inter-related but each has a logic of its o w n . M o s t independent African 
countries are colonially-created states struggling to become more coherent 
nations. A country like Somalia, on the other hand, is an indigenous 
nation struggling to become a more stable and m o r e inclusive state. But 
because nationhood and statehood in the twentieth century are inter-
related, both categories of countries continue to experience the twin crises 
of identity and authority in the post-colonial era. 
In m a n y ways the greatest threat to national identity in independent 
Africa is the legacy of artificial boundaries created by the colonial 
powers. T h e greatest question m a r k hanging over stable statehood has 
often been the standing army, which was also a creation of colonial 
rule. M o s t African societies before colonialism created armies only 
w h e n needed in times of conflict. T h e y did not have regiments 
permanently under arms, whether there was conflict or not. T h e y did 
not have brigades consuming a large proportion of the resources of 
the country. W h a t colonialism created was a military machine with an 
imported technology of destruction well ahead of the rest of the 
infrastructure. Both African nationhood and African statehood have 
been under pressure from the twin forces of artificial boundaries and 
unstable civil-military relations. 
However , in terms of planning for indigenous leadership, a central 
dilemma for colonial policy-makers had been whether to maintain the 
authority of traditional leaders and rulers or to cultivate a cadre of Western 
or semi-Westernized intelligentsia. T h e British genuinely grappled with 
that dilemma and never really resolved it, even in their o w n minds. Their 
ideology of'indirect rule' favoured traditional leaders where it was applied, 
especially in Northern Nigeria. But from the 1930s onwards, colonial 
policy-makers in the British tradition were also engaged in 'colonial 
development and welfare' - which included the expansion of secondary 
! 
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and tertiary education in the Western style. A larger Westernized élite 
was in the process of being created. 
In the French colonies, the balance was more clearly in favour of 
creating a Gallicized intelligentsia at the expense of traditional rulers. But 
even in the French empire there were contradictions. T h e marabouts, in 
colonial West Africa, retained considerable authority; and the monarchy 
in 'protectorate' Morocco retained considerable power in spite of periodic 
confrontations with the French overlords. 
O n the whole, the central dilemma of African authority during the 
colonial period remained between indigenous traditional credentials of 
legitimacy and the n e w credentials of Western education. O n the other 
hand, the central dilemma of authority after independence has been 
between the Westernized civilian intelligentsia and the post-colonial armed 
forces. During the colonial period, traditional rulers were on the defensive 
as they faced the challenge of the Westernized intelligentsia. Since 
independence, the Western-educated leaders have been on the defensive 
as they face the challenge of the military. 
O f course, the debate about traditional rulers is far from dead yet, 
especially in countries like Nigeria and post-Amln Uganda where indigen-
ous monarchical traditions have refused to be completely extinguished. 
But on the whole, the divide between traditional rulers and Westernized 
leaders is a declining confrontation - whereas the divide between West-
ernized civilians and the armed forces threatens to be an indefinite contest 
for power. 
In post-colonial G h a n a every civilian ruler has been a Westernized 
university graduate, usually with a doctorate of a kind (Nkrumah, Busia 
and Limann) . But the pendulum has then swung towards the soldiers as 
alternative rulers, usually less Westernized. Other African countries have 
also illustrated this pendular tendency between Westernized civilians and 
military rulers. Uganda's civilian rulers have included a product of 
Makerere College (Milton Obote), a former principal of Makerere College 
(Y. K . Lule), and the country's first Queen's Counsel ( Q C ) in the British 
tradition (Godfrey Binaisa). 
But some of Uganda's rulers have combined different credentials. Sir 
Edward Mutesa as the first president was both a traditional king and a 
Westernized African. Yoweri Museveni is both a soldier and a university 
graduate. T h e picture is not neatly in the proverbial 'black and white'. 
But in general it can indeed be re-affirmed that while the choice of 
African leaders during colonial rule was between traditional ones and the 
newly Westernized intelligentsia, the choice of leaders after independence 
has been between Westernized civilians and professional soldiers under 
modern arms. 
But underlying all these tensions are the historic twin processes of 
nation-building and state-formation in twentieth-century Africa. O u r 
emphasis in this chapter is on the post-colonial phase. But Africa's 
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plate i 5. i King Mutesa II, the last Kabaka ofBuganda, in military uniform
problems after independence have been merely a continuation of its
history before independence. And if nation-building and state-formation
are central to our understanding of political Africa, let us be sure to
understand the concepts of 'nation' and 'state' themselves.
Nation and state: towards definitions
The concept of a nation may refer to at least three categories of human
groups. First, it may refer to 'a stable, historically developed community
of people with a territory, economic life, distinctive culture, and language
in common'. Secondly, it may refer to 'the people of a territory united
under a single government; county; state'. Thirdly, a nation may refer to
'a people or tribe'.1
Often scholars in attempting to define the concept of nation make
distinctions between objective and subjective properties of a nation.
Among such objective indicators of a nation often mentioned are: language,
history, territory, culture (at times including religion), political organ¬
ization and economic life. The subjective indicators include a common
1. D. B. Guralnik, 1970, p. 946.
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sense of identity and commitment or loyalty to the group. These psycho-
logical variables do not render themselves easy to measure. M . G . Smith, 
however, did a good job of combining both the objective and subjective 
variables w h e n he defined a nation as 
. . . usually a single inclusive group whose members - or the majority 
of them - share c o m m o n traditions, institutions, history, and ethnic 
identity.2 
B y our first definition, a nation m a y refer to the Igbo, Yoruba, or 
Hausa-Fulbe in Nigeria; the Kikuyu or L u o in Kenya, the H u t u in 
Burundi; or the Tswana in Botswana. For our purposes, however, the 
operational definition of a nation is the second one, which states that a 
nation is 'the people of a territory united under a single government', 
country, or state. B y this definition, w e should be talking about Nigeria, 
Kenya, Burundi and Botswana as nations - not about the various 'nations' 
within the nation-state or state-nation. 
M u c h of the literature on nation-building refers to this process 'whereby 
people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages 
or petty principalities to the larger central political system'.3 F r o m their 
o w n experiences, Western writers also create the notion that state- and 
nation-building processes are two separate processes which eventually 
lead to the establishment of a nation-state. Implied in this view is that 
the development of a nation-state is the highest point in the process of 
state- and nation-building. T h u s , in Western experience, the nation is 
normally established before the state, and the nation-state forms the end 
product of their processes. In essence, the process of nation-building is 
the cultivation by a people over time of political 'attitudes, beliefs and 
values - the development of a political culture'.4 T h e emphasis in nation-
building is thus on the 'congruity of cultural and political identities'.5 It 
is a 'trend toward cultural homogeneity (nationhood)'.6 
For us the process of nation-building does not involve the transfer of 
'commitments and loyalties' from narrow or parochial levels of ethnic 
groups to a larger political unit such as Nigeria. That you are an Igbo, a 
Yoruba, or a Kikuyu, is a matter of identity. Y o u cannot transfer it. You 
cannot cease being an Igbo or a Hausa or a Kikuyu simply because you 
so declare. For us it involves the widening (rather than transfer) of 
horizons of identity of parochial units to include larger units such as the 
state. 
2. M . G . Smith, 1971, p. 32. 
3. G . Almond and B . Powell, 1966, p. 36; see also L . Pye, 1962. 
4. G . Almond and B . Powell, 1966, pp. 33-6; M . G . Smith, 1971, pp. 30-3. 
5. This does not make sense in developing or Third-World states. For a good discussion 
of this, see S. Rokkan, 1973. 
6. A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 373. 
438 
Nation-building and changing political structures 
B y nation-building w e refer to two dimensions of identity. O n e is 
closely linked to state-building. W e refer to the progressive acceptance 
by members of the polity of the legitimacy of a central government, and 
identification with the central government as a symbol of the nation. This 
is the vertical dimension of nation-building - that is, that you not only 
have a state, but that people accept the authority of the state (and not 
merely its coercive power) and see its government as the symbol of their 
political community. Hence, secessionist bids in Nigeria, Ethiopia, the 
Sudan and Zaire were challenges to the authority of the central government 
and a denial of a shared sense of identity. T h e end of the civil war in 
Nigeria not only indicated the renewed acceptance of the Nigerian state 
by its citizens, but also an acceptance by Nigerians that the central 
government should be the symbol of an emerging Nigerian nation. 
O n the horizontal dimension, nation-building involves the acceptance 
of other m e m b e r s of the civic body as equal fellow-members of a 
'corporate' nation - a recognition of the rights of other members to a 
share of c o m m o n history, resources, values and other aspects of the state -
buttressed by a sense of belonging to one political community. It involves 
the feeling that all members of the polity are entitled to a share of the 
sweet and the bitter in the process of political development - not only 
the sweet. Nation-building, therefore, is the widespread acceptance of the 
process of state-building; it is the creation of a political community that 
gives a fuller meaning to the life of the state. 
Both processes of state- and nation-building can take place concurrently, 
and often do overlap. For m a n y ex-colonial African states, the state has 
preceded the nation. M a n y groups of peoples were arbitrarily sandwiched 
into a territorial unit, which then formed a geopolitical entity called the 
state. T o m a n y of the peoples of these states, there was no identification 
with the state as a symbol of a people, a political community. In fact, 
most of these groups became exposed to one another in the terminal 
colonial period, as the colonial masters folded their political umbrellas 
and rolled their flags.7 
For these peoples there was no sharing of c o m m o n 'values, beliefs, and 
attitudes' a m o n g the peoples of n e w states that would have created a 
political culture. In addition, emerging mainly after the 1960s, the periods 
of state-building for m a n y African states have been short. A s experiments 
in state-building go on, so also have experiments in nation-building. 
7. T h u s , writing to the Nigerian head of state for the creation within Nigeria of a 
separate state (from the former Benue-Plateau State), the Plateau Students' Association 
(1974, p. 2) stated: 
T h e Tiv and Idoma have social set-ups, completely distinct from that shared by 
the various groups on the Plateau. There have been no cultural ties between our 
people of Southern Benue. History has it that w e in fact never knew of their 
existence until recently. 
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These add to the strains on the capabilities of the political systems in all
African states. Rajni Kothari was correct when he observed that in the
Third World, 'the concept of nation itself tends to draw less from cultural
and linguistic notions which were the origins of national consciousness
in Europe and more from a transcendent notion of statehood which
coincides with nationhood.'8
Furthermore, as Sheldon Gellar persuasively argued, the processes of
state- and nation-building have witnessed the development of 'state-
nations' which recognize the paradox of national integration, that is,
'diversity in unity' and not only 'unity in diversity'.9 The process of
nation-building could thus entail the creation of 'state-nations' as well as
'nation-states' as end products.
plate 15.2 The Second Summit of the Maghreb Countries, Marrakesh, 15-16 February
1989; from left to right: President Ben Ali of Tunisia, President Muammar Kadhaß ofLibya,
King Hassan II ofMorocco, President Chadli Bendjedid ofAlgeria and President Ould Sid
'Ahmed Taya ofMauritania
Does nation-building necessarily involve homogenization of cultural
and political identities? As Clifford Geertz observed, any attempt at simple
replacement of primordial ties and identifications by civil ones is 'sheer
8. R. Kothari, 1973, p. 104.
9. S. Gellar, 1972, pp. 40-1; see also M. Rejai and C. Enloe, 1969.
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impossibility'.10 T h e compromise is to be found, he contends, in 'adjust-
ments between them', so that the processes of government can proceed 
'fully without threatening the cultural framework of personal identity'. 
Whatever discontinuities occur as a result of this would, therefore, 'not 
radically distort political functioning'. Perhaps Ali Mazrui and Michael 
Tidy are correct in suggesting that what nation-building implies is 
'substantial cultural homogeneity' to enable the sense of nationhood to 
stick." 
It m a y be argued, therefore, as E d m u n d Burke wrote, that 'the love of 
the whole' 
is not extinguished by . . . subordinate partiality. . . . to be attached 
to the subdivision, to love the little platoon w e belong to in society, 
is just the principle . . . of public affections." 
Perhaps it is the degree of attachment to the sub-national loyalties which 
m a y threaten the whole. T h e process of nation-building consciously 
attempts to widen the horizons of sub-national loyalties to coincide with 
state boundaries, and ultimately partialize the level of commitment to the 
parochial groups. 
Finally, w e should hasten to argue that the processes of nation-building 
in African states have been punctuated by conflicts and crises. Given the 
diversity of the groups involved in this process, conflict is inevitable. It 
is not just the conflicts, but the intensity of the conflicts without 
threatening the consensual values on which the association is grafted, that 
are important in the process of nation-building. A s Ali Mazrui has 
suggested, 'an accumulated experience of resolving conflicts between 
antithetical forces is, after all, one of the great indices of national 
integration'.13 After all Lewis Coser has argued that conflicts m a y be 
positively functional to group solidarity.14 
For our purposes, 'changing political structures' refer to political 
institutions inherited and the amendments to these and/or n e w institutions 
introduced to assist African states to build a nation, after their inde-
pendence in the 1960s. 
F r o m colonial models to independence constitutions 
In addition to indirect rule, the British established legislative councils in 
their colonies. T h e membership of these changed in composition from 
10. C . Geertz, 1963, p. 155; see also M . Fortes and E . E . Evans-Pritchard, 1940, and 
P. Brown, 1970, for another typology. 
11. A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 373. 
12. Quoted in S. Huntington, 1968, p. 30. 
13. A . A . Mazrui, 1969a, p. 105; see also A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 12; 
J. F. A . Ajayi, 1968, p. 194; and I. L . Markovitz, 1977, p. 47. 
14. L . Coser, 1956, p. 188. 
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predominantly white administrators to Africans and from appointed 
members to elected members , towards the terminal stage of colonialism. 
T h e process was gradually democratized as prospects for self-government 
and independence became greater. 
In the last years of colonial rule, the British transferred to their 
territories the 'Westminster' model of government - in Nigeria, Sudan, 
Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Tanganyika, Ghana and others. Except in a 
few cases such as Tanzania, this model encouraged multi-partyism and 
electoral competition among such parties. A s prospects for independence 
came closer in these territories, semblances of 'parliaments' (very often 
bicameral) began to emerge and Africans began a period of tutelage in 
the operation of the cabinet system as some elected members became 
ministers. Similarly, the British often bequeathed federal structures (which 
they did not have at home) to their colonies. 
In this terminal colonial period, the prospect of independence brought 
together m a n y ethnic groups or 'cultural nations' to compete for political 
power, n o w to be bequeathed to the n e w state. Very often the competitive 
setting led to a new parochialism based on awareness of one another in 
a competitive setting. T h u s political élites often withdrew into their 
ethnic or geo-ethnic or regional platforms to mobilize support for such 
competition. T h e Northern People's Congress ( N P C ) and the Action 
Group ( A G ) in Nigeria; the National Liberation M o v e m e n t ( N L M ) , the 
Northern People's Party (NPP) , and Togoland Congress Party ( T C P ) in 
Ghana; the A B A K O , the Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga 
( C O N A K A T ) in Zaire; and the Kabaka Yekka ( K Y ) Party and the 
Democratic Party (DP) in Uganda, are only a few examples of these 
parties. All these were providing a setting for the politics of the post-
colonial era. S o m e of these parties, such as C O N A K A T , were even 
sponsored by business concerns in the colony or by the colonial authority 
itself in order to dilute support for national parties. T h e seeds of future 
dependency were being sown. 
There were, however, territory-wide political parties which in m o b -
ilizing the masses for political action, tried as m u c h as possible to 
transcend parochial horizons of loyalty and commitments. As noted in an 
earlier chapter, among such political parties was the National Council for 
Nigeria and Cameroons ( N C N C - later 'for Nigerian Citizens' after 
Western Cameroon opted out of Nigeria). T h e N C N C later staged a 
retreat from being a nationwide party and gave the semblance of being a 
regional party. 
W e have noted that in Guinea the Parti démocratique de la Guinée 
( P D G ) under Sékou Touré mobilized various ethnie groups and trades 
unions into an effective national institution for participation. Not only 
did this party organization drive underground other ethnic associations 
and parties, it effectively mobilized the Guinea people against French 
rule. W e know that the ' N o ' vote to de Gaulle's referendum of 1958 came 
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as a shock to the French after the pro-France campaigns of de Gaulle. 
In fact, the attempt to transcend ethnicity is amply illustrated by the 
ability of the P D G to get five of its leaders selected in the 1956 'municipal 
elections outside their regions of origin'.IS Sékou Touré's ancestry also 
created some form of traditional legitimacy for him, though with some 
risk of alienating other ethnic groups.16 
Senghor's Bloc démocratique sénégalais ( B D S ) transcended ethnic loy-
alties and mobilized Senegalese people for independence. It is even more 
interesting that Senghor, a Christian in a predominantly Muslim country, 
could so effectively w o o prominent Muslim religious leaders, or marabouts, 
to his side. These people were very important in Senghor's victory 
over his opponent Lamine Gueye. M o r e than anything else, Senghor's 
experience illustrates an effective if inchoate process of nation-building 
before independence. This R o m a n Catholic ruled a country which was 
over 80 per cent Muslim - a great ecumenical achievement. 
Senghor's experience was in a way similar to that of Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania. H e not only hailed from a small ethnic group (the Wazanaki), 
but found himself operating as a Christian in a country with a Muslim 
plurality. But Nyerere had neither the large and autonomous sub-state 
'nations' nor the linguistic problems of Nigeria. Tanzania is a poly-ethnic 
but not a multi-national state in the sense that Nigeria is, and it has 
Kiswahili as a country-wide language which provides an umbrella over 
other differences. Julius Nyerere helped to establish the Tanganyika 
African National Union ( T A N U ) in 1954. This sole party led Tanganyika 
to independence without m u c h opposition, ruling the country until it 
expanded into Chama cha Mapinduzi ( C C M ) in 1977. 
In other areas, such as Uganda, pluralism did create problems, as w e 
stated earlier. Though an essentially pan-ethnic party, Milton Obote's 
Uganda People's Congress ( U P C ) found that it had to go into alliance 
with the Kabaka Yekka ( K Y ) to form a government at independence. 
T h e duality of the kabaka's role as the king of Buganda and the ceremonial 
president of Uganda did create problems of nation-building and symbolism 
of nationhood. Kenyatta's Kenya created a mobilization organ, the Kenya 
African Union ( K A U ) and later the Kenya African National Union 
( K A N U ) . Essentially ethnic, it was dominated by the Kikuyu and the 
L u o in an uneasy alliance. O n the eve of independence, the fear of a one-
party-state under Kikuyu-Luo dominance had led to the formation of 
the Kenya African Democratic Union ( K A D U ) which was also pan-
ethnic. But K A N U w o n the 1961 elections to the legislative council, and 
fought for Kenyatta's release from prison. T h e 1963 elections swept 
Kenyatta to power as prime minister, and independence came in 
December, 1963. 
15. A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 90. 
16. Sékou Touré was the grandson of the Samori Touré, the Mande king. 
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T h e Zairean experience ¡was more turbulent. L u m u m b a ' s party, Mou-
vement national congolais ( M N C ) was a pan-ethnic political party. A 
nationalist and pan-Africanist, L u m u m b a was able to mobilize the Zairois 
(or Congolese) to press for independence. His main opposition parties 
were more parochial in their bases of appeal. A B A K O , for exam-
ple, pushed for separation and the formation of a Congo state which 
could later on merge with French Congo (later Congo, Brazzaville.)17 
T h e C O N A K A T , under Moïse Tshombe, opted for secession. This sit-
uation led to a civil war immediately after independence. L u m u m b a ' s 
was an uphill task - to unite a country which was constantly threat-
ened by foreigners and Zairois alike. It is ironic that after indepen-
dence M o b u t u found it necessary to use L u m u m b a ' s n a m e as one 
of the symbols of nation-building. Thus , what L u m u m b a could not 
do while alive, Mobutu was trying to do in (deceased) L u m u m b a ' s 
name. 
Not all nationalist reactions, in the last years of colonialism, ended up 
in peaceful concession of independence by colonial authorities. In Angola, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Algeria, there were armed 
struggles. T h e Partido Africano para a Independencia de Guiñé e Cabo 
Verde ( P A I G C ) in Guinea-Bissau was able to effectively mobilize the 
people for anti-colonial struggle. In fact the Guinea-Bissau nation was 
born before the state - a rare occurrence in Africa. Nation-building 
became a condition here for the attainment of a state. Angola, immediately 
after the precipitate withdrawal of the Portuguese, was embroiled in a 
civil war among the Movimento Popular de Libertaçào de Angola ( M P L A ) 
under Agostinho Neto, the Frente Nacional de Libertaçào de Angola 
( F N L A ) under the leadership of Roberto Holden, and the Unido Nacional 
para a Independencia total de Angola ( U N I T A ) , led by Jonas Savimbi. 
With the backing of the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) , the 
M P L A government of Agostinho Neto was recognized as the legitimate 
government of Angola. 
Elsewhere in Southern Africa, the white-settler element created prob-
lems of decolonization for the British. Here, racism and ethnicity played 
an important part. K a m u z u Banda's Malawi Congress Party ( M C P ) was 
able to mobilize Africans against racism and colonialism in Malawi. H e 
succeeded in getting an independent Nyasaland, baptized as Malawi. 
In Zimbabwe the struggle was as m u c h a fight against racism as 
colonialism. In the process, the ethnic cleavages between the Shona and 
Ndebele played an important part. South Africa continued its apartheid 
policy in spite of Macmillan's 'wind of change' speech there, and held 
on to its usurped authority over Namibia. 
At independence, therefore, a number of features were discernible in 
the new states. Traditional African religion and Islam survived colonial 
17. A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 96; see also C . Young, 1965, p. 659. 
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rule, and Christianity attained greater saliency in Africa's triple religions -
traditional, Islamic and Christian. These had consequences for communal 
stability and nation-building after independence. 
Traditional leadership and authority survived colonial rule and their 
roles differed between Francophone and Anglophone states. Traditional 
authority attained higher political saliency in Anglophone than in Fran-
cophone states. This had consequences (as the experiences of Nigeria and 
Uganda later illustrated) not only for state-building but also nation-
building. 
Western education became a passport to the modernizing sector of 
society. M o r e than that, Western education created a n e w African élite, 
which, at different levels and given their colonial experiences, suffered 
from cultural schizophrenia.18 
Political parties emerged in Africa, and with few exceptions such as 
Tanzania (and given its peculiar nature, Guinea-Bissau), colonial auth-
orities encouraged multi-partism. Often this encouragement emanated 
from the desire to divide the ranks of nationalist movements or from the 
desire of these colonial authorities to transfer to the colonies their model 
of 'democracy' at h o m e . T h u s all colonial authorities, apart from Portugal, 
bequeathed to African states parliamentary systems along with multi-
partism. 
Similarly, European laws were imposed at territorial level to govern or 
regulate the behaviour of colonized peoples. T h e Francophone and 
Anglophone countries not only inherited these laws but also the judicial 
institutions of the imperial country. N o wonder Nigeria still operates the 
English C o m m o n L a w as the core of its legal system. 
Colonial bureaucracies were inherited by the n e w political élite. These 
bureaucracies were essentially colonial structures of administration for the 
maintenance of law and order, and for extraction of resources. H o w have 
these changed? W h a t n e w goals have been set for them? 
Finally, the forms of government bequeathed to the élites on inde-
pendence had their o w n contradictions. While Britain is unitary in spite 
of its cultural pluralism, it often bequeathed federal or quasi-federal 
institutions to its ex-colonies. Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, 1 9 the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Uganda's amorphous and contradictory 
federal-unitary relations between sub-national units and the centre are 
examples. 
If de Gaulle's France had operated a federal colonial West and E q u a -
torial Africa, de Gaulle never favoured federalism and even worked against 
it. A s he once said: 
18. See A . A . Mazrui, 1978, p. 392. 
19. This was challenged and effectively changed by Nkrumah's C P P . Ghana became a 
unitary government. 
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It is not certain that the concept of a federation, which replaces in 
certain areas to a certain extent the concept of colonization, is always 
very good and very practical, and particularly in Africa - but not 
only in Africa, for in fact, that consists in automatically putting 
together very different peoples, sometimes very different indeed, and 
w h o , in consequence dó not like it at all. O n e sees this in Canada, 
one sees this in Rhodesia, in Malaysia, in Cyprus, and one sees it 
in Nigeria . . .20 
M o s t Francophone states inherited unitary governments except for 
Cameroon, which tried federalism for a brief period after its absorption of 
Western Cameroons from Nigeria. T h e Senegal-Sudan (Mali) federation 
attempt failed. 
Let us n o w turn to h o w African leaders coped with the problems of 
creating nations out of the states inherited from colonial rule. 
Integrative processes and changing political structures 
O n attaining independence, the leaders of Africa's n e w states found that 
they had to grapple with basic challenges of nationhood and statehood -
that is, the challenges of political development. These challenges included 
(i) centralization of political authority, often referred to as the process 
of state-building; 
(2) creating unity a m o n g heterogenous groups in their polity, often 
referred to as the process of nation-building; 
(3) providing avenues for political participation; and 
(4) distributing scarce but allocatable resources.21 
If earlier developers such as Britain and the United States had had the 
luxury of treating these challenges sequentially, African states found that 
that technique had become a luxury. T h e technological revolution which 
also entailed a communication revolution had not only created a smaller 
globe, thus denying these states the relative isolation within which to 
tackle these problems, but had m a d e simultaneous solutions to these 
challenges a political imperative. T h u s n e w leaders w h o took over the 
reins of government soon found their decision-making units overloaded 
with demands and expectations but with few capabilities and resources 
to meet them. 
T h e first shock was that those political leaders, especially those in 
British Africa w h o had undergone a period of dyarchy with colonial 
rulers, soon found that the n e w parliamentary system they were to 
implement did not give them as m u c h power as it gave to their pre-
decessors. T h u s , if the colonial governor-general combined legislative and 
20. C . de Gaulle, 1968, p. 1186. 
21. This is the Social Science Research Council position. See L . Binder et al., 1971. 
446 
Nation-building and changing political structures 
executive powers, the n e w system had checks and balances and division 
of functions between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
Schooled in authoritarian colonial political culture, it was not easy making 
a transition to parliamentary democracy with values of participation, 
accommodation of political opponents, and the spirit of tolerance. 
Did the n e w political élites actually try to change the inherited political 
structures such that they could build a 'nation' out of the state they were 
n o w leading? Using the inheritance model,2 2 what did the heirs of the 
colonial legacy do with the inherited political structures in the nation-
building process? 
B y our inheritance model , the colonial authorities bequeathed to 
indigenous political élites a central government with control over instru-
ments of coercion and maintenance of law and order, such as the police, 
the army, and the legal system. T h e bureaucracy which they inherited 
was not only the largest employer, it was to be the main engine of growth. 
T h e government also had the greatest economic resources in the state. 
Given these legacies, were the n e w élites able to dissociate themselves 
from the colonial structures in order to achieve n e w goals? T o a large 
extent Sheldon Gellar was correct in observing that 
Since the control over the colonial territorial centre and its resources 
was the main prize of pre-independence politics, there was little 
desire to diminish this prize. O n the contrary the main goal for 
inheritance elites after independence was precisely the consolidation 
and expansion of state authority.23 
There was hardly any effort at making substantial changes in the 
inherited institutions for purposes of nation-building. In any case the 
multi-national and poly-ethnic structures of these countries did not change 
overnight because they had attained independence. T h e heterogeneity of 
these states was also part of the legacy of colonial rule. N e w states in 
Africa, except in the very few cases w e have mentioned earlier, hardly 
coincided with the boundaries of old nations, empires and kingdoms. For 
the n e w leaders, nation-building was really a long-term goal. M o r e 
immediate was the desire to consolidate the powers of the centre they 
had inherited and penetrate the periphery m o r e effectively - that is, state-
building. Actually, when political élites speak of nation-building, they 
make it clear that strengthening the centre, either through the state 
and/or the party, comes first in their order of priorities since the 
state and/or party is perceived as the principal instrument for 
creating a national consciousness.24 
22. This model was used by S . Gellar, 1972, pp . 384-426. 
23. ibid., p. 398. 
24. H . Bienen, 1974, p. 215. 
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Given these circumstances, therefore, it was more in the interest of the 
inheritance élites to retain the colonial political structures which were 
not, in the first place, established for nation-building purposes. Continuity 
in institutions provided relative predictability and security for the leaders. 
W h e r e there were changes, reformist (rather than revolutionary) options 
were chosen. 
It was hardly surprising, then, that gradually the central bureaucracy 
in post-colonial African societies expanded rapidly. T h e structures not 
only remained essentially as those established by the colonialists, their 
goals hardly changed. Francophone West African states, as well as G h a n a , 
Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda , illustrate such expansions in the bureaucracy 
at the expense of political parties. This was mainly because bureaucracies 
were seen as institutions for political control. With regard to Kenya, as 
Henry Bienen has clearly illustrated, the civil service provided more 
opportunities for participation and representation than the political party, 
K A N U . 2 5 Kenya's regional administration is reputedly strong and cen-
tralized under the office of the president. 
T h e Nigerian bureaucracy expanded rapidly after independence but 
hardly showed any signs of other forms of change. T h e general orders, 
which governed the behaviour of the civil service, were written under the 
colonial regime and for a long time had perquisites which Europeans 
inserted for themselves such as 'bush allowance', 'horse allowance', and 
so on. 
In essence only in a few states such as Tanzania were there attempts 
to set n e w goals for the state bureaucracy. Nyerere within the context of 
his Arusha Declaration envisaged a n e w role for the bureaucracy - to 
'enable the Central Government to give guidance and assistance to local 
people, as well as check on their work, while it reduces the amount of 
red tape and bureaucracy which is, at present, in danger of strangling 
our people's enthusiasm."6 
In most of Africa, the influence of the bureaucracy increased but it 
was not always clear that their roles had changed. If colonial rule saw the 
bureaucracy as an instrument for maintaining law and order as well as 
for exploitation, inheritance élites did not go m u c h beyond this to include 
welfare of the people as a goal. In some states, such as Nigeria, it took 
various successors to inheritance élites to get the bureaucracy to intervene 
in essential areas of the private sector which affected the lives of the 
people.27 This was something Tanzania had embarked upon m u c h earlier. 
25. ibid. 
26. J. K . Nyerere, 1972, p. 2. 
27. Nigeria, Federal Republic of, 1972; see also P. Collins, 1983, pp . 412-14. 
This is the decree aimed at indigenization of the economy, thus giving the bureaucracy 
additional powers of intervention in the private sector in order to protect the interest of 
Nigerians. It took 12 years before such an action could be taken. 
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Perhaps, it is pertinent at this point to note that, because of the 
European colonial policies described earlier, and the differences in admin-
istrative styles, Francophone state bureaucracies were generally more 
dependent on the ex-colonial power than the Anglophone state bureauc-
racies which had been used to a relatively higher degree of autonomy. 
T h e currencies of the new states also reflected the caution on the part 
of the inheritance élites in effecting changes. M u c h of Francophone Africa 
still operates in the franc currency zone, while m a n y Anglophone states 
operate in the sterling zone. Nigeria only left the sterling zone in 1973, 
while Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda still use the word 'shilling' as a 
currency denomination. 
T h e pluralism of African countries extended to language - as indicated 
in the chapter on language and social change. T h e Francophone states, 
of course, use French as the official language, while most Anglophone 
states still use English as the official language. In East Africa Kiswahili 
has been adopted as an official language in Kenya, Tanzania and, for a 
while, Uganda. It is hoped that Kiswahili will turn out to be a unifying 
force in these countries in the future. T h e introduction of Arabic as 
Sudan's official language was resisted in vain by the southern Sudanese. 
But English has a role in southern Sudan. Liberia adopted English as the 
official language, while Ethiopia uses Amharic for the same purpose. 
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao T o m e and Principe and M o z -
ambique use Portuguese as the official language. T h e dangers of intro-
ducing a national language had dissuaded inheritance élites from effecting 
changes. For most of them, in any case, it was not a priority. 
T h e educational system was hardly changed in content in either 
Francophone or Anglophone states. However, as indicated in the chapter 
on education and social change, there was an expansion of the school 
systems. These schools were not used for purposes of socialization of 
youths for nation-building. Thus Shakespearean literature and British 
and Commonweal th history featured prominently in Anglophone African 
educational curricula. In Nigeria (and this was true for most Anglophone 
states) m a n y adults w h o studied for the General Certificate of Education 
examination registered for subjects such as 'British Constitution', even 
though they hardly understood their o w n nation's constitution. If the 
Gauls were presented in France's empire as the ancestors of Francophone 
Africans, it was not the priority of the inheritance élite of some states to 
focus on changes in the content of education. In any case, French colonial 
education as a tool in cultural imperialism was even more thorough and 
effective than British or Belgian education. 
Traditional institutions had been really weakened by colonial rule. 
However, in Nigeria and Uganda traditional rulers played an active role 
in politics and administration. In Uganda , the kabaka (or king of the 
Baganda) became the president of the country (1963) as a whole in almost 
the same way as Lesotho's king ascended to political heights even in the n e w 
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political set-up. In Northern Nigeria, the emirs wielded substantial power 
through the native-authority systems inherited from colonial rulers but 
which did not undergo any real changes until the advent of military rule. In 
Tanzania, while chieftaincy was legally abolished, chiefs still existed and 
operated albeit at a very low-key level. Guinea abolished chieftaincy as a 
reactionary institution after independence; so did R w a n d a . 2 8 
In the French empire, the French had done an effective job of relegating 
chiefs to political obscurity for the inheritance élites. But in Swaziland a 
traditional leader, King Sobhuza, wielded executive authority for decades 
in a country of about half a million people. 
Reactions to traditional institutions in independent African states have 
been varied, but at least three basic patterns are easily identified. First, 
is the reaction of inheritance élites, some of w h o m had roots in traditional 
royalty, to define and limit the powers of the chiefs in politics and 
administration, as in Nigeria before 1966. T h e second reaction, as in 
N k r u m a h ' s G h a n a , relegates the chiefs to political obscurity but concedes 
to them advisory powers. T h e third is one which sees no place for them 
in the n e w political set-up, as in Guinea or R w a n d a . 2 9 However , traditional 
institutions have persisted (if on the defensive and in decline) and still 
have to be dealt with today by either military and/or civilian regimes. 
Their political resilience is to be found in the nature of African community 
life in rural areas. Traditional rulers represent one of the continuities in 
Africa's political history. Nigeria's first Republic maintained regional 
houses of chiefs - a demonstration of their saliency in politics.30 Today 
Nigeria operates traditional councils at sub-national state levels. These 
councils are essentially advisory in matters such as chieftaincy, culture 
and local government. T h e tension between traditionalists and the West-
ernized is n o w overshadowed by the divide between the military and 
Westernized civilians. 
Ideology and political systems 
Generally because of the fragility of authority in African states, most 
inheritance élites preferred unitary systems of government. In G h a n a , 
N k r u m a h succeeded in getting a unitary constitution for the country and 
so the regional legislatures disappeared. In mobilizing against federal or 
quasi-federal institutions in G h a n a , N k r u m a h was trying to overcome any 
threats of aggressive regionalism in the country, Kenya at independence 
was laden with regional legislatures under the majimbo constitution. 
Kenyatta did his best to weaken and kill regional administration and 
28. L . Rubin and B . Weinstein, 1974, pp. 213-14. 
29. ibid. 
30. All the three regions, except the Eastern Region, had houses of chiefs after 
independence. 
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legislature. A s Kenyatta told the National Assembly in 1964, ' T h e 
majority of the voters in Kenya agree with K A N U that the constitution 
was too rigid, expensive, and unworkable.'31 H e gradually reduced the 
powers of the regions such that they had 'no executive authority or 
legislative competence in any matter'. Local governments were brought 
directly under central-government control and the public service was 
centralized. 
In the same vein, Kenya m o v e d away from the parliamentary system 
as it had been inherited at independence. A s the minister of justice and 
constitutional affairs, M r T o m M b o y a , told the same parliament: 
T h e historical process by which, in other lands, Heads of State, 
whether Kings or Presidents have become figureheads, are no part 
of our African tradition. S o in this respect, w e politely reject the 
Westminster model. T h e m a n w e choose for our President will be 
the leader of our nation and the leader of our Government; and this, 
Sir, is what our people understand.32 
T h u s , Kenya not only had a unitary constitution by the time it became 
a republic, it shifted to an executive presidential system in which the 
president was also to be an elected m e m b e r of the parliament. Even 
Kenya's institutional adjustment, as w e have seen, buttresses our earlier 
contention that inheritance élites' priorities after independence were the 
consolidation of the colonial state and central government that had been 
bequeathed to them. If regionalism had been overcome, echoes of ethnicity 
were still being heard on the political horizon. 
Unlike Kenya, Nigeria operated a federal system of government, 
originally based on three regions. T h e aggressive ethno-regional politics 
of Nigeria led to the emergence of strong regions under powerful regional 
premiers, and a weak centre in the context of a parliamentary system. 
Unlike Kenya, Nigeria did not go presidential after becoming a republic. 
Centrifugal forces were so powerful in the country, that Balewa, the first 
prime minister after independence, remained a weakened leader of a fragile 
central government. Nigeria's federal system was popularly described as 
one in which ''regional tails wagged the federal dog\ Threats of secession 
by regions in the period 1950-66 were rife in the polity. Nigeria's 
inheritance élite found it very difficult to centralize authority and/or 
consolidate the inherited state.33 
Francophone states remained unitary in their governments except for 
Cameroon, which turned federal with the incorporation of Western 
Cameroon into that state. With the ghost of French colonial presence 
31. Kenya, Republic of, Official Report, House of Representatives, First Parliament, 
Second Session, vol. II, part II, 14 August 1964, cols 1707-10, in C . Gertzel et al., 1972, 
P- 193-
32. ibid., p. 195. 
33. See J. I. Elaigwu, 1979, pp. 155-81, for some discussion of this. 
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behind the inheritance élites, the consolidation of their dependent state 
did not seem to be as m u c h of a problem as in Anglophone states which 
had had a history of autonomy for sub-national units. 
Another experiment at federalism was the quasi-federal association 
between Zanzibar and Tanganyika, thus transforming the country into 
Tanzania under the T A N U political party. 
Generally, African inheritance leaders preferred the unitary system 
which assisted in the consolidation of their power base. In addition, 
federalism is expensive to operate. 
Ideologically, it is possible to identify some 'radical' African states and 
'moderate' African states in terms of their choice of paths of economic 
development. A s William Foltz correctly pointed out, ideologies were 
important in African mobilization for development. However , 
these ideologies should not be seen in classic 'left-right' terms; the 
distinction between those states hewing to some explicitly socialist 
policy and those favouring a more capitalist m o d e of development 
rather concerns alternate means of achieving similar ends of political 
control.34 
T h u s , while Tanzania, M o z a m b i q u e and Guinea-Conakry preferred to go 
'socialist', Nigeria, K e n y a and the Côte d'Ivoire opted for the 'capitalist' 
route of development. O f all African states, Tanzania under T A N U and 
later C C M leadership seems to have ventured further into structural 
reorganization in order to achieve the declared ideological objectives of 
the ujamaa villages and the Arusha Declaration.35 
O f course, other African leaders had espoused their o w n philosophies 
of the state. Obote's Common Man's Charter, Sékou Touré's National 
Democracy, and Senghor's Négritude are all examples of the philosophical 
positions of these leaders. But few of these leaders really empirically 
mobilized the populace to achieve their dreams of the state.36 
T o what extent did the political parties, which really were the indigenous 
institutions of political participation and mobilization, perform effectively? 
T o what extent were these institutions used for political integration? 
Sheldon Gellar was persuasive in assuming1 that 
to the extent that the party was an indigenous institution whose 
functioning depended largely upon the organizational skills of its 
leaders and energies of its followers, it was less tied to colonial 
institutions and norms and therefore could be used as a more popular 
agent for promoting a post-colonial national identity than could the 
state.37 
34. W . J. Foltz, 1973, p. 365. 
35. See J. K . Nyerere, 1967b and 1968b; and United Republic of Tanzania, 1967a and 
1967b. 
36. See G . C . Mutiiso and S. W . Rohio, 1975. 
37. S. Gellar, 1972, p. 401. 
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In some states, especially the relatively 'radical' single-party states, the 
value of political parties as mobilizational instruments of nation-building 
heightened after independence. Tanzania's T A N U , Guinea-Bissau's 
P A I G C , and the P D G of Guinea are examples of single-party states in 
which the parties served as vehicles for relative dissociation from ex-
colonial rulers and for effecting changes in inherited political structures. 
In m a n y states, the trend has been in the direction of one-party state or 
one-party-dominant state - for example, K A N U in Kenya, the C P P in 
Ghana , the Union démocratique voltaïque in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), 
the Union soudanaise in Mali, the Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire 
(PDCI) in Côte d'Ivoire (as from 1957), and the Malawi Congress Party (as 
from 1966). In Senegal, the Union progressiste sénégalaise ( U P S ) has been the 
dominant party in the state. In Cameroon, the Union nationale camerounaise 
became the only party as from 1966. T h e politics of consolidation of the 
inherited state often entailed killing opposition parties, sometimes through 
legislation, and at other times, through different mechanisms of political 
overkill. M a n y of these parties, unlike the ones in the 'radical' states, were 
dormant between elections. S o m e of them became increasingly personalized 
with the rise of authoritarian executives in the context of political insecurity 
and centrifugal social forces in the state. 
T h u s by 1966 the trend was in the direction of single-party states or 
single-party-dominant states. S o m e of these parties, as in Kenya, have 
managed to contain ethnic conflicts. Others hardly changed the polity or 
mobilized the people, but virtually became bureaucratic institutions of 
control and penetration of the periphery. 
Yet in countries such as Nigeria, Zaire, civilian Ghana after N k r u m a h , 
and Uganda, which have had multi-party systems under civilian rule, the 
conflicts generated by parochial parties had provided an opportunity for 
military interventions. 
Increasingly, political parties in such systems ceased to become organs 
for articulating and aggregating the interests of the masses. N o r did they 
provide alternative political élites for ruling the countries. A s political 
parties decayed, so also did electoral competitive processes and the 
inherited functional legislative institutions. In place of parties arose strong 
individual executives - such as N k r u m a h , Sékou Touré, Houphoüet-
Boigny, Kaunda , Kenyatta, Banda, Ahidjo and others - whose political 
parties always w o n elections. 
However, in the context of nation-building, it seems that single-party 
states, such as Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry under Sékou 
Touré, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Cameroon, have had a better record of 
creating a semblance of unity in their countries than multi-party states. 
Multi-party states, such as Nigeria, Zaire and Uganda, found it difficult 
to curb the parochial nationalisms of the various 'nations' within them. 
Does this recommend the single-party system for Africa? It is hard to 
say as the records of some single-parties, such as in Burkina Faso (formerly 
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Upper Volta), Mali and Nkrumah's Ghana , did not prevent military 
interventions. It must, however, be conceded that in Nkrumah's Ghana , 
aggressive ethnicity was not really a feature of the polity. Does Mugabe's 
push for a one-party state entail an attempt to contain ethnicity? 
Part of the problem of nation-building inherited by African élites was 
cultural sub-nationalism. Nigeria experienced a bitter civil war (1967^70) 
as a climax of its inter-ethnic strife. Uganda's inter-ethnic squabbles have 
succeeded in immobilizing every leader except A m i n , whose dispensation 
of misery a m o n g Ugandan people united most Ugandans against him. 
T h e communal conflicts in Zaire exploded into a civil war (1960-65) 
which led to military intervention and the ascendancy of General M o b u t u . 
Chad is ridden with different types of communal instability - religious, 
racial, ethnic and ideological - all mixed up in a complex form. Sudan 
was engaged in a civil war from 1955 to 1972; it has again relapsed into 
civil war. Angola had a civil war from 1975-6 after independence. 
T h e conflict continued, with the rebel U N I T A forces, led by Savimbi, 
controlling substantial parts of the country, until a cease-fire was signed 
on 31 M a y 1991. Ethiopia had one or more civil wars from 1961 to 1991. 
Prospects for reconciliation improved after the flight from the country of 
Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. 
All the above are manifestations of ethnic, racial and sometimes religious 
strife which bedevilled the capabilities of the inheritance elites. After 
independence, aggressive domestic communal and parochial nationalisms 
emerged which, during the anti-colonial nationalist period, had been 
submerged. T h u s the capacity of the inheritance élites to build a nation 
out of a state was often inhibited or complicated by cultural sub-
nationalism. In their reaction, the leaders opted for an immediate process 
of consolidation of state power before embarking on the arduous process 
of nation-building. In some cases ethnic and racial differences were 
reinforced by class distinctions - as the cases of Burundi and R w a n d a 
illustrate in the relation between the ruling Tutsi and the ruled Hutu . 
T o summarize then, post-colonial Africa showed relative continuity of 
political structures inherited from colonial regimes. There have been very 
few attempts at changing political institutions fundamentally, for purposes 
of nation-building. However, Western parliamentary institutions gradually 
failed as political parties and legislatures declined in their importance and 
as elective processes decayed. Authoritarian executives emerged and 
compounded problems of political succession. But what led to the spate 
of military interventions in African politics and h o w did the military react 
to existing political structures in the context of nation-building? 
T h e pendulum of civil-military relations 
Since the Egyptian army overthrew King Farouk in 1952, military coups 
have spread across Africa - from the Sudanese coup of 1958, in Zaire 
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(1965), D a h o m e y or Benin Republic (December 1965), Central African 
Republic (January 1966), Nigeria (January 1966) and G h a n a (February 
1966) to the piecemeal supplanting of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia 
in 1974 and the overthrow of Moktar Ould Daddah in 1978. M o r e 
recently, there have been coups in G h a n a (December 1981), Nigeria 
(December 1983) and Mauritania (1984). B y the mid-1980s, Africa had 
had more than 70 military coups (Table 15.1). 
W h y have there been military coups in Africa? W h a t are the causes of 
constant extensions of the boundaries of the barracks into the political 
arena? It is possible to identify at least four broad reasons for military 
implosions into the African political arena.38 First are causes which are 
basically ecological or societal (that is, from the socio-political and economic 
environment). A m o n g such reasons are cleavages in the socio-political 
structure (ethnicity, class, and so on), leadership controversy, political 
ineptitude of leaders, economic malaise and 'praetorian' traits in the 
society. T h e second broad cause of military intervention in politics has 
its roots in intra-military or socio-militaty sources (tfiat is, those factors 
within the military which encourage the military to attempt coups and/or 
those factors within the society which gate-crash through the boundaries 
of the barracks). These include the level of professionalism of the military, 
civilian intervention in decidedly military matters, political use of a 
supposedly apolitical army, tensions in barracks, rival military or para-
military units used by the political leader, defeat in war and generational 
cleavage. 
T h e third source of military coups in Africa is extra-societal or inter-
national (factors within the international environment which give m o m e n -
tum to coups within the nation-state). A m o n g these are cross-national 
contagious effects of coups from one country to another, training sources 
of the officer corps, externally instigated subversion and more direct 
external intervention (especially w h e n an ex-colonial master intervenes 
with its o w n troops). 
Finally, w e m a y look at other causes of coups which m a y be classified 
under miscellaneous. These include personality conflicts between the 
military chief and the supreme political leader, problems of development 
overwhelming the capability of leaders, institutional transfer and inchoate 
socialization processes of the military in the value of civilian supremacy. 
After intervention, the military find themselves laden with the same 
problems that the civilian regimes had experienced. T h e problems of 
state- and nation-building, as well as economic development, stare them 
in the face. Africa's experience shows that, depending on the country and 
the socio-political context, the military play guardianship, reformist or 
radical roles.39 
38. See J. I. Elaigwu, 1981, pp. 17-38. 
39. C . E . Welch Jr and A . K . Smith, 1974, pp. 55-70. 
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TABLE 
Country 
Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
15.i Government changes in 
Colonial 
name 
Algeria 
Angola 
Dahomey 
Date of Capital 
inde- city 
pendence 
1962 
1975 
i960 
Algiers 
Luanda 
Porto-Novo 
(officially) 
Cotonou 
(in practice) 
Africa, IQ02-Ç2 
Leaders since independence 
A h m e d Ben Bella, 1962-5 
Col. Houari Boumedienne, 1965-78 
Chadli Bendjedid, 1978-92 
M o h a m e d Boudiaf, 1992 
'Ali Kai, 1992-
D r Agostinho Neto, 1975-9 
José Eduardo dos Santos, 1979-
Hubert M a g a , 1960-3 
G e n . Christophe Soglo, 1963-4 
Sourou-Migan Apithy (Pres.), Justin 
Ahomadegbe (Vice Pres.), 1964-5 
Coups 
196S 
1963 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
(since 1984) 
Bechuanaland 1966 Gaborone 
Upper Volta i960 
Tahirou Congacou, 1965 
G e n . Soglo, 1965^7 
Lt. Col. Alphonse Alley (Pres.), 1967-8 
D r Emile Zinsou, 1968-9 
M a j . Kouandete, 1969 
Hubert M a g a , 1970 
Sourou-Migan Apithy, 1971 
Justin Ahomadegbe, 1972 
M a j . (later Lt . -Gen.) Matthieu 
Kerekou, 1972-91 
Nicéphore Soglo, 1991-
Sir Seretse K h a m a , 1966-80 
D r Quett Masire, 1980-
1965 
1965 
1967 
1969 
1972 
Ouagadougou Maurice Yameogo, 1960-6 
Lt.-Col. (later Gen.) Sangoule 
Lamizana, 1966-80 
Col. Saye Zerbo, 1980-2 
Maj. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, 1982-3 
Capt. Thomas Sankara, 1983-7 
Capt. Blaise Compaoré, 1987-
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Part of 
Rwanda-
Urundi 
French 
Cameroon 
and British 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Islands 
Ubangui-
Chari 
1962 Bujumbura 
i960 Yaounde 
M w a m i Mwambutsa IV, 1962—5 
Col. Michel Micombero, 1966-76 
Lt.-Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, 1976-87 
Maj. Pierre Buyoya, 1987-
Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1960-^ 82 
Paul Biya, 1982-
1966 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1987 
1966 
1976 
1987 
I97S Praia 
i960 Bangui 
Aristides Pereira, 1975-91 
Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, 1991-
David Dacko, 1960-6 
Lt.-Col. (later Emperor) Jean-Bedel 1966 
Bokassa, 1966-79 
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Country 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Colonial 
name 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Côte d'Ivoire 
French 
Somaliland 
then Afars 
and Issas 
Date of Capital 
inde-
pendence 
i960 
I97S 
i960 
i960 
1977 
city 
N ' D j a m e n a 
Moroni 
Brazzaville 
Abidjan 
Djibouti 
Leaders since independence 
David Dacko, 1979-81 
G e n . André Kolingba, 1981-
François Ngarta Tombalbaye, 1960-75 
M a j . - G e n . Félix Malloum, 1975-9 
Goukouni Oueddei, 1979-82 
Hissène Habré, 1982-90 
Idriss Deby, 1990-
A h m e d Abdallah, 1975 
Ali Soilih, 1975-8 
A h m e d Abdallah and M o h a m e d A h m e d 
(co-Presidents), 1978-89 
Said M o h a m e d Djohar, 1989-
Abbé Fulbert Youlou, 1960-3 
Alphonse Massemba-Debat, 1963-8 
Capt. (later Maj.) Marien Ngouabi, 
1968-77 
Col. Joachim Yhombi-Opango, 1977-9 
Col. (later Gen. ) Denis Sassou-Nguesso, 
1979-91 
G e n . Denis Sassou-Nguesso (Pres.), 
1991-2 
P M : André Milongo, 1991-2 
Pascal Lissouba (Pres.), 1992-
Félix Houphouét-Boigny, 1960-
Hassan Gouled, 1977 
Hassan Gouled Aptidon, 1977-
Coups 
1979 
1981 
1975 
1979 
1982 
1990 
I97S 
1978 
1968 
Egypt Egypt 1922 Cairo King Farouk, 1937-52 
G e n . M u h a m m a d Naguib, 1952-4 
Lt.-Col. Gamäl 'Abd al-Nasser, 1954-
70 
M u h a m m a d Anwar al-Sadat, 1970-81 
Hosni Mubarak, 1981-
Equatorial Fernando Poo 1968 Malabo Francisco Macias N g u e m a , 1968-79 
Guinea and Rio Muni Lt.-Col. (later Brig.-Gen.) Teodoro 
Obiang N g u e m a Mbasogo, 1979-
I9S2 
Ethiopia Ethiopia 
Gabon Gabon 
ist Addis-Ababa Emperor Haile Selassie, 1932-74 
century G e n . A m a n Andorn, 1974 
of the G e n . Teferi Bante, 1974-7 
Christian Lt.-Col. Mengitsu Haile Mariam, 
era 1977-91 
Ato Mêles Zenawi, 1991-
1960 Libreville Leon M ' B a , 1960-7 
1979 
•974 
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Country 
T h e Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Colonial 
name 
Gambia 
Gold Coast 
French 
Guinea 
Portuguese 
Guinea 
Kenya 
Basutoland 
Italian 
provinces of 
Cyrenaica, 
Tripolitania 
and Fezzan 
Date of Capital 
inde- city 
pendence 
196S 
1957 
1958 
1973 
1963 
1966 
1847 
1951 
Banjul 
Accra 
Conakry 
Bissau 
Nairobi 
Maseru 
Monrovia 
Tripoli 
Leaders since independence 
Albert-Bernard (later Omar) Bongo, 
1967-
Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, 1965-
K w a m e Nkrumah, 1957-66 
Lt.-Gen. J. A . Ankrah, 1966-9 
Brig.-Gen. A . A . Afrifa, 1969 
D r Kofi Busia, 1969-^ 72 
Col. (later Gen.) I. K . Acheampong, 
1972-8 
Lt.-Gen. Frederick Akuffo, 1978-9 
Flight-Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings, 1979 
D r H ü h Limann, 1979-81 
Flight-Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings, 1981-
A h m e d Sékou Touré, 1958-84 
Gen . Lansana Conté, 1984-
Luis de Almeida Cabrai, 1973-80 
M a j . Joäo Bernardo Nino Vieira, 1980-
Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-^8 
Daniel T . Arap Moi , 1978-
Coups 
1966 
1972 
1978 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1980 
Chief Leabua Jonathan, 1966 
King Moshoeshoe II, 1966-90 dethroned 
King Letsie HI, 1990-
William V . S. Tubman, 1944-71 
William R . Tolbert Jnr, 1971-80 
Master-Sgt. (later Gen.) Samuel K . 
Doe , 1980-90 
Prof. A m o s Sawyer, 199c— 
Kingldrls, 1951-69 
Col. M u a m m a r Kadhaffi, 1969-
1980 
1969 
Madagascar Madagascar 1960 Tananarive 
Malawi Nyasaland 1964 Lilongwe 
Mali French i960 Bamako 
Soudan 
Philibert Tsirinana, 1960-^ 72 
Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa, 1972-5 1972 
Col. Richard Ratsimandrava, 1975 
Lt.-Cdr. (later Admiral) Didier 
Ratsiraka, 1975-
D r Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 1964-
Modibo Keita, 1960-8 
Lt. (later Gen.) Moussa Traoré, 1968 
1968-91 
Lt.-Col. Amadou Toumani Touré, 1991 
1991-2 
Alpha Oumar Konare 1992-
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Country 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Réunion 
R w a n d a 
Colonial 
name 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
South-West 
Africa 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Réunion 
Part of 
Ruanda-
Urundi 
Date of Capital 
inde-
pendence 
i960 
1968 
1956 
•975 
1990 
i960 
i960 
French 
city 
Nouakchott 
Port-Louis 
Rabat 
Maputo 
Windhoek 
Niamey 
Lagos (from 
1991 Abuja) 
St Denis 
Overseas 
Dep . 
1962 Kigali 
Leaders since independence 
Moktar Ould Daddah, 1960-78 
Lt.-Col. Mustapha Ould M o h a m e d 
Salek, 1978-9 
Lt.-Col. A h m e d Ould Bouceif, 1979 
Lt.-Col. M o h a m e d Khouna Ould 
Haidalla, 1979-84 
Col. Maaouya Ould Sid ' A h m e d Taya, 
1984-
P M s : Sir Seewosagur Ramgoolam, 
1968-82 
Aneerood Jugnauth, 1982-92 
Cassam Uteem (Pres.), 1992-
P M : Aneerood Jugnauth, 1992-
King M o h a m e d V , 1956-61 
King Hassan II, 1961-
Samora Machel, 1975-86 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano, 1986-
dejure: T h e U N Council for Namibia 
defacto: South Africa 
S a m Nujoma, 1990-
Hamani Diori, 1960-74 
Lt.-Col. Seyni Kountche, 1974-87 
Brig. Ali Saibou, 1987-
D r Nnamdi Azikiwe (Pres.) and Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa ( P M ) , 
1960-6 
Gen. J. T . A . Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966 
Lt.-Col. (later Gen.) Yakubu G o w o n , 
1966-75 
Gen. Murtala M u h a m m e d , 1975-6 
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, 1976-9 
Shehu Shagari, 1979-83 
Maj. -Gen. M . Buhari, 1983-5 
Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, 1985-
President of France 
Grégoire Kayibanda, 1962—73 
Maj . -Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana, 
1973-
Coups 
1978 
1984 
1974 
1966 
1966 
1975 
1983 
1985 
1973 
Sao T o m e Sao T o m e 1975 Sao T o m e 
and Principe and Principe 
Senegal Senegal i960 Dakar 
Manuel Pinto da Costa, 1975-91 
P M : Miguel Trovoada, 1975-8 
Miguel Trovoada, 1991-
Léopold Sédar Senghor, 1960-80 
Abdou Diouf, 1981-
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Country Colonial Date of Capital 
inde- city 
pendence 
Leaders since independence Coups 
Seychelles Seychelles 1976 Victoria 
Islands 
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 1961 Freetown 
Somali Italian 
Democratic Somaliland 
Republic and British 
Somaliland 
i960 Mogadishu 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Union of 
South Africa 
(1910-61) 
Anglo-
Egyptian 
Sudan 
1910 
1956 
Pretoria 
(administra-
tive) and 
Cape T o w n 
(legislative) 
Khartoum 
Swaziland Swaziland 1968 Mbabane 
James Mancham, 1976-7 
France-Albert René, 1977-
Sir Milton Margai, 1961-4 
Sir Albert Margai, 1964—7 
Siaka Stevens, 1967 
Brig.-Gen. David Lansana, 1967-8 
Brig.-Gen. Andrew Juxon-Smith, 1968-
Siaka Stevens, 1968-85 
Gen. Joseph Saidu M o m o h , 1985-92 
Capt. Valentine Strasser, 1992-
Aden Abdulle Osman (Pres.), 1960-7 
P M s : Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke, 
1960-4 
Abdi Razaq Hussen, 1964-7 
Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke (Pres.), 
1967-9 
P M : M o h a m e d Haji Ibrahim Igal, 
1967-9 
Maj.-Gen. M o h a m e d Siad Barre, 
1969-90 
Ali Mahdi M o h a m e d , 1990-
Jan Smuts, 1939-48 
D . F. Malan, 1948-54 
J. G . Strijdom, 1954-8 
D r Hendrik Verwoerd, 1958-66 
B.J.Vorster, 1966-78 
P. W . Botha, 1978-89 
F . W . de Klerk, 1989-
Ismail el-Azhari, 1956 
Abdallah Khalil, 1956-« 
Gen. Ibrahim Aboud, 1958-64 
Sayed Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifa, 1964-5 
M o h a m e d A h m e d Mahgoub, 1965-9 
Col. (later Gen.) Gaffer M o h a m e d 
Nimeiri, 1969-85 
Gen. Abdulrahman Swareldarhab, 
1985-6 
A h m e d Ali Al-Marghani 1986-9 
Lt.-Gen. O m e r Hassan A h m e d el-
Bashir, 1989-
King Sobhuza II, 1921-82 
Queen Mother Indlovukazi Dzeliwe, 
1982 
Queen Regent Indlovukazi Ntombi, 
1983-6 
King Mswati III, 1986-
1977 
1967 
1992 
1969 
1958 
1964 
1969 
1989 
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Country 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Colonial 
name 
Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar 
Togo 
Date of 
inde-
pendence 
1961 
1963 
i960 
Capital 
city 
Dar es Salaam 
(being 
transferred to 
Dodoma) 
Lomé 
Leaders since independence 
Julius K . Nyerere, 1961-85; 
Ali Hassan M w i n y i , 1985-
Sylvanus Olympio, 1960-3 
Nicolas Grunitzky, 1963-7 
Lt.-Col . (later G e n . ) Etienne 
Coups 
1963 
1967 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
1956 Tunis 
1962 Kampala 
Gnassingbe Eyadema, 1967-91 
Gen. Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema 
(Pres.), 1991-
P M : Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, 1991-
Habib Bourguiba, 1956-87 
Zine El-Abidine Ben A H , 1987-
Milton Obote, 1962 
King Mutesa II, 1963-6 
P M : Milton Obote, 1963-6 
Milton Obote (Pres.), 1966-^ 71 
Gen. (later Field Marshal) Idi Amin 
Dada, 1971-9 
Yusufu Lule, 1979 
Godfrey Binaisa, 1979-80 
Paulo Muwanga, 1980 
Milton Obote, 1980-5 
Tito Okello, 1985-6 
Lt.-Gen. Yoweri K . Museveni, 1986-
1966 
1971 
1980 
198S 
1986 
Western 
Sahara 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Spanish 
Sahara 
Belgian 
Congo 
Northern 
Rhodesia 
Southern 
Rhodesia 
(i97S) 
i960 
1964 
1980 
El Aaiun 
Kinshasa 
Lusaka 
Harare 
In dispute between the Polisario and 
Morocco 
Joseph Kasavubu (Pres.), 1960-5 
P M s : Patrice L u m u m b a , i960 
Joseph Deo, 1960-1 i960 
Cyrille Adoula, 1961-4 
Moïse Tshombe, 1964-5 
Evariste Kimba, 1965 
G e n . (later Field-Marsh.) Mobutu Sese 1965 
Seko,1965-92 
Field-Marsh. Mobutu Sese Seko (Pres.), 
1992-
P M : Etienne Tshisekedi, 1992-
Kenneth D . Kaunda, 1964-91 
Frederick J. Chiluba, 1991-
President Rev. Canaan Banana, 1980-7 
Robert G . Mugabe , 1987-
Source: A . A . Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984; and updated by U N E S C O , 1992. 
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T h e guardian role is w h e n the military regime's major preoccupation 
is the maintenance of law and order rather than introducing social changes. 
Very often this emanates from the general political climate that the 
military inherited. There is a high reliance on coercion. T h e reformist 
regime is concerned mainly with 'creating national identity and promoting 
orderly economic development'.40 T h e radical regime often acts as 'the 
linkage of interest between military officers w h o are essentially of the 
middle and lower classes, and the masses, w h o previously had been 
unintegrated into the national political life'.4' Often a regime can also 
m o v e from radical, through reformist, to guardianship role in time - or 
take a reverse direction of change. 
W e suggest that the M o b u t u regime in Zaire has been essentially 
guardian in its role, even though it has taken some actions in a reformist 
direction. T h e military regimes in Ghana , Republic of Benin, Mauritania, 
Burundi and R w a n d a are examples of these regimes for which political 
stability is the key objective. Coercion contains sub-nationalism. Often 
these regimes consolidate the state they inherited rather than reform it. 
Nation-building is not necessarily part of their package of action. 
Reformist regimes in Africa include Nigerian military regimes which not 
only built a federal state with a strong centre but undertook institutional 
engineering in the creation of 12 and 19 states. T h e y also carried out a 
number of laudable economic programmes at the height of the oil b o o m 
and embarked on indigenization of the economy. Their local government 
reforms during 1968^76 basically eroded the political powers of traditional 
leaders. T h e civil war and its lessons seem to have put Nigeria at the 
inchoate stage of nation-building - the ethnic, geo-ethnic and religious 
differences still simmer on the surface. M o b u t u m a y be credited with 
pulling Zaire out of its chaos. H e has survived the various Shaba attempts, 
but one must concede to him that he has engaged in state-building in Zaire. 
This has stretched out to the point of carrying out institutionalization of 
political processes to the level of personalization of these processes. In 
his attempts at nation-building, he has used L u m u m b a ' s n a m e and 
embarked on a crusade of authenticity. 
S o m e military regimes gave a verisimilitude of radicalism on coming 
to power. These often tapered off to reformist and guardianship roles. 
T h u s the Egyptian and Algerian military, on coming to power, embarked 
on land reforms and espoused Arab socialism. In Ethiopia the military 
regime, as in Egypt, took over from an aristocratic class and m a d e attempts 
at land reform. It even launched the 'Zematcha' programme and sent 
students, professionals and others to the rural areas to assist in its socialist 
programmes. In both areas, the radicalism hardly lasted. Egypt and 
Ethiopia have both formed parties to enable them to mobilize the 
40. ibid., p. 63. 
41. ibid., p. 65. 
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population. But it is clear that the Ethiopian regime is fast moving towards 
a guardianship role. While the Idi A m i n regime was hardly reformist, it 
took an action which could, in a way, be regarded as revolutionary - that 
is, the 'de-Indianization' of the Ugandan economy. But he hardly created 
any tangible economic structures to indigenize the economy. 
Generally military regimes have been more effective in state-building 
than in nation-building in Africa. T h e y are better at asserting authority 
than consolidating identity. T h e military leaders often suffer from the 
same problems of ethnicity, class, race and religion as their civilian 
predecessors. A few military leaders have tried to assume the national-
hero position as symbols of nation-building - G o w o n and Muríala in 
Nigeria, al-Nasser in Egypt, Kadhaffi in Libya and Mobutu's attempts 
in Zaire. While in some African countries the records of the military are 
no better than those of the civilian leaders, in others, their records have 
been better, and generalizations can be deceptive. But neither the military 
nor the civilian regimes have been able adequately to mobilize the people 
for nation-building except for a few states where the leaders have used 
ideology and single-party structures for nation-building purposes. 
T h u s , in Africa, parliamentary institutions and political parties have 
constantly been dismantled by the military. T h e state bureaucracy has 
been the most persistent institution in the fragile authority base of Africa's 
leaders. They have provided institutional continuity from colonial, through 
inheritance élite regimes, military regimes, and back to civilian regimes 
after military withdrawal from the political arena (where this happens). 
Generally, the boundaries between the barracks and the political arena 
are often so thin that the alternation of government between the military 
and civilian élites is likely to continue for a while. 
H u m a n rights and the ancestors 
Caught up in all these conflicts in post-colonial Africa have been h u m a n 
rights. But here w e must distinguish between fundamental h u m a n rights 
and instrumental h u m a n rights. Government by consent, for example, is 
a fundamental h u m a n right - an end. But the right to vote is an 
instrumental right — the means for achieving government by consent. 
There is considerable consensus in post-colonial Africa about funda-
mental h u m a n rights. Most African societies were traditionally based on 
some doctrine of 'government by consent'. But whose consent? S o m e 
societies believed in the consent not only of the living, but also of the 
dead, and of those yet to be born. U n d e r traditional conditions the elders 
were supposed to be well-informed about the ancestors and to have 
acquired their wisdom through cultural continuity, custom and tradition. 
Policies which were in gross violation of custom and tradition were 
supposed to be devoid of the consent of the dead. Policies which did not 
m a k e allowances for the survival and happiness of children were supposed 
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to be bereft of the consent of future generations. It was the duty of the 
living to estimate the wishes of the dead and of those yet to be born — 
and to act accordingly. 'Government by consent' was not a voting day 
once every four, five, or six years. It was a constant receptivity to 
generations of both the past and the future. It was partly in this light 
that Julius Nyerere reminded us of 'elders sitting under the tree, talking 
until they agreed'. It was a doctrine similar to the Islamic idea that the 
U m m a , the C o m m u n i t y of Islam, would never agree on error. Absolute 
consensus was a link between the present and both the past and the 
future. Consensus was a guide to the true general will, to the truth: 
W e have no more need of being taught democracy than w e have of 
being taught socialism. . . . Both are rooted in our past, in the 
traditional society which produced us.42 
But in reality the imperial Western world had introduced Africa to a 
n e w concept of democracy, a n e w principle of 'government by consent'. 
A general election became the instrumental right for achieving government 
by consent. It was no longer enough for 'elders to sit under a tree and 
talk until they agreed'. 
Elections under the Western model had to be competitive. T h e shift 
from a culture of consensus to a culture of competition in post-colonial 
Africa has proved to be devastating for h u m a n rights. Most African 
societies have shown that they need time to learn the secret of preventing 
high-stake political competition from becoming high-stake political con-
flict. T h e result has been rigged elections, harassment of opposition 
parties, suppression of dissidents, and persecution of dissenting opinions 
in the media and elsewhere. H u m a n rights suffered in Africa w h e n 
fundamental h u m a n rights were re-defined to exclude the rights of 
tradition (ancestors) and the rights of posterity (children of tomorrow). 
H u m a n rights also suffered when instrumental rights were excessively 
based on neo-Western principles of 'winner takes all' in periodic general 
elections. F r o m the point of view of h u m a n rights, it was unfortunate 
that the basic debate in Africa shifted from a dilemma between tra-
ditionalists and Westernized élites to a dilemma between Westernized 
civilians and soldiers equipped with Western weapons. T h e later con-
frontation has been more damaging to h u m a n rights. T h e worst violations 
in the 1970s occurred in places like Uganda under Idi A m i n , the Central 
African Empire under Jean Bedel Bokassa, and Equatorial Guinea under 
Francisco Macias N g u e m a . 
Rights and duties - if they are to be respected - need to be rooted in 
tradition and continuity. If nation-building suffers from inadequate cul-
tural coherence in national identities in Africa, so do h u m a n rights. T h e 
cultural interruptions in post-colonial Africa are not merely between one 
42. J. Nyerere, 1962. 
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ethnic group and another (as in Nigeria), not just between one race and 
another (as in South Africa), not just between one generation and another 
(as in Ethiopia), but at least as fundamental is the break between today 
and yesterday everywhere in Africa. All these cultural interruptions are 
part of the background to repression, suppression and torture in post-
colonial Africa. Apartheid in South Africa is only one elaborate case of 
denial of h u m a n rights. There are other kinds of violations in black Africa 
itself. 
W h a t is the way out? O n e solution is a pan-African system of monitoring 
and enforcing performance in h u m a n rights, continent-wide. W e need an 
African equivalent not only of Amnesty International but of the European 
Commission for H u m a n Rights. W e need an institution manned by 
Africans to inform Africans about their o w n moral performance in the 
public domain. But in due course Africa also needs a pan-African system 
within which aggrieved citizens are able to accuse their o w n governments 
of violations of h u m a n rights. T h e Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity and the Banjul Declaration on H u m a n Rights and People's Rights43 
(the charter was adopted in June 1981 and came into force on 21 October 
1986, when it was ratified by a clear majority44) was an important step 
towards Africa's monitoring and enforcement of h u m a n rights in the 
decades to come. T o that extent it must also be seen as part of both 
nation-building and state-formation in post-colonial Africa. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter w e have argued that state- and nation-building experiences 
are not new to Africa. Pre-colonial states and empires have had to cope 
with these challenges. However, most of the current states do not 
correspond with these pre-colonial nations. In m a n y cases, strange bed-
fellows have found themselves in a state in the throes of the European 
scramble for colonies in Africa. T h e colonial authorities created certain 
institutions in these territories which later attained independence and 
thus became sovereign states. Nation-building, therefore, has meant 
attempts at the horizontal integration of these 'strange' bedfellows in the 
n e w state in order to create a 'nation', a political community to which 
the people n o w owe their allegiance, loyalty and commitment. 
W e noted, however, that there were problems of institutional change 
for the inheritance élites. Colonial structures and even pre-colonial political 
structures (such as chieftaincy) persisted and at times m a d e the process 
of state-building difficult. In addition, because of the vested interests of 
43. For an interesting discussion of the charter, see E . Kannyo, 1984, pp. 128-76. 
44. Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events, 1986, vol. 32, no. 11, 
P- 34729-
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the post-colonial élites in the consolidation of the inherited power centre, 
the leaders could not embark on institutional or structural changes. 
Except in few areas, inherited colonial structures even decayed. T h u s , 
except in a few states - such as Tanzania, Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-
Bissau - which used ideology and single-party structures to mobilize the 
populace towards nation-building, political parties declined in their pol-
itical saliency. Even in countries where single parties have been useful in 
state-building - such as Zambia, Malawi, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire -
they more or less became bureaucratic instruments of penetration and 
control (that is, of state-building) rather than instruments of nation-
building. 
Generally, with the decline of political parties (and political acrimony 
was worse in multi-party states), so also competitive electoral processes 
and parliamentary institutions declined. Military intervention in some 
states put the death knell on some of these structures. T h e most perennial 
of these structures has been the state bureaucracy which has survived 
regimes of all kinds. 
In spite of the few structural changes m a d e in African states in order 
to mobilize people for nation-building, the efforts have been tedious and 
have often been punctuated by setbacks or failures. W e identified a 
number of factors which contribute to the failure of nation-building in 
Africa. A m o n g these is the legacy of colonial administration. A H Mazrui 
and Michael Tidy were perhaps correct to assert that in the context of 
nation-building in the current state, French I assimilation was more posi-
tively functional than the British 'dual mandate'.45 T h e assimilation policy, 
the centralized technique of administration, ¡imposed relative uniformity 
of French cultural and political values in these states. Francophone states 
m a y suffer more from dependency on ex-colbnial masters, but the nature 
of their colonization provided a basis for less; complicated efforts towards 
cultural homogeneity than in Anglophone states. 
Anglophone states experienced British racial arrogance and its attendant 
cultural and administrative autonomy. These have created a basis for 
more sovereign states. But in creating sovereign states, indirect rule 
preserved traditional institutions and structures which crystallized pri-
mordial identities, thus making nation-building a more difficult task in 
Anglophone than in Francophone states. Lest w e be misunderstood, 
nation-building in both Francophone and Anglophone Africa (and in any 
state) is a difficult political enterprise in any case. 
T h e prevalence or survival of pre-colonial primordial identities -
ethnicity, religion and race - all in a modern competitive setting, m a k e 
nation-building more difficult. While Islam is a unifying element in 
Senegal, Guinea and Mali, both Islam and Christianity have divisive 
45. A. A. Mazrui and M . Tidy, 1984, p. 373. 
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consequences in Nigeria. T h e problem with sub-cultural nationalism 
based on primordial identity is that 
rightly or wrongly, each dismissal from a cabinet, each military 
coup, tends to get interpreted in these terms; even where ethnic 
identification has played little part, the actors often feel such forces 
are the real key to the interpretation of events.46 
If pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions have survived all regimes, 
especially in Anglophone states, if these institutions have been obstacles 
to state-building, they have been real obstacles also to the process of 
nation-building, as Nigerian and U g a n d a n experiences have illustrated. 
T h e y have served as focal points for the regimentation of parochial 
nationalism. 
Only recently have some African states started reorganizing their 
educational systems. Yet, education (and its embedded socialization 
function) is crucial to nation-building. Related to it is the role of ideology 
and political education. Only a few African states have used ideology for 
nation-building purposes. Ideologies are useful instruments for dis-
sociating a state from colonial institutional structures and m o r e African 
states m a y take note of this. If nothing else ideology, well sold to the 
masses, prepares people for action and transcends parochial loyalties. 
Finally, let us conclude this chapter by suggesting that most African 
leaders have been more concerned with changing political structures for 
the consolidation of their power base than for nation-building. Since both 
state- and nation-building processes for African states are simultaneous, 
unless more efforts are m a d e to change and adopt those political structures 
which would enhance nation-building processes, even state-building pro-
cesses in some states would remain fragile. T h e quests for greater 
coherence in nationhood and m o r e stable authority in statehood continue 
to be the paramount political imperatives of post-colonial Africa. 
46. J. Goody, 1973, p. 353. 
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Introduction 
T w o familiar dialectics have conditioned political values in Africa during 
the period since 1935 - the dialectic between collectivism and indi-
vidualism, on one side, and the dialectic between pluralism and national-
ism, on the other. Older traditions of collectivism have sometimes clashed 
with newer forms of individualism; principles of pluralism have interacted 
with the values of nationalism. 
A s w e shall elaborate later, thinkers like Julius K . Nyerere of Tanzania 
and T o m M b o y a of Kenya identified traditional collectivism as a potential 
foundation for modern forms of socialism. M b o y a put it as follows: 
Socialism . . . is a continuing tradition among our people. . . . It is 
an attitude towards people practised in our societies and did not 
need to be codified into a scientific theory in order to find existence.1 
Sékou Touré used traditional collectivism to deny almost all forms of 
individualism in post-colonial Guinea. 
Africa is fundamentally communocractic. T h e collective life and 
social solidarity give it a basis of humanism which m a n y peoples 
will envy. These h u m a n qualities also m e a n that an individual cannot 
imagine organising his life outside that of his family, village or clan. 
. . . Intellectuals or artists, thinkers or researchers, their ability is 
valid only if it coincides with the life of the people, it is integrated 
into the activity, thinking and hopes of the populace.2 
Sékou Touré used traditional collectivism against both individualism 
and pluralism. T h e collectivist ideas also became part of the rationalization 
of the one-party state in Guinea and elsewhere in post-colonial Africa. 
W e have shown elsewhere h o w , in his Philosophy of the Revolution, 
Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser married nationalism to Egypt's three overlapping 
circles - the Arab, Musl im and African circles, within each of which 
1. T . Mboya, 1963a. 
2. Qted in C . Wauthier, 1966, pp. 173-4. 
1 
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Egypt was a crucial actor. AI-Nasser's ideology was collectivist and 
nationalist, but fundamentally anti-pluralist and distrustful of indi-
vidualism. 
W h a t were the phases in the history of ideology in Africa in this era 
since 1935? Is it possible to sub-periodize this era into distinct ideological 
phases? 
T h e heyday of compatibility between nationalism and pluralism in most 
of English-speaking and French-speaking Africa were approximately the 
last years of colonial rule (1945-60). Those were the years w h e n African 
nationalism - partly as a strategy of fighting colonialism - expressed itself 
in such liberal slogans as ' O n e m a n , one vote', multi-party democracy, 
the free press and opposition to detention without trial. Far from 
nationalism and pluralism being in conflict, they were in strategic and 
tactical alliance. Leaders like Kenneth Kaunda , Hastings Banda, Habib 
Bourguiba and Leopold Senghor were at once great nationalists and great 
liberal democrats in the concluding years of colonial rule. In the fight 
against British and French imperialism, it m a d e good sense in any case 
to invoke Western liberal values against the West itself. Such slogans did 
not work against Portuguese colonialism. 
After independence, m a n y African countries witnessed the decline of 
both nationalism and liberal democracy (1965-85). Collectivism was 
invoked by one-party ideologues and by socialists - and pluralism and 
individualism were in decline. Indeed, even nationalism was in decline in 
the 1960s and 1970s almost everywhere but in Southern Africa. T h e 
heavy hand of authoritarianism and pseudo-collectivism stifled m u c h of 
Africa well into die 1980s. Senegal, the Gambia , Mauritius and Botswana 
were a m o n g the very few exceptions. W e shall return to such exceptions 
later. 
T h e n came the liberal revival of the late IQ8OS and early içços from 
Algeria to Mozambique — with renewed popular demands for multi-party 
democracy and agitation for greater privatization of the economy. Both 
military regimes and one-party states found themselves on the defensive. 
Pluralism was in the air - and African public opinion was becoming truly 
activist. This chapter will address these themes more fully. Is the 
collectivist ethos under challenge? Is a liberal revival under way in Africa? 
In addition to the twin-dialectic of collectivism versus individualism 
and pluralism versus nationalism, political values in Africa have been 
conditioned by what K w a m e N k r u m a h called iConsciencisrrC — the interplay 
between indigenous tradition, Islam and Euro-Christian culture. Does 
liberal democracy in Nigeria favour Muslims? Does Islam in Algeria 
favour liberal democracy? In the first two republics of Nigeria, Muslims 
captured the leadership (First Republic under Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
and Second Republic under al-Haji Shehu Shagari). In Algeria more 
recently, on the other hand, the fear of the Islamic opposition forced the 
F L N regime to seek allies a m o n g non-Islamic opponents — and speeded 
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up democratization. In Nigeria's first two republics pluralism favoured 
Islam; in Algeria more recently Islam has favoured pluralism, in effect if 
not by intent. 
Let us look more closely at some of these sub-themes of political values 
and nationhood in Africa's experience. 
Nation-building and political values 
T h e increasing success of the demand of liberalism all over the world in 
1989-90, and especially in Africa, brings into sharp perspective the 
problem of the political values that underlie the action engaged in by 
African leaders over the past few decades. Virtually every country of the 
continent has agreed to implement structural-adjustment programmes 
'proposed' by international financial institutions. W a s there a liberal revival 
in Africa in the concluding years of the twentieth century? In addition, 
there has been the spectacular renunciation of the values and institutions 
of Marxism-Leninism by other countries (Benin, M o z a m b i q u e , Ethiopia, 
and so on), which shows that those values had not really taken root in 
the political class and even less in civil society. O n c e again, African 
countries seem to be faced with the choice between several value systems, 
or rather, as at the beginning of colonization, they are being obliged to 
m a k e their policies in a context of implicit values which are not always 
frankly articulated. Colonialism dismantled the vast majority of African 
political institutions and with them the related values. But some indigenous 
values outlived the institutions, while structures spared by the colonizer 
or preserved by the colonized continued to generate autochthonous values. 
T h e anti-colonial struggle, particularly before and after the Second World 
W a r , was also a debate and a struggle between political values. W h a t was 
at stake was the resumption of control over the ends and motivations of 
political action. 
That is w h y the winning of independence in the 1960s was, in the area 
of political values, the critical m o m e n t of more or less relevant choices, 
lack of choice or deferred choices, the results of which are unfolding as 
the century draws to an end. 
A s countries became independent, the issue was the building of states 
and national communities, building economies able to satisfy the needs 
of the people and weaving a network of inter-African and international 
relations that would help to realize the global political options, while at the 
same time transforming the values that underlie international transactions. 
Formidable obstacles stood in the way of this project: national integration 
conflicted with certain ethnic or pseudo-ethnic interests, while African 
integration was thwarted by 'micro-national' ambitions. Furthermore, 
societal projects aiming to ensure the socio-economic progress of the 
majority of the population clashed with certain 'negative' values of pre-
colonial societies and the colonial system. 
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Faced with this w e b of vicious circles, African leaders initially either 
chose to manage the neo-colonial status quo or opted for the total 
transformation of African and international socio-political values. Never-
theless, by the end of the 1980s, w e find them almost all professing 
similar or analogous values, either because of the objective structures that 
impinge on them or because of changes in values occurring outside being 
reflected in African attitudes. All African countries are the h o m e of often 
similar pre-colonial and colonial political traditions. T h e y have a double 
heritage of political values. These values provide benchmarks for analysis 
and action, motivating ideas and ideals that systematically enlighten and 
orient individual and collective choices. 
But values are not transcendent entities frozen outside time. Political 
values produce history, but they are also produced, influenced and 
transformed by history. That is w h y the questions that arise here are the 
following: W h a t are the constant features and the changes in African 
political values since 1935? W h a t are the contradictory levers of the work 
of nation-building from the independence struggles to the final decade of 
the twentieth century? W h a t values underpin the events, institutions and 
ideologies marking that evolution? 
F r o m colonial rule to political pluralism in the 
independence struggles 
T h e colonial system was built on a semi-coherent body of political values. 
Lord Lugard expressed it well in his book The Dual Mandate in Tropical 
Africa? These two mandates, of civilization and of exploitation, are 
carriers of explicit and implicit values. For Lugard, the best political 
institution to reconcile them was indirect rule. O n the other hand, under 
colonizing countries with assimilationist aims such as France and Portugal, 
the imposition of colonialist political values was more flagrant.4 After the 
Second World W a r , African demands for self-government and inde-
pendence were stepped u p in all colonial territories, creating or promoting 
two sets of political values destined for a great future: the values of 
pluralism and the values of nationalism. 
T h e legacy of pluralism 
Even in the national liberation movements, pluralism was the basis, at least 
initially — for example, in Angola, Southern Rhodesia and M o z a m b i q u e . 
But it is above all in the cases oí peaceful evolution towards independence 
that the value of political pluralism was expressed most forcefully on the 
3. Lugard, Lord, 1922. 
4. See R. F. Betts, 1985, pp. 312-31. 
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basis of the liberalism professed in the métropole by the colonial powers, 
and resting on the principle of the freedom of the individual in every 
domain. Liberal ideology thus provided an arsenal of legal formulae and 
political methods to African leaders fighting against colonialism; it was 
on the basis of the very principles and values ideologically proclaimed by 
the colonizer that intellectuals in the colonies claimed equal rights and 
later independence for the colonies, often with the support of opposition 
groups in the métropole. 
In North Africa, except for Algeria which established presidentialism 
and the single party from independence in 1962, pluralism prevailed: as 
in Egypt with the 1923 constitution up to the time of the Free Officers' 
coup d'Etat in 1952. Similarly, the constitution which put an end to the 
French protectorate in Tunisia in 1955 was essentially liberal. Fur-
thermore, the Neo-Destür agenda was to reform social institutions in 
accordance with the Western liberal code: abolition of polygamy, civil 
law, and the granting of voting and eligibility rights to w o m e n . Morocco 
under M o h a m e d V (1956-61) was a compromise between the traditional 
monarchy and parliamentary institutions. But after proclaiming liberal 
values as norms for the rebuilding of society, the states of North Africa 
were to turn their backs on liberalism after periods of varying lengths. 
In Africa south of the Sahara dozens of parties and movements, legal 
and otherwise, proliferated in black Africa between 1945 and i960 on the 
basis of the values of Western pluralism, which was far and away the 
dominant model. This was true of both Anglophone and Francophone 
countries. In the Gold Coast, the political movement led by J. B . Danquah 
in 1947, the United Gold Coast Convention, had not been in existence 
for more than two years w h e n K w a m e N k r u m a h broke away from it to 
form the Convention People's Party (CPP) . In Nigeria, the constitutions 
granted in 1945 and 1948 permitted the burgeoning of a dynamic press 
inspired by youth associations, trades unions and parties centred on the 
country's main regions. In Sierra Leone and the Gambia, liberal pluralism 
set the 'Creoles' of the 'colony' against the majority indigenous peoples 
of the protectorates in the hinterlands. In the British Central African 
Federation, long and tortuous three-sided negotiations were conducted 
between the Africans, divided among several parties, the white settlers, 
themselves sometimes divided, and the government in London . 
In the Francophone territories, there was the same proliferation of 
political parties and movements between 1935 and i960, mainly after the 
end of the Second World W a r . Assimilation, here written into the political 
structures themselves, took African elected representatives into the par-
liamentary bodies of France, in Paris or Versailles, and still further steeped 
political leaders in the political values prevailing in the French system. 
Political apparentements or associations did not function on their o w n at 
the beginning. T h u s the Communist Study Groups (Groupes d'études 
communistes, G E C ) were extremely active in m a n y African cities. In 
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PLATE i 6. 1 Franz Fanon, French writer born in Martinique
Senegal, these French GECs devoted to training for the benefit of the
RDA were overtaken by African activists belonging to the French Socialist
Party (Parti socialiste français, SFIO).
In short, before independence, the political values advocated in African
countries constituted a cultural transfer under the cover of the notorious
'civilizing mission'. This transfer ignored endogenous democratic features,
thus seriously compromising the internal organic adjustment between
political society and civil society. Nevertheless, the transfer of Western
political ideals to Africa, especially when the values of Marxist socialism
were mixed up in them, was bound to accelerate the dynamic of nation-
building and first of all the struggle for African independence.
The political values of pluralism in Africa between 1945 and i960
enabled minority progressive parties, whether Marxist (like the Parti
africain de l'indépendance, PAI) or not (as in the case of the Mouvement
de libération nationale, MLN)5 to make their voices heard and play a
vanguard role in carrying along the moderate or conservative parties closer
to the colonial administration. Moreover, while the colonial powers
5. Libérons l'Afrique, MLN Manifesto, 1958.
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themselves doggedly defended the vast material interests they had invested 
in Africa, they were bound sooner or later, whether they liked it or not, 
to accept the demands of African nationalists or else repudiate their o w n 
domestic ideological values. 
T h e values of nationalism 
At the same time as the values of democratic pluralism were being 
conveyed by the liberal political institutions borrowed from Europe and 
in dialectical interaction with them, the values associated with nationalism 
were growing in Africa, particularly from armed resistance movements and 
struggles but also in areas where the colonial system evolved peacefully. It 
was above all in these violent i struggles that the values of African 
nationalism were most highly developed. In reality, these armed struggles 
were not explosions that simply i came out of nowhere; they were the 
historical continuation of the struggles and resistance movements that 
arose in Africa against invasion and rule by colonizers. 
T . O . Ranger has stressed the connections between the nationalist 
movements in sub-Saharan Africa and the many-sided resistance m o v e -
ments opposing foreign rule. T h e activists of Julius Nyerere's party saw 
themselves as the direct heirs of the Maji Maji movements which fought 
G e r m a n imperialism during 1904-6; and the leader of T A N U (Tanganyika 
African National Union) himself declared: 'Our n e w nation was built on 
the ashes of Maji Maji'.6 In Zimbabwe too, the nationalists invoked the 
m e m o r y of the anti-colonial revolt of 1896-7, and they restored to a place 
of honour the concept of Chimurenga (armed resistance) which was the 
expression of African patriotism at the time. In South Africa, even Nelson 
Mandela sought his inspiration in the story of 'the wars the ancestors 
fought to defend the homeland which are the glory and pride of the 
whole African nation'. In addition to the heritage of armed and political 
resistance movements, the legacy of religious-type cultural resistance was 
also used. In Kenya, the militants of K A N U (Kenya African National 
Union) drew on the ideological legacy of the Mumbi cult and Dini Ya 
Musambwa cult between the two world wars and in 1947. Through 
historical m e m o r y , the liberation struggle was thus linked to a mobilizing 
past in which the struggle found its legitimacy. | 
M o r e generally still, the need to assert by force the right of exploited 
people to resist the domination of the colonizers restored to a place of 
honour the 'value' of violence as a therapeutic agent of historical progress. 
T h e whole context pointed in that direction: the exaltation of militarism 
during the world wars, the exactions of the colonial forces engaged in so-
called 'pacification', the use of blacks recruited en masse for the wars of 
colonial reconquest in Indochina, Algeria, Madagascar and elsewhere. If 
6. T . O . Ranger, 1968a, p. 636. 
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w e add to that the uniform, the pensions and the standard of living of 
ex-soldiers, w e can see h o w the warrior m y t h was formidably stimulated 
in popular imagery. 
Furthermore, the anti-colonial wars were sometimes fought on the very 
sites of exploits accomplished by the ancestors in their confrontations 
with the foreigner: for example, when the Algerian F L N established its 
sanctuaries in the Aurès mountains in Kabylie or in the Chouf. Likewise, 
the special n a m e of Houari Boumedienne is taken from the names of two 
saints of Algerian Islam: Houari and B o u Médin . 7 Habib Bourguiba was 
to be styled 'the Supreme Combatant' {le Combattant Supreme), J o m o 
Kenyatta 'the Flaming Spear of Kenya', Houphouët-Boigny 'the R a m 
w h o defends his People' (le Bélier défenseur du peuplé), K w a m e N k r u m a h 
'the Osagyefo', the victorious general, and Amilcar Cabrai 'Abdel Jessi', 
the sabre-bearing justiciar. 
T h e values of militant nationalism were further fuelled by Marxist-
Leninist theory, which attributed to all forms of violence the status of 
demiurge of history and which makes imperialism the highest stage of 
capitalism. T h e colonized continents, with Africa in the forefront, thus 
became the 'soft underbelly' through which mortal blows could be dealt 
to the world capitalist system. Such were the messages of the Third 
International (Moscow, 1919) and the Congress of Oppressed Peoples 
(Baku, 1920). 
Nationalism and the wider culture 
Apart from the armed struggles or struggles directly engaged in political 
action, Africans have cultivated the values of nationalism in a particular 
historical context, but in forms that are sometimes original, sometimes 
merely imitative. 
T h e ideology of the nation-state was, along with capitalist imperialism, 
one of the twin pillars of colonial conquest; and African borders, for 
example, were simply a projection of the European borders of the time. 
Although this ideology has given Europe and the world both local wars 
and worldwide holocausts, it is the 'values' of the European nation-
state that were bequeathed to colonized territories at the time of their 
independence. 
Another important aspect of nationalism is religion whose role is crucial. 
T h e Mahdist uprising against foreign rule in the late nineteenth century 
was largely inspired by the values of a religious-based nationalism. In 
1899 a M a h d l appeared too among the Somali against the British and 
Italians: he was M u h a m m a d 'Abdallah Hassan, nicknamed by imperialists 
as 'tJie m a d Mullah'. In West Africa, revivalist and Mahdist movements 
erupted sporadically, echoing the numerous resistance movements of 
7. See the article on Boumedienne in M . Mourre, 1978, vol. 1, p. 619. 
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Muslim leaders such as Shaykh A m a d u B a m b a (Senegal) and Shaykh 
Hamalläh (Mali and Mauritania). But the values of rejection of any 
submission to an external authority were also abundantly illustrated by 
the leaders of African traditional religion. Thus , the leaders of the Maji 
Maji rebellion in Tanganyika sought to fight the Germans between 1905 
and 1907 using holy water to protect themselves against bullets. Another 
dramatic example is provided by the revolt, in 1947, of all the south-east 
and east of the island of Madagascar. T h e rebels also believed bullets 
could not harm them because they were protected by magic. T h e 
suppression of this uprising was horrific. It, too, is considered by the 
Malagasies as a significant step on the road to independence, even though 
the whole of the island did not take part. 
Another element often close to language and religion that marks 
nationalism is ethnicity. This concept must, however, be handled with the 
greatest care because of its highly equivocal content. T h u s the M a u M a u 
movement in Kenya (1952-60) was a struggle emerging from the quest 
for land disputed among the peoples of central Kenya and against the 
seizure of the best agricultural land by Europeans. But it was also a battle 
for political and cultural liberation. T h e symbolic rituals initially used by 
the guerrilla fighters were borrowed from the religious heritage of the 
Kikuyu and related ethnic groups (Meru and E m b u ) : for example, in the 
oath-taking ceremonies, designed to m a k e a sacred commitment that 
would discourage any idea of betrayal. Similarly, Mugabe's army in 
Southern Rhodesia two decades later was m a d e up mainly of Shona but 
the aims of the movement made it a liberating struggle for the whole of 
Zimbabwe. In short, any resistance by the Shona, Ndebele or F o n of 
D a h o m e y , the Asante or S a m o of Burkina Faso, or the Wolof or Joola 
(Diola) of Senegal was both an act to protect the ethnic group and a 
struggle for wider interests and values of a nationalistic character. It is 
precisely the colonial intrusion itself which, by upsetting this earlier m a p , 
broke the coincidence between 'national' and 'ethnic' identities. 
T h e other fundamental dimension of the nation-state is obviously 
territory; but unlike European countries and pre-colonial Africa, where 
the shaping of the 'national' space by peoples and states was the result 
of a centuries-long effort, the borders of the modern African states were 
drawn by the conquering zeal of a handful of foreigners in one or two 
decades. Yet some territories federated under colonial rule in British East 
Africa or French West Africa were broken up. Moreover, in their struggle 
for independence, African nationalists were often aiming not at the 
emancipation of a particular territory but at putting an end to the 
submission of African peoples. T h e values of nationalism were almost 
always closely associated with the values of African unity as indissolubly 
linked elements. 
Finally, and here w e touch on an aspect of the contents of African 
nationalism at once more ambiguous but also more fundamental, that 
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pertaining to 'race' and civilization. T h e French statesman René Pleven 
said that: 'To colonize is to spread civilization in space'. Colonization, an 
eminently economic act, was thus also a cultural phenomenon. A s a result, 
decolonization was bound in some way to be a cultural conflict. There 
had to be a decision on the relative weights to be given to the values of 
the autochthonous heritage and the cultural principles purveyed by the 
colonizers. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, the movement 
of cultural awakening in the Arab-Muslim world (nahda) and the black 
renaissance movement in America (the Negro renaissance) had to face 
this problem. A s regards Negro-African civilization, two movements of 
ideas symbolize this effort, which goes from African Personality and pan-
Africanism to Négritude, the intellectual focus created around the review 
Présence Africaine and its editor, Alioune Diop. 
T h e fundamental question had in fact come from E . W . Blyden in 
Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (1887), where he proposed a 
synthesis of the values of the Western Sudan and those of the Christian 
West and later advocated racial consciousness and pride among blacks of 
the continent and those in the diaspora. This contributed to the inaug-
uration of the pan-Africanist movement. Négritude belongs in this current 
with its project of a 'civilization of the universal'. 
In the first half of the century, as was indicated in Volume VII, the 
leadership of the pan-African movement was in fact held by people of 
African ancestry in the western hemisphere; that is to say, in the Americas, 
especially in the United States and the Caribbean. People like Marcus 
Garvey of Jamaica, George Padmore of Trinidad and W . E . B . DuBois 
of the United States were among the founding fathers of pan-Africanism. 
F r o m 1900 on there were pan-African meetings to emphasize racial 
solidarity, and organize for the struggle against discrimination and in 
pursuit of racial dignity for black peoples both in Africa and in the 
Western world. 
A s w e indicated elsewhere in this volume, it was not until 1945 that 
the leadership of the pan-African movement passed from blacks of the 
Americas to blacks of Africa. This was the fifth Pan-African Congress 
held in Manchester, England, in 1945. T w o of those w h o were present 
there later became founding fathers of newly independent countries. 
These were, as related in other chapters, K w a m e N k r u m a h of Ghana and 
J o m o Kenyatta of Kenya. T h e Africans at the conference were still slightly 
overshadowed by some of the giants of black nationalism from the 
Americas, but nevertheless 1945 signifies the re-Africanization of pan-
Africanism, the passing of the torch from diaspora people of African 
ancestry abroad to citizens of African countries. Twelve years later, 
K w a m e N k r u m a h headed the first government of independent Ghana, 
which was itself the first black African country to be liberated from 
European colonial rule, and pan-Africanism took a more militant form, 
which will be discussed later. 
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In North Africa, the problems of the general orientation of the countries 
and the values that were to inspire this orientation lay between the 
Koranic or Islamic path of nationalism and the liberal or modernizing 
one, with intermediate reformist positions in favour of individualism 
combined with Islam. 
Hence, in the late nineteenth century, the Egyptian M u h a m m a d 
c A b d u h , w h o had disciples in the Maghreb ('Allai al-Fasi), led a movement 
for a return to the sources of the Kur'an or salafiyya without totally 
rejecting contributions from outside or the progression towards rep-
resentative institutions. His fellow scholar, A . Razeq, stressing the essen-
tially political nature of the caliphate, accepted the principle of the 
separation of the spiritual and temporal powers. Later, in the 1930s, 
Taha Hussein could be seen as resolutely defending liberal modernism, 
presented moreover as the continuation of Mediterranean Hellenistic 
civilization. But extreme positions are also to be noted, such as those of 
the Musl im Brothers opposed to any reformism and of the socialists in 
their dire hostility to bourgeois liberal modernism. Writers and artists 
championed individual creativity. 
T h e acceleration of the historical process towards independence 
occurred at a time when neither in North Africa nor in sub-Saharan 
Africa had an integrated body of social thought succeeded in taking on 
board the exogenous values of Western modernism in an autonomous 
thought anchored in the endogenous cultural heritages; for the maturing 
of ideologies is more sluggish than events. This lack of a global philosophy 
of national culture and liberation was to weigh heavily in the subsequent 
global evolution of African countries. 
In short, the period from 1935 to independence was chiefly marked by 
two great political values - pluralism and nationalism - but beneath an 
older cultural tension between collectivism and individualism. In a way, 
these two ideologies were mutually reinforcing; but their limits were soon 
revealed and they began in the 1960s to give way to other values. 
Political values since independence 
With the winning of independence by African countries, a period opened 
which might have led to an explosion of original and positive values 
mixing with the best of pre-colonial experience and exogenous con-
tributions, building on deliberate choices. But most of the time, there 
was a spectacular withering away of the values of pluralism. Both 
endogenous and exogenous indications and behaviours were mobilized to 
this end. But w h e n this process culminated in personal power, it also 
sounded the death knell of the values associated with nationalism and 
pluralism. 
In the beginning, if w e look at the mottoes, anthems and flags adopted 
by the new independent states, w e can see the values that they wanted 
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to achieve. State mottoes, concise words which strike people because they 
appear to have the character of categorical imperatives, invoke such 
fundamental collectivist values as 'Unity, Peace and Development'; ' O n e 
people, O n e goal, O n e faith' (Senegal), 'Union, Discipline, W o r k ' (Côte 
d'Ivoire), 'Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress' (Nigeria), 'Unity, 
Freedom, W o r k ' (Zimbabwe), 'Peace, W o r k , Homeland' (Cameroon) and 
'Freedom and Justice' (Ghana). National anthems exalt collective struggle, 
unity and African and universal brotherhood (the Senegalese anthem), or 
recall the honour of the ancestors, freedom and unity (Cameroonian and 
Nigerian anthems). The colours of flags and emblems or national arms refer 
above all to symbolic animals: the lion of Senegal, the elephant of Côte 
d'Ivoire, the eagle of Nigeria, the leopard of Zaire, the mysterious bird 
that flies over the ruins of Zimbabwe. T h e colours of national flags show 
the predominance of green, which m a y symbolize plant resources, Islam 
or hope in the future. C o m m o n too are red, for the blood of martyrs, 
the heroism of struggles or the revolution, and yellow (the gold of mines, 
the African sun). W h e n it features (which is rarely), white is the colour 
of peace and unity. Finally, black identifies the race or has an Islamic 
referent. 
In s u m , four ideological messages are dominant in this dense discourse 
of emblems and symbols: the assertion of an identity, the quest for 
development, the desire for unity, and the call for freedom and social 
justice. All this shows continuity with the immediate pre-independence 
values. M u c h of it reaffirms collective freedom. 
N e w political ideologies 
Beside these mottoes, anthems and emblems, some of the new African 
leaders formulated their o w n ideologies. A m o n g them are al-Nasser, 
N k r u m a h , Senghor, Bourguiba, Sékou Touré, Nyerere, Amilcar Cabrai 
and Kaunda. From the Philosophy of the Egyptian Revolution (1954) to 
the National Charter (1962), Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser of Egypt accentuated 
his abandonment of Western liberal values in favour of pan-Arabism, 
Islam, Arab socialism, pan-Africanism and charismatic presidential power. 
T h e National Charter vigorously denounces the charade of Western-type 
democracy which operates in the interests of ruling feudal and capitalist 
groups, but welcomes socialism which guarantees economic democracy 
and collective liberty to the masses. It describes socialism as 'the path 
that leads to this social liberty',8 hence the necessity for the people to 
o w n the instruments of production and direct the surplus of this pro-
duction through a plan. Nasserite ideology was both pro-socialist and 
anti-Marxist. 
8. For further details, see the texts assembled by A . Abdel-Malek, 1980, and J. P. 
C h a m a y , 1966, pp. 225-46. 
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On the other hand, Arab socialism also expressed itself through the
single party and categorically rejects atheism as the absolute anti-value,
together with the dictatorship of the proletariat. It advocates the assimi¬
lation of classes into the democratic power of the whole people, whose
confidence legitimizes and inspires the leaders.
Furthermore, Arab socialism postulates the imperative of Arab unity.
This option brought al-Nasser close to the supporters of the Ba'th like
the Syrian Michel Aflaq, for whom the real issue is 'how are we to give
our nation back its soul, to ensure that the Arab and the nation as a
whole recover a positive, active, determined and correct attitude to life,
consisting for the individual Arab in a mastery of his destiny?' Whence
the imperative need for a Ba'th revolution of which 'socialism is the body
and unity that soul'; this resurgence (ba'th) will have to rely on the
people, the sole force capable of realizing unity.
The key ideas of Nasserism and Ba'thism socialist democracy, theistic
socialism, authentic values of Islam (fraternity, defence of the community),
Arab unity and recourse to the people - were to spread all over North
Africa.
In Algeria, a peasant-based and Islamic revolutionary socialism, emerg¬
ing from a long and bloody liberation struggle, attempted to combine the
plate 16.2 Ahmed Ben Bella's arrival in Algeria on 5 July 1962, Algerian Independence
Day
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political values of nationalism and self-management under the aegis of 
B e n Bella and, after 1976, an F L N that had n o w become the single party 
whose leading role was to confirm socialist democracy, while Islam became 
the state religion.' 
In Tunisia there emerged a co-operationist-type Neo-Desturian social-
ism linking the notions of profit and capital accumulation with those of 
public enterprises and state participation. According to the theoretician 
and advocate A . B e n Saläh, what was needed was to exorcise the horrors 
of the class struggle through a revolution 'in minds more than in 
structures' with a view to securing acceptance of the sacrifices required 
for economic take-off.10 
In Libya the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969 was followed by the 
establishment of an Arab socialist republic based on nationalization and 
pan-Arabism. In his Green Book (1976), Kadhaffi undertook a systematic 
demolition of the liberal thesis, seeking in Islam a third way between 
capitalism and socialism, both deemed to have failed. Representative 
democracy, he says, is just a circus; the referendum is an imposture, 
hence the recourse to the direct democracy of popular committees and 
congresses (jfamahiriyyah) that are traditional in inspiration." 
In sub-Saharan Africa, K w a m e N k r u m a h in his Consciencism (1964) 
formulated one of the most important doctrines of decolonization and 
development for Africa. H e wrote that 
T h e way out is certainly not to regurgitate all Islamic and Euro-
colonial influences in a futile attempt to recreate a past that cannot 
be resurrected. T h e way out is only forward to a higher and reconciled 
form of society in which the quintessence of the h u m a n purpose of 
traditional African society reasserts itself in a modern context.12 
Consciencism is, therefore, an attempt at synthesis which, like the 
Nasserist project, combines the values of anti-imperialist nationalism, 
technological and scientific modernization and the African and Islamic 
heritage, all by w a y of socialism and African unity. 
Julius Nyerere also stresses above all the African legacy of collectivist 
values of which the key one is communal solidarity. 'Africa', he says, 'has 
no lesson in socialism to learn from Europe; it would rather have 
something to teach'. Such a socialism is above all an attitude which 
consists in 'everyone being concerned for the welfare of others'.13 Ujamaa 
is 'the community bound together by affection and solidarity a m o n g its 
9. J. P. Charnay, 1966, p. 245. 
10. Texts by A . Ben Çalah, in A . Abdel-Malek, 1980, pp. 255-8. 
11. Text by M . Kadhaffi, in A . Abdel-Malek, 1980, pp. 337-41. 
12. K . Nkrumah, cited by Y . Benot, 1969, p. 394. 
13. J. Nyerere, 1963b, p. 8. 
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members who work to enrich the common heritage and through this work
to satisfy their personal needs'. If it was Nkrumah who did the most to
integrate the values involved, it is perhaps Nyerere who has done the
most to promote the development and critical and creative exploration of
the African heritage of values. Thus to those who fear that the value of
solidarity might stifle the spirit of individual initiative and the imperative
of work, he replies by saying that the solidarity of all implies that all
must work. If there exists a duty of hospitality, the individual beneficiary
also has the duty to join in communal work. This leads to an emphasis
on the values of 'African socialism' which must animate both civil society
and political society.
plate 16.3 Amilcar Cabrai of Guinea-Bissau, president of the PAIGC, on the East Front
Through the discipline of Marxism-Leninism, Amilcar Cabrai, the
founder of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, also tried to
integrate the values of socialism and nationalism. He thought that only
such an organic association would make it possible to give the aspirations
of the people a proper place in the political arena through people's power,
and in the socio-economic and cultural sphere, thanks to social justice
and the fact of being rooted in the values and civilization of ordinary
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people. Such a societal project had been initiated in the zones liberated 
by the liberation war in Guinea-Bissau. 
Finally, Leopold Sédar Senghor, a follower of African socialism, while 
acknowledging the usefulness of the conceptual framework offered by 
Marxism, refuses to accept an ideology enthralling the class struggle and 
atheism. 'Thus ' , he writes, 'while using Marx's method to analyse the 
economic and social situation of Senegal and Black Africa in the grip of 
capitalism, w e m a y legitimately give our religious and cultural values their 
natural place in our spiritual life."4 
It is quite evident that all these ideas which came under the general 
classification of African socialism were very m u c h influenced by Islam, 
Marxist-Leninism and African traditional values. 
W h a t sort of regimes then emerged in Africa during the post-colonial 
period in the light of all these old and n e w ideologies? 
T h e post-colonial regimes of Africa 
In all about five types of regimes have emerged in Africa in the post-
colonial era. First were the socialist regimes founded by those leaders 
whose ideas have already been discussed. T h e m o v e was led by al-Nasser 
in 1952 w h e n he dissolved all the parties in Egypt and set up the Arab 
Socialist Union - a state party, or rather a state agency for political 
control of the masses.15 This precedent was widely copied in Africa under 
a variety of labels: rally, movement , front, convention, congress, union, 
and so on. But they were one and all socio-political and ideological 
apparatuses functioning as systems to monopolize communication between 
the membership and the grass-roots. K w a m e N k r u m a h also converted 
Ghana into a one-party socialist regime in 1964 after suppressing ethnic, 
regionalist and religious organizations. S o also did Sékou Touré of Guinea, 
Modibo Keita of Mali and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in the 1950s. In 
Mozambique , in 1974, F R E L I M O was also established as the sole party, 
the instrument of incorporating rural society into the project for creating 
a nation through the state apparatus. Amilcar Cabrai of Guinea-Bissau 
and Agostinho Neto of Angola also aligned their countries with socialist 
countries at least for a while. 
T h e second type of regime is the military. Regimes of this type, whose 
number varies from year to year, have already been discussed in Chapter 
15. Suffice it to state here that they are the regimes in which the civilian 
rulers have been replaced by soldiers through military coup d'Etat. These 
abrupt incursions, of which there have been dozens, imply n e w political 
values: the imposition of consensus by force of arms and the repudiation 
of the rule of law. 
14. L. S. Senghor, 1971, p. 58. 
15. P. Wanyande, 1987, p. 71. 
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T h e third type is the apartheid regime found fortunately only in South 
Africa. W e do not intend to discuss this regime here except to state that 
it is an extreme case of the theorization and implementation of monstrous 
political 'values': inequality, segregation and bloody racism. Even religion 
has been called in to help justify the status quo. For decades the presence 
of this regime has led the frontline states in Southern Africa to widespread 
violence that has taken m a n y forms: ethnic wars, state wars or liberation 
wars (Namibia), revolts by bandits and mercenaries, coups d'Etat, massive 
forced migration, acts of sabotage, and so on. Apartheid has prevented 
nation-building in m a n y countries. 
T h e fourth type of regime is the conservative regime. Regimes of this 
type, professing belief in and respect for the capitalist approach to 
development and nation-building, have abandoned their concomitant 
liberal and democratic aspects in favour of the one-party system or a 
dominant one-party system and autocracy. These regimes constitute a 
high proportion of African states and include Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, 
Senegal (until 1978), Cameroon, Kenya , Zambia, Zaire, Malawi and 
G a b o n . O n e of their fundamental values is 'modernization', that is, the 
race for extroverted growth. Sixty to eighty per cent of export earnings 
come from the sale of one, two or three agricultural or mineral products. 
State capitalism syphons off vast resources into the public coffers at the 
mercy of the political class. T h e scramble for money pervades all motiv-
ation, attitudes and behaviour. Power and wealth have become c o m -
municating vessels. T h e sense of public service and the sense of 
responsibility are shaken in all these states; individuals are deprived of 
certain rights and associated values. Similarly the poor classes, deprived 
of the fruit of growth, do not have the right to express themselves, for 
that would endanger the stability necessary for a development incidentally 
not guaranteed. 
These are ideal conditions for the unbridled accumulation of capital at 
the expense of a defenceless lumpenproletariat: a 'hybrid political system', 
declared the Zaireian bishops' conference on 15 M a r c h 1990 in its 
contribution to the 'national consultation on die general situation of the 
country'. T h e system, the bishops continued, 'draws from liberalism the 
advantages offered to a minority by the enjoyment of private property 
and borrows from totalitarianism the methods of winning and retaining 
power'.'6 T h e incoherence of calculated contradiction transformed into a 
perverse political 'value' is at the root of the African sickness in that it 
accumulated all the negative aspects of three systems: the African heritage, 
capitalist liberalism and the Marxism-Leninism of the old Eastern bloc 
countries. 
Finally, there are the regimes that have stuck to the liberal values of 
pluralism and parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, they constitute 
16. Jeune Afrique, N o . 1527, 9 April 1990. 
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the smallest group, five in all: namely, the Gambia , Botswana, Senegal, 
Namibia and Mauritius. It is only in these countries that competitive 
political elections are still allowed and opposition parties operate unhin-
dered. It is true that in these countries the economic situation is only a 
little brighter than elsewhere. But as will be seen in other chapters, it 
simply shows that all African countries are subject to the same structural 
limitations. However, with regard to political values the situation is 
qualitatively different, given the existence of an independent press, an 
autonomous judicial system with legal guarantees, the relative separation 
of powers, open if not absolutely free elections, freedom of movement 
and assembly and so on. 
Pan-Africanism and non-alignment 
Besides the new ideologies and regimes that have emerged in post-colonial 
Africa two other themes have also become part-and-parcel of the political 
values of Africa. These are a more radical and Africanized form of pan-
Africanism and non-alignment. Both themes will be discussed in Chapters 
24, 25 and 28 below. Suffice it to state here, first, that though the 
leadership of the pan-African movement passed from blacks of the 
Americas to blacks of Africa at the fifth Pan-African Congress held in 
Manchester in 1945, it was not until after the attainment of independence 
by G h a n a in 1957 that pan-Africanism as an operational movement was 
transferred from America and Europe to the African continent itself. This 
was signified by the two conferences which the n e w leader of Ghana , 
K w a m e N k r u m a h , w h o was one of the joint secretaries of the Manchester 
Conference, organized in Accra in 1958. These were the conference of 
the heads of the then-independent African states and the All-African 
People's Conference. It was also from that time that the focus of territory 
entered the universe of pan-Africanism. F r o m then on, pan-Africanism 
n o w assumed two dimensions, the trans-Saharan variety of pan-Africanism 
and the trans-Atlantic variety of pan-Africanism, one urging unity based 
on the mystique of the African territorial continent and the other 
the mystique of the black race. Ideologically, pan-Africanism also n o w 
emphasized two themes, the pan-Africanism of liberation and the pan-
Africanism of integration - both of which will be discussed later. 
T h e second n e w ideology that became part of the world-view of African 
states, especially in the realm of external and global relations, was that 
of non-alignment. Again, the comment that should be m a d e at this stage 
is that no principle of foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth 
century has had a greater impact on relations between small countries 
and big powers than non-alignment. T h e concept has changed in meaning 
and operational implications since its inception in the 1950s, but it 
continues to affect significantly the diplomatic orientation of a majority 
of states in the developing world. K w a m e N k r u m a h and Gamâl ' A b d 
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al-Nasser were among the African founding-fathers of non-alignment. 
Originally, the movement served as a solidarity of protest and for 
modernization in East-West relations. But ever since the 1970s, especially 
from the Algerian summit of September 1973, there has been a change 
of focus to a more pronounced emphasis on attaining a basic restructuring 
of the global system in the direction of greater equity in North-South 
relations. 
T h e new political trends in Africa 
It was not in the realm of non-alignment and global relations that n e w 
trends began to emerge in the 1970s but also in the internal political 
situation in Africa. These trends are signified first by the collapse of the 
socialist regimes in Africa, secondly, by the change-over from military to 
civilian regimes signified by the temporary return of both G h a n a and 
Nigeria to civilian rule in the late 1970s, and, above all, in the movement 
back from one-party and autocratic rule to the former values of liberal 
democracy and multi-partyism. 
Failure of the socialist m o d e l 
A s has been indicated already, the socialist model which was a combination 
of Marxist-Leninism, Islamic socialism and traditional African values 
became extremely popular in the early decades of independence and 
was adopted by countries like Egypt, Guinea, Ghana , Mali, Tanzania, 
Mozambique and Angola. But without a single exception, that model has 
been dropped by all these countries, a process which began in Egypt with 
al-Nasser and continued with the fall of N k r u m a h in Ghana and M o d i b o 
Keita in Mali in the 1960s. T h e interesting question is h o w this failure 
of socialism in Africa can be accounted for. 
It should be pointed out immediately that this failure has nothing to 
do with the collapse of c o m m u n i s m in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s. A s has been pointed out already, the process began 
in Africa in the 1960s. W h a t that Eastern European collapse has done 
has been merely to accelerate the African process. It seems that in Africa 
the failure of socialism has been due to the fact that while the intellectual 
climate for socialism has been quite good, the sociological and material 
soil has not proved fertile enough for socialism. T h e intellectual climate 
for socialism became favourable in the early decades of independence 
first, because m a n y African nationalists had conceptually come to associate 
capitalism with imperialism and colonialism, and the progressive African 
leaders therefore became 'socialists' because they were nationalists. Sec-
ondly, as the capitalist approach to development in the early years of 
independence proved inadequate, some African leaders tended to look to 
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the socialist path as an alternative strategy of social and economic
improvements and transformation.
The third factor which predisposed many Africans in favour of socialism
was the rampant corruption that soon appeared among the post-colonial
rulers of the continent. It is true that corruption is by no means a
peculiarity of capitalism and is not unknown in socialist countries. It was,
nevertheless, felt that social discipline could at times be more difficult to
uphold in conditions of laissez-faire economic behaviour than in conditions
of relatively centralized planning and supervision. The fourth factor
was the widespread belief that traditional African culture was basically
collectivist, and therefore 'socialist'. This was certainly the contention of
African leaders like Senghor, Nyerere and Mboya. Above all, African
regimes which were planning to go the one-party-state route were
particularly tantalized by socialist symbolism. After all, the centralizing
tendencies of socialism could help justify a one-party monopoly of power.
PLATE 16.4 7bi« Mboya of Kenya, former trade union leader and minister of economic
planning, assassinated in 1969
It was for all these reasons that the intellectual climate looked more
broadly favourable to socialism. Indeed, most African governments soon
after independence paid some kind of lip-service to socialism, while those
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countries already listed adopted it not only ideologically but operationally. 
But all these countries have failed because of the barrenness of the 
sociological soil for socialism in spite of the suitability of the intellectual 
climate. T h e first unfavourable sociological factor was, and is still, the 
fact that ethnicity in Africa is far stronger than class consciousness. M o s t 
Africans are members of their ethnic group first and m e m b e r s of a 
particular social class second. W h e n the chips are d o w n , the L u o and the 
Yoruba workers are more likely to identify with the L u o and Yoruba 
bourgeoisie in Kenya and Nigeria respectively than they are with fellow 
peasants, as the experience of both Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo clearly signified. Oginga Odinga attempted to form a 
radical socialist party. H e soon discovered his supporters were not the 
disadvantaged of Kenya but almost exclusively L u o . Similarly, despite 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo's socialist rhetoric in both the first and second 
Republics of Nigeria, he soon discovered that he was a hero not of the 
working class of Nigeria as a whole but of nearly all classes of Yorubaland. 
O n balance, it can be legitimately argued that whenever there has been 
near confrontation and competition between the forces of ethnicity on 
one side and the forces of class-consciousness on the other, ethnicity has 
almost invariably triumphed in Africa. 
T h e second unfavourable sociological factor is the strength of cultural 
élites in Africa as against economic classes as such. O w i n g to the weakness 
of economic classes, the only class that could have brought about the 
socialist revolution in Africa was the élite. Unfortunately, the élite was 
composed entirely of highly Westernized Africans w h o acquired their 
power not through the possession of wealth but the possession of 
Western education and verbal skills. T h u s , even w h e n this élite became 
revolutionary, they could not bring about the socialist revolution since, 
as Karl M a r x had expected, it was the least-advantaged class in the 
most advanced societies - and not the best-advantaged class which the 
Westernized African élite was - that could bring about the revolution. 
Even those Africans w h o went to the Soviet Union or China had to be 
Westernized first since the works of M a r x , Engels, Lenin and M a o have 
not been translated into indigenous African languages like Kiswahili or 
Yoruba. It is a socio-linguistic impossibility for an African to be a 
sophisticated Marxist without being at the same time substantially W e s t -
ernized. T h e nature of élite formation in Africa can therefore be counted 
definitely as an aspect of the uncongenial sociological soil that socialism 
had to confront in African conditions. 
A third factor of this barrenness of the soil concerns Africa's organ-
izational capabilities in the present historical phase. M a n y hastily assume 
that a tradition of collectivism in a traditional setting is a relevant 
preparation for organized collective efforts in a modern setting. Unfor-
tunately, m u c h of the evidence points the other way. Collective effort 
based on custom and tradition and kinship ties leaves Africa unprepared 
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for the kind of organized collectivism which needs to be based on 
c o m m a n d rather than ritual. If socialism requires a rational, efficient 
command-structure which is not based on custom, ethnic empathy or 
ritual, the present stage of social change in the African experience is still 
inhospitable to socialist transformation. 
T h e fourth aspect of the infertility of Africa's sociological soil for the 
socialist plant would take us back to issues of historical continuity. M a n y 
African economies have already been deeply integrated into a world 
economy dominated by the West. African countries which go socialist 
domestically find that they are still integrated in the world capitalist 
system. T h e rules of that system are overwhelmingly derived from 
principles evolved in the history of capitalism. In international trade, 
countries seek to maximize their return and acquire profit. T h e rules of 
business and exchange at the international level, the banking system which 
underpins those exchanges, the actual currencies used in m o n e y markets 
and in meeting balance of payments, are all products of the capitalist 
experience. Countries like Vietnam, Angola and even Cuba , discover soon 
enough that their best economic salvation is to gain international legitimacy 
by Western standards. Vietnam and C u b a m a y fail in gaining their 
legitimacy, but it is part of their ambition to begin receiving Western 
benefaction and to have easy access to Western markets for their goods, 
and Western currency markets as well. 
W h a t all this once again means is that Third-World countries can m a k e 
their internal domestic arrangements socialist while remaining deeply 
integrated in the international capitalist system at the same time. It has 
also been argued that a country like Tanzania is today more dependent 
on the world capitalist system than it was before it inaugurated its neo-
socialist experiment under the Arusha Declaration in 1967. 
This then is the configuration of factors which on one side reveals that 
Africa is ready for socialism intellectually and, on the other side, warns 
us that the material conditions for genuine socialist experimentation in 
Africa are not yet at hand. T h e intellectual climate is promising; the 
sociological soil is forbidding. 
Return to liberal democratic values 
In addition to the demise of socialist values in Africa, there has also been 
a steady return to the former liberal democratic values of the early years 
of independence. There are liberal democratic movements n o w in a 
majority of African states demanding an end to one-party and military 
rule, the return to a multi-party system and competitive political elections, 
and the restoration of basic h u m a n rights, in particular freedom of 
association and of the mass media, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention. Other demands are for social justice and accountability, and 
for privatization, free-market forces and decentralization and for the 
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participation of all classes in the decision-making and developmental 
processes. Even former stalwarts of the one-party system and the socialist 
model of development such as Nyerere have joined the new band-wagon. 
A n d that this new movement is achieving success is evident from the 
granting of multi-partyism and free elections by such leaders as M o b u t u 
of Zaire, Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Kerekou of Benin. 
There followed open competitive elections in Benin, Cape Verde, Sao 
T o m e and Principe, Gabon and Senegal, all of which decided to join the 
small group of democratic countries in Africa. Once more, one cannot 
help but demand an explanation of this very welcome turn of events. 
Again, one should hasten to add that these developments are neither 
of recent origin nor have they been touched off by the glasnost and 
Perestroika of Gorbachev or the pressure of international financial insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and the I M F or by aid-donors such as 
the United States, Britain and France. In some African countries such 
as Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, the demand for democracy 
and civilian rule began as early as the late 1960s and 1970s following the 
introduction of the one-party system or military dictatorships. Surely, 
everybody is aware of the M w a k e n y a movement in Kenya and the arrest 
and detention of the novelist Ngugi and some members of parliament 
and other intellectuals in Kenya in the 1970s, and of the anti-Union 
government movement in Ghana in the 1970s, led by the People's 
Movement for Freedom and Justice against the military rule of Col. 
I. K . Acheampong, which demanded the restoration of civilian rule and 
parliamentary democracy based on the multi-party system. W h a t the fall 
of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the pressures 
of the I M F and the industrial countries of the West are doing is to 
compel African leaders to concede to the demands of these movements 
instead of arbitrarily and brutally suppressing them, as had been the case 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. T h e real reason for the rise of these 
movements is the simple fact that by the 1970s not only the socialist 
regimes but also the one-party systems had failed to deliver the goods, 
namely development and nation-building. 
It should be emphasized that two key arguments that were advanced 
in the late 1950s and 1960s for the introduction of the one-party 
democracies were the imperative of national unity over-and-above classes 
or ethnic groups and the demand for development. Thus Julius Nyerere 
contended: 
N o w that the colonialists have left, there is no longer any division 
between the rulers on the one hand and the ruled on the other . . . 
Multi-partyism is a luxury that w e in Africa cannot afford. W e have 
too little time and there is too m u c h to do to allow ourselves such 
an idle pastime.'7 
17. J. K . Nyerere, 1970a, p. 48. 
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Madeira Keita of Mali also argued that the single party, the concentrated
structure of the nation, is 'the crucible in which the peasant and the
urban-dweller meet'.18
'Continuous development', wrote F. Tombalbaye (Chad), 'requires the
commitment of all to an objective agreed upon together, as well as the
coming together of all energies; and, as mobilizer, the single party, will
play a key role in the area'.19
plate 16.5 Ahmed Sékou Touré, president of the Republic of Guinea, 1958-84
'If the party identifies itself with the people', Sékou Touré maintained,
'it is obvious that the State must also identify itself with the party so as
to form the unbreakable trilogy: people, party and state'. Thus 'no reason
of party can or should prevail over the reason and interest of the people,
just as no reason of state can prevail over the party line'.20 The 1982
constitution in Guinea provided that 'revolutionary power ... is exercised
by the people organized in the Democratic Party of Guinea, the party-
state, on the basis of democratic centralism'; all organs of power are
organs of this party-state and 'judges shall be elected by party bodies at
all levels'. This was also the language of the leaders of Togo, Cameroon,
18. M. Keita, cited by L. Sylla, 1977, p. 260.
19. F. Tombalbaye, 1977, cited by L. Sylla, 1977, p. 260.
20. A. Sékou Touré, 1977, cited by L. Sylla, 1977, pp. 245^7.
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Zimbabwe and Zaire. In the latter country, the president's party was 'the 
only state institution'.21 Collectivism had become a political monopoly. 
However, after decades of this system, neither national unity nor 
development had been achieved in those African countries. O n the 
contrary, it was obvious by the late 1970s that the few democratic countries 
like Mauritius and Botswana had done significantly better in terms of 
economic development, political stability and nation-building. W h a t had 
in fact happened in all these countries was surely the suppression of the 
basic h u m a n rights, blatant autocracy, widespread corruption, nepotism 
and the domination of all aspects of the society by the state apparatus 
and the monopoly of the resources and wealth of the state by the party 
leaders or the military oligarchies and their clients. O n the contrary, it is 
n o w being increasingly realized that while pluralism has not been a 
panacea for political ills, it does facilitate the attainment of one of the 
highest political values, namely, freedom. For in the end, as m a n y Africans 
are n o w asking, w h y talk of development and unity as absolute values? 
Development for w h o m ? Unity for w h o m ? W h a t is development for those 
w h o are not apparatchiks of the party? Herein lies the heart of the 
democratic revolution sweeping through Africa in the early 1990s. W h a t 
Africans are demanding, then, is a return not only to liberal democratic 
values but also to those values embodied in and symbolized by their 
national mottoes, anthems and flags: national unity, development, freedom 
and social justice. 
T o w a r d s a n e w capitalist ethic 
However, in its present push for the liberal and democratic m o d e of 
development, should Africa go the whole hog of privatization and the 
free-market approach of the West? In the light of past experience, Africa 
should exercise some caution here and introduce some modification. In 
the first place, Africans have all seen h o w strong ethnicity with its 
concomitant nepotism still is in Africa, and if they adopt this approach, 
is there not the likelihood of the whole market being cornered or 
monopolized by an ethnic group or two? Should Africa therefore not 
introduce some ethnic 'anti-trust legislation' to prevent or break up 'ethnic 
monopolies' like say those of the Igbo or the Kikuyu in Nigeria and 
Kenya respectively in the early years of independence? 
T h e second important lesson is h o w the prestige motive in African 
economic behaviour has encouraged ostentatious consumption and self-
indulgent 'aristocratic' and monarchical exhibitionism. T h e Mercedes-
Benz has continued to be a symbol of Africa's ostentatious indulgence — 
but in places in Nigeria the expensive fleet of cars sometimes went with 
21. P. F. Gonidec, 1983, p . 72. 
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a palace or two, sometimes a private plane and a helicopter, and a loud 
w a y of life, all for a single family! 
While the profit motive in classical economic theory was supposed to 
lean toward greater production, the prestige motive in contemporary 
African economic behaviour leans towards greater consumption. W h a t is 
more , the consumer products commanding the most prestige are often 
imported and require foreign exchange. Privatization on its o w n does not 
m a k e an African economy produce more. T h e prestige motive operates 
both privately and at the state level, ominously eating away into the 
resources of the country. 
W h e n Westerners call upon African countries to privatize, they are 
expecting the profit motive to be given a free play. But in fact, the 
problem in most of Africa is not simply h o w to liberate and activate the 
profit motive, but also h o w to control and restrain the prestige motive. 
Arguably the latter crusade is even more urgent than the former. 
Indeed, the ultimate crusade m a y well turn out to be h o w to tap the 
prestige motive in such a way that it serves the goals of production and 
not merely the appetites of consumption. Should Africa not then make 
creativity more prestigious than acquisition? Should Africa not make 
production more prestigious than possession? Should Africans not take a 
closer look at the problems of incentives in Africa? H o w can w e be more 
precisely sensitized to the African equilibrium between prestige and profit? 
A third major private constraint on the market (after ethnic nepotism 
and the prestige motive) is the general problem of bribery and corruption 
prevalent in post-colonial Africa. Corruption can clog up procedures and 
substantially paralyse production and distribution. Again corruption can 
be both in the public sector and in the private; it can be bureaucratic or 
omnipresent. Privatization of the economy m a y simply m e a n the pri-
vatization of corruption - and sometimes this is more contagious in the 
wider society than the corruption of officials and bureaucrats. 
Capitalism has come to Africa without the 'Protestant ethic' of work 
and frugality. Economically Protestantism was not against the acquisitive 
instinct; it was distrustful of the instinct to consume, especially indul-
gently. A s a Puritan saying put it at the time of the Reformation, 'You 
m a y labour to be rich for G o d , though not for the flesh and sin'. Wealth 
was regarded as unethical only insofar as it was a temptation to idleness 
and sinful indulgence. T h e acquisition of wealth was only dangerous if 
it eroded the twin disciplines of work and frugality in the n a m e of G o d . 
Capitalism arrived in Africa with the imperative of acquisition without 
the discipline of work and frugality. T h e white m a n himself in Africa set 
a dangerous example. H e never washed his o w n clothes, or cooked his 
o w n food, or polished his o w n shoes, or m a d e his o w n bed, or cleaned 
his o w n room, or even poured his o w n gin and tonic! T h e luxurious 
aristocratic life of white settlers as they played masters to African servants 
was detrimental to the spirit of the capitalism the white m a n himself had 
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arrived with. Africa's o w n prestige motive - which had been sociable in 
its original versions - n o w was transformed by the aristocratic life-styles 
imported by the white m a n . Africa's prestige motive was given the colonial 
incarnation of expensive European consumer culture complete with huge 
houses, domestic servants and 'garden boys'. 
If the ideology of entrepreneurship simply means acquisitiveness, this 
has n o w arrived in a big way in m u c h of Africa. Indeed, those w h o do 
not take advantage of their opportunities to become wealthy, and to help 
their kinfolk, are sometimes despised. 
T h e challenge is partly about the means used to acquire wealth. Is the 
wealth created or simply obtained? Acquiring wealth from a prosperous 
farm is a creative process. Acquiring wealth as either a middle-man on 
behalf of external interests or through corruption m a y not be creative at 
all. C a n w e transform the acquisitive instinct in Africa into something 
more directly productive? 
But if the means of acquiring wealth need to be creative, the ends of 
acquiring wealth also need to be healthy. Ostentatious consumption is not 
usually a m o n g the healthier ends of economic success. In short, the 
African ideology of entrepreneurship needs a fundamental reform of both 
the means and the ends of the pursuit of wealth in society. Until that 
happens, privatization of African economies - far from being the best 
way of achieving a healthy and free market - m a y itself be detrimental 
to the market-place. For those w h o are sufficiently attentive, the African 
experience demonstrates that privatization is not necessarily the best 
protection for the free market in all cultures. Other social, moral and 
legal safeguards are often necessary. 
Conclusion: a chronology of ideology 
History is partly a struggle to identify trends. Particularly elusive are 
trends in the history of ideas and values. Nevertheless, what can w e m a k e 
of the years since 1935 in Africa's experience? W h a t have been the trends 
in values and ideas? 
At the general level, w e have identified the more familiar dialectic 
between collectivism and individualism in Africa's ideological history. W e 
have also identified the dialectic between pluralism and nationalism — 
encompassing issues as diverse as democracy and pan-Africanism, the 
state and ethnicity. 
This chapter has also addressed what N k r u m a h designated as con-
sciencism — the interplay between indigenous culture, Islam and E u r o -
Christian civilization. Edward Wilmot Blyden had preceded N k r u m a h in 
this vision of the triad. Ali Mazrui developed it further in his television 
series, The Africans: A Triple Heritage, and in Mazrui's companion book 
of the same title. 
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But on the ground in Africa are there definite trends identifiable as sub-
periods in the era since 1935? W e have already referred to the golden age 
of the alliance between pluralism and nationalism - the period of the last 
years of colonial rule. African nationalists used liberal and pluralistic 
rhetoric against their o w n Western masters. Liberal slogans served the 
nationalist cause. 
In the 1960s most of Africa experienced a turn towards authoritarianism. 
One-party systems, military coups and presidential autocracy were on the 
increase throughout m u c h of this first decade of Africa's independence. 
M a n y regimes claimed to be socialist in the 1960s - even when they 
followed the capitalist path. J o m o Kenyatta's senior ministers like T o m 
M b o y a talked enthusiastically about 'African socialism' in the early years 
of Kenya's independence. 
Claims about 'Arab socialism' were also strong in parts of North Africa. 
T h e 1960s were Gamal ' A b d al-Nasser's last decade in power. H e spent 
those years partly consolidating 'socialist' changes in Egypt and partly 
pursuing vigorous pan-Arab, pan-African and non-aligned policies in 
world affairs. Al-Nasser died in 1970. 
A h m e d Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria in 1965, but the succeeding 
regime of Houari Boumedienne continued the politics of state socialism 
which had characterized the earlier rhetoric of the Algerian revolution. 
M u a m m a r Kadhaffi overthrew King Idrls in 1969 - and before long 
Kadhaffi initiated a version of Libyan welfare socialism which Kadhaffi 
subsequently called 'the Third W a y ' . 
W h a t was missing throughout the 1960s was an open declaration of 
Marxism-Leninism as official ideology, almost anywhere in Africa. T h e 
1960s were, in general, the years of enthusiasm for socialism but with a 
cautious attitude towards Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, regimes like that 
of al-Nasser in Egypt were both strongly pro-socialist and anti-Marxist 
at the same time. M a n y Egyptian communists were imprisoned by al-
Nasser. 
Gaffar Nimeiri in the Sudan began his 1969 coup in strong alliance 
with Sudanese communists. But the alliance did not last long. T h e 
partners turned against each other. Nimeiri triumphed. 
Politically fragmented Nigeria did not develop a nationally popular 
ideology. But left-wing tendencies were discernible not only on campuses 
but also in Chief Obafemi Awolowo. C o m m u n i s m was almost totally 
absent. 
It was not until the 1970s that Marxism-Leninism attained a high 
profile on Africa's continental landscape. T w o factors in the 1970s were 
crucial - first, social revolutions in countries like Ethiopia and the 
Malagasy Republic and, secondly, the collapse of the Portuguese empire. 
T h e 1974 Ethiopian upheaval was perhaps the most far-reaching social 
revolution in Africa in the second half of the twentieth century. T h e 
regime which succeeded Haile Selassie eventually declared itself Marxist-
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Leninist. Francophone countries like the Malagasy Republic, the Congo 
and Benin also moved in a Marxist-Leninist direction - though some 
more in rhetoric than in substance. 
With the collapse of the Portuguese empire, Marxism-Leninism 
acquired additional visibility elsewhere. Both Angola and Mozambique 
declared themselves as Marxist-Leninist states and Guinea-Bissau flirted 
with the radical ideology for a while. 
Is the golden age of Marxism-Leninism in Africa from the 1970s to 
the late 1980s? Certainly by the late 1980s countries like Mozambique , 
Benin and the Congo were moving away from Marxist-Leninist rhetoric 
at the governmental level. S o m e were to give up the labels of being 
Marxist-Leninist states altogether before long. B y the late 1980s and 
early 1990s was pluralism re-asserting itself in Africa? W a s a liberal revival 
under way? A s w e indicated, m a n y countries even returned to multi-
party constitutions and competitive elections. W h a t could not be predicted 
with certainty was the durability of these new pluralistic tendencies. 
Would they at least characterize the remaining few years of the twentieth 
century? It remains to be seen. 
A final historical puzzle concerns the relationship between the precise 
nature of colonial policy, on the one hand, and the post-colonial ideological 
consequences, on the other. Virtually no country on the African continent 
previously ruled by the United K i n g d o m has declared itself a Marxist-
Leninist state. O n the other hand, virtually every country previously ruled 
by Portugal has at least experimented with Marxism-Leninism or actually 
adopted it as official ideology. Countries previously ruled by France lie 
somewhere between the Anglophone paradigm (no Marxism-Leninism) 
and the Lusophone paradigm (widespread Marxism-Leninism). Fran-
cophone Africa is ideologically diverse. T o what extent were the different 
colonial policies of the three imperial powers responsible for the post-
colonial ideological differences between their former colonies? For 
example, was the greater oppression of Portuguese colonial rule responsible 
for the greater ideological radicalization of its colonial victims? S o m e 
historical puzzles in Africa's experience have no easy answers, but 
comparative repression m a y be part of the background. 
In any case, the post-colonial ideological differences between A n g -
lophone, Lusophone and Francophone countries m a y turn out to be very 
short-lived. T h e values and ideas which c o m e with colonial rule m a y turn 
out to be far more temporary than the underlying cultural continuities 
of indigenous Africa. 
Colonial rule enclosed together people w h o had previously lived sep-
arately - and divided people w h o were once united. Ethnic tensions are 
conflicts of values. They have also partly become the greatest threat both 
to Africa's stability and to African democracy. T h e answer lies in 
purposeful national integration and a shared experience in ideas and 
values. Africa is in search of a creative ideology. 
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W h e n multiple cultures confront each other within the same national 
boundaries, their relationship can be at varying degrees of social depth. 
T h e m i n i m u m stage of relationship is that of co-existence — w h e n two or 
more cultural communities barely k n o w about each other. Each m a y have 
its o w n conservative paradigm of thought, grounded on ethnic exclusivity. 
Indigenous traditionalism can reign supreme at this level. 
T h e second degree of relationship is that of contact - w h e n two or 
more groups either begin to trade with each other, or participate jointly 
in the job-market, or become members of the same political party, or 
listen to each other's music. Above all the contact must include sharing 
ideas and evolving shared priorities. Ancient traditions of the elder, the 
warrior and the sage m a y interact between ethnic cultures. 
T h e third degree of inter-ethnic relationship is that of competition — 
w h e n these contacts result in rivalry for resources, for power, or for social 
and economic opportunities. Debates about ideology and policy are part-
and-parcel of this competitive stage of nation-building. Capitalism m a y 
conflict with socialism in the political arena. Individualism m a y be on the 
defensive against collectivism. 
T h e fourth relationship between two or more ethnic cultures is that of 
conquest - when one of the ideologies or cultures begins to get the upper 
hand. O n e ideology, for example, m a y become more influential than 
others. O r the newly-dominant system of values m a y successfully claim 
a disproportionate share of power, resources or socio-economic oppor-
tunities. Nepotism could prevail even under socialism. Pluralism maybe 
stifled by political hegemony and monopoly of power. 
T h e fifth stage of relationship between cultures is that of compromise. 
This is a stage w h e n the competing ideologies, political values and 
traditions find a modus vivendi, an acceptable formula of conflict-resolution 
and a viable basis of social partnership. Individualism m a y be reconciled 
with collectivism; pluralism with nationalism. 
T h e sixth stage of relationship is that of coalescence — w h e n the values 
and identities of the political groups begin to merge, and their boundaries 
become less and less distinct. T h e cultures, values and ideologies, and 
even languages, intermingle, and a larger sense of identity starts to emerge. 
That enlarged identity could be national consciousness. Ethnicity merges 
with national consciousness. A national ideology m a y be evolving. 
In some African countries ideological divisions are also affected by 
international relations and by economic factors. But it should be borne in 
mind that diplomacy and economics are often integrative as well as 
divisive. T h e balance varies from society to society. Non-alignment can 
consolidate a sense of national identity at h o m e . 
T h e struggle for national integration and state-building in Africa has 
only just begun. Ideological intercourse and cultural interaction are part-
and-parcel of the evolution of nationhood and the consolidation of 
collective identity in the post-colonial era. 
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This social trend will have to include the creative contributions of 
Africa's thinkers and intellectuals allowed to operate in freedom. T h e 
m o r e innovative aspects of individualism m a y truly enter into an alliance 
with the more humanistic aspects of collectivism. Only then will state 
and nation in Africa, instead of destroying each other, be able to engage 
at last in a process of mutual construction and enrichment. 
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Religion and social 
evolution 
Tshishiku T S H I B A N G U 
in collaboration with 
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Introduction 
O u r society is not the ancient society but a n e w society broadened 
by Euro-Christian and Islamic influences. So, a n e w ideology is 
necessary, an ideology that can be stated in a philosophical definition, 
but which is at the same time an ideology which does not abandon 
Africa's original and h u m a n principles . . . an ideology whose aims 
will be to contain the African experience of the Islamic and Euro-
Christian presence as well as the experience of African traditional 
society.1 
Religion, it has been said, impregnates the entire texture of individual 
and commercial life in Africa. T h e African is 'profoundly, incurably a 
believer, a religious person'. T o him, religion is not just a set of beliefs 
but a way of life, the basis of culture, identity and moral values. Religion 
is an essential part of the tradition that helps to promote both social 
stability and creative innovation.2 It is therefore not surprising that in his 
agenda for social transformation and in the search for a n e w ideology to 
guide that transformation, N k r u m a h saw in religion a resource to be 
utilized as well as a problem to be contained. H e sees African society as 
rooted in traditional religion and broadened by Euro-Christian and Islamic 
influences. A s a resource, he sees the n e w ideology as a 'gestation' of the 
three religious traditions in Africa. A n d yet if 'social harmony' is to result, 
the religious factor has to be constrained: the n e w ideology should be 
one that 'can be stated in a philosophical definition' - that is to say, in 
secular terms without abandoning the basic values of African traditional 
religion or the African historical experience of both Islam and Christianity. 
T h e problem of religion in African social transformation arises from 
both the strength and the plurality of religion. Traditional African religion 
was, a m o n g other things, a vehicle for exploring the forces of nature and 
for systematizing n e w knowledge both of the h u m a n and the physical 
i. K . Nkrumah, 1964, pp. 93-7. 
2. See Présence Africaine, 1972; V. Mulago, 1980; M . Glélé, 1981. 
1 
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environment. In the search for understanding and coping with the m a n y 
aspects of nature, the African recognized several divinities and established 
m a n y cults. Traditional African religion was non-proselytizing and open-
ended. It was tolerant of religious innovation as a manifestation of n e w 
knowledge, always hoping to interpret and internalize the n e w knowledge 
within the traditional cosmology. T h u s , in time, both Christianity and 
Islam developed within Africa, initially in a symbiotic relationship with 
traditional religion. But both Christianity and Islam are proselytizing 
religions, claiming exclusive revelation of the Truth, fiercely competitive 
and intolerant of co-existing with other religions, particularly each with 
the other. In their competition, ancient Christianity was rubbed out in 
North Africa and the Nile valley, except a m o n g the Copts of Egypt and 
in Ethiopia. Periodic movements of reform and religious purification 
produced a continuum from situations where Islam and Christianity were 
interpreted in traditional African cosmology to those in which Islam and 
Christianity provided the cosmology but which was indigenized within 
African social thought. T h u s , plurality of religion became an essential 
feature of African society, but there was also what N k r u m a h called a 
distinct 'African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence'. 
T h e widespread activities of Christian missions in Africa in the nine-
teenth century in the wake of colonialism complicated the religious 
situation. T h e degree of indigenization of Christianity and Islam in the 
past had depended on the autonomy of the people both socially and 
politically. With the loss of autonomy under colonialism, traditional 
African religion became identified in the mind of m a n y Africans with an 
Africa that had failed and had been subjugated. M a n y people began 
to proclaim adherence to Christianity or Islam as representing n e w 
developments, progress and the future, without necessarily abandoning 
the old cosmology or basic religious beliefs. Western education, sponsored 
largely by the Christian missions, became the vehicle both for the African 
aspiration for n e w knowledge and the technology of Europe, and for 
alienation from traditional culture. 
T h u s , the problem that faced N k r u m a h and other leaders of the period 
of decolonization was h o w to achieve social transformation and create a 
n e w society in the face of the strength of religious beliefs and yet of 
divided commitments to different religious views of society. W h a t role 
should traditional religion play? H o w far could a person be a faithful 
Musl im or Christian and still be a good African? T h e conflict of values 
and ideologies produced trauma in the private lives of individuals and 
communities that has been the subject of several novels. It is the crises 
in the public sector occasioned by the religious factor that has interested 
historians: the role of the different religious traditions in the struggles for 
liberation in Kenya and Zimbabwe , in Morocco and Algeria, in Senegal, 
Zaire and Zambia; the religious factor in the competition of various 
groups for sharing political and economic power, the control of education 
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or control over foreign policy and foreign relations; the struggle between 
various religious groups seeking autonomy within a state aiming for 
exclusive monopoly of power, or minority religious groups resisting a 
dominant one seeking to impose its o w n faith as the national religion, the 
only basis of values, and of access to political and economic resources of 
the state.3 
Accurate statistics are notoriously difficult to come by,4 partly because 
national censuses are either out-of-date or non-existent, partly because 
claims of rival statistics are an important part of the competition for 
power, partly also because there is genuine doubt as to w h e n some w h o 
claim to be adherents of Islam or Christianity have effectively ceased to 
belong to the traditional religion, and w h e n they m a y have reverted back 
to it. B y 1935, it does appear that roughly 80 per cent of the total African 
population were divided roughly equally between Islam and Christianity, 
with Islam probably having a slightly larger share. Since then, both Islam 
and Christianity have m a d e rival claims of further advances at the expense 
of African traditional religion, though more recently the widespread 
revival of traditional religion has been reported. Countries in Southern 
and Central Africa which used to return figures of almost total affiliation 
to Christianity are discovering substantial survival or revival of traditional 
beliefs. 
Equally important is the national distribution of religious adherents 
(Fig. 17.1). There are countries with wholly or almost wholly Islamic 
populations where Islam has been declared the state religion, whether or 
not the sharfa is enforced. These include Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Libya, Somalia, the C o m o r o Islands and Mauritania. Egypt is pre-
dominantly Musl im but with a significant Christian minority group of 
less than 10 per cent, and so is Senegal. There are several countries where 
the balance between Christianity and Islam is a major political issue. 
These include the Sudan, Ethiopia, C h a d , Nigeria, Cameroon and T a n -
zania. S o m e of these officially declare in their constitutions that the state 
is 'neutral' or 'secular' in relation to religion. In practice, all the leaders 
of Africa belong to an élite that has been educated within schools and 
religious structures that are either Christian or Islamic. While proclaiming 
the need for reviving traditional African values and principles, few leaders, 
irrespective of private beliefs and practices, have dared to alienate the 
religious susceptibilities of the Christians or Muslims by openly embracing 
traditional religion. 
3. For a sample of sources, see E . Fashole-Luke et al, 1978; A . Hastings, 1979; 
M . O . Beshir, 1968; A . F. Walls, 1978; Gatta Gali Ngothe, 1985; D . Ndogo Bidyogo, 
1977. 
4. Compare, for example, the two very different sets of statistics for Uganda, 1977, in 
Pro Mundi Vita (Brussels), 1985, and M . Glélé, 1981. 
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fig. 17.1 Distribution ofChristianity, Islam and African traditional religion in Africa, where
each religion claims 50 per cent or more of the country's population (Source: adapted from
The World Almanac and Book of Facts, World Almanac of Books and Facts, New York,
1991, © Pharos Books, 1990)
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T h e continuing relevance of traditional religion 
T h e importance of traditional African religion5 goes well beyond what 
the statistical affiliation figure of 20 per cent of the total African population 
m a y suggest. For m a n y Christians and Musl ims, the basis of moral values 
still derives more from the old cosmology than from the n e w beliefs: 
there is still respect for ancestors as in the pouring of libations, belief in 
the continuing involvement of ancestors in the life of their successors, 
belief in the forces of good and evil which can be manipulated by direct 
access to the divinities through prayer and sacrifice, belief in the efficacy 
of charms and amulets to ward off evil, and so on. Belief in spirits and 
witches in social relationships remains a major factor beyond the avowed 
adherents of traditional religion. Even where such beliefs and practices 
cease to be held as matters of religion, they are still observed as custom, 
tradition and part of the cultural heritage. T h u s the solidarity of m a n y 
an extended family or clan or community still revolves round some beliefs 
in ancestral spirits, venerated periodically by rituals conducted by priests 
set apart for the purpose. 
There is a vast area of African life which both Islam and Christianity 
have invaded but have not succeeded in completely displacing. This is 
the area of health and healing. T h e concept of health in traditional African 
society was very broad, including well-being in day-to-day life, success 
on the farm or in whatever craft or other venture one was engaged, in 
the health of the children, their happiness in the choice of life partners, 
and so on. Physical ailment is only a symptom of ill health which could 
arise from the anger of some malevolent force which itself could be 
because of some misdeed or lack of healthy relationship with one's 
neighbours or with s o m e ancestor or some divinities. Securing good health 
meant that the healer would inquire into these varieties of relationships 
and, through prayer or sacrifice or both, put right whatever was amiss. 
In addition, the physical ailment was then treated with herbs or incantation 
if necessary. M a n y a Christian and Mus l im continued to patronize 
traditional healers and diviners. M a n y Musl im teachers practice as medical 
consultants, making charms and amulets for clients w h o operate within 
the framework of the traditional healing systems. M u c h of the current 
revival of traditional religion is associated with the greater official rec-
ognition of the continued importance of the traditional healing systems 
in the delivery of health care. Official recognition has lessened the necessity 
for clandestine cover of the continued patronage of traditional healing 
systems even by the highly-placed Westernized élite. 
Similarly, there is today a wider appreciation of the value of the oral 
traditions of Africa, hitherto nourished by traditional religion, but n o w 
studied for their spiritual, literary, philosophical and humanistic qualities 
5. Présence Africaine, 1972; M . Glélé, 1981. 
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independent of religious beliefs. Only a fraction of this has yet been 
committed to writing or embodied in scholarly dissertations. T h e accumu-
lated wisdom of several generations of Africans is to be found in these 
oral sources. T h e Western-educated élite, by cutting themselves off from 
this rich source which is the root of their culture, suffer a great deficiency 
in their mental development and their creativity. M u c h of the balance 
and the dignity of villagers regarded as illiterates comes from continuity 
with these rich cultural traditions. O f particular importance is the heritage 
of scientific knowledge in agriculture and health care which is embodied 
in these traditions, developed over the centuries through acute observation, 
experimentation and practice. M u c h of this knowledge has been trans-
mitted through the training of priests and diviners which, in m a n y 
places, has remained meticulous and rigorous. It involves m u c h botanical, 
zoological, pharmacological and mathematical knowledge, the properties 
of plants and animals, complex calculations of probabilities, the power of 
words, and numbers.6 While these could be detached from traditional 
religion, there is no doubt that it is association with religious beliefs that 
has kept alive these systems of knowledge and ideas which form the bulk 
of the African claim to distinctive culture and contribution to the world 
pool of ideas. A n d this body of ideas must have a part to play in re-
educating the intellectual leaders of Africa as a basis for any renaissance 
and revival of creative efforts. 
This is not to deny that for m a n y Africans, African religion as a body 
of religious ideas has an autonomous value of its o w n . 7 It is ironic that 
while Western-educated Africans were abandoning the religion even 
without knowing anything about it, m a n y in the N e w World in C u b a , 
Brazil, Haiti and other places were deliberately choosing it in preference 
to Christianity and Islam because of its deep spiritual qualities. M a n y 
people have thus achieved a stable synthesis between the spiritual values 
of Christianity and African traditional religion. This N e w - W o r l d appreci-
ation has itself played a part in the revival of interest in African traditional 
religion a m o n g the Western-educated élite in Africa. 
Until recently, the adherents of traditional religion have, as a body, 
m a d e few demands on the state in the group struggle for power or the 
control of education or economic resources. Yet the leaders frequently 
evoked the cultural resources of traditional religion in the process of 
decolonization, not only in the ubiquitous dance troupes and festivals of 
arts, but more seriously in the search for an African ideology, theology 
or philosophy and the source of African renaissance and creativity. S o m e 
traditional rulers, even w h e n they are personally Christian or Musl im, 
6. Various scholars are beginning to draw attention to knowledge in agricultural sciences 
and health sciences. For the mathematics of the Yoruba divining system, see O . Lange, 
1985. 
7. See A . Hampaté Bà, 1972; K . Mabika, 1965; C . A . Diop, 1957. 
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are beginning to consider it necessary to emphasize the religious foundation 
of the pre-colonial polities in their struggle against total eclipse in the post-
colonial socio-political order. So also associations of traditional healers8 are 
drawing attention to the need for allocation of state resources for develop-
ing the traditional healing systems that, as w e have shown, have remained 
so important. 
Christianity, decolonization and development 
Christianity illustrates best the contradictory role of religion in the social 
transformation of Africa as both a resource and a problem. O n the resource 
side, there was no doubt that Christianity had been welcome and had 
grown because of its direct involvement in the development of Africa.9 
Its role in the promotion of Western education at different levels -
elementary, secondary, teacher-training, and sometimes also technical and 
tertiary - was at the heart of African development. Throughout Africa, 
except in the predominantly Muslim areas, the colonial powers were 
usually satisfied to leave the missionaries in charge of education in return 
for some financial support from taxes. T h e missionaries had extended 
their interest in Western education to the study of African languages, the 
elaboration of orthographies, initial linguistic studies, and the translation 
of the Bible and other religious works to initiate a n e w literary tradition 
in African languages and promote literacy. T h e Christian missions also 
dominated the book trade, printing and publishing, bookshops and 
libraries. T h e y played a similar pioneering role in the introduction of 
Western-type health care in the establishment of hospitals and clinics. 
T h u s , a great attraction of Christianity was in its essential pioneering 
effort in progressive measures, and encouraging the transition of its 
m e m b e r s from traditional society into the modernizing world which was 
set as the goal of colonization, but which colonial policies did little to 
realize. 
At the same time, Christianity had grown up in close collaboration 
with colonialism while Islam and traditional religion were more distant 
and sometimes hostile. T h e European and American missionaries w h o 
maintained a rigid hold on the churches they had created were closer in 
their thought and attitudes to the colonial officials and European settlers 
than to their African colleagues, assistants and parishioners. B y 1935, 
m a n y missionaries did not believe that Africans could hold positions of 
responsibility in the Church comparable to positions they had held in the 
nineteenth century prior to the establishment of colonial rule. T h e Church 
8. M . Last and G . Chavunduka, 1986. 
9. J. Mbiti, 1962; R . Sastre, 1962. 
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establishments were thus part of the colonial structures that African 
independence movements were trying to decolonize.10 
Most of the leaders were products of Western education, but they were 
nonetheless most conscious of the extent to which their education had 
involved a degree of mental colonization, enforced subordination to 
Western ideas, and alienation from the roots of African culture. T h e y 
had first to transcend these constraints and, benefiting from missionary 
work on African languages, renew their contact with African thought and 
values, and use these to create the vision of a new African society. T h u s , 
decolonization had to begin with the Church, not only to transform its 
structures and replace European leadership with African, but also to seek 
indigenization of its form and content without losing the essence of 
Christian values. This task of indigenizing the Christian Church was 
tackled by both Catholics and Protestants, but it was widely recognized 
that the issues involved went beyond the question of control, content and 
form of the Christian churches. It concerned the whole development 
strategy, Nkrumah's search for an ideology of social transformation, the 
adaptation of Western science and technology, the search for an African 
philosophy, and a definition of the identity of the African in the modern 
world. 
O n e of the most influential documents on the question of the indi-
genization of the Church was the collective work of African leaders of 
the Catholic Church published in 1956 and setting out the various issues 
involved: Des prêtres noirs s'interrogent (Black priests ask themselves 
questions). At the same time, the African Society for Culture based in 
Paris and led by Alioune Diop, saw the issue as the most crucial part of 
the debate about négritude. Diop used the journal Présence Africaine to 
conduct a lively debate on African religious thought, and specifically even 
theological research. T h u s when the Second Congress of Black Writers 
and Artists was convened in R o m e in 1959, a sub-committee of African 
theologians and philosophers was established. In 1962, at the time of the 
Second Vatican Congress, Alioune Diop canvassed the opinion of African 
Christian intellectuals and, in 1963, published a special issue of the journal 
on the work of the Vatican Congress entitled Personnalité africaine et 
catholicisme. Diop was also the moving spirit in the three international 
symposia, in Abidjan in 1961 on 'Religions in Africa' in general, in 1970 
in Cotonou on 'African Religions as a Source of Values of Civilization', 
and in Abidjan in September 1977 on ' T h e Catholic Church Festival and 
Black Civilization'. T h e Colloquium of the World Festival of Black and 
African Art and Civilization ( F E S T A C ) in 1977 also had an important 
section on religion." 
10. A . Hastings, 1979. 
11. See Bulletin de Théologie Africaine edited at Kinshasa in French, English and 
Portuguese. O n F E S T A C , see M . A m o d a , 1978. 
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PLATE 1 7. î On the occasion ofa meeting in Cairo with Third-World theologians, members of
the EcumenicalAssociation ofAfrican Theologians paid a visit to Pope Shenouda III, Patriarch
of the Coptic Church ofEgypt
The search for models for the indigenization of the Christian Church
in Africa went on not only within Catholicism but also within the
Protestant churches as well. What is more, both Catholics and Protestants
realized that the issues involved were in no way sectarian and there have
been efforts to work together not only at a pan-African but also at an
ecumenical level. Notable in this regard was the meeting of African
theologians convened in Ibadan in 1969 by the World Council ofChurches.
Several institutes, such as the Kinshasa Centre of African Religions, have
tried to reflect this pan-African ecumenism both in their journal (Cahiers
des religions africaines) and their symposia on Christianity and African
Religions (1978); Christianity and African Forms of Spiritual Life (1983);
and African Mediations of the Sacred Rites and Religious Language
(1986). All these have encouraged the formation of the Ecumenical
Association of African Theologians (Association Scuménique des théologiens
africains AOTA). In all these, three trends have been discernible in the
approach to the question of African theology.
(1) Initially, the approach was to explore the theology of traditional
African religion in its various forms: the nature and attributes
of the supreme being; the nature and meaning of sacrifice; the
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role of prayer and religious rituals. Distinct from the efforts of 
usually-European agnostic anthropologists and ethnologists, these 
were studies by African theologians and Christian leaders w h o 
saw traditional African religion as preparatory to the Christian 
gospel, and were exploring it for spiritual values which could be 
used to bring h o m e more clearly to Africans the gospel message. 
(2) Others rejected that approach and m a d e a distinction between 
the theology of traditional African religion and African theology 
as such. T h e y are wary about suggesting a dialogue between the 
Christian theology and the theology of traditional African 
religion. T h e y see African theology as the thought of African 
Christian theologians, deriving from the Bible, interpreted in the 
light of African historical experience and reality, and in dialogue 
with Christian theology in other non-Western parts of the world. 
(3) There is also emerging a black theology or liberation theology, 
specifically in South Africa, drawing its inspiration from biblical 
faith expressed in the languages and categories of Africa, as 
well as the experience and reflections of the oppressed peoples 
struggling for liberation, such as blacks in North America and 
marginalized groups in Latin America.12 
Side by side with this search for a n e w theology, there has also been 
the effort to organize and structure the liturgy, and develop a system of 
sacramental rites that, while being faithful to the received Christian 
formulae, takes account of the African reality. For example, what role 
could African musical styles and musical instruments play? H o w could 
Christian rites of baptism, marriage and burial take account of African 
family institutions in which the naming of a n e w child is a family affair; 
marriage is not just a union of the bride and bridegroom but a union of 
their two families, and burial ceremonies have various family dimensions 
and implications. T h e missionaries saw clearly enough that if the Christian 
Church were not to lose its social and political significance, Africanization 
of the personnel in the leadership of the Church must keep pace with, 
or even m o v e ahead of, that of the institutions of the state. It was 
important that the spokesmen of the Church in the ensuing struggle for 
political and economic power, the control of education, the shaping of 
the structures of the state, and so on, should be Africans. A n d these n e w 
leaders of the Church could not but contribute their views to the political 
search for the African personality, identity and authenticity. 
Islam and modernization 
Unlike Christianity which was an ally of colonialism, Musl im states gave 
the colonial powers some of the most determined resistance. Yet, in spite 
12. V. Y. Mudimbe, 1985. 
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of continued suspicion and occasional hostility, Islam benefited from the 
colonial presence. T h e colonial powers were most suspicious of, and 
continued to monitor cautiously, the international connections of Islam, 
especially with well-known anti-imperialist centres such as Cairo. T h e y 
controlled the movement of would-be scholars seeking education, and 
even the pilgrimage in the Middle East. But at h o m e , they found that 
collaboration with quiescent Muslim communities could be of advantage 
both to the colonial powers and the Muslims. Islam, it has been shown, 
benefited from the degree of urbanization and increased mobility encour-
aged by the railways, motor roads and demand for migrant labour. While 
the colonial powers were hostile to m a n y institutions of traditional religion, 
they encouraged elementary Islamic education in the Kur'änic schools; 
they enacted laws protecting Muslims in the free practice of their religion, 
including the provisions of the sharfa in the regulation of civil law a m o n g 
Musl im communities. T h e y placed restrictions on the access of Christian 
missionaries in Muslim areas. M a n y African communities w h o had 
previously resisted the spread of Islam, considered it more honourable 
after the colonial conquest to join Islam than the religion of the conquerors. 
But even with such people w h o became Muslim as an act of passive 
resistance, there often developed a remarkable degree of collaboration 
with the colonial authorities. T h e most notable example was the Wolof 
w h o m the pre-colonial djihad movements had failed to convert but w h o 
came out of the colonial period thoroughly Islamized.13 
This remarkable achievement was in no small measure due to the work 
of Shaykh A m a d u B a m b a , 1 4 founder of the sfifi order called the Mourides. 
T h e success of his evangelical work a m o n g the Wolof benefited from the 
combination of religious belief and economic prosperity in the cultivation 
of groundnuts for export. H e himself became a highly respected figure 
in the colonial period and was decorated for his services in recruiting 
troops for the French army to serve in France during the First World W a r . 
T h e success and continued importance of the Mourides in contemporary 
Senegal illustrates one way in which Islam, through the spiritual values 
of mysticism, has accommodated itself within African society and culture 
as a vital religious force. 
T h u s , in the process of decolonization, Muslims did not face the 
same problems of colonial structures and cultural alienation that faced 
Christians. That initially they regarded independence as an 'Ambiguous 
Adventure"5 was because of their hostility to Western education under 
the control of Christian missionaries and the fear that this had given an 
unfair advantage to the Christians. While in North Africa there was a 
13. L . Sanneh, 1986. 
14. See F. Dumond, 1975; M . Klein, 1968; D . C. O'Brien, 1971; and L. Brenner, 
1984. 
15. C. A. Kane, 1962. 
5" 
Africa since 1935
plate 17.2 Shaykh Amadu Bamba, head of the Mourides ofSenegal, with his talibe
continuous evolution of nationalist ideas, Muslims in West Africa to begin
with tended to be lukewarm in the nationalist movements. They had
stood outside the mainstream of the pan-African movement which was
inspired from the New World through European Christian circles. It was
one of the contributions of al-Nasser that he became the point of juncture
of pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and pan-Africanism. His influence helped
to pull West African Muslim leaders into the mainstream of the nationalist
movement.
For 50 years, in several African countries, Islam has made advances
toward modernism, particularly by launching an educational system that
branched out from the purely traditional paths. First, there was the
Ahmadiyya movement, outside the mainstream of Islamic orthodoxy,
combining Western education with Islamic and Arabic studies. The
Ahmadiyya were important in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Then the
Wahhabis, within the Wahhabiyya reform movement, developed after the
Second World War, formed two important action groups: the Subbanu
al-Muslim, leading the movement for educational reform, and the Union
culturelle musulmane (Moslem Cultural Union), now an international
organization concerned with all Islamic affairs, including politics.16
The expansion of the Wahhabiyya reform movement coincided with the
appearance of the Rassemblement démocratique africain RDA (Democratic
16. L. Kaba, 1974; H. M. Amiji, 1984.
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African Union), the most important movement for decolonization in 
French West Africa. M a n y Wahhabi , acting individually, rallied to the 
R D A , their chief political aim being to establish a democratic state based 
on Koranic teaching of liberty, equality and idimä1 or 'consensus'. Their 
conviction of the need for a radical reform of society, their firm opposition 
to the colonial order and to Westernization, and their openness beyond 
ethnic barriers, all allowed them to co-operate with African leaders 
w h o had more secular views. Islam therefore appeared as a force for 
independence, unification and the transformation of society. A s K e n Post 
put it: 
In areas where Islam has long been established, in northern 
Cameroon, northern Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Senegal and 
Mauritania, it has profoundly affected the process of élite-formation 
produced by the social changes of colonial rule. In some of them it 
offered an alternative cultural tradition, and even indigenous political 
systems, and provided ways of obtaining power and influence other 
than the purely modern ones.'7 
O n the east coast of Africa, ideas on the transformation of society 
developed through reformist newspapers such as Al-Islah (Reform), which 
began to appear in M o m b a s a , Kenya, in 1932. T o counter the attraction 
and influence of Islamic anti-imperialistic and nationalistic messages that 
spread from Cairo and other places, the British colonial government at 
the end of the 1940s and during the 1950s encouraged the setting up of 
the East African Musl im Welfare Association under the patronage of His 
Highness Aga K h a n III and of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Similarly, they 
helped to finance the establishment of the M o m b a s a Institute of M o s l e m 
Education ( M I O M E ) . This institution served all of East Africa, and m a n y 
young African Muslims were able to receive a modern education at 
secondary and post-secondary level, in an Islamic cultural and religious 
environment.18 
Historians and ideologists have emphasized that conditions existed in 
Africa for the establishment and development of an Islamic socialism. 
According to Mustafa as-Sibaci,19 society at the time of the Prophet 
M u h a m m a d and of the first four caliphs was socialist in character, and 
these leaders are considered to be founders of the first socialist community. 
Elsewhere in black Africa some have insisted that pre-colonial African 
society was also socialist in character. ' T h e sense of solidarity within the 
community between the members of the same group, and also the 
collective right to ownership of land, are seen as the most important 
17. K . Post, 1964, p. 52. 
18. H . M . Amiji, 1984, p. 115. 
19. M . as-Sibaci, n.d. 
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elements of socialism in primitive Islamic society and of that of African 
precolonial society'.20 
In fact, Islamic socialism is the official ideology in North Africa of 
countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Libya; that of the majority party in 
power in Tunisia is specifically termed 'DestOrian socialism'. It is also 
practised in Somalia. T h e statesman M a m a d o u Dia advocated it in 
Senegal, and argues for it in his book, Islam, sociétés africaines et culture 
industrielle (Islam, African societies and industrial culture).*1 
There is increasing reflection on the doctrinal principles of research 
for lines of action that favour the psycho-social liberation and the 
promotion of w o m e n within Islam. This is particularly necessary on the 
social plane, because of the problem of the status of w o m e n in a regime 
of polygamy, a regime that is generally officially recognized and inscribed 
in the family law of African states that are influenced by Musl im 
doctrines.22 
T h e problems of indigenizing Islam in depth arise only in relation to 
black Africa. Here, one must establish that Islam is stricter than Chris-
tianity, for example as regards admitting adaptations of its ritual system. 
With some delimitation of detail only, imposed by local conditions and 
particularly climate, black Muslims carry out all the essential obligations 
called the five pillars of Islam: the profession of faith in one G o d and in 
his Prophet M u h a m m a d ; daily prayers, carried out five times; the Ramadan 
fast, which has connotations of mortification, purification and solidarity 
with the poor; the required giving of alms; the pilgrimage to Mecca , to 
be accomplished at least once in a lifetime. 
C a n one then legitimately speak in Africa of a true 'Africanization' of 
Islam? A m a d o u Hampaté B à is categorical on this subject: 
There cannot be a black Islam any m o r e than a black Christianity 
or a black Judaism. W h a t there is is the principal Islam, the only 
one that must be studied. Naturally, as m y master Tyerno Bokar the 
sage of Bandiagara told m e , it m a y happen and happens quite 
frequently that in islamizing itself, a country adopts one of the 
multicoloured tones that the gigantic triangular prism of Islam m a y 
offer, breaking up the divine white truth whose light Islam diffuses.23 
However , African Islam shows none the less characteristic currents and 
tendencies according to the moral and social problems of local situations. 
This is the explanation for the emphasis on brotherhoods, particularly in 
West Africa. A n d w e have already mentioned the reformist current that 
is well k n o w n through the procedures of the M o s l e m Cultural Union 
20. J. M . Abun-Nasr, 1979, p. 120. 
21. M . Dia, 1975; R . Milon, 1962. 
22. See, for example, A . Boudhiba, 1975. 
23. Statement made at the Colloque sur les Religions, Présence Africaine, 1961. 
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founded in 1953. O n the decidedly 'progressive' orientations of this 
movement , Vincent Monteil says: 'It favours all that expresses the African 
personality - despite some of its Bamako members w h o wanted to destroy 
the masks and the statuettes. S o it admits songs, dances and Negro art. 
It insists on the necessary distinction, on religious matters, between dogma 
and cult on one side, and social relationships on the other.' T h e latter in 
his opinion m a y be accommodated. S o m e people even think that fasting 
m a y be given freedom of choice, that the number of daily prayers could 
be reduced to two, or even dropped, because 'work is the true prayer'. 
W h a t count are morals, conduct and social behaviour. A s to polygamy, 
'there will necessarily be evolution, linked to the education of girls and 
to the emancipation of w o m e n ' . 2 4 
T h e development of Islam in contemporary Africa must also have been 
influenced by the socio-political reality in most African countries of co-
existing with Christianity and traditional African religion. While formal 
dialogue with traditional religion is unacceptable, there have been inter-
esting attempts to establish, in religious and doctrinal centres, high-level 
dialogue with Christianity. O n e such centre was opened in Tunis in 1977 
under the leadership of Professor A . Boudhiba.25 In Senegal, at the Bopp 
Centre,26 there is an effort to achieve Muslim-Christian co-operation in 
community development. In spite of fierce competition which seems to 
characterize religious rivalries, especially a m o n g the élite, generally there 
is a good deal of actual co-operation and genuine dialogue at the more 
popular village level. 
O n e of the most important results of the process of decolonization has 
been the transcending of the bounds of localism imposed on Islam by 
colonialism, and the re-emphasizing of the universal and international 
aspects of Islam. Contacts with the Middle East through the pilgrimage, 
pan-Islamic movement and exchange of scholars have been revived and 
greatly expanded. T h u s major movements in the Middle East - such as 
the Shfite fundamentalism of Khomeini's Iran and Kadhaffi radical 
revolutionary ideology - have had their impact on Africa. It is never 
certain, however, to what extent such localized anti-modernist radical 
movements in popular Islam, such as Maitatsine in Northern Nigeria, 
can be attributed to international influences. However, through its inter-
national links, Islam makes a definite contribution to the general socio-
economic development of Africa thanks to the financial support m a d e to 
different countries by the oil-producing Arab states of North Africa and 
of the Gulf.27 
'Religion', says Hatim M . Amiji, 'plays an important role in the granting 
24. V . Monteil, 1964. 
25. Centre de rencontres islamo-chrétiennes. 
26. D . El-Hadjdj Badara, 1979. 
27. A . A . Mazrui, 1975c; H . M . Amiji, 1984. 
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of aid to Africa'. But observers of Afro-Arab relations have noticed that 
almost all the Arab aid went to African beneficiaries w h o are connected 
with Islam. This link between economic aid and religious obedience 
corresponds to a precise political objective on the part of the Arab donors, 
which has been officially recognized by the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance, 
w h o said in 1974: 'The major portion of our international financial aid 
will be placed at the service of Arab countries and to assist the Mos lem 
countries, particularly in Africa'. 
However, since then Arab aid has been diversified and has gone to 
African states of differing political tendencies, Musl im or non-Muslim. 
A n d one should note among the Arab institutions for multilateral aid the 
Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa {Banque arabe pour 
le développement économique de l'Afrique - B A D E A ) , and the Special F u n d 
for Africa set up by O P E C , as well as the Fund for Arab-African 
Technical Assistance which is attached to the Economic Council of the 
Arab League. 
Independent African churches and African identity 
Although they have existed from the beginning of this century and even 
from the end of the last century, the movements of independent churches, 
including various kinds of sects, either messianist or millenarian, have 
expanded greatly since the 1960s. In 1967, they totalled 15500000 
according to the specialist D . B . Barrett. In 1970 there existed 6000 
strictly independent African organizations, with congregations of 16 
million. Today, in 1987, there must be about 10 000 independent churches 
and sects, totalling some 33 million faithful.28 
Although these churches and sects are spreading throughout Africa, 
the greatest concentration is found in South Africa with 3000, in Nigeria 
with 800, in Zaire which has more than 600, in Ghana with about 400 
at the present time, and in Kenya 180. O n e of the most important of 
these independent churches is the Church of Christ on Earth, founded 
by the prophet Simon Kimbangu. This Church alone estimates having 
about three million followers spread in several communities besides Zaire, 
particularly in the Congo Popular Republic, in Angola, in R w a n d a and 
in Burundi. 
These independent churches and sects have been classified into five 
categories by H . W . Turner.29 T h e first category comprises politico-
messianic movements - that is, groups essentially aiming at cultural and 
political liberation. O n e of the oldest of these movements is the United 
Native African Church of Nigeria, already active in 1891. Harrisism (from 
William W a d e Harris), active in the Côte d'Ivoire, in Liberia and in 
28. D . B . Barrett, 1982, p. 815. 
29. H . W . Turner, 1968, p. 178. 
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PLATE 17.3 Simon Kimbangu of the Belgian Congo (now Zaire), banished to prison in
Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi)
Ghana, is classified within this group. Another church along the same
lines is that called the Aroti or 'dreamers', which fought as early as 1934
in Kenya for liberation from British domination. This group ofmovements
insists on the need to develop an African Christianity, culturally integrated
into Africa.
A second category is that of the movements called neo-traditionalist.
In this group, for example, there is the organization known as Dini Ya
Musambwa, that is 'religion of the ancestors'. In Nigeria, Godianism may
be mentioned. This places at its centre the 'God of Africa', who is said
to have revealed himself for the first time in Egypt several thousand years
ago.
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T h e third category is that of the syncretic cults. These cults include 
a mixture of borrowings from African traditional beliefs and practices and 
from Christian beliefs and practices. T h e group includes the Bwiti cult 
from Gabon and the Deima cult from the Côte d'Ivoire. 
Other movements declare themselves to be monotheist or Hebraist, in 
the sense that they completely reject all traditional religions and are 
turned towards monotheism as revealed in the Old Testament. 
T h e fifth category groups the prophetic and healing churches. These 
proclaim themselves to be Christian, believing in Jesus Christ as the 
'Saviour' and placing great weight on the revelations of the Holy Spirit; 
for this reason they are often also known as 'Churches of the Holy Spirit'. 
A m o n g these the best-known are those with the n a m e of Sion, which are 
implanted especially in South Africa and in the surrounding countries. 
It used to be emphasized that the historic and circumstantial origins 
of these movements are related purely to the colonial situation, and linked 
on the political, cultural and social plane with the African struggle for 
independence. This point of view is well expressed by Baeta w h e n he 
says: 
T h e entire phenomenon of the prophetic and separatist churches has 
been very closely linked with the conflict between the European 
governments and the dominated peoples. In practically all analyses 
of these churches, from the first movements in central Africa and 
southern Africa to the contemporary movements among the Bakongo 
of the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, their importance 
has been noted and pointed out everywhere . . . In Southern Africa, 
Sundkler attributes their appearance to the total lack of all other 
opportunity for black citizens to express their political or even social 
opinions.30 
According to this view, the extension and proliferation of these inde-
pendent churches were greatly stimulated by the availability to African 
Christians of the translations of Holy Scriptures in the different African 
languages. 'These translations', wrote J. R . Leferink, 'gave Africans the 
possibility of comparing the Christianity presented by the churches 
founded by missionaries, and the message they read in the Scriptures. 
This comparison gave them the consoling impression that from then on, 
G o d spoke to them in their o w n language and was close to them. T h e y 
like very m u c h to feel him present and not simply to know that he is 
present.'31 
S u m m i n g up, a specialist states that the sects are the fruit of a double 
movement of disappointment and enthusiasm: 
30. C . G . Baëta, 1962, pp. 3-4; N . I. Ndiokwere, 1981, pp. 16-20. 
31. J. R . Leferink, 1985. 
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In different terms and through different practices, the sects offer a 
reply to the frustration that m a n y feel faced by the model of society 
and of the church during a particular epoch. T h e sects are an 
indicator and a challenge. Behind their multicoloured movements 
can be seen a claim of the senses, an immense thirst for betterment, 
freedom and salvation, lived in the socio-cultural conditions of the 
present time.32 
It is n o w generally agreed33 that this emphasis on the resistance, protest 
and proto-nationalist aspects takes too limited a view of the value of these 
independent African Church movements. It has distracted from the more 
positive and creative aspects of the churches, in the effort to develop an 
African theology that finds accommodation between African spiritual 
values and the inspiration of the Christian Bible. T h e churches could be 
viewed as centres for the re-evaluation of African religions and theology, 
in renewing the themes of humanism, sanctity of life and solidarity. 
Perhaps more important than the protest value of the churches was also 
the preservation of the African cosmology within the scope of Christian 
teaching. This m a d e it possible for the urban poor and rural villagers to 
join the churches in large numbers, to abandon the old divinities of 
traditional religion, and to m a k e sense of colonialism and its version of 
modernism without the trauma of having to abandon the essence of their 
world view. In particular, the traditional view of healing and deliverance 
through faith which the mission churches were unable to provide was 
what attracted most people to these churches. T h e churches offered their 
m e m b e r s security against the traditional forces of evil, sorcery and 
witchcraft in particular. In the urban areas, they offered a framework of 
security, solidarity and hospitality, aspects of welfare which the colonial 
system could not provide. T h e y provided scope for the traditional 
patronage of artistic talent in the drama of ritual, and the music, both 
vocal and instrumental, that traditional religion had provided. But above 
all, it was the churches that kept alive the traditional healing systems 
within the Christian idiom until their social value began again to be 
publicly appreciated. 
It can be said that generally the emergence of the multiple and 
complex messianistic movements in African societies both before and after 
independence was a reply to socio-economic requirements, and to the 
search for n e w spiritual paths in these societies. 
Seeking a n e w global balance in society, Africans felt the need to 
reconstruct their former religious systems, which used to give them all 
the elements that satisfied their global situation. Imported religious 
systems seeming to be ill-adapted and inadequate, they produced n e w 
32. R . D e Haes, 1982. 
33. T . O . Ranger, 1986. 
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systems that brought n e w values and n e w motivations.34 O n these grounds, 
these n e w religious movements questioned contemporary African societies 
in transition, but especially official Christianity and official Islam. But can 
it be said that they point the way towards eventual resolution of the 
plurality of religion in Africa? 
Conclusion 
(1) T h e religious factor, manifested in different forms, is undeniably 
influential in the historic development of Africa, where it plays 
a very important role. 
(2) It is important to be aware of this role, to be able to discern its 
advantages as a resource to be used and encouraged, and, on the 
other hand, as a problem to be contained, so as to condemn the 
negative effects of a religiosity that is contrary to the true meaning 
and requirements of African development. 
(3) African traditional religion, eroded though it is by the spread of 
Islam and of Christianity, is still alive and still has its o w n 
humanistic and spiritual principles, which have supported suc-
cessive African generations for thousands of years. W h e n given 
rational, scientific and philosophical criticism, these principles 
can be validly accepted and lived by contemporary African m a n , 
whether he has become Christian or M o s l e m , or has opted for 
a rationalist spiritual path. However , it must be noted that still 
too often, a certain African mentality that is superstitious, 
magical and mystical in character and therefore irrational, causes 
blockages in the processes of constructive thought and action 
towards effective progress within African society. 
(4) T h e Christian and Musl im religions have already deeply influ-
enced the history of the African continent, particularly over the 
last 50 years. For example, the influence of Islamization as of 
Christianization is clearly visible in the working out of African 
law. This is particularly so in the case of family law, and also 
certain civil laws which are impregnated with Islamic or Christian 
principles, according to whether they refer to countries pre-
dominantly Islamic or Christian. T h e y indicate present socio-
cultural tendencies, and play a major role in the development of 
Africa, both in the orientation of thought and also in the 
establishment and development of social and economic infra-
structures, the bases of the general development of Africa. F r o m 
the point of view of African identity, it is logical that in Africa 
both Christianity and Islam undergo at least a minimal process 
of 'inculturation', especially concerning doctrinal or ritual 
34. E. De Rosny, 1983. 
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expressions compatible with the basic requirements of these 
religions, imported by history into the bosom of African society. 
(5) T h e spread of African brotherhoods in relationship with Islam, 
or the independent churches, sects, messianisms and other 
Christiano-African syncretisms, causes one to reflect on the 
questions these pose to the religions that were historically con-
stituted and hierarchically controlled - as, in fact, was African 
society itself. These movements reveal the faults and short-
comings in the principles of social organization; they draw 
attention to spiritual aspirations and psycho-social needs that are 
not entirely satisfied by the existing political and economic 
systems. 
So , the religious factor, adequately perceived, analysed and criticized, 
and correctly planned, can still contribute to the harmonious social 
transformation and total development of Africa at this end of the twentieth 
century. 
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Alfa I. S O W and 
Mohamed H . ABDULAZIZ 
T h e most salient features of this period have been the consolidation of 
traditional colonialism and racism, with their far-reaching language and 
cultural policies; the struggle of the African peoples for self-determination 
and independence; the emergence of neo-colonialism, which has altered 
the language and cultural situation; and the incipient African awareness 
of the importance of preserving and developing national cultures and 
languages. 
T h e period can be divided into three parts: 
(i) 1935 to i960, w h e n African languages were being confronted 
with the danger of assimilation; 
(2) i960 to 1982, w h e n a n e w language and cultural policy was being 
shaped; and 
(3) on the horizon of the year 2000: important challenges as from 
1982. 
African languages and the danger of assimilation: 
1935-60 
T h e colonial powers, each acting according to its inclination, its chosen 
course of action, its interests at the time, and its ability to enlist differing 
numbers of middle-grade administrators to run its empire, either engaged 
in a straightforward policy of linguistic, educational and cultural assimi-
lation or else adopted a selective and more subtle approach. For instance, 
the French colonial administration, with its centralizing bent, set out to 
integrate the Africans into its education system, which it looked upon as 
being universally valid. O n the other hand, the pragmatic British stood 
resolutely aloof from the 'natives' and introduced the use of African 
languages in the early years of primary schooling, especially for such 
subjects as history and geography, religious instruction, natural history, 
and so on. In reality, this practice paved the way for the learning of 
English. 
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Assimilation as the aspiration of a whole era 
Until quite recently, assimilation was a goal m u c h sought after by the 
Africans themselves and it came to be rejected only at a later stage, from 
1954 onwards. 
In a paper entitled 'Traditional cultures and social changes', A m a d o u 
Hampaté Bà had this to say: 
W h e n the European colonialists went into action [in the cultural 
field] they did not meet with any fierce instinct of social preservation 
on the part of autochthones, w h o were already well-accustomed to 
adapting themselves to conversions imposed on them by the trend 
of history. They seemed to be mere nonentities, following meekly 
along like Panurge's sheep.1 
However, the colonial system was organizing itself and tightening its 
grip on Africa at a time w h e n the world was being shaken to its foundations 
and colonial empires were being toppled by two world wars within the 
space of 21 years, by the triumph of the Socialist Revolution in October 
1917, by the concept of the 'right of peoples to decide their o w n fate', 
and by the movements aimed at liberating the colonized peoples. At a 
time w h e n the far-reaching social and political changes of the twentieth 
century had already been set in motion, Africa was still being exposed to 
a serious threat to its cultural identity. T h e authentic values of the past 
that had withstood the test of time were being decried, ridiculed and 
debased in the face of the new values imported by the European 
civilizations. Confrontations arose between the more and less 'advanced' 
members of the population or between those w h o were deemed to be 
'assimilated' and the 'natives'. For m a n y Africans, assimilation came to 
be regarded as a legitimate demand or as a moral ideal to which they 
sincerely aspired. Hence, the new ambitions of the colonized subjects 
took the form of wanting to live like the colonialists, dress like them, eat 
and drink like them, speak and be housed like them, and laugh and get 
angry like them, in short to have the same religious, moral and cultural 
yardsticks. 
Colonization: a blow dealt by fate 
While some colonial administrators and technical personnel learnt 'native 
languages' primarily in the hope of understanding the Africans and 
penetrating their innermost secrets, after the First World W a r and its 
ensuing social and cultural upheavals, Africans w h o were in a position to 
do so sent their children to the 'white men's schools' back in the colonial 
h o m e country, so that they could study the real knowledge which the 
1. UNESCO, 1975a, p. 48. 
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whites imparted to their o w n children, discover the reasons for their 
power and their victory and, 'things being what they were', live on good 
terms with them. 
There are a host of examples of this attitude in the African-language 
literature of the period, both oral and written in Arabic script (the so-
called Ajami literature). 
T h e wish to gain an insight into the other side's secrets, so as not to 
be deceived, became an increasingly widespread aim and a lasting obsession 
on both sides. W i m few exceptions, however, those detached observers 
on the African side were completely overwhelmed and w o n over, so that 
they eventually allowed themselves to be transformed and drawn into the 
system. 
European colonization was accepted practically everywhere as being a 
blow dealt by fate. A n assimilationist trend emerged in the literature of 
the period, sometimes at the instigation of the colonial administrators 
themselves. This trend contributed to the demoralization of Africans by 
calling on them to co-operate loyally with the colonialists, and to assist 
them both in the war effort and in mobilizing forced labour and conscripts, 
house and feed their agents, provide them with the workers they needed 
to make roads, lay railways and build bridges spanning rivers, as well as 
pay the income tax and other taxes which they levied on the population. 
This defeatist current, which was often encouraged by leading traditional 
figures, extolled the colonial order, the sense of security, which it had 
established, and the major discoveries and marvels of the 'white man's 
century', such as motor vehicles, aircraft, radio, railways, motor roads 
and so on. 
However, a minority and usually anonymous counter-movement m a d e 
its voice heard in the n a m e of ancestral values and age-old tradition. 
Setting out as it did to be the conscience of the people, this minority 
denounced the loyalist faction and its standard-bearers and became the 
spokesman of the colonized peoples, whose emancipation it presented as 
an irreversible process, especially after the victories of Lebanon and Syria 
and the independence of the peoples of Indochina, followed by the 
uprising in Algeria in 1954. 
Literature as a fall-back value 
African-language oral and Ajami literature derided 'those w h o ape the 
white m a n ' and those ' w h o speak the white man's language without 
understanding it', and cursed w o m e n ' w h o shamelessly take off their 
clothes and talk like the soldiers they hope to attract'. A s critical 
bystanders, some of the cultural élites described the major upheavals 
taking place in their writings and warned African societies of the danger 
of surrendering their fundamental values and of thereby losing their 
personalities. 
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T h e sense of helplessness felt by those élites, with their traditional 
upbringing, w h o had to contend with the grave perils of the time, found 
expression in their literary and artistic works and in the proverbs and 
songs which they composed or inspired. For example, a Muslim poet 
from the Futa Jalon, in Guinea, writing in Fulfulde, described the 'woes 
of our century' in the following words: 
Misfortune is upon us: the times have changed, 
Lawlessness is spreading and the law is retreating, 
Tradition has vanished and heresy has appeared, 
Morals have declined and selfishness is the rule, 
Kinship has yielded to the quest for pleasure, 
Compassion has been banished; adultery is rife 
A n d its offspring is legion, ( 
Truth is forsaken, 
Education suffers and hypocrisy is rampant, 
Wealth abounds and discord is rampant, 
Theft is rampant, looting is rampant, 
Lying is rampant: Satan has triumphed! 
Their evil hearts are more poisonous than venom, 
Their sole concern is to amass wealth 
A n d w o m e n and jewellery, 
They have chosen this world and abandoned the other, 
Those w h o deny or ignore the truth are on the increase, 
Conflict and sin are on the increase, 
W e must escape, 
But there is nowhere to flee, nowhere to stay, 
Caught as w e are in the clutches of this vast world.2 
T h e African peoples accordingly rediscovered their identity in their 
languages and literatures, which continued to provide close and indis-
soluble links with the lost past and the vanished generations by still 
conveying the ancestral moral values and representing particularly precious 
fall-back values. However, even those values were affected by the changes 
occurring. 
Enrichment of the vocabulary and vehicular languages 
A s a result of contacts with Islam and with Arab and Asian traders, 
especially from Iran, as well as of contacts with European languages 
and Christianity, all the African languages considerably enriched their 
vocabulary and a whole wealth of religious, technological, scientific and 
cultural terms still bear witness to the economic and social developments 
over that 25-year period. 
2. A . I. Sow, 1966, p. 136. 
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Euro-African languages, such as Creole and pidgin, developed and 
became genuine black African languages in some of the countries and 
cities of the Atlantic seaboard, such as Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, the 
Gambia , Sierra Leone and Cameroon. T h e Creole languages of Gambia 
and Cameroon and the krio of Sierra Leone borrowed a large number of 
words from English, and the crioulo of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau 
likewise borrowed from Portuguese. In the cases where such languages 
exist, their basic phonological, syntactical and semantic features are 
African, even though their vocabulary, which is a reflection of a particular 
power relationship, is borrowed to a considerable degree from European 
languages. In some countries, such as Mauritius, Creole is the most 
widespread and popular means of linguistic communication. 
With the encouragement of the colonial powers, Kiswahili, Lingala, 
Bambara and Hausa all underwent remarkable growth as inter-ethnic 
vehicular languages that were widely used in the armies and police forces 
of the G e r m a n , English, Belgian or French administrations. 
Furthermore, from the late 1920s, there were, among the colonial 
technical personnel and senior administrators, specialists w h o pointed to 
the dangers of assimilation and w h o m a d e out a case for engaging in far-
reaching research on Africa and its inhabitants and called for an in-depth 
study of African languages and literatures. 
A cleverly engineered development 
T h u s it was that in June 1926, the inaugural meeting of the International 
Institute of African Languages and Civilizations was held in London , 
attended by delegates from South Africa, Germany, Belgium, Egypt, the 
United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Sweden. This new 
institution was defined as being a body designed to gather information 
of all kinds on the languages, civilizations and particular problems of 
Africa, and to act as a liaison office between specialists on those subjects. 
It set out to 'link science to practical experience by showing h o w the 
discoveries of the former can be used for the administration, education, 
hygiene, well-being and development of Africans'.3 
Hence, there came into being a style of African studies which was at 
the behest of the colonial system and was subsequently responsible for 
the type of ethnographic scrutiny to which Africans and their societies 
and cultures came to be subjected. 
T h e Institute, which was to become the International African Institute, 
more commonly k n o w n by its initials IAI, publishes Africa, a quarterly 
journal, the first number of which appeared in January 1928, as well as 
African monographs and documents containing papers, written in African 
languages on religion, customs, myths, legends, historical and other 
3. V . Foutchantse, 1967, p. 143. 
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traditions and social institutions, and 'tales, proverbs and riddles', all of 
which are translated into a European language. 
Right from the time the Institute was first established, it applied itself 
to transcribing African languages in R o m a n characters and to developing 
a reference alphabet, the 'International African Alphabet', which is still 
k n o w n as the 'IAI alphabet' and which was to serve as a basis for the 
transcription of some sixty African languages. 
In April 1929, it established a prize 'to assist and encourage the natives, 
with the aim of getting them to produce, in their o w n languages, works 
that will last and of which they can be proud'. This practice continued 
until 1950, w h e n the Institute decided that the original aim had been 
achieved, since both the West African and East African Literature Bureaux 
were by then in a position to meet the need for works of 'vernacular 
literature'. 
In point of fact, in 1942, the Council of American Churches on African 
Affairs, with the agreement of the IAI, had recommended that priority 
be given to Christian literature in African languages. Moreover, in 1950, 
the Institute established the Margaret W r o n g Prize, after the n a m e of the 
secretary of the International Committee for Christian Literature in 
Africa, ' w h o played a leading role in the spiritual and cultural development 
of Africa in the last twenty years of her life' and w h o died in Uganda on 
11 April 1948. 
Henceforward, works written in African languages or in Arabic could 
not be awarded the prize unless they had already been published in 
Afrikaans, French, English or Portuguese. T h e n e w prize was accordingly 
expected to encourage literature 'in European languages'. 
This development clearly points to the colonialist design forming the 
backdrop to the undertaking. T h e IAI had been created to bring together 
isolated scholars engaged in African studies and to co-ordinate activities 
that were primarily geared to colonialist action, and were meant to prepare 
for the far-reaching changes ahead and to manage the 'development of 
Africans' within Western civilization. It was not a philanthropic institution 
dedicated to scientific research on Africa for Africa's sake. T h e 'African 
school textbook' project set up by the IAI laid d o w n the following 
guidelines: 
Designed to introduce students to Western civilization and thought, 
they [the textbooks] will deal above all with subjects having a bearing 
on European life, but they will also show h o w Africa and its 
inhabitants can be the subject of serious studies, especially as they 
pertain to history, geography, natural history, social life and religion. 
It is becoming increasingly necessary to provide educated Africans 
with well-produced books in European languages, since their influ-
ence is expected to be decisive for the training of future chiefs.4 
4. See V . Foutchantse, 1967, p. 143. 
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It is important, however, to highlight the work done by scholars and 
missionaries w h o , either at the IAI's urging or out of conscientiousness, 
produced European-language reference books, such as dictionaries and 
grammars, or educational works of a high scientific standard which 
provided an insight into the languages and cultures of Africa. Colonial 
administrators, missionaries, and specialists of all kinds, such as social 
anthropologists, geographers, naturalists, musicologists, educators and 
military officers, some of them humanists and some enlightened amateurs 
of both sexes, often disregarded or defied the prohibitions and instructions 
of the colonial administrations and engaged in the collection and the 
transcription, in the 'LAI alphabet' or in a script of their choosing, of 
historical, scientific and literary works belonging to the African cultural 
heritage, which they then translated into European languages. Their work 
was published in the journals of the period, such as the Bulletin du Comité 
d'études historiques et scientifiques de l'AOF (later to become the Bulletin 
de l'Institut français de l'Afrique noire), and, w h e n replaced in its context, 
can still be useful today. It is through their action and that of their 
'informers' and other African collaborators that a whole living corpus of 
newspapers and literature in the Yoruba, Igbo, E w e , Hausa, Akan (Twi 
and Fanti), Duala and Kiswahili languages came into being in R o m a n 
script (usually the 'LAI alphabet'), especially in Nigeria, Ghana , Togo , 
Cameroon and Tanzania. 
The shaping of a new language and cultural policy: 
1960-82 
Even so, as long as colonialism lasted, though some important steps were 
taken by private institutions and m e n of goodwill, there was no permanent 
effort to promote African languages and cultures. 
A time of hesitation and trial and error 
T h e accession of m a n y African countries to independence in i960 could 
have provided an opportunity for a critical and lucid assessment of the 
colonial experience, the definition of outstanding problems, and the laying-
d o w n of principles and guidelines for a fresh departure as far as national 
languages, cultures and education were concerned. Unfortunately, with 
very few exceptions, the former practices of the colonial powers were 
merely taken over wholesale, often without the slightest alteration. Indeed, 
m a n y of the n e w nations attached so little importance to the cultural 
sphere that they allowed it to slip to the bottom of their priorities, 
virtually relying on the generosity of foreign countries and international 
organizations for its survival. 
It was only little by little, acting at the instigation and prompting of 
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universities, private foundations and institutions in m a n y countries of 
Europe and America, as well as under pressure from regional and sub-
regional learned societies at their congresses, seminars and symposia, and 
in response to the energetically-voiced demands of youth and student 
movements and w o m e n ' s and workers' organizations, that the leaders of 
the post-colonial states came to acknowledge the need for educational 
programmes that took African languages as a basis. Even then, it was 
necessary to proceed with the utmost caution so as not to upset the 
former colonial powers and the acculturated national administrators, w h o 
regarded the 'vernacular languages' as worthless. Even political leaders as 
clearsighted as President K w a m e N k r u m a h of G h a n a were reluctant to 
promote what they felt to be a vast number of 'backward' languages, for 
fear that such a policy might jeopardize the new states' efforts at nation-
building by dividing the Africans to no useful purpose at a time when 
they ought to be united. Those political leaders could not yet visualize 
Africans speaking and making themselves understood in languages other 
than English, French or Arabic! 
T h e break with the past 
For all these reasons, African languages were first looked upon as having 
a geographical, social and cultural scope confined to rural areas, to adults 
and to oral tradition. Yet the issues at stake were immense; the question 
was whether the peoples of Africa would have access not only to education 
and culture but to the exercise of political and economic power as well. 
Eventually, however, the poignant observation that 'in Africa, every time 
an old m a n dies, a library goes up in flames' began to have some effect 
on international decision-makers, w h o were moved to allocate substantial 
resources to research on African oral traditions and cultures. 
Between 1962 and 1964, a large number of African-language depart-
ments and study and research centres were created in the newly founded 
universities of the continent, and high-quality journals and periodicals 
specializing in African languages and linguistics came into being and grew 
rapidly, especially in the universities of Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Addis 
Ababa and Ibadan. 
During the same period, at the Congress of the Association of Orien-
talists held in M o s c o w in i960, Africanist studies were separated from 
Orientalism, so that Africa assumed a place of its o w n , no longer being 
treated by the Europeans as part of the Orient or by the Orientals as part 
of the West. With U N E S C O ' s support, the International Congress of 
Africanists was created in Accra in i960, notably at the instigation of the 
Société africaine de culture (Alioune Diop) and the University of Ibadan 
(Onwuka Dike). 
Encouraged from the outset by the world-famous American and Soviet 
scholars, Melville Herskovits and Ivan Posteshkin, this new institution 
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contributed to promoting African studies and to 'arousing, among 
Africans, a profound awareness of their o w n cultures'. 
In 1962, in the context of its activities under the World Programme 
for Combating Illiteracy, U N E S C O decided in favour of adult education 
in African languages and promised assistance for that purpose to the 
countries of the region. This decision marked the first step in the 
recognition of those languages and their introduction into the modern 
sector of the education system of the African countries. 
N e e d s and realities 
Thus , African languages acquired their proper status as fully-fledged 
languages and the disparaging terms such as 'dialects', 'tribal languages', 
'vernacular languages' and so on, which had formerly been used indis-
criminately to label them, gradually disappeared from the vocabulary of 
the specialists and only emerged from time to time in the unguarded 
writings or provocative pronouncements of a handful of irresponsible 
individuals. 
It was then found that m a n y of the purportedly scholarly studies and 
academic papers available on African languages had been produced by 
amateurs or autodidacts w h o had no proper grounding in linguistics, had 
used a rudimentary descriptive approach for immediate practical purposes, 
had aligned philology, phonetics and grammar too closely on European-
language models and had indulged in obscure comparisons based on a 
priori judgements. W h a t is more, although the studies were undertaken 
well after the emergence of modern linguistic theories, few of them had 
made use of the discoveries of Saussure and the structuralists. 
It was therefore necessary to start all over again with the assistance 
of consultants, foreign counterparts, researchers and teachers. African 
university teachers and scholars had to be alerted to linguistic problems 
and arrangements had to be m a d e for them to be awarded training 
fellowships in the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. 
U N E S C O ' s action 
Once the general guidelines and basic options had been laid d o w n by the 
countries concerned, U N E S C O ' s assistance m a d e it possible, by consulting 
specialists and holding regional and sub-regional meetings of experts, to 
identify the methodological and technical difficulties and to point to 
solutions, as well as to draw up operational programmes for a set of 
countries and languages and to train and equip national professionals to 
supervise the implementation of such programmes.5 Table 18.1, from a 
U N E S C O publication, demonstrates the complexity of the task. 
5. A detailed review of U N E S C O ' s action can be found in A . I. S o w , 1977. 
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Little by little, U N E S C O ' s activities became more systematically organ-
ized and m a d e it possible to achieve decisive results in collecting oral 
traditions and promoting the languages conveying those traditions. 
A m o n g the main contributions m a d e by U N E S C O , mention must be 
m a d e of the adoption, in 1964, of the Project for the Drafting of a General 
History of Africa; the organization, in 1966, of the Linguistic Conference 
in B a m a k o , which laid d o w n the standardized transcription of a number 
of vehicular languages in West Africa; the definition of a Co-ordinated 
Regional Research Plan on Oral Traditions in 1968; assistance with 
the publication of literary and initiatory texts of considerable cultural 
significance, such as the Kaidara in 1968; the preparation, adoption and 
implementation of the Ten-Year Plan for the Systematic Study of Oral 
Tradition and the Promotion of African Languages as vehicles of culture 
and instruments of lifelong education, in 1972; support for the estab-
lishment, fitting-out and operation not only of the A h m e d Baba Centre 
in Timbuktu (for Arabic and Ajami manuscripts of the Sahel and the 
Western Sudan), but also of the sub-regional centres for research on oral 
tradition and African languages: C E L H T O {Centre d'études linguistiques et 
historiques par tradition orale) in Niamey for West Africa, C E R D O T O L A 
(Centre régional de documentation sur les traditions orales et les langues 
africaines) in Yaounde for Central Africa, and E A C R O T A N A L (Eastern 
African Centre for Research on Oral Traditions and African National 
Languages) in Zanzibar for East and Central Africa. 
Each of these institutions, created with international assistance under 
the Ten-Year Plan, co-ordinates research activities for the sub-region and 
publishes academic papers both in the African languages of the sub-
region and on the subject of those languages. S o m e of the centres - for 
instance, the one in Niamey, even publishes a journal: the Cahiers 
du C E L H T O - have established bi-lingual African/European-language 
collections of major historical, literary and philosophical documents. 
B y organizing regular meetings of experts, U N E S C O also encourages 
personal contacts and the sharing of ideas between African scholars and 
their counterparts working on African languages, cultures and studies 
elsewhere in the world.6 
U N E S C O has also taken steps to arrange for the translation of the 
General History of Africa into some of the vehicular languages of the 
region, such as Arabic, Kiswahili, Hausa and Fulfulde and, at the start 
of the 1980s, began preparations for the publication of general and cultural 
dictionaries of Kiswahili, Yoruba, Fulfulde and other languages. 
6. A m o n g others, the meeting in B a m a k o in 1979 on the use of African regional or 
sub-regional languages, and that in Conakry in 1981 on the definition of a strategy for 
the promotion of African languages. 
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African studies outside Africa 
O n e of the main results of decolonization will certainly be the significant 
growth of African studies outside Africa, not only in the universities of 
the former colonial powers where they have taken on a fresh lease of life, 
but also and above all in m a n y countries in Western and Northern Europe, 
the Americas and Asia. 
Under the irresistible impetus of the African-American communities 
of North, Central and South America, and as a result of the enormous 
interest shown in 'African affairs', m a n y universities in the United States, 
the Caribbean and Brazil have set up centres for African studies and have 
introduced courses on such subjects as Africa past and present, its 
languages and literature and its different cultures. 
Arabic, Kiswahili, Yoruba and Hausa studies, to mention only a few, 
have expanded significantly in North America. Indeed, it was a profoundly 
moving experience for the peasants of present-day Africa to welcome 
young American travellers, or Peace-Corps volunteers, or Japanese or 
European researchers w h o could speak to them in Fulfulde, Kiswahili, 
Yoruba, Wolof, Hausa or other languages, as if they had always been 
living in the neighbouring village! 
T h e French Agence de coopération culturelle et technique ( A C C T ) , which 
was originally created for the purpose of defending and developing the 
language and culture of France, has funded significant research and other 
work on African languages and literature. It has commissioned and 
published bi-lingual editions of works aimed at promoting these languages 
and spreading knowledge of them throughout the world. 
T h e enthusiasm for Africa and its languages and cultures was such 
that it inspired African students and intellectuals to take up the call and 
incited African countries to show greater interest, provide more substantial 
resources and encourage advanced teaching and research. 
W h a t does the future hold in store? 
All in all, the accession of the peoples of Africa to 'international sov-
ereignty' opened a wide variety of horizons and prospects for them. 
However, the assistance their countries received from all quarters did not 
always help to stiffen their resistance to foreign cultural domination. T h e 
divisions and the burdensome legacy of their recent past as colonized 
peoples, the hesitations and lack of experience of their leaders, the 
watering-down of decisions at the executive level, the dilapidation and 
wastage of their resources and of their domestic efforts were all factors 
that scarcely m a d e it possible for them to take an overall view of the 
situation or to spell out the issues and evolve a strategy and operational 
programme likely to guide their steps more surely on the path to the 
unity and freedom they sought. 
549 
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A critical appraisal and the application of the relevant findings of 
certain regional or worldwide meetings - such as the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Cultural Policies in Africa held in Accra in 1975, or the 
World Conference on Cultural Policies held in Mexico City in 1982, or 
the regional meetings of experts which U N E S C O organizes periodically 
in African capitals on cultures or languages and language policies - would 
have m a d e it possible to reverse the trend by providing African leaders 
with the all-embracing and untroubled view of things which they still 
lack. 
Unfortunately, these conclusions do not appear to have been assimilated 
and used to shed light on the cultural practices, or indeed the cultural 
policies, of any country in Africa. 
T h e year 2000: important challenges as from 1982 
In the countries of present-day Africa, there appears to be very little 
concern for the acquisition of written and oral fluency in African languages 
and the progress accomplished by linguistic research, with international 
assistance, is all too often disregarded. 
However, unless priority is given to the development of those languages, 
there can be no prospect of Africa and its peoples achieving endogenous 
economic development and social and cultural advancement within a 
time-span that is humanly reasonable or acceptable. O n the threshold of 
the third millennium, time is more than ever working against the African 
languages. 
F r o m oral tradition to oral communication 
W e are still at a stage where tape-recorders continue to be used to take 
d o w n African languages and where makeshift devices are being tacked 
onto traditional typewriters in an attempt to transcribe them. However, 
it is already high time to have assimilated and gone beyond the outmoded 
stages represented by the mini-cassette, the long-playing gramophone 
record and the electric typewriter, in order to catch up with those w h o 
have taken the lead in using video-discs and word-processors. 
African languages came late to the appointment with the Gutenberg 
galaxy and it is an acknowledged fact that they have by no means m a d e 
up for the delay or still settled their score with writing. 
However, the world's other languages, which are often saturated with 
writing, are n o w taking giant strides towards oral communication and the 
visual image. T h e goal to be achieved bears no relation whatsoever to the 
unsophisticated orality which impregnates communication in the African 
languages, where the h u m a n voice can only be relayed from time to time 
by the talking drum. O n the contrary, it is a new type of oral c o m -
550 
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munication, arising out of writing and industry, a technocrat's oral 
discourse in which video has a decisive role to play. 
Perform or perish 
T h e population experts estimate that if the current growth rates are 
maintained, Africa will have 850 million inhabitants by the year 2000, 
representing 14 per cent of the world's population at that time, compared 
with 10.6 per cent at the end of the 1980s. O f those Africans, 297.5 
million will be under 15 years of age. W h a t languages will they be 
speaking in a continent where the pace of urban growth is being stepped 
up? Like the cultures they epitomize and convey, African languages are 
currently undergoing constant changes, some of which can be ascribed 
to the all-pervasive domination of the foreign languages of worldwide 
communication that are used in all the spheres of the everyday life of the 
nation. Although the world linguistic scene is n o w tending to over-
simplification in favour ofthat handful of universal languages, the portents 
are that African languages, like other minority languages, will resist and 
will continue to exist. 
However, if African languages are to survive, they will have to evolve, 
and that implies that governments will have to have a clear vision of their 
goals and needs; they will have to draw up coherent operational pro-
grammes and allocate substantial h u m a n , technical and financial resources 
to implementing them. This means that it will be more than ever necessary 
to go beyond the stage of improvisation and hesitation, expediency and 
the makeshift, in order eventually to evolve a genuine language policy. 
Terminology committees will endeavour to draw up an inventory of 
the scientific and technological information accumulated by mankind as 
a whole, so as to integrate it systematically into African languages. Other 
research units will rapidly create and foster a whole range of specialized 
and popular press organs serving those languages. 
There can be no doubt that, by the end of the present century, the 
technological revolution w e are n o w witnessing will dictate the formation 
of major geo-political and socio-cultural units, in which speed will abolish 
distance and free the farthest corners of the earth from isolation through 
advanced technology and increasingly high-performance communications 
systems. In this breakneck race towards universality, there will no longer 
be any room for amateurs and Africa will be compelled, merely in order 
to retain sovereignty over the space it occupies, to ensure that computers 
and satellites can speak its languages. 
Are w e asking too m u c h of our run-down neo-colonized economies? It 
is quite clear that the break-up of the old territorial units of the pre-
colonial and colonial era has given rise, in present-day Africa, to states 
that are incapable of coping by themselves and are often condemned to 
beg for alms on the international scene. 
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A s it approaches the threshold of the third millenium, Africa is faced 
with a host of strategic cultural and language issues. Year in and year 
out, its languages have hitherto largely defended themselves with a 
measure of success against the grave dangers to which they were exposed 
under colonial occupation. However, the problem will no longer be merely 
one of safeguarding knowledge w h e n that knowledge itself has been 
undermined by its o w n conditions of preservation and by the manner in 
which it is handed d o w n . 
Unless Africa is to allow itself to be taken over and eventually be 
overwhelmed by cleverly packaged and widely disseminated values that 
are artificial or superficial, it will have to m a k e its presence and per-
formance felt in the new electronic age. If the ancestral knowledge of 
Africans is compiled, analysed, updated and communicated both in writing 
and by image and sound from the end of this second millenium onwards, 
it will be possible for future generations to refresh themselves at this 
source and to maintain the close ties with the past that are essential to 
them. 
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T h e period since the 1930s is precisely the era which has witnessed the 
most extensive flowering of written literature in Africa.1 A s formal 
education and literacy expanded, and African access to university edu-
cation increased significantly, a reservoir of literate Africans was created 
from which n e w writers finally emerged. A n d an expanding pool of 
potential readers of and listeners to African literature came into being. 
Although the short story, the essay and the biography as literary genres 
were by no means insignificant, the most basic forms of creative literature 
in this period of African history were, first, poetry and rhetoric; secondly, 
drama and the theatre; and, thirdly, the novel. Perhaps the easiest to 
accommodate with indigenous tradition were rhetoric and poetry. Africa 
had had poets, orators and composers of songs almost since the beginning 
of language itself. T h e interplay between indigenous poetic and oratorical 
traditions and the n e w forms of the Western world was in m a n y ways 
the least painful area of culture contact in literature. 
But if poetry was the most indigenous form of literature on the continent, 
the novel was the most alien. E v e n in the Western world the novel was 
primarily a product of the nineteenth century and of the industrial rev-
olution. O f course story-telling as such was primordial in both the West and 
Africa. H e n c e the transition to short stories was not so difficult. Griots in 
West Africa go back at least a millennium. Complexity of material was not 
a problem. After all, very long and complex epics were told in Africa. But 
the novel as an art-form which fuses a single story with characterization, 
plot and narrative went beyond the conventions of the griot. O f all the 
literary forms which burst their w a y into Africa during European colonial 
rule, the novel was in m a n y ways the most purely European. 
This chapter discusses the main themes expressed in literature as they 
relate to the general history of Africa without attempting to give a 
1. This chapter is greatly indebted to earlier work by A. A . Mazrui, especially A . A . 
Mazrui, 1975a, and A . A . Mazrui and M . Bakari, 1986a and 1986b. 
! 
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PLATE 19.1 A griot, or traditional African story-teller
complete overview of all aspects of literature. Changes of a formal or
stylistic nature are not discussed, the history of literary circles, organ¬
izations and journals is not pursued, the complex filiation of influences
and innovations cascading over their generations must be left aside.
Before a discussion of the main themes of African literature can be
opened, a few words must first be said about the economic and technical
constraints which have impeded and still hamper the production of literary
works. The scarcity of presses, the absence of substantial publishing
houses in most parts of the continent and the cost of books are major
obstacles. Moreover, too few of the writers' countrymen and women can
read European languages and even fewer can afford to buy books. The
writer in African languages paradoxically faces similar problems. More
readers of diverse walks of life can enjoy the texts, but their appeal is
now limited by the language itself. This is not a problem for Arabic, but
it is the tragedy of much writing in sub-Saharan African languages.
The new oral artists, and such composers still exist, are bypassed in
literary surveys because they are contemporary, yet expressing themselves
in a mode associated with archaism. Moreover, they reach only those who
listen to them. Thus even today African oral authors still suffer from the
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lack of a diversified African audience, and this in turn affects the authors. 
Since they can rarely take part in dialogue, they are condemned to 
soliloquy. T o o often they write for a handful of peers, or for localized 
audiences. A high proportion of authors and narrators in the oral tradition 
are women with great verbal skills and virtuosity, in both verse and story-
telling. Grace Ogot's early writings had links with a m u c h older L u o 
tradition of oral narrative. 
O n poetry and politics 
W e shall return to the novel later, but let us first examine that most 
indigenous literary form - poetry. O n e of the most important aspects of 
African poetry in this period was the link with political experience. Several 
factors went towards forging this linkage. O n e factor was the phenomenon 
of cultural nationalism itself. Connected with this was the use of proverbs 
in traditional discourse. Yet another factor in the African poetic experience 
in this period was the impact of the Bible and the Kur'ân as sources of 
poetic inspiration. But underlying all these was the role of emotion as a 
basic element in both poetry and certain forms of political appeal. 
A m o n g the peoples of Africa perhaps none has had a body of poetry 
more closely linked to nationalism than the Somali. John Drysdale was 
once startled by h o w Somali nationalism was fostered by 'the national 
appeal of the Somali poetry'. A n d Colin L e g u m soon discovered that 
because of the longing for Somali reunification, Somali poetry was often 
'strongly tinged with ideas of "amputation" and "the dismemberment" 
of the Somali nation'.2 Poetry by Somali w o m e n is less politicized, but 
by no means divorced from patriotism. 
A different kind of cultural nationalism erupted among Africans in 
Paris in the 1930s. Partly inspired by surrealism as a rebellion against the 
tyranny of language and bourgeois art, Francophone Africans in Paris 
initiated a rebellion against the colonization of the African mind, but in 
a European frame of reference.3 T h e French imperial policy of cultural 
assimilation provoked the African response of négritude. It turned out to 
be a pan-African experience of unique significance. African and Caribbean 
writers forged an alliance of poetry to lament their o w n dislocation from 
ancestry and affirm the validity of tradition and African authenticity. T h e 
alliance between A i m é Césaire of Martinique and Leopold Sedar Senghor 
was a particularly important foundation of the literary movement of 
négritude. Indeed, A i m é Césaire invented the word 'négritude', and then 
embarked on what Nietzche would have called a 'transvaluation of values'. 
A i m é Césaire applauded and said 'Hooray' to the following: 
2. J. Drysdale, 1964, p. 15; and C . Legum, 1963, p. 505. 
3. W . Soyinka, 1985, p. 564. 
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plate 19.2 Above left: Aimé Césaire, French
writer born in Martinique; above right: Leopold
Sédar Senghor ofSenegal, member of the Aca¬
démie française
Those who have invented neither powder nor the compass,
Those who have tamed neither gas nor electricity,
Those who have explored neither the seas nor the skies . . .
My négritude is not a rock, its deafness hurled against the
clamour of the day,
My négritude is not a thing of dead water on the dead eye
of the earth;
My négritude is neither a tower nor a cathedral:
It plunges into the red flesh of the earth.4
Writers like Jean-Joseph Rabearivelo (Malagasy), Tchicaya U Tam'si
(Congo) and Yambo Ouologuem (Mali) joined the literary African forces
against European cultural imperialism and in favour of African cultural
vindication.
The forces of poetry and of politics were joined. In the earlier years
of this period it was not clear whether we were witnessing poets with an
interest in politics or politicians with an interest in poetry. It has been
pointed out often enough that Leopold Senghor of Senegal was a poet,
Keita Fodeba of Guinea a producer of ballets, Bernard Dadié of the Côte
d'Ivoire a novelist and Cofi Gadeau a playwright, before they held political
office in their respective countries. In those early years it was difficult to
4. This rendering in English is from S. W. Allen's translation of J.-P. Sartre, 1963,
PP- 41-3-
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draw a line between the artist and the activist, between the poet and the 
politician.5 
In the fusion between art and agitation, certain African magazines 
played a decisive role for a while. These included Présence Africaine 
(Paris), Black Orpheus (Ibadan) and Transition (Kampala and Accra).6 
Are oratory and rhetoric a branch of literature? They definitely can be -
especially in societies of the oral tradition. Let us turn to a special kind 
of fusion between oratory and poetry. 
Foreign art and African activism 
Oratory and rhetoric definitely are flourishing branches of African litera-
ture. N o one w h o ever heard Patrice L u m u m b a ' s impassioned pleas can 
ever doubt this. N o one swayed by al-Nasser's rhetoric will ever forget 
it. But, alas, a record of most such performances has not survived. 
Until independence, the African activist w h o used art for political 
oratory did not limit himself to indigenous art. T h e African politician 
w h o used poetry for political rhetoric did not limit himself to indigenous 
poetry either. Just as the frontier between art and activism was blurred, 
so was the frontier between the indigenous and the imported. Africa 
conscripted European languages and literature for the cause of African 
liberation and rhetoric. 
Intimately linked is Africa's love for the sound of words. O n e of the first 
warnings which young N n a m d i Azikiwe pronounced on his return to 
Nigeria from the U S was a warning against what he called 'the by-
products of an imitative complex'. H e urged his countrymen to go 'beyond 
the veneer of knowledge', and he emphasized that 'ability to quote 
Shakespeare or Byron or Chaucer does not indicate original scholarship'.7 
Chinua Achebe, Nigeria's leading novelist, points at his countrymen's 
love for the sound of big words in a speech he allocates to the president 
of Omuafia Progressive Union in the novel No Longer at Ease. A n d in a 
play by W o l e Soyinka, Nigeria's leading playwright and Nobel-Prize 
winner, a teacher assails the custom of paying 'bride price' with a series 
of long high-sounding English words — 'and only stopped because he had 
only the Shorter Companion Dictionary - the longer edition which he 
had ordered hadn't arrived'.8 
T h e literary critic Donatus N w o g a refers to certain characters in 
Nigeria's market literature - and the satire of high-sounding words: 
5. For the Francophone phenomenon, consult T . Hodgkin and R . Schachter, i960, 
P- 387-
6. See especially P. Benson, 1986. 
7. From a speech given in November 1934 in Lagos. See N . Azikiwe, 1961, p. 23. 
8. See W . Soyinka, 1963. 
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PLATE 19.3
1986
Wole Soyinka of Nigeria, receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature, December
In Veronica, My Daughter, Chief Jombo, feeling that Veronica, his
daughter, and Pauline, his wife, were trying to browbeat him with
their superior knowledge of the English language, sent for Bomber
Billy, reputed for the bomb words he could throw . . . This
concatenation of bombasts would be greatly effective on stage in
Nigeria where big words do make an impact.9
In addition to the sound of words, foreign literature was attractive as
a source of wit - 'to point a moral or adorn a tale'. European literature
was made subject to the laws of conversation of indigenous African
languages. Conversational wit in many African languages postulates a
ready command of diverse proverbs. As a Yoruba proverb has put it: 'A
wise man who knows proverbs reconciles difficulties'.10 Proverbs are also
the staple of oratory.
9. D. Nwoga, 1965, pp. 28-9.
10. See Introduction in C. Leslau and W. Leslau, 1962.
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T h e indigenous love of proverbs was transferred to quotations from 
foreign literature. Donatus N w o g a tells us about an Igbo dictum that to 
make a speech without using proverbs is like trying to climb a palm tree 
without a climbing rope. N w o g a then goes on to make a connection 
between traditional proverbs and Shakespearean quotations in con-
temporary Africa. H e says: 
I suggest that the tendency towards supporting one's statements with 
proverbs might have carried over into this market literature in the 
form of using quotations. In Veronica, My Daughter, between pages 
20 and 23, there are quotations from Richard Whateley, William 
Shakespeare, G . A . Gallock, Rudyard Kipling, Benjamin Harrison, 
William Ernest Henley and Henry Longfellow; and before the end 
of the story there are further quotations from Johann Wolfgang V o n 
Goethe and some unknown poet . . ." 
But quotations were important not only for conversation but also for 
political anti-colonial oratory. Africa's new activists were often straining to 
be literary. 
European colonial powers in Africa in the first half of the twentieth 
century — though sensitive to 'sedition' and 'subversion' — underestimated 
the political implications of those poetically expressed ideas. T h e late 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo once confessed in his autobiography: ' S o m e of 
the mighty lines of Shakespeare must have influenced m y outlook on 
life'.12 In Uganda, young Apollo Obote adopted a new first name, Milton, 
out of admiration for the author of the British classical poem, Paradise 
Lost. A n d in the Gold Coast in 1934, young K w a m e N k r u m a h was 
applying to the Dean of Lincoln University in the U S for admission. In 
his application, N k r u m a h quoted from Tennyson's In Memoriam: 
So m a n y worlds, so m u c h to do, 
So little done, such things to be. 
In his autobiography more than 20 years later, N k r u m a h confirmed 
that this verse 'was to m e then, and is it still is today, an inspiration and 
a spur. It fired within m e a determination to equip myself for the service 
of m y country'.13 
Significant also was the longest and 'in some respects the most important 
speech' that mature Premier N k r u m a h m a d e before independence. T h e 
speech was made on 12 November 1956. H e was asking the National 
Assembly to approve his government's Revised Constitutional Proposals 
11. D . Nwoga, 1965, p. 31. 
12. 'Shakespeare is m y favourite. I have read all his plays, and have re-read some of 
them - like Julius Caesar, Hamlet, The Tempest, Anthony and Cleopatra and Henry V -v 
more than three times. S o m e of the mighty lines of Shakespeare must have influenced 
m y outlook on life.' See O . Awolowo, i960, p. 70. 
13. K . Nkrumah, 1957, p. v. 
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for the Gold Coast's independence. N k r u m a h opened his speech with a 
reference to E d m u n d Burke's remark: ' W e are on a conspicuous stage 
and the world marks our demeanour'. N k r u m a h asserted: 'Never has this 
been truer than today. H o w w e conduct ourselves when w e become 
independent will affect not only Ghana but the whole of Africa'.14 
K w a m e N k r u m a h concluded his speech with Wordsworth's immortal 
lines about the French Revolution of 1789. N k r u m a h said: 'I hope that 
someday, somewhere, w e also m a y be able to say with William Wordsworth: 
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, 
But to be young was very heavenV5 
W e might therefore conclude that either directly, or by kindling a new 
interest in local styles of argumentation, European literature generally is 
part of the genesis of the linkage between art and activism in Africa. Just 
as African nationalists used European languages for n e w purposes of 
political struggle, so also for a while they used European literature for 
the same nationalistic goals. European poetry afforded quotations for use 
in those early days of the newly aggressive African intellectualisai. Foreign 
literature inspired a paradoxical form of cultural nationalism among the 
new wave of African freedom-fighters. It afforded a new discourse by 
proverbs. It often merged with the Bible or the Kur'än, or with Christian 
and Islamic h y m n s , to provide additional stimuli to Africa's sensibilities. 
Both European literature and European languages provided the basis of 
some of the emerging oratory of this period of African history. If oratory 
and rhetoric are a branch of literature, this phase was a striking mixture 
of foreign poetry and African rhetoric. 
T o m M b o y a of Kenya once recited Rudyard Kipling's p o e m If in its 
entirety before a huge crowd. It was the eve of an election in Nairobi. 
T h e crowd was waiting to hear Mboya's last pre-election speech. M b o y a 
burst into foreign poetry: 
If you can keep your head when all about you 
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you, 
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster 
A n d treat those two impostors just the same, 
If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue 
or walk with kings - nor lose the c o m m o n touch, 
If you can fill the unforgiving minute 
With sixty seconds worth of distance run, 
Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it, 
A n d - which is more, you'll be a M a n , m y son.16 
14. K . Nkrumah, 1961, p. 71. 
15. ibid., p. 84; the italics are Nkrumah's. 
16. R . Kipling, 1903. 
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There in Nairobi was this immortal son of Kenya, worn out by the 
exertions of campaigning, nervous about the election the next day, 
confronting an eager audience of fellow black people listening to his words 
of wisdom. M b o y a was later to communicate to posterity the following 
paragraph: 
I read out to the great crowd the whole of Rudyard Kipling's poem, 
If. W h e n facing the challenge of nation-building nobody can claim 
to have played a manly part if he (or she) has not ' . . . filled the 
unforgiving minute with sixty seconds' worth of distance run'.'7 
Again two branches of literature were interacting - poetry and rhetoric. 
T h e poetry was foreign and imperial, the oratory and rhetoric were deeply 
African. 
Kipling, the poet of 'The White M a n ' s Burden', had become the poet 
of ' T h e Black M a n ' s Ambition'. O n the one hand, European literature 
was colonizing the African mind. O n the other hand, when Rudyard 
Kipling's poetry was mobilized in the service of Africa, it was a case of 
Rudyard Kipling being decolonized. It was Kipling himself w h o said in 
1923: 'Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind'.18 
But it is in the nature of nationalism in Africa, as elsewhere, to be 
economical and sparing in its acknowledgement to foreign inspiration -
be that inspiration poetic or ideological, Shakespearean or Leninist. If it 
be asked why nationalism should be so inhibited in acknowledging its 
debt, the reply might best be given by Zimbabwe's veteran politician, 
Ndabaningi Sithole. His answer rests on the premise that nationalism has 
a strong elemental force of sheer ambition - and his answer is directly 
Shakespearean. W h y are the imperial literary origins of modern African 
nationalism not acknowledged by the nationalists? Ndabaningi Sithole 
quotes: 
But 'tis a c o m m o n proof, 
That lowliness is young ambition's ladder, 
Whereto the climber upward turns his face; 
But w h e n he once attains the upmost round, 
H e then unto the ladder turns his back, 
Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees 
By which he did ascend.19 
T h e African orator had arrived at the rich mines of European literature. 
T h e orator saw, conquered - and took. A n d then climbed upwards. 
17. T . Mboya, 1963b, p. 114. 
18. In a speech on 14 February 1923: see The Times, 16 February 1923. 
19. W . Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, II, 1; quoted by N . Sithole, 1959, p. 57. See also 
J. S. Coleman, 1963, pp. 114-15. 
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The muse of liberation 
But not all African activists used borrowed foreign poetry for nationalistic 
African purposes. S o m e of the n e w activists and liberation fighters 
were themselves poets or other kinds of creative writers. S o m e created 
workshops or cultural organizations to promote wider literary creativity. 
A m o n g these must be counted Agostinho Neto, later destined to be the 
founder-president of independent Angola. 
In the winter of 1948-9, a number of militant 'exiles' got together in 
Lisbon. T h e group was small - consisting of Amilcar Cabrai (1924-^73), 
Vasco Cabrai, Marcelino dos Santos, Mario de Andrade and Agostinho 
Neto (1922^79). T h e intellectuals were reading poetry and discussing 
literature w h e n Neto interrupted to say: 
Today I received a letter from m y friend Viriato da Cruz - perhaps 
you have heard of him. H e is one of our poets. H e says they have 
organized a cultural center [in Luanda] and named it 'Let's Discover 
Angola'. H e also writes that they're going to do studies on African 
history and popular art, write stories and poems, and use the profits 
from the sale of publications to help talented and needy writers. I 
think w e could also do this here in Lisbon. There are m a n y people 
here w h o can write poetry and short stories, not only about student 
life, but also about our native countries — Angola, Mozambique, and 
the islands of Cape Verde and Sâo Torné.*0 
In the 1950s, Neto, Cabrai and Mario de Andrade secretly established 
a Centre for African Studies (Centro de Estudos Africanos) with a broad 
agenda for promoting the study of colonized black people, including the 
study and promotion of creative African literature. A literary wing of the 
enterprise was the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio. In 1951 two works on 
creative literature were issued - Linha do Horizonte ('The Horizon 
Line') by Aguinaldo Fonseca (Cape Verde) and the anthology Poesia em 
Moçambique edited by Orlando de Albuquerque and Victor Everisto. 
A m o n g the most notable of the 25 writers from Mozambique represented 
in the volume were Orlando M e n d e s , Noemia de Sousa and Fonsesca 
Amaral. 
Art and activism once again interacted. T h e Salazar regime in Lisbon, 
reacting to the militant anti-imperialism of post-war Africa, suppressed 
the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio from 1952 to 1957. After its revival in 
1957 it still clashed periodically with the authorities until it was closed 
d o w n completely in 1965. 
T h e word 'African' was once forbidden w h e n referring to the 'overseas 
Portuguese provinces'. W h e n referring to the spread of African traditions, 
colonial writers had to resort to the jargon of 'the spreading of overseas 
20. O . Ignatiev, 1975, p . 15; English translation from M . Ferreira, 1986, pp . 398-9. 
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cultural values'. Ideas of négritude in Lusophone Africa therefore came 
like a breath of fresh air. S o m e of the poetry exploded in wild physical 
abandon: 
A n d I lift up into the equinox of m y land 
the ruby of the most beautiful Ronga song; 
A n d on the rare whiteness of the loins of dawn 
the caress of m y beautiful savage fingers 
Is like the tacit harmony of spears in the rut of the race, 
Beautiful as the phallus of another m a n , 
Erect within the nervous w o m b of the African night.21 
Craveirinha — perhaps Mozambique's most prominent non-white poet — 
was arrested in 1964 when war broke out in his land. But the imperial 
order could not silence either him or Agostinho Neto - even if the poetry 
had to be published far from Portugal's reach. Both Craveirinha's and 
Neto's poems appeared in Italy in 1966, for example. Activism and art 
continued to be dramatically fused.22 
A more complex relationship between art and activism, between poetry 
and politics, lay in the mind of Leopold Sédar Senghor. O n the one 
hand, Senghor sought to rescue African culture from the contemptuous 
arrogance of Europe. O n the other hand, Senghor fell in love with the 
country which colonized his o w n . In Senghor's o w n words: 
Lord, among the white nations, set France 
at the right hand of the Father. 
O, I know she too is Europe, that she 
has stolen m y children like a 
brigand to fatten her cornfields 
and cottonfields, for the negro is dung. 
She too has brought death and 
guns into m y blue villages, 
has set m y people one against 
the other, like dogs fighting over a bone . . . 
Yes, Lord, forgive France w h o hates her 
occupiers and yet lays so 
heavy an occupation upon m e . . . 
For, I have a great weakness for France.23 
W e do have in Leopold Senghor a perfect illustration of the fusion 
between poetic rebellion and political collaboration, the quest for African 
authenticity combined with the imperial legacy of Africa's cultural 
21. J. Craveirinha, 1964, p. 15; the English rendering is from A . S. Gerard, 1986, 
pp. 407-8. 
22. See C . Wauthier, 1966. 
23. L . S. Senghor, 1965, pp. 135-6. 
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dependency. Meanwhile a Namibian guerilero still asks in a series of 
rhetorical questions that roll one into the other, and are left for the reader 
to answer: 
Shall w e meet again at h o m e 
T o talk and sing again 
T o walk and sit again 
In our homes? 
Shall w e meet at home? 
W h a t a meeting it shall be! 
Shall w e meet again in the 
land of our love? 
In the land of our dear hope? 
Shall w e meet again at h o m e 
A n d end the longing for h o m e 
A n d send the wronging h o m e 
A n d from sorrow ever be free?24 
In the case of people like Neto and Senghor, it is impossible to be sure 
whether w e are studying political animals w h o became literary or literary 
creatures w h o became political. But with people like the younger N k r u m a h 
and his Tennyson, or Awolowo and his Shakespeare, or Obote and his 
Milton, w e are more sure that w e are examining political animals w h o 
drew from literature. Even as president of Tanzania after independence, 
Julius K . Nyerere was, as w e indicated elsewhere in this volume, 
sufficiently literary to embark on the task of translating into Kiswahili 
two of Shakespeare's plays - The Merchant of Venice and Julius Caesar. 
But while politicians like M b o y a and Awolowo in the latter years of 
colonialism and early years of independence were indeed tempted to go 
literary, writers throughout this period since 1935 have often been tempted 
to be political. Earlier African activists often touched base with art; latter-
day artists have increasingly touched base with activism. It is to this latter 
category of politicized writers (as distinct from literary politicians) that 
w e must n o w turn. 
Authenticity: seven themes of conflict 
O u r discussion of the history of literature in Africa could not entirely be 
separated from more general thematic issues, but in this section w e shall 
examine more closely some of the central areas of literary focus during 
that period. 
A number of inter-related conflicts of values manifested themselves in 
African writings. O n e was the conflict between the African past and the 
24. C . O'Brien Winter, 1977, p. 223. 
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African present. Quite often, themes of this kind betrayed a deep nostalgia, 
an idealization of what once was, or might have been. 
Related to this is the conflict between tradition and modernity. That 
is not quite the same as the first conflict, since the dialectic between 
tradition and modernity can be taking place in the same historical period. 
It certainly continues to unfold in the Africa of today. 
T h e third dialectic, again intimately related but by no means identical, 
is the conflict between the indigenous and the foreign. Indigenous 
traditions m a y struggle for supremacy with imported foreign traditions. 
A debate was also under way as to whether there could be a distinctly 
African approach to modernization which did not at the same time involve 
Westernization. 
T h e fourth dialectic in the literature of this period, and indeed of the 
future, is the apparent conflict between the individual and society, between 
private rights and public duty. 
T h e fifth dialectic which did not really gather m o m e n t u m in Africa 
until the 1960s was the grand dilemma between socialism and capitalism, 
between the pursuit of equity and the quest for affluence. 
T h e sixth, and intimately related dialectic, concerns the apparent 
dilemma between development and self-reliance, between rapid economic 
change with foreign help on one side and slower but autonomous progress 
on the other. 
T h e seventh dialectic is the even more fundamental one between 
Africanity and humanity, between the rights of Africans as members of 
a particular race or inhabitants of a particular continent and the duties 
of Africans as members of the h u m a n race. 
T h e first theme of nostalgia for the past has points in c o m m o n with 
the whole movement of négritude in parts of French-speaking Africa. 
There is an idealization of ancestry, and sometimes an obsession with 
dance and rhythm as aspects of ancestral culture. A striking example is 
Le regard du roi by Cámara Laye. J o m o Kenyatta, though Anglophone, 
belonged to this m o o d not only as a writer but also as president of Kenya. 
Literally to his last day of life he was a patron of traditional dancers, 
spending m a n y hours in the course of his presidency watching dancers 
from different cultural backgrounds, and sometimes participating with 
them. This obsession with dance was a musical and artistic manifestation 
of cultural nostalgia. In Kenyatta's view: 'It is the culture which he 
inherits that gives a m a n his h u m a n dignity."5 
Kenyatta's etJinic compatriot, Joe Mutiga, addresses thé fig tree in a 
similar m o o d : 
25. J. Kenyatta, 1938; for this section on authenticity, the author is greatly indebted 
to previous collaboration with M . Bakari of the University of Nairobi. 
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Holy huge trees, you tax m y memory: 
Over you boys awaiting circumcision 
Proudly threw indorothi' to show ability 
T o shoulder social responsibility, 
While all dance in heartful joy, 
Bearing proudly the tribal decorum: 
A m e m o r y of olden days 
W h e n the Agikuyu were a tribe, 
Though n o w but part of a nation . . . 
. . . the beauty of old is gone.25 
A longing for the past in Africa is interwoven with values of tradition 
as against modernity. S o m e of the writers and poets of this period were 
all too aware that dancing for rain was a less efficient way of increasing 
productivity than learning h o w to use a tractor. But the more romantic 
of the poets still longed for those rhythms of rural incantation, the music 
of supplication rather than the voice of an exhaust pipe. 
Joseph Waiguru, another Makerere graduate, wrote a kind of ode to 
the 'Round M u d Hut' - a p o e m which was broadcast on the B B C African 
Service and on the old Radio Uganda. In the poem he sees the m u d hut 
as a shared refuge for humans and their animals; for adults and their 
children. But the round m u d hut is under siege - the forces of modernized 
accommodation, separating parents from children in their different rooms, 
humans from their animals in stables, segregating the inhabitants of the 
otherwise shared earth. 
T h e round w a r m hut 
Proud to the last 
O f her noble sons 
A n d daughters 
Stands besieged. 
O f late stones, 
In tripartite agreement 
Guarded a fire 
A n d then a pot, 
A large hot pot 
Which nurtured 
Black, black children 
T h e bleating sheep 
A n d the horned goat, 
26. J. Mutiga, 1965, p. 132; see also I. N . Shariff, 1988. 
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Calves cud-chewing 
At the end penned, 
Share the warmth 
O f the round m u d hut. 
All this and m u c h more. 
Slowly and slowly disappears: 
Slowly and slowly iron appears 
Lays a siege on the roof 
A n d takes prisoner of the gourd. 
T h e plate, the cup, the lamp, 
What's this but a change 
T o the new oblong house? 
T h e round m u d hut is no more.27 
But modernity in Africa is not only contrasted with tradition; it is also 
substantially identified with Westernization. That is w h y the second 
dialectic between modernity and tradition is so intimately linked with the 
third dialectic between the indigenous and the foreign. T h e very situation 
of those African writers using European languages was a dramatization 
of the basic tension between what was native and what was alien. Three 
forces were at work in facilitating this alien penetration of African 
societies. O n e was precisely Western-style education, whose pinnacle was 
universities like Dakar, Ibadan and Makerere. T h e second m e d i u m of 
penetration was Western Christianity, importing new paradigms of both 
ethics and explanation. T h e third m e d i u m of penetration was technology, 
especially those aspects which were of relevance to economic change and 
material production. 
T h e writers of this period were m u c h more conscious of the implications 
of Western education and Western Christianity than they seemed to be 
of the implications of Western technology and science. O n the educational 
front, there was some recognition that these n e w processes of instruction 
and socialization created forms of cultural dependency. N e w Africans 
were in the process of being manufactured - somewhat less African than 
their parents were. Jonathan Kariara writing in English and at a Western-
style university institution, wondered if he were being encased in clay, 
stifled by an alien structure. 
I lay the other night and dreamt 
That w e were all being glazed 
With a white clay of foreign education, 
A n d it was stifling, stifling the sleeping blackman 
Inside there. 
27. J. Waiguru, in D . Cook, 1965, p. 132; see also I. N . Shariff, 1988. 
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Will it be the pearl in the oyster shell, 
O r mere rottenness?28 
A s for the impact of Christianity, this has also been treated extensively 
in African literature. T h e best-known example certainly is M o n g o Beti's 
Le pauvre Christ de Bomba. Ngugi's novels are at times obsessed with this 
clash, a perfectly understandable preoccupation for a writer w h o is a 
Kikuyu w h o grew up in the course of the M a u M a u emergency. T h e 
impact of Christianity was at m a n y levels - it affected conceptions of 
knowledge, methods of rearing children, rituals of initiation and rites of 
passage, concepts of right and wrong, and paradigms of explaining natural 
phenomena, as well as the broader interpretation of metaphysical and 
supernatural concern. Western Christianity was thus a fundamental factor 
in the broader Westernization of Africa. 
Okot p'Bitek drew attention to the tendency among Africans even to 
recreate their o w n gods in the image of the Christian G o d . A s Okot 
p'Bitek put it: 
W h e n students of African religions describe African deities as eternal, 
omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, etc., they intimate that African 
deities have identical attributes with those of the Christian G o d . In 
other words, they suggest that Africans hellenized their deities, but 
before coming into contact with Greek metaphysical thinking. . . . 
African peoples m a y describe their deities as 'strong', but not 
'omnipotent'; 'wise', not 'omniscient'; 'old', not 'eternal', 'great', 
not 'omnipresent'. Like Danquah, Mbiti, Idowu, Busia, Abraham, 
Kenyatta, Senghor and the missionaries, modern Western Christian 
anthropologists are intellectual smugglers. T h e y are busy introducing 
Greek metaphysical conceptions into African religious thought. T h e 
African deities of the books, clothed with the attributes of the 
Christian G o d , are, in the main, creations of the students of the 
religions. T h e y are all beyond recognition to the ordinary African 
in the countryside.29 
Okot p'Bitek later became Uganda's most eloquent rebel against Western 
cultural imperialism. His p o e m , Song of Lawino, is one of the strongest 
statements on cultural authenticity to have emerged out of Africa. 
A s for the dialectic between the individual and society, this too was 
linked to some extent with the impact of Christianity and the Protestant 
idea of personal accountability before G o d . 
Individualism in Africa was also fostered by the ideas of private 
property which came with Western capitalism. In East African Childhood, 
Joseph A . Lijembe refers to his discovery of the principle of property 
after he left h o m e and went to a Western-style school: 
28. J. Kariara, in D . Cook, 1965, p. 100. 
29. O . p'Bitek, 1971, pp. 80 and 88. 
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At h o m e I had not been given a chance to care for and look after a 
bit of property that I could really call 'mine'. At school I found I 
possessed a set of articles, which, for a period, were mine. I had to 
begin afresh learning h o w to respect not only m y things, but those 
that belonged to m y class-mates and the school as a whole . . .3° 
T h e third major promoter of individualism was the n e w liberal ethos 
which came with Western political ideologies. T h e special premium which 
liberalism gave to individualism helped to transform the political horizons 
of African writers, as well as other African intellectuals. A s Jonathan 
Kariara said of one of his short-story characters: ' H e had inherited two 
things from the white m a n , a n e w religion and the desire to decide for 
himself'.31 
In politics, Western liberalism helped to inspire demands for 'one 
m a n , one vote' and liberal forms of self-determination. In literature, 
individualism produced the n e w writers. After all, traditional oral literature 
was in some sense a literature without authors, a collective and cumulative 
heritage without individual attribution. But the n e w novels and poems, 
the n e w plays and short stories were works by specific artists, bearing 
their names or their pen-names. T h e very birth of written literature in 
European languages constituted an important departure from the collective 
traditions of an orally transmitted heritage. With the new trend came 
personalized copyright, royalties for individual authors and rules against 
plagiarism. 
In addition, some of the art-forms which the writers were exploring 
themselves required a capacity on the part of the writer to create believable 
individual characters. A s w e indicated earlier, the short story in Africa 
has its antecedents in folk tales; modern verse can be a continuation of 
ancestral poetry, but the novel as normally understood is clearly a foreign 
art-form n o w being developed for African purposes. A n d the history of 
the novel is intimately connected with the rise of individualism in the 
West. Molly Mazrui, in her Makerere thesis on the individual and society 
in some African fiction, takes us back to that first English novel, Robinson 
Crusoe. She then quotes a critic w h o said of that book: '. . . the terms of 
the problem of the novel and of modern thought alike were established 
w h e n the old order of moral and social relationships was shipwrecked, 
with Robinson Crusoe, by the rising tide of individualism'.32 
Molly Mazrui related this observation to African societies, and argued 
that those societies had to some extent been shipwrecked by colonialism. 
Individualism in m a n y areas of life was rapidly becoming a n e w order. 
30. J. A . Lijembe, 1967, pp. 25-6. 
31. J. Kariara, in D . Cook, 1965, p. 95. 
32. I. Watt, 1969, p. 96. 
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M a n y African novelists, including Achebe and Ngugi, have explored 
what caused the shipwreck and tried to understand whether it was 
avoidable or not. They have shown us the anguish and conflict both 
for the individual and for his community as fluidity of values and 
rapidly changing standards have become the order of the day. . . . 
There are m a n y reasons w h y this growth of individualism in Africa 
m a y be lamented, but a m o n g its more positive aspects must be 
counted the birth of the African novel.33 
T h e fifth dialectic affecting African writers concerned the dilemma 
between capitalism and socialism. T h e initial African enthusiasm for at 
least socialist rhetoric was connected with the degree to which capitalism 
had been an ally of imperialism. Since socialism was opposed to capitalism, 
and African nationalism was opposed to imperialism, nationalistic ideas in 
Africa found a comradeship-in-arms with socialistic ideas from elsewhere. 
Opposition to exploitation, whether it was by domestic capitalists or 
external imperialists, was just beginning to inspire African intellectuals 
on the eve of independence. Its major expression came a little later with 
the likes of O u s m a n e Sembene, Ayikwei A r m a h , Chinua Achebe or Wole 
Soyinka and first of all Franz Fanon. 
In 1988 - a mere two years after Laureate Wole Soyinka's achievement -
the Nobel Prize for Literature was once again in Africa. This time the 
recipient of the prize was Nagib Mahfuz , Egypt's greatest contemporary 
novelist, deeply concerned about exploitation. In the Dickensian tradition, 
m u c h of Mahfuz's early and middle work focused on the life of the urban 
poor. Mahfuz demonstrated a remarkable sensitivity to the nuances and 
colour of life in the urban slums - especially in his most famous work, 
The Valley of al-Midakk. 
T h e impact of the Western world on North Africa is widely discussed 
in the literature of the Maghreb. Arabic and the French language compete 
as media of literary expression in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. A number 
of literary reviews have helped promote n e w radical talent. In Tunisia 
the journal Al-Fikr ('Thought') played a particularly historic literary role, 
sometimes politicized. North Africa is also leading the way in the literature 
of w o m e n ' s liberation. 
'Westernization' as a theme in the modern Egyptian novel has included 
Tawfik al-Hakim's The Bird from the East and the novella by Yahyä Hakki, 
The Lamp of Ümm Hashim. A profound cultural ambivalence is at the 
core. 
Ideological ambivalence has also been recurrent when writers have 
confronted exploitation. In North Africa the tension has sometimes been 
between Islam and secular radicalism. All over the continent the principle 
of social equality has often mesmerized novelists, poets and playwrights. 
33. M . Mazrui, 1972, p. 407. 
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Ngugi wa Thiong'o, for one, later evolved into a neo-Marxist, com¬
bining more fully his rebellion against imperialism with a disgust for
domestic African capitalists. But that itself was a transition from the
preoccupation of colonized Africans before independence in their quest
for indigenous authenticity to a new dedication concerned with social
transformation and the pursuit of greater equity.
Deeply related to this transition from colonial obsessions to independent
commitments is the sixth dialectic we mentioned - the dialectic between
the attractions of rapid economic development as against the disciplines of
self-reliance and even self-denial. This dialectic as a literary concern was
most elaborately explored in Tanzania, especially in the later period of the
Arusha Declaration and the pursuit of ujamaa. Significantly, much of the
literary debate and discussion concerning self-reliance in Tanzania is to
be found more in Kiswahili literature than in English writings. Poetry in
Tanzania in this period is partly a transition from the disciplined rhyme of
Shaaban Robert to the experimentalist blank verse ofEuphrase Kezilahabi.
Cultural self-reliance is itself caught up in the very vigour of Kiswahili
literature in Tanzania. To use a language more widely understood in
society was itself a tribute to ujamaa and the ideal of real authenticity.
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The new political literature on dependency in Africa certainly belongs
to this general school of emphasis, and has affinities with the literature
of dependencia of Latin America. The thrust of the discussion is that
Africa may have attained some level of political independence, but the
struggle for economic autonomy and cultural authenticity has only just
begun. The economies of Africa are still penetrated by foreign capital,
and members of the new black bourgeoisie are mainly allies of external
foreign interests. The cultural penetration includes the prevalence of a
consumer culture, the persistence of a colonial educational structure, the
infiltration of African societies by alien information media and electronic
services, and the survival of language policies which serve the interests
of the élite and ruling classes and are inadequately sensitive to the needs
of the masses. The continuing domination of élite culture in Africa by
foreign languages becomes symptomatic of this deep-seated cultural
dependency.
Female literary rebels against neo-colonialism have included Molara
Ogundipe-Leslie of Nigeria, Abena Busia of Ghana, and Christine Obbo
of Uganda. One of the ironies of their predicament is that these particular
PLATE 19.5 Molara Ogundipe-Leslie ofNigeria: academic professor, poet, writer on literature,
essayist and critic
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w o m e n are among the most Westernized of their generation. 
Political writers in Anglophone Africa w h o are concerned with economic 
dependency include Adebayo Adedeji of Nigeria, Isa Shivji of Tanzania, 
D a n Nabudere of Uganda and Atieno-Odhiambo of Kenya. Political 
writers concerned with cultural dependence include Chinweizu of Nigeria, 
the late Okot p'Bitek of Uganda, Ali A . Mazrui of Kenya and Julius K . 
Nyerere of Tanzania. M u c h of the writing in this area is either academic 
or polemical: only a little has so far taken the form of poetry or fiction. 
But the basic dilemma between dependent development on one side and 
self-reliant stagnation on the other is in any case the latest incarnation of 
such older dilemmas as the one between tradition and modernity, and 
between the indigenous and the foreign. W h a t the writers of the earlier 
decades of this century grappled with in terms of the tensions of 
modernization and freedom are n o w being explored in terms of the 
tensions of development and dependency. 
But finally w e have the most fundamental dialectic of them all - the 
dialectic between African distinctiveness and the idea of universalism, 
between the uniqueness of the African person and the Catholicism of 
humanity. Our writers in the days before independence did indeed often 
use the language of humanity, but more often to demand rights for 
Africans. 
Chinua Achebe has referred to 'the black writer's burden'. Achebe 
points out that in colonial Africa it was the African writer's job to attack 
colonial injustice. In independent Africa, according to Achebe, the writer 
must still accept the duty to challenge injustice wherever he sees it, even 
if it is injustice committed by Africans against Africans: 
. . . w e must never agree to bargain away the right to be treated like 
full members of the h u m a n family. W e must seek the freedom to 
express thought and feeling, even against ourselves, without the 
anxiety that what w e might say might be taken as evidence against 
our race.34 
In a way, political independence has been a contributory factor towards 
expanding the moral horizons of African intellectuals generally. T o 
experience tyranny by Africans against Africans after experiencing the 
domination of Africans by white people is to learn about the universalism 
of rights and duties, and sin and redemption. T h e radicalization of writers 
like Kofi Awonoor and Lewis Nkosi has been part of this adventure into 
n e w categorical imperatives. S o m e writers have gone beyond demanding 
rights for Africans, or for black people - they have transcended even 
pan-Africanism as a specialized solidarity, and have instead sought to 
identify with the oppressed generally. Writers have indeed gone political -
just as politicians had once gone literary. Journalists of this universalist 
34. C . Achebe, 1966, pp. 138-9. 
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persuasion include M u h a m m a d S i d - A h m e d of Al-Ahram in Cairo. 
This seventh theme of conflict, between the parochial and the universal, 
between Africanity and humanity, is perhaps the most central issue of 
authenticity. T h e tension between the past and the present, tradition and 
modernity, are ultimately agonies of epochs across time. T h e tensions 
between the indigenous and the foreign are concerned with a dialectic 
across space. T h e confrontation between socialism and capitalism is a 
confrontation across values. T h e dilemma between rapid development 
and stagnant self-reliance is also about values, but taking the form of 
priorities in policy. But in the final analysis, it is the dialectic between 
the individual and society, on one side, and between society and uni-
versalism on the other, that lies at the heart of art itself. H o w the h u m a n 
person relates to the immediate social group and h o w that social group 
relates to humanity itself together constitute the ultimate universe of 
aesthetic exploration. Senghor has called it 'the Civilization of the 
Universal'. 
T h e African writers w e have examined in this essay are decidedly part 
of that exploration. Caught u p in the agonies of multiple estrangement -
political, educational, linguistic, aesthetic and technical - the African 
writers are engaged in setting the pace in the struggle to recover their 
m e m o r y , in the quest for ultimate renewal. 
O n literature and war 
Although African literature after independence has paid considerable 
attention to the military, it has paid relatively little attention to war itself. 
A n d in discussing soldiers, African writers have been more preoccupied 
with military villains than with military heroes. A n adversarial relationship 
has developed between writers and soldiers, except for liberation fighters 
in Northern and in Southern Africa. A whole generation of Algerian 
writers was inspired by armed struggle. A n d yet even liberation poets 
like Dennis Brutus of South Africa are ambivalent about 'boots, bayonets 
and knuckles'. 
T w o questions arise. W h y is there so little written literature of military 
heroism in post-colonial Africa? W h y is there so m u c h literature about 
military villainy? 
T h e dearth of a written literature of heroism is not due to a dearth of 
heroes. M a n y brave m e n and w o m e n have died for their respective causes 
in African wars since independence. But the nature of those wars has 
tended to m a k e praise-songs of heroes politically sensitive. After all, apart 
from Egypt, most wars experienced by independent African countries 
have been civil wars, often secessionist. 
Chinua Achebe — w h o became Biafra's ambassador-at-Iarge while the 
civil war lasted - has written things about the conflict. But his status in 
post-war Nigeria has inevitably discouraged too obvious a glorification of 
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plate 19.6 André Brink ofSouth Africa, anti-apartheid writer
Biafra and its heroes. The Federal side would not want to reactivate old
wounds among the Igbo (Ibo) either.
The Ugandan military prophetess of the late 1980s, Alice Lakwena,
was an Acholi equivalent of Joan of Arc. But praise-songs in her honour
were unlikely since Yoweri Museveni's government regarded her as a
'tribal rebel'.
Another reason for the absence of military heroism in African literature
may simply be that there has been a low level of combat involvement by
the élite in many of Africa's wars since independence. Poets and writers
are more likely to be inspired by the sacrifices of fellow intellectuals than
by the death of unknown peasants. ¡The death of Christopher Okigbo in
the Nigerian civil war inspired a greater literary response than the death
of half a million anonymous young Igbo. Ali Mazrui wrote his only novel,
The Trial of Christopher Okigbo, in response to that death of a fellow
intellectual.
In Nigeria itself, so few Igbo élite or Federal intellectuals were aroused
enough to bear arms on behalf of either Biafra or Federal Nigeria.
Intellectuals took sides in the war, and sometimes assumed non-combat
roles in support of their side. But few intellectuals joined their respective
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armies or volunteered to go to the front line. In the words of John D e 
St. Jorre in his impressive book, The Nigerian Civil War. 
. . . the proportion of actual casualties among the élite, compared 
with the masses is minute and must constitute something of a record 
in the history of warfare. With a few courageous exceptions, the 
Nigerian and Biafran intellectuals, unlike their counterparts, say, in 
the First World W a r or Spanish civil war, did not believe in picking 
up a rifle to defend the cause. T h e Nigerian war produced its 
'Wilfred O w e n ' (the Biafran poet, Christopher Okigbo, w h o died in 
action in Nsukka early in the fighting), but w e have yet to see the 
Nigerian or Biafran equivalent of a Robert Graves, a George Orwell, 
or a N o r m a n Mailer emerge.35 
T h e shortage of African heroic military literature m a y also be due to 
the fact that a war against a foreign power is the most likely conflict to 
generate the type of patriotic fervour which celebrates heroes. Yet Africa — 
especially south of the Sahara - has been short of foreign military 
adversaries since independence. 
T h e October war of 1973 between Egypt and Israel was regarded as 
heroic by Egyptians and generated poetry and songs in Egypt. Morocco's 
war to retain Western Sahara has also been widely seen at h o m e as 
patriotic - and has similarly inspired song and poetry. T h e Western 
Sahara (recognized by the Organization of African Unity as the Sahräwi 
Arab Democratic Republic) has in turn generated heroic literature of its 
o w n about its o w n conflict with Morocco, while the wars in the H o r n of 
Africa also gave birth to anguished poetry. 
For Chad, Libya was a hostile foreign power. Chad's struggle against 
Libyan hegemony helped to nourish oral poetry and heroic songs. In 
1987, Chad struck into the Libyan heartland for the first time: Libyan 
patriotism was wounded in a new way. It was only a matter of time before 
Libyan counter-moves in defence of al-watßn (ancestral land) would 
provoke its o w n pool of heroic literature. 
W h a t had already inspired such songs and poetry was the American 
bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986. T h e heroism of 'David 
versus Goliath' had been re-enacted on Arab soil. 
South of the Sahara, the image of the warrior is used more widely in 
indigenous languages - but often as a metaphor for non-military forms 
of combat. Tanzania's Swahili poet, Kezilahabi, proclaims 'Had I been a 
warrior I would have bathed in blood and water' (Kichwa na Mwili, 1974). 
But it is metaphorical. 
If there is such a shortage of literal African military heroes in literature, 
w h y is there a greater abundance of African military villains? W h y has 
there developed an adversarial relationship between African writers and 
35. J. D e St. Jorre, 1972, pp. 374-5. 
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African soldiers? A major reason is that since independence, soldiers have 
been more inclined to be involved in politics than in war. A n d yet soldiers 
and writers have conflicting visions of the political process. Perhaps the 
adversarial relationship has been between writers and rulers — be those 
rulers military or civilian. 
M u h a m m a d Haykal, former editor of Al-Ahram in Egypt, is one 
political writer w h o rose to great influence under al-Nasser - only to end 
up behind bars under A n w a r al-Sadat. Yet Haykal's impact on Arab 
journalism has remained immense. 
Wole Soyinka's angriest and perhaps most irrational book is The Man 
Died. It is a strong indictment not only of tyranny but also of the military, 
per se. It is a statement of the torment of detention to which Soyinka was 
subjected by General G o w o n ' s regime. Soyinka's contempt for the soldiers 
is palpable in the book. O n the other hand, Kenya's Ngugi w a Thiong'o 
was imprisoned by a civilian regime. His o w n post-detention statement 
was almost as angry as Soyinka's. 
Somalia's leading novelist, Nuruddin Farah, has written a trilogy of 
novels against military tyranny in his h o m e country. Although coming 
from a family of poets in the Somali language, Farah abandoned his 
mother-tongue as a m e d i u m for his literary work. T h e reasons he has 
given are the constraints of repression in Somalia. If he wrote in the 
Somali language he would not be read at all. Under Siad Barre, Farah's 
books were banned in the main market of the language - Somalia itself. 
In his plays, Farah has also often returned to the theme of tyranny. 
Yusuf and His Brothers is indeed a story of heroism - pitched against the 
callous obscenities of repression. T h e play has been successfully staged 
in Nigeria. 
O n balance, it continues to be one of the anomalies of post-colonial 
literature that war has not been an inspiration for 'powerful poetic 
emotions, recollected in tranquillity'. It is also a post-colonial anomaly 
that African soldiers are more recognized in the literature as villains than 
as heroes. This includes Chinua Achebe's 1987 novel, Anthills of the 
Savannah, his first since the Nigerian civil war. Soldiers in their post-
colonial roles have aroused a m o n g writers more hostility than nero-
worship - for better or for worse. 
Conclusion: literature and the triple heritage 
Like other branches of culture, African literature has been subject to the 
wider influences of Africa's triple heritage. T h e heritage consists of the 
three legacies of indigenous values, Islamic influences and the impact of 
Western culture. T h e different branches of literature have responded 
differently to the three legacies. 
While African fiction has been greatly enriched by contact with the 
West, indigenous African poetry in inland West Africa and along the 
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shores of the Indian Ocean has been more enriched by contact with Islam. 
Even in the religiously controversial area of song, the Zanzibari w o m a n 
singer, Siti bint Saad, was a fusion of Islam and Africanity. 
T h e Somali have developed, as w e indicated earlier, an exceptional 
culture of oral and even instant poetry. Their greatest modern national 
hero - Sayed M u h a m m a d 'Abdallah Hassan - was (in British terms) a 
fusion of William Shakespeare and Winston Churchill. T h e exceptionally 
sane Mullah was both saviour of the nation and hero of the language. O f 
course the Sayed lived prior to the period of this volume, but his influence 
on contemporary Somali poetry is still so great that the Sayed has to be 
regarded as one of the persistent forces of modern Somali literature at 
least to the end of the twentieth century. 
In Tanzania, m a n y of the writers are not Muslims. A n d yet the Swahili 
poetic traditions within which they have operated have been partly a 
product of contact between Islam and African culture. M u c h of the 
imagery is rooted in words of Arabic derivation. Quite often there is one 
Bantu word and an Arabic synonym, a bonus for the Swahili poet. T w o 
words for a concept, one Bantu, the other borrowed from Arabic: 
Mapenzi and mahaba (love); 
pwaa and bahari (the sea); 
nchi and ardhi (the land); 
mnyama and hayawani (animal); 
Mtu and Binaadamu (human being); 
Ngoja and Subiri (wait). 
A n d when the poet is stuck for a new concept, the two traditional sources 
have been the Bantu and Islamic legacies. 
N o r is the outlet for poetry limited to literary magazines and scholarly 
journals. Tanzanian newspapers have space not only for 'Letters to the 
Editor' but also for 'Poems to the Editor'. Readers send to the editor 
poems and verses on subjects which range from traditional medicine to 
a new piece of legislation, from matrimonial problems to the rate of 
inflation. It is again worth nothing that the debating poets of Tanzania 
have included highly eloquent w o m e n . 
In such a literary national atmosphere it was not surprising that the 
head of state should try his hand at completing the triple heritage 
by translating Shakespeare into Kiswahili. T h e translations themselves 
generated a debate in Tanzania of a purely literary kind. W a s blank verse 
admissible in Swahili poetry? Shakespeare had indeed written the plays 
in blank verse. That was perfectly compatible with the rules of poetic 
composition and the use of meters in the English language. Julius Nyerere 
had translated Shakespeare's plays also into blank verse. W h a t was 
admissible in the English language was surely not necessarily admissible 
in Kiswahili. T h e debate shifted in Tanzania from the issue of translating 
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foreign plays to the more basic indigenous issue of the nature of Swahili 
poetry itself. 
O n the issue of African languages and literature Islam has played a 
more paradoxical role. O n the one hand, Islam appears to be linguistically 
intolerant. Formal prayer has to be in the Arabic language. T h e Muezzin 
calls believers to prayer in Arabic. T h e Kur'än in its sacred role has to 
be read in Arabic. 
At first sight this appears to be linguistically less tolerant than Christian 
behaviour. Even Catholicism has scaled d o w n the role of Latin in worship 
and ritual. O n the other hand, Jesus spoke Aramaic. T h e Bible (a work 
of immense influence in African literature) is a book in translation 
anyhow - so w h y not one more additional translation into an African 
language this time? If the Bible is already in English, w h y not also in 
Lunyoro-Lutoro? It has already been translated into over ioo African 
languages. 
It is as if the Christian G o d was a god in exile. Christianity is a religion 
which failed at h o m e and triumphed abroad. Its centre was not a m o n g 
the Jews and other Semites but a m o n g Caucasians — not in the Middle 
East but in the West. It was therefore easy to accept the word of G o d in 
translation. 
But Islam triumphed among those to w h o m it was first revealed - and 
in the language in which it was revealed, Arabic. T o insist on Arabic as 
the language of worship is to insist on authenticity. It is also to insist on 
the original poetry of the Kur'än. Hausa poetry has felt that Kur'änic 
impact. 
But has the insistence on Arabic for formal worship helped or hindered 
both African languages in contact with Islam, and African poetry in 
contact with Islam? 
In Musl im Africa south of the Sahara before European colonialism, 
Arabic was not the official language of the state but was the official 
language of the 'Church', or the M o s q u e . 
O n the whole, the effect was to enrich languages like Kiswahili. Other 
languages influenced by Arabic include Wolof, Somali, Tigrinya and 
Tigre. 
W h a t about African poetry and its response to Africa's triple heritage? 
H o w has African literature been affected by the imported legacies of the 
West and Islam? There has been a school of thought in the West which 
has denied Africans a capacity for art at all. Let us look at this challenge 
more closely. 
T h o m a s Jefferson of America went to the extent of denying blacks a 
capacity for art or poetry. In Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia 
(Paris, 1784) there occurs the following astonishing observation: 
. . . never yet could I find that a black m a n had uttered a thought 
above the level of plain narration; never saw even an elementary trait 
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of painting or sculpture. In music they are more generally gifted 
than the whites with accurate ears for tune and time, and they have 
been found capable of imagining a small catch. Whether they will 
be equal to the composition of a more extensive run of melody, or 
of complicated harmony, is yet to be proved. 
Jefferson then goes on to m a k e an interesting statement. Pain is often a 
mother of poetry - anguish a stimulant to the muse. In Jefferson's words: 
Misery is often the parent of the most affecting touches in poetry. 
A m o n g the blacks is misery enough, G o d knows, but no poetry. 
Love is the peculiar oestrum of the poet. Their love is ardent, but 
it kindles the senses only, not the imagination. Religion, indeed, has 
produced a Phyllis Wheatley; but it could not produce a poet. T h e 
compositions published under her n a m e are below the dignity of 
criticism. 
While Hegel and H u g h Trevor-Roper denied Africans a capacity for 
history, T h o m a s Jefferson had earlier denied Africans a capacity for art. 
Yet both forms of prejudice have been contradicted m a n y times by the 
relentless march of historical and social research. 
As for T h o m a s Jefferson's belief that blacks were a people without 
poetry, black Ethiopians were writing poetry before Jefferson's ancestors 
in the British Isles were taught the Latin alphabet by the R o m a n s . A n d 
so entrenched is the poetic tradition among the Kiswahili-speaking peoples 
of East Africa today that the newspapers receive not only 'Letters to the 
Editor' but also 'Poems to the Editor' almost every day, as w e indicated. 
T h e most powerful genre of literature in Africa continues to be poetry — 
both oral and written, in both indigenous and foreign languages. S o m e 
of the poetry is a celebration of uniqueness; some is a cry of anguish. 
Considering his tragic fate as a casualty of the Nigerian civil war, few 
lines in African literature are as poignant and prophetic as the following 
ones by Christopher Okigbo: 
W h e n you have finished 
A n d done up m y stitches 
W a k e m e near the altar — 
A n d this p o e m will be finished. 
Leopold Senghor fuses Africanity with femininity. If Eve was the 
mother of the h u m a n species, and Africa was the mother of Eve, where 
does Africa end and womanhood begin? Senghor answers thus: 
Naked w o m a n , black w o m a n , 
Clad in your colour that is life, 
In your form that is beauty! 
I have grown up in your shade, 
the sweetness of your hands bound m y eyes. 
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A n d n o w in the heart of summer and noon, 
I discover you, promised earth, 
from the tower of your sun-scorched neck 
And your beauty smites m e to the full 
of m y heart like the flash of an eagle. 
Naked w o m a n , dark w o m a n . . . 
But there is more than sadness and joy in African literature - more 
than tragedy and comedy. T o paraphrase and supplement a Sierra Leonean 
poet-diplomat, Davidson Abioseh Nicol: 
'You are not a country, Africa 
You are a concept . . . ' 
You are not a concept, Africa, 
You are a glimpse of the infinite. 
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since 1935 
Jan V A N S I N A 
Everywhere in Africa today w e witness an astonishing creative outburst 
of the arts, bewildering in their diversity and welling up in all social 
strata. M a n y of the new trends in the arts date from the latter half of 
the colonial period. Indeed, some pioneers are still active today. After all, 
only two generations have elapsed since 1935. In this short interval of 
time, however, the pursuit of the arts has been so rich and diverse that 
this chapter can do no more than set out the major lines of development.1 
At the outset, a few general social and cultural features affecting all of 
the arts must be enumerated, as they provided a matrix for all of them. 
These include the waxing, but uneven, impact of Europe, the growth of 
the cities, the increasingly sharp social stratifications resulting in the 
formation of new classes, the industrial division of time which created 
leisure time, a time for the practice and the enjoyment of the arts, the 
prestige attached to technicity and technical training, the changing place 
and role of the artist in society from artisan to cultural diviner, the 
changing attitudes towards works of art and their uses, the alteration of 
values in general and especially the shifts in religious values. Focuses for 
artistic production have multiplied, providing new patronage. These 
include not only centres of government, churches and temples or mosques, 
but also bars, dance halls, military institutions, schools and museums. 
Older centres such as palaces, masquerades, shrines, religious festivals 
and initiation schools still exist, but have been waning. T h e phenomenon 
of fashion has gained in intensity and its impulses originate in fewer 
centres now, usually major cities such as Cairo, Tunis, Algiers, Fez, 
Nairobi, Lagos, Dakar, Kinshasa, Luanda or Soweto. This reflects typical 
patterns of increased conspicuous consumption2 and the pull of élites as 
1. T h e two general bibliographies are L . J. P. Gaskin, 1965, and D . Coulet-Western, 
1975. T h e earlier work by T . Heyse, 1950, is still useful. Journals reporting on the arts 
are African Arts, Présence africaine, Afrique littéraire et artistique and West Africa. T h e 
acquisition lists of the National M u s e u m of African Art (Washington) provide another 
source of current bibliography. M o r e restricted bibliographies or general works are listed 
under each section. 
2. T . Veblen, 1899, 1981 edn, pp. 185-7 a n d in general pp. 66-101. 
0 
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reference groups for millions of others. T h e mere listing of such features 
shows us h o w intimately the development of the arts has been tied to the 
general, social, intellectual and effective history of the period and the 
recurring imprint of these features over every art form, over every artistic 
expression, soon ceases to surprise the student of the arts. 
O u r itinerary starts from a consideration of the visual arts and the arts 
of the body, to consider the performing arts: music, some forms of dance, 
followed by the arts of the spectacle: pageantry, ballet, theatre, cinema 
and television. W e conclude with a few remarks about the role of the 
African arts in the context of the world. 
T h e visual arts 
After 1935 the visual arts easily fall into four broad categories, namely, 
traditional,3 tourist, urban popular and academic - as characterized by 
the subject matter, styles, patronage, goals and locus of production. T h e y 
differ from each other mainly as follows. Traditional art, often sculpture 
but also wall-painting,4 figurative or geometric, was practised in the 
countryside - which, as late as 1980, still encompassed some two-thirds 
of all the inhabitants of Africa - and in a few of the older cities. T h e 
objects m a d e , except for mural decor, had practical uses. A m o n g the 
users, institutions such as initiation ceremonies for boys or girls, funerals, 
next-to-village palaver houses, courts and some Christian churches,5 as 
well as some palaces of former rulers, stand out. Tourist art was aimed 
at foreign patrons. Its subject matter accordingly favoured exotic and 
anecdotal themes. T h e style was figurative, simplified and its canons were 
half-Europeanized. Urban popular art was still inchoate in 1930. It 
consisted mainly of paintings to decorate the walls of houses in town. 
Arising f.1930 in Central Africa, and m u c h earlier in North Africa, it 
was figurative. Portraits, historical, anecdotal and decorative subjects were 
favourites. Another variety of popular art is expressed in sign-paintings 
for shops, vehicles, cinemas, and so on. T h e artists, like traditional artists 
or producers of tourist art, see themselves as able craftsmen. Academic 
art was practised by artists trained in Western principles of painting and 
sculpture, using European techniques. Their patrons were governments, 
churches or the international art market. Their subject matter was often 
immediately similar to the repertoire in international use. Artists formally 
3. T h e term 'traditional', although consecrated by usage is an unhappy one. Traditional 
arts constantly changed and some traditional arts of 1935 did not even exist in 1900 or 
in 1880. Still, for lack of consensus about any alternative terminology, I will use 'traditional' 
in this text. 
4. Traditional wall-painting in m a n y parts of Central and East Africa developed after 
n e w styles of housing became c o m m o n from the 1890s onwards. 
5. O n Christian art, see J. F. Thiel and H . Helf, 1984; A n o n . , 1982; and Etudes des 
religions africaines, 1982, vol. 16, nos 31-2 . 
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trained in official academies assumed roles associated with international art 
while those w h o were trained in workshops have assumed fewer of these roles. 
T h e categories are not absolutely exclusive. Traditional items could 
appeal to tourists, as happened with painting on glass in Senegal6 where 
the consequent rise in prices shut out local customers from the market. 
Conversely tourist items could appeal to m e m b e r s of the local élites, w h o 
could afford going prices. S o m e academic art was produced by artists 
w h o had been trained as traditional artists (Lamidi Fakeye)7 or as 
producers of tourist art (Felix Idubor),8 while academic artists reverted 
to tourist or popular art (school of Lubumbashi , some Oshogbo artists). 
Yet, on the whole, the extent to which these trends remained separate 
strands over the two generations discussed here is the more remarkable.9 
Before w e discuss each of these separately, architecture must be at least 
mentioned. South of the Sahara very little modern architecture has been 
left to African architects, even though a handful of schools (Kinshasa, 
Luanda, M a p u t o ) trained potential architects. Traditional architects were 
still found in Northern Africa, but not elsewhere as housing became more 
and more standardized and built by the users, while after agio almost 
no traditional public buildings of a lasting character were realized. Hence 
the categories of art discussed do not apply to architecture, which in 
contrast to all the other arts is limited to expatriate activities, even if 
some of their efforts aim at reproducing features of traditional archi-
tecture.10 Local innovative architecture of a popular kind is limited to the 
building of places of worship." 
Table 20.1 summarizes the salient points of the various categories. 
6. H . Schissel, 1985. 
7. T . Ogunwale, 1971. Apprenticed to Bamindele in the late 1940s, he later executed 
major commissions for Catholic churches in south-western Nigeria. 
8. Anon. , 1968; Y . A . Grillo and J. Highet, 1968. Idubor began as a tourist carver in 
Lagos in the late 1940s. 
9. The major handbooks for the visual arts south of the Sahara are: Badi Banga N e -
M w i n e , 1977; U . Beier, 1968; M . W . Mount , 1973; E . Berman, 1983 (only this edition); 
E . J. D e Jager, 1973; S. EI Mansury, 1984; R . Italiaander, 1937; J. Kennedy, 1985; 
E . Micaud, 1968; G . I. P. Okoro, 1984; F. Willett, 1971. U . Eckardt and G . Sievernich, 
1979, is perhaps the most useful for the popular arts, which tend to be neglected elsewhere. 
10. M . A . Fassassi, 1978. T h e CICIBA headquarters at Libreville is based on an 
interpretation of Bamileke architecture, but conceived and built by European architects. 
T h e St. Michael church in the same city is supposed to remind the worshiper of a Fang 
temple. Its m a n y columns carved by a local sculptor on Biblical themes but in the spirit 
of carved columns of Gabon and Cameroon are the real modern African art here, not the 
building itself. 
11. A m o n g colonial churches, w e find the most innovative colonial sculpture itself as 
well as replicas of all European styles of religious architecture. Independent churches, 
especially the smaller ones, have achieved some striking architectural innovations such as 
the Harrist church at Gregbo (P. Curtin et al., 1978, p. 443), or Fang rural churches and 
baiti temples on the road from Libreville to Cocobeach (Gabon). 
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Traditional arts 
Although its demise had been heralded well before 1935," traditional art 
still lives and develops today. Most Africans are still rural and still crave 
artistic expression. In the generations before 1936 traditional arts had not 
only undergone internal developments of style and the gradual adoption 
of imported materials (cloth, paints), tools (saws, files) and some tech-
niques, but lively novel traditions had sprung up here and there such as 
figurative work on calabashes (Zaire, Kenya)'3 or in ceramics (Zaire).'4 
Often substantial innovations meant sales to European residents. T h u s 
full-length Fang funerary figures or D a n female statues are n o w seen as 
timeless traditional art. Yet they developed only after 1885 in response 
to local European interest. These innovations soon found a niche of use 
in the cultures that created them, distinguishing such works from early 
tourist art. 
Nevertheless, the variety and output of these arts had shrunk by 1935, 
due to competition from cheap manufactured imports and to a loss of 
buying power as well as a loss of status by the traditional élites. A s the 
depression struck in 1930, however, and imports became more expensive 
relative to income, the dynamics of substitution were reversed for all 
products, even metal wares. This situation lasted until the close of the 
Second World W a r . T h e n , however, the process reversed again. After 
i960 even ceramics, which had held their o w n against enamelled ware, 
were being abandoned as the age of plastic dawned. Local textiles became 
relatively so expensive that they survived only as tourist items or as the 
costly materials for n e w national costumes. 
Already by 1935, the outcry that traditional arts were dying out had 
led to official action in favour of handicrafts - as in Tunisia, G h a n a and 
Zaire.'5 Government intervention, to be sure, led more often than not to 
the development of tourist art since the customers for the products were 
no longer local rural people, but it did preserve or at least retard the loss 
of technical k n o w - h o w . 
Sculpture and painting on traditional themes in a traditional setting 
continued their stylistic developments after 1935. Religious painting in 
12. For example, see F. Willett, 1971, p. 239; and W . Gillon, 1984, pp. 347-8, citing 
the end of the Second World W a r as the end of traditional art. Most recent books on 
modern art tend to date the supposed demise from ¿.1960 and independence; K . Fosu, 
1986. 
13. J. Van den Bossche, 1955; S. Kay, 1978. Calabash carving in Lower Zaire dates at 
least to £-.1885. 
14. Zande and Mangbetu figurative pottery after f.1895, dying out by 1940. For Lower 
Zaire, Z . Volavka, 1977; and J. MacGaffey, 1975. 
15. T h e Commission pour les arts et métiers indigènes du Congo belge dates from 1935, 
Tunisian schools from 1935, Ghana before 1929. 
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Ethiopia is an outstanding example'6 and so are buildings and carvings 
for traditional palaces in south-western Nigeria or the creation of mbari 
houses in south-eastern Nigeria.'7 A s the dynamics of traditional art 
during this period have attracted little research, w e cannot describe h o w 
these arts developed thematically and stylistically, apart from changes 
fuelled by a tourist market. In K u b a art during these years the range of 
media for carving increased (for example, ebony, ivory), but the repertoire 
of style formulae decreased in sophistication (for example, rhythms of 
repeated decor). Yet some new themes were developed and at least one 
royal statue stood in a direct line of development within the earlier 
series.'8 Fewer of the available models (shapes, decoration) were used and 
choices of clichés waxed and waned with fashions responding in part only 
to local European tastes. Masks in coastal West Africa increased in 
complexity and fancifulness as religious purpose was turning to carnival. 
Sometimes greater stylization and assuredness of proportion and rhythm 
replaced earlier preciosity (for example, Senufo), sometimes the reverse 
evolution occurred (Baule). Very little change took place between f.1930 
and 1982 in some items such as icons and masks for the K u b a boys' 
initiation. A n d yet in the Genya initiations (Kisangani, Zaire) m o d -
ernization of icons was continually occurring, despite the fact that the 
initiation never became a tourist show.'9 O n the whole, one dare neither 
generalize about the evolution of traditional art, nor continue to proclaim 
its imminent demise. 
In North Africa independence brought an emphasis on traditional 
architecture and on the renovation of ancient monuments . O n e thinks of 
the mausoleum for M o h a m e d V of Morocco or the stone-cutting revival 
in Tunisia and of restorations everywhere. N e w work includes such 
buildings as the n e w opera-house in Cairo with its specific M a m l u k 
reminiscences.20 Elsewhere such a return to the roots of regional traditions 
did not occur. But it is enough to contrast the utterly forlorn situation 
of the traditional arts in Lebowa (Republic of South Africa) to that of 
such arts elsewhere to realize h o w well and truly alive these arts still are 
in most of Africa.2' 
Tourist art 
B y 1935 tourist art was still a small business, because apart from Egypt 
there were few tourists. In Egypt, fake Pharaonic items and all sorts of 
16. U . Eckardt and G . Sievernich, 1979, pp. 56-67. 
17. H . Cole, 1982. 
18. J. C o m e t , 1975, p. S3, and 1974. 
19. A . Droogers, 1980. 
20. A n o n . , 1985. 
21. P. Davison, 1984. 
587 
Africa since igjs 
kitsch, exotic and romantic, produced in Suez, Port Said, Alexandria and 
Cairo was selling well. Elsewhere along the coasts selling souvenirs to 
sailors was also a traditional activity. Other items were produced in small 
numbers for European residents (ashtrays, bookstands, salad bowls) or as 
souvenirs to take h o m e . But in the 1930s the foundations for the main 
genres and productions of later times were being laid. W h e r e traditional 
carvings were liked, shoddy copies were n o w churned out, while rarer 
works were being imitated or even forged. For instance, the F o u m b a n 
(Cameroon) brasses in the Ife style, using a Nigerian stamp as a model, 
began to be manufactured in the 1940s. A n artist such as Osei Bonsu 
provided both for the needs of the establishment at Kumasi and made 
copies of well-known works for sale.22 Secondly, existing genres developed 
further. K u b a statues for the tourist market in the 1930s derived from 
the royal statues, from charm figures and from figures for chiefs {tnwaan). 
Thirdly, European representations, whether Christian or secular, were 
imitated. Experimentation showed what sold best. T h e role of missions 
has been paramount here, not only because missions encouraged the 
production of works for churches, but also because vocational schools 
soon produced imitations of textiles, mats, ceramics and woodwork for 
sale. Well before 1936 the tourist-art style of Buta Catholic Mission, with 
its emphasis on ebony and ivory and its carvings of elephants and genre 
scenes, was flourishing and profitable. B y 1950, half a dozen such schools 
in the Belgian Congo alone were producing a variety of goods from 
furniture to knick-knacks. 
Tourist art is bought as a souvenir. T h e message to be conveyed 
therefore had to be familiar to the foreigner even though it was supposed 
to be exotic. Therefore, tourist art was figurative, conformed approxi-
mately to European canons of proportion, used ebony and ivory and 
represented exotic wildlife or anecdotal themes (daily life in the village, 
dances) or the equivalent of costume dolls23 such as Maasai warriors, 
Mangbetu with elongated heads or 'typical' busts such as those from the 
workshop of Massengo in Brazzaville (from the 1950s onwards). T w o -
dimensional decorative patterns had to be simple, deadeningly regular, 
imitating machine work as m u c h as possible and colours should please 
European eyes. T h e n there were the practical requirements. In the age 
of travel by sea, massive wooden furniture such as Zanzibari chests or 
Benin chairs were liked. But after 1945 the age of travel by air and of 
mass tourism required small and light items. Crudely carved camel-saddle 
stools and little tables easily dismantled became favourites, whilst North 
African poufs, however garish, always did well, as did the n e w Maghrebi 
22. D . H . Ross, 1984. 
23. Costume dolls were produced in South Africa from i.1815 to at least the 1860s, 
but then fell out of favour. Elsewhere this form of souvenir never seems to have caught 
on. 
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plate 20.1 Artisans working in brass at Foumban, Cameroon
figurative carpets, labelled 'Berber' or Kabyle. Such, then, were the
requirements of tourist art. Moreover, it had to be cheap and easily made.
Hence its shoddy character. Higher-quality goods for export such as the
carpets of Fez or the fine Kuba textiles suffered from the impact of a
mass market.24
In the first phase, before f.1950, schools and craft shops, later co¬
operatives, fuelled production while professional traders with a retinue of
artists were still rare.25 Markets were near major hotels at ports and
capitals. After 1950 tourist art became airport art. Tourists arrived in
ever-increasing numbers, and the demand was met by co-operatives,
entrepreneurs and a network of organized hawkers, the so-called 'Sén¬
égalais' of West and Central Africa. Forgery of classical works became
much more common as an appreciation of traditional art spread among
24. B. Jules-Rosette, 1984, is the basic study, see P. Ben Amos, 1977, on meaning and
form; and C. Geary, 1983, pp. 74-6 and 86-7, on the decline of quality comparing
traditional work at Foumban (Cameroon) with tourist copies.
25. Still, M. H. Lelong, 1946, vol. 1, p. 200, claims to have seen a sizeable factory in
the Gulf of Guinea well before 1940.
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plate 20.2 'Tourist art' or 'airport art'
the middle classes of the world. In general, the whole of Africa now
produced works on the lines long-familiar in Egypt.
And yet all tourist art is not the same. Let us look at the Kamba and
Makonde productions in Kenya and Tanzania to show two very different
dynamics at work. During the First World War, Mutisya Munge was a
carrier.20 Until then he had carved the occasional ceremonial stick for a
local Kamba elder. Now he derived new models and ideas from the
Zaramo near Dar es Salaam, who had already been selling items to
German residents, speculating on ethnographica, before 19 14. Munge
26. W. Elkan, 1958.
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took up full-scale carving and found a market for Christmas presents 
from Europeans n o w streaming into the highlands of Kenya. H e and 
others imitating him hawked their wares. After 1945 business boomed as 
large numbers of British soldiers were stationed in Kenya. T h e next big 
market was American. D e m a n d n o w required thousands of objects. A n 
official co-operative failed, but orders were met and the curio business 
became a cottage industry. B y 1955 Mutisya M u n g e attempted to set up 
shop in London . B y i960 'African and A k a m b a Handicrafts' there 
employed five agents and by 1970 imports into the U S A totalled a quarter 
of a million pieces from Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.27 Phalanxes of 
Maasai warriors and coy antelopes invade the West every year. 
In contrast, Makonde carvers never copied objects until very recently.28 
Mainly as a result of the guerrilla war of liberation, they moved from 
Mozambique to Mtwara, later to Dar es Salaam. Over one hundred 
carvers worked near Dar from ¿-.1964 onwards and sold their works 
through dealers. O n e of them created a n e w icon, the representation of 
a spirit being (skaitani), which allowed for fantastic creations. At the same 
time, though, conventional Christian and anecdotal genres were also 
produced. Europeans have not denied the label 'art' to such works, 
especially the shaitani, because of the sculptural virtuosity of every piece, 
reminiscent of recent European sculpture. Moreover each piece is unique, 
m a d e for display, and the carvers expressly label them as products of 
innovative creativity: art for art's sake. 
T h e contrast between K a m b a and M a k o n d e carving is extreme, but 
typical for the full range of tourist art. T h e same contrasts can be seen 
for instance at F o u m b a n (Cameroon) where some metal work, often in 
new media such as aluminium, is an expression of deeply-held values, 
while other items are but shoddy copies of traditional icons. Hackwork 
m a y be the rule but some artists create genuine works of art, expressing 
major metaphors in a careful form. 
Such situations help us to understand the production of small paintings 
of rural life, often fishing scenes, which by the 1930s had begun to be 
sold to tourists. They were for sale to foreigners, yet expressed the 
nostalgia of the new urban immigrants for the simple rural life. They 
were folk art, whether produced in innumerable copies or not. A fair 
proportion of such works were bought by local people and became popular 
art. Continuities with earlier traditions of painting or drawing can often 
be traced, including antecedents for the abstract works on sale after the 
mid-1960s. S o m e artists have claimed that they expressed a creative urge 
in producing these, while attributing their practice of making innumerable 
copies to economic need.29 
27. M . W . M o u n t , 1973, p. 55 and p. 217, fn. 32. 
28. S. J. Ntiro, 1982, is m u c h more reliable than A . J. Stout, 1966. See also 
S. Littlefield-Kasfir, 1980; and E . Herold, 1983. 
29. S. Creuz, 1951; B . Jules-Rosette, 1984, pp. 30-56. 
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plate 20.3 Makonde art
Tourist art can be of considerable interest to the historian, especially
because it embodies genuine communication directed not merely to the
foreign tourist, but to a local public, even if that public is not the buyer
of the product.
Popular art
South of the Sahara, urban popular art dating from after independence
is the best-known.30 But some popular art is much earlier in date and the
30. See U. Eckardt and G. Sievernich, 1979, for the best introduction to popular art.
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limit between traditional and popular is blurred in rural areas - as, for 
example, on cemeteries with cement sculpture (Côte d'Ivoire, Akan, Cross 
River, Kongo),3 1 or the murals of Ndebele villages in Transvaal.32 Cement 
replaced m u d but also stone and wood. T h e sculptures often represent 
modernity (planes, cars), new religious emblems (crosses, sexed angels) 
and portraits (in K o n g o continuation of the wood and stone tradition). 
In some cases there are breaks. Ndebele murals were a total innovation 
f.1945 and Nubian murals developed only f.1925,33 to die out with the 
creation of Lake Nasser in 1964. A certain A h m a d Batul, probably from 
Ballana, invented the new murals. Hitherto murals had been the work of 
w o m e n . H e was the first m a n to make them. H e drew his inspiration 
from older geometric motifs, and from simple figurative scenes on imports. 
O n e painter even used the pictures on the lids of tin cans for inspiration. 
T h e large figurative advertisements done on the walls of establishments 
in the western oases of Egypt were similar to such murals. Murals were 
also found in parts of Central and East Africa. T h e y were favoured by 
missions in Uganda to replace body-painting, of which they disapproved. 
Other rural products of popular art have been mostly shrines and churches, 
mentioned above. 
In the cities, one finds some churches, some murals on interior walls 
in houses or bars, sign-paintings and advertisements.34 Yoruba townhouses 
sported cement lions and other architectural sculpture from the 1930s to 
1950s.35 A unique form of popular visual art was the ensemble of sculpture, 
painting and appliqué flags for the asafo associations of Fante (Ghana) 
towns.3 
But the most characteristic popular urban art came to be painting on 
canvas. This sometimes derives from the murals which in parts of West 
and all of Central Africa were pre-colonial or early colonial, or from body 
art. Figurative themes soon incorporated products of the modern age and 
historical scenes (foundation of administrative posts, battles). Similar 
graphic art developed also on calabashes, on some pottery and sometimes, 
as appliqué, on cloth, as well as in the shape of bas-relief on ivory or 
wood. Popular painting has deep roots in African traditions. 
T h e earliest painters such as Ibrayima Njoya in Cameroon (f.1920), 
A . Onabolu in Nigeria (1920s), or A . Lubaki (c.1926) and others in Zaire, 
were inspired by such works. Lubaki was a carver on ivory before he 
31. K . Nicklin and J. Salmons, 1977; D . R . Roseyear, 1984; S. Dornowitz and 
R . Mandirola, 1984; P. S . Breidenbach and D . H . Ross, 1978; M . Gilbert, 1981; R . F. 
Thompson and J. Cornet, 1981. 
32. S. Priebatsch and N . Knight, 1979; E . A . Schneider, 1985; C . A . M . Vogel, 1985; 
T . Matthews, 1979. 
33. M . Wenzel, 1972; H . Jaritz, 1973; and B . Jewsiewicki, 1986. 
34. U . Beier, 1971; and O . Pritchett, 1979. 
35. U . Beier, i960. 
36. G . N . Preston, 1975. 
593 
Africa since ig35 
began to paint.37 But only in the 1930s do w e see the appearance, all 
along the Atlantic coasts, of nostalgic painting, depicting beaches, palm 
trees, villagers and urban genre scenes.38 A n art for sale to tourists, yes, 
but also for urbanités. In i960 one could still see a camel and his escort 
under starry Saharan nights on the wall of a Mauritanian house in Dakar, 
or a monumental elephant on the wall of a watchmaker's house in 
Bujumbura (Burundi).39 Similar scenes on canvas were beginning to be 
bought by urban dwellers, along with portraits of famous people 
(marabouts in Senegal), or self-portraits (Zaire). 
A striking innovation in the themes portrayed occurred in the 1950s, 
first in Kinshasa, then, after independence, in Lubumbashi, and in Nigeria 
after the civil war, and still later in Ghana. Historical subjects became 
favourites. B y i960 the exotic image of M a m y Wata (or mamba muntu), 
the siren temptress, the symbol of magic and alienation, had also spread 
from Ghana to Shaba. A n e w complex of themes coalesced around i960 
in the bleak industrial landscape of Lubumbashi. Scenes from the trau-
matic past and the tribulation of the present directly expressed the 
historical consciousness of the inhabitants. G o n e are nostalgic scenes of 
a return to the unproblematic village life. T h e perception of urban 
identities predominated now. Portrait painting evolved so that its subjects 
were n o w shown as tragic figures rent by historical contradiction. These 
anonymous works40 met with great success and spread quickly to Kinshasa 
and Kisangani, a little later to D a r es Salaam4' and to Lusaka. This genre 
will not disappear fast. Its models are various chromolithographs, including 
advertisements and illustrations in magazines. European perspectives and 
European canons for the rendering of figures are used, even if modelling 
and shading are not. This strongly contrasts with the local historiographical 
themes rendered.42 
Popular religious art survived in Ethiopia with the production of 
standardized icons, historical scenes or magic scrolls. Portraits and scenes 
37. M . W . M o u n t , 1973, pp. 161-5; O . Dapo, 1973; Badi Banga ne-Mwine, 1977; 
G . D . Perier, 1930. 
38. G . D . Perier, 1950-2. 
39. G . Sandrart, 1953, ill. on p. 7 (Bujumbura), in this case a nostalgic reminder of 
an animal then almost extinct in the area; J. Beinart, 1968 (Maputo, Johannesburg). 
40. Signatures at first were often not the names of the painters but those of the 
customers. T h e cult of the master-painter's signature spread only among European 
collectors. 
41. The Tingatinga school of Dar es Salaam was inspired by Zairian artists, but the 
themes are still on the whole the older type of nostalgic genre. J. A . R . Wembah-Rashid, 
1972; and M . Teisen, 1968. 
42. Contributions by Y . L . Mundara and Badi-Banga ne-Mwine, 1982, pp. 145-64; 
J. Fabian, 1978; I. Szombati-Fabian and J. Fabian, 1976; I. M . G . Quimby and S. T . 
Swank, 1980, pp. 247-92; B . Jules-Rosette, 1984, pp. 142^73 (Lubumbashi styles in 
Lusaka); B . Jewsiewicki, 1986; J. Salmons, 1977; U . Beier, 1976; T . Fiofori, 1986a. 
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are stereotyped, but from time to time a novel composition appears — 
such as St Yarid accompanied by birds, for he is the saint w h o introduced 
sacred music into the country. Elsewhere in northern Africa religiously-
inspired works were more limited, as befits Islam. A m o n g these, images 
of the Ka'ba at Mecca were the most c o m m o n . 4 3 
With the growth of the cities and the stabilization of the immigrant 
population, urban popular art and the themes mentioned steadily increase 
in importance and significance. Such works attract the social historian 
especially because they directly portray the perception of the changing 
times a m o n g the urban masses. 
Academic arts 
B y 1913 the practice of visual arts in the European tradition, mainly 
architecture and painting, had been implanted in Egypt with the foun-
dation of an Ecole des Beaux-arts in Cairo. Since then, and even before, 
Egyptian painters and architects participated in all the movements of 
European art as did the occasional sculptor, from the romanticists of the 
late nineteenth century to the surrealists, abstract artists, and pop artists 
of recent decades. Yet Egyptian painting is readily recognizable in most 
instances because m a n y of its themes and some of its forms intentionally 
hark back to older Islamic or even Pharaonic traditions.44 Elsewhere 
though, only an isolated African artist here and there had m a d e it to 
Paris or L o n d o n and was being trained there. In 1935 a small number of 
painters returned to Tunis and started the so-called Tunisian school, a 
school whose themes were often to be denounced as folkloric. Yet this 
was part of the cultural revival of the country.45 In Morocco a similar 
development occurred a little later,46 while in Algeria, local artists were 
m u c h more stifled and limited to traditional arts and crafts. Outside 
Egypt, schools of fine arts appeared m u c h later, the earliest being perhaps 
the department at the University College of Makerere (1937). In the 
generation between 1935 and i960 three major trends developed on the 
continent. European artists set up workshops, some of which were 
transformed later into regular schools. S o m e local artists continued to be 
trained in Europe (Paris, L o n d o n , Germany) and some were trained in 
local academic institutions. These trends are n o w discussed in turn, 
starting with the earliest one: the independent artists trained abroad. 
T h e first Africans from south of the Sahara to study art in Europe 
arrived there from the later 1930s onwards, the earliest one being perhaps 
Ghana's O k u A m p o f o w h o arrived in Great Britain to study medicine 
43. G . Fisseha and W . Raunig, 1985; D . Hecht, 1979. 
44. S. El Mansury, 1984; G . Boctor, 1969. 
45. E . Micaud, 1968. 
46. D . Desanti and J. Decock, 1969. 
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and then art in 1932. A m o n g the pioneers were also Iba Ndiaye (Senegal) 
in Paris by 1948, Gerard Sekoto (South Africa) in Paris by 1947, Afewerk 
Tekle (Ethiopia) in L o n d o n by 1948, Kofi Antubam, a graduate of 
Achimota College of 1936 (Ghana) in London by 1946, Ben E n w o n w u 
(Nigeria) in London by 1944 and Viteix (Angola) in Portugal in the 1950s.47 
This generation was to influence subsequent developments especially with 
regard to the role and the goals of artist, but also by example, excepting 
only Sekoto w h o practically lived in exile. T h e drive of m a n y academic 
artists is perhaps best rendered by Iba Ndiaye: 
In fact the African graphic artists themselves must find the answers 
to the question: h o w to remain African or to become African again -
while willing to be resolutely modern and attempting to explain 
oneself in a universal visual language. It does not suffice in order to 
achieve this, to proclaim one's Africanness, to state that one holds 
to African values. It is in the practice of painting, carving, engraving 
. . . that such artists will shape their singularity.48 
T h e quote captures the dilemma of the academic artist. T h e y wanted 
to be technicians, 'up-to-date', equals of others on the international scene 
and yet they refused alienation. They strove to retain a link to their 
specificity. T h e tension is visible in their works, perhaps most in those 
of E n w o n w u w h o at times changes styles from international to 'modern 
Benin' even in a single work. It is least visible in Sekoto's dramatic 
expressionism, and in that of other South African graphic artists, because 
the concerns of the industrial society from which they sprang were so 
similar to those that fuelled expressionism or the Neue Sachlichkeit in 
Europe. 
A m p o f o , E n w o n w u and Antubam were practising artists well before 
1940, Sekoto from 1938 onwards. T h e y and the others w h o were in 
Europe in the later 1940s were the spokesmen for African art at the first 
gatherings of artists in Paris (1956) and R o m e (1959). Their successors 
and disciples soon merged, however, with artists trained in local schools 
and none founded a truly independent artistic trend as such. But their 
goals, standard and practice set the patterns for the artists of the 
generations after i960. 
T h e first developments after the Second World W a r concerned E u r -
opean painters, usually surrealists, w h o believed that techniques could be 
transmitted without affecting the m o d e of expression of the pupils at all. 
They would create the 'natural art' that was in the mind. B y 1944 a 
French painter established a school in Lubumbashi, another one opened 
47. In general, see M . W . M o u n t , 1973, pp. 160-86 and passim; D . Mestre, 1981, 
pp. 3-5 and 28-30. 
48. I. Ndiaye, 1984, p. 8. For a similar quote by Kofi Antubam dating from 1961, see 
M . W . Mount, 1973, p. 5. 
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plate 20.4 Above: Iba Ndiaye ofSenegal, with one ofhis paintings; below: Kofi Antubam
of Ghana, with one ofhis sculptures
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plate 20.5 Viteix ofAngola, with one ofhis paintings
598
Arts and society since igm 
the school of Potopoto (Brazzaville) in 1951, and in 1961 renewed the 
experience in Dakar. Similar schools arose in M a p u t o (i960), Harare 
(1961), Rorke's Drift, South Africa (1963), and Oshogbo, Nigeria (1961). 
A n artist missionary forerunner at Cyrene (Bulawayo, Zimbabwe) kept a 
workshop from 1939 to 1953 that was later taken over by his pupil S a m 
Songo, but left no enduring legacy. 
Despite the declarations of the founders, it is evident that they deeply 
influenced the styles of their pupils. T h e schools of Lubumbashi, Potopoto 
and Dakar produced very decorative works in ochre or garish colour, 
reflecting colonial notions of popular art as it should be. Several styles 
per school were c o m m o n , but they all partook of similar characteristics. 
As the output was brought by Europeans the border between art for art's 
sake and art as souvenir has waned. At the same time popular themes 
have renewed some of this art. At Potopoto themes from the village, 
Mboshi headpieces or sticklike persons in the supposedly rock-art style 
have waned. C r o w d scenes and sometimes anguished landscapes have 
taken their place.49 
Developments in Mozambique , Harare and especially Nigeria have 
been quite different. T h e first Mozambican painter, Valente Malangatana, 
influenced by the revolutionary school of Mexican wall-painting, has 
produced an art whose forms and themes were totally different. Tragic 
scenery, records of brutality, anguish and goals dominate; a thematic 
repertory shared by most black South African artists but not elsewhere. 
His social concerns and his preference for wall-painting have remained 
hallmarks of art in Maputo. 5 0 In Harare sculpture was favoured over 
painting. It was very close to G e r m a n expressionism (especially Barlach) 
and has not evolved very m u c h since i96i.5' ^ 
' T h e Oshogbo workshop certainly has been the most successful of all 
these ventures. It produced a spectacular variety of styles and artists still 
very active today, still working for the expatriate market or for public 
sponsors at h o m e . Fantastic themes in local surrealist, yet decorative 
styles, sometimes in mixed media, especially beadwork, dominate. Most 
artists are painters. Very few are sculptors, which is surprising because 
Yoruba tradition is so heavily sculptural. But only legends and myths 
have been taken from the Yoruba tradition, the forms and styles of its 
visual arts being eschewed completely. This m a y well be an effect of the 
founder's creed: 'Art should be sincere'. In practice this meant that it 
should not continue in the existing line of traditional art.52 T h e vitality 
49. J. P. Lebeuf, 1956; d'Arschot, Comte, 1951, pp. 37-45; G . D . Perier, 1950-2; 
M . W . Mount, 1973, pp. 74-94. 
50. M . W . Mount, 1973, pp. 160-1 and appendix; B . Schneider, 1972. 
51. U . Eckardt and G . Sievernich, 1979, pp. 72-5 and introduction; M . W . Mount, 
!973> PP- ! I7 _ 23; F- M c E w e n , 1972. 
52. U . Beier, 1968, pp. 89-164; M . W . Mount, 1973, pp. 147-58; J. Kennedy, 1985; 
G . I. P. Okoro, 1984; J. Buraimoh, 1971. 
599 
Africa since igjj 
of Oshogbo artists and the favour they have found abroad is remarkable. 
It often obscures the fact, however, that Oshogbo only forms a fraction 
of contemporary Nigerian art, even Nigerian academic art. T h e chronology 
of the expansion of academic institutions teaching the arts parallels that 
of the workshops initiated by artists. T h e early ventures in Uganda and 
Nigeria - such as Makerere College (1927) were followed by academies 
in Kinshasa (1943) and Khartoum (1945), after which most countries 
followed suit in the 1950s and early 1960s. In every country painters and 
sculptors began to be trained, even while others still went to Europe to 
study either to complement local training or completely bypassing the 
local institutions. Artists were supported by official commissions and by 
sales to expatriates w h o also owned the galleries where they were shown. 
In this sense they tend to be alienated from their o w n societies, even 
from most of the élite. This situation changed only very slowly. Nigeria 
had to wait until 1962 to have its first locally-managed gallery and until 
the late 1970s before some of its artworks were being bought by local 
individuals for high prices.53 A n d elsewhere south of the Sahara the 
situation was less brilliant. 
Independent governments used art for prestige, yet artists have rarely 
been asked to create propaganda nor has censorship been a problem. 
S o m e governments have supported quasi-official artists such as Kofi 
Antubam in Ghana , Afewerk Tekle in Imperial Ethiopia, Ben E n w o n w u 
in Nigeria or Liyolo in Zaire. In these cases their themes and styles have 
adapted to ensure easy communication with a wider public. There are 
signs that some change is in the offing. Propaganda is becoming more 
important. Socialist realism m a y well become official doctrine in some 
countries. Artistic freedom continues today, maybe because of the lack of 
resonance most academic art has in African societies, even a m o n g the 
élites. It is also striking h o w little relevance m a n y themes have for 
contemporary realities beyond the celebration of cultural nationalism. T h e 
exceptions here are the artists of South Africa and Mozambique whose 
nightmarish portrayal of anxiety and anguish closely correspond to precise 
social settings. 
For the most part academic art squarely belongs to the mainstream of 
international art. A m o n g its tendencies, surrealism and abstract art have 
had m u c h less following than expressionism. T h e n e w African expression-
ism recalls that of the European continent, especially G e r m a n y before 
1932. M o d e r n British art, which was important in the academic institutions 
of former British colonies, has steadily been losing ground. T h e other 
major trend has been neo-traditional - that is, the re-use of traditional 
items for inspiration, sometimes canons of style, sometimes themes in 
works. This tendency favours the emergence of regional (if not quite 
national) styles, as for instance in the Côte d'Ivoire as opposed to Ghana . 
53. M . Crowder, 1978. 
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In parts of northern Africa the insistence on line has remained and leads 
to neo-calligraphy, a sparing use of figurative elements, if they are used 
at all, and a consequent tendency towards abstract art. Sudanese and 
Moroccan artists, as well as some northern Nigerian works, have often 
gone in this direction. W h e r e traditional arts are still quite vigorous a 
contrary trend also flowed. T h u s in Ethiopia abstract or starkly engineered 
graphics or paintings are seen as liberation from tradition. 
Such major trends are not haphazard. T h e neo-traditional one cor-
responds to négritude and related movements before and after inde-
pendence. T h e expressionist styles share deep formal links with older 
African art, especially sculpture, since European expressionism and the 
styles derived there from it had absorbed the deepest fundamental African 
influences relating to volume, stylization and even canons of proportion 
('systematic distortion'). Abstract art had its African roots in geometric 
decoration or in the Islamic arts. Only surrealism was totally new. Even 
here its resonances echoed collective fantasies about gods and spirits or 
built on the rich symbolic clichés of African oral arts and ritual. At the 
same time all diese trends underwent a strong impact of international 
fashions, accompanied by international concepts concerning the role of 
the artist and an extreme stress on individuality, the primacy of m o o d 
and emotion, the absolute values of artistic freedom, creativity per se and 
the work of art as legitimated by creativity whatever its form or content. 
T h e impact of critics has been minimal. There are few or no trained 
critics,54 and critics often do not transcend the lavish praise that usually 
greets the exhibitions of academic artists. 
Academic art exists alongside popular, tourist and often traditional 
streams of art which influence each other constantly. Cases are k n o w n of 
tourist artists developing into academic artists (Felix Idubor) and of 
academic artists becoming popular (some Lubumbashi artists) and tourist 
artists. Such interaction is bound to intensify in time. This m a y yet lead 
to the emergence of regional or national styles in painting and sculpture 
as soon as local markets for art predominate over expatriate sales. 
The arts of the body 
T h e body, its adornment and its garb proclaims the self as well as various 
group identities (status or ethnicity) and a sense of the occasion (work, 
festivity, mourning, and so on). Hence a history of the body arts is 
directly relevant to the historian for w h o m it m a y be one of the more 
sensitive indicators of social change and cultural influence.55 
54. M . Crowder, 1978, pp. 142-5. 
55. Such an historical study is only just beginning. See J. Eicher, 1970 and 1985; 
M . Pokornowski et al., 1985; R . P. Dozy, 1969, for costume; A . Fisher, 1984, for jewellery. 
Textiles have been well studied. Overviews in J. Picton and J. M a c k , 1979; and R . Sieber, 
1972. Mos t studies, however, are not historical or do not relate to art and the body. 
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Traditional Africa had k n o w n an infinite variety of personal adornment 
by scarification, tattooing, body-painting, hairstyles and operations such 
as circumcision or excision which altered the body temporarily or per-
manently. Jewellery and costume complemented the appearance. Differ-
ences by gender, age, marital status and social position were thus 
expressed. T h e monotheistic religions had strong views about modesty 
and their adherents dressed accordingly. Ethnicity was also reflected, often 
by scarification, or by standard costume such as those of Tunisia or 
Morocco. Even headgear or hairstyles (veil, tarbusk, turban, hairstyles for 
w o m e n in Angola, G a b o n , Zaire) could be signs of ethnic, class or 
religious affiliation. Additional adornment (jewellery, festive paint or 
clothing) testified to individual standing and to the degree of competition 
or solidarity on occasions of public display. Fashions were set by élite 
groups, acting as examples to be imitated by others,56 for 'traditional' 
body art was not static. T h u s fashions at the K u b a court in the early 
years of this century or in R w a n d a are well known. For a decade or so, 
young K u b a Brummeis affected tall hats. In R w a n d a the upper-class 
masculine rage was for haircuts leaving curved tufts imitating the styles 
worn by upper-class unmarried girls. T h e fashion began around 1900 and 
had died out by 1945." T h e same m e n donned togas of flowery textiles 
from the closing years of the nineteenth century onwards until the 1950s, 
when European dress m a d e them outmoded. 
B y 1935 the colonial situation had long m a d e an impact and proposed 
the exclusion of most arts of the body in the n a m e of civilization to such 
an extent that scholarly studies of body-painting or scarification are rare 
and of late date.58 Tattoos and scarifications were deemed to be barbaric. 
So was nudity, especially if it was painted.59 M u c h adornment was also 
discouraged in the n a m e of thrift, good working habits or comfort. 
European gibes at heavy brass collars or anklets are a stereotype of the 
early colonial period. Proper clothing was incessantly promoted and not 
just by missionaries. South of the Sahara, missions had proposed patterns 
for a decent female dress, all variants of late nineteenth-century working-
class garb or of the so-called Mother Hubbard dress (long skirt and 
sleeved blouse).60 Europeans introduced various styles of administrative 
garb: shirt and shorts; bush jackets, military uniforms and servant uni-
forms. Business suits were rarely seen, except in the cities a m o n g the 
56. T . Veblen, 1981 edn, pp. 115-87. 
57. R . Kandt, 1905, opp. p. 80, and A . Frederick 1910, for Rwanda fashion as it 
developed between c. 1900 and 1909. 
58. Works such as H . Brandt, 1956 (Geretvol, festive adornment of Bororo Fulani in 
Niger) are still descriptive. J. C . Farris, 1982, is a scholarly study. 
59. E . C . Burt, 1984, pp. 60-3 and p. 80, documenting the mission-inspired transfer 
of this art to wall-painting at Christmas time among the Luo . 
60. They were just as concerned with 'proper' underwear, to the point that some 
missions actually sold such garments as late as the 1950s. 
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European élite there, which explained their appeal first to the cream of 
the Europeanized African élite and then to other urban or rural m e n . In 
northern and western Africa, as well as on the east coast, varieties of 
Islamic dress persisted. T h e West African stuck to his boubou in the Sahel 
or to Yoruba-type costume on the coast, the Moroccan to his burnous, the 
Sudanese to his jallaba and the Swahili to his kanzu and kofia. 
B y the 1930s, Africa can be divided into three main regions from the 
point of view of dress and the divisions remain important until now. In 
eastern and southern Africa, European business suits began to replace 
imitations of military uniforms as prestige dress. T h e fashion spread from 
the Tanzanian coast inland as far as Malawi and Zambia with the Beni 
dance association,62 in Kenya, Uganda and Ruanda-Urundi from Nairobi 
and in southern Africa from its main cities, the styles in Angola and 
Mozambique being quite different. Shorts, shirts or bush jackets were 
becoming c o m m o n as working clothes, although urbanités all preferred 
trousers to shorts and the combination loincloth and jacket was still 
c o m m o n in rural areas. W o m e n ' s wrappers gave way gradually to the 
standard mission dresses and came to be associated in urban areas with 
loose morals. Indeed, in Namibia dresses were accepted to the point that 
a Central-European, nineteenth-century costume became something like 
an ethnic dress among the N a m a and Herero. African fashions for m e n 
were maintained as military costumes expressing ethnicity only a m o n g 
Zulu and Nguni.6 3 Another innovation was the flowing white or red garb 
of prophets and pastors of African independent churches, complete with 
crook and/or staff. Biblical illustrations probably were their model. A m o n g 
pastoralists in East Africa, especially in Kenya and in the southern Sudan, 
traditional body art and absence or scantiness of male clothing still 
survives. Indeed, as new media for adornment became available more 
spectacular variants of body art developed in Kenya. 
In coastal western and equatorial Africa, European models for w o m e n ' s 
clothing were rejected. T h e wrapper remained the classy dress. Whether 
locally m a d e or imported, its patterns had to conform to local taste and 
the textile industry in Europe continued to heed the preferences of its 
African customers.64 Fashions in patterns were set in the major cities by 
courtesans (often dressed for free by importers) and African élite w o m e n . 
Male festive costume on the West African coast remained unaffected by 
European dress, but suits were adopted by professionals, scholars and 
clerks. At the same time in equatorial Africa, they came to be upper-
61. T h e following remains especially tentative, as I found not even one article sketching 
the main evolution of clothing in colonial and post-colonial times. 
62. T . Ranger, 1975; J. Mitchell, 1956. 
63. J. A . Barnes, 1952; M . Read, 1936. 
64. C . B . Steiner, 1985, pp. 91-110 is basic. See also J. Fourneau and L . Kravetz, 
1954-
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class wear, although m u c h less so in Western Zaire than in French 
colonies. Meanwhile the boubou held its ground in the Sahel and actually 
expanded to the south. In short, European fashions found m u c h less 
favour here than in East and South Africa. 
O n the whole, northern Africa clung to its o w n costumes and body 
adornment (painting with henna). W o m e n adopted European dresses in 
the main cities, but wore them under the haik, just as Moroccan business 
suits might be worn under a burnous or even zjallaba and with slippers. 
European working clothes, however, were adopted by m e n and in Egypt 
suits had long been the usual clothing for the middle and upper classes. 
T h e symbolic value of clothing is well illustrated by the quarrel over the 
tarbush in Egypt. Just after 1935 radicals were denouncing these hats as 
demeaning, an emblem of servility, and the playwright Tawfik al-Hakim 
wore a basque béret in defiance. T h e élite, however, stoutly defended the 
tarbush. Still today that headgear is gone. Only conservative businessmen 
still sport it. 
Nationalism after 1945 found its expression in costume.65 Nationalists 
decried nudity and skin adornment even more than Europeans. T h e y 
developed national costumes, often quite consciously as in Sierra Leone 
where the Kabah cloth with embroidered yoke became a national female 
dress by consensus. Only the pattern of the yoke differentiated it from 
earlier imported dress in Freetown.66 N k r u m a h set the style for national 
dress in 1957 and the West African élites followed. Yoruba festive 
garments, boubou styles of K a n o or Bamako 6 7 became expressions of 
nationalism. A s a result, local weaving, embroidery and dyeing revived, 
especially w h e n the n e w élites became wealthy enough to use dress as an 
indicator of relative status.68 European hairstyles and beauty aids for 
w o m e n were anathema to nationalists - and to m a n y rural m e n . T h e y 
were replaced by national hairstyles.69 In Zaire, M o b u t u imposed the 
abacos by decree, outlawing the business suit and especially the wearing 
of neckties.70 Abacos {'A bas le costume' - d o w n with the suit!) were an 
expression of authenticity, symbolizing equality, virility, simplicity. T h e y 
were at the outset inspired by Maoist dress. In time, however, the abacos 
reflected local status by the quality of the cloth and of the cut, as class 
differentiation in Kinshasa kept growing after 1970. 
Wrappers spread again in Equatorial and Central Africa, styles and 
65. T h e general relationships between nationalism and clothing have been well set out 
by P. Bogatyrev, 1971. See also A . Mazrui, 1970 (neither nudity nor European dress). 
66. B . Wass , 1979. 
67. J. Perani, 1979. 
68. A . Perry, 1984 (some costumes worth thousands of pounds); E . D e Negri, 1968; 
F. Smith and J. Eicher, 1982. 
69. A n o n . , 1964. Yet by the 1980s urban w o m e n had once again turned to beauty aids 
and foreign hairstyles. 
70. F. S . B . Kazadi, 1978. 
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patterns becoming more ornate and also fostering the revival of costly 
local textiles. But in eastern and southern Africa upper-class w o m e n 
resisted its re-introduction in the city. European-style fashions developed 
in Nairobi far more than in Dakar.71 For m e n about town, business suits 
triumphed, although not completely in Tanzania. Nationalism was on the 
whole less expressed in clothing than in other ways. Elsewhere European 
fashions were not totally excluded either. Fads such as high platform 
shoes in Nigeria (¿'.1975) or Zazou outfits in the Côte d'Ivoire (c. 1965) 
swept the urban landscape from time to time. 
In North Africa the major development has been an attempted return 
to the woman' s veil in urban Egypt72 as a sign of commitment to 
fundamentalism. In Libya and Tunisia there has been a renaissance of a 
national costume derived from older rural shaykh 's robes. 
Textiles and costumes also entered the tourist trade. T h e man's shirt 
with embroidered neckline, h e m and pocket became a favourite a m o n g 
expatriates all over the continent as well as a m o n g African-Americans 
and sympathizers in the U S A . Figurative decoration on cloth or costume, 
mainly for export, developed in the Côte d'Ivoire (Senufo) whilst Lesotho 
began to produce tourist blankets, Botswana printed fabrics and Mali 
rugs.73 
T h u s patterns of dress and adornment proposed by Europeans were 
accepted only selectively during this period while the desire to stress 
national identity and later social status also left their mark on the history 
of costume. Concurrently, however, clothing and body adornment were 
still genuine expressions of aesthetic urges. If w e could tell even a 
rudimentary history of styles in jewellery or headscarfs, the search for 
n e w expressions of beauty for its o w n sake would be evident. But so far 
even the rudiments of such a history are lacking. 
Music and dance 
Vocal music was the queen of popular art during the whole period, in 
the countryside as well as in town, for the record industry and the radio 
ensured its diffusion to the masses. S o m e singers acquired immense 
popularity matched only by that of major political leaders. S o m e con-
tributed to the drive for independence by mobilizing people, disseminating 
programmes and extolling leaders. It is not surprising that governments, 
after independence, continued to use music as an instrument of propa-
ganda and tried to stifle music critics. This situation affected the lyrics, 
but left the musical developments themselves largely untouched.74 
71. F. Court and M . M ' W a n g i , 1976. 
72. J. A . Williams, 1979. Several recent Egyptian films deal with this topic. 
73. M . Hartland-Rowe, 1985; E . Dudley, 1986. 
74. C . H . Cutter, 1968, is an example of the use of music and griots to launch the 
directives of the party, to praise its leaders and to extol the success of their policies. 
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T h e musical traditions of Africa have shown remarkable continuity 
despite outside pressures from the West. T h e potential for blending was 
high because of the similarities between Western and African music south 
of the Sahara, including the use of diatonic scales and harmony as well 
as the practice of accompanying the voice with percussion instruments 
and with stringed instruments. European models were diffused mainly 
through the missions and the radio.75 Despite this, old and n e w African 
music still share c o m m o n stylistic features, including a c o m m o n 
approach to linear rhythms, a c o m m o n concept of 'beat' and energy 
flow, use of c o m m o n rhythmic motifs, cross rhythms, types of melodic 
progression, polyphonic parallelism and vocal techniques. But in their 
use of scales, harmony, form and instrumentation, old and n e w African 
music diverge.76 
European instrumental music has had no impact. Today still, a taste 
for European music is seen as the sign of the most profound alienation. 
While some European instruments have been adopted for the accompani-
ment of vocal music, there are no African instrumentalists of note 
performing classical music. Composers, with one or two exceptions, 
create church music - that is, music for voices, rather than orchestral 
works.77 
T h e history of music in recent generations must distinguish two 
different developments, one tied to the countryside and to sacred music, 
the other to the city bars and dance-halls, where the n e w urban music 
was created. 
Rural music and sacred music 
Although by 1935 African rural traditions were still largely intact, influ-
ences via records, radio, the spread of Islam and Christianity, and military 
band music were already strong, and in the last three cases old. But m a n y 
of these influences are so subtle as to be really clear only to musicologists.'8 
T h e great variety of existing songs ranged from lullabies to dirges, from 
work songs to protest songs, from praise poetry to satire. M a n y songs for 
accompanying dances continued to flourish, although some categories 
such as work songs began to wane. Purely religious music associated with 
specific rituals had been rare in classical African religion. But where it 
75. A . Merriam, 1981, pp. 100-5. 
76. L . J. P. Gaskin, 1965b; B . A . Aning, 1967; A . Merriam, 1970; and H . Tracey, 
1973, are bibliographies. P. R . Kirby, 1964; G . Kubik, 1966; J. H . Kwabena Nketia, 1965, 
1975 and 1978; and H . Tracey, 1961, are the general studies available for Africa south of 
the Sahara. In addition West Africa often carries articles about modern music and has a 
rubric 'Records' authored by 'Concobility Jane'. 
77. E . Akin, 1965 (p. 61 on rejection of Western orchestral music) and 1970; and N . 
L . Korley, 1986 (on the transformation of Ghana's national symphonic orchestra). 
78. J. H . Kwabena Nketia, 1978. 
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occurred the music underwent the fate of the ritual. Protest songs 
flourished in the colonial period and sometimes later. Their music reflected 
the old and the new. Typical is the situation of the Rwenzururu protest 
songs (Uganda). S o m e used music associated with the older beer parties, 
others h y m n tunes or school songs.79 T h e form reflected not the message, 
but the generation and age of the singers. Influences from European hit 
records were stronger in the 1940s and 1950s than later. In the 1950s the 
Mangbetu (Zaire) liked the French singer Tino Rossi80 and in 1966 the 
Rwenzururu songs included the tune of Alpenrosen, an old sentimental 
Central European ditty. But rural songs also innovated. In some areas the 
old historical genre of epic song was used to compose new historical songs. 
T h u s a blind Lulua troubadour recently composed a song interpreting the 
recent history of Kasai (Zaire) in terms of traditional chiefs and their 
protector spirits.81 
Sacred music gained in importance where Islam was spreading or as 
the result of church activity.82 Well before 1935, hymns were favourites, 
even if their scales and harmonics were unconsciously adapted to local 
norms. Chorales in schools were founded and by the 1950s troupes on 
the pattern of the Wiener Saengerknaben appeared in Central, East and 
South Africa.83 Catholics began to experiment with 'African masses' from 
the 1930s onwards.84 Masses were composed by Africans, often seminarians 
or priests, from 1939 onwards, a vogue reaching its peak before the 
Vatican Council II of 1964 and its pronouncements on liturgical language 
and practice.85 Later this movement abated, even though the creation of 
sacred music remains strong as it keeps pace with the religious revival 
and the increased pace of conversion evident for the whole continent after 
1980. However, hymns are n o w less favourite tunes for m a n y than the 
n e w urban popular music, which affects the rural areas everywhere. 
North African urban music 
In 1871 Verdi's Aida was premiered in the n e w opera-house of Cairo. 
This is symptomatic for Egypt, the only country in Africa which came 
to terms with European instrumental music. Northern Africa had its o w n 
rich and long tradition of instrumental music, still associated, however, 
79. P. Cooke and M . D o o m b o s , 1982. 
80. A . Scohy, 1955, p. 113. 
81. T . K . Biaya, 1984. 
82. H . Weman, i960. 
83. See G . Haezon, i960, for an example from 1954 onwards, in Shaba. 
84. P. Jans, i960. J. H . Kwabena Nketia, 1957, cites Ephraim A m u , and his 1933 
collection of Twenty-five African Songs (hymns) in African style and with African 
accompaniment, as the father of African composers of sacred music. 
85. T . Tshibangu, i960. 
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with vocal performance. In the first part of our century, however, Sayyed 
Darwish developed a stable new musical style blending European and 
Oriental traditions. B y 1929 a Higher Institute for Arabic Music was 
founded in which instrumental music found a place along with vocal 
music. T h e new style was such a great success that a group of musicians 
in Algeria and in Tunisia found it necessary in 1934 to found the 
Rachidiyya, a group devoted to fight its influence and to revive the old 
traditions of the tnd'lüf orchestra and its nuba partitions. Ma'lof became 
a symbol for independence in these countries and in Libya. But the lead 
of Egypt was followed in borrowing European instruments such as the 
cello, the saxophone and the accordion, the concept of a large musical 
ensemble and even some melodies and rhythms from Europe. In Morocco 
the traditional urban music had never been threatened and continued to 
flourish, a direct descendant of the learned Arabic music from the heyday 
of Islam. Its treasures include the larubi quatrains of the w o m e n of Fez, 
the sacred songs of the brotherhoods, or again the haddarat sung in 
chorus by w o m e n on various occasions such as marriages or circumcisions, 
but above all the melhün, or griha. T h e melhün is poetry. Kasîda poems 
are sung, and created according to highly complex rules. T h e 
Moroccan music remained m u c h more traditional than others. Its musical 
modes continue to be adapted to the temper of the message or to be 
sung.87 
Just as in Africa south of the Sahara, however, the voice remained 
central and only vocal artists became truly stars with a retinue of fans, 
and enormous popular appeal. S o m e enjoyed local fame such as Saliha, 
the great singer of Badawi ona in Tunisia, while others saw their fame 
spread all over the Arabic-speaking world. T h e most famous singer of 
this century has been U m m Khulthum, w h o took her n a m e from pre-
Islamic Arab poetry and had already begun her career by 1932.88 She 
incarnated in the al-Nasser years the drive to return to the early greatness 
of Islam. In the later 1960s she developed a new style which also found 
its aficionados. But she has been only the first in rank among m a n y . It 
is worth underlining that in North Africa no clear distinction can be 
m a d e between popular and élite urban music. Neither the use of vernacular 
Arabic as opposed to the literary language, nor the specific genres are 
reliable indicators. This again corresponds to the situations south of the 
Sahara, where the popular song has become the élite music as well, 
whatever the other divisions between the social classes. 
86. M . El Fasi, 1967. Arabic texts published in Fez, 1971. 
87. T h e notes on Morocco are based on a contribution by His late Excellency M . El 
Fasi. 
88. A . Elnaccash, 1968. 
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plate 20.6 The Fez Orchestra ofMorocco, an orchestra ofArabo-Andalus music
Urban music south of the Sahara89
Urban music began as an accompaniment to dances in the new towns
and as bar music performed by organized troupes. v In the early 1930s the
presentation of ethnic dances, such as the agbaya of Brazzaville and
Kinshasa, perhaps related to the agbadza of Ghana and Togo.90 Dances
in European costumes, where the groups were still defined by ethnic
origin and competed with each other, were also common. The complex
history of one such tradition is that of the Beni ('Band') movement,
originally linked to agonistic festivals in Lamu (Kenya) and influenced
by German military bands. Beni spread throughout Tanzania and then
to Southern and Central Africa,91 where it was still a favourite on the
Copper Belt in 1951.92 In the Witwatersrand one of its functional
equivalents was the performance of Zulu regimental dances, but with new
music.93 Competitive dancing and singing were also quite common in the
West African coastal centres.
89. This section is based on a contribution by Kazadi wa Mukuna. See also Kazadi
wa Mukuna, 1980.
90. E. W. Smith, 1962. Given the links between colonial Léopoldville and Accra from
the i88os onwards the similarity in name may not be fortuitous.
91. T. Ranger, 1975.
92. J. Mitchell, 1956.
93. H. Tracey, 1952.
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plate 20.7 The Egyptian singer Umm Khulthum, during a recital in Paris in ¡967
Around 1940, a major musical style of a different nature appeared: the
rumba of Zaire. It followed the earlier but slower development of highlife
in Ghana which has its origins in a kind of parade during which players
and dancers moved slowly along a street from one end to the other, and
which was fully developed at least by 1930. Brass dominated in its
instrumentation and it developed two forms, a fast-tempo variant and a
slow tempo, the 'blues'. Highlife came to be associated with the ballroom
and a Western style of dancing. As a result of this and of the use of
European instruments it tends to Western harmonic usage, even though
its treatment of beat rhythm and melody was Ghanaian.94 Accra before
94. J. H. Kwabena Nketia, 1957.
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1940 was the epicentre of a musical tradition embodied in large orchestras 
such as the Excelsior or the Accra rhythmic opera which spread all along 
the west coast. Highlife reached its peak in the 1950s, falling gradually 
out of favour in the 1960s both in Nigeria and in Sierra Leone, where a 
more Latin American type of music, inspired also by Zairian music, took 
over. Highlife had absorbed m a n y elements of jazz, especially in the 
c o m m o n woodwind and brass orchestras. It also had Afro-calypso and 
reggae facets, based on the guitar and with Caribbean inspiration.95 
T h e guitar came to West Africa f.1935 and was first used in Nigeria 
along with drums, later accordion and rattles as well, as accompaniment 
to the styles of music called first juju and later miliki. Zairian music 
influenced these strongly until c.1968 and the rise of Afrobeat, a synthesis 
of highlife and African-American soul music. This style developed a 
further variant, Syncro (1976). Afrobeat is associated especially with the 
star singer Amikulapo Kuti Fela, w h o sees himself as the spokesman for 
the working class. In the 1970s he established a c o m m u n e that was broken 
up in 1977. Still he persisted in his protest songs despite further 
harassment.95 
T h e Zairian tradition took shape under the inspiration of the per-
formances in Kinshasa of Cuban ensembles visiting there just before the 
Second World W a r . During the war, strong n e w influences came with 
American and European soldiers. With the maringa, a dance appeared in 
which the couple was the performing unit, even if they still danced 
separately most of the time and used local instruments, but soon also the 
guitar. Hitherto the use of imported instruments had failed97 but n o w 
performers learned from European musicians w h o worked with them in 
urban bars. T h e guitar was first adopted in southern Zaire, where stringed 
instruments were traditional. It rapidly ousted the hitherto ubiquitous 
likembe {tnbira, also sanzaf* which no longer could express the complex 
harmonic needs of the new music. B y 1946 the guitar had reached 
Kinshasa. This event combined with the fashion for Afro-Cuban music, 
the rejection of colonial models such as the polka, waltz or march, and 
the beginnings of a record industry99 to give birth to a major new tradition. 
T h e record companies backed the first singers w h o were a success. 
T h e diffusion of the records over the radio and through sales established 
the rumba style. With the creation of African jazz (1953), the still existing 
O . K . jazz (1956) and the gradual development of lyrics in Lingala rather 
than in Spanish, which had allowed only for rudimentary messages, 
95. E . W . Smith, 1962; E . S. Kinney, 1970; N . W . Hooker, 1970. 
96. V . Tunji, 1976; J. Labinjoh, 1982; J. Miller, 1985; C . Moore, 1982; and J. H o w e , 
1986. 
97. N . Nlolo, 1983; M . Lonoh, n.d.; Kanza Matongo, 1972; and S. Bemba, 1984. 
98. W . Soyinka, 1985. 
99. Philips, N g o m a , Loningisa. 
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Zairian music took off. Despite its titles, jazz was of minor importance 
in Kinshasa, especially after f.1955, but remained more central in L u b -
umbashi, where songs in Kiswahili and Tshiluba flourished until a few 
years after independence, at which time the Kinshasa example and Lingala 
lyrics became universal. Although this correlates with the political triumph 
of Kinshasa over Lubumbashi (end of the Shaba secession in 1963, Second 
Republic in 1965), the use of the electric guitar and the spread of the 
transistor radio after i960 also contributed to the success of the Kinshasa 
ensembles.100 
Even though fashions in dance and variants of style followed each other 
almost year after year and, until i960, were influenced by European fads 
such as the cha-cha-cha and the twist, the lyric tradition continued 
basically uninterrupted. M o r e important than the fads were the develop-
ment of lyrics into sophisticated songs or complex ballads, often carrying 
a strong social commentary, and the renewed influences from traditional 
dances. T h e rumba kept its basic structure - namely, an introduction, 
preceded by a brief instrumental prelude presenting the main motif; 
the development of the song and its refrains by a duo or trio; and instru-
mental improvisation in which the rhythmic and melodic development 
occur. 
Meanwhile, the number of ensembles increased from 19 in i960 to 
well over 200 by 1984, well supported by organizations such as the Union 
of Musicians (1965). Nothing comparable to these developments had 
occurred in neighbouring areas, so that Zairian music swept the scene 
not only in Central Africa, but in part also on the east coast and as far 
south as Zimbabwe, even though the Lingala lyrics were not widely 
understood. In Kinshasa, however, the themes changed. Early couplets 
on unsuccessful love or nostalgic verses about the simple rural life were 
supplemented even before i960 by political songs celebrating inde-
pendence, the country and its heroes. After i960 social commentary grew 
in importance and in time became bitter and outspoken.101 T h e lyrics 
there have m u c h to do with the fame of great stars such as L u a m b o 
(Franco). Censure began in 1967, but dampened such trends only slightly, 
until Luambo's arrest and subsequent release in 1979. Less controversial 
lyrics appeared and protest songs gradually moved to Cameroon (the 
Makossa) and Gabon.1 0 2 B y the mid-1970s, and even more after 1979, 
styles changed in Kinshasa and came to reflect new social realities. Melodic 
line became more banale, lyrics less elaborate. At times the song is reduced 
to a heartfelt outcry (cri du coeur) accompanied by a brutal, frantic and 
100. J. Fabian, 1978, pp. 315-21 for music in Lubumbashi. 
101. For example, 'The dialogue of A d a m and G o d ' by Luambo. See O . Debhonvapi, 
1984. 
102. O . Debhonvapi, 1984, p. 130; B . Ephson, 1984; Anon., 1984; H . Kala-Lobe, 1982; 
C . Monga, 1983. 
612 
Arts and society since igjs 
more acrobatic style of dancing, m u c h more spectacular than before and 
more trance-like as well.103 
T h e third major development in music took place in southern Africa. 
In the 1920s, the marabi originated in the clandestine urban bars of the 
African townships. It was influenced by Nguni polyphony with the 
development of complex rhythms, explosive yells and unusual harmonies 
(open fifths). T h e influence of North American jazz became predominant 
and in the 1940s the marabi developed into the kwela, first in Malawi 
and then by the 1950s in South Africa itself. T h e accompaniment was 
dominated n o w by a long tin flute, the penny-whistle, and rhythms 
became even more complex, accompanied by a steady beat.104 T h e resulting 
type of song, requiring virtuosity beyond the usual, has become well 
known through the records of Miriam Makeba. 1 0 5 Jazz also influenced 
Kenyan urban music directly. In East African cities as well as in South 
Africa there has been more influence from expatriate or local white tastes 
linked to the fashions in Europe and the United States, than elsewhere 
on the continent.106 
D a n c e 
Africa Dances, affirmed G . Gorer in 1935 about West Africa: 
They dance for joy and they dance for grief; they dance for love 
and they dance for hate; they dance to bring prosperity and they 
dance to avert calamity; they dance for religion and they dance to 
pass the time.107 
H e worried needlessly about the future. Such a rich heritage does not 
quickly fade, all the more so in that European dance, social or artistic, 
never was a challenge. Social dancing was borrowed, but very little of its 
music and few of its steps were. Meanwhile rural dance fashions persisted 
and continued to develop. Such was the dynamic of this art, that even 
after 1900, a n e w complex theatrical ballet tradition, the bobongo, could 
develop in a part of Zaire, despite the colonial situation.108 Migrants 
brought their dances to town where they flourished often in competitive 
settings with other ethnic or regional groups. A m o n g the novelties 
introduced was the adaptation of military drill and of gymnastics to dance. 
It occurred in Beni before 1914, but also elsewhere, as a m o n g the E w o n d o 
103. N . Nkashama, 1979; G . Ewens, 1987. This is the soukous music. 
104. M . Andersson, 1981; K . Cuper, 1958; D . Rycroft, 1959. 
105. J. Gwanga and E . J. Miller, 1971. 
106. G . Kubik, 1981; J. L o w , n.d.; S. H . Martin, 1982. 
107. G . Gorer, 1945 edn, p. 191. 
108. Iyandza-Lopoloko, 1961. 
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of Yaounde where by 1970 a woman' s drill dance to the tune of a police 
whistle was hallowed as 'traditional'.109 
Dances did not draw m u c h colonial attention until the 1950s, except 
in the form of condemnation, or as an attraction for feastdays and for 
visiting luminaries. B y then, the rural troupes that were often solicited 
in such circumstances began to refuse to dance, except for pay. Already 
by the early 1930s, a group of Dogon dancers had been sent to Paris. 
Out of such beginnings, professional dance troupes were born.110 Another 
wellspring for the creation of the modern ballet was Fodeba Keita's 
concern to integrate dance into the theatre. H e created his ballets africains 
by the mid-1950s. B y then folkloric dance programmes in halls or the 
open air were becoming c o m m o n elsewhere as well."1 Yet another 
dynamic, nationalism, was at work now. Folk dances became so m u c h a 
must for nationalists, that in Egypt, where there was no rural dancing 
tradition, the genre had to be invented. This was also the only African 
country to found an Institute for (European-style) Ballet in 1958. Else-
where all other countries turned to their choreographic heritage to organize 
troupes soon after their independence. Schools of drama at universities 
also started from the local heritage. 
These developments changed the nature of dancing in the following 
ways. Traditional dances in non-traditional settings meant a new relation-
ship to the audience, n o w impersonal and based on payment of an entrance 
fee. Spectacular elements in dance were stressed, but the overall patterns 
of movements were simplified and shortened. T h e limits of space (stage) 
and of time radically altered the ground plan and overall organization of 
the dance, as well as the attitude of the dancers toward their o w n 
performance. Moreover, costumes and movements were tailored to meet 
urban standards of decency and new dance themes were introduced.112 
Also, programmes were composed to stress variety and hence dances from 
different peoples and of different nature were amalgamated. O n the 
Changwe Yetu programme of 1958, war dances jostled funeral dances from 
another area, competitive displays of skill, satirical initiation dances, 
spectacular gymnastic sword dances with enthronement dances for chiefs. 
N e w pantomime drill-like dances also evolved in the cities. Since then 
greater artistic unity has been introduced. T h e dance is m a d e to correspond 
to a m o m e n t in the development of an operatic (Nigeria) or theatrical 
plot and becomes ancillary to the theatre, or a progression of dances is 
109. See J. Mitchell, 1956, for an example; and P. Harper, 1969, p. 166, for urban 
ethnic dance and school dances. 
n o . As among the Mangbetu. A . Scohy, 1955, p. 113; P. J. Imperato, 1971. 
m . F. Keita, 1957. By 1958 Zaire sent its first theatrical troupe Changwe Yetu to the 
World Exhibition in Brussels. It was also organized by a theatrical producer. 
112. P. Harper, 1969. For Nigeria she adds the influence of television (started in 1959) 
and film (after 1970) in their requirements of dance. See also R . Berger, 1967. 
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plate 20.8 Fodeba Keita's ballets africains
presented so as to create a structure of moods, to provide a pseudo-plot
of tensions to be resolved and a succession of displays leading to the
spectacular grand finale. A wholly new choreography results.
Meanwhile, social dancing in the cities changes only in minor ways as
fads come and go, rural dances persist, ethnic dancing competitions are
channelled in the form of 'festivals', while the urban style of social dancing
daily gains ground in the countryside. Today, dance remains a well-loved
activity, the art practiced by most people and, with music, the most
popular of all the arts.
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Pageantry and theatre 
Pageantry and theatre are a single art - despite the constraints imposed 
by the settings of the stage or the studio contrasted to their absence 
during public festivities, and despite even the degree of professionalism 
found among actors of the theatre. 
Pageantry 
Parades, pantomimes, even staged dialogue by masked dancers, had been 
very c o m m o n in pre-colonial Africa, often in sacred or ceremonial contexts. 
M a n y of these traditions have survived. T h e continuity sometimes is 
astonishing as between the ceremonial Akan processions sketched by 
Bowdich in 1817 and modern Akan practice, even though most such 
happenings have been updated,"3 inspired by n e w situations as well as 
by European practices, as in military pageants or in official ceremony. 
Complex masquerades are still c o m m o n on the west coast especially, be 
they the Lantern Festival traditions of Sierra Leone or the G a m b i a , " 4 
the Fanti asafo displays,"5 the glitter of Akan courts, the myriad m a s -
querades of Nigeria" or the carnival of Luanda. Celebrations for the 
Prophet's birthday in North Africa and public feasts in East African 
coastal towns have kept, indeed even developed, their entertainment 
activities. In rural areas, initiation rituals for boys, often conceived of as 
dramatic happenings, were still c o m m o n in 1935 - or around 1950 w h e n 
V . Turner studied those of the N d e m b u (Zambia). In remoter areas and 
even in some cities"7 they have continued until today."8 A m o n g the most 
spectacular older productions were those of the Tsogho (Gabon) to w h o m 
spectacle and induced trances were crucial means to communicate with 
the supernatural. Their bwiti has declined since the 1930s, but meanwhile 
the ritual had spread to northern G a b o n where it became part of dramatic 
new rituals."9 T h e flair for the dramatic remains alive everywhere. 
Traditional theatre in the more narrow sense of acting out a story in 
front of an audience of spectators was less widespread. Still from Mali 
to the Cross River or at various places in the basin of the River 
113. H . Cole, 1975. 
114. J. W . Nunley, 1985; and J. Bettelheim, 1985. 
115. G . N . Preston, 1975. 
116. See special issues oí African Arts, vol. 6, no. 4, 1973 and vol. 11, no. 3, 1978; also 
N . Nzewunwa, 1982; and many descriptions in Nigeria Magazine. 
117. See A . Droogers, 1980, who shows how the new urban elements have been fused 
into the dramatization. 
118. Kuba initiations studied in 1982 by W . Binkley are surprisingly like similar 
activities in 1953. 
119. J. Fernandez, 1982, pp. 436-93. 
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Congo/Zaire some peoples organized such spectacles.120 Colonial auth-
orities frowned on such performances, preferring their o w n parades, 
national-holiday ceremonials and Te Deums, at least until the touristic 
value of such happenings began to be realized after the Second World 
W a r . Even so a few African elements slunk on occasion into European 
ceremonial, such as the skits performed during parades of the Force 
Publique from the Belgian Congo. These derived from mimes during 
dances in the equatorial zone.121 T h e y showed the evils of the Zanzibari 
slave trade. After independence these easily turned into the evils of 
colonialism.122 
After independence some leaders began to use older pageantry to 
develop enthusiasm at political meetings. Animation is performances staged 
on public occasions to elicit the enthusiasm of the spectators for the 
specific political proposals m a d e at the meeting, or in support of the 
regime in general. Political slogans often are launched in this fashion. A s 
far as is known, the practice first developed in Guinea before 1965, the 
examples being the former griots, and then animation was transplanted to 
Zaire in 1967^70, where the military skits, older dance formations and 
even Western majorettes all became sources of inspiration. 
Theatre 
Theatre proper or the acting out of a plot on a stage, often following the 
conventions of the Italian stage, with a text learned by rote and usually 
in a European language, clearly is an urban innovation.123 T h e form first 
developed in missions and schools, often as a one-act play, and served 
didactic purposes or as an aid to conversion.124 Biblical or moral subjects, 
often quite satirical, were c o m m o n . For it was not forgotten that theatre 
must entertain as well as teach. T h e development of theatre took very 
different pathways in areas under French, Belgian or Portuguese control, 
where the French tragedy was the model, and areas under British control -
at least in West Africa - where the school was not the only avenue to 
the theatre. Moreover, the situation in North ; Africa was significantly 
different. 
120. See B . Traoré, 1958; Y . Ogunbiyi, 1962; M . A . Alarinjo, 1981; J. C . Messenger, 
1962 and 1971; A . D e Rop, 1959; J. Cornet, 1982, pp. 272-8 (masked itul play); but 
J. Leloup, 1983, argues that these are not ancestral to modern theatre in Africa. 
121. G . Hulstaert, 1953. 
122. H . Deschamps, 1971, p. 560. 
123. A recent bibliography can be found in Recherche, Pédagogie et Culture, vol. 61, 
1983, pp. 101-5. Basic surveys are W . Soyinka, 1985; B . Traoré, 1958; Y . Ogunbiyi, 1962; 
P. Paricsy, 1971; Anon., 1971; R . Mshengu-Kavanagh, 1979 and 1981; M . Schipper, 1982. 
124. For the text (the plot mainly, dialogue was free) of a 1934 schoolplay, see 
R . Bonneau, 1972. Also G . Hulstaert, 1953; and B . Lindfors, 1980. 
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In Egypt the theatre had been flourishing in the late nineteenth century. 
Even European opera, an art form as ethnocentric as the N o h theatre in 
Japan, had found favour here, since the days of Khedive Ismâ'îl. B y the 
1930s, most of the theatres used colloquial Arabic. M a n y light comedies, 
even farce and morality plays were produced although Tawfik al-Hakim 
and others also produced dramatic plays stressing universal h u m a n 
dilemmas. B y the mid-1950s and in the era of al-Nasser plays became 
more socially topical, realistic, but also symbolic. They were heavily 
influenced by the cinema which was, in turn, influenced by them. B y 
1964, nine or ten theatres in Cairo played classical or modern Arab plays, 
comedies and Egyptian operettas. Both realistic plays such as those of 
Yüsuf Idrïs and symbolic plays carrying revolutionary messages, such as 
N u c m a n Ashur's works on egalitarianism, were liked by the public."5 
Since then less use has been m a d e of the theatre to indoctrinate the 
public but, as in the cinema, the melodramatic, comical, realistic and 
symbolic trends have continued. 
Libya, Tunisia and Algeria shared the tradition of a puppet shadow 
theatre, Karaguz, ultimately derived from Turkey. But this had no 
influence during colonial times. T h e theatre was frowned upon by the 
(ulamä> on moral grounds. Plays were performed mainly in French and 
Italian for expatriate communities, and for a fraction of the élite public. 
Moreover, censorship was stringent. Before the independence of Tunisia 
and Morocco the main activity there consisted in translating European 
plays into classical or colloquial Arabic, although a handful of plays with 
didactic topics (mis-spent youth, drugs, the black market) were produced 
in Tunisia. B y the later 1960s the urban public in the Maghreb as a 
whole became less apathetic. T h e number of troupes began to grow. Radio 
and television productions required scripts. A n d so the modern theatre 
developed mostly one-act plays, usually satire or melodrama, except in 
Algeria where propaganda plays, often concerned with the war of lib-
eration, were c o m m o n . " 6 
In the French-speaking areas of West Africa an academic theatre did 
develop in the 1950s. T h e playwrights were often pupils of the William 
Ponty school of Dakar which had required pupils to write plays about 
their research in 'folklore' from 1933 to i960. Anti-colonial critique, the 
tensions between the older generation and its views of the world as against 
those held by the newer generation, and a tendency towards satire were 
the hallmarks of such productions, although some historical subjects also 
appeared. Most plays retained the existing rules for the European theatre, 
125. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropedia, vol. 9, p. 981; P. Mansfield, 1965, pp. 124— 
5; P. J. Vatikiotis, 1980, pp. 455-6. 
126. A . Roth, 1961; H . Djaziri, 1968; H . D . Nelson, 1978, p. 141. T h e use by trades 
unions in Morocco of the theatre (troupe H a m m a m e t ) to spread their cause was not 
successful. 
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except, at William Ponty, that only the skeleton of a text was produced 
leaving m u c h room for improvisation in dialogue. But as later playwrights 
wrote longer plays this feature was eliminated. A few such as Cheick 
N ' D a o in L'exil d'Albouri (1969) introduced poetry, song and dance aiming 
for total theatre. Most eschewed such innovations. B . Dadié of the Côte 
d'Ivoire is typical. H e continued to write in the same form in the 1970s 
which he had adopted in his early play Assemien Débylé, which was played 
in Paris in 1937.127 Zairian playwrights followed in this tradition although 
their theatre only developed after 1955, inspired by travelling troupes and 
school plays.128 
After independence the usual repertoire was enriched by propaganda 
plays, which were accepted only in so far as they carried comical 
elements.129 T h e main problem with the theatre was in fact its lack of 
appeal. This was due in part to language problems although some authors 
wrote in African languages or more usually translated their work into the 
local urban language. But even such works were not received with 
enthusiasm by the multitudes. T h e conventions of form, the laws of the 
theatre (including the unity of space and time) were just too foreign to 
the experience of the public. 
A n d yet, as early as 1947, Fodeba Keita130 had attempted to break 
away from them. Dance and choral singing accompanied the action and 
interpreted it as it was spoken by the leading actor, an adaptation of both 
M a n d e (Malinke) and classical Greek procedure. But he was not followed 
and the form did not develop into a more flesh-and-blood theatre. It did 
however become quite successful as a framework for the numerous ballet 
companies that followed the pattern of his ballets africains. Dance and 
spectacle took over at the expense of the richness and complexity of the 
plot. Moreover, such ballets came to be aimed more at overseas audiences 
than at a local public and can be seen as tourist art.13' A n d so both the 
theatre and the ballet found themselves alienated from the culture of their 
public, which renders the continuing concern about négritude in the 
repertory all the more poignant. 
Meanwhile, theatre had developed quite differently in the former 
British colonies of West Africa. By the 1920s, vaudeville theatre in English 
and the local languages was thriving in G h a n a , followed in the 1930s by 
a European-inspired theatre but in the vernacular, the first success of 
which was a play by F. K . Fiawoo written in E w e . 1 3 2 Both traditions 
127. B . Traoré, 1969; W . Z immer , 1985. 
128. See Jeune Afrique (Elisabethville) issues for 1958; Y . L . Mundara, 1972; M . du 
M a - N g o , 1980; and Kadima-Nzuji, 1981. 
129. N . S. Hopkins, 1971. 
130. F. Keita, 1957; P. Paricsy, 1971, pp. 54-6-
131. See U N E S C O , 1982c, for examples of government perception of dance troupes 
as tourist activities - for example, the statements by the government of Zambia. 
132. In response to a competition organized by the International African Institute. 
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continued,133 although the academic tradition enjoyed less success than 
the vaudeville. T h e academic trend continued, however, both in the 
vernacular and in English where there was a market for didactic plays in 
schools. Both trends were to develop dramatically. 
T h e first was developed by H . Ogunde . In 1944 he created a musical 
play for the Church of the Lords in Lagos, using Yoruba, organizing the 
plot around music and dance and leaving the script to be ad-libbed. With 
this the West African operatic tradition began. O g u n d e wedded the 
traditional spectacle to dialogue, staging and other elements of the 
vaudeville tradition. His ventures met with such success that the income 
allowed him to lay the institutional and business foundations for the 
theatre in Nigeria.134 
O n the academic side, W . Soyinka appeared. Trained from 1955 
onwards in London and back in Nigeria by 1959 he created the first true 
academic plays. H e was at h o m e in the European techniques and could 
overcome them to incorporate Yoruba dramatic elements. His example 
was followed from i960 onwards by other talented writers such as J. P. 
Clark.'35 
Meanwhile in Ghana E . T . Sutherland, writing in Fante, developed 
the academic theatre from 1958 onwards and in 1961 created a new form, 
first labelled musical, later opera. It was a pantomime for dancers, 
accompanied by chorus and soloists. These developed the plot in Fante 
while a commentator gave an English rendering.'3 But the opera really 
found its African expression with Duro Ladipo w h o created his first work 
in 1961 as well at the Oshbogo art centre. F r o m 1962 to 1964 he produced 
a cycle about historical kings of O y o . These became the m o d e for the 
Yoruba opera, combining a highly literate language in Yoruba with social 
satire and metaphysical reflection. T h e form was a spectacular fusion 
between the academic tradition and the popular genre of Ogunde , w h o 
assisted him in its development.'37 
Since the 1960s form and content have not altered very m u c h . Inspi-
ration is largely drawn from oral traditions, but is used to bear on 
contemporary situations, often to express discontent, sometimes as satire. 
S o m e major playwrights such as Soyinka in time turned from satire to 
despair. In turn Femi Osofisan, the best-known author of the youngest 
generation in Nigeria, turns to more radical political prescriptive plays. 
But while berating Soyinka he and others still closely follow his language, 
play structuring and even repertoire of topics.'38 
133. J. Collins, 1985; K . N . Biame, 1968. 
134. E . Clark and H . Ogunde, 1979. 
135. O . Ogunba, 1966; O . Ogunba and A . Irele, 1978; Y . Ogunbiyi, 1981; M . Etherton, 
1982; A . Ricard, 1975. 
136. K . Muhindi, 1985; S. Acquaye, 1971; O . Chinyere, 1980. 
137. U . Beier, 1970 and 1973. 
138. C . Dunton, 1984. 
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A s a result of these developments, theatre in both its popular and 
academic forms has found fertile ground in G h a n a and especially Nigeria. 
In this it differs completely from the alienated francophone tradition. But 
it also differs from drama elsewhere in English-speaking Africa. 
In East Africa the theatre was slower to develop. Its epicentre was the 
University College of Makerere. T h e first playwright began writing one-
act plays in somewhat hesitant English by the early 1960s. Given the 
disinterest of the public for plays in English, experimentation with local 
languages began early on in Kiswahili and Kiganda first, later also in L u o 
and Kikuyu. T h e one-act format was transcended only by Ngugi in 1966. 
Censorship has been ferocious at times in Uganda, but is a real problem 
in other countries as well. Elsewhere the acceptance of the European 
theatrical conventions in their entirety, especially at Makerere in the 
1960s, has retarded public acceptance of the theatre.139 
Apartheid in South Africa m a y be the main reason w h y the development 
of the theatre for African audiences has lagged so m u c h behind the 
development of African literature, which had already produced a m a s -
terpiece such as Mofolo's Shaka before 1935. Mphalele's work was drama 
to be read more than to be performed. African theatre broke through 
with the production of King Kong in 1959. Its success allowed the group 
at Witwatersrand University that produced it to expand and to offer 
teaching in music and in the theatre to Africans. Meanwhile, however, 
more popular plays were beginning to be produced by Gibson Kente. 
This township art was performed in community halls and aimed at 
entertainment from 1958 onwards to the late 1960s. Yet another strand 
in the development of the theatre was school plays in African languages. 
In the 1970s the People's Experimental Theatre and other groups began 
to produce political action plays written by Credo M u t w a and others. 
Despite censorship and arrests this form of drama flourished until the 
Soweto riots. T h e repression led to the production of plays for which no 
written text existed, so that they could not be censored. Until recently140 
the political situation has prevented the development of any other the-
atrical repertoire apart from political issues. Plays in all of the African 
languages are n o w c o m m o n and offer a wider range of content.141 
European theatre has not easily been accepted in Africa, because of its 
convention, literary character, absence of audience participation and 
emphasis on didactic messages rather than entertainment, in addition to 
the barriers created by the use of foreign languages. In its classical form 
139. M . M . Mahood, 1966; R . Serumaga and J. Johnson, 1970; and L . A . Mbughunî, 
1976. 
140. M . H o m m e l , 1962; special issue of Theatre Quarterly, vol. 7, 1977-8; 
M . Mabogoane, 1983. 
141. In general, A . Fuchs, 1985; M . M . Mahood, 1966, pp. 25-6; and R . Mshengu-
Kavanagh, 1981. 
621 
Africa since IQJS 
it has only been accepted by a fraction of the élites and by governments 
w h o see it as a prestige product of national pride. But where the theatre 
broke its conventions, admitted popular tastes, used local languages, 
especially in dialogue, allowed at least for some audience participation 
and became less highbrow, it generally became popular. At one extreme, 
plays became mere musical comedy with the slightest of content. But the 
experience, especially of Nigerian theatre and opera, has shown that 
popular productions can reach a high level of dramatic and literary quality. 
Cinema and television 
Radio, cinema and television are media whose character approximates 
most to that of the older performances of oral tradition. Radio, however, 
lacked the visual impact and was therefore a less powerful m e d i u m than 
cinema or television which involve both sound and sight. Cinema in turn 
was on the whole less close to the mainstream of African oral tradition 
than television using video techniques, because the latter preserve m u c h 
more spontaneity than the former. O f the three, cinema was the earliest 
as foreign films were shown from c.1905 onwards in Egypt and from the 
1920s south of the Sahara, both in a few urban theatres and also in the 
form of travelling shows in rural areas. F r o m the outset, films were very 
well received - even if the foreign films shown were scarcely under-
standable by the public. T h e situation led to the production of a substantial 
number of films, always didactic, even if they were feature films, aimed 
at an African public, but shot by foreigners. Censorship of films shown 
also developed.142 Radio began for the most part in the 1930s, but became 
the mass m e d i u m par excellence only from i960 onwards w h e n cheap 
transistor radios run on batteries flooded the continent. This industry 
firmly remained in government hands and played its first major role in 
moulding public opinion in the years leading up to independence. 
Television started with transmissions at Ibadan in 1959, followed by Cairo 
in i960. T h e m e d i u m spread more slowly because the costs of investment 
in the infrastructure were substantial and sets were expensive. Still, by 
1985 almost all African countries had set up T V networks and were 
striving to achieve coverage over the whole of their territory. W e discuss 
the cinema first, television later. 
C i n e m a 
T h e earliest film shot by an African m a y well be Ghézal, the Girl of 
Carthage (1924), a Tunisian production, soon followed by Egypt's Leila 
(1926) and Zainab (1926). These were inspired by theatrical models but 
theatrical conventions were soon breached and then abandoned. Misr 
142. F. Ramirez and C . Rolot, 1985. 
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Studios opened in 1934 and the industry there took off, soon producing 
several films per year. This stands in sharp contrast to the colonies. 
Political considerations explain the reluctance of colonial governments to 
allow Africans to make films. But financial considerations also account 
for delay and explain w h y in m a n y countries national film directors 
appeared only in the 1970s. 
Film production is a business. It requires substantial initial inputs of 
capital for production, for the creation of a network of distribution, and 
for the building or the adaptation of theatres. Returns on the investment 
have to wait for box-office receipts and capital for further production 
costs consists of what remains after theatre operators and distribution 
firms have taken their profits. So far, only Egypt has succeeded in setting 
up an efficient self-sustaining industry. T h e alternative is for the state 
initially to finance its film industry, and then attempt to put it on sound 
financial bases afterwards. A small industry in Nigeria and in Morocco 
succeeded in this, while Senegal was able after 1969 to set up its 
distribution network and build theatres, and is n o w on the way to become 
self-sustaining. A more c o m m o n pattern was found in Algeria, Tunisia, 
Mali and Burkina Faso, where the governments have sponsored propa-
ganda and educational films, but not feature films. Still, this brought 
expertise to the country as well as some facilities for production, and in 
these countries the first film-makers have used these bases. But after 1970 
the presence of television studios has been m u c h more important in this 
regard. Television tended to promote the creation of films by providing 
facilities and an outlet. O f late, however, with the prominence of video 
rather than film, it has tended to depress film production.143 
Most governments were reluctant to invest heavily in the industry 
because, contrary to popular belief, film is not a mass m e d i u m . It is not 
comparable to radio or television, which therefore have had absolute 
priority in all countries. W h e n U p p e r Volta (now Burkina Faso) broke 
the hold of the foreign distributors in 1969, there were only ten cinemas 
in the country. G a b o n in 1986 had only eight. Senegal today, with the 
best infrastructure in tropical Africa, has 80 cinemas and 13 million 
viewers a year. This begins to be mass exposure. O n e of the greatest 
successes of any film was Cheick-Oumar Sissoko's Nyamaton shown at 
the Ouagadougou film festival in July 1986. It attracted 35 000 viewers 
over two weeks; yet compared to the millions of television viewers per 
day such an audience is not massive.144 
Still, even if films are not a mass m e d i u m , they are potent enough to 
provoke a constant struggle of competing cultural interests. India, Egypt, 
143. P. Haffner, 1978; G . Hennebelle, 1972; G . Hennebelle and C . Ruelle, 1978; 
J. Binet et al., 1983; P. S . Vieyra, 1968, 1975 and 1983. Vieyra also reports regularly in 
Présence africaine especially about film festivals such as those of Ouagadougou or Carthage. 
144. M . Diawara, 1986 and 1987; P. Michaud, 1986. 
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France, Great Britain and the United States all vie for a share of the 
market and national policies must defend their markets as well as m a p 
out cultural policies of their o w n . T h u s two French distribution companies 
had a stranglehold on the whole French-speaking market in western 
Africa until 1969, w h e n Upper Volta broke through, and even today most 
of the area is still dominated by French companies.143 T h e public's choice 
is responsible for the large share of Indian and Egyptian films shown in 
tropical Africa. T h e remaining fifth of the market is the battle-ground 
for Western countries. France and the United States are the main 
protagonists. At first African governments merely attempted to play 
them off against each other, but accepted co-production by which film 
technology was transferred. In the 1980s, however, it became c o m m o n to 
turn to other foreign partners, especially Cuba and Latin American 
countries.'46 
Given such conditions, censorship is to be expected and governments 
hold strong views on the subject of films. Only 'good African films' are 
to be promoted and film should be used 'as a pleasant and elegant way 
of developing a m o n g African peoples certain desirable attitudes for 
improving welfare, hygiene, education, discipline, work . . . V 4 7 
All the above considerations must be kept in mind when film is 
discussed as a form of art, for they both limit and deeply affect the vision 
of the film-maker. A s w e turn to this topic one must limit the discussion 
to the major centres of production only. There are well over 250 film 
producers n o w in Africa living and working in well over 40 different 
countries. 
T h e first Egyptian cinema was romantic and appealed to the urban 
middle class. Ever since the opening of Misr Studios directors specialized 
in musicals and melodrama strongly influenced by the theatre. This 
tendency continues until today. But by 1939 neo-realist films appeared. 
T h e Second World W a r made cinema a very lucrative business. Production 
soared by 300 per cent, but the content was shoddy and escapist. T h u s 
the life of night clubs became the subject of m a n y of them. In the 1950s 
war films, mysteries, folkloric films, and renewed verist cinema revolving 
around individual psychological drama appeared, while some of 
N . Mahfuz's novels were also filmed. In 1952 most of the industry was 
nationalized but that did not alter its programming very m u c h . Melodrama 
and farce maintained their dominance. After all, by then the Egyptian 
film industry occupied the twelfth place in the world and dominated the 
Middle East as well as North Africa. Most of the 50 or 60 films produced 
per year in the 1960s belong to the genres mentioned. But populist 
realism did develop, current issues such as the debate about the status of 
145. M . Diawara, 1986. 
146. M . Shirazi, 1987. 
147. Anon. , 1987. 
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w o m e n became topics for films, and adaptations of famous literary works 
were created. Critics often decry Egyptian films for their superficiality 
and facile plotting, but the public likes them. Per year the industry 
produces as m a n y films as tropical Africa has over the last quarter of a 
century. A m o n g them one finds all the genres of contemporary film. 
Regularly, works of high technical quality expressing original thought and 
sentiment appear in the flood of mediocre production.'4 
In the Maghreb1 4 9 modest centres appeared in Algiers and in Morocco. 
T h e Algerian government decided from the start to subsidize the pro-
duction of propaganda films about the war of independence and about 
state socialism, although it has not prevented criticism of its bureaucracies 
appearing in some recent productions. T h e few Tunisian films (1966 and 
later) tend to fall into the same mould. Morocco produced films in the 
commercially successful genres along with some intellectual films. T h e 
most remarkable movies are reminiscent of Buñuel and use symbol to 
captivate rather than plot or action. 
French-speaking West Africans began to experiment with film by the 
mid-1950s, first in Paris, later in Dakar.150 T h e first full-length feature 
film was La Noire de . . . by O u s m a n e Sembene (1966). Sembene1 5 1 has 
dominated the French-speaking African film scene ever since, at least 
until very recently, and was also the only film director w h o found adequate 
financing for his art. Trained in the verist Russian tradition, his film used 
images to show social problems and support dialogue about profound 
truths and fundamental ideologies. With this he started an intellectualist 
tradition. All his films deal with the clash between colonial or European 
ways of life and African realities - his négritude component — with 
tensions between social classes - his Marxist components - and with 
praise for pre-colonial heroes - his nationalist component. T h e latter 
strand is expected to culminate in his six-part Samory, an epic for 
television. 
Despite the dearth of financial support, almost two hundred film 
directors have appeared in French-speaking Africa. M u c h of their pro-
duction was didactic and intellectualist, and the public rejected most of 
their films. But some producers such as Souleymane Cissé or Cheick-
O u m a r Sissoko transcended the Sembene legacy. T h e lyrical quality of 
Cissé brought him fame while Sissoko's recent Nyamaton about the lives 
of poor and rich schoolchildren enjoyed a huge appeal. It is half 
documentary, half fiction. It does not propose solutions and the emphasis 
148. A . Elnaccash, 1968; G . Hennebelle, 1972, pp. 13-81; P. Mansfield, 1965, pp. 125-6. 
By 1972, Egypt had produced some 1400 films compared to 50 over 20 years for Africa 
south of the Sahara (G. Hennebelle, 1972, p. 77). 
149. M . Berrah et al., 1981; G . Hennebelle, 1972, pp. 105-94. 
150. P. S. Vieyra's film Afrique-sur-Seine is commonly held to be the first one, but this 
is disputed. Cf. V . Bachy, 1983, in J. Binet et al., p. 24. 
151. F. Pfaff, 1984; O . Okore, 1984; M . B . C h a m , 1984; R . A . Portimer, 1972. 
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lies on action and image rather than on intellectual debate carried by 
dialogue. T h e public loved to see a mirror image of its familiar society 
and all the more so as the language used was Bamana. ' 5 2 Sissoko followed 
a recent trend by abandoning French in favour of local languages. T h e 
Cameroonian detective story is a recent and entirely different genre. 
Although it is at the antipode of Cissé or Sissoko, it too broke with the 
Sembene legacy, albeit by yielding to public taste. 
In Nigeria, television developed well before the cinema did, and 
provided a technical infrastructure. At first the film industry followed the 
Yoruba theatrical tradition and used its financial infrastructure. Feature 
films appeared only after 1972, the year in which a play by W . Soyinka 
was filmed. T h e first film director was trained in the French tradition, 
but O g u n d e taught him to develop a popular, yet artistic film in the 
musical tradition. Nigeria has produced about one feature film a year 
since 1975 even though the cinema is not subsidized. O f late the industry 
has suffered from the stranglehold video production has acquired over 
television.153 
Films using scenarios composed by Africans in South Africa date from 
1975. They compete with films m a d e for a white audience as well as with 
films m a d e by government for its 'Bantu', and they face censorship. T h e 
first was a Zulu film, Ikati elimnyama, ' T h e Black Cat'. At least one later 
feature film has been entirely directed by an African. M o r e important is the 
production of clandestine documentaries and film dossiers documenting 
apartheid. But obviously the African film is not flourishing.'54 
T h e general public clearly has received films m u c h better than it has 
the theatre. But the success of African films compared to imported films, 
especially Indian and Egyptian products, points to the fact that m a n y 
African film-makers have forgotten h o w to entertain. If Egypt is so 
successful, it is because of the numbers of comedies and melodramas (the 
soap operas of television) which it churns out year after year. African 
film directors aim to teach, to educate the public conscience. Their 
concerns are political (social class, neo-colonialism, dependency), moral 
(alienation and the evils of modernity as opposed to tradition), didactic 
(the roles of good, simple, rural w o m e n as opposed to bad, complex, 
urban w o m e n ; the evils of drugs), personal (identity problems) or mili-
tantly cultural (traditional health care against Western medicine).155 T h e 
public wants stories - be they romantic, historical, dramatic or comical. 
It craves mystery films, adventure, glamour and heroic action. A n d only 
n o w are some directors coming to grips with such demands. 
152. M . Diawara, 1987. 
153. A . Opubor and O . Nwuneli, 1979; A . Ricard, 1982; M . B . C h a m , 1982; T . Fiofori, 
1986b. 
154. M . Pheto, 1981; T . Keya, 1981. 
155. See the analysis of F. Boughedir, 1983, pp. 48-57. 
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Television 
Television came to Cameroon and Burundi in 1984. They were among 
the last countries to adopt the new and costly m e d i u m . T . M . Azonga 
describes what the new m e d i u m meant to Cameroonians. T h e y could 
n o w actually watch their idols, be they musicians, sportsmen or public 
leaders. They discovered their o w n country, viewing landscapes, cities 
and rural scenes which they had not even k n o w n about. They saw the 
world open before them as they learned about apartheid and saw its 
brutality in action or followed the horrors of the Iran-Iraq war. They 
entered into august halls of power such as the National Assembly and 
they saw current affairs and the stakes at hand as news developed.'50 N o 
wonder that television soon outdid the radio's popularity, or that viewers 
were ready to spend m u c h on access to it. B y 1986, 50000 sets had 
already been sold, m a n y cheap black-and-white South Korean sets, but 
even more expensive colour sets. Nor is Cameroon alone in this. B y 1986 
one person in twelve owned a set in neighbouring Gabon, and in Nigeria 
one-fifth of the population (20 million people) watched television daily.IS7 
N o doubt figures for other countries are comparable. 
Such a success could leave no government unconcerned. A n d govern-
ments had learned about this power from Nigerian television which began 
in 1959,158 from Cairo (i960), and from the introduction of the medium 
in European countries. For government, television was to be its voice, as 
the radio had been, but also its image. In m a n y parts of the continent 
citizens distrusted the radio because on occasion news was misrepresented 
or suppressed and people knew about it. But television allowed govern-
ments to show events or situations and by that fact alone was m a n y times 
more convincing than radio or other media could be. Governments wanted 
to create public opinion or mould it to their goals, to educate the public, 
to define the content of national consciousness, to create a sense of shared 
morality and to build a national culture. Moreover, m a n y countries also 
attempted to influence the populations of neighbouring countries beyond 
their borders. T h e history of the expansion of television stations and 
networks in Nigeria shows clearly how intimately the m e d i u m is linked 
to competition in politics.159 
O n e understands w h y governments were willing to spend very large 
amounts of money on infrastructure for television. Even governments 
such as that of Burundi, which well into 1983 resisted the wish to 
introduce the m e d i u m on grounds of cost, were forced to give in. Whatever 
the cost, television has become an essential appurtenance of sovereignty. 
156. T . M . Azonga, 1986. 
157. T . Fiofori, 1986b; P. Michaud, 1986. 
158. O . Ikime, 1979; S . Olusola, 1979. 
159. T . Fiofori, 1986b. 
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A n d the wealthier the country the more ambitious its networks. Not only 
has G a b o n just expanded its two colour channels so that the transmissions 
cover the whole of that vast and underpopulated country, it is also 
building its o w n satellite, so that by 1990 it can beam its views as well 
as the results of its studies in Bantu civilization to m u c h of Central Africa. 
It thus competes with Zaire which also aims to o w n its satellite.160 
But television requires a vast number of programmes. O n e hundred 
hours a week means the equivalent of 60 feature films. Programming 
involved news and current affairs for at least one hour a day, children's 
programmes, documentaries (often related to development and recently 
m u c h concerned with the rural world educational programmes), action 
dramas (often as serials), and comedies (often slap-stick), not forgetting 
sports programmes and coverage of public ceremony. T h e demand exceeds 
any other for the services of actors and programme-makers, even with 
the use of video. In fact, the demand cannot be met and operating costs 
would run too high if all programmes were original. Therefore stations 
built up stocks of old films and other materials and leased rights to foreign 
serials, thus reintroducing what has become the single most important 
source of cultural alienation. A s governments strove to define and unify 
national culture, they also were obliged to introduce competing images 
of culture. 
Is television an original art? It produced a wholly n e w genre: the serial, 
which stands to the film as an epic to a short story. Serials in Nigeria 
were at first vignettes around the same setting and the same principal 
characters, as in the series 'The Village Headmaster' which ran for almost 
a generation. But of late six or more hours of television can be used to 
develop a grand theme, such as the history of the first caliphs or the saga 
of Samory. All the genres of cinema too can be transformed, from the 
documentary with its n e w emphasis on 'snapshots' and in m a n y cases the 
exotic at h o m e , to children's cartoons. But m a n y programmes cannot 
be structured enough to qualify as art. However absorbing they m a y 
be, soccer matches are not art and films where critics are in dialogue 
with cabinet ministers (popular in G a b o n and Cameroon) can be given 
an orderly form but not an artistic one. For to be art the material must 
express metaphor in an apposite form. Still, several television genres can 
be art and exhibit m a n y of the structural features k n o w n from oral (epic 
or other) tradition. But the m e d i u m is too n e w to assess its contribution 
to the performing arts. T h e overwhelming pressure to provide both escape 
and to meet immediate goals, coupled to very tight production schedules, 
make it quite difficult for masterpieces to emerge. 
160. P. Michaud, 1986. T h e contracts for the House of the Radio in Kinshasa and for 
the relay of networks there are among the biggest development projects the country has 
undertaken since 1970. 
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T h e arts of Africa in world context 
African sculpture revolutionized European art from 1905 onwards, 
especially in sculpture. B y 1935 Cubism and G e r m a n expressionism were 
outmoded but the basic influence of African art persisted and up to this 
day continues to dominate sculpture, as the work of Zadkine, M o o r e , 
Archipenko and others shows. In this way, the principles of classical 
African art have become part of the international repertoire of forms.161 
Such impulses often returned to Africa. T h u s a popular artist in Benin 
(Nigeria) copied a work by Benson Osawe, in turn inspired by Modigliani, 
himself endebted to Lega mask forms from eastern Zaire.'62 T h e impact 
of expressionism on African artists trained in Europe derives from the 
impact of African art on expressionism. T h u s Gerard Sekoto, for instance, 
echoes classical forms through the prism of G e r m a n expressionist painting. 
African music also had m a d e its greatest contributions well before 1935 
with its input in the creation of jazz and Afro-Latin music. A s in the 
case of the visual arts, this explains w h y these movements in turn could 
contribute so m u c h to modern African music. 
During the high colonial period, after 1920, the African artistic heritage 
had little impact, barring only L e Corbusier's inspiration from the 
architecture of the M z ä b (southern Algeria). Arrogant colonialism only 
saw Africans as pupils to be taught, not as teachers. After independence, 
however, African arts once more began to influence the world. T h e 
international public was exposed first to more exhibits of African classical 
art, to the new music and to theatrical or ballet productions. Slowly these 
are recognized as original contributions to the world heritage and musicians 
in particular enjoy a growing international public, while at least one film, 
Le mandat by O . Sembene, had a genuine popular success in Europe. If 
classical art is n o w highly rated, modern visual art is only beginning to 
be k n o w n to an international public. So far, it has exerted little influence 
on the international scene. 
T h e full recognition even of African classical art still remains incom-
plete. Despite m a n y temporary exhibitions from Paris to Tokyo, Prague 
to N e w York, African classical art is still segregated from the repositories 
of what the public views as 'fine art'. Only the Metropolitan M u s e u m of 
N e w York displays classical African sculpture as a permanent feature, but 
still as 'primitive art'. Nonetheless, the growing appreciation of the 
classical arts has boosted the market in art works. This market existed 
by 1900 but grew by leaps and bounds after 1945 and again after i960. 
Unfortunately, this has been accompanied by the usual problems of 
161. M . Leiris and J. Delange, 1967, pp. 117-61; D . Ola, 1980; F. Willett, 1971; 
S. Barron, 1983, for the magnitude of the African impact; and C . Einstein, 1915, for its 
manifesto. 
162. P. Ben A m o s , 1977, pp. 135-7 an^ fifv 9-io. 
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Court, Kana, Dahomey; right, 'The Prophet', a sculpture by Ossip Zadkine, 1914
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smuggling, illegal excavation, an industry of forgeries and further sub-
stantial losses of significant works of art as they are exported to other 
continents.103 Classical art has not entered the Louvre yet, but it has 
reached the great auction houses. Meanwhile, modern artists, musicians, 
playwrights and film producers struggle to be recognized. B y the 1980s, 
as shown by W . Soyinka's Nobel Prize and the 1987 award of a gold 
medal at the film festival of Cannes, these struggles are producing results. 
Conclusion 
T h e half-century since 1935 does not contain two generations of artists 
but three: the precursors, the pioneers of the contemporary arts and the 
followers. T h e die was cast between 1945 and 1965. During these years, 
earlier experiments coalesced into a new tradition from which later artists 
did not depart, i960 is not a crucial date in the arts. T h e n e w arts are a 
product of the great age of nationalist expectation, not of political 
independence. In a massive outburst, the arts reflected nationalism and 
in the next generation produced scores upon scores of artists in all media, 
in all genres, in all arts, still developing the insights the pioneers had 
conceived. 
O n the whole, the new arts are not derived from European traditions, 
even though they developed at the peak of European cultural influence 
which spans the same years, and perhaps continues to be stronger n o w 
than before 1945, and despite the adoption of European techniques or 
instruments. In the final analysis the continuity with earlier times is more 
striking. Continuities are evident for the rural arts, obvious for the popular 
arts, and underlie m u c h tourist art. A clear break is only evident in the 
theatre in so far as it conforms to Italian convention, and in the cinema 
which, apart from Egypt, is not yet a popular art. Intellectualist cinema 
and academic theatre do not appeal even to most of the élites, which also 
refuse European-inspired visual arts and eschew European classical music. 
T h e academic arts, derived from Europe, are still foreign to collective 
African sensibilities. T h e artists w h o practise them feel it and m u c h of 
their stance concerning Africanness, alienation and négritude derives from 
this feeling of not belonging. O n the whole, then, the n e w arts in Africa 
are a synthesis in which a selective small portion of the European heritage 
has been combined with a large African legacy. 
Recently, D . Niven remarked on the close links between academic 
artists and political leadership.164 This is one facet of a wider truth: the 
arts have faithfully mirrored the changing history of African societies, 
163. Arts d'Afrique noire devotes m u c h space to reports of sales and prices attained on 
the international market. For tourist art, see the contributions of D . Crowley to African 
Arts. 
164. D . Niven, 1985. 
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with their tensions within and without. Urban arts became dominant as 
urban folk did. As social classes took shape and the gaps between them 
became rifts, each class found its o w n artistic expression. T h e tensions 
between highbrow cinema, theatre, visual arts, even costume, and the 
lowbrow varieties are evident everywhere. Only in music is the rift not 
glaring because there are almost no academic musicians. Whether academic 
artists agree or not with the élite, they speak their language and are 
recognized by them. Popular artists, on the whole, are not. African 
societies, once again, are the masters of their o w n destinies and they 
find the dreams and metaphors, the arts, which express their complex 
aspirations. T h e arts are new, because they mirror a n e w Africa. 
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and science in Africa 
AH A. M A Z R U I and J. F. Ade AJAYI 
in collaboration with 
A. Adu B O A H E N W Tshishiku 
T S H I B A N G U 
This chapter is dedicated to the m e m o r y of Cheikh A n t a D i o p 
Introduction1 
W h a t does political subordination do to philosophy and science in a given 
society? T h e whole of Africa has been under varying degrees of foreign 
domination throughout the entire period since 1935, even w h e n nominal 
political independence has been achieved. O n e central question for this 
chapter to consider, therefore, is the impact of this subordinate condition 
upon Africa's pool of knowledge and expertise. W a s colonialism a n e w 
stimulus for scientific advances and technological change? W a s Africa's 
formal philosophy enriched by colonialism? W a s African philosophy 
actually born out of Africa's interaction with the Western world? O r did 
colonialism have an inhibiting effect on both philosophy and science? 
W e propose to demonstrate that partly because of colonialism, the 
contribution of African scientists to the total pool of h u m a n knowledge 
has been comparatively modest in the period since 1935. But w e also 
hope to show that science has always been too important to be measured 
purely in terms of the activities of scientists. Just as history is not m a d e 
by historians but by society, so science is not developed only by scientists 
but by the wider community. W e hope to demonstrate h o w African 
society became one of the pillars of Western science and technology, 
precisely by being colonized. While colonialism m a d e it difficult for 
science and technology to develop within Africa itself, the same colonial 
condition became a transmission belt for Africa's material contribution to 
science and technology in the Western world. 
But African realities are not simply a derivative of colonialism. A more 
powerful force in Africa than the colonial experience is African culture 
itself. A survey of the trends in science and technology in Africa must 
1. T h e authors of this chapter acknowledge with gratitude the stimulation and research 
help provided by Marcien Towa, Malu wa Kalenga and C . Wondji. 
-
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IFAN, Dakar, Senegal
therefore recognize the salience of values and traditions in both African
philosophy and African science.
This chapter will address Africa's experience in philosophy and science,
and examine knowledge as an empirical phenomenon. Partly because of
that, when we discuss science, there will be a lot of philosophy; and when
we discuss philosophy, there will be a lot of science. But both philosophy
and science will be viewed - to borrow Marxist vocabulary in a new
way - as part of the superstructure. The base or substructure will be
culture itself.
This chapter addresses science and philosophy in Africa since 1935.
But there is a sense in which philosophy and science defy the boundaries
of both geographical space and historical time. The discussion of science
and philosophy could not be kept strictly within the geographical bound¬
aries of Africa and the historical limits of the period since 1935. The
price for dealing with such universals as science and philosophy is the
inevitable tendency to break out of the confines of space and time.
And yet even on this issue culture will help to restrain universalism.
This chapter will be geographically comparative from time to time, looking
at other societies in order to understand Africa better. We have come
neither to bury the Caesars of African science nor to praise them. We
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are trying to understand the empire of African science and philosophy in 
their cultural context, with all their strengths and limitations. 
We feel, 
Therefore we think, 
Therefore we are. 
But in order to comprehend the uniqueness of Africa, w e have para-
doxically to compare it with other civilizations. W h a t is distinctively 
African cannot be fully grasped without exploring what is universally 
h u m a n . It is not just the mirror which tells us what w e are; it is also the 
traffic with the rest of humankind. 
Traditional science 
Recognition and some appreciation are only just beginning to be accorded 
the body of knowledge and expertise that sustained pre-colonial societies 
in agriculture, health, crafts and industries. In the colonial period such 
knowledge and expertise were not dignified with the n a m e of science, but 
were damned as superstitious and pre-scientific. Western education and 
Christianity, sometimes even colonial laws and deliberate policies, were 
used to subvert the basis of such traditional knowledge. Those educated 
in Western-type schools were taught to despise and reject traditional 
knowledge, though nevertheless it continued under varying circumstances 
to be transmitted orally a m o n g the masses. Today, it is found that in spite 
of the impact of Western medicine, agriculture, science and technology, 
traditional knowledge and expertise in agriculture, healing practices and 
beliefs have retained a firm hold on the life of a majority of Africans. 
T w o features of traditional science should be noted. First, the role of 
individual thinkers and inventors was subordinated to that of society in 
nurturing knowledge and expertise within the culture. T h e loss of 
autonomy and sovereignty during the colonial period was therefore bound 
to have a profound effect on the further development and nurturing of such 
knowledge. Secondly, traditional societies m a d e no distinction between 
knowledge acquired by reason, experimentation, imagination or faith. 
There was no dichotomy between science and religion, science and 
philosophy, or science and art. Scientific knowledge was not reduced only 
to the quantitative and the mechanistic. T h u s , Western science could not 
begin to appreciate method or value in traditional science in Africa until 
the stage of relativity w h e n Western science began to shift emphasis from 
discrete entities to the complexities in nature and the universe, and 
Western paradigms of progress and development began to be questioned.2 
During the colonial period, African peasants were forced to produce 
raw material for European industries under conditions dictated by Western 
2. R. Schräm, 1981, pp. 391-9. See also A. O . Anya, 1987, pp. 141-60. 
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agricultural science developed largely in the temperate zone. Agricultural 
practices developed in Africa over the centuries to preserve soil fertility 
under tropical conditions were discouraged: they were forced to adopt 
monoculture instead of intercropping, and intensive agriculture with 
fertilizers instead of allowing cultivation to rotate and some land to remain 
fallow. N o w that African soils, exhausted by these methods of producing 
cash crops, have deteriorated to the point where it is difficult to get them 
to produce enough food to sustain the increasing populations, scientists 
are beginning to draw attention to the rationality and wisdom of m a n y 
traditional tropical agricultural practices: 
T h e destruction of forest cover m a d e necessary . . . for large scale 
agriculture facilitates the degradation of the soil since the special 
nutrient cycling mechanism is upset leading to the degradation of 
the soil and consequent low agricultural productivity. In addition, 
the tilling of such soils facilitates oxidation of organic matter, 
accelerates the leaching of the little nutrients available, and disturbs 
the fragile ecological balance of the flora and the fauna with associated 
micro-organisms. A s a result of the destruction of soil structure, the 
application of fertilizer under such conditions is a waste as the 
predominantly lateritic soils lack colloids which can absorb the 
applied fertilizer for subsequent release to plants. T h e high levels of 
iron and aluminum in such soil further neutralises the use of fertilizer 
as a strategy for higher agricultural productivity.3 
A s might have been expected, m a n y African peoples both north and 
south of the Sahara had specialists with detailed knowledge of the weather 
and soil properties. T h e y picked the location of settlements and farming 
areas carefully, and some societies had fertility cults to regulate agricultural 
practices through annual festivals and ritual observations. People like the 
Hausa, the Berber and the Igbo promoted good husbandry through 
competition and the conferment of titles on the most successful. T r a -
ditional skills in agronomy and soil conservation can still be seen in m a n y 
places in Africa practising hill-top terraced agriculture undisturbed by 
colonial agricultural science. 
M a n y African peoples had detailed knowledge of the varieties of tropical 
plants and trees in their neighbourhood. Even shrubs in the Sahara 
were carefully studied by the Berber and Arab nomads and cultivators. 
Elsewhere there were elaborate classifications of plants into families and 
sub-groups according to cultural and ritual properties which do not tally 
with modern botanical classification but were so detailed and complex 
that modern botanists have a lot to learn from the basis of comparison 
and classification. Knowledge of the pharmaceutical properties utilized in 
3. A . O . Anya, 1986, pp. 11-12. See also P. Richards, 1985. 
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healing systems is n o w beginning to be investigated by Western-trained 
pharmacologists.4 
F r o m the Cape to Cairo there were detailed and elaborate studies of 
h u m a n and animal behaviour. These were classified into complex patterns 
from which traditional philosophers tried to draw analogies between 
h u m a n and animal behaviour. F r o m such close observations, deductions 
were drawn about the essential nature and properties of different things. 
T h e intention of such analysis was often to discover the 'true' n a m e of 
the thing, for it was only by knowing the true n a m e and utilizing it in 
incantations that the thing could be controlled.5 
Similarly, elaborate schemes of relationships in the spirit world were 
drawn up, deducting the behaviours of gods and spirit beings (jinnis in 
Musl im Africa) from the patterns of h u m a n and animal behaviour, and 
sometimes using the imagined patterns of the spirit world as models for 
h u m a n society. T h e consensus, based upon detailed observation and 
analysis, was sometimes processed into myths of creation, encoding beliefs 
about h u m a n nature and social psychology. Egyptians sometimes mixed 
pharaonic and Islamic ideas. But the example of the D o g o n of Mali is 
the best documented in sub-Saharan Africa because they were studied by 
the devoted interpreters, Marcel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen, w h o 
said: 
Within and beyond this totality of beliefs appears a logical scheme 
of symbols expressing a system of thought which cannot be described 
simply as myth . For this conceptual structure, when studied, reveals 
an internal coherence, a secret wisdom, and an apprehension of 
ultimate realities equal to that which w e Europeans conceive ourselves 
to have attained.6 
There were complex theories of numbers, observations of the stars and 
other natural phenomena which were used to produce some ordering of 
social, natural and metaphysical phenomena. F r o m such ordering, diviners 
sought to predict the trend of events and advise clients what might be 
expected and h o w to prevent the intervention of evil forces. Egypt is the 
most complex. But Ifa, the Yoruba divination system, is probably the 
best documented elsewhere in Africa. A computer scientist has recently 
drawn attention to the similarity of the number structure in Ifa (multiples 
of four), and that of the computer system based on eight. 
A m o n g cultivators, there were specialist groups, particularly hunters 
as individuals and guilds, w h o acquired and classified knowledge of 
tropical animals in cultural terms. S o m e of this knowledge was applied 
4. M . Last and G . L . Chavunduka, 1986. See also C. Wilcocks, 1962; and J. B. London, 
1976. 
5. Boubou Hama, 1981, pp. 170-2. 
6. M . Griaule and G . Dieterlen, 1954, in D . Forde, 1954, p. 83. See also C. H . Long, 
1985, pp. 369-70. 
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in healing systems largely on the basis of analogy: that bits of an animal 
prepared with herbs of known therapeutic value can pass on their 
characteristics to heal a person suffering from lack of those characteristics 
for which the animal was best known. Pastoralists such as the Fulbe and 
the Maasai, and some Somali, acquired extensive knowledge of their 
animals and their biological needs, and detailed knowledge of the animal 
world generally. F r o m this m a n y developed impressive veterinary k n o w -
ledge and expertise, including noteworthy techniques of animal surgery. 
S o m e of this knowledge has been extended to surgical treatments of 
humans , and it is n o w believed that modern medicine has something to 
learn from such traditional surgical practices as used in therapeutic 
coagulation skin treatment and traditional methods of bone-setting. This 
last art - though more developed a m o n g some pastoralists - is a widespread 
skill in African medical practice. Broken legs and sprained ankles are 
treated m u c h faster among traditional healers than in modern hospitals. 
T h e reputation of some African bone-setters spread so widely that medical 
researchers in distant lands like the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Scotland and Poland started focusing special investigative attention on 
African techniques. Such specialized African expertise has also been 
sought in the Middle East, sometimes through the intermediary of Arab 
Africa. 
Traditional healing systems included some knowledge of the relation-
ships between disease and micro-organisms and bacteria, which is at the 
core of Western scientific medicine. T h e Yoruba, ahead of even medieval 
Egypt, displayed a prior understanding of the relationship between 
diseases and what Western science called 'bacteria'. Yoruba medical culture 
was already predicated on a concept of 'worms' and 'insects' which were 
so small as to be invisible. These germs and w o r m s had a beneficial as 
well as detrimental role in the body. S o m e of them attacked the body as 
a result of wrong food, excessive eating, or improper physical exertions 
and abuse of the body. Other 'insects' fought disease and sought to protect 
the healthy equilibrium of the body. 
T h e germ and w o r m theory of disease was more widespread in Africa 
than m a n y people realized. Evidence of a comparable paradigm has been 
found among the Tonga of South Africa. But the traditional healers 
proceeded on the assumption that health embraced more than controlling 
the injurious effects of bacteria on the physical plane and that the social 
and spiritual relationships of the patient also needed to be investigated 
and normalized. This holistic approach to healing is beginning to be 
appreciated and utilized by Western medicine, not least in the treatment 
of psychiatric disorders. T h e work of T . O . L a m b o , the Nigerian 
psychiatrist, at the Aro Hospital of Mental Diseases in Nigeria is world-
famous. H e demonstrated the utility of involving local communities in 
the treatment of the mentally ill. H e later became the Deputy Director-
General of the World Health Organization ( W H O ) . 
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Indeed, the rationality of this linkage between physical, social and 
spiritual well-being is beginning to be appreciated. For one thing, in the 
face of epidemics such as the Acquired I m m u n e Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) and other scourges for which a scientific solution is yet to be 
found, it offers the comfort of faith healing in spite of some unease on 
die part of Church authorities such as greeted the work of Bishop 
E m m a n u e l Milingo of Zambia. For another, it heightens a concern for 
the inter-dependence of m a n and the natural environment which is 
precisely what die advanced technologies of the Western world are 
beginning to wake up to. This appreciation should lead to a better 
understanding of traditional thought which, in the ordering of knowledge, 
accepted no dichotomies between the biological and the social, or the 
social and the metaphysical. This should ultimately end the prejudicial 
classification of traditional thought as pre-scientific. T h e emphasis on the 
holistic approach should, however, not obscure the purely scientific 
knowledge that was involved in the agricultural and healing systems, from 
Marrakesh to Maputo . 
Indeed, African science and technology in the pre-colonial period were 
adequate to sustain life, especially in the areas of health care, agriculture, 
veterinary medicine and industrial processes such as food preservation, 
metallurgy, fermentation, the making of dyes, soaps, cosmetics and other 
toiletries. H o w then has Africa become so backward scientifically and 
technologically? 
T h e disruption of Africa's technology 
Africa's present scientific and technological backwardness is the outcome 
of the Western impact on the continent, especially since the establishment 
of colonialism. A s this phenomenon has already been dealt with in Volume 
VII of the series, w e will confine ourselves here to the scientific and 
technological issues. In die first place, with the establishment of colonial 
rule, the Europeans m a d e it clear that they intended to use their advantage 
to dominate and exploit Africa and increase not only the technological 
but also the economic gap. T h e y certainly showed no anxiety to reduce 
their advantage of superiority of science and technology which they 
enjoyed over Africa by any precipitous plans for the scientific and 
technological development of Africa. Rather, instead of stimulating and 
developing existing scientific and technological practices, they set out to 
discredit and discourage them, while secretly poaching some of these 
ideas and developing them within Western science. For example, principles 
of inoculation, metallurgy, fermentation and any of the other skills that 
could be used to compete with Western manufacturers were decried, 
m a d e illegal and persecuted in other ways. 
T h e most powerful factor that they used in inhibiting Africa's scientific 
and technological advancement was the school. First of all, formal 
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schooling in colonial Africa was linked to the promotion of religion rather 
than the dissemination of science. So m a n y of the schools were in fact 
Christian missionary schools. In its classes M a r y Magdalen was far better 
known than Marie Curie, and the L a w of Moses was more familiar than 
the Laws of Relativity. Young Africans like K w a m e N k r u m a h and Joseph 
Kasavubu were far more likely to dream of becoming priests one day 
than to dream of becoming physicists. T h e Bible was not of course a 
manual of technology. A n d yet in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century the Bible provided m a n y of the aspirations and ideals of the 
emerging African intelligentsia. 
Next to the missionary factor in inhibiting the scientification of Africa 
in this period was the more general literary orientation of education in 
French and British colonial schools. Western literary figures loomed larger 
as role models to colonial school children than did towering Western 
scientists. Obafemi Awolowo was inspired by Shakespeare himself, K w a m e 
N k r u m a h by Alfred Tennyson, Apollo Obote by John Milton (even 
adopting 'Milton' for his o w n middle name) . In the biographies of the 
first generation of African leaders in the second half of the twentieth 
century one looks in vain for statesmen w h o had been significantly inspired 
by Copernicus, Galileo, Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin, T h o m a s Edison, 
Graham Bell, Henry Ford or Albert Einstein.7 
T h e third colonial factor which inhibited the scientification of Africa 
in m u c h of the twentieth century was indeed amnesia. F e w African 
children outside Ethiopia knew anything about the sunken churches of 
Lalibela as an engineering achievement. F e w children outside Southern 
Africa knew anything at all about the ruins of Great Zimbabwe - and 
very often those structures were in any case credited either to outright 
foreigners or to such ambiguous categories as 'Hamites'. Colonial curricula 
refused to acknowledge ancient Egypt as an African civilization, let alone 
a black one. Algerians were taught that their country was a backward 
extension of France. N o b o d y in a colonial school even raised the hypothesis 
that centuries before Columbus non-Europeans - perhaps even Africans — 
might have crossed the Atlantic to the Americas. Nobody referred to the 
evidence of Negroid sculptured figures in Mexico {cabeza colossal), pre-
Columbian in origin and perhaps even pre-Christ.8 
T h e scientification of twentieth-century Africa was slowed down partly 
because Africans were m a d e to forget that they themselves had once been 
scientific achievers. Even Egyptians, w h o invented civilization, were taught 
to forget their role. This collective technological amnesia helped to create 
7. For more relevant role models, consult J. A . Rogers, 1972; see also S. F. M a s o n , 
1962. 
8. T h e huge stone heads with Negroid physiognomy are n o w on display in Mexico 
City. T h e first head was discovered in 1869 by J. M . Melgar; archaeologists from the 
Smithsonian Institution later found further gigantic Negroid stone heads. 
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collective scientific impotence. It also fostered a deep-seated technological 
inferiority complex in large numbers of the n e w generation of colonized 
Africans. Inferiority complex and Africa's dependency complex were two 
sides of the same colonial coin.9 
In addition to the missionary factor (the Bible as a priority), the literary 
factor (European languages and literature as blueprints) and the factor of 
amnesia (wiping Africa's technological slate clean), the colonial order also 
inhibited the march of science by its policy of 'pacification', especially in 
the first half of the twentieth century. Colonial policies based on 'paci-
fication' and 'law and order' in themselves distrusted the more enterprising 
of the colonial subjects. U n d e r such conditions, innovators were perceived 
as 'upstarts', debaters were 'agitators', self-confidence was 'cheek'. 
Finally, the control of the economies and the obstacles placed in the 
w a y of industrialization in Africa also inhibited the spread of Western 
science and technology. Take textiles, for example. Africans in Egypt, 
Sudan, Uganda , northern Nigeria and elsewhere were m a d e to grow 
cotton for export. Traditional dyes and design patterns in different parts 
of Africa were studied in Europe, and cheap textiles imitating those 
designs and dyes were imported into Africa, forcing hand-woven fabrics 
off the popular market to become occasional luxury items for ceremonial 
and ritual events. Similarly, imported household utensils, building 
materials, jewellery, toiletries and m a n y food and drink items began to 
displace local manufactures. This was in addition to n e w demands created 
during the colonial period, such as school and hospital equipment, paper 
and other manufactured goods which had to be imported.10 
Even communities that had lived by mining and metallurgy were 
prevented from working the mines except as unskilled labour. Mining 
areas were granted out as concessions to trans-national companies able to 
operate capital-intensive deep mines, and the Africans became illegal 
operators in the mines on their o w n land. T h e companies restricted the 
employment of Africans to unskilled or at best semi-skilled labour 
involving little or no transfer of science and technology. It should be 
particularly emphasized that it was in this very period w h e n Africa's 
innovation was being deliberately sabotaged that Europe continued to 
keep ahead in the development of rockets, atomic and nuclear physics, 
communications, computers, electronics and high technology. 
Law-and-order colonialism was basically a substitute for development 
colonialism. Belgian colonialism in Zaire was only marginally better than 
Portuguese colonialism in Angola. 
It was in the 1940s that the British at long last tried to go beyond law-
and-order colonialism into what they called 'colonial development and 
9: Consult I. Van Sertima, 1986, and 19S5; also C . Singer, 1959. 
10. See, for example, P. Kilby, 1969; P. Pugh and J. F. A . Ajayi, 1990. For the impact 
of capital on the peoples of the Jos Plateau, see B . Freund, 1981. 
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welfare'. T h e y even set u p a fund by that name: the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Fund . Although developmental colonialism was to a large 
extent a contradiction in terms, even that contradiction was definitely an 
improvement on the arrogance of law-and-order colonialism. 
It was this phase of developmental colonialism which allowed room for 
some expansion of education, especially at the tertiary level, partly by the 
award of scholarships for Africans to study in Europe, and even more by 
the establishment of degree-granting institutions, initially as outposts or 
colleges of metropolitan universities, at Ibadan, Legon, Makerere, Dakar 
and Lovanium in addition to older centres like Fourah Bay and Fort 
Hare. Their curriculum and staffing were controlled by the metropolitan 
universities w h o granted their degrees. They maintained high standards 
and initiated scientific research in areas of competence of the pioneering 
professors w h o came mostly from Europe. S o m e of the areas of strength 
included tropical h u m a n and veterinary medicine, especially parasitology 
and virology, epidemiological and biochemical investigations and estab-
lishing hospital baseline; in physics, ionosphere; in chemistry, natural 
products; in biology, ecology and mycology. Before the interference of 
politics and underfunding brought deterioration, the quality of some of 
the research w o n international acclaim. T h e principal areas of focus were 
extensions and supplementary to the research based in the metropolitan 
institutions." Nevertheless, they did not include vital areas such as 
genetics and biotechnology, information science or computer technology. 
Instead, the university colleges were for the teaching of science rather 
than for advanced scientific research. Such dependent education inhibited 
indigenization. It developed individuals not within their culture and 
society but outside them. It kept the educated élite separate from the 
mass of society and thus stifled their creativity. F r o m countries like Egypt 
the technological brain-drain to the Western world started early because 
of this alienation. 
Institutions for scientific research and training required for the exploi-
tation of African resources were based and developed in the European 
countries. Between the two world wars, stations for collecting data and 
specimens of flora and fauna, crafts and other local 'curiosities' were 
established as outposts of metropolitan m u s e u m s , botanical and zoological 
gardens, and agriculture and forestry research institutions where basic 
research and possible applications were conducted. Generally, while the 
British expected each colony or regional group of colonies to initiate and 
fund the work of such stations, research organizations in France sponsored 
them, while the Belgians and Portuguese expected concessionaire c o m -
panies to be the scientific and financial sponsors." 
In that inter-war period, the story of m a n y of the stations, especially 
ii. For example, see J. F. A. Ajayi and T . N . Tamuno, 1973; and K . King, 1984. 
12. J. W . Froje, 1989, pp. 19-22. 
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during the years of depression, was one of neglect, understaffing and 
underfunding. T h e French Pasteur Institute managed to achieve, notable 
research in North Africa in tropical medicine, resulting in two Nobel 
Prizes, one to Alphonse La verane in 1907 for his work on malaria, done 
mostly in Algiers, and the other to Henri Nicolle in 1928 for his research 
on typhus conducted principally in Tunis. T h e I F A N {Institut français 
a" Afrique Noire; French Institute of Black Africa), an interdisciplinary 
research institute established in Dakar in 1936 with branches in each 
French West African colony, was also relatively successful in stimulating 
research, and was later to be the centre for m u c h of Cheikh Anta Diop's 
work. T h e Belgians also set up in 1947 the important 1RS A C {Institut 
pour la recherche scientifique d'Afrique Centrale; Institute for Scientific 
Research in Central Africa) to serve all Belgian dependencies in Africa. 
T h e aims of the I R S A C , with its headquarters in Brussels, were defined 
as follows in the Decree which established the Institute on 1 July 1947: 
' T h e purpose of the institution shall be to sponsor, promote, perform and 
coordinate the study of h u m a n sciences and of nature, more particularly in 
the Belgian Congo and in Rwanda-Urundi ' (Article 2). A centre for 
agronomic research had already been established in the Belgian Congo in 
1933 and was destined to acquire great international prestige: the Institut 
national d'études agronomiques au Congo (Congo National Institute for 
Agronomic Studies). Its main centre was located in the heart of the 
equatorial forest at Yangambi in the Eastern province of Congo, n o w 
k n o w n as Upper Zaire. 
In most of Africa, the commonest colonial establishments were not 
science laboratories or research institutes but either workshops for main-
tenance of the railways, telegraphs, radio stations and survey equipment 
or experimental stations to improve the yield and processing of cash crops 
for export. T h e best of these were to be found in areas of European 
settlement such as Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa where 
settler-farmers exerted pressure on local administrations for the provision 
of research facilities to serve their exclusive interests. It was also in such 
areas, particularly the mining areas, that the potential for industrialization 
first emerged. In South Africa, the rich diamond and gold deposits 
attracted large capital investments, and settlers to manage the investments 
and supervise mining technology. Prosperity in the mining areas, autonomy 
w o n by the settler communities after the South African W a r and the 
shortage of imported manufactured goods during the First World W a r -
all these set off the manufacturing sector of the South African economy. 
This led to an expansion of the universities and research institutes and 
strengthened the base of Western science and technology in South Africa 
as an exclusive preserve of the whites.13 
T h u s , the impact of Western science and technology on Africa during 
13. A. C . Brown, 1988. 
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the colonial period was to strengthen underdevelopment. It was exhibited 
to impress and overawe Africans, shaking their confidence in traditional 
knowledge and expertise while keeping Western science and technology 
beyond reach. A few Africans managed to get to Europe to train as 
medical doctors but, because of discrimination in the colonial service, 
they usually had to operate as self-employed general practitioners, with 
no opportunities for research. Very few African students opted for 
engineering or advanced science as there was no scope for them to practise 
outside the restricted colonial service. M o r e usually, Africans trained as 
pastors, teachers, administrators and lawyers.14 T h u s , w e cannot expect 
to find a research scientist a m o n g the first generation of African top 
leaders, though one was trained in pharmacy (Algeria's Ferhat Abbas) 
and three of them were medical doctors (Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 
Agostinho Neto and K a m u z u Banda). T h e mass of people, impressed as 
they were by the marvels of European science, continued to live as best 
as they could by the traditional agricultural and healing systems, crafts 
and industries, while trying to buy predominantly literary Western edu-
cation for their children. Yet traditional knowledge continued to exert its 
cultural force even on the Western-educated élite, and m a n y a university 
graduate found occasion to consult traditional diviners and healers. 
Developments since independence 
In the second half of the twentieth century, w h e n most African countries 
became independent, advanced scientific research in Africa took place in 
four types of institution. T h e first category were universities whose 
establishment was given a tremendous push following the initial nationalist 
enthusiasm of the 1950s and 1960s. These have produced the most 
widespread centres of advanced scientific research in their departments 
of science, engineering, agriculture and medicine. Countries like Nigeria, 
G h a n a and Côte d'Ivoire have been able to sustain a high level of 
university expansion, and a few specialist universities devoted to science 
and technology of agriculture, but not yet medicine, have emerged. 
T h e University of East Africa while it lasted (1963-70) was perhaps 
the most ambitious pan-African academic experiment. Medical and agri-
cultural teaching and research were supposed to be a specialization of 
Makerere College in Uganda; engineering (teaching and research) was 
entrusted to the University College, Nairobi. T h e University College, 
D a r es Salaam, initially specialized in law, and later expanded into 
agricultural and economic research. Almost all the organs of the University 
of East Africa were initially intended to serve not merely the particular 
country in which they were located but the East African community as 
14. For even more relevant role models, see J. A . Rogers, 1972; see also S. F. M a s o n , 
1962. 
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a whole (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). T h e level of research into medical 
problems at Mulago Hospital and the Makerere Faculty of Medicine was 
so high in the 1960s that there were periodic rumours about a possible 
Nobel Prize for Medicine. Unfortunately no such prize materialized 
before the University of East Africa itself collapsed into its three national 
constituent parts. Later on Makerere University as a national institution 
was further damaged by the political turmoil into which Uganda was 
thrown after Idi A m a captured political power in 1971. 
T h e second category of institution is national research centres and 
institutions, both private and public-funded. Kenya and Nigeria have 
such institutes in disease control, forestry and agriculture; Zaire and 
Ghana in nuclear physics; Nigeria in oceanography. Nigeria, Zimbabwe 
and Zaire have paid considerable attention to traditional herbal medicine 
as an area of modern research. T h e Kenya Medical Research Institute 
under the leadership of D r D a v y Koech entered the 1990s at the forefront 
of research against Acquired I m m u n e Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In 
February 1990, the Research Institute even claimed to have developed an 
anti-AIDS treatment drug which it called K E M R O N . 1 5 
In 1966, 1RS A C , referred to earlier, was restructured and reorganized 
as the O N R D {Office national pour la recherche et le développement; National 
Office for Research and Development). A few years later, it was given 
the n e w n a m e of Institut de recherche scientifique (Scientific Research 
Institute); today, it operates a number of centres throughout Zaire, each 
specifically dedicated to research in a branch of natural science, the h u m a n 
sciences and primate studies, and also in various branches of technology. 
There are also national academies of science to encourage and reward 
excellence. 
T h e third category of research institution in Africa is that of regional 
pan-African organizations and structures. S o m e of these have been 
concerned with climatic and ecological studies specific to the particular 
areas of Africa, such as the Sahel; others have co-operated on such 
regional concerns as the movement of locusts. 
A special kind of pan-African scholarly or scientific organization is the 
professional association or academy of specialists. Cheikh Anta Diop even 
attempted to pan-Africanize research beyond the borders of Africa -
encompassing the black world as a whole. That was the purpose of the 
World Black Researchers Association which was formed in 1976, and of 
which Diop became president. A s Diop himself put it in his presidential 
statement: 
15. For a detailed report of the work of the Kenya Medical Research Institute against 
A I D S , see the special issue of The Weekly Review (Nairobi), 9 February 1990. It should 
be noted that although the Kenya Institute's research work against A I D S has been admired 
and encouraged, its claims about the anti-AIDS drug K E M R O N are widely regarded by 
scientists as having been 'premature'. 
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T h e association will englobe all the scientific disciplines, both the 
natural and social sciences In both domains scholars and scientists 
of the black world will be asked to direct their efforts toward 
solving the most vital scientific and sociological problems presently 
confronting the black world. This will further solidify the cultural 
ties binding all black populations of the globe.'6 
T h e final category of institutions which conduct or promote African 
scientific and technological research is that of international and inter-
continental research organizations which go beyond the pan-African 
scientific fraternity. T h o m a s Odhiambo heads a major international c o m -
munity of scholars (ICIPE - International Centre of Insect Physiology 
and Ecology) devoted to an understanding of the world of insects. This 
is quite apart from Odhiambo's leadership of the African Academy of 
Sciences — a pan-African instrument of scholarship and academic excel-
lence with its headquarters in Nairobi. T h e Academy issues a scientific 
magazine of its o w n entitled Discovery and Innovation, co-sponsored by 
the Third World A c a d e m y of Sciences.17 T h e United Nations University 
Institute for Natural Resources in Africa ( I N R A ) located in Yamoussoukro 
(Côte d'Ivoire) is yet to take off. 
Nigeria plays host to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
( U T A ) with a focus on improving varieties of African food crops as 
distinct from cash crops. African scientists like Bede Okigbo have been 
prominent on its staff and the Institute has had significant success, for 
example in developing disease-resistant cassava varieties.18 Cheikh Anta 
Diop's radiocarbon laboratory at I F A N in Dakar included national, pan-
African as well as intercontinental scopes at different times. T h e laboratory 
came into being in 1966, committed to the study of low-energy radio-
activity and carbon-14 dating.19 
In the 1970s, die O A U , U N E S C O and the E C A have jointly also been 
paying some attention to the development of science and technology in 
Africa. T h e First Conference of Ministers of African M e m b e r States 
responsible for the application of science and technology to development 
was held in Dakar (Senegal) in January 1974; this conference was organized 
by U N E S C O in association with the O A U and the U N Economic 
Commission for Africa, and resulted in the adoption of recommendations 
for policies on science and technology. 
A regional meeting for Africa was held in Cairo (Egypt) in 1978, in 
16. See I. Van Sertima, 1989, p. n . 
17. In June 1986 the African Academy of Sciences co-sponsored a unique international 
event in Nairobi - the first conference of the Network of African Scientific Organizations -
which signalled new areas of co-operation among scholars and scientists of both Africa 
and the rest of the world. 
18. A summary of the disease-resistant cassava varieties is given in World Bank, 1989b, 
pp. 95-6. 
19. See I. Van Sertima, 1989. 
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preparation for the U N Conference on Science and Technology for 
Development ( U N C S T D ) , which took place in Vienna (Austria) in August 
1979. Its main aim was to find ways and means of bridging the economic 
gulf between the Third World and the industrialized countries. This 
matter - which was broached, but dealt with only superficially in Vienna -
was to be examined in more detail at a series of specific conferences held 
in each of the regions concerned. 
At the sixteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the O A U , held in Monrovia (Liberia) in July 1979, 
the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment was adopted, in which the 
heads of state and government of the O A U expressed their will to put 
science and technology in the service of development by reinforcing the 
autonomous capacity of their countries in this field. T h e Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the O A U , Second Extraordinary 
Session, held in Lagos (Nigeria) on 28-29 April 1980 also adopted the 
Lagos Plan of Action. Chapter V of the plan in particular is devoted to 
science and technology and calls attention to the role of science and 
technology in integrated rural development. 
A symposium on African science and culture as the bases of develop-
ment was organized by the O A U in co-operation with U N E S C O in 
Libreville (Gabon) from 23 to 27 January 1981; one resolution adopted 
at this symposium called upon the O A U to organize a meeting of scientists 
in Africa. Four years later, the twenty-first ordinary session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O A U , held in Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia) on 18-20 July 1985 adopted Africa's Priority Programme 
for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990. Paragraph 34 of the programme 
states: 'Experience indicates that no country has attained any break-
through in its economic development without the development of a 
m i n i m u m science and technology base'. At this same session, the heads 
of state and government of the O A U adopted resolution A H G . R e s . 146 
(XXI) calling on U N E S C O to draw up a Programme of Assistance to 
Africa in the fields of scientific research and research/development, aimed 
primarily at developing the scientific and technical potential of African 
countries in the fields of geology, microbiology, agriculture, food, health, 
surface and underground waters. 
Finally, the Second Conference of Ministers Responsible for the 
Application of Science and Technology to Development in Africa (Arusha, 
United Republic of Tanzania, 6-15 July, 1987) adopted a special Pro-
gramme of Assistance to Africa in the Fields of Scientific and Tech-
nological Research and of Research and Development. T h e highly-realistic 
Special Programme sets out an objective analysis of the economic, social 
and cultural situation in Africa. Reference is first made here to the main 
obstacles, including those resulting from mental attitudes and education, 
which inhibit or handicap efforts to bring about economic and social 
development. T h e programme goes on to indicate the general conditions 
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for scientific development at national and regional levels, while also taking 
account of the environment which m a y or m a y not be propitious for 
scientific and technological research. Finally, research priorities are 
proposed, together with the procedures and strategies to be followed for 
the promotion of science and technology at three levels: national, sub-
regional and regional.20 
Inter-African agencies with non-governmental status, but still enjoying 
the support and encouragement of the O A U and the African states, have 
also proliferated in recent years. These include the Institut africain d'études 
prospectives ( I N A D E P ; the African Forecasting Institute), the Institute for 
Black Peoples (IBP) and the Pan-African Union for Science and Tech-
nology ( P U S T ) . 
I N A D E P was established in Kinshasa in 1989 in response to a request 
put forward by African scientists and senior officials at a major symposium 
held in Kinshasa (Zaire) in 1985 on the subject of Africa and its future. 
A Centre for Egyptological Studies ( C E G A D ) , dedicated to the m e m o r y 
of Cheikh Anta Diop, has been attached to this institute. 
T h e Institute for Black Peoples (IBP), was established in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) in 1990 with the aim of promoting the widest possible 
scientific knowledge of the black world. T h e Pan-African Union for 
Science and Technology ( P U S T ) was set up on 30 June 1987 with its 
headquarters in Brazzaville, Congo, and is the most important of them 
all. At its Second Congress, P U S T proposed a number of research sectors 
as being of priority interest for the development of Africa and the well-
being of its population. Particular emphasis was placed on: 
• traditional medicine and the study of medicinal plants; 
• agriculture and self-sufficiency in foodstuffs; 
• n e w and renewable energy sources; 
• rational use of mineral resources; 
• rational use of marine resources; 
• progress towards industrialization; 
• bio-technologies; 
• catastrophes and natural disasters; 
• peaceful applications of nuclear research (in agriculture, medicine 
and the economy). 
Wide-ranging and detailed studies were recommended in the following 
areas: scientific education, scientific and technological planning at the 
regional level in every country, ways and means of disseminating scientific 
knowledge in Africa (cf. Second Congress of African Scientists, Accra, 
Ghana P U S T , 1989). P U S T in association with the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science has also published the Directory of 
20. C A S T A F R I C A Special Programme of Assistance to Africa in the fields of Scientific 
and Technological Research and of Research and Development, 1987. 
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Scientific and Engineering Societies in Africa which gives an idea of the 
scale of the scientific and technological research m o v e m e n t in Africa. 
Perhaps the most global of all the major organizations committed to 
science in Africa is the United Nations Environmental Programme 
( U N E P ) , with its headquarters in Nairobi. It has been encouraging and 
promoting ecological and climatic research not just in Africa but through-
out the world. T w o of its most passionate crusades of the 1980s concerned 
the issues of global warming and the question of ozone depletion to which 
w e shall return later. 
Post-colonial Africa is trying to recover from the stultifying impact of 
colonial rule upon its capacity for scientific research and technological 
innovation. T h e pace of recovery has been slow - though by no means 
insignificant. S o m e outstanding individual scientists have emerged in 
practically every field, but in no field - and in no country outside South 
Africa and to a lesser extent Egypt - has a critical mass capable of self-
sustaining growth been realized. M a n y African scientists survive either 
because they work in foreign-assisted agencies or have links with research 
institutions abroad. S o m e achieve their best work in laboratories abroad 
on projects they do not control. Others get results that are not fed into 
industries because the industries are locked into technologies pre-
determined from abroad. African scientists work against all odds in terms 
of the shortage of funds, equipment, uncertain supply of water and 
electricity, computer facilities and other means of communicating with 
colleagues and against a background of chronic political instability. T h e y 
further exemplify the view that science is not developed by scientists 
alone but by society as a whole. T h u s , the most significant trend in 
science in Africa is the evolving science policy of African states and the 
growing network of research institutions which are capable of being 
developed to create the necessary critical mass. T h e centres which hold 
promise, however constrained, do include national universities, national 
research centers, pan-African organizations, pan-African professional 
associations and intercontinental research institutions and scholarly c o m -
munities. 
Africa's contribution to Europe's industrialization 
It has been pointed out already that it was in the colonial and post-
colonial period that Europe further widened the gap between her and 
Africa. T h e question to be considered n o w is h o w Africa has contributed 
to this development since independence. It is quite clear from the available 
evidence that Africa's impact on Western technological change in the 
second half of the twentieth century, as in previous centuries, has been 
greater and more profound than the impact of the West on indus-
trialization, science and technology in Africa. Indeed, the balance of 
indebtedness is in the reverse direction. 
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Western industry and technology still rely greatly on a wide range of 
strategic minerals from Africa. T h e great proportion of minerals extracted 
from Africa is for Western industry - very little is for Africa's o w n 
technological needs. T h e Third World generally produces a third of the 
key minerals of the world economy, but the developing countries use only 
one-twentieth of those minerals. Africa's share of consumption is small 
even by Third-World standards, but Africa's share of reserves and of 
production is impressive. 
In the period covered by this volume, Africa has sometimes had up to 
90 per cent of the world's cobalt reserves, the bulk of this being in Zaire. 
Africa has had at times over 80 per cent of the world's reserves of chrome, 
more than 50 per cent of the reserves of gold, nearly half of the planet's 
reserves of platinum and nearly all of the so-called 'non-communist' 
reserve of industrial diamonds. These are some of the strategic industrial 
minerals. 
T h e n there are the exchange minerals — of which the most important 
is gold, often relevant for funding research as well as trade. Most of the 
African reserves are in Southern Africa, but there was considerable gold 
in other parts of the continent as well. For parts of the period since 1935, 
gold has provided some of the support of the international monetary 
system. A disrupted gold market could from time to time endanger the 
world's system of exchange. 
Thirdly, there are Africa's fuel minerals - of high technological rel-
evance. T h e continent in this period has had u p to a third of the world's 
reserves of uranium. Africa's share of natural gas is expanding, especially 
in the North African countries. A n d of course Africa is well represented 
in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) by Nigeria, 
Algeria, Libya and Gabon. It should also be noted that Zaire is the chief 
source of the world's radium - located in the uranium ores of the 
Shinkolobwe—Kasolo area. 
Less clearly technological are Africa's gems and precious metals. T h e 
bulk of the world's gem diamonds still c o m e from Africa. Africa in this 
period since 1935 had up to 80 per cent of the world's tantalum. Africa's 
share of the world's silver is small, but Africa's precious stones are diverse, 
ranging from sapphires to topaz, from malachite to opals, from rubies to 
tanzanite. Sometimes this wealth has indeed not only catered for the 
consumption patterns of others but has also helped their productive 
capacity. 
Africa's metallic deposits also include substantial amounts of manganese, 
iron ore, copper, vanadium (a rare element to toughen steel), bauxite 
(the chief aluminium ore), lead and zinc. There is no doubt about 
the technological relevance of these. M a n y a Western factory in this 
period would have ground to a standstill without Africa's metallic 
inputs. 
T h e n there are Africa's non-metallic deposits. Large deposits of phos-
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phates stretch from Morocco to Senegal. Other phosphate deposits occur 
in the Great Lakes area. In Madagascar, Africa possesses the largest-
known accumulation of flake-graphite deposits in the world. A n d the 
People's Republic of the C o n g o has had potash deposits in this period 
which were regarded as a m o n g the largest in the world. 
There is no doubt that in the period since 1935 the biggest beneficiary 
of all this mineral wealth has been the West and its factories and 
laboratories. In the 1970s the United States was importing nearly half its 
manganese from Africa. A major reason w h y the West was bailing out 
M o b u t u Sese Seko so often in those years was the importance of Zaire's 
cobalt for Western technology and industry. It was said at the time that 
the West would go to war to keep Zaire within the Western orbit. Niger's 
uranium mining was designed and developed in the 1970s specifically for 
the French nuclear programme. Iron ore from Swaziland went directly 
into Nippon steel. 
In addition to being the main consumer of Africa's mineral wealth, the 
West was the main manager ofthat wealth. A few Western firms controlled 
the processing, manufacturing and marketing of Africa's resources. Anglo-
American, Debeers, Roan Selection Trust, the old Union Minière, were 
only a few of the names that shaped this phase of Africa's contribution 
to Western technological development. This was quite apart from the oil 
giants - Shell, British Petroleum (BP), Gulf, Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, 
Texaco and smaller independents. Even the smaller ones often had a 
capital value which was greater than the gross national product of the 
majority of African states. 
O f the two major areas of African production (agriculture and mining), 
mining was both the more capital-intensive and the more skill-intensive. 
It needed a lot of money to initiate and needed a lot of technological skill 
to operate and maintain. In the absence of an adequate Western transfer 
of technical and managerial skills to Africans, and against the background 
of Western trans-national corporations dominating the field, mining in 
Africa remained a preserve of Westerners even when African governments 
ostensibly put it under state ownership. Reliance on Western expertise 
and Western marketing often perpetuated the Eurocentric orientation of 
African mining. 
W h e n Africa's contribution to industrialism in the West was mainly 
through the export of labour (the slave trade), the Americas rather than 
Europe directly were the main importers of the slave labour. In this latest 
phase of mineral contribution to Western technology and industrialism 
since 1935, it was Europe that was the main importer. However, in both 
phases, the economic interconnection between European economies and 
those of the Americas made African resources fundamental to almost all 
sectors of the West's technological civilization. In the final analysis, 
Africa's contribution to science and technology in this period goes far 
beyond the work of individual African scientists. Discoveries and inven-
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tions are not m a d e by lone researchers out of a social vacuum. Africa's 
biggest contribution in this field in the period since 1935 has been through 
the impact of Africa's labour and resources upon the factories and 
laboratories of the world. African minerals were the aphrodisiac of Western 
technological potency. 
Isaac Newton was not a modest or humble m a n . In a self-deprecating 
m o m e n t he once conceded that he had seen as far as he had as a scientist 
because he had been 'standing on the shoulders of giants'. H e was 
acknowledging his debt to previous towering scientists. It is also true that 
every major achievement in the history of science and technology has 
been m a d e not simply by standing on the shoulders of previous scientific 
giants but more often by being carried on the backs of the less-advantaged 
classes. T h e pyramids were not simply the achievements of Egyptian 
engineering: they were also the triumph of Egyptian labour. Ferdinand 
de Lesseps used to be honoured with a statue on the bank of the Suez 
Canal as the innovator w h o promoted and sponsored the great waterway. 
T h e statue was angrily pulled d o w n after al-Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal C o m p a n y in 1956. T h e statue had honoured the single French 
planner w h o championed the canal and forgot the hundreds of thousands 
of Egyptians w h o built it, and literally perished in doing so. W h o was the 
true builder of the Suez Canal - de Lesseps; or Egyptian labour, toil and 
economic martyrdom? 
Great engineers m a y or m a y not have stood on the shoulders of 
previous engineering giants. W h a t is certain is that they have almost 
always been carried on the backs of some wider society. In the modern 
phase of Western science and technology, it was not just the backs of 
Western workers which sustained the West's technological lead. It was 
also the resources and labour of Africans and Asians under European 
domination. 
Bertrand Russell once said mat civilization was born out of the pursuit 
of luxury. T h e frontiers of Western science and technology have been 
pushed forward partly in pursuit of capitalist luxury. T h e people of Africa 
were among those w h o have financed Western science and technology for 
over three hundred years. Africans have subsidized Western science from 
the slave plantations of the N e w World to the mines of Kimberley. 
However, by 1958, it was Eastern Europe which launched the space 
age, with Sputnik. W a s space travel the ultimate luxury? Yuri Gagarin 
before long became the first m a n in space. T h e first black m a n to go into 
space had to wait until the United States caught up in the space-race. 
Africa was participating in the new age partly through its resources, partly 
through its black diaspora in the United States, partly through space 
observation centres like the one in Kenya, and increasingly through the 
small but historically-significant body of African astronomers. Civilization 
was seeking a new frontier of creative luxury - and Africa was part of 
the effort. 
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Between global warming and nuclear winter 
But simultaneously with the world's increasing fascination with other 
planets was a n e w global anxiety about the safety of Planet Earth itself. 
This anxiety has reached n e w levels precisely in the period since 1935. 
Originally African culture was - in its values - far more protective of the 
environment than Western science had increasingly become. At least for 
a while Western technology was 'bad news' for Planet Earth. T h e reckless 
destruction of vegetation, the pollution of lakes and rivers with acid rain 
and other hazards, the slow poisoning of the atmosphere - were all ways 
in which Western technology had declared war on the h u m a n habitat. 
Africa, as well as the rest of the world, was endangered. 
T o make matters worse, Africa's more environmentalist values were 
under attack. Traditional African culture had started from the premise 
that the whole universe, and not merely ' m a n ' , had been created in the 
image of G o d . A n d so m a n y African societies m a d e some trees sacred, 
some hills holy, some animals totemic siblings, some forests the abode of 
ancestors. African cultures m a d e no sharp distinction between the h u m a n 
race and other species. While some monkeys were sacred, some humans 
were evil. 
Such philosophies were inherently protective of the environment -
sharing sacredness with it. But m a n y colonized Africans permitted their 
values to be prostituted by the n e w commercialization and consumerism 
which came with Western capitalism and colonialism. Hence the African 
environment suffered both from the activities of outsiders and from the 
greed of those w h o might deservedly be called ecological traitors. Par-
ticularly poignant were the depletion of Africa's rain forests and the 
endangering of m a n y African species of animals. Reckless Western tech-
nology and consumerism sometimes triumphed over African environ-
mentalist values — and the h u m a n race was increasingly the poorer for it. 
Deforestation is still contributing to the warming up of the climate. W h e n 
combined with carbon-dioxide and other 'greenhouse gases', the climate 
of the world as w e know it is increasingly at risk. 
A s a partial redress, the United Nations decided to base its global 
Environmental Programme ( U N E P ) in Africa (Nairobi) - the first United 
Nations specialized agency to have its headquarters in the Third World. 
Africa was struggling to recover its moral leadership in the protection of 
Planet Earth against the dangers of the n e w technology and the insen-
sitivities of the industrial age. After initial neglect, U N E P by the late 
1980s was beginning to be taken more seriously. While other U N agencies 
were tightening their belts, U N E P was expecting its budget to be doubled. 
W h e n , in M a r c h 1989, the world began to confront more firmly the 
threat to the ozone layer and n e w commitments were called for, Africa's 
participation at the London conference was led by Daniel Arap M o i , the 
president of Kenya himself. It was a fitting role for the head of state of 
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the host country to the U N E P . T h e 1989 London meeting was also 
addressed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. A follow-up meeting 
in Helsinki in M a y 1989 on the ozone layer m a d e further progress 
in seeking to phase out the dangerous anti-ozone chemicals (chloro-
fluorocarbons - C F C s ) by the end of the twentieth century. T h e head of 
U N E P , Mustafa Tolba, was one of the organizational leaders at Helsinki. 
H e applauded the progress which had been m a d e to protect the ozone 
layer since the earlier meetings on the subject in Montreal and London. 
U N E P planned more meetings on the defence of the ozone layer in the 
1990s. 
It is one of the ironies of imperial history that the dangers of artificial 
refrigeration have at last caught up with the h u m a n race in relation to 
the ozone layer. N o w that Africa is learning this n e w technology at h o m e , 
and countries like Algeria are manufacturing their o w n refrigerators, the 
urgent consequences for the ozone layer have become more manifest. 
T h e chloro-fluorocarbon gases (CFCs) emitted by refrigeration and air-
conditioning are a m o n g the most hazardous to the ozone layer. Africa 
and the rest of the Third World are being called upon to unlearn these 
n e w skills - immediately after acquiring them. T h e techniques of creating 
artificial winter conditions by refrigeration in precisely those countries 
without a natural winter would n o w expose the h u m a n species to more 
sunlight and ultra-violet rays than is safe for the h u m a n skin. 
Other technologies newly learnt by Africa and other developing regions 
have also been contributing to the rising levels of gases like carbon 
monoxide. Those levels were already made dangerous by the factories 
and consumer patterns of the industrialized world. Those richer countries 
of the world can n o w switch technologies even at this late hour and still 
help to save the climate of this planet. T h e developing countries will find 
it harder and doubly expensive to have to unlearn those new technologies -
unless global funds are made available to ease the transition. Soon after 
the conference in Helsinki on the ozone layer in M a y 1989, U N E P 
sponsored a meeting in Nairobi on the greenhouse effect. Problems of 
funding and the costs of de-industrialization loomed large. W h a t was at 
stake ultimately was something which endangered all species — the 
endangered climate of Planet Earth. T h e future of winter on earth was 
indeed on the line. 
However, there is another danger facing Planet Earth whose conse-
quences could be almost exactly the opposite of the demise of winter. 
This is the danger of there being nothing else but winter - the devastating 
risk of nuclear winter. T h e h u m a n race has entered the nuclear age in this 
period since 1935. T h e implications of this stage of science and technology 
have still not been fully understood. However, by the 1980s the horrendous 
risk of plunging the world into an endless winter had at last been grasped 
in large sections of the scientific community world-wide. Nuclear war 
could mean not the end of winter but its ultimate triumph. Such a war 
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could keep out the sun from h u m a n habitation rather than increase its 
presence. A n e w dark age could descend upon Planet Earth - but in the 
most literal sense of the term 'dark': even the white m a n would have 
stopped calling Africa 'the dark continent'. T h e world itself would be 
one large, ominous dark mass of water, territory and endless fog. 
In i960 K w a m e N k r u m a h sensed the danger of this n e w science, but 
was ambivalent about h o w Africa should respond to it. Other chapters 
show h o w N k r u m a h was decidedly outraged by France's use of the Sahara 
desert for nuclear tests. Ghana encouraged and helped organize an 
international march of protest against the Sahara tests - although the 
protestors' movement across borders was blocked. N k r u m a h froze French 
assets in Ghana. 
But K w a m e N k r u m a h lived at a time w h e n it was still believed that a 
distinction could realistically be m a d e between 'safe' nuclear knowledge 
for peaceful purposes and 'dangerous' nuclear technology for war.21 
Working on this assumption, N k r u m a h inaugurated a nuclear research 
programme in his o w n country. H e declared that Africa had to enter the 
nuclear age and learn its n e w science and technology. H e also asserted 
that the socialist option in Africa had to be firmly married to the scientific 
spirit. T o N k r u m a h , socialism was one philosophy which had to be 
simultaneously a science. In Nkrumah's words: 'Socialism without science 
is void'.22 
Ghana's attempted entry into the atomic age came after Zaire's. T h e 
Belgians had established a nuclear research reactor in the late 1950s in 
what was then the Congo. W h e n Zaire became independent the research 
continued — and the scientific personnel was increasingly Africanized. In 
spite of all the vicissitudes that wider Zairean society has gone through 
in the last 30 years, nuclear research still continues in Kinshasa. 
President Shehu Shagari in Nigeria (1979—83) also encouraged his o w n 
country to start pursuing the nuclear option. Unlike Zaire and G h a n a , 
Shagari's regime defended the nuclear option partly for military reasons. 
According to Shagari, there was still a link between racism and the nuclear 
threat. In Nkrumah's day, the nuclear threat was in the north (in the 
Sahara) while the racist threat was in the south (in South Africa). But 
by President Shagari's time, both threats were n o w perceived in the south. 
Apartheid had acquired a nuclear capability. Shagari saw Nigeria's pursuit 
of nuclear technology partly as a response to the nuclearization of South 
Africa from the 1970s onwards. 
A n d yet as the century comes to a close the chances are that the first 
black nuclear country could well be black-ruled South Africa. W h e n the 
Republic is finally liberated, m u c h of the industrial infrastructure will 
probably remain. It is more than possible that enough of the nuclear 
21. K . Nkrumah, 1961, p. 213. 
22. See Ghana Today, vol. 8, no. 21, 1964, p.i. 
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reactors will also remain, ready to resume work after the war of liberation. 
M u c h of the white population m a y also remain, or after a temporary 
departure return to live in that beautiful land. 
Perhaps the very fact that the nuclear club acquires a black m e m b e r 
early in the twenty-first century m a y cause enough consternation in the 
northern hemisphere to motivate all Northerners to search more effectively 
for truly universal nuclear disarmament. M a n y Westerners believe that 
nuclear weapons are not for Africans and children under 16. Perhaps this 
particular form of racist consternation could be put to good use w h e n 
black-ruled South Africa joins the nuclear club. A frightened humanity 
could at last be genuinely converted to global nuclear disarmament, and 
the threat of the nuclear winter could at last be truly averted. 
The social and human sciences 
A s for the impact of Africa on the social and h u m a n sciences, this has 
taken two main forms. O n e kind of impact does lie in the uniqueness of 
the African continent itself, and the attraction it has held for scholars 
and scientists from all over the world. T h e other kind of African 
impact has c o m e from the contributions of African researchers and social 
scientists, pushing forward the frontiers of both knowledge and theory. 
T h e scientific attractiveness of Africa included the fascination of its 
cultures for social and cultural anthropologists, the mysteries of its fossils 
for archaeologists and palaeontologists, and the challenges of the oral 
tradition for historians. B y studying Africa, the world has learnt about 
itself - and the h u m a n species has learnt about its o w n nature and its 
o w n origins. 
But it is not merely Africa as an object of study which has pushed 
forward the frontiers of the social and h u m a n sciences. It has also been 
Africans themselves as scientists and researchers. Both forms of African 
impact on the corpus of h u m a n knowledge have been particularly extensive 
in die period since 1935. 
In a sense the social and h u m a n sciences lie somewhere between the 
physical sciences on the one side and philosophy on the other. M u c h of 
the social theorizing which is going on a m o n g sociologists, economists, 
political scientists and others provides a bridge between the concerns of 
the natural scientists and the preoccupations of philosophers. This chapter 
addresses the social sciences partly in terms of that role as a bridge 
between science and philosophy. 
Africa has provided the basic ground for some of the major theorizing 
on economic growth in less industrialized societies in the twentieth 
century. T h e African diaspora has been particularly visible in liberal 
economic theory - with special reference to Sir Arthur Lewis from St 
Lucia, in the British West Indies, w h o w o n the Nobel Prize for economic 
science in 1979 (shared with Theodore W . Shultz, an American). Lewis's 
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achievement was in studies on economic development - with special 
reference to his theory linking North-South terms of trade with c o m -
parative levels of labour productivity in industrialized and less indus-
trialized countries. 
William Arthur Lewis served as adviser to governments both in Africa 
and the Caribbean, including K w a m e Nkrumah's government in Ghana. 
Lewis's most influential books were The Theory of Economic Growth 
(I955)> Development Planning (1966) and Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-
1913 (1978). William Arthur Lewis was knighted in 1963. 
In radical economic theory, Samir A m i n of Egypt led the way in the 
1970s, exploring the nature of unequal economic exchange in a world in 
which capitalism had become global. Samir Amin's work was often a 
remarkable fusion of theoretical refinement with hard empirical data from 
such countries as Côte d'Ivoire.23 
Nigeria's Adebayo Adedeji occupied a middle ground between liberal 
and radical economic theory. A s Executive Secretary of the United 
Nations' Economic Commission for Africa ( E G A ) , Adedeji in the 1970s 
and 1980s challenged the conventional economic wisdom of the World 
Bank and the "International Monetary F u n d ( IMF) on the causes of 
persistent underdevelopment in Africa. Adedeji and the E C A emphasized 
the global constraints on Africa's development; the World Bank and the 
I M F often focused on Africa's 'mismanagement' and 'errors in policy'. 
Jointly with the Organization of African Unity, the E C A provided the 
basic economic analysis for the historic Lagos Plan of Action, which was 
adopted in 1980 by African heads of state. T h e Lagos Plan provided an 
alternative explanatory paradigm to the Elliot Berg Report of the World 
Bank of 1979. Paradigms of economic development were in conflict once 
again.24 
In political science, Africa provided the challenges of nation-building, 
state-formation, political dependency, political development and political 
decay. International theories of all these issues in the post-colonial period 
have been deeply influenced by the ups and downs of African experience. 
One-party theories, civil-military relations, and philosophies of indigenous 
socialism have all been dramatically stimulated by African political realit-
ies. 
Observers have sometimes assumed that Africa's theorists of depen-
dency have simply followed the lead of Latin America's dependencia 
theorists of the 1970s. It is worth remembering that K w a m e N k r u m a h 
published his book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism before 
he was overthrown in 1966. A n d Ali A . Mazrui developed his ideas about 
'Neo-Dependency and Africa's Fragmentation' in his D.Phil, thesis for 
23. S. A m i n , 1974a, 1974b, 1976, 1977. 
24. A . Adedeji, 1976a, 1981, 1989; E C A , 1976, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Organization of 
African Unity, 1981; World Bank, 1989b, 1990; U N , 1990. 
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Oxford University in the 1960s and published them in his subsequent 
book, Towards a Pax Africana (1967)25 
Africa has been the pre-eminent laboratory of the study of languages. 
With one-tenth of the population of the world, Africa has about a quarter 
of its languages - apart from being the birthplace of h u m a n language 
itself. T h e range of languages in twentieth-century Africa has been from 
tonal languages like Yoruba to click languages like Xhosa, from Semitic 
languages like Amharic and Arabic to southern Bantu like Sindebele and 
Chichewa.26 
In the period since 1935, external scholars w h o have had the most 
influence on the classification of African languages have included 
M . Guthrie of Britain and J. H . Greenberg of the U S A . Their work has 
depended on whole 'armies' of African experts of African languages. 
Inevitably scholars like Guthrie and Greenberg have had to stand on the 
shoulders of African linguists themselves.27 
Estimates of the number of indigenous languages spoken in Africa have 
ranged from hundreds to thousands - partly depending upon where a 
dialect is supposed to end and another distinct language supposed to 
begin. 
Even though Africa has perhaps the largest number of languages per 
capita of any area in the world, it is possible to group these languages 
into language families. Linguists base their typologies either on word 
similarities (e.g. Greenberg 1966. . . ) or in historical relatedness (e.g. 
Guthrie 1948). T h e Greenberg typology is perhaps the most widely 
accepted.. ,28 
Once again, Africa's o w n uniqueness and complexity have continued 
to fascinate some of the best scholarly minds of the twentieth century -
both within Africa itself and abroad. T h e birthplace of h u m a n language 
itself continues to constitute a rich diversity of verbal wealth. 
A majority of Africans are probably multi-lingual. This makes the 
region also attractive for the study of socio-linguistics more generally. 
Africa is also a laboratory for the study of language policy and national 
integration. Scholars like Pathé Diagne of Senegal and M u h a m a d Hassan 
Abdulaziz of Kenya have been among the contributors to the unfolding 
scholarly discourse on these issues.29 
Social and cultural anthropology developed as a discipline partly under 
the stimulation of the study of African societies. Western anthropologists 
25. See K . Nkrumah, 1966; and A . A . Mazrui, 1967. 
26. Papua N e w Guinea is widely regarded as having the widest diversity of languages 
per square mile in the world - but most of those are languages with only a few hundred 
speakers each. 
27. J. H . Greenberg, 1966; M . Guthrie, 1948. 
28. D . G . Morrison with R . C . Mitchell and J. N . Paden, 1989, p. 46. 
29. See Chapter 18, above. 
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early in the century were often paternalistic towards the 'tribes' they were 
studying, but in the period since 1935 African scholars were beginning 
to correct Western condescension. J o m o Kenyatta's Facing Mount Kenya 
was published in 1938, and constituted an important milestone in the re-
Africanization of ethnology. O n African campuses the n a m e 'anthropology' 
has not yet recovered from its previous reputation as 'the science of 
studying primitive societies'. M a n y African universities prefer the term 
'sociology' to cover the study of both industrial and pre-industrial societies. 
But the frontiers of this entire area of social science have been extended 
by the challenges posed by African social realities. 
Africa's oral tradition also provoked the science of historiography into 
looking for ways of benefiting from the unwritten transmission of evidence. 
Perhaps no region of the world has done more to diversify historical 
methodology than Africa. Precisely because m a n y African cultures had 
previously been unwritten, their study demanded the scrutiny of alter-
native forms of documentation. Oral tradition, linguistic evidence, n e w 
archaeological techniques all reached higher levels of sophistication under 
Africa's challenge. 
Indeed, well before the period of this volume, Egyptology had become 
a distinct science in its o w n right. N o country in the world except Egypt 
has ever forced science to invent an entirely distinct discipline for the 
study of that country's past.30 
Earlier volumes of this General History of Africa have dealt with the 
African origins of the h u m a n species. But it was especially in the period 
since 1935 that palaeontology and palaeo-anthropology have had their 
most impressive achievements in East Africa. Research work since 1935 
in Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia and elsewhere has taken humankind m u c h 
further back towards understanding the species' origins than has ever 
been possible before. T h e n a m e of the Leakeys in Kenya has become a 
household word internationally. But behind that high-profile n a m e lies a 
whole army of palaeontologists, archaeologists and palaeo-anthropologists, 
handling a delicate range of evidence about the origins of the only species 
which studies its o w n past. 
T h e social study of other species has also gone further in Africa than 
in almost any other region in the world. Certainly the observation and 
study of gorillas, chimpanzees and baboons - nearest relatives to h u m a n s -
has been undertaken with exceptional sensitivity and with remarkable 
results in places like R w a n d a and Zaire. Gorillas and baboons have been 
studied as 'households' and 'societies'. T h e techniques used by scientists 
have sometimes c o m e close to being 'participant observation'. B y under-
30. T h e U N E S C O General History of Africa, vol. I, is devoted to paradigms and 
methodologies of African historiography. T h e International Scientific Committee of this 
U N E S C O Series includes a m o n g its members significant methodological innovators in 
the oral tradition, linguistic historiography and archaeology. 
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standing monkeys better, do w e learn more about h u m a n beings? Once 
again Africa has provided the material for teaching the h u m a n race about 
itself. Such Western w o m e n scholars as Jane Goodall have provided 
impressive scientific partnership in the study of these wild relatives of 
Homo sapiens. 
T h e period since 1935 has also witnessed n e w challenges to European 
theories about w h o crossed the Atlantic first. W a s it Christopher Col-
u m b u s - or were there African navigators before him? 
T h e challenge to the Columbus paradigm has come from both Africa 
and the African diaspora. Ivan Van Sertima had led the latest diaspora 
challenge to the Columbus paradigm. Born in Guyana, South America, 
Van Sertima m a d e his scholarly impact in the United States. His 1977 
book, They Came Before Columbus: The African Presence in Ancient America, 
went into more than ten reprints. Van Sertima's pre-Columbian navigators 
were conceived heavily though not exclusively in terms of the Nile valley 
and the Mediterranean. His evidence was varied, beginning with the 
'Africoid' pre-Christ stone sculptures found in Mexico with striking 
'Negro' features.31 
T h e African continent's direct challenge to the Columbus paradigm in 
this period (as distinct from the diaspora challenge) places the pre-
Columbian African navigators more firmly from West Africa rather than 
from the Nile valley and the Mediterranean. T h e Senegalese scholar 
Pathé Diagne initiated a project in the 1980s to research jointly with 
Cornell University the role of Bakari II in crossing the Atlantic, ostensibly 
before the year 1312. (Columbus's achievement across the Atlantic is 
normally dated as having been in 1492.) W a s the project romance or 
history? Pathé Diagne's partnership with Cornell had ups and downs, but 
they each remained separately committed to research into whether Africans 
were pioneers in trans-Atlantic crossing. Pathé Diagne's thesis was that 
the expeditions of M a n s a Bakari II (an African Musl im) and Christopher 
Columbus were inter-related. 
Both Bakary II and Christopher Columbus learned from the African 
nayigators of Senegambia and the Gulf of Guinea about (1) trans-
oceanic traffic and trade (2) the existence of a corridor fed by North 
Equatorial winds and (3) the existence of a current that was easy to 
navigate during the s u m m e r and fall and that led to the rich M a y a , 
Olmeque, Aztec and Inca Kingdoms and civilizations. Neither Bakary 
II nor Christopher Columbus were ready to share this geopolitical 
secret with [rivals] . . . (Project Outline, Cornell, 1990). 
But w e must not over-emphasize the distinction between diaspora pre-
Columbian theories, focusing on navigators from the Nile valley, and 
31. Consult I. Van Sertima, 1984b, which includes some photographs of the 'Africoid' 
sculptures. See also I. V a n Sertima, 1977. 
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African pre-Columbian theories, focusing on West African navigators. In 
1962 the official organ of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People ( N A A C P ) in the United States published an article by 
Harold G . Lawrence entitled 'African Explorers of the N e w World'. In 
the article, Lawrence referred to Abubakari II of Mali as having employed 
Arab navigators and equipped them with a whole armada of ships and 
African sailors to venture westward. 
W e can n o w positively state that the Mandigoes of the Mali and 
Songay Empires, and possibly other Africans, crossed the Atlantic 
to carry on trade with the Western Hemisphere Indians and further 
succeeded in establishing colonies throughout the Americas. . . . 
Abubakari II (1305-1307) did not believe that it was impossible to 
conquer the limits of the neighbouring ocean.32 
Is this history or a case of African romantic gloriana? Is it the history 
of African navigation before Columbus; or is it part of the history of 
black nationalism in the twentieth century? T h e case for a pre-Columbian 
African crossing of the Atlantic is far from complete, and m a y never be 
fully proven. But alternative explanations of the pre-Christ Negroid stone 
heads in Mexico have not been convincingly forthcoming either. T h e 
historical period since 1935 has witnessed the beginnings of a major 
Afrocentric and Islamic challenge to the Columbus paradigm of 'dis-
covery'. A n d the challenge has been coming from both African and 
diaspora historians.33 
While history and the social sciences have often grappled with the origins 
of things, philosophy and religion have sometimes confronted the distinction 
between the finite and the infinite, between what has an end and what is 
endless, between what has a beginning and what m a y not. It is to these 
complexities of philosophy and doctrine that w e must n o w turn. 
Between origins and 'the end of time' 
W h a t impact have all these historical and scientific developments had on 
philosophy in this period of African history? Whether Columbus or Bakari 
'discovered' a 'new world', h o w has the prospect of the end of the world 
influenced philosophical thought in Africa - with or without a nuclear 
winter? 
O n the whole, the idea of 'the end of the world' has been m u c h more 
important in Musl im Africa than outside it. Islam has a concept of 
Qiyama, the D a y of Universal Death preceding the D a y of Judgement. 
32. H . G . Lawrence, 1962, pp. 2-4 . Lawrence was Chairman of the Research and 
Education Committee of the Detroit branch of the Association for the Study of Negro 
Life and History. 
33. See I. Van Sertima, 1984a, especially pp. 221-46; and I. Van Sertima, 1977. 
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Islam also has a concept of Akhir al-Zaman, meaning the end of time. 
In reality Christianity has analogues of these Islamic concepts, but for 
some reason these particular Christian equivalents have had far less of an 
impact on Africa than have their Islamic counterparts. O n e reason m a y 
be the greater degree of fatalism that Islam has sometimes generated in 
Africa - a distortion of the concept of Inschâ" Allah (if G o d wills). 
Mahdist movements in Africa have sometimes been accompanied by a 
notion of 'the end of time' - the Mahdt being a saviour not long before 
the D a y of Judgement. Islam in Nigeria and Sudan has had a particularly 
strong Mahdist tendency, but the idea of Akhir al-Zaman (the end of 
time) is m u c h more widespread than Mahdi sm in Muslim Africa. T h e 
self-destructiveness of the new Western science and technology has been 
used as evidence of a cataclysmic and inevitable d o o m . 
Indigenous African religion is more concerned with the beginning of 
time than with its end. Ancestry is more important than conclusion. 
Every African culture is inspired by two basic myths - the myth of origin 
and the myth of collective purpose. T h e myth of origin includes the 
beginning of society — an African Genesis. T h e myth of collective purpose 
gives the society its sense of uniqueness and its mission in history. 
African myths of origin often equate the beginnings of a particular 
society (the Baganda, for example) with the origins of the h u m a n species 
as a whole. For the secular observer, it could be argued that the Jews did 
the same when they turned the first mythological Jews (Adam and Eve) 
into the first h u m a n beings. But the Jews covered themselves by later 
having Abraham as the father of the Jewish nation. 
W h a t is clear is that the Semitic myth of origin (Genesis according to 
the Bible and the Kur'an) had increasingly challenged indigenous African 
myths of ancestry like that of Kintu as the first M u g a n d a or M u m b i as 
the first Kikuyu. Originally the first M u g a n d a or the first Kikuyu were 
also the first humans. But A d a m and Eve have cut African originals d o w n 
to size just at the time when Western science has begun to concede that 
Africa was where the h u m a n species scientifically began after all. African 
myths of origin are being discredited by Western religion just at the time 
when Western science is demonstrating that the Garden of Eden must 
have been in Africa after all. W h a t the myth of Lucifer is demolishing, 
the science of Leakey is re-constructing. Kintu and M u m b i are dead; 
long live Kintu and M u m b i ! Religion and science are once again in a 
dialectical relationship in Africa.34 
African religious myths sometimes even suggest that G o d has a begin-
ning - but not an end. This is not unlike some scientific theories about 
the origins of the universe. T h e 'Big Bang' theory of the origins of the 
universe does postulate a momentous start — but not necessarily the end 
34. See V . Hamilton, 1988, on comparative myths of origin; the book has illustrations 
which cover non-African as well as African myths. 
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of the universe. W h a t is initiated does not necessarily terminate; what is 
born need not die. 
In his book The Mind of Africa, the Ghanaian philosopher, William E . 
Abraham, addressed the concepts of 'eternity' and 'infinity' in comparable 
terms. Could something be 'eternal' in the sense of having no terminal 
m o m e n t and yet still have a specific point of commencement? W a s G o d 
such a concept of infinity and eternity - self-created but never-ending? 
W a s the Akan concept of G o d so envisioned?35 
T h e Christian concept of the birth of Jesus is more ambivalent. Jesus 
was born. But could he ever die even during those three momentous days 
at Easter? If he died and was resurrected, is the death of the son of G o d 
ever possible again? 
M a n y myths of ethnic origin in Africa include the origins of death 
itself. A myth from Sierra Leone relates that death once lived with G o d , 
and kept on pleading to G o d to let it go. But G o d had promised M a n 
that although death had been allowed to come into the world, M a n would 
not die. There were two things which G o d had to reconcile: liberating 
death and letting it go where it pleased, on the one side, and saving M a n , 
on the other. G o d decided to send M a n n e w skins which would protect 
him from the elements and save him from death. But the messenger with 
the skins was waylaid by a snake w h o stole the skins. W a s the snake, in 
fact, death in disguise? M a n discovered too late that the skins of protection 
against death had been stolen in transit. 
O f course, such a story was articulated well before Sierra Leoneans 
knew anything about the Earth's ozone layer. But the new ecological 
anxiety in the scientific world is that death m a y be coming to M a n 
through damage to the h u m a n skin. Ultra-violet rays of the sun coming 
through the depleted ozone layer are already playing havoc with marine 
creatures in Antarctica and the southern seas. T h e whale is facing a n e w 
danger from these rays. A n international conference in Tasmania, A u s -
tralia, held in m i d - M a y 1989, heard reports about the possible aggravation 
of such h u m a n diseases as herpes and A I D S as a result of these ultra-
violet rays penetrating the new ozone hole. 
Sierra Leoneans m a y be justified in regarding their o w n myth of origin 
as prophetic. M a n will n o w need extra layers of skin which G o d had 
intended him to have as protection against death. M a n still blames the 
snake w h o waylaid the messenger with the skins: 
F r o m that day onwards, M a n has always borne a grudge against the 
Snake, and has always tried to kill him whenever he sees him. T h e 
Snake, for his part, has always avoided M a n and has always lived 
alone. A n d because he still has the skins that G o d provided, he can 
always shed his o w n skin.36 
35. For one interpretation of Akan philosohpy, see W . E . Abraham, 1962. 
36. See M . Carey, 1970, pp. 18-19. 
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This Sierra Leonean myth echoes the Semitic myth of the fall of A d a m 
through the special use of a snake or serpent. Satan, like death in the 
African myth, had once lived with G o d and then wanted to break out 
into liberty. W h a t the Sierra Leonean m y t h had done was to fuse the 
concept of Satan with the concept of death into a single being. In the 
biblical Genesis, on the other hand, Satan was instrumental in creating 
death for h u m a n kind. 
But the biblical Genesis also called upon M a n to 'fill the good earth 
and subdue it'. M a n was m a d e master of the world and all its creatures. 
Modern science and technology did enable m a n to 'subdue' the earth and 
all its creatures. Therefore, m a n can no longer blame snakes and serpents 
for his misfortunes. A s God' s Vizier, M a n is n o w almost Master of the 
Universe. But is m a n become master of himself as yet? O r is the 'end of 
time' drawing near? 
At m y back I always hear 
Time's winged chariot hurrying near 
A n d yonder before us lie 
Deserts of vast eternity.37 
T h e themes of eternity and the infinite have been part of African 
philosophy almost from 'the beginning of time' - and have continued 
into the post-colonial period. T w o African writers exchanged poetic 
exclamations in a television programme in 1986: 
A : You are not a country, Africa, 
You are a concept! . . . 
B : You are not a country, Africa, 
You are a glimpse of the Infinite!38 
But while such 'eternal' themes in African philosophy and literature 
are, by definition, not specific to any particular period of history, the 
years since 1935 have exhibited their o w n special characteristics. Inevitably 
there has been both continuity and change in Africa's philosophical 
experience. A n d both science and culture have cast their shadow on the 
African philosophical mind at work. Let us n o w look more particularly 
at the special philosophical tendencies of these years. 
Three currents of philosophy 
African philosophy since 1935 can be grouped under different categories 
or currents. For this chapter, the most promising classifications m a y be 
cultural, ideological, and critical. Each of these schools of philosophy has 
37. A . Marvell, 1981. 
38. D . A . Nicol and A . A . Mazrui, 1986. 
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distinct characteristics - though it is worth bearing in mind that these 
classifications are for analytical convenience only and do allow for a good 
deal of overlap. 
T h e cultural school of philosophy is rooted primarily in indigenous 
traditions. It is what is sometimes called 'ethno-philosophy', but w e prefer 
the term 'cultural' mainly because it is more accurate in this instance. 
T h e fact that m u c h of indigenous philosophy is ethnic-specific (such as 
the philosophy of the Lugbara) is only one attribute of that body of 
thought. Cultural philosophy also tends by and large to be collectivist, 
and transmitted mainly through the oral tradition. But the collectivism 
should not be exaggerated. There were individual innovators also. This 
corpus of African thought is sociological - encompassing the way of life 
of a people, the rules governing it, and the cumulative wisdom of 
the ancestors across generations, but sometimes guided by exceptional 
individuals. 
If in the West philosophy begins with thought and empirical science 
begins with touch, cultural philosophy in Africa makes no sharp distinction 
between thought and touch. A s w e mentioned earlier, the completed 
syllogism of one aspect of African cultural philosophy is as follows: 
We feel 
Therefore w e think, 
Therefore w e arel 
In time-scale the cultural current of philosophy in Africa includes pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases. It is, almost by definition, the 
oldest and most durable of Africa's philosophical traditions. 
But for our purposes in this chapter w e distinguish between culture 
and ideology. Here w e use the narrow sense of ideology as a policy-
oriented body of ideas, mainly designed to govern political action and 
define political goals. O f course, culture does include ideology - and the 
cultural current of philosophy in our sense subsumes political goals and 
action. But culture is a whole way of life and not merely the arena of 
political relations. T h e cultural school of African philosophy includes 
such concerns as relations between m a n and nature, between the living 
and the dead, between husband and wife, as well as between rulers and 
subjects in those African societies which did traditionally have distinct 
rulers. 
T h e ideological current of African thought is even m o r e narrowly 
political. It tends to be mainly colonial and post-colonial — and ranges 
from K w a m e Nkrumah's Consciencism to Franz Fanon's The Wretched of 
the Earth. There was very little of this kind of philosophizing in the pre-
colonial period. Ideological thought in this particular sense is primarily a 
child of colonialism and its aftermath. 
Cultural philosophy is, in the first instance, conceived in indigenous 
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languages. Ideological philosophy in black Africa is disproportionately in 
European languages. 
Cultural philosophy is, as w e indicated, mainly collectivist and c u m u -
lative. T h e tradition is not usually in terms of great individual thinkers. 
There are very few African Platos, African Lockes and Rousseaus, or 
African Hegels. T h e current of cultural philosophy is normally the flow 
of collective wisdom, cumulative across generations. 
Ideological philosophy in colonial and post-colonial Africa raises the 
individual afresh as the fountain of ideas. African philosophy begins to 
be studied in terms of the ideas of individuals like Amilcar Cabrai and 
G a m ä l c A b d al-Nasser rather than the philosophies of cultural units like 
the Zulu or the Berbers. 
If cultural philosophy is ethnic-specific in the sense w e mentioned (for 
example, Yoruba philosophy), ideological philosophy tends to be Africa-
specific, in the sense of generalizing about Africa as a whole or the black 
experience world-wide. In other words, while the fountain of ideological 
philosophy is narrower than the fountain of cultural philosophy (the 
individual thinker instead of collective wisdom), the subject-matter of 
ideological philosophy is often wider (being concerned with Africa as a 
whole or black people generally rather than a particular ethnic group). 
A particular thinker like Agostinho Neto was a narrower fountain of 
ideas than the O v a m b o people as a source of collective cultural wisdom. 
But Neto was concerned about the black genius in international capitalist 
conditions - and k n e w more about Africa and the world than the ancestors 
of the O v a m b o did. 
T h e ultimate value of cultural philosophy is probably identity. All the 
other elements reinforce the self-awareness and identity of, say, the Wolof 
as a people. O n the other hand, the ultimate value of ideological philosophy 
has tended to be liberation. S o m e thinkers have linked liberation to pan-
Africanism, others to black genius. O f course, other values also come into 
play. But because of the nature of the colonial impact in this particular 
period of African history, the political focus of so m u c h of Africa's 
ideological preoccupation has centred on liberation. 
Although w e must not confuse this with populism, cultural philosophy 
to some scholars is basically a philosophy of the masses. It consists of 
ideas which are essentially often intelligible to ordinary people. T h e 
philosophy is expressed in languages which are meaningful to the average 
citizen - indigenous African languages. Although there are exceptions, 
like the thought of Ogotommeli of the D o g o n , cultural philosophy is 
basically about a familiar way of life, intellectually accessible to the m a n 
or w o m a n in the village. 
O n the other hand, ideological philosophy in our sense is basically 
elitist, even w h e n it seeks to identify with the masses. Amilcar Cabrai 
identified with the most ordinary of Africans, and Fanon elevated even 
the lumpen proletariat to a level of dignity and respectability unimagined 
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by the more sceptical Karl M a r x . A n d yet neither M a r x nor Fanon -
nor, indeed, Cabrai - is intelligible to the ordinary villager in Burkina 
Faso or a m o n g the Karimojong of Uganda. T h e ideas of M a r x and Fanon 
constitute a conversation a m o n g the urbanized and Westernized African 
élite. 
A central problem with Africa's ideological thought continues to be 
the language in which it is expressed. While empirical science elsewhere 
begins with the five senses (touch, sight, smell, hearing and feeling), 
linguistic philosophy is often concerned with the five tenses (was, is, will 
be, ought and eternal). 
In Africa, more important than the philosophy of language is the 
language of philosophy. Colonial and post-colonial ideologies are dis-
proportionately in European languages. T h e formal study of philosophy 
at African universities is done in foreign imperial languages - English, 
French, Portuguese, and so on. Most of the towering modern African 
thinkers - from Edward Blyden to P. J. Hountondji have conducted their 
primary discourse in European languages. T h e main exceptions are in 
Arabic-speaking Africa. 
A s for those African thinkers inspired by external ideologies, it is a 
socio-linguistic impossibility for an African to be a sophisticated Marxist 
without being substantially Westernized. This is because access to Marxist 
literature is still overwhelmingly in European languages. A n African learns 
his or her first European language not simply as a skill but in a massive 
educational process of acculturation. B y the time the African is competent 
enough in a European language to understand Marxist literature, that 
African is substantially Westernized. 
It is this bondage of language which had m a d e so m u c h of ideological 
philosophy in Africa hopelessly elitist even w h e n it is doctrinally opposed 
to elitism. M u c h of the philosophy of people like Eduardo Mondlane was 
committed to liberation and morally concerned about ordinary African 
people. But most of such ideological philosophy had inadvertently erected 
for itself a linguistic barrier to keep the ordinary people out. It is not an 
iron curtain. It is a curtain of the impenetrable verb. T h e people cannot 
understand the language - not because it is a technical idiom but because 
it is a foreign tongue. That is one of the most fundamental of the 
differences between the cultural current of African philosophy (transmitted 
orally in indigenous languages) and the ideological current (transmitted in 
writing, using European languages). 
Arab Africa has been less dependent on European languages. Arabic 
has filled the gap. Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution 
was originally in Arabic. O n the other hand, in Arab Africa both cultural 
and ideological philosophy have often been inseparable from religion. 
Issues of mosque and magistrate, church and state, have come to the fore. 
T h e tension between secularism and religious thought was sometimes at 
its sharpest in Egypt. It was in 1928 that Hassan al-Bannä established 
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the Muslim Brotherhood - with considerable consequences for the entire 
period of this volume. 
In its sixty years, the Brotherhood has managed to politicise Islam 
as no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt. 
. . . In its most violent phase (1945-65) the Brotherhood was 
implicated in assassinations of its political opponents in both royal 
and revolutionary Egypt.39 
Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser broke the power of the Brotherhood in Egypt for 
a while. Later on internal divisions weakened it in the concluding years 
of the twentieth century. But the Muslim Brotherhood has remained one 
of the most activist schools of Islamic ideology throughout m u c h of Arab 
Africa. Other streams of Islamic thought in Egypt have included Süfism 
and the established authority of the 'ulamâ' of Al-Azhar. 
Ideological philosophy in Morocco during this period included issues 
of whether or not there was a Muslim equivalent of the divine right of 
kings. Particularly dramatic was the famous faWâ (legal opinion) by 
Shavkh al-Islam Moulay al-Arbi 'Alaoui given in December 1963. H e 
ruled that the legitimacy of the monarch depended on whether he 
ascended to the throne through shurâ (consultation) and with the approval 
of the Umma (community of believers). T h e fatxpä was a direct challenge 
to the principle of hereditary succession and the credentials of King 
Hassan II of Morocco. Debates about the nature of royal legitimacy have 
continued ever since.40 
In Libya the monarch was overthrown in September 1969. W h e n 
M u a m m a r Kadhaffi launched his 'cultural revolution' in 1973, he 
attempted to abolish the distinction between ideology and culture. H e 
developed Libya's philosophy of 'The Third Universal Theory' consisting 
of Arabo-Islamic unity, Arabo-Islamic socialism and Libyan popular 
democracy. T h e Libyan opposition to Kadhaffi's cultural revolution 
included liberal and socialist Libyans, sections of the Sanusi Muslims, 
sections of Ikhwan and, for a while, a dynamic and charismatic Tripoline 
preacher, Shaykh al-Bishti, w h o later disappeared under ominous and 
mysterious circumstances. 
Tunisia took the debate about modernity and tradition in North African 
thought to new levels. In a way, Tunisia was continuing a controversy 
which was unleashed on modern Islam in an earlier generation by the 
Egyptian M u h a m m a d ' A b d u h and his mentor, Jamal al-Din al-Afghäni. 
A n d yet, ironically, Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba did not take his cue from 
'Abduh and Afghani. Bourguiba took his inspiration from Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Victor H u g o and Lamartine. Bourguiba's ambition was to 
recreate Tunisia in the image of the French revolution. B y seeking to 
39. S. E . Ibrahim, 1988, p. 640. See also E . Davis, 1987, pp. 145-68. 
40. J. Benomar, 1988, pp. 550-1. See also M . W . Suleiman, 1989, pp. 16-27. 
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reduce the role of Islam in Tunisian society, Bourguiba unleashed a 
considerable philosophical and literary upsurge on the competing claims 
of modernity and tradition, Westernism and Islam. O n c e again cultural 
and ideological philosophy converged in an African society.41 
T h e third school of African philosophy after cultural and ideological 
is the critical school. Like the ideological current, the critical school is 
also a colonial and post-colonial response. Both schools also use primarily 
European languages and have been profoundly influenced by Western 
intellectual traditions. 
But while the ideological school is self-consciously political, the critical 
school is more narrowly academic. While the ideological school is pre-
occupied with liberation, the critical school aspires to be morally agnostic 
or value-free. While the ideological school is often nationalist, the critical 
school aspires to be strictly rationalist. 
T h e critical school of African philosophy does have a concept of 
'liberation' - but what is to be liberated is philosophy itself rather than 
Africa. A rescue operation is ostensibly needed to emancipate philosophy 
in Africa from both ethnology (as in our concept of cultural philosophy) 
and ideology (as w e have defined it). 
T h e central thesis of the critical school is basically as follows: 
Philosophy only exists where there is a personal commitment by 
philosopher(s) to rational discourse, the only truth or value is that 
elaborated or revealed in the crucible of the debate between con-
sciences and confrontation with the Real. . . . [Philosophy must 
cease to be] the handmaiden of Religion or Politics and become a 
faithful but demanding collaborator with them.42 
T o some extent, the critical school aspires to bring philosophy back to 
the fold of the scientific spirit. T h e 'confrontation with the Real' is 
basically a beckoning to the measurements of rationalism. Paradoxically, 
critical philosophy is also an invitation to some degree of empiricism -
the criteria of touch in a special sense of realism. 
African critical philosophers in this sense have included F. Crahay, 
B . F. Eboussi, P. J. Hountondji, K . Anthony Appiah, M . T o w a and 
S. Adotevi. Their ambition is, in a sense, to m a k e African philosophy 
more scientific, m o r e disciplined, and more rigorous. T h e y have declared 
war against what Hountondji (in alliance with the structuralists) calls the 
'unthought'. 
A n d yet there is a whole school of thought in this period of African 
history which takes pride in what might be called 'the Unscience'. W e 
have already referred to A i m é Césaire's salute to: 
41. For an early evaluation, see C . H . Moore, 1965. See also M . Boulby, 1988, pp. 
590-93; and M . Madhi, 1990. 
42. E . P. Elungu, 1984, pp. 40-1. This chapter is indebted to Marcien T o w a and Malu 
wa Kalenga for bibliographical guidance. 
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. . . Those w h o have invented neither powder nor the compass 
Those w h o have tamed neither gas nor electricity 
Those w h o have explored neither the seas nor the skies . . ,43 
Western thought has a whole sub-field called the 'philosophy of science'. 
W h a t the African agenda had included is what might be called the 
philosophy of unscience. It is to this cluster of African philosophical 
values that w e must n o w turn. 
T h e philosophy of unscience 
W e have already mentioned h o w Europe's industrial revolution had 
pushed its science far ahead of its technology — and accelerated the 
pace of social and industrial change. With its spectacular technological 
successes, Europe then embarked on its mission of conquering the world. 
Europe's massive cultural arrogance affected the African personality 
and sometimes distorted the priorities of African philosophy. Westernized 
Africans especially suffered acute cultural schizophrenia. O n e school of 
African thought chose to emphasize that Africa before the arrival of the 
Europeans had its o w n complex civilizations of the kind that Europeans 
regarded as valid and important - civilizations which produced great 
kings, impressive empires and elaborate technological skills. This par-
ticular school of African thought looked to ancient Egypt as an African 
civilization, and stressed Egypt's contributions to the later miracle of 
ancient Greece. Cheikh Anta Diop's scholarly commitment to demonstrate 
that the civilization of ancient Egypt was not only African but black had 
produced an influential school of thought not only within Africa but also 
in the African diaspora in the Americas. 
W e m a y call this school of African philosophy romantic gloriana. It 
seeks to emphasize the glorious moments in Africa's history, defined in part 
by European criteria of impressive performance, including performance in 
creating material monuments . 
In contrast to the philosophy of romantic gloriana is what might be 
called romantic primitivism. This is what the philosophy of the unscience 
is all about. T h e emphasis here is not on achievements of grandeur, but 
on accomplishments of simplicity; not on Africa's historical m o n u -
mentalism, but on the virtues of the village; not on Africa's castle-
builders, but on Africa's cattle-herders. 
M y négritude is neither a tower nor a cathedral; 
It plunges into the deep red flesh of the soil.44 
43. A . Césaire, 1969. 
44. ibid. See also A . A . Mazrui, 1986, pp. 72-6. 
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A s Jean-Paul Sartre pointed out, this revelling in not having invented 
either powder or the compass, in not having built either towers or 
cathedrals, is a proud claim to 'non-technicalness'. In our terms the 
unscience is glorified. In Sartre's terms: 'That which might appear to be 
a deficiency becomes a positive source of richness'.4S 
Romantic gloriana as a philosophic disposition seeks to emphasize 
Africa's role in the history of science and technological achievements. But 
Leopold Senghor prefers to trace Africa's genius to intuition, to the 
wisdom of settled experience, to the instincts which are educated by 
history. T h e h u m a n instinct is a better guide to behaviour than the m o r e 
precise computer. 
Romantic gloriana tends to have a sense of awe towards literate 
civilizations. N k r u m a h ' s cultural policy as president of G h a n a sometimes 
tried to claim an African origin to almost every achievement in the history 
of science and culture before the computer. Postcards with paintings of 
African originators and inventors were widely distributed by G h a n a at 
the time. Tyro, an African secretary to Cicero, was credited with the 
invention of shorthand in the year 63 before the Christian era. Another 
postcard stressed the Egyptian origins of paper. Ancient Ghana was 
credited with the origins of legislation and formal law. Other postcards 
showed Africans teaching mathematics to the Greeks or leading the w a y 
in chemistry, medicine and other sciences. N k r u m a h ' s cultural policy 
sometimes carried romantic gloriana to extravagant lengths. 
In its more restrained form, romantic gloriana is a branch of idealized 
African historiography. It tends to accept European values while rejecting 
European 'facts' about Africa. T h e gloriana tendency betrays a readiness 
to accept the Western assumption that respectable societies are not 'tribal' 
and are endowed with relatively centralized political systems, with kings 
or imperial structures, with monuments in bricks and mortar, and are 
ultimately based on the organizing principle of statehood. T o the gloriana 
philosophical tendency, it is an insult to call the Karimojong or the 
Barabeg 'stateless societies'. There is once again an acceptance of Western 
criteria of political respectability (states are the 'in-thing') but a rejection 
of Western information about Africa. A 'yes' is given to Western values 
but a resounding 'no' to alleged Western 'facts' about Africa. 
In contrast, the philosophy of the unscience rejects Western values but 
accepts Western information or 'facts'. It rejects Western criteria of 
respectable civilizations - towers, cathedrals and statehood - and accepts 
Western descriptions of Africa as a land without advanced science or 
technology. However, romantic primitivism takes pride in the unscience -
while the West despises it. 
45. J.-P. Sartre, 1963, pp . 41-3. This part of the analysis is also greatly indebted to 
A . A . Mazrui, 1986. 
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Towards cross-cultural philosophy 
It is these considerations which link up the philosophy of unscience with 
Rousseau's tradition of 'the Noble Savage', on the one hand, and with 
M a h a t m a Gandhi's ideas about civilization, on the other. 
A n interviewer once asked India's M a h a t m a Gandhi: ' W h a t do you 
think of Western civilization?' T h e M a h a t m a is reported to have replied, 
'I did not k n o w that they had any!' It was presumably the West's 'moral 
sensibilities' which M a h a t m a Gandhi was questioning. 
Like M a h a t m a Gandhi, Africa's philosophers of unscience have not 
been impressed by the West's technological achievements. Those African 
thinkers have identified stronger moral sensibilities among the less tech-
nically-preoccupied rural peoples of the African continent itself. Rous -
seau's ideas about the corrosive and corrupting influences of industrial 
culture and Gandhi's techniques of handloom village textiles provide 
powerful comparisons with this primitivist tendency in modern African 
thought. T h e convergence of négritude, Gandhism and Rousseau's 'Noble 
Savage' is one area of cross-cultural philosophy. 
Although both the primitivist and the gloriana schools are interpret-
ations of traditional Africa, they are different from the 'cultural current' 
of African philosophy as w e have defined it before. Romantic primitivism 
and romantic gloriana both belong to a cross-cultural tendency in African 
philosophy. 
W h a t should be borne in mind is that our three original general currents 
of African philosophy - cultural, ideological and critical - have not been 
rigidly demarcated. African Islamic thought and African Christian thought 
have often cut across both culture and ideology in our sense. T h e legacies 
of Jamal al-Din al-Afghäni and his Egyptian disciple, M u h a m m a d c A b d u h , 
have continued into the second half of the twentieth century - grappling 
with the cross-cultural tensions between modern science and ancient 
sacred truth. 
Secular cross-culturalism includes the impact of Marxism-Leninism 
on indigenous ideas of collectivism. African thinkers like Senghor and 
Nyerere insisted that African socialism owed nothing to class struggle. 
T h e question has often been raised whether the concept of 'class' was 
African at all. W h y did most African languages lack a word for 'class'? 
Also cross-cultural are those African versions of modernism in Islamic 
thought referred to earlier. These, too, have produced their o w n heroes 
and martyrs. A m o n g the most original of Africa's Islamic thinkers in the 
second half of the twentieth century was the Sudanese theologian, 
M a h m o u d M u h a m m a d Taha. His concept of the Dual Message of 
Islam was more cross-temporal than cross-cultural. Taha engaged in an 
intellectual effort to reconcile the ethos of the twentieth century with the 
spirit of the ancient era of the Prophet M u h a m m a d . M a h m o u d Taha 
argued cross-temporally and with a freshness that one message of the 
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Prophet was intended only for his followers in his o w n day (the Arabs 
of the seventh century of the Christian era) and the second message of 
Islam was intended for all time. T h e secret of true piety, according to 
Taha, was not only to recognize this cross-temporal duality of the Islamic 
message but also to be able to distinguish between what was historically 
specific to the seventh century and what was truly eternal. M a h m o u d 
M u h a m m a d Taha paid the supreme price for his cross-temporal intel-
lectual innovations. T h e regime of Gaffer Nimeiri in the Sudan executed 
him for apostasy and heresy in 1985.46 
Christian thinkers in Africa have done more than merely interpret their 
o w n Gospel. T h e y have often taken the lead in re-interpreting cross-
culturally the indigenous civilization of Africa as well. A n impressive 
breakthrough in Christian interpretation of African indigenous thought 
came with Father Tempels's seminal book, Bantu Philosophy. It was 
a look at traditional thought viewed from the outside. T h e perspective 
was sympathetic but basically Euro-Christian. Tempels was succeeded 
by a whole school of Christian interpreters of the ancestral heritage of 
Africa.47 
Afro-Christian interpreters of indigenous philosophy since the seminal 
work of Tempels have included J. Kinyongo of Zaire, A . K a g a m e of 
R w a n d a , W . E . Abraham of G h a n a and John Mbiti of Kenya. Sometimes 
the basic Christianity of these writers has distorted their Africanity - and 
portrayed the indigenous heritage in Christo-centric terms. S o m e of these 
writers wanted their Western readers to believe that traditional African 
beliefs were almost Christian — as if the African ancestors anticipated 
Jesus Christ and the Sermon on the M o u n t . 
T h e late Ugandan anthropologist and poet, Okot p'Bitek, complained 
about this dual tendency a m o n g sympathetic Westernized writers to 
Christianize and Hellenize the indigenous heritage of Africa. Okot p'Bitek 
was blowing the whistle against this n e w cultural 'Trojan horse' which 
was penetrating Africa's traditional legacies.48 
In spite of these dangers of Christo-centrism and Euro-centrism, there 
is little doubt that the efforts of Christianized Africans to interpret the 
legacy of the black ancestors had made m u c h of that cultural heritage 
more intellectually accessible to the rest of the world. Books like John 
Mbiti's African Religions and Philosophy have been translated into lan-
guages which have ranged from Japanese to Finnish. It is one of the 
ironies of history that John Mbiti has seldom been translated into African 
languages. W e are back to the problem of the language of philosophy in 
46. See M . M . Taha, 1987. 
47. R . P. Tempels, 1949. African political philosophy is discussed in W . O . Oyugi and 
A . Gilonga, 1987. 
48. See O . p'Bitek, 1971; consult also A . Kagame, 1956; J. Mbiti, 1969; J. Kinyongo, 
1974, pp. 205-11; and W . E . Abraham, 1962. 
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Africa - so different from the British preoccupation with the philosophy 
of language. 
In cross-cultural terms, Julius Nyerere is the most enterprising of 
African political philosophers. H e has philosophized extensively in both 
English and Kiswahili. H e has tried to tear d o w n the language barriers 
between ancestral cultural philosophy and the new ideological tendency 
of the post-colonial era. Nyerere is superbly eloquent in both English 
and Kiswahili. H e has allowed the two languages to enrich each other as 
their ideas have passed through his intellect. 
His concept of ujatnaa as a basis of African socialism was itself a 
brilliant cross-cultural transition. Ujatnaa traditionally implied ethnic 
solidarity. But Nyerere transformed it from a dangerous principle of 
ethnic nepotism into more than a mere equivalent of the European word 
'socialism'. In practice his socialist policies did not work — as m u c h for 
global reasons as for domestic. But in intellectual terms Nyerere is a m o r e 
original thinker than K w a m e N k r u m a h - and linguistically m u c h m o r e 
innovative. N k r u m a h tried to update Lenin - from Lenin's Imperialism: 
The Highest Stage of Capitalism to N k r u m a h ' s Neo-Colonialism: the Last 
Stage of Imperialism. Nyerere translated Shakespeare into Kiswahili 
instead — bodi jfulius Caesar and The Merchant of Venice. N k r u m a h ' s 
exercise in Leninism was a less impressive cross-cultural achievement 
than Nyerere's translation of Shakespeare into an African language. Yet 
both these African thinkers will remain among the towering figures of 
the twentieth century in politics and thought.49 
Conclusion 
This chapter has started from the premise that Africa's contribution to 
science and technology is not to be measured merely by the activities of 
African scientists and engineers. T h e region's impact includes the role of 
African labour and material resources in global technological change. T h e 
continent's strategic minerals have equipped the factories and activated 
the laboratories of the Western world not only in the period since 1935 
but for generations before that.50 
Colonial rule itself was not a fertile soil for indigenous science and 
technology. Colonial schools managed to produce two African Nobel 
Prize-winners for literature (Soyinka and Mahfuz), two African Nobel 
Prizes for peace (Luthuli and Tutu), one diaspora Nobel Prize for 
economics (Arthur Lewis) - but not a single African Nobel Prize-winner 
for any branch of the natural sciences. Colonial schools were quite 
49. K . N k r u m a h , 1966; J. Nyerere, 1963a and 1969. 
50. For older civilizational interaction, consult J. G . Jackson, 1970. 
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competent laboratories for the humanities but not effective workshops for 
science and technology.51 
O n the other hand, a Zairean mineral like cobalt could keep the jet 
engines of the Western world running w h e n there were hardly any 
alternative sources of the commodity available outside Africa. It is in this 
sense that Western colonialism in Africa fuelled technological change in 
the West - while inhibiting it in the economic bosom of Africa itself. 
T h e West attempted to castrate African technology - while African 
minerals served as the aphrodisiac ('the Afrodisiac1) for Western tech-
nological virility. 
W a r is sometimes the mother of invention. After all, the Second World 
W a r played midwife to the birth of the nuclear age - often encouraged 
by otherwise humanitarian scientists like Albert Einstein. It was probably 
Einstein's advice to President Franklin Roosevelt which tipped the scale 
in favour of the Manhattan atomic project in the middle of the war. 
Africa's wars of liberation sometimes gave birth to impressive examples 
of intermediate technology. T h e M a u M a u war in the 1950s yielded 
intriguing rudimentary firearms manufactured in the bush. 
However, the most impressive innovative war in Africa in this period 
technologically was not a war of liberation but a post-colonial civil war. 
T h e Biafran side in the Nigerian civil war revealed great skills of 
technological improvisation. Biafra produced memorable examples of 
intermediate armoured vehicles and quasi-tanks. Unfortunately, the tech-
nological prowess which war had produced between 1967 and 1970 was 
promptly killed by the oil bonanza in Nigeria from 1973 onwards. 
Prosperity destroyed innovation. 
In the field of philosophy colonialism helped to foster the ideological 
and critical schools, both of which were deeply Westernized and were 
often expressed in European languages. B y far the most indigenously 
authentic branch of philosophy has been the cultural school - deeply 
rooted as it is in native perspectives and ways of thought. Indeed, cultural 
philosophy in Africa in the post-colonial era is both oral and written, 
both sacred and secular - and has its origins in indigenous African 
languages and concepts.5* 
Underlying all these trends has been that basic question which w e 
posed at the very beginning of this chapter. W h a t has political sub-
ordination meant for Africa's role in science and philosophy? In the field 
of science and technology the costs and benefits are difficult to compute. 
O n the whole, it has not been African scientists w h o have had the biggest 
impact on global science and technology. It has been African workers and 
mineral resources — benefiting industries abroad. 
51. There have indeed been black inventors and discoverers at levels 'below' the Nobel 
category. See, for example, J. A . Rogers, 1972. 
52. See UNESCO, 1985-6. 
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In philosophy, on the other hand, colonialism m a y have started a 
process which will eventually be enriching. There is surely room for the 
study of secular ideologies in the Africa of the twenty-first century - and 
the colonial legacy has already initiated that particular endeavour. O u r 
interest today in Fanon, Cabrai, N k r u m a h , Senghor and Gamal ' A b d al-
Nasser is part and parcel of that process. 
T h e critical school is already preoccupied with such special concepts 
as 'post-modernism' and deconstruction and such carefully defined social 
predicaments as post-coloniality. Thinkers like K w a m e Anthony Appiah 
and Nkiru N z e g w u are part of the vanguard of these new intellectual 
horizons. 
T h e twenty-first century will surely also celebrate such critical African 
philosophy — formal, disciplined, rigorous, sometimes obscure, occasion-
ally profound. N a m e s of critical philosophers which m a y survive into the 
twenty-first century are likely to include V . Y . M u d i m b e , W . E . Abraham, 
O . Bodurin Kwasi Wiredu, H . Odera, P. Hountondji and a number of 
others. All these were products of colonialism and yet transcended it. 
A s for trans-cultural schools of philosophy, these include the works of 
such African Christian thinkers as A . K a g a m e and John Mbiti and such 
African Islamic thinkers as M a h m o u d M u h a m m a d Taha and Abdallah 
Saleh Farsy. These thinkers, too, bore the stamp of colonized Africa -
but their reach often exceeded their grasp.53 
Are Africans an historical people? It is a matter of astonishment that 
right into the second half of the twentieth century, Africans have had to 
establish their credentials as a people with a recorded past and a past 
worth recording. It was as late as the 1960s that the Regius Professor of 
M o d e r n History at Oxford University - H u g h Trevor-Roper - proclaimed 
his infamous dogma: 
M a y b e in the future there will be African history. But at the m o m e n t 
there is none. There is only the history of the European in Africa 
. . . T h e rest is darkness - and darkness is not a subject of history.54 
Are Africans a philosophical people? Perhaps the wonder is even greater 
on this issue - for Africans themselves are divided about the answer to 
the question. T h e critical current in African philosophy comes close to 
saying something like the following: 
M a y b e at present there is some African philosophy. But in the past 
there was none. There was only philosophizing about Africa by 
53. Consult, among others, L . Brown and M . Crowder, 1964. See also C . Wauthier, 
1966; and O . Otite, 1978. Also useful is not only V . Y . Mudimbe' s brilliant book, but 
also his bibliography, 1988. 
54. This often-quoted statement was m a d e in a broadcast on British television in 1968. 
It was in the opening lecture of the series on The Rise of Christian Europe, by H u g h 
Trevor-Roper, printed in The Listener, 28 November 1963, p. 871. 
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Europeans . . . T h e rest was ethnology and ethnology is not a subject 
of philosophy. 
Are Africans a scientific people? Again Africans themselves are divided 
on that issue. Negritudists salute those w h o invented neither the compass 
nor the computer - while Cheikh Anta Diop came close in tracing all 
meaningful science to the African intellect at work. 
A future A i m é Césaire and a future Davidson Abioseh Nicol m a y one 
day collaborate as poets and proclaim to the world: 
Hooray for those w h o pursued no science! 
Hooray for those w h o refused to philosophize! 
Y o u are not a concept Africa, 
Y o u are a mere country! 
In fact, the age of consensus is ending in Africa. That is what all the 
intellectual noise is about. A restless continent is finding n e w issues to 
disagree about and n e w doctrines for debate. S o m e old paradigms are 
dying - some n e w paradigms are in the crucible of formation. Perhaps 
that is what both science and philosophy are all about. 
W h e n two elephants fight, it is the grass which suffers - especially 
if each elephant has a scientist to advise it. 
A n d w h e n two elephants make love, it is still the grass which 
suffers - especially w h e n each elephant has a philosopher to advise 
it. 
{Ancient African proverb, 
revised in the light of experience since 1935. 
A paradigm shift.) 
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Introduction 
Education is the mechanism by which a society generates the knowledge 
necessary for its survival and sustenance and transmits this from one 
generation to another, largely through processes of instructions to the 
young. It could be informal in the h o m e , at the workplace or in the 
playground. M o r e usually, it is formalized and is conducted in places and 
contexts specially set apart for the guidance of the young and the 
edification of older people. T h e young are trained to acquire knowledge, 
skills and aptitudes necessary both for preserving and defending the basic 
institutions and values of society, as well as for adapting these to meet 
changing circumstances and new challenges.1 
In pre-colonial Africa, as w e have seen in earlier volumes, there were 
different systems of education performing these tasks in different parts 
of the continent. Notably, there were three main patterns: the indigenous, 
the Islamic, and what m a y be called the Afro-Christian, that is the early 
Christian traditions that survived in Ethiopia and a m o n g the Copts of 
Egypt.2 Within both the Islamic and Afro-Christian traditions, society 
had great respect for literacy and learning: they helped to unlock the 
mysteries of the Holy Kur'an (Koran) and the Holy Scriptures, and they 
also tended to be confined largely to rulers and priests, the two most 
highly respected groups in society. Otherwise, the cultures remained 
predominantly oral. T h e effort of European and American missionaries 
in the nineteenth century to spread Christianity in Africa stimulated 
Western education. It expanded the scope of literacy not only in European 
languages, but also in several African languages, m a n y of them being 
written for the first time in newly-devised schemes of orthography in 
R o m a n letters, thus in m a n y cases superseding earlier attempts to write 
some of the languages in the Arabic script. 
i. P. C . Lloyd, 1972, pp. 160 if. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the 
contribution of Mary Achate, School of Education, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
USA. 
2. A . A . Mazrui and T . G . Wagaw, 1985; J. F. A . Ajayi, 1985 
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T h e spread of literacy in African languages had the greatest potential 
for social change in the number of people that could learn to read and 
write African languages and m a k e the transition from a predominantly 
oral to an increasingly literate culture. During the colonial period, 
however, this potentiality was played d o w n , and the importance of the 
m u c h smaller group of people able to read and write the European 
languages was highlighted instead. It was the knowledge of the European 
languages that provided access to jobs as messengers, clerks, artisans and 
even occasionally professionals. T h e degree of competence in Western 
education and European languages became the n e w index of status and, 
often, this also corresponded with the income level and social influence 
of the relevant jobs.3 
T h u s , by 1935, Western education had superseded all pre-colonial 
systems of education in relative importance. Within Western education, 
it was education in European languages that counted for more than 
education in Arabic and other African languages. Western education had 
become a factor of class formation, tending to separate the Western-
educated élite from the masses often denigrated as 'illiterate' or 'unlet-
tered', and this was in spite of the great artistry of the oral cultures in 
the use and manipulation of words, especially because of the tonality of 
the languages w h e n spoken. For the colonial regimes, Western education 
became a powerful weapon of acculturation, moulding the minds of the 
Western-educated élite to desire particular aspects of European culture 
such as European clothes, food, laws, patterns of government and imported 
European goods. Through Western education, reinforced by colonial laws 
of marriage, inheritance and land tenure, as well as Christian teachings 
on m o n o g a m y , the educated élite were being wooed away from the 
communal pattern of traditional African societies towards a n e w model 
of individualism, the nuclear family, private property and accumulation. 
T h e educated élite were beginning to k n o w less about and show little 
appreciation for African history, religious ideas, clothes, cuisine, art, music 
and life-styles generally, which were retreating to some extent from the 
large urban centres but continued to dominate life in the rural areas. 
Yet, as w e have seen in other chapters of this volume, it was this same 
Western-educated élite, somewhat alienated as they were from the masses, 
w h o were in a position to lead the struggle against colonialism, aggregating 
the grievances of the masses of farmers in the rural areas as well as those 
of the trades unions, market w o m e n and the unemployed in the urban 
areas. T h e colonialists had in fact exaggerated the degree of alienation 
and the educated élite proved this again and again whenever those of 
them aspiring to political leadership were challenged to demonstrate their 
popularity and ability to win and retain the support of the masses. T h e 
level of Western education in the official European languages was an 
3. M . Bray et al., 1986, eh. 4, pp. 58-^78. 
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essential part of their ability to c o m m a n d the confidence of the masses. 
In particular, Western education enabled the nationalist leaders to tran-
scend the bounds of ethnicity set by the African languages and attempt 
to speak for all the multilingual, multi-national people within the bound-
aries of the colonial territories. This was the major advantage they had, 
for example, over the traditional rulers w h o were their major rivals in 
the bid for the succession to the colonialists, but were usually able to 
operate only within their o w n particular ethnic groups. Hence the view 
expressed by A w o l o w o in 1947 that the educated élite, though an 
insignificant minority, were the ones w h o had the political awareness and 
'. . . this articulate minority are destined to rule . . .'4 T h e level of 
Western education, often combined with travel or a study period abroad, 
had also developed in several of the leaders of the educated élite a pan-
African perspective which linked them with other leaders in Africa, and 
this perspective was another important factor in the nationalist struggle. 
T h u s , the nationalist leaders valued their educational background, and 
they saw in education their greatest weapon of nation-building and social 
transformation in the search both for mental decolonization and for 
economic development. S o m e scholars m a y be inclined to argue about 
the effectiveness of education as an instrument of social change: 'It is not 
the consciousness of people that determines their existence but . . . their 
social existence that determines their consciousness', according to Karl 
M a r x . 5 T h e nationalist leaders, however, shared no such hesitation. In 
colonial Africa, the type and level of education determined not merely 
the consciousness of people, but also very m u c h their place in society 
and their life-style. T h e nationalist leaders saw in the colonialist insistence 
on vocational training and adaptation to suit the African situation merely 
a device to suit the exploitative goals of the colonial regimes, and a 
weapon of control calculated to delay the process of decolonization. It 
was this insistence, taken to a logical conclusion, that produced the 
monstrosity of 'Bantu education' in South Africa. T h e educated élite saw 
in Western education which emphasized intellectual attainments the 
possibility of Africans acquiring the knowledge and insights necessary to 
'modernize' African societies, the qualification for jobs in the colonial 
services, and the training of the African bureaucracy that would replace 
the colonial officials.6 
T h e demand for improved educational facilities was, therefore, high 
on the agenda of every nationalist movement in Africa. T h e emphasis 
was on the expansion of elementary education, the provision of improved 
secondary schools and teacher-training colleges, and the establishment of 
African universities. T h e political leaders were also generally aware that 
4. In The Path to Nigerian Freedom, cited by B . Davidson, 1978, p. 197. 
5. K . Marx, 1859, trans, by N . I. Stone, 1904, p. 11. 
6. E . Ashby and M . Anderson, 1966, especially pp. 236-47. 
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Kinshasa, Zaire)
if education was to serve as the instrument for mental decolonization and
economic development, the system inherited from the colonial regimes
needed not merely to be expanded and consolidated but also to be
reformed and adapted to the needs of post-colonial African societies.
Thus, the history of education throughout Africa in the contemporary
period revolves round the dual theme of expansion and reform. While
the agenda for expansion was clear, the programme for reform was more
complex and less easy to achieve than had been expected in the euphoria
of the immediate post-colonial period.
Continuing relevance of the pre-colonial systems
One reason why the Western-educated élite were not completely alienated
from the masses was that, in spite of the missionary schools and other
pressures of the colonial system, the pre-colonial traditions of education
continued to function largely through the influence both of the home and
of religion. The influence of the home could not be completely obliterated
by later schooling considering that during the first five years of life the
African child was very close to the mother and she usually taught the
child her own language along with the basic values of her culture. Even
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where the mother herself had received some foreign education and 
religious ideas, her roots in the culture might have been weakened, but 
never wholly severed.7 Secondly, the religious needs of the community, 
especially in the Islamic and Afro-Christian areas, demanded the con-
tinuation of the traditional system of education. 
There was of course no colonial system to disrupt the traditional 
education within the family and the Church in Ethiopia. T h e Orthodox 
Church continued to organize and support a wide range of educational 
establishments which have remained the core of Ethiopian cultural, 
spiritual, literary, artistic and scientific life.8 At the elementary level, there 
was the Nebab Bet (School of Reading), to which the few ruling families 
and others w h o had aspirations sent their children, largely to become 
monks or priests. Most of the pupils were male and only some of those 
w h o graduated from diere went on to the Quedasse Bet (School of Holy 
Mass) and the Quine Bet (School of Poetry). Institutions of higher 
education were collectively referred to as Metshafit Bet (School of the 
Holy Books or Scriptures), and only a select few ever completed the 
rigorous study in theology and philosophy. T h e whole process lasted 
some 28 years, and involved m u c h arduous work and personal deprivation. 
However, those w h o achieved this exalted intellectual state enjoyed the 
envy of dieir colleagues, the respect of the Christian communities, and 
the esteem of the rulers. Usually they had by then become of advanced 
age. Most of them did not attempt to start a family, but devoted the rest 
of their lives to meditation and scholarly pursuits as monks . 
Similarly, the religious needs of the Musl im communities ensured the 
continuance of Islamic education not only within the family but also in 
a wide range of formal and informal educational and religious estab-
lishments.9 Because the message of die Kur'än has to be comprehended 
in the original Arabic in which it was revealed, most Musl im parents 
wanted their children, particularly the males, to attend Kur'änic schools, 
on a full-time or part-time basis, to learn the Kur'än by heart and pick 
up the rudiments of Arabic grammar and syntax during their most 
impressionable years. Further education was available in the Him (formal 
school establishments) or madrasas (classes conducted by mifallimün 
(scholars) around the mosque). Subjects studied included tafstr 
(commentaries on the Kur'än), hadîth_ (sayings of the Prophet, especially 
on issues of personal conduct such as marriage, divorce and inheritance) 
znàfikh (studies of Islamic law or sharfa). 
In spite of occasional periods of hostility and confrontation, the colonial 
regimes did not oppose the spread of Islamic education in its elementary 
forms at the local level. T h e y tended, however, to discourage higher 
7. J. F. A . Ajayi, 1985, pp. 15-16; A . A . Mazrui and T . G . Wagaw, 1985, pp. 39-44. 
8. T . G . Wagaw, 1979, ch. 1. 
9. A . A . Mazrui and T . G . Wagaw, 1985, pp. 48-53; M . Bray et al., 1986, ch. 5. 
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education, especially when it involved international contacts with anti-
colonial traditions in places such as al-Azhar in Cairo. The colonial
regimes tried to monitor those who went on pilgrimages, preferring to
select and if possible sponsor only the more conservative scholars. This
could not deter the most ambitious scholars continuing the tradition of
travelling round to sit at the feet of the most reputed scholars, mastering
their works and profiting from the contents of their libraries. In this way
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some local centres of higher education emerged, such as the M o s q u e of 
Riyadha in L a m u on the East African coast which attracted students from 
over a wide region. 
T h e greater problem came from the threat posed to Islam by Western 
education, sponsored largely by Christian missionaries as a weapon of 
evangelization. For this reason, there developed between Western edu-
cation and traditional Islamic education not merely a gap but an actual 
state of hostility. In a few places the colonial regimes barred Christian 
missionaries from Musl im areas and tried to sponsor secular Western 
education through the local administrations, but this achieved little in 
bridging the gap or lessening the hostility. A few Musl im organizations 
were more successful in this w h e n they sponsored Western education 
within the context of Islam, teaching the Kur'an and Arabic, as well as 
reading and writing in English, and basic arithmetic in Western-style 
schools. For the most part, however, Islamic and Western education 
remained unreconciled and this became a factor of uneven development 
as Western education continued to supersede Islamic education as the 
gateway to jobs within the modernizing sector of society and as an index 
of status during the colonial period. 
Indigenous education within the oral cultures also continued largely 
outside the purview of the Western schools.10 Contrary to the mis-
conception developed in the colonial period, this system of education 
went beyond socialization within the extended family, age-grade organ-
izations, and institutions of puberty rites such as the Poro and B u n d o of 
the West Atlantic region. At the elementary level, the child was taught 
in the informal setting of the family through word play, conundrums and 
similar exercises, to master the mother tongue. H e was taught to count 
and, through sessions of story-telling, to appreciate his culture, values, 
world-view and historical background. Through forms of apprenticeship, 
usually to his father, mother or other relation, the child learnt various 
crafts and trades. In this process he was m a d e to learn also about 
the environment, plants and animals, hunting or fishing skills, some 
manufacturing processes, housekeeping for girls and agriculture for boys, 
house construction, art, music, dancing, religion and so on. T h e infor-
mality of the processes should not blind us to the deliberate manner in 
which the education of the child was undertaken, or the extent to which 
society relied for its survival and sustenance on the individual h u m a n 
factor of ingenuity and innovation and took steps to foster them. 
Higher education was reserved largely for the training of rulers and 
priests. T h e rulers, especially in the centralized state systems, learnt in 
depth the history of the community, the legal basis of the claims to their 
land and other essential properties, the laws and customs, the duties and 
responsibilities of the ruler, and so on. T h e pre-coronation period con-
io. M . Bray et al., 1986, eh. 6; N . K . Dzobo, 1975. 
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tinued the process, emphasizing attitudes and behaviour patterns expected 
of the ruler, while the coronation rites themselves aimed to transform the 
ruler from a m a n to a king pertaining to the nature of a god. T h e priest 
went through a rigorous training lasting several years and covering m a n y 
fields. H e had to master religious philosophy and the meaning of various 
sacred chants, myths, praise verses of various divinities, etc. H e was also 
required to recognize the symptoms of different ailments and k n o w the 
herbal and ritual cures — for the priest was not only the diviner w h o 
communicated between the client and the divinities, he also practised as 
a healer and, in the m o r e arid areas, as a rain-maker with control over 
the forces of nature. H e had to master, with varying degrees of perfection, 
the classification and properties of plants and animals, as one versed not 
only in biology and pharmacology, but also in botanical and zoological 
semantics and philosophy. S o m e of the processes of divination also 
involved intricate mathematical knowledge which modern studies are just 
beginning to appreciate." 
Because of the contempt that those with Western education developed 
for the indigenous system of education, the spread of Western education 
has contributed little to the knowledge of agriculture, health sciences, 
crafts and traditional manufacturing processes that continue to sustain 
life in the rural areas. M a n y people, even in the rural areas, have rejected 
the traditional religion that was the motive force of the indigenous system 
of education, and identified with Islam and Christianity; but the traditional 
values did not cease to be important or relevant for them. T h e world 
view, the basic aesthetic values and explanations of good and evil, sickness 
or health, continued to derive from the traditional culture. A s Africanized 
forms of Christianity spread in the rural areas, m u c h of the ethos of this 
traditional culture, particularly about the nature of illness and the pro-
motion of health, was incorporated. With the increasing recognition of 
the continuing relevance of traditional agriculture and health sciences, 
there is a revival of traditional religion, and growing appreciation of the 
achievements and continued importance of the indigenous system of 
education. 
Expansion and reform 
African leaders at independence realized the need for expanding and 
reforming the colonial system of education. In the words of Sékou Touré 
of Guinea, ' W e must Africanize our education and get rid of the negative 
features of misconceptions inherited from an educational system designed 
to serve colonial purposes'.12 All were agreed on the need for expansion. 
Apart from a few, like the president of Malawi advocating an unabashed 
ii. J. F. A . Ajayi, 1987. 
12. In A . Sékou Touré, 1963, cited in L . G . Cowan et al., 1965, p. 129. 
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copying of the English public school and the virtues of education based 
on the study of Latin and Greek, most African leaders agreed on the 
need for Africanization and rooting education in African cultures. Perhaps 
no other leader has attempted to formulate and expatiate on a philosophy 
of African education as clearly as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, himself a 
former teacher and generally referred to as Mwalimu (teacher). In his 
Education for Self-reliance,1* in which he emphasized the role of education 
to achieve his goal of African socialism as outlined in the Arusha 
Declaration, he advocated four major reforms: 
(1) to integrate Western education into the life of the family and 
community; 
(2) to end the elitism of colonial education through a p r o g r a m m e of 
universal primary education that integrates Western and tra-
ditional systems of education; 
(3) to bridge the gap between the educated élite and the masses 
through better appreciation in the educated of the accumulated 
knowledge and wisdom that existed within traditional societies; and 
(4) to inculcate the spirit of work and service to the community in 
the process of education. 
Although expansion and reform went on side by side, the initial 
emphasis was on expansion. A t the Addis A b a b a Conference in M a y 1961, 
convened by U N E S C O , representatives of s o m e 35 African independent or 
soon-to-be-independent countries met to review their systems of education 
and plan for their immediate and long-term development.14 T h e resulting 
Addis Ababa Plan for African Education set specific targets for expanding 
enrolments and necessary financial support. D u e to the absence or 
inadequacies of economic development plans, workforce surveys, reliable 
and comprehensive statistics, and because of the serious underestimation 
of the demographic p h e n o m e n a , the Addis Ababa targets can be said, 
from hindsight, to have reflected more the hopes and aspirations of the 
participants than the economic realities of Africa. Nevertheless, the 
conference provided bases for further debate and clarification of the role 
and pace of educational development in relation to available resources 
and the needs in other sectors of national life. 
T h e Addis Ababa Plan recognized the dismally inadequate provisions 
m a d e u p to that time for the development of h u m a n resources both in 
terms of quality and numbers . It noted that only 40 per cent of all 
primary-school-age children were enrolled in any kind of school and that 
an even smaller percentage of older children were enrolled. Equally 
important, it noted the questionable quality of the education provided. 
T h e conference participants stressed that, given the African conditions 
of the period: 
13. J. Nyerere, 1967c, pp. 10-15. 
14. U N E S C O , 1961a, pp. 1-127; and U N E S C O , 1961b. 
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the present content of education . . . is not in line with either 
existing African conditions, the postulate of political independence, 
the dominant features of an essentially technological age, or the 
imperatives of balanced economic development involving rapid indus-
trialization. . . . It is based on non-African background, allowing no 
room for the African child's intelligence, powers of observation and 
creative imagination to develop freely and help him find his bearings 
in the world. African educational authorities should revise and reform 
the content of education in the areas of the curricula, textbooks, and 
methods, so as to take account of the African environment, child 
development, cultural heritage, and the demands of technolo-
gical progress and economic development, especially industrializ-
ation . . .I5 
In terms of quantitative goals, the conference plan called for enrolments 
to expand from the i960 ratio of 40:3:0.5 (40 per cent of the elementary, 
3 per cent of the secondary and one-half of one per cent of the tertiary 
age group enrolled) to 100:30:20 by 1980. T h e goal was to make primary 
education universal, compulsory and free. O f those completing primary 
education, 30 per cent would proceed to the secondary stage, and 20 per 
cent of those completing the secondary stage would proceed to the tertiary 
level, mostly at institutions within Africa. Wastage in primary education 
would not exceed 20 per cent, and the average number of pupils per 
teacher would be 35. Increasingly, African teachers would be recruited 
and trained. In addition, adult education would be provided in the schools, 
at work-places, and in places of worship. T o this end, national governments 
were called upon to increase their financial support from the prevailing 
3 -4 per cent of G N P to 4-6 per cent between 1970 and 1980. T h e 
African states were also encouraged to enlist the support of the inter-
national community in their educational efforts. 
Since 1961, periodic conferences of ministers of education addressing 
the issues of education in Africa have been held: in Narobi 1968, Lagos 
1976 and Harare 1982, besides the Tananarive Conference of 1962, 
specifically on higher education. Each one has built upon the experience 
of its predecessors - rectifying, refining, gaining knowledge and insight, 
expanding the visions and aspirations of the African people and their 
governments, and forming them into a system of co-ordinated, planned 
educational development. It is n o w possible to assess the educational 
development of Africa in relation to these plans and determine the extent 
to which it has been responsive and relevant to the socio-economic and 
cultural requirements of the communities as well as the progress m a d e 
toward universalization of primary and adult education. 
Numerically, the rate of growth in enrolment has been impressive. T h e 
continent has achieved the highest overall growth rate of any region in 
15. UNESCO, 1961a, p. 23; see also UNESCO, 1961b. 
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the world, as well as the most rapid increase in literacy. In several places 
programmes of universal primary education were embarked upon, and in 
some free education even up to secondary and tertiary levels. F e w leaders 
championed the cause of universal and free education as consistently as 
K w a m e N k r u m a h of Ghana and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria. However, 
even in Ghana and Nigeria, severe economic and demographic pressures 
have led to a backing away from the effort to make elementary education 
universal. Resistance to the social effects of Western education — such as 
encouraging late marriage in girls and rural to urban migration of 
children - have continued, particularly in Muslim areas. T h u s , in spite 
of the massive expansions, the 1961 targets for primary-school enrolment 
were not realized, and there has recently been a decline.16 
Figures 22.1-22.3 depict the pattern of enrolment of all levels of the 
schooling system for the 1960-80 period. F r o m 1961 to 1980, enrolment 
16. See documents made available to the Harare Conference by U N E C A , O A U and 
U N E S C O , especially 1982, Documents E D / 8 2 / M I N E D A F / 4 and E D / 8 2 / M I N E D A F / 2 
and the World Bank, 1988. 
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at the primary level increased by 6.2 per cent per a n n u m , exceeding the 
5.6 per cent projected in the Addis Ababa Plan. However, mainly because 
the data used to make projections in 1961 were incomplete, universal 
primary enrolment had not been achieved by the majority of African 
countries. About 13 states out of 51 had come close to universal enrolment. 
For the region as a whole, 62 per cent of primary-school-age children were 
enrolled by 1980. There were, of course, wide variations in achievement 
depending on the countries and the base from which their enrolments 
grew. In i960, some countries had enrolments as low as 3 or 4 per cent 
for the 6-11 age group, while some others had a ratio as high as 75 per 
cent. In 1980, the lowest enrolment was 13 per cent while some 15 
countries had attained more than 75 per cent. T o achieve this measure 
of success, the African states embarked upon massive programmes of 
primary-school construction and teacher training, often with a high degree 
of community involvement. These efforts, however, were not sufficient 
to ameliorate the severe shortage of qualified teachers.17 
Growth rates at the secondary level are even more impressive though 
uneven. T h e overall enrolment ratio achieved at the secondary level in 
1980 was 20 per cent for the corresponding age groups with variations 
between countries ranging from 2.1 per cent to 82.3 per cent. In the past 
seven years some newly-independent states have increased their secondary 
enrolments five-fold. Female enrolment has lagged behind that of males 
at all levels. 
Another measure of Africa's commitment to development through 
education can be found in the patterns of resource allocation in the region. 
For the years 1970 and 1978, public expenditure on education in Africa 
were US$2377 and U S $ 1 1 1 4 4 billion respectively. W h e n compared to the 
industrialized nations and other developing regions, Africa's investment in 
education was significantly low. However, in terms of expenditure as a 
percentage of G N P , Africa was competitive. For instance, Africa invested 
3.8 and 4.8 per cent of G N P in education in 1970 and 1980, respectively, 
a higher percentage than in the developing countries of the world taken 
as a whole, where 3.3 per cent was recorded in 1970 and 4.1 per cent in 
1980. For the industrially developed regions, the figures were 5.7 and 5.9 
per cent respectively. 
B y 1980, education claimed 25-35 P e r c e n t °f current government 
expenditure in Africa. In terms of per capita student-year costs for the 
late 1970s, it was U S $ 2 2 , US$133 a n d U S $ 9 8 6 for primary, secondary 
and tertiary education respectively. This represents a commitment that is 
higher than any other developed or developing region in the world.'8 
In most African countries, education still claims more resources than 
17. See UNESCO, U N E C A and O A U , 1982, Document ED/82/MINEDAF/2. 
18. T. G . Wagaw, forthcoming, ch. 10; also UNESCO, UNECA and O A U , 1982, 
Document ED/82/MINEDAF/REF.5. 
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any other function of government except general administration. T h e 
question is whether, given the limited fiscal resources of most countries 
of the region, current levels of investment in education will be sustainable. 
T h e answer is probably no, in which case nations m a y have to resort to 
n e w and unconventional methods of financing such as manipulating 
incentive and salary structures, introducing multiple shifts, utilizing 
facilities and personnel on a year-round basis (including nights), and 
increasing the use of long-distance education and the electronic media. 
T h e pressure to keep u p the pace of expansion was perhaps the most 
important factor undermining the efforts to achieve at the same time 
structural changes in the inherited colonial systems of education. There 
was no time to halt, m a k e fundamental changes, retrain the staff and 
create n e w orientations. Usually, the constant rhetoric emphasizing the 
need for educational reform produced no more than cosmetic changes 
while the existing system reproduced itself in responding to increased 
demand and increased allocation of resources. Yet strenuous efforts were 
m a d e at the successive pan-African conferences of ministers of education 
and even more within individual countries'9 to evolve national policies of 
education that would implement more or less the reforms outlined by 
President Nyerere - to integrate the traditional forms of education with 
Western education in a n e w national system of education; to use education 
to promote a national ethos, ideology and philosophy, and fundamental 
principles of a new cohesive, egalitarian society embracing a concept of 
social justice; to make education less elitist, oriented more to the c o m -
munity than to the individual interests of the educated; to evolve a pattern 
of education more relevant to the practical and immediate needs of society, 
emphasizing not only culture but also science, technology and vocational 
training so that the products would be more readily employable and thus 
reduce unemployment and underemployment, and so on. 
Educational reform is a long, complex and continuous exercise, and 
the immediate post-independence era probably exaggerated h o w quickly 
fundamental reforms could be achieved. Economic recession and political 
instability have compounded the problems. This is not to deny that some 
significant changes have been achieved. T h e dominance of Western 
education by European and American Christian missionaries has been 
weakened, if not everywhere superseded by the secular state taking over 
control. Education has remained the most powerful factor of social 
mobility and in most places access has been widened if not completely 
democratized, though various élite and professional groups are able to 
establish or retain some advantages for their children, through pre-school 
nursery education and better c o m m a n d of the official European languages. 
T h e continued dominance of the European languages thus remains one 
19. See, for example, U . Bude, 1980; Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Ministry 
of Education, 1981; and K . King, 1976. 
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of the basic pillars inhibiting fundamental reform of the colonial systems 
of education. T h e African languages that have the advantage of facilitating 
social integration at the local level and the key to a more thorough-going 
educational reform have had to play only marginal roles while European 
languages continue to be promoted as providing politically the most 
acceptable lingua franca. Nowhere is this factor of expansion of facilities 
and limitation of reform better illustrated than in the field of higher 
education. 
Tertiary education 
Institutions of higher learning are the nerve centre of African m o d -
ernization. T h e y also represent the highest expression of a society's search 
for continued renewal, enlightenment, growth and fulfilment. A m o n g 
other things, institutions of higher learning train, certify and otherwise 
equip some of the sharpest minds for leadership roles in government, 
business and the professions. T h e number of people thus equipped and 
certified is very small but their power and influence in society are 
disproportionately very high. It is not surprising that these centres of 
higher learning are looked upon with hope, admiration, awe, fear or 
suspicion by young and old, and especially by politicians. 
Higher education is not n e w to the African continent. T h e University 
of Sankore in Timbuktu flourished in the sixteenth century as a centre 
for scholarship and learning in law, philosophy and theology. Another 
institution of similar importance is al-Azhar University in Cairo, which 
has been in existence for over one thousand years. This institution became 
well k n o w n for the study of Islamic religion and law and still continues 
to function even as it expands and modernizes its scope by embracing 
other branches of study. In Ethiopia, as w e have seen, scholarship was 
also nurtured and supported. There were centres of higher studies 
scattered throughout the highlands where specialists in c o m m o n law as 
well as some of die high-level state functionaries were trained. In Sierra 
Leone, the Church Missionary Society of London founded the Fourah 
Bay College in 1927 as a centre for religious studies. In the aftermath of 
the Second World W a r , the institution formed the basis for a n e w state 
university. 
There were other centres of higher education in other areas of the 
continent, including some established by the colonial powers, where 
instruction in law and the humanities as well as some vocational training 
were provided. For the most part, however, the 80 or more colleges and 
universities n o w operating in Africa came into being after political 
independence was attained, beginning in the late 1950s. Besides uni-
versities, there are different professional schools, advanced teacher-training 
colleges, polytechnics and colleges of technology. 
O n e year after the 1961 conference in Addis Ababa, a second conference 
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convened in Tananarive, Madagascar, to deal specifically with the develop-
ment of higher education in Africa for the ensuing 20 years.20 In spite of 
the fact that even rudimentary demographic data were still unavailable, 
the conference tried to determine h o w m a n y institutions of higher learning 
were needed and what roles they should play in the development of the 
region. At the outset, the conference sought to delineate the goals and 
purposes of higher education. T h e mission of higher learning, according 
to the conference participants, was to define and confirm the wishes 
and aspirations of the respective societies it served. While maintaining 
international standards of academic excellence, African higher education 
must provide the African peoples their rightful place in the world and 
cement their unity forever. T o this end, institutions of higher education 
must consider themselves the cultural centres of the communities in 
which they exist and the guardians and supporters of artistic, literary and 
musical heritages. T h e y should carry out research in these heritages and 
m a k e the fruits of their research available through concerts, galleries, 
m u s e u m s , libraries and archives. African universities, like all universities, 
were expected to advance the frontiers of knowledge through teaching 
and research as well as through consultancy and service to the larger 
community. 
T h e universities were established on models drawn either from Western 
Europe or North America. However, they derived their inspiration from 
African challenges. In most cases, the political leadership of the respective 
countries became involved in the development of higher education. Often 
heads of state or government served as chancellors of the institutions. 
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania urged the African university to 
remain truthful to world standards of objectivity and the pursuit of truth 
without at the same time becoming isolated from the community. H e 
challenged the University of East Africa to take an active part 'in the 
social revolution w e are engineering' without at the same time becoming 
a centre of opposition to the legally constituted government. Above all, 
the university must maintain 'the spirit of truth; it must be as objective 
and scientific as possible, and must fight prejudices of all kinds, at all 
times, and at all places . . . the University must think and force us to 
think in terms of humanity - not any sectoral interests'.21 T h e leaders of 
G h a n a , Nigeria, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, among others, 
reiterated similar hopes that the institutions would stand firm in the 
search for truth, objectivity, humanity and enlightenment even as they 
promised to discharge their responsibilities with a spirit of loyal dedication 
to their immediate society. 
T w o decades after the Tananarive Conference, analysis reveals that the 
20. UNESCO, 1963. 
21. Quoted in L . G . Cowan et al., 1965, pp. 309-13; see also pp. 317-21 for extracts 
from speeches by K w a m e Nkrumah of Ghana. 
693 
Africa since 1935
plate 22.3 Above: biology laboratory in a College of Education, University of Lagos,
Nigeria, ¡968; below: the Kenya Polytechnic and Technical Institution, 1968
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progress of African higher education has been uneven. Overall enrolment 
grew from 140000 in i960 to 1 169000 in 1980, a more than eight-fold 
increase. In 1980, 3 per cent of the college-age population were enrolled 
in universities, exceeding the projected 2 per cent. Indeed, enrolment in 
higher education continues to grow at a faster rate than enrolment at any 
other educational level despite the fact that governments have attempted 
to limit enrolment due to its high cost. This phenomenon illustrates the 
political realities of education. 
African institutions of higher learning are very expensive. T h e cost of 
a college student per year has been estimated at $927-1045 for Africa. 
For the most part, these costs are borne by the national treasuries. T h e 
students contribute very little, if anything, to the cost of higher education. 
University teachers are a m o n g the most highly-paid m e m b e r s of the 
community. Expatriate staff, still c o m m o n in m a n y institutions, are even 
more expensive in their salaries, transportation and various allowances. 
This places an onerous burden on the limited national resources of the 
respective countries. 
Nevertheless, since higher education is perceived as the ticket to the 
good life - power, money, prestige and influence - young people and 
their parents continue to d e m a n d adequate places in the universities. N o 
matter h o w reluctant they m a y be, politicians must respond. A s a result, 
enrolment in higher education continues to expand - sometimes at the 
expense of the lower levels of education. 
A number of additional problems remain unresolved at the tertiary 
level. It was the hope of African policy-makers that more university 
students would enroll in the science and technology fields than in the 
humanities and social sciences. D u e to a n u m b e r of complex social and 
cultural factors, as well as a lack of adequate facilities and qualified 
teachers at the lower levels of the school system, this is not happening. 
T h e result is skewed. It leaves the critical need for people with specific 
technical skills unfulfilled, while it maintains a surplus of trained workforce 
in certain other areas. S o m e recommendations that have been put forward 
to reduce this distortion are to strengthen instruction in the lower grades, 
to provide incentives that encourage people to pursue careers in science 
and technology, and to provide informed guidance regarding national 
priorities at all levels.22 
Another problem is the under-representation of female students in 
institutions of higher learning. In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, few 
females attend such institutions, more of them drop out before completing 
their studies, and those w h o graduate tend to concentrate in disciplines 
such as the social sciences and the humanities that are not considered 
national priorities. 
22. See T . G . Wagaw, forthcoming; also A . Habte, 1969; T . M . Yesufu, 1973; and 
J. F. A . Ajayi, 1987. 
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A s for overall quality, the institutions of higher learning have produced 
skilled people for the civil service, the military and business, which 
has in turn diminished Africa's reliance on expatriates. Nevertheless, 
expatriates still head the large commercial and industrial establishments 
in most African countries. 
African higher education is also constantly challenged to be relevant 
and responsive to the myriad needs of developing societies. Africa is 
predominantly rural. T h e skills needed in farm management, agricultural 
engineering, h o m e economics, repair and maintenance of farm equipment, 
animal husbandry, public health and extension education are in short 
supply. M a n y strongly believe that universities and colleges should 
provide, above all else, an adequate n u m b e r of trained persons capable 
of addressing and satisfying these needs. 
Conducting research, developing appropriate technology, and fac-
ilitating its deployment for the solution of development problems are 
additional critical functions that institutions of higher education are called 
upon to provide. T h e discovery, promotion and expansion of the artistic, 
literary and historical legacies of Africa are also responsibilities that rest 
on the shoulders of these institutions. 
Language issues are still on the agenda. T h e vast majority of the 
African people utilize their o w n respective languages in business 
and social intercourse. Yet, in most societies, the languages of govern-
ment, business and education remain the international languages -
French, English or Portuguese. These languages are alien in that 
they are not rooted in African soil and do not draw their continued 
vitality from the material and cultural essence of Africans. As vectors 
of values, self-identity and pride, the indigenous languages must be 
not only researched, codified and taught, but also used as languages of 
instruction at all levels and as keys to the knowledge and wisdom a c c u m u -
lated by African societies over the centuries. M o r e than ever before, 
the universities are looked to for leadership in meeting these important 
needs. 
T h e expansion and revitalization of the entire educational system is an 
ever-present challenge. T h e institutions of higher learning are called upon 
to lead efforts to delineate and articulate educational goals, the direction 
of the curricula, the improvement of learning and teaching materials, the 
training of teachers, and the study of h u m a n learning and development. 
T o the extent that they consciously and loyally accept their full educational 
responsibilities, they will come to merit the informed appreciation and 
the support of their societies, both material and moral. If they do not do 
this adequately, they deserve to be ignored. 
A n equally important development in higher education has been the 
redefinition of the concept of education. This redefinition has been 
followed by modifications in the philosophies and policies of education. 
However different the aims and purposes of education m a y be from one 
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state to the next, m a n y of them seem to have m o v e d towards adopting 
more or less the following views and policies. 
T h e first is the democratization and relevance of education. Education 
is more and more viewed in terms of the type of person it hopes to 
develop. This n e w person is seen as deeply rooted in the African 
environment without being isolated from wider h u m a n cultures and 
experience; conscious of his or her political, civic and family responsi-
bilities; and ready to play a dynamic role in the economic, social and 
cultural development of Africa. In addition to its powerful role in the 
evolution of democracy, education is increasingly viewed as an instrument 
for individual as well as societal enlightenment and self-fulfilment. 
In contrast to the 1960s w h e n the mission assigned to education was 
primarily economic, African educators are n o w taking a more c o m -
prehensive view of the nature of the individual child and the developmental 
aims of education. Since i960, m a n y African countries have concluded that 
education should concern itself with all aspects of individual development: 
physical, intellectual, athletic, social, moral and spiritual. Also, education 
is n o w considered the best means for the rediscovery, expansion and 
promotion of indigenous cultures and indigenous development.23 
S o m e policy-makers and educators fear that there is n o w too m u c h 
emphasis placed on individual development independent of the larger 
societal institutions such as the family, and the religious and political 
institutions. Others think that, while such reservations m a y have some 
merit, for the time being the educational system is better organized to 
provide the controlled environments necessary to produce enough well-
educated people to accelerate social development. T o this end, they argue, 
education, as broadly conceived, should be provided with all the support 
that it needs. 
A s the institutions move toward increased relevance to and engagement 
with social needs, staff and students m a y c o m e into direct conflict with 
established political authorities. T h e students and their mentors, the 
professoriate, m a y come to detect and analyse discrepancies in admin-
istration, incompetence, injustice or violations of basic h u m a n rights, 
and greed in the political establishment. A s members of the aspiring 
intelligentsia, students and academicians often express and at times act 
on such concerns, and the political leadership usually responds with some 
physical action which, if successful, threatens the well-being of the 
institutions. W h e n this happens, the university as well as the larger society 
suffers. This type of disharmonious interaction between colleges and 
universities on the one hand and the political leadership on the other, 
constitutes one of the ominous dangers that threaten the continued vitality 
23. For a further analysis of the evolution of policies and aims of education, see 
U N E S C O , U N E C A and O A U , 1982, Document E D / 8 2 / M I N E D A F / 3 , pp. 9-11; and 
Document E D / 8 2 / M I N E D A F / 1 , pp. 3-20. 
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of institutions of higher learning. Prudence, patience and a desire to 
understand and engage in informed dialogue m a y help ameliorate this 
problem and thereby free the institutions to discharge their critical 
responsibilities to Africa and humanity. 
Conclusion 
African societies like m a n y others had their indigenous systems of 
education for the transmission of values, skills and attitudes to the 
oncoming generation. Over time, the indigenous systems were joined by 
the Islamic and Christian types. A relative newcomer was the European 
model, religious as well as secular. T h e dominance assumed by this model 
during the colonial era has survived the departure of the Europeans. For 
the last three decades the independent African states have m a d e concerted 
efforts to extend such education to as large a number of people as 
resources permitted without succeeding in modifying m u c h of its alien 
character. 
Although progress has been m a d e in educating a significant number of 
people, not only for political and social consciousness but to build and 
operate the political, cultural, economic and industrial institutions, the 
efforts have not accomplished the desired goals relative to the quality and 
numbers of graduates. African education thus has very far to go. Millions 
of young people and adults have received no education (Table 22.1). 
Education is not equally accessible to all segments of society. Females are 
under-represented at all levels. Rural areas fare worse than urban areas. 
For a variety of reasons some ethnic or linguistic groups are inadequately 
served. T o o often the curricula and methods of instruction remain bookish 
and lack relevance to the local realities and problems confronting Africa. 
Qualified classroom teachers are in short supply. Adequately furnished 
school facilities, libraries and equipment are either non-existent or inad-
equate. T h e list of problems is long and compounded by the fact that 
the material and h u m a n resources in most African nations are limited 
and already over-extended. 
T h e urgent needs of African states include the consolidation of their 
independence, the expansion of their economies, and the revival and 
promotion of their authentic cultures. A s an agent of development and 
social change, the educational systems in Africa are called upon to do 
more than pass on values and knowledge to the younger generations. 
They must transform the thinking and attitudes of both individuals and 
groups in ways that facilitate the creation of conscious citizens, productive 
and dynamic workers, and the movement of African societies towards 
achieving goals of progress, justice and liberty.24 Given the budgetary 
24. See UNESCO, 1976, pp. 49-50. 
698 
Education and social change 
constraints mentioned earlier, imaginative approaches and the creative use 
of scarce resources must be applied to education at all levels. 
M o d e r n authentic education should be designed and implemented in 
the context of permanent, life-long education, available to all and aimed 
at developing aptitudes and behaviours in individuals which m a k e them 
active agents of their o w n futures and contributors to social evolution. 
T h e adoption of this authentic, modern , development-oriented edu-
cation requires the complete restructuring of the curricula, the teaching 
methods, and the preparation of teachers. It calls for, as early as possible, 
the development of curricula whose scientific and technical nature would 
be evident from the creative interaction of education with its physical 
and social environments. 
A s part of this restructuring, higher education must be redefined and 
assume a n e w role. Research and training at the three levels of education 
must be based upon economic and social realities in such a way that 
education will be better able to respond to development requirements. 
Imitation of imported conventions and models will not do. Creating n e w 
approaches, modifying the old and incorporating and making them work 
for Africa are all essential to the task. This authentic, endogenous 
development of education should be able to assimilate and adapt the most 
successful foreign experiments while, at the same time, subjecting the 
results of the innovations undertaken or borrowed to critical analysis and 
reflections vis-à-vis the realities mandated by African conditions.25 S o m e 
interesting experiments are being carried out today in this regard. T h e 
most fundamental ones observed are: the transition from elitist education 
to mass education; and the linking of the school with the life of the 
community and the strengthening of cultural and national unity. 
Approaches such as these, coupled with ongoing experimentation and 
research, are expected eventually to yield achievement of the sought-after 
goals. 
T A B L E 22.1 Illiteracy in Africa: estimates and projections of illiteracy by 
country, population aged 15 + (M = males, F = females) 
The following table presents, for those countries for which the necessary statistics 
were available, the estimates and projections of illiteracy rates by country in 
1985, 1990 and 2000, prepared by U N E S C O . The reader should keep in mind 
the conditional nature of these projections. 
For countries providing the relevant information, the total rate of illiteracy 
was derived from an analysis of the rates by demographic generation. Following 
the rate of a cohort from one census to another gives a relatively stable curve: 
adjusting this statistical curve permits the estimation and projection of the 
illiteracy rates in a satisfying manner. 
25. ibid., pp . 22-47. 
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For s o m e countries, with insufficient statistical information, an estimation of 
the global illiteracy rate (15 years and over) w a s m a d e , without taking into 
account the generation rates. In this w a y , b y using all the available data for all 
countries, a preliminary analysis was m a d e to decide the m o s t significant 
correlation between illiteracy and several socio-economic and educational vari-
ables. O n e multiple regression was finally decided u p o n with 3 explanatory 
variables: infant mortality, fertility rate and enrolment ratio in primary education. 
Following this procedure a certain n u m b e r of rates were estimated, but d u e to 
the uncertainty of s o m e of t h e m , not all are included in this table. 
Large decreases in the illiteracy rates are expected not only in those countries 
where enrolment has rapidly increased, but also in countries w h e r e important 
literacy campaigns have been carried out or are currently underway. T h e s e 
campaigns can completely change the illiteracy rates of certain cohorts, but due 
to insufficient information the impact of the m o r e recent campaigns has not been 
reflected in these projections. Consequently, it w a s considered preferable not to 
present estimates for certain countries such as Ethiopia and the United Republic 
of Tanzania w h i c h have recently carried out important literacy campaigns. 
Country 
Illiterate population 
(in thousands) 
1983 1990 2000 1985 
Total M F 
Illiteracy rates 
(percentages) 
1990 
Total M F 
2000 
Total M F 
Algeria 6062 6004 557851.4 37.3 64.9 42.6 30.2 54.5 28.1 19.3 36.7 
Angola 3117 3221 339564.3 50.4 77.4 58.3 44.4 71.5 46.6 33.6 59.1 
Benin* 1754 1904 2251 81.3 74.0 88.3 76.6 68.3 84.4 65.8 56.3 74.8 
Botswana* 168 175 189 30.0 18.5 39.6 26.4 16.3 34.9 19.9 12.4 26.5 
Burkina Faso* 3791 4137 481385.5 77.0 93.8 81.8 72.1 91.1 72.3 60.9 83.3 
Burundi* 1508 1482 1386 57.9 46.6 68.2 50.0 39.1 60.2 34.6 25.4 43.3 
Cameroon 2911 2912 2858 52.0 38.9 64.4 45.9 33.7 57.4 34.0 24.3 43.4 
Central African 1014 1028 1062 68.5 55.0 80.7 62.3 48.2 75.1 49.9 36.5 62.4 
Republic* 
Chad* 2230 2280 235477.0 66.0 87.5 70.2 57.8 82.1 56.6 43.3 69.4 
Congo 473 485 502 48.3 34.0 61.8 43.4 30.0 56.1 34.1 23.0 44.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 2687 2941 339751.3 37.5 65.7 46.2 33.1 59.8 36.5 25.1 48.2 
Egypt 15686 16492 18535 554 4°4 7°-5 5!-6 3 7 1 66.2 43.3 30.4 56.4 
Equatorial 127 127 128 55.1 40.6 68.8 49.8 35.9 63.0 39.5 27.4 51.1 
Guinea* 
Gabon 284 311 29743.9 3 0 1 5 6 9 39-3 26.5 51.5 30.7 20.3 40.7 
Gambia* 336 350 368 79.7 69.6 89.5 72.8 61.0 84.0 58.7 45.5 71.3 
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Country 
Ghana 
Guinea* 
Guinea-
Bissau* 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Madagascar 
Mali* 
Mauritania* 
Morocco 
Mozambique* 
Niger* 
Nigeria 
R w a n d a * 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone* 
Somalia* 
Sudan* 
Togo* 
Tunisia 
Uganda* 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Illiterate population 
(in thousands) 
1Q85 iggo 2000 
3316 
2879 
368 
3473 
811 
883 
1309 
3 357 
715 
7454 
5 593 
2 558 
28224 
1701 
2 433 
1783 
2877 
9040 
1 015 
1858 
4600 
5641 
1172 
1683 
3 258 
2 947 
367 
3728 
839 
890 
1305 
3 398 
740 
7526 
5880 
2683 
28723 
1838 
2525 
1830 
3003 
10 061 
1070 
1 762 
4908 
5466 
1170 
1776 
¡98S 
Total M 
2 974 47-2 
3060 
370 
4360 
862 
848 
1303 
3 235 
785 
7303 
6377 
2 945 
28448 
2149 
83.2 
69.8 
35° 
67.7 
43-5 
23.1 
77-3 
72-5 
58.3 
72.4 
78.5 
57-3 
54-6 
2672 67.9 
1909 
3235 
12541 
1173 
1497 
5 545 
4919 
1127 
1900 
86.7 
83.1 
75-6 
62.1 
42.4 
57-2 
341 
32.6 
37-7 
36.3 
74-5 
56.6 
22.9 
57-3 
29.9 
14.2 
69.0 
60.2 
45-7 
60.6 
67.9 
45-2 
40.7 
54-6 
79.2 
73-3 
60.7 
48.6 
32.2 
429 
20.6 
23-3 
30.2 
F 
57-8 
91.6 
81.9 
46 .8 
78.6 
59-7 
316 
84.6 
84.2 
70.5 
83.6 
88 .7 
68.9 
67.9 
80.7 
93-8 
91 .2 
90.3 
74-9 
52.7 
71 .0 
46 .8 
413 
450 
Illiteracy rates 
(percentages) 
'990 
Total M F 
39-7 
76.0 
635 
31.0 
60.5 
36.2 
19.8 
68.0 
66.0 
50-5 
67.1 
71.6 
49-3 
49.8 
61.7 
79-3 
75-9 
72.9 
567 
34-7 
51-7 
28.2 
27.2 
331 
30.0 
65.1 
49.8 
20.2 
50.2 
24.6 
12.3 
59-2 
529 
38.7 
54-9 
59-6 
37-7 
36.1 
48.1 
693 
63 9 
57-3 
43-6 
25.8 
37-8 
16.4 
19.2 
26.3 
49.0 
86.6 
76.0 
41-5 
71.2 
49.6 
27.1 
76.1 
78.6 
62.0 
78.7 
83.2 
60.5 
62.9 
74-9 
88.7 
86.0 
88.3 
693 
43-7 
65.1 
39-3 
34-7 
39-7 
2000 
Total M 
26.4 
61.5 
50.9 
23.8 
45-3 
24.0 
H S 
48.0 
531 
36.5 
55-4 
57-7 
34-4 
40.9 
49-5 
64.2 
61.3 
66.9 
45-6 
22.5 
41.i 
18.3 
18.2 
25-4 
195 
48.5 
37-6 
154 
36.1 
16.0 
9.0 
40.1 
39-7 
27.0 
434 
44-5 
24.9 
28.5 
36.3 
515 
47-9 
504 
33-9 
16.0 
28.8 
IO.I 
12.6 
20.0 
F 
33-2 
73-9 
6 3 4 
32.0 
54-7 
329 
19.7 
554 
65-9 
45-7 
66.9 
70 .6 
43-6 
52.8 
62.2 
76.2 
73-5 
83-3 
56.8 
29.1 
530 
26.3 
23.6 
30.6 
*Countries belonging to the group of least developed countries 
Source: U N E S C O (1990) Compendium of Statistics on Illiteracy, N o . 31, Division of 
Statistics on Education, Office of Statistics (Paris: U N E S C O ) . 
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Pan-Africanism: liberation 
and integration since igj^ 
Africa and its diaspora 
since 1935 
Joseph E. HARRIS 
in collaboration with 
Slimane Z E G H I D O U R 
In the twentieth century and especially after World W a r I, it was 
the American Negro w h o spoke forcefully for African Negro rights 
during the making of the Treaty of Versailles and the formation of 
the League of Nations at a time when w e were not in a position to 
speak for ourselves.1 
W e must never forget that they [diaspora blacks] are part of us. 
These sons and daughters of Africa were taken away from our shores, 
and . . . they have not forgotten their ancestral links . . . L o n g 
before m a n y of us were even conscious of our o w n degradation, 
these m e n fought for African national and racial equality . . . N o w 
that w e in Africa are marching towards the complete emancipation 
of this continent, our independent status will help in no small 
measure their efforts to attain full h u m a n rights and dignity as 
citizens of their country.2 
T h e greatest service you could render your country would be to 
influence thousands of Black people in the U . S . A . and the West 
Indies and let them c o m e and help us develop Ethiopia.3 
T h e quotations above clearly show that the historically dynamic relation-
ship between continental Africa and its diaspora, which were discussed 
in the previous volumes, continued after 1935. That relationship survived 
the slave trade to Asia, Europe, the Americas and elsewhere, and was 
sustained in host countries abroad by psychological and social experiences 
which led to protests, revolts and the development of international efforts 
to liberate themselves and to assure freedom and equality for Africans 
and their descendants abroad. While the type, demography and severity 
of slavery, as well as the ratio of slaves to master, greatly influenced the 
socialization process and thus helped to shape the diaspora African's 
perspective of Africa, so too did the colonial experience of continental 
Africans mould their views of African people overseas. In both situations 
1. A . Diop, 1958. 
2. K . Ntrumah, 1958a. 
3. M . Bayen, 1939. 
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Europeans, Americans and Asians derogated blackness and discouraged 
the establishment of an international black network. But the idea of a 
'redemption' of Africa to provide freedom for blacks and to demonstrate 
their ability to govern and contribute to world civilization emerged as a 
powerful force in the diaspora and led to the development of a number 
of international black movements for freedom. A s was clearly brought 
out in Chapter 29 of Volume VII, the peak of that emergence of African 
and diaspora efforts occurred in the pan-African movement between 1900 
and 1935, with the greatest activities during the 1920s, thanks to the 
efforts of Marcus Garvey, W . E . B . DuBois and others in Europe and 
the United States, and those of African students, especially in France 
and England. W h a t , then, happened in the field of the diaspora from 
1935 onwards? 
In the first place, the migration of Africans into Europe, Asia and the 
N e w World continued after 1935 though there was a significant change 
in the motivating factors, volume and direction. T h e fundamental cause 
of the diaspora during the centuries to about the end of the nineteenth 
century was, of course, the slave trade across the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Indian and above all the Atlantic Oceans. (See Volumes III and VII.) 
F r o m the beginning of this century - particularly from 1935 until the 
1960s — the colonial system became the principal motivating factor. A n 
increasing number of Africans seeking freedom from economic and 
political oppression migrated to European capitals. This was particularly 
true of the French North African and the Belgian colonies and especially 
of Algeria, from which thousands of people migrated to France during 
the period under review. During the Algerian war of independence, for 
example, there were about 450000 Algerians in France and very few of 
them returned h o m e . 4 Another important push factor was the need for 
higher education in particular which was the direct outcome of the neglect 
of higher education by nearly all the colonial powers. Thus the number 
of African students going to Europe and the United States increased 
greatly between 1935 and i960 and quite a substantial number of them 
never returned h o m e . During this period the migration of Africans to 
South America, the Caribbean and India virtually ended, an overwhelming 
majority of them heading towards Europe and the United States compared 
with the previous two centuries. Although no figures are available, it can 
be confidently asserted that the number of Africans involved was rather 
small, confined as it was mainly to students. 
After the independence revolution, that is, from the 1960s onwards, 
the diaspora continued although again its nature and motivation as well 
as its direction changed. It became more and more the migration not of 
students but rather of technical and highly qualified professionals such 
as doctors, engineers, businessmen, musicians, artists, university lecturers 
4. For an excellent account of Algerian migrations to Europe, see C . R . Ageron, 1979. 
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and professors. During this period, the direction also resumed its world-
wide aspect of the pre-twentieth-century era, for Africans moved not only 
to Europe and America but also into the Middle East, the socialist 
countries, Canada, Australia and the South Pacific. There are African 
lecturers and professors lecturing at the University of Papua N e w Guinea! 
This is a phenomenon which has n o w become k n o w n as the 'brain drain' 
and it assumed really alarming proportions in the 1960s and 1970s but 
seems fortunately to be on the decline n o w . During this period, African 
physicians, dentists, scientists, engineers, teachers and so forth become 
familiar figures abroad. While Africa needed their expertise, they became 
positive evidence that Africa had arrived, intellectually, culturally and 
politically. 
Another very recent feature of the diaspora is the gender drain which 
involves the migration of literate and even semi-literate, qualified and 
unqualified, African w o m e n out of Africa, especially from the west coast, 
to Europe — particularly to France, G e r m a n y and the United K i n g d o m -
and to the Americas in search of jobs (especially nursing) and of fortune 
(which has involved them in activities related to smuggling and drug-
trafficking). T h e n there is the third feature of the modern diaspora, the 
male equivalent of the female phenomenon, an increasing infiltration into 
European capitals of Africans, semi-educated, unskilled and untrained, in 
search again of fortune through all sorts of ways, fair or foul, ranging 
from dish-washing and manual labour to smuggling and drug-trafficking. 
T h e final new category of the recent diaspora consists of those w h o 
leave their countries to settle abroad either permanently or temporarily 
mainly for political reasons. S o m e of them are victims of civil wars in 
their o w n countries. Others are victims of inter-border disputes between 
two independent African countries; others are unsuccessful plotters and 
organizers of coup d'Etat against ruling governments; while finally, others 
are those w h o are expelled from their o w n countries by their o w n 
governments for one reason or the other, such as spying for other 
countries. This did occur, for instance, in 1986 in G h a n a when eight 
Ghanaians accused of spying for the United States were deprived of their 
Ghanaian citizenship and repatriated in exchange for one Ghanaian 
security agent operating in the United States! 
A s can be easily deduced from the above, the main reasons for the 
continuing and changing nature of the diaspora are the increasingly 
deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions since the inde-
pendence revolution (discussed in other chapters of this volume) and the 
consequent need to emigrate to seek n e w employment, job satisfaction, 
quick fortune or even adventure. 
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T h e Africans in the diaspora since 1935 
W h a t have the Africans in the diaspora been doing in their new homes 
in the area of pan-Africanism since the 1930s? As w e have seen, all those 
pan-Africanist activities in the Americas as well as in Europe virtually 
disappeared after the Pan-African Congress of 1927 in N e w York. T w o 
events of the late 1930s - Italy's aggression against Ethiopia (1935-41) 
and the rise of fascism in Europe - greatly stimulated pan-Africanism 
and pan-Africanist activities, especially in Europe and the Americas, 
culminating first in the Manchester Pan-African Congress in 1945 and 
partly in the independence revolution and the overthrow of the colonial 
system in the 1950s and 1960s. These two events dramatized not only 
the dependent relationship of Africa to Europe but also the ineffectiveness 
and lack of determination of the powers individually or under the auspices 
of the League of Nations to assure freedom and justice. 
In England, C . L . R . James and others founded the International 
African Friends of Ethiopia (IAFE) in 1936. Largely through lectures, 
petitions and demonstrations the I A F E w o n support for Ethiopia. 
However, a broader-based more militant organization, the International 
African Service Bureau (IASB), was formed in 1937 and became more 
effective in wedding local issues to the Ethiopian crisis. T h e I A S B 
was designed to serve blacks in Britain educationally, economically and 
politically. Through its paper, International African Opinion, the organ-
ization had wide appeal and sought co-operation with groups in the 
United States.5 
In the midst of these developments in England was George T h o m a s 
Nathaniel Griffith, a Guyanese better k n o w n as Ras Makonnen . Having 
studied in and made a number of black friends in the United States, 
Makonnen became a major, frequently low-profile force among blacks in 
Britain. After having worked and saved money, he opened several res-
taurants and clubs in Manchester where he promoted causes of concern 
for workers and blacks. His several businesses included the Ethiopian 
Teashop, Cosmopolitan, F o r u m Club, Belle Etoile and others where 
future black leaders of Africa and the Caribbean debated issues of the 
day. Moreover, a number of black students supported themselves as 
university students by working in Makonnen's businesses.6 
With die help of his fellow compatriot, D r Peter Milliard, the Kenyan 
J o m o Kenyatta, and George Padmore, Makonnen established the Pan-
African Publishing C o m p a n y which published the Pan-Africa monthly 
periodical. T h e Economist was his bookstore.7 This institutional base 
paved the way for the most successful meeting of black nationalists prior 
5. V. P. Thompson, 1969, p. 32. 
6. K . King, 1971, pp. 135-8. 
7. ibid., p. 145. 
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to the era of independence. M o r e specifically, that core of leadership was 
joined by the South African Peter Abrahams, Sierra Leonean Wallace-
Johnson, C . L . R . James and later K w a m e N k r u m a h , to form in 1944 the 
Pan-African Federation which organized the momentous Fifth Pan-
African Congress which was convened in Manchester in 1945. 
In the United States, under the leadership of William Leo Hansberry, 
blacks from Africa and the diaspora in 1934 organized the Ethiopian 
Research Council ( E R C ) to disseminate information about Ethiopia and 
to help forge an international black network to work on behalf of Africa-
related causes. T h e organizers — William Leo Hansberry, Ralph Bunche 
and William Steen of the United States; Hosea Nyabongo of Uganda and 
Malaku Bayen of Ethiopia - recognized that Ethiopia had great appeal 
among African peoples and that historically the consciousness of the 
Ethiopian heritage had inspired a redemptive ideology which continued 
as a recurring force of identity and solidarity in Africa and the diaspora.8 
Although the E R C was essentially a small group of professors and 
students associated with Howard University, it established functional 
relations with committed individuals in several United States' cities, 
Ethiopia, England, France, Italy and the Caribbean. T h e significance of 
the organization stems from its role as a clearing-house for information 
on Ethiopia and a facilitator/co-ordinator of activities on behalf of 
Ethiopia. 
W h e n Italy invaded Ethiopia m a n y African-Americans expressed eager-
ness to join the Ethiopian military, but the United States proclaimed 
neutrality and prevented Americans from participating in the war. In 
spite of that official position, two African-American pilots, Hubert Julian 
and John Robinson, encouraged by the E R C , did go to Ethiopia to fight. 
Robinson became the emperor's private pilot and aviation adviser. K n o w n 
as the Brown Condor, Robinson flew several missions for Ethiopia and 
his plane was shot d o w n on one occasion.9 
M o r e significant than military participation was the diaspora's moral 
and material contributions. Blacks in colonial Africa as well as the 
diaspora organized public demonstrations and wrote editorials and articles 
supportive of the Ethiopian cause. A number of pro-Ethiopian organ-
izations emerged in the United States. O n e notable example was the 
Friends of Ethiopia ( F O A ) organized by Willis Huggins, an African-
American teacher w h o had visited Europe and elicited endorsements from 
Ethiopia's ambassadors in London and France. Within a year, the F O A 
had branches in 106 cities and 19 states. Joint fund-raising plans were 
m a d e with the International African Friends of Ethiopia in London.1 0 
8. Ethiopian Research Council, 1935; J. E . Harris, 1974, ch. 1. 
9. J. Cheeks, 1936; and J. Cheeks, unpublished M S on his experiences in Ethiopia 
with Robinson. 
10. W . N . Huggins and J. G . Jackson, 1937, pp. 90-1, n.d., and 1935. 
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Another notable example of support came from the Medical Committee 
for the Defense of Ethiopia, a group of black doctors from the Caribbean 
and the United States practising in N e w York. They sent at least one, 
and possibly two, shiploads of medical supplies to the embattled Ethi-
opians. Other groups in the United States, Jamaica, Trinidad, Panama, 
Barbados, St Lucia, and elsewhere distributed pro-Ethiopian pamphlets, 
held mass meetings and expressed their pro-Ethiopian sentiments. Not 
surprisingly, pro-Ethiopian sentiment was especially vocal among the 
Rastafarians w h o earlier had deified Emperor Haile Selassie and adopted 
his previous title, Ras Tafari." 
Diaspora support continued even after the emperor was forced into 
exile. Fund-raising continued and in at least one case African-Americans 
engaged in private diplomacy. A delegation was dispatched to London 
and persuaded the emperor, over U S State Department objections, to 
send an emissary to rally support for Ethiopia. Thus in 1936, Malaku 
Bayen, a 1935 H o w a r d University Medical School graduate and a founder 
of E R C , arrived in N e w York as the emperor's emissary to the American 
hemisphere. Bayen and his African-American wife were well received by 
African-Americans and some whites. A number of large fund-raising 
rallies was held. But die greatest result of Bayen's presence in the United 
States was the Organization of the Ethiopian World Federation ( E W F ) 
in 1937. Bayen publicly stated that ' W e are out to create a United States 
of Africa'. H e also held that the E W F would instil black pride in the 
black world. B y 1940 Bayen was praising Marcus Garvey and crediting 
the U N I A with having laid the foundation for the E W F . " 
Like Garvey, the Bayens initiated an official publication, The Voice of 
Ethiopia, 'a paper for the Vast Universal Black Commonwealth and 
Friends of Ethiopia Everywhere'. The Voice played a central role in the 
redefinition of African people. It opposed the use of the term 'Negro' as 
an 'insulting tool' to divide black people. ' W e are no more West Indian 
and American Black people, but true Ethiopians'; 'Black America, Ethiopia 
is yours'. T h e term 'black' gained popularity: 'Black M e n Let U s Get 
Together'; ' N o Black M a n Shall Shed His Blood for Europe Until 
Ethiopia Is Free'. These and other slogans were popularized by The 
Voice.1* 
The Voice featured articles by George Padmore, N n a m d i Azikiwe, 
W . E . B . DuBois, J. A . Rogers, Akiki Nyabongo and others. Quizzes on 
black history appeared regularly in The Voice along with pieces on such 
black personalities as Toussaint L'Ouverture of Haiti, Menelik of Ethiopia, 
11. U S Archives, Diplomatic Branch, 884, 142/19, Photo/Article, Enclosure; see also 
L . Barrett, 1977. 
12. Voice of Ethiopia, 19 March 1938, 6 M a y 1939, June 1939, 8 July 1939, 3 February 
1940, 24 M a y 1940. 
13. ibid., 19 March 1938, 29 April 1939, 24 June 1939, 15 July 1939, and 29 July 1939. 
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James Aggrey of the Gold Coast, Richard Wright of the United States, 
and many others. 
Because branches of the E W F were established throughout the United 
States and the Caribbean, one can get an idea of the scope of its impact. 
O n 23 July 1939, an estimated 800 Jamaicans witnessed the unveiling of 
an E W F charter, and A m y Garvey gave the main address. In November 
1939, a charter was unveiled in Havana, Cuba, and in Tela, Spanish 
Honduras. Several speakers on these occasions praised Garvey's work.14 
A regular section on ' N e w s of the Black Commonwealth' gives an 
indication of the influence of The Voice and the organization. N e w s and 
letters appeared from Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Panama, Jamaica, H o n -
duras, Venezuela, Nigeria and elsewhere. Reports of The Voice's articles 
appeared in The Comet (Nigeria), The Boston Chronicle (United States), 
The Panama Tribune (Panama), The Union Messenger (St Kitts) and The 
People (Trinidad). Contributions to the Ethiopian cause were acknow-
ledged from British Guyana; Bocas del Toro and G a m b o a , Panama; 
San Andres Island, Colombia; Westmoreland, Jamaica; Maracaibo and 
Longunillas, Venezuela. 
W h e n Haile Selassie regained the throne in 1941 he supported the 
establishment of the first Ethiopian co-educational school which was 
founded by Mignon Ford, a Barbadian w h o had emigrated from the 
United States in 1930. T h e physicians, pilots, teachers and other African-
American emigres of that period had returned to the United States. But 
in 1943, William Leo Hansberry arranged for several African-Americans 
to go to Ethiopia where they served as teachers and journalists. Others 
from Barbados, Guyana, Puerto Rico and the United States went as pilots 
and mechanics.15 
Italy's invasion of Ethiopia also inspired the organization in 1937 of 
the International Committee on Africa which in 1941 became the Council 
on African Affairs.16 T h e founder was M a x Yergan, an African-American 
w h o had worked for about 20 years in Eastern and Southern Africa as 
secretary for the Y M C A . H e was no doubt influenced by his contacts 
with the African National Congress and Industrial Commercial Workers 
Union in South Africa. Long committed to 'helping Africa', Yergan 
convinced a number of blacks and liberal whites to join him in founding 
the Council. Paul Robeson, the noted concert singer, William Alphaeus 
Hunton, also an e x - Y M C A worker, and Yergan were the principal leaders 
of the organization while wealthy white liberals provided financial support. 
14. ibid., 19 August 1939, 5 November 1939, 11 November 1939, and 9 December 
1939-
15. U S Archives, 884, 01A/72, Employment of American Citizens by the Ethiopian 
Government, 13 March 1944. 
16. H . Lynch, 1978. 
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plate 23.1 Some outstanding personalities of the African diaspora, famous for their fight for
blacks' rights: above left, George Padmore; above right, Paul Robeson and W. E. B. DuBois;
below left, Marcus Garvey; below right, Max Yergan
Yergan, Hunton and Robeson subscribed to Marxism and had good
connections with the American Communist Party, although they do not
seem to have been members at the time. Still, their ideological persuasion
made the Council the object of public attack. At that time, however, the
general political line was a 'united front against fascism' which included
co-operation with the communists. Many intellectuals, trades-unionists
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and others co-operated with communists to achieve particular goals, and 
blacks were no exception. 
T h e Council's objectives were the promotion of the political liberation 
of Africans and the advancement of their social and economic status 
through the dissemination of relevant and current information, facilitation 
of training for Africans in Europe and America, and arrangement of 
mutual exchange of visits and co-operation among African people. O n e 
example of the latter was a public meeting between D . T . T . Jabavu and 
A . B . . X u m a , American-educated South Africans w h o were leaders of the 
All-African National Convention ( A A N C ) organized in 1935 to promote 
the rights of black South Africans. 
After 1941 the Council became a more active advocate for Africa and 
decolonization generally. Branches were organized in several United 
States' cities and included Rosebery T . B o k w e , a South African medical 
doctor w h o was also a m e m b e r of the African National Congress ( A N C ) . 
Letters and petitions were sent to United States' and European govern-
ments and international bodies, and encouragement was given to African 
labour and nationalist groups. O n e indication of the Council's influence 
m a y be seen by the banning of its publication New Africa, in Kenya, 
South Africa and the Belgian Congo. 
As a precursor of a specifically African lobby in the United States, 
several Council members met in 1944 with officials of the recently-
established Africa Division of the U S State Department and recommended 
a pro-African policy. Indeed, the use of a few black experts on Africa 
seemed to have been a result. At the initial U N Conference which 
convened in San Francisco in 1945, Yergan and Eslanda Robeson called 
for the promotion of economic, political and social welfare of Africans. 
T h e Council specifically urged that the mandates and all African territories 
of Spain, Portugal and Italy, except Eritrea, be placed under U N trustee-
ship and that South Africa not become a m e m b e r of the trusteeship council. 
After the Second World W a r , the Council increasingly became anti-
American in its statements. This resulted partly from the Cold W a r 
developments that pitted East against West, but also because of the 
accelerating freedom movements in Africa and the diaspora. T h e Council 
showed particular concern for South Africa, not only because of Yergan's 
experiences there but also because of the increasing repression of blacks, 
especially from the late 1940s. Famine in South Africa exacerbated the 
situation. However, the Council established the Committee for South 
African Famine Relief which sent m o n e y and food to alleviate the 
condition of hunger. 
South Africa's incorporation of South-West Africa became a source of 
vigorous protest. T h e Council published editorials and pamphlets on the 
issue. O n e such pamphlet was written by I. B . Tabata, w h o first published 
the piece under the aegis of the A N C in 1945. Hunton wrote pieces about 
famine and political repression in South Africa; he also sent periodic 
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reports of U N proceedings to African nationalists in Africa, Europe and 
the United States. 
T h e board of the Council became all black in 1949. Paul Robeson was 
chosen as chairman, W . E . B . DuBois as vice-chairman, and Hunton as 
executive secretary. T h e growing radicalism of the Council became clear 
and brought greater harassment from the U S government; but the Council 
continued its fight for African issues until its demise in 1955. It had thus 
paved the way for a more extensive and effective African-American lobby 
on African and black world issues for the future. 
T h e Fifth Pan-African Congress 
T h e several organizations and meetings in Europe, Africa and the United 
States to co-ordinate actions on behalf of Africans and their descendants 
abroad culminated in the convening of the Fifth Pan-African Congress 
in Manchester, England, in 1945. This Congress will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 25. Suffice it to point out here that it was this Congress 
under the chairmanship of DuBois that really launched pan-Africanism 
as a liberation movement in Africa rather than in Europe and the 
Americas. Essentially, the Congress represented a synthesis of DuBois' 
intellectualism and Garvey's pragmatism, and signalled to the world that 
the primary struggle for liberation had transferred to Africa and its 
leaders. Moreover, whereas Blacks in the United States and the English-
speaking Caribbean had been the most outspoken and effective leaders in 
pan-Africanism up to 1945, in the 1950s the movement for equality within 
the United States became the major locus of activity while Barbados, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago attempted to make their Federation 
function. 
Links to Africa, however, continued. Back in 1947 Alioune Diop, a 
Senegalese in Paris, founded Présence africaine, a widely-read journal 
devoted to African culture. In 1957 Diop issued a call for a world 
conference of Black writers. Out of that conference emerged the Société 
africaine de culture ( S A C ) which led to its U S branch, the American 
Society of African Culture ( A M S A C ) headed by John A . Davis. A M S A C 
published the African Forum. Both the S A C and A M S A C collaborated 
in a number of conferences, exhibits and publications, thereby strength-
ening pan-African links. 
By the mid-1960s, Malcolm X , Minister of the Nation of Islam ('Black 
Muslims'), had emerged as a very popular figure among African-Americans 
generally, but especially the young. H e urged a study of the African 
roots and self-determination among Blacks. In 1964 he organized the 
Organization of African-American Unity which he hoped would unite 
African-Americans in their national struggle and co-operate with the 
O A U as well. His assassination in February 1965 cut short his efforts. 
But his Autobiography by Alex Haley and The Wretched of the Earth by 
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plate 23.2 Malcolm X, a passionate figure in the fight for Black rights
the Martinican, Franz Fanon, became virtual handbooks for emerging
young leaders of the 'Black Power' movement, including Stokely Car-
michael, Walter Rodney and others.
By the late 1960s, young African-Americans in the United States
became the vanguard of a resurgent international African consciousness.
Not only did they demonstrate their pride in life-styles derivative of
Africa wearing dashikis, decorative beads and bracelets, natural hair¬
styles, and assuming African names - they demanded Black studies
(studies of Africa and the diaspora) in their schools and colleges. Thus
a proliferation of publications appeared to support the introduction and
expansion ofBlack studies, African-American studies, pan-African studies,
African studies and so forth at many black and white American colleges
and universities. Continental and diaspora Africans headed and taught in
those programmes.
The Black-studies movement owed some of its success to the withdrawal
of a number of African and diaspora scholars from the United States
African Studies Association meeting in Canada in 1969.17 That breakaway
17. I. S. Reid, 1976.
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group, the African Heritage Studies Association ( A H S A ) , began to hold 
its o w n conferences, sponsor publications and generally encourage the 
reinterpretation of black peoples' history from a black perspective. It 
promoted the dissemination in all schools of materials on the African 
heritage, and it encouraged international collaboration among black intel-
lectuals. T h e high point of the A H S A occurred at its annual meeting in 
1970 when over 2000 delegates from Africa and the diaspora met at 
H o w a r d University. 
There was also in the United States official black concentration on 
African and diaspora issues. Beginning in 1969 black congressmen began 
informal meetings under the chairmanship of Charles Diggs. T h e group 
formally organized in 1971 as the Congressional Black Caucus. In addition 
to monitoring and recommending policies for African-American concerns, 
the Caucus did the same for African and Caribbean issues. Several Caucus 
members have travelled widely throughout Africa and the Caribbean, 
criticized United States' policies there and initiated legislation supportive 
of those areas. This group of black congressmen has on several occasions 
been able to mobilize support within and outside Congress and has thus 
become a significant force for freedom and equality in the United States 
and abroad. 
Since 1969 blacks in the United States have formed m a n y cultural, 
political and developmental organizations with a principal interest in 
Africans and links with the diaspora: African-American Scholars Council, 
American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, African Liberation 
D a y Coordinating Committee, Africare, Congress of African People, 
and others. A n d once again, those organizations - along with similar 
developments in Africa - facilitated communication a m o n g African 
peoples and led to the convening of the Sixth Pan-African Congress in 
D a r es Salaam in 1974. 
Professor St Clair Drake, pan-Africanist theorist and practitioner, has 
observed that the First Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar, Senegal, in 1966 
signalled that cultural pan-Africanism would provide a broader base of 
identification and co-operation a m o n g African people than political pan-
Africanism. For those observers less clairvoyant than Drake, the Sixth 
Pan-African Congress of 1974 certainly revealed the limited political 
influence of diaspora Blacks in continental forums. Diaspora delegates to 
the Congress witnessed the downgrading of race by a resolution which 
criticized 'skin-colour polities'. United States' African-Americans were 
also criticized for not pursuing an alliance with white workers.'8 
Drake again is helpful in analysing the problem. H e has distinguished 
between racial pan-Africanism, which dominated the early pan-Africanists, 
and continental pan-Africanism, which appeals to those whose priority is 
continental unity. T h e latter not only includes North Africa; it also 
18. St C . Drake and R . B . Laporte, 1982. 
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encourages non-blacks from countries like Brazil and Cuba - with large, 
possibly majority, communities of African ancestry - to represent and to 
speak for blacks w h o frequently are denied opportunities to represent 
themselves because of political, economic or educational inequity. Racial 
pan-Africanists adamantly denounce this situation. 
Pan-Africanism is in fact undergoing a transformation. Continental 
Africans are primarily preoccupied with issues affecting national unity 
and development; problems c o m m o n across the continent and which 
therefore encourage continental unity as a priority. T h e kind of resources 
African countries require for development, the magnitude of that need 
and the structures that are available to facilitate communication to acquire 
the necessary resources, all favour country-to-country relations and major 
funding from international agencies and super powers. Black-led countries 
outside Africa have similar regional-based priorities which require sub-
stantial funding. A n d diaspora Blacks without control over their govern-
ments have limited opportunities to render the vital support needed in 
Africa or elsewhere in the black world, unless they develop strong non-
governmental structures with links abroad. 
T h e United States is the only country capable of substantial assistance 
and which has a large and influential population of African ancestry 
sensitive to black world issues. But that population is a minority and 
neither makes nor implements foreign policy. Moreover, they and other 
diaspora Africans generally accept their national identity. Consequently, 
the early pan-African idea of a mass return to Africa is not an appealing 
proposition to them or to Africans, whose people are already under-
employed and underserviced in the social sector. Consequently, more 
realistic considerations of h o w diaspora Africans can apply pressure at 
h o m e and extend economic and political assistance are issues that dominate 
contemporary black debates. 
Given the fact of continental over racial unity in Africa, ideological 
differences and the reality of citizenship in Africa and the diaspora, what 
is the future of the African-diaspora connection? Both retain a strong 
psychological and social identity which reinforces international networks 
and can exert pressure on national governments to support policies and 
programmes in the interest of African peoples. This is the philosophy 
which sustains TransAfrica, the African-American lobby for Africa and 
the Caribbean. That organization, which publishes TransAfrica Forum, is 
well respected by the Organization of African Unity and other world 
bodies. Indeed, TransAfrica is a product of earlier African-American 
lobbies and n o w has the expertise, black world constituency and support 
for its efforts. 
Other examples of the TransAfrican approach m a y be seen in the 
following conferences: F E S T A C - 7 7 , the World Black and African Festival 
of Arts and Culture in Lagos, Nigeria, which led to the establishment of 
the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization in Lagos to 
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promote communication in Africa and the diaspora through international 
forums, exhibitions and publications; the Congress of Black Culture in 
the Americas which convened in Colombia (1977), Panama (1980), Brazil 
(1982) and produced several publications; the Festival of the African 
Diaspora in Brazil (1979), Haiti (1980), Suriname (1982), Senegal (1983) 
and Barbados (1985); U N E S C O ' s Meetings of Experts on the Diaspora 
in Haiti (1978), Barbados (1980), Benin (1983) and Brazil (1985) and 
which have produced several publications; the First and Second African 
Diaspora Studies Institutes at Howard University (1979) and the Uni -
versity of Nairobi, Kenya (1981), which resulted in a book and a newsletter 
in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish; the World Conferences on 
Orisha Tradition and Culture at the University of Ife, Nigeria (1981), 
and Bahia, Brazil (1983); the African/Afro-American Connection: F r o m 
Dependency to Self-Reliance in Monrovia, Liberia (1983) which produced 
' T h e Liberia Declaration' calling for co-operation among African peoples 
and the pooling of their resources.19 Other conferences with equally 
important goals and results have no doubt met. 
T h e proliferation of diaspora organizations and conferences has already 
strengthened the means of communication a m o n g African peoples, elev-
ated their level of pride and action, stimulated m a n y research projects 
and publications and thus expanded the pool of expertise and knowledge 
of African peoples. However, several descendant African groups remain 
too unknown because of limited research and publications. 
Expanding horizons of African consciousness. 
It is significant to note that the African diaspora is virtually global and 
that several of the lesser-known communities of African descent strongly 
affirm their African identity. In South America, generally, the official line 
is that descendant Africans have been or are being assimilated into the 
Hispanic and Lusophonic cultures, racial identity in most census reports 
was discontinued decades ago, and racial issues are difficult to identify. 
Nevertheless, African-South Americans not only reflect their Africanity 
in literature and song, they have also organized to challenge racism and 
co-ordinate self-help, educational and cultural programmes.20 
Although the African presence in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay has been virtually eclipsed, the small number of blacks in 
Peru has a theatre group, Expression Negra Peruna, and an institute, the 
19. T h e African Diaspora Studies Newsletter, vol. 1, no. i, was published in 1948 in 
English, French, Spanish and Portuguese; see also Carib, 1981. 
20. L . Rout, 1976, is an excellent book on this subject; important current sources 
include Palenque, the official publication of the Centro Cultural Afro-Ecuatoriano; the 
Boletín Informativo, the regular official publication of the Instituto de Investigaciones Afro-
Peruana, L ima, Peru; Centro De Estudos E Investigaciones, 1977; and J. M . R . Guedez, 
1985. 
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Instituto de Investigaciones Afro-Peruana. In Ecuador, where estimates of 
the black population range up to i o or 15 per cent, with a few districts 
reportedly over 50 per cent, the Centro de Estudios Afro-Ecuatorianos has 
active branches in several cities and villages. In 1983 the Centro hosted a 
Pan-American Conference on Black W o m e n . In Venezuela, with a black 
population of nearly 30 per cent, there is the Section Africa Y Afro-
America at the Instituto Autónomo Biblioteca Nacional. Colombia's black 
population is estimated between 30 and 40 per cent, making it the largest 
African-Hispanic community of African descent. T h e dominant African-
Colombian organizations are: the Colombian Folklore Research F o u n -
dation, the Centre for Research on Black Culture and the Black Cultural 
Movement . T h e former organized a national colloquium on African-
Colombian bibliography in 1983; the latter publishes a monthly, Presentía 
Negra." 
In the case of Brazil, which shares the tradition of historically projecting 
a post-slavery assimilationist policy, there is unmistakable evidence of a 
sizeable, possibly 50 per cent, African-Brazilian population which would 
make African-Brazilians the largest diaspora community, and it has had 
a significant cultural impact on the non-African descendants. Still, except 
for the voluntary emigration of thousands of African-Brazilians to the 
Gold Coast, Togo , D a h o m e y and Nigeria during the nineteenth century, 
black Brazilians seem to have had very little success in establishing or 
sustaining links with continental Africa or the diaspora until relatively 
recently. 
T h e newspaper, Afro-Brazil, is published in Salvadore, Bahia, where 
the largest African-Brazilian community lives. Also in Salvadore is the 
Centro de Estudos Afro-Orientais which houses the Museo Afro-Brasileiro. 
In the federal capital, Brasilia, a core of researchers at Pro Memoria 
concentrates on the African-Brazilian heritage. 
T h e Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiaticos of the Candido M e n d e s Univ-
ersidade in Rio de Janeiro sponsors lectures and publications on African-
Brazilian subjects. Also in Rio is the Instituto De Pesquisas e Estudos Afro-
Brasileiros ( I P E A F R O ) headed by Abdias Nascimento, a federal deputy 
of African descent. I P E A F R O publishes the journal, Afrodiaspora." 
T h e Movimento Negro Unificado Contra a Discriminacao Racial annually 
sponsors the National D a y of Black Consciousness on 20 November, the 
day when Z u m b i do Palmares, the African founder of the Palmares 
Quilombo, was killed by the Portuguese in 1695. A. m o n u m e n t to 
commemorate Z u m b i has been approved by the Brazilian government. 
21. Presentía Negra is the regular official publication of the Centro para la investigación 
de la cultura negra, Bogota, Colombia. 
22. Afrodiaspora: Revisto Quadrimestal Do Mundo Negro (Rio de Janeiro), edited by 
A . D . Nascimento; and Estudos Afro-Asiaticos, published by the Centro de Estudos 
Afro-Asiáticos, Rio de Janiero, are both regular publications. 
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Branches of Movimento Negro exist in the United States and elsewhere.23 
T h e Central American countries share the Hispanic tradition. S o m e of 
them also have two types of descendant Africans, native and immigrant. 
T h e former are citizens by birth; the latter are descendants of immigrant 
workers from neighbouring English-speaking countries. A major conflict 
has thus stemmed from governmental policies of Hispanization. This is 
especially evident in Costa Rica where nineteenth-century mercenary 
soldiers and later workers for railroad construction and banana plantations 
arrived from Jamaica, Trinidad, and other Caribbean islands.24 
Panama has a similar problem, but unlike Costa Rica, it has a large if 
not majority black population of native and immigrant groups. T h e latter 
were largely Barbadian, Jamaican, Trinidadian and some from the United 
States, and were used by the United States to construct and fortify the 
Panama Canal. T h e United Fruit C o m p a n y also imported Blacks as 
plantation workers. Those American employers established their cus-
tomary segregation practices which further aggravated relations. There 
are, however, Black consciousness groups of both black populations. 
Blacks in Mexico comprise a very small minority, possibly no more 
than 1 per cent. T h e n e w African Studies Centre, however, is actively 
promoting interest in African culture and pan-Africanism. In Cuba, where 
the African population has been estimated at between 30 and 40 per cent, 
unlike other Spanish-speaking Blacks, African-Cubans have been vocal 
participants in Cuban politics for most of this century. However, although 
Nicolas Guillen founded the negrismo school of Cuban poetry which drew 
on African roots, the government emphasizes the theme of nationalism 
over diverse identities. But the African influence remains strong in 
music, literature, religion and life-styles, all of which probably have been 
reinforced by the participation of African-Cubans in the military and 
related activities in Ethiopia and Angola.25 
Although Asia historically received m a n y slaves, a small number of 
free merchants and others from Africa, there are virtually no studies of 
those developments or their contemporary impact. Serious studies remain 
to be conducted on the African dimension of the world from Turkey 
through the Middle East, South and East Asia, and the islands of the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
S o m e of the descendant Africans in India continue to practise traditional 
ceremonies, sing and dance to African music; and some can still speak in 
Kiswahili. These factors are indications that they, Siddis or Habshis, are 
conscious of their African ancestry. In fact, in 1973 a delegation of these 
23. Zumbi , African-Brazilian Cultural Association, N e w York; the N e w York branch 
publishes a newsletter on the history and culture of African-Brazilians. 
24. St C . Drake and R . B . Laporte, 1982; C . Melendez and Q . Duncan, 1981. 
25. R . F. Thompson , 1983, is an excellent study of African influence on art and 
philosophy in Cuba, Haiti and other parts of the Americas, including the United States. 
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African-Indians visited Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to become more 
aware of continental issues and to explore areas of possible co-operation.26 
Whatever effect that mission had, it did serve to inform continental 
Africans about African-Asians and it m a y well have stimulated greater 
interest in the African presence abroad. 
T h e number of diaspora Africans in Europe has also greatly increased. 
In 1983 there were approximately 1 572164 North Africans in France 
(866595 Algerians, 492669 Moroccans and 212909 Tunisians). This 
population continues to cause tensions not only within France but between 
that country and the North African countries. Increasing numbers of 
those North Africans are becoming naturalized, in spite of opposition 
from elements of the French society; and the North African countries 
themselves oppose naturalization, being more interested in attracting a 
return migration. A s the process of naturalization continues, relations 
between France and its southern neighbours in Africa will probably 
remain sensitive, but over the long term those descendants m a y well be 
a bridge to harmonious relations.27 Equally great was the increase of blacks 
in Britain - mainly from the West Indies, America and Africa - and the 
interaction between them and the British people. Today, the annual 
festival of the West Indian communities in London has become a 
permanent cultural feature while Black music, dancing, food and art are 
having a growing impact on British culture. 
In spite of the serious gaps in our knowledge about them, diaspora 
Africans have clearly had a significant history which has had major 
repercussions on other parts of the world. They have contributed ines-
timable labour to the agricultural, industrial and technical development 
of the world. Several of their religions, especially in Brazil and Cuba, 
retain African characteristics and have non-African adherents and symbols. 
Their languages have influenced m a n y Romance and other languages and 
continue to be evident in Europe, the Americas and India, for example. 
Their art influenced Picasso and others, while their music and dance 
continue to syncopate the world's population. 
Diaspora scientists - George Washington Carver in agriculture, Charles 
D r e w in blood plasma, and Hildrus Poindexter in tropical medicine, and 
m a n y others - have used their genius to promote human-kind. Their 
scholars have provided insights into the complexity of the social order. 
A n d their age-old tradition of struggle against oppression in Africa and 
the diaspora has m a d e them familiar figures in the vanguard of h u m a n -
rights movements as Nobel Laureates Ralph Bunche, Albert Luthuli, 
Martin Luther King, Jr, and Archbishop D e s m o n d Tutu demonstrated. 
26. See J. E . Harris, 1971, and in the East African Standard, 14 July 1982. 
27. O n this subject, see La Nouvelle génération de l'immigration maghrébine, essai d'analyse 
sociologique, 1982; Esprit, 1985; and Les Temps Modernes, 1985. 
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Notting Hill Carnival, the annual street festival of West Indian communities in
The challenge
While many continental Africans, including several heads of state, civil
and foreign servants, academics and business persons, maintain close
contacts with African-Americans, such connections do not have the
structural design necessary for effective and continuous interactions. Quite
apart from the personal dimensions involved, ideological differences,
distance and communications problems, pressing national issues, and
financial constraints have all militated against the establishment of inter¬
national structures for black collaboration.
Moreover, African heads of state and government must consider the
possible adverse effects their involvement in an international Black network
may have on their diplomatic and economic affairs with the super-powers.
Not all such leaders are of the mould of Kwame Nkrumah's pan-
Africanism; nor are many of them as bold as Julius Nyerere who as
President of Tanzania insisted in 1977 on making his major address in
the United States on the campus ofHoward University where many more
blacks had access to him. And too few continental governments would
match Nigeria's public stance of regarding itself as a guardian and
spokesman for African people worldwide. And although the OAU coupled
its congratulations to the United States for its space achievements in 1962
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with an admonition over racial discrimination against African-Americans, 
and has welcomed TransAfrica's Director Randall Robinson into its 
confidence on a n u m b e r of occasions, that body has been generally 
quiescent on the matter of promoting international networks of African 
peoples. 
Yet, most African countries are only about a generation old and have 
had to confront a myriad of problems in an age where split-second 
decisions could m e a n life or death, success or failure. A n d most of those 
leaders were educated in a colonial ambiance and received the reins of 
government from colonial mentors w h o sought guarantees against even 
suggestions of race-consciousness or retribution for past exploitation of 
African peoples. But with a new generation of leaders in Africa and the 
diaspora, and a greater appreciation of the heritage and historical social 
condition they share, it is likely that renewed efforts to forge lasting 
structural links between Africa and its diaspora will be undertaken. 
Not only will the twenty-first century then witness the convergence of 
a strong African political economy with access to its diaspora pool of 
knowledge and expertise, it will probably mark the inclusion of all the 
far-flung communities of African ancestry into a meaningful pan-African 
orbit. 
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T h e early history of pan-Africanism, which has been denned as 'a political 
and cultural phenomenon which regards Africa, Africans and African 
descendants abroad as a unit, and aims at the regeneration and unification 
of Africa and the promotion of a feeling of solidarity a m o n g the people 
of the African world',1 has been dealt with in Volume VII of this history 
while other aspects of it were discussed in Chapter 23 of this volume. 
There are, however, two other aspects of that phenomenon since 1935 
which have not been dealt with, namely, pan-Africanism as an integrative 
force and pan-Africanism as a movement of liberation. T h e former forms 
the theme of this chapter and the latter, that of the following chapter. 
A s an integrative force which aims at achieving political, cultural and 
economic unity or co-operation in Africa, the history of pan-Africanism 
falls into three distinct phases: the colonial phase from 1935 to 1957; the 
independence phase from 1957 to the 1960s, which has been described 
as the heyday of pan-Africanism as a movement of liberation; and the 
third phase since the 1970s. During this last phase, pan-Africanism as an 
integrative force received a great deal of impetus following the dramatic 
changes in the world economy and the serious repercussions which these 
have had on the economies of Africa. 
Though pan-Africanism as a movement of integration was vigorously 
pursued in the 1920s, as seen in the activities of the Congress of British 
West Africa, which included the formation of a British West African 
University, a West African Press Union and a British West African C o -
operative Association, and those of student societies such as the West 
African Students Union ( W A S U ) , it lost its attraction in the 1930s and 
1940s, the heyday of colonialism in Africa. It was revived in the 1940s 
to some extent, thanks to the activities of N k r u m a h and Padmore in 
London and the Senegalese Alioune Diop. A s early as 1942, N k r u m a h 
insisted that all the West African colonies 'must first unite and become 
a national entity, absolutely free from the encumbrances of foreign rule, 
before they can assume the aspect of international cooperation on a grand 
1. P. O . Esedebe, 1980, p. 14. 
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scale." Also, in 1947 was born Présence africaine, a cultural movement 
that took up the main ideas of the apostles of pan-Africanism and the 
first Pan-African Congress. S o m e black and European intellectuals came 
together around the Senegalese Alioune Diop, and they were responsible 
for the publication of some basic books such as Nations nègres et culture, 
by Cheikh Anta Diop. T h e general thinking of the militants of Présence 
africaine tended to show that the flowering of black culture was unthinkable 
in a situation of political dependence, and that black people needed to be 
united by solidarity in the struggle. They therefore had to mark themselves 
off from the other, the colonizer, and assert themselves. Invited to 
write the preface to Father Temple's Bantu Philosophy, Alioune Diop 
acknowledged that 'This is prescribed reading for blacks, for their growing 
awareness and their urge to understand their relationship to Europe'. 
Pan-Africanism and continental integration 
In spite of the integrationist efforts in the 1930s and 1940s, not m u c h 
had been achieved by 1957. It was from that date, signified by the gaining 
of independence by Ghana under the dynamic leadership of K w a m e 
N k r u m a h , that pan-Africanism as a movement of integration was 
attempted with any purposiveness and dynamism. T h e aim during the 
period was not only to achieve political, cultural and economic integration 
but to do so at regional, continental and extra-regional (that is Africa and 
the European Economic Community) levels. 
There is no doubt that the pace-setter of this period was K w a m e 
N k r u m a h . His first move in that direction was the formation of the 
Ghana-Guinea Union in 1958 and of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union as 
the first step toward the 'Union of African States'. T h e second was the 
Conference of Independent African States which he organized in Accra 
in April 1958 only about a year after Ghana's independence. This 
conference was attended by all the then-independent states of Africa, 
namely, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and 
Tunisia. This was followed as w e shall see in the next chapter by the 
historic All-Africa Peoples Conference held in 1958, again in Accra; the 
Sanniquelli Meeting of Guinea and Liberia in July 1959; the Second 
Conference of Independent African States in Monrovia in August 1959; 
and the third in Addis Ababa in i960. All these conferences advocated, 
among other things, die establishment of a broad continental c o m m o n 
market. T h e first 1958 conference, for example, called for the removal of 
customs and other restrictions on trade among African states and the 
conclusion of multi-lateral payments agreements with a view to enhancing 
economic exchanges and the consequent establishment of a c o m m o n 
market. T o push this economic aspect the Economic Commission for 
2. K . Nkrumah, 1962, p. 33. 
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Africa was set up in 1958; its activities since then have been fully discussed 
in Chapter 14. 
All these conferences also vigorously advocated the political integration 
or the political unity of Africa. N k r u m a h was the greatest advocate here 
and he pushed his ideas of African unity and a pan-African c o m m o n 
market with uncompromising vigour and fanaticism. T o him, both were 
the indispensable precondition for the speediest and fullest development 
not only of the totality of the continent, but also of the independent 
countries linked together in the union. H e advocated the 'high polities' 
of continental political unity while expressing reservations about regional-
ism. H e cautioned against such regional federations, lest regional loyalties 
give rise to power politics or 'enable the imperialists and neo-colonialists 
to fish in such troubled waters'.3 
This linkage of the political unity movement with that of a continental 
c o m m o n market m a d e those African leaders w h o were opposed to the 
former give less than serious attention to the latter. For even though 
other African governments might accept Nkrumah' s analysis, they would 
not necessarily choose to accept a far-reaching political solution. T h e 
threat of neo-colonialism might not have seemed to them to warrant such 
drastic steps as the derogation of sovereignty to an overall political 
authority. T h e Addis Ababa Conference in i960 was of great significance 
since it was there that the divisions and differences a m o n g African states 
over the way to African unity came into the open. 
T h e attainment of independence by a very large number of African 
states between i960 and 1964 - the number of independent African states 
rose from 9 to 26 in i960, including all the former French colonies, 
Nigeria, Zaire and Somalia, and to 33 by 1964 - very m u c h complicated 
the attainment of the integrative aspect of pan-Africanism. T h e n e w 
African leaders became divided horizontally into pro-East and pro-
West blocks and vertically into revolutionaries, progressives, reactionaries, 
capitalists, socialists, traditionalists and middle-of-the-roaders. Moreover, 
as will be seen in the next chapter, the overriding aim of pan-African 
conferences during the 1960s was to intensify the political struggle for 
independence for those countries still under colonial rule. Consequently, 
economic development, although of vital importance, did not constitute 
the principal policy objective. Moreover, the newly-independent leaders 
became preoccupied with immediate territorial problems of the unification 
of ethnic and regional groups, the consolidation of their o w n parties and 
power over the masses and against opposition leaders, the fight against 
poverty, disease and ignorance, as well as the defence and security of 
their nations against the Cold W a r and internal coup d'État. These internal 
priorities, tensions and conflicts m a d e it rather difficult for some leaders 
of independent states to engage in pan-Africanist affairs outside their o w n 
3. K . Nkrumah, 1963, p. 215. 
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plate 24.1 President G. 'Abd al-Nasser ofEgypt with President M. Kadhaffi ofLibya and
General M. Fawsi, the Egyptian war minister, on a military inspection in the United Arab
Republic, 24 June 1970
borders, or to implement pan-Africanist resolutions within their states.
Under the circumstances, African leaders began to divide into opposing
camps, particularly over the future of the integrationist aspect of the pan-
African movement. In 196 1, Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Mali, Morocco, Libya
and the Algerian government-in-exile formed the Casablanca Group, while
the remaining former French colonies plus Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia
and Sierra Leone formed the Monrovia Group. Generally, the Casa¬
blanca Group favoured a strong political union along the lines of
Nkrumah's United States of Africa. The group consisted of the
militant pan-Africanist, socialist and non-aligned leaders of Africa,
who believed in centralized continental economic planning and develop¬
ment, in a continental defence and security system, and in cultural
restoration.
The Monrovia Group favoured a loose confederation of independent
sovereign African states that would promote voluntary participation and
co-operation in cultural exchanges and economic interaction. The group
was particularly adamant about respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each state. It was suspicious of the personal ambitions of
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some of the peers in the Casablanca Group , and of any interference in 
the internal affairs of their states. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next chapter, both groups maintained 
the historical commitment to the total liberation of the remaining colonies 
and to the policy of non-alignment. Through the relentless efforts of the 
Casablanca Group, especially N k r u m a h , Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita, 
and with the support of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, a S u m m i t 
Conference of Independent African States was convened in Addis Ababa 
in 1963, to resolve the factionalism, unite the leaders and form a c o m m o n 
pan-African structure. After m a n y proposals and counter-proposals, m a n y 
committee meetings and bilateral negotiations, 30 African heads of inde-
pendent states and governments signed the Charter of African Unity 
which established the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) on 25 M a y 
1963-
T h e details of the O A U - its aims, structure and activities since its 
formation - are provided in the following chapter. Suffice it to state here 
that while its formation indicates a partial success for the integrationist 
aspect of pan-Africanism, it fell far short of the expectations of the old 
and radical pan-Africanists led by N k r u m a h , and at practically each 
meeting of the O A U until his overthrow in 1966, N k r u m a h in very long, 
detailed and moving speeches fanatically and doggedly campaigned for 
the conversion of the O A U into a continental union government or a 
fully-pledged United States of Africa - but without success. 
With the formation of the O A U and its concentration on the liberation 
aspects of pan-Africanism to be discussed below, and with the con-
centration of m a n y independent states on internal developments and on 
strengthening their ties with their former colonial rulers, and, above all, 
with the overthrow of N k r u m a h , the continental integration aspect of 
pan-Africanism lost its m o m e n t u m throughout the second half of the 
1960s. It was rather replaced by movements for the formation of regional 
and inter-state groupings. According to Adebayo Adedeji, executive 
secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa ( E G A ) , there were by 
1977 over 20 inter-governmental multi-sectoral economic co-operation 
organizations in Africa and about one hundred single multi-national 
organizations that are meant to promote technical and economic co-
operation in Africa.4 M a n y of these were established in the 1960s, which 
were the halcyon years of African integration. But the decade was also 
characterized by the decline of several regional groupings. B y the early 
1970s, if not earlier, it was clear that African integration efforts were in 
serious trouble. 
For example, the two initiatives a m o n g the French-speaking West 
African countries, resulting in the successive establishment of the West 
African Customs Union ( U D A O - Union douanière de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) 
4. A Adedeji, 1977, p. 10. 
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in June 1959 and of the Customs Union ofWest African States (UDEAO -
Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) in June 1966, both
failed. The Economic Community of West Africa (CEAÓ - Communauté
économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest), formed in 1973, is the latest of the
experiments at regional integration by the majority of the states created
out of the former federation of French West Africa (AOF - Afrique-
Occidentale française). Nor did the Customs and Economic Union of
Central Africa (UDEAC - Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique
centrale), set up in January 1966, fare any better; restrictions on the
opening of markets and non-compliance with its rules have sapped it of
most of its energy as an integrative system. Similarly, the Council of the
Entente States (Conseil de l'Entente) founded in 1959 through the initiative
of President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire seems to be diminishing
in importance due to the increasing attention being focused on the
larger and dynamic grouping, the CEAO. The short-lived (1968-71)
Organization of Senegal River States (OERS - Organisation des états
riverains du Sénégal) was succeeded in 1972 by the Organization for the
plate 24.2 From left to right: President H. Maga of Dahomey, President F. Houphouet-
Boigny of Câte d'Ivoire, President H. Diori of Niger and President M. Yameogo of Upper
Volta: the four heads ofstate ofthe Conseil de l'Entente, after a meeting at the Elysée Palace,
Paris, April 1961
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Development of the Senegal River ( O M V S — Organisation pour la mise 
en valeur du fleuve Sénégal), which has still not been able to establish a 
workable machinery for co-operation. Also, the co-operation agreements 
of the nine-member Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee, formed 
in November 1965, have never been ratified. 
In Anglophone Africa, however (apart from East Africa, which attained 
independence as an economic community), no regional economies were 
established during the early years of independence. Whereas the Fran-
cophone West African countries consistently strove to maintain pre-
independence joint institutions and to establish n e w ones, their anglophone 
counterparts, mainly at the insistence of Ghana , disbanded the few joint 
institutions - the British West African Currency Board, the West African 
Court of Appeal, the West African Cocoa Research Institute and the West 
African Airways Corporation - which the British had established, thus 
advancing the 'balkanization' of that part of Africa. 
M o r e worrying was the East African Community , arguably the most 
sophisticated regional co-operative arrangement in the Third World at 
the time, which experienced such acute tensions in the 1960s that by the 
end of the decade the level of economic integration had declined. T h e 
significance of East African integration can best be grasped by reflecting 
that at independence, external trade, fiscal and monetary policy, transport 
and communications infrastructures, and university education were all 
regional rather than national. Subsequently, these links and services were 
systematically dismantled and all the high hopes that Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania would eventually evolve into full federation under one 
government evaporated. B y June 1977 the whole structure of the East 
African Communi ty , once regarded as a model for African regional co-
operation, had collapsed. 
Undeniably, economic integration schemes launched optimistically in 
the 1960s were largely moribund by the end of the decade. T h u s , despite 
the rhetoric of pan-African solidarity and the paraphernalia of elaborate 
decision-making structures, paradoxically, the period witnessed decline 
rather than progress in the field of effective regional integration in Africa. 
N o solid foundations for regional groupings were laid, in spite of the 
countless expressions of fidelity to the principles of pan-Africanism. T h e 
question then arises, w h y so little progress and such faltering steps? W a s 
it because African states failed to see the advantages of regional economic 
integration and collective self-reliance? O r , were there some undercurrents 
which rocked the very foundation of co-operation? 
T h e problems and constraints of African regional integration during 
the early years of independence were m a n y and seemingly intractable. 
T h e y stemmed from internal as well as external and historical factors. 
O n e of these factors was the growth and impact of national consciousness 
on regional integration. Colonialism not only left behind a patchwork of 
m a n y sovereign states, but the states spawned by this process were 
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plate 24.3 From left to right: President J. Nyerere of Tanzania, President A. M. Obote of
Uganda and President J. Kenyatta ofKenya, signing the East African Co-operation Treaty
in Kampala, June 1967
themselves artificial entities. They were, as yet, by no means nations;
rather, they represented the shells of territorial independence in which
the kernel of national identity had been planted by the independence
movements. The major task of the new governments was to provide the
soil in which the seed could grow. Anxious to encourage national inte¬
gration, the new leaders were compelled to look inward and to rank as
their first priority the political, economic and social developments of their
own polities. The immediate concern, then, was to build viable nation
states based on their own traditions and customs, and on the promises
which had been held out to the masses. To the extent that national
consolidation received high priority, co-operation with other African
countries would have to be secondary. Since meaningful co-operation
necessarily implied long-term commitment, there was an understandable
reluctance to take decisions which restrained national sovereignty in
certain key areas, including development-plan formulation. While this did
not rule out joint endeavours in some forms of regional integration, it
did suggest the existence of very real limits on the extent to which African
states were willing to part with or to pool their sovereignty.
Throughout, African states did not display much willingness to sacrifice
perceived national interests on the regional altar. They entered into
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agreement to liberate trade or allocate industries on a regional basis only 
when these integrative objectives were not in conflict with considerations 
of national security, prestige, or economic advantage. This tendency was 
aggravated, a m o n g other things, by the different economic groupings 
within Africa of the pre -Lomé Convention era: the 18 French-speaking 
associated states with the European Economic Communi ty ( E E C ) under 
the Yaounde system; the Commonweal th non-associates and C o m -
monwealth associates like Nigeria under a special trade agreement with 
the E E C signed in January 1966 (but never implemented); and the three 
East African states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania under the September 
1969 Arusha Agreement. 
F r o m a political-economy perspective, too, a variety of factors can be 
said to have complicated the functioning of schemes for economic co-
operation.5 O n e such factor was the economic and political heterogeneity 
of the continent. Countries that followed vastly different development 
paths would not make good partners in economic co-operation schemes. 
Indeed, political and ideological cleavages threatened even existing and 
otherwise viable co-operative arrangements such as the defunct East 
African Community . A d d e d to all these critical constraints and issues is 
what Timothy S h a w has termed the intractable problems of politicization 
of organizations, both of which led to institutional tension and decay.6 
Besides the classic case of the East African Community , was the bewil-
dering frequency of changes in organizations and memberships in Fran-
cophone Africa which was partly the result of regional inequalities. 
Because of such intractable difficulties, the establishment of regional 
groupings in Africa's first decade of recaptured independence was often 
no more than a declaration of intent and an indication of continental 
alignments. Neither Nkrumah's enthusiasm for the noble pan-African 
ideal of political unity and economic continentalism nor Julius Nyerere's 
preferred incremental regionalism leading eventually towards pan-African-
ism went beyond the stage of theoretical discussions. Ironically, despite 
this disillusioning record, the fervour with which integration has been 
proposed as a response to the problems of Africa has increased tremen-
dously in recent years. A s suggested below, this is due to the development 
crisis in Africa and, especially, to the intensification of this appalling 
condition by Africa's overdependence on the Western-dominated inter-
national economy. For a while in the 1960s pan-Africanism as a movement 
of liberation weakened Africa's political ties with Europe. Simultaneously, 
the period witnessed a reinforcement of Africa's economic and cultural 
dependence upon Europe and the developed world generally. T h u s , 
economic neo-colonialism and dependency waxed as political colonialism 
waned. It will be instructive to outline briefly what is n o w termed the 
5. T . M . Shaw, 1975b, pp. 29-38. 
6. T . M . Shaw, 1975a, pp. 667-8. 
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'African continental crisis' in order to appreciate the extent of the current 
renewed enthusiasm for pan-Africanism as an integrative quest. 
Pan-Africanism, regionalism and economic development 
Since the 1970s, there has been indeed a renewed enthusiasm for pan-
Africanism as an integrative force at the regional level. W h a t was the 
nature of this n e w interest and h o w can it be explained? Both questions 
have been discussed in Chapter 14 and here w e will concentrate on the 
integrative aspects. T h e main reason, as Adedeji has emphasized in 
Chapter 14, has been the disappointing African economic performance of 
the last 25 years. For despite efforts to stimulate industrial growth, to foster 
agricultural production and to initiate other development programmes to 
bring about more fundamental changes in the economic situation inherited 
at independence, today's reality is that the transformation of the continent 
which was expected to follow closely on the heels of political independence 
still remains only a hope. There has been no marked improvement in 
m a n y African economies since i960. Africa harbours 16 out of 25 countries 
classified by the United Nations in 1971 as 'the least-developed' countries. 
A n d of the 32 countries identified by the 1974 Sixth Special Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly as 'most seriously affected' by the 
'current economic crisis', 20 are in Africa. 
T h e hopes of African leaders earlier in the 1960s - that a combination 
of trade with aid from the industrialized nations would provide the 
necessary resources to satisfy national aspirations for autonomous, self-
sustaining development - failed to materialize. T h e record of the 1960s 
was therefore most disappointing. Neither the trade nor the aid policies 
practised by the industrialized nations appeared capable of accelerating 
economic expansion. Africa thus emerged from the First United Nations 
Development Decade (1960-^70) as the region registering the lowest rate 
of growth a m o n g developing countries - 2 per cent as against Southern 
Asia (4.1 per cent), East Asia (5.6 per cent), Latin America (4.5 per cent) 
and the Middle East (7.2 per cent). Initial indications from the Second 
United Nations Development Decade (1970-80) are that the situation has 
changed little, if at all. T h u s despite its vast natural resources, Africa is 
unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of 
well-being in the last 25 years.7 
In spite of exports, m a n y African countries showed throughout the 
1970s a pattern of sluggish economic growth, low levels of productivity, 
a circumscribed and fractured industrial base, high dependence on a 
vulnerably narrow spectrum of primary export commodities, low levels 
of life expectancy, and widening deficits on the aggregate current accounts 
of the balance of payments. Real per capita income declined while the 
7. Organization of African Unity, 1981, para. 10. 
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rate of inflation approximately doubled, reaching an average annual rate 
of over 20 per cent during 1977-9. T h e combined current-account deficit 
of the balance of payments rose from about $4 billion in 1974 to close to 
$10 billion annually in 1978-9.8 Above all, between 1970 and 1979 external 
indebtedness of sub-Saharan Africa rose from $6 billion to $32 billion 
and debt service (for the oil-importing countries) increased from 6 to 12 
per cent of export earnings in the same period.9 T h u s , if Africa's 
inheritance from colonialism in i960 was 'inauspicious', to borrow 
Timothy Shaw's description, by 1980 it has become even less promising. 
M o r e worrying, Africa provides a fertile ground for what has come to 
be k n o w n as neo-colonialism and dependency which has greatly con-
tributed to the continent's problems. By the end of the 1970s, Africa's 
dependency on the economies of the industrialized Western countries had 
become greater than it had ever been. Most African countries had become 
even more heavily dependent on foreign interest, foreign investments, 
foreign technology, foreign expertise, foreign theories of development and 
economic growth and, above all, on exports of raw materials and agri-
cultural primary commodities to the rich, industrialized West. 
In the world economy, Africa has always been in a subordinate position, 
characterized by asymmetrical and unequal economic relationships with 
the industrialized Western world. Even if one does not accept dependency 
theory as an accurate description of African economic systems and 
relations, it is beyond question that the continent's position in the 
international economic order has been one of inequality. This disturbing 
condition has been aggravated by the impact of the global-crises syndrome 
symbolized by the collapse of the Bretton W o o d s Agreement, the oil-
shocks of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) , 
the energy crunch, and the continuing stagflation of the mid-1970s 
onwards, which has revealed as never before the extreme vulnerability of 
almost all African countries to external forces. Confronted with this 
implacable reality, African leaders have been forced into a sobering 
reassessment of what their options are: what is the correct path towards 
economic development? 
Given the imminence of catastrophe and collapse, innovative responses 
are imperative. For if the deterioration in economic performance is to be 
halted and reversed, then n e w directions of policy are required. Africa's 
hopes, then, lie in a fundamental redirection of national and regional 
development strategies. T h e O P E C success has crystallized the concepts 
of strength through collective action and solidarity. Such action is seen 
as vital to the salvation of Africa's economic problems. African states 
therefore strongly feel that they have to foster mutual co-operation to 
impart strength to their national endeavours to fortify their independence -
8. J. B. Zulu and S. M . Nsouli, 1984, p. 5. 
9. World Bank, 1981, p. 3. 
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for although each individual country might be weak, President Nyerere 
counselled: 
Together, or even in groups, w e are m u c h less weak. W e have the 
capability to help each other in m a n y ways, each gaining in the 
process. A s a combined group w e can meet the wealthy nations on 
very different terms, for though they m a y not need any one of us 
for their economic health, they cannot cut themselves off from all 
of us.10 
B y the mid-1970s, therefore, Africa was faced with a choice between: 
continuing to support an inherited structure of dependence, and therefore 
subordination of its o w n development to special interests in the Western 
international economic system; or beginning to break away from this 
structure, in part through regional economic integration. 
It was in response to this crucial challenge to the disillusioning 
performance of most African economies, coupled with the failure of the 
series of North-South Dialogues to realize the objective of a n e w 
international economic order ( N I E O ) , that the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
was conceived and born. T h e Lagos Plan, which has been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 14, is a major document formulated around the concepts 
of self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic growth. Its 
main theme is Africa's reduction of its dependence on external strategy, 
as declared by the continent's leaders: 
W e view, with disquiet, the over-dependence of the economy of our 
continent. . . This phenomenon had m a d e African economies highly 
susceptible to external developments and with detrimental effects on 
the interests of the continent." 
A s a counter-strategy to this phenomenon of over-dependence, African 
states 'resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily 
on collective self-reliance'. Regionalism, which is discussed in virtually 
every chapter of the Lagos Plan, therefore constitutes an integral condition 
for implementation. Without regional integration the L P A collapses as a 
concept and strategy. 
It is against this background that pan-Africanism as an integrative 
quest is n o w seen to be an important element in reducing dependence 
and in helping to improve the bargaining position of African countries, 
thus contributing to their development potential through the broader 
strategy for promoting a N I E O . Apart from the more orthodox benefits 
promised by regional groupings in the shape of expanded trade and 
investment, economic integration is being vigorously advocated as a means 
of reducing external vulnerability. This has become increasingly urgent 
10. J. Nyerere, 1970b, p. 12. 
11. Organization of African Unity, 1981, para. 14. 
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mainly because the dependent relationship does not appear to be lessening; 
indeed, given the soaring foreign debts of m a n y African states, it is 
increasing. Hopefully, regional economic integration would break this 
dependent relationship by helping each m e m b e r nation to export m a n u -
factured goods and eventually capital goods to their neighbours. T h e 
underlying premise here is the desire by African states and leaders to 
determine as far as possible their o w n economic policies based on their 
national aspirations, natural resources and political ideologies outside the 
influence of developed countries. T h u s the problems and prospects of 
recently-created regional groupings in the area of dependency reduction 
merit special attention. 
T h e n e w regional schemes and the question of dependency 
For m a n y years now, the re-emergence of a rash of regional integration 
schemes in Africa as more or less explicit challenges to the external 
domination of the continent inherited from the colonial era has been in 
evidence. A m o n g the most ambitious and dynamic is the Economic 
Community of West African States ( E C O W A S for the English-speaking 
and C E D E A O for the French-speaking), which brings together 16 coun-
tries covering an area of 6 m sq k m stretching from Mauritania in the 
north-west to Nigeria in the south-east, and a total population of about 
150 million. Established in Lagos, in M a y 1975, E C O W A S is the first 
serious attempt at economic co-operation and integration in the West 
African sub-region, cutting across divisions of language, history and 
existing affiliations and institutions. O f its m e m b e r states, five are officially 
Anglophone, eight Francophone, two Lusophone and one Arabic.12 
Besides E C O W A S , the two newest initiatives are in Southern Africa. 
T h e first is the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
( S A D D C ) , which was formally inaugurated in April 1980 by the signing 
of the Lusaka Declaration on Economic Liberation by the five Front-
Line States (FLS) - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia — joined by Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Originally 
conceived as the economic counterpart to the F L S , which, since 1974, 
have been most closely involved in assisting and, to some extent, direct-
ing - militarily, politically and diplomatically - the liberation struggle in 
the then Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, the nine S A D C C countries 
cover an area of 5 m sq k m , and have a total population of some 60 
million. T h e second initiative is the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern 
and Southern African States (PTA), which was concluded in Lusaka in 
December 1981 by nine out of the potential 18 states. T h e P T A was 
finally launched in Harare in July 1984. Despite its n a m e , the P T A does 
not confine itself to trade alone. T h e treaty is m u c h more than an elaborate 
12. For a full-scale study of E C O W A S , see S. K . B . Asante, 1985. 
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definition of trading relationships. It addresses itself to virtually every 
sector relating to the promotion of regional economic integration. Like 
E C O W A S , the P T A is the brainchild of Adebayo Adedeji, the executive 
secretary of the E G A . But whereas the P T A was an example of painstaking 
development from below, the S A D C C , like E C O W A S , was m u c h more 
an act of deliberate political will, carrying the personal authorization of 
its presidents and prime ministers. Just as the six French-speaking C E A O 
members are signatories to the E C O W A S treaty, so are all the S A D C C 
m e m b e r states potential members of the P T A . A n d like E C O W A S and 
C E A O , although the purposes and programmes of S A D C C and the P T A 
are substantially similar, and steadily converging, distinct differences are 
apparent in the origins of the two organizations, their institutional 
structures, financial patrons, ideologies and strategies. 
Another manifestation of the current concern with regional co-operation 
in Africa was the creation in December 1981 of the Senegambian 
Confederation which joins Gambia and Senegal towards an economic and 
monetary union. This is the culmination of m a n y years of efforts to create 
closer economic co-operation between these two countries. T h e latest 
initiative is the treaty signed in Libreville, Gabon, in October 1983 to 
establish the Economic Community of Central African States ( E C C A S ) , 
comprising the present members of U D E A C and those of the Economic 
Community of the Great Lakes. This is intended to be the Central 
African equivalent of E C O W A S . 
T h e basic objective of these n e w regional integration schemes is the 
same - to reduce the dependence of their respective m e m b e r states on 
the external forces which speak to influence the economic policies and 
directions of African countries; and to co-ordinate the development 
programmes in the different sectors and subsectors as a means of acce-
lerating the rate of economic growth and development. E C O W A S , for 
example, has as its central objective the promotion of co-operation and 
development in virtually all fields of economic activity for the purpose 
of 'reducing gradually the Community's economic dependence on the 
outside world'. T h e lessening of a high degree of external dependence is 
seen as a precondition for achieving basic structural development goals. 
Similarly, die S A D C C came about as the result of a c o m m o n desire 
among its nine members to reduce and eventually to eliminate economic 
dependence upon South Africa. T h e emphasis in the S A D C C on reducing 
dependence is focused 'especially', but not exclusively, on Pretoria. As 
President Machel of Mozambique stressed in his opening address at 
S A D C C 2 in Maputo in 1980: 'The effects of colonial domination are 
still present in our countries . . . the mentality of dependence, the fatalist 
spirit'.13 O n die other hand, the P T A , with its broader membership, 
makes no direct attempt to address the issues of reducing dependence on 
13. A . Kgarebe, 1981, p. 23. 
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South Africa. Instead it advocates a positive approach to the problem, 
contending that, to the extent that it succeeds in promoting intra-regional 
trade and development, the present dangerous dependence on South 
Africa will decrease. Viewed within the context of a N I E O , all these n e w 
regional initiatives must abo be regarded as integral parts of a wider 
desire of the poor nations of Africa to eliminate, or at least to reduce, 
the inequalities inherent in the present international economic system. 
T o what extent are these new regional schemes effectively equipped in 
terms of resources and power to confront the disturbing problems posed 
by the question of dependency and neo-colonialism? O r to what extent 
can they create conditions that will make self-sustained, autonomous 
development possible? In the African setting, such developments can only 
come about through the transformation of productive structures. Can 
E C O W A S , the S A D C C or the P T A contribute to this type of change? 
It must be stressed even ad nauseam that regional integration can hardly 
be successful while regional partners remain incorporated into the inter-
national system. Put differently, regional self-reliance is incompatible with 
global and trans-national integration. W h a t , then, have the n e w regional 
initiatives achieved so far, in only a few years of existence, in the area of 
dependency reduction? W h a t is the future of regional economic integration 
schemes in Africa? 
M a n y development theorists n o w acknowledge that regional-change 
processes are neither autonomous nor self-generated, but rather they are 
responsive to a context of global interdependence and interaction. For, 
as Philippe Schmitter has argued, 'no matter what their original intentions, 
it should prove difficult to isolate regional deliberations from their context 
of global economic and political dependence'.14 T h e actions of external 
actors, or what Schmitter has termed 'external penetration', have had a 
profound effect on the direction of integrative undertaking. T h e analyses 
by Steven Langdon and Lynn Mytelka of the Customs and Economic 
Union of Central Africa ( U D E A C ) 1 5 and by Peter Robson of the West 
African Economic Communi ty ( C E A O ) 1 6 provide excellent case-studies 
of the way in which trans-national corporations ( T N C s ) and other external 
interests have not only derived benefits from African regional integration 
to the disadvantage of the partner states; they have also m a d e these 
countries unable to take full advantage of the economic co-operation 
institutions to introduce changes in production and industrial structures 
as a means of encouraging intra-African trade and thereby reducing 
dependence on external forces. 
Given this background, it is easy to envisage the kind of problems 
likely to confront the new regional integration schemes in the area of 
14. P. C . Schmitter, 1972, p. 8. 
15. S. Langdon and L . K . Mytelka, 1979, pp. 179-80. 
16. P. Robson, 1983, p. 41. 
738 
Pan-Africanism and regional integration 
external pénétration. There is, for example, the problem of extricating 
the m e m b e r states of E C O W A S , the S A D C C , the P T A or C E E A C from 
existing dependency relationships with the external powers by using 
national and regional institutions to bring about greater control over 
resources. Given the complexity of this problem, the question which 
arises is: h o w adequate are the provisions m a d e in the treaties of these 
new regional initiatives to confront the issues posed by dependency 
relationships? 
Evidence tends to suggest that none of the n e w regional schemes has 
adequate provisions for attacking the all-engaging issue of dependency 
reduction. For example, although the E C O W A S protocol on the rules of 
origin anticipated the problems posed by external linkages, it does not 
effectively confront the issues of foreign ownership and participation. For 
a long time to come, most industrial enterprises in West Africa will 
continue to have foreign majority ownership. O f significance here is the 
fact that although Article 32 of the E C O W A S treaty specifically calls 
upon the E C O W A S Council of Ministers to take effective steps towards 
gradual dependency reduction, there is no institution or machinery in 
E C O W A S which is empowered to enter into negotiation with external 
actors on behalf of the Community.1 7 Neither has the E C O W A S treaty any 
provisions for a c o m m o n regime on foreign investment and divestment, nor 
has any institution been established to control the importation of tech-
nology, as evidenced in the case of the Andean C o m m o n Market in Latin 
America. Thus , the redefinition of E C O W A S ' s economic relationship 
with the outside world, which is crucial if the reduction of dependence 
is the goal, is largely ignored by the E C O W A S treaty. 
Although S A D C C countries have identified transport and c o m -
munications as the first priority sector for reducing dependence on South 
Africa, and have consequently established the Southern African Transport 
and Communications Commission ( S A T C C ) for this purpose, implemen-
tation of this laudable scheme entirely depends, paradoxically, on the 
availability of foreign sources of aid and investment. For an organization 
dedicated to self-reliance and the reduction of economic dependence on 
any single or group of states, the ingenuity and effort that have gone into 
cultivating beneficial relations with sympathetic international partners, 
principally in the West, m a y appear contradictory. T h e S A D C C has had 
to recognize that its priorities are not necessarily the same as those of the 
interested parties from w h o m it seeks development assistance. A s a result, 
the S A D C C had, in the past, advanced projects on the basis of their 
appeal to prospective donors, rather than because they were the projects 
considered most beneficial for the region. T h u s , anxious as S A D C C 
members are to escape from the South African frying-pan, they seem to 
land in the fire of other Western donors, which constitutes a n e w form 
17. J. P. Renninger, 1982, p. 170. 
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of dependency. Besides, the S A D C C ' s concentration on the rehabilitation 
of transport systems inherited from colonialism m a y perpetuate and 
reinforce 'neo-colonial' patterns of trade and production and hinder intra-
S A D C C trade. 
Regionalism versus extra-regional pan-Africanism 
T h e complex problems confronting new regional initiatives within the 
context of dependency have been seriously compounded by the emergence 
of a new type of pan-Africanism at the extra-regional level in the shape 
of the L o m é Convention between the European Economic Communi ty 
( E E C ) and Africa. For - from a stance of structural change, in particular -
the new L o m é 'regime' was and is in no sense a road-to-Damascus 
conversion for either Europe or Africa. T h e continuity from the age-old 
colonial patterns of dependency is as evident as any change. It is the 
E E C ' s brand of neo-colonialism to consolidate and maintain the status 
quo of the old order - the traditional post-1884 Berlin Conference 
and post-colonial dependency structures. While the Berlin Conference 
established the undisputed sway of colonialism in Africa, the Treaty of 
R o m e , which gave birth to the E E C , marked the advent of neo-colonialism 
and dependency in Africa. Hence the stalwart pan-Africanist K w a m e 
N k r u m a h was quick to denounce the E E C as a new system of 'collective 
colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils 
w e are striving to liquidate'. For the L o m é Agreement is not a progressive 
document which constitutes an inching toward a more balanced and 
beneficial interdependent relationship between Europe and Africa; rather, 
it is a shift in the nature of imperialism. Hence, despite the variety of 
E E C assistance, through L o m é I and L o m é II, to the new African regional 
groupings, it can hardly be disputed that the new relationship between 
Europe and Africa has greatly reinforced the latter's collective dependence 
on the former through trade relations, industrial co-operation, economic 
development through EEC-financed aid, and consultation through a range 
of institutions. 
In m a n y respects, therefore, this n e w pan-Africanism at the extra-
regional level, exemplified by the L o m é Conventions, is essentially incom-
patible not only with the fundamental objectives of the Lagos Plan, but 
it is also certainly out of step with the perceptions, development strategies 
and basic objectives of pan-Africanism at the regional level. A s noted 
above, the n e w African regional groupings, particularly E C O W A S , the 
S A D C C and the P T A , have adopted the strategy of self-reliant develop-
ment aimed at reducing their dependency on the former colonial powers 
and the international economic system generally (and in the case of the 
S A D C C and the P T A , South Africa as well). O n the other hand, L o m é 
represents a vertical Euro-African orientation, while the n e w regional 
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schemes reflect an interest in horizontal South-South links.18 T h u s , 
structurally, this n e w level of pan-Africanism charts no n e w path for 
Africa, breaks no n e w ground, and offers no n e w perspectives. Rather, it 
accepts the validity of the existing approach to African development and 
tends towards further capitalist penetration of African economies. Briefly 
stated, therefore, although greater economic self-reliance is a necessity 
for regional economic integration schemes in Africa, since it enables them 
to escape from or at least reduce dependency on the industrial centres 
and so facilitates their development, the successful implementation of this 
strategy within the L o m é framework remains problematic. 
Pan-Africanism and regionalism: an overview and 
conclusion 
For better or for worse, Africa is coming of age. T h e golden epoch of 
high hopes for pan-Africanism as a m o v e m e n t of political decolonization 
has passed. In its place has emerged a n e w era of pan-Africanism as an 
instrument of regional integration and economic decolonization. T h e types 
of regionalism which emerged from the mid-1970s onwards are closely 
related to the broader question of collective self-reliance and Africa's 
historical incorporation within the world system. Undoubtedly, the con-
tinued integration of Africa within the international system has seriously 
affected the progress of regionalism in the continent. For today, m u c h 
regional economic co-operation serves not the interests of Africa but 
rather those of foreign aid agencies, consultants and trans-national cor-
porations.19 A s noted in the case of the S A D C C , the U D E A C and C E A O , 
for example, the major beneficiaries of African regional integration have 
been centres of foreign investment, aid and technology. There is thus a 
major problem in Africa because economic co-operation, which is the 
backbone of collective self-reliance, cannot be effectively implemented as 
an instrument for regional development so long as the participating 
countries have no effective control over the resources flowing into joint 
projects, or sovereignty over the key sectors of the economy. 
A n d what is more , African élites or foreign collaborationist groups, 
w h o have a close identity of interests with certain trans-national or 
external forces, are likely to resist any efforts towards a high level of 
integration, involving reduction of dependence, or any radical change that 
m a y lead to a restructuring of their political economies and external 
linkages away from inherited, external orientation. T h u s the structural 
integration of the African economies, as well as the dominant group of 
social and political forces in the continent, into the international capitalist 
order has constituted a major constraint on the ability of African countries, 
18. S. K . B . Asante, 1984, pp. 171-95. 
19. A . Jalloh, 1976, p. 49. 
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even if they are willing, radically to change this structure of dependence. 
Besides, given the entrenchment of neo-colonialism in Africa, and the 
extent of diversification in markets and sources of investment and tech-
nology among different former colonial powers, any abrupt severance of 
Africa's intimate linkage with the industrialized nations is likely to 
inflict unacceptable pain upon the continent's fragile economies. African 
countries, therefore, m a y opt to be part of the system while simultaneously 
seeking the kind of terms which would enable them to exercise greater 
control over the industrialized world. T h u s it would be necessary for 
African regional integration schemes to adopt a pragmatic and flexible 
approach towards the question of dependency and the neo-colonial mesh . 
In this regard, African regional groupings m a y have to diversify their 
external economic relations - trading partners and sources of technology 
and capital. This approach has the potential for strengthening the bar-
gaining position of the governments of African states by enabling them 
to play off one developed economy against another. T h e importance of 
such diversification of external economic links cannot be overemphasized; 
Mazrui has recently driven it h o m e : 
. . . there are occasions w h e n freedom begins with the multiplication 
of one's masters. If one is owned and controlled by only one power, 
freedom is often particularly restrictive. But if an African society 
cultivates the skills to have more than one hegemonic power c o m -
peting for it, this has possibilities for liberation. T o be dependent 
on two giants, especially w h e n the giants have rivalries between 
them, is sometimes an opportunity to play one against the other -
and maximize one's o w n options.20 
Another option available to African regional groupings for transcending 
dependency is to develop preferential economic links with the regional 
integration schemes in Asia and Latin America. In more concrete terms, 
this type of 'horizontal integration' implies the promotion of economic 
co-operation a m o n g developing countries, 'the n e w imperative of develop-
ment of the 1980s' to quote El vin Laszlo. A vast realm is open for joint 
action in the fields of economic and technical co-operation. Such joint 
action can be crucial in enabling developing countries to defend the prices 
of their exports of raw materials and to enhance their sovereignty over 
their natural resources. It can also encourage the growth of indigenous 
capacities in science and technology, facilitate the marketing of their 
products, help to increase their industrial capacity and, above all, streng-
then their decision-making power in multi-lateral institutions. 
T h e n , too, African countries and leaders should be willing to introduce 
fundamental policy and institutional changes. These should include a 
redefinition of development objectives at national and regional levels to 
20. A . A . Mazrui, 1980a, p. 82. 
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recognize fully regional integration as an effective approach to the issues of 
dependency and underdevelopment. But a regional development strategy 
cannot be fully realized unless countries develop a c o m m o n policy towards 
the problem of foreign investment and technology dependence through 
regional regulation and planning. This should be backed by an important 
policy directive designed to build a joint industrial research and develop-
ment institute which would also look into the appropriateness of foreign 
technology, its purchase, acquisition or adaptation for use in joint develop-
ment projects. 
Finally, whatever strategy is adopted for transcending dependency, 
priority should be given to internal policy reforms. This calls for self-
discipline and sacrifice. W e in Africa must accept the discipline, restraint 
and austerity that are required for establishing what m a y be termed a 
n e w domestic order if w e ever hope to transform our relationship with 
the industrialized nations from one of permanent dependence to one of 
beneficial interdependence which can generate within African society itself 
the engine necessary for sustained economic growth. A s the distinguished 
African historian, A d e Ajayi, has remarked recently in a ' m o o d of cautious 
optimism': 
T h e vision of a n e w society in Africa will need to be developed in 
Africa, born out of the African historical experience and the sense 
of continuity of African history. T h e African is not yet master of 
his o w n fate, but neither is he completely at the mercy of fate.21 
2i. J. F. A . Ajayi, 1982, p. 8. 
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E d e m K O D J O and David C H A N A I W A 
If pan-Africanism as a movement of integration witnessed some successes 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, experienced fluctuating fortunes and 
failures from about the mid-1960s onwards, and from the mid-1970s 
received a great deal of impetus, pan-Africanism as a movement of 
liberation rather attained the peak of its achievements during the first 
decade of African independence — the heyday of pan-Africanism as a 
movement of liberation. However, from the late 1960s onwards, it became 
more of a broken reed, having survived only up to the attainment 
of independence. Following independence, the unifying spirit of pan-
Africanism, the fight against the colonial powers, was no longer strong 
in some African states, despite the protracted Southern Africa conflict, 
that unfinished business of independent Africa. 
Though pan-Africanism originated in the N e w World in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries as an integral part of the black liberation 
struggle against white domination and exploitation, and though the earliest 
manifestation of pan-Africanism and liberation were in the forms of 
African-American religious separatism which later spread to Africa, pan-
Africanism as a movement of liberation in Africa itself dates, as has been 
pointed out in Chapter 23, from the fascist Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
in 1935 and above all from the Pan-African Congress at Manchester in 
October 1945. For the first time in the history of the pan-African 
movement, African delegates predominated at the Manchester Congress 
and the focus of the discussions was the liberation of colonized Africa. 
T h e congress was organized by a Special International Conference 
Secretariat consisting of D r Peter Milliard of British Guiana as 
chairman, R . T . Makonnen of the West Indies as treasurer, K w a m e 
Nkrumah of Ghana and George Padmore of Trinidad as joint 
secretaries, Peter Abrahams of South Africa as publicity secretary and 
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya as assistant-secretary. Altogether, there were 
over 200 participants, mostly from British colonies in Africa, among 
w h o m were some future presidents of independent states. DuBois, 
the veteran pan-Africanist, as the permanent chairman of all the 
sessions. 
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plate 25.1 The Pan-African Congress at Manchester, England, November 1945. From left
to right on the platform: Peter Milliard, Mrs Amy Jacques Garvey, the Mayor ofManchester
and I. T. A. Wallace Johnson
The tone of the discussions and, especially, the resolutions that were
passed, were considerably more militant and radical than those of past
congresses. Among the demands in the Declaration to Colonial Powers
were:
(1) total emancipation and independence for Africans and other
subject races from domination by European powers claiming
sovereignty and trusteeship over them;
(2) the immediate abolition of all racial and other discriminatory
laws;
(3) freedom of speech, press, association and assembly;
(4) abolition of forced labour, and the introduction of equal pay for
equal work;
(5) the right of every man and woman over the age of 21 to vote
and be elected; and
(6) medical, welfare and educational services to be made available
to all citizens.
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T h e call for economic integration has already been discussed in Chapter 
14. T h e delegates also demanded for Africa freedom from 'foreign 
imperialist control, whether political or economic'. M o r e importantly, for 
the first time Africans clearly warned that, if Europeans still intended to 
rule Africa by force, Africans would use force, in the effort to achieve 
freedom. 
Simultaneously, the delegates m a d e another declaration to the African 
peoples, which emphasized that the struggle for political independence 
was only the first stage and the means towards complete economic, 
cultural and psychological emancipation. They called upon the urban and 
rural masses, and upon intellectuals and professionals of Africa to unite, 
organize and persevere for total independence. 
B y the end of the Fifth Congress, pan-Africanism finally had been 
turned into a mass ideology of Africa, by Africans and for Africans. It 
had grown from a reformist, protest ideology for the peoples of African 
descent in the N e w World into a nationalist ideology for the continental 
liberation of Africa. T h e global pan-Africanism of DuBois, the militant 
self-determination and self-reliance of Garvey, and the cultural restoration 
of Césaire had then become integral elements of African nationalism. 
Several of the delegates, such as N k r u m a h and Kenyatta, soon left London 
for Africa and led their peoples into independence. T h e constitutions of 
all nationalist movements included pan-Africanist clauses. 
Pan-Africanism and the liberation of Africa, 1945-60 
In the history of pan-Africanism as a movement of liberation, the period 
from 1950 to 1965 can be called the age of K w a m e N k r u m a h . B y words, 
action and example, N k r u m a h mobilized African leaders of both liberation 
movements and independent states for pan-Africanist causes. In con-
formity with his declaration, on the night of Ghana's independence, that 
the independence of Ghana was meaningless unless it was linked with 
the total liberation of the African continent, he organized a number of 
pan-African congresses immediately after Ghana's independence which 
have been discussed in the previous chapter. A s it was pointed out, the 
first of these conferences was the First Conference of Independent African 
States, held in Accra, the capital of his newly-independent state of Ghana, 
in April 1958, which was attended by Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, 
Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia, as well as by m a n y of the former 
delegates of the Fifth Pan-African Congress. T h e agenda and resolutions 
of the conference centred on the relations a m o n g the independent African 
states, on assistance to the liberation movements throughout Africa, on 
the relation between independent Africa and the United Nations, and on 
the ways and means of protecting Africa from the divisiveness of the 
East-West Cold W a r . T h e conference established the major themes of 
post-independence pan-Africanism and arguably laid the basis for the 
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Organization of African Unity (OAU), namely the primacy of political
independence, assistance to liberation movements, a united front at the
United Nations and non-alignment.
The Second Conference of Independent African States took place in
Monrovia in August 1959. It adopted four resolutions; one condemned
France for its nuclear tests in the Sahara; another called for a political
truce in the Cameroons; another for a negotiated peace in Algeria;
and the fourth proclaimed the right of the colonial territories to self-
determination. The third conference was held in Addis Ababa in i960.
During the same period, Nkrumah and his pan-Africanist compatriots
were convening conferences for leaders of both independent states and
liberation movements to share ideas and strategies on the struggle for
independence. The First All-African People's Conference was held in
Accra in December 1958, and was attended by 250 delegates and several
observers. The agenda consisted of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism,
anti-racialism, African unity and non-alignment. The delegates discussed
pertinent issues such as colonial boundaries, the role of chiefs and
separatist religious leaders, and regional groupings. More importantly,
African politicians and trades-unionists from French-, English-, Arabic-
and Portuguese-speaking states and colonies had the opportunity to
establish long-lasting ideological and personal relationships, such as the
one between Nkrumah and Patrice Lumumba of the then Belgian Congo.
The Second All-African Peoples' Conference was held in Tunis in
i960. This was attended by 73 African delegations, and the proceedings
concluded with the adoption of a series of resolutions mainly concerned
with decolonization. The third was in Cairo in 1961.
plate 25.2 The First All-African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, December 1958: the
opening speech
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There were two regional pan-Africanist organizations established mainly 
for the purpose of waging co-ordinated liberation struggles. O n e was the 
Pan-African Freedom Movement for Eastern, Central and Southern 
Africa, consisting of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanganyika, Uganda, 
Zanzibar and the nationalist movements of Central and Southern Africa, 
which was commonly known as P A F M E C S A (1958-63). T h e other 
was Rassemblement démocratique africain ( R D A ) a trans-territorial alliance 
established after the Bamako Congress by nationalist leaders in former 
French colonies which sought to go beyond the limited self-government 
envisaged by the Loi Cadre of 1946. T h e n came the de Gaulle referendum 
of 1958 which sought to establish a Franco-African Community.1 Through 
the R D A , Africans had a pan-Africanist forum to discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of the community and to register their opinions with 
the French government. But in the de Gaulle referendum of 1958, only 
Sékou Touré of Guinea voted against the Community in favour of total 
independence, and joined N k r u m a h in the Union of African States. 
T h e O A U and liberation 
If the birth of so m a n y n e w African states between i960 and 1964 
complicated pan-Africanism as a movement of integration, it definitely 
assisted and accelerated it as a movement of liberation. While the n e w 
African leaders could not agree on the nature of the political integration 
that should occur in Africa, they were virtually unanimous on the urgency 
of the total liquidation of colonialism from Africa, and both the Monrovia 
and Casablanca groups maintained the historical commitment to the total 
liberation of the remaining colonies and to the policy of non-alignment. 
Indeed, it was this universal commitment to the cause of liberation that 
was partly if not mainly responsible for the success of the moves that 
brought the two groups together to form the O A U at the epoch-making 
meeting in Addis Ababa in M a y 1963. H o w then was O A U created and 
structured, and what role did it play in the cause of pan-Africanism? 
As was pointed out in the last chapter, largely through the efforts of 
K w a m e N k r u m a h , Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita, on the one hand, 
and the Emperor of Ethiopia on the other, and also because of the 
attainment of independence by Algeria in 1962 which perceptibly reduced 
tension between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, an agreement to 
form a single organization was reached and their foreign ministers met 
from 15 to 21 M a y 1963 to draw up the draft agenda for the heads of 
state discussion. 
O n 23 M a y 1963, the Conference of Heads of State and Government 
opened. Thirty states were represented: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Léopoldville, 
1. For more details, see J." de Benoist, 1980. 
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D a h o m e y , Ethiopia, Gabon, G h a n a , Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, R w a n d a , Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab 
Republic and U p p e r Volta.* O n 25 M a y the heads of state and government 
signed the Charter of African Unity. 
In the preamble they recited the considerations on which their action 
was based: the peoples' right to self-determination; ideals of freedom, 
justice and equality; a c o m m o n desire for union and mutual assistance; 
the preservation of national independence and sovereignty; and devotion 
to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
H u m a n Rights. Article I sets up the Organization of African Unity; 
Article II defines its objectives; Article III states the principles needed to 
achieve them; Articles IV, V and V I deal with the members; and Articles 
VII-XVIII describe the institutions of the Organization. Interpretation 
of the Charter is contained in Article X X V I I . 
T h e Charter of African Unity embodies another aspect of pan-African-
ism, namely pan-Africanism as a political ethic. T h u s it states principles 
such as: 
(1) sovereign equality as between all m e m b e r states; 
(2) non-interference in the internal affairs of states; 
(3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state 
and its inalienable right to an independent existence; 
(4) the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration; 
(5) unreserved condemnation of political assassination, and of sub-
versive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other 
states; 
(6) unreserved dedication to the total liberation of the African 
territories which are not yet independent; and 
(7) affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. 
This pan-Africanist ethic offered m e m b e r states a set of principles 
calculated to strengthen their aspirations towards African unity and 
solidarity. T h u s pan-Africanism, regarded initially as 'a movement of 
ideas and emotions', had managed to crystallize the feelings, strengths 
and aspirations of the peoples of Africa and e m b o d y them in the Charter 
of African Unity. 
Until 1982 the Charter of African Unity underwent only minor 
modifications. T h u s the number of specialized commissions was reduced 
from five to three. It was also decided to do away with permanent 
membership of the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbi-
tration. In 1979, as part of the structural reform, the term 'administrative' 
2. In view of the circumstances of President Sylvanus Olympio's assassination, Togo 
was not admitted to the conference. Morocco refused the invitation. These two states 
were later to sign the Charter. 
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was deleted from the title of the secretary-general. At the same time the 
sixteenth session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government 
set up a committee to revise the Charter in the light of the changes and 
new situations in Africa. T h e point was that after some years it became 
necessary to remodel the Charter so as better to reflect the struggles of 
the twenty-first century and the priority to be given to development in 
all its forms, including culture, based on respect for h u m a n rights and 
the basic freedoms of peoples. 
T h e headquarters of the Secretariat-General is at Addis Ababa in 
Ethiopia. In 1963 the first secretariat, which was temporary in nature, 
was placed under the direction of D r Tesfaye Gebre Egzy. In 1964 the 
Conference of Heads of State and Government elected the Guiñean Diallo 
Telli to the post of secretary-general. In 1968 he was re-elected. In 1972 
he was succeeded by the Cameroonian N z o Ekangaki. In 1974 the latter 
was succeeded by his compatriot William Eteki M b o u m o u a . In 1978 it 
was the turn of the Togolese E d e m Kodjo to take over as head of the 
Secretariat-General; in 1983, it was the turn of Peter O n u from Nigeria; 
in 1985, Ide O u m a r o u from Niger; and in 1989, Salim A h m e d Salim 
from Tanzania. T h e secretary-general is aided by assistant secretaries-
general, four to begin with and five from 1979 onwards. They each 
represent one of the sub-regions of the continent. They run the technical 
departments, and with the secretary-general make up the 'political Cabi-
net'. T h e role of secretary-general has been variously interpreted. For 
some he is no more than a glorified clerk. Others would have liked to 
give him a political and co-ordinating role. President O m a r Bongo, then 
acting chairman of the O A U , told Jeune Afrique in July 1978: 'the 
structures of the O A U have become largely archaic, precisely because 
they limit the Secretary-General to mere administrative duties'. 
A standing order lays down the functions of the secretary-general, the 
assistants and the other members of staff, and the methods of recruitment. 
O n the tenth anniversary of the O A U , the Council of Ministers set up 
a committee to revise the structures of the Organization and the rules 
that govern its working. Its conclusions were adopted by the Khartoum 
summit in 1978 and gradually implemented in keeping with budgetary 
resources. 
T h e supreme authority of the O A U is the Conference of Heads of 
State and Government. It meets once a year in ordinary session, and at 
each session it elects a bureau headed by a chairman. Over the years the 
latter has become de facto chairman of the O A U . 3 
T h e second institution of the O A U is the Council of Ministers. It 
holds two ordinary sessions a year. O n e , at the beginning of the year, 
3. This post is not mentioned in the Charter, but has come into being over the years. 
O n e head of state, O m a r Bongo, has said of the acting chairman: 'In fact everything 
happens unknown to him. Nobody listens to him. Nobody reports to him'. 
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deals mainly with administrative and financial questions. T h e Council 
prepares the meetings of heads of state, and follows up the implementation 
of the decisions they adopt. 
T h e O A U on decolonization and liberation 
O n e of the most enduring and most effective pan-Africanist activities of the 
O A U has been its concerted assistance to national-liberation movements in 
colonized Africa. At the S u m m i t Conference in Addis Ababa in M a y 
1963, the independent states adopted a strong resolution on decolonization, 
in which they unanimously acknowledged 'the duty of all African Inde-
pendent States to support dependent peoples in Africa in their struggle 
for freedom and independence'. They also agreed on the 'imperious and 
urgent necessity of co-ordinating and intensifying their efforts to accelerate 
the unconditional attainment of national independence by all African 
territories still under foreign domination'.4 
After listening to representatives of national-liberation movements from 
East, Central and Southern Africa, speaking on settler colonialism and 
on the possible courses of action, the heads of state resolved: 
(1) that the continuation of colonial rule was a flagrant violation of the 
inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories 
concerned and a menace to the peace of the continent; 
(2) that Britain should observe the provision of United Nations 
Resolution 1515 on independence and should not grant inde-
pendence to the white minority of Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe); 
(3) that, if Britain granted the independence, O A U members would 
lend their effective moral and practical support to any legitimate 
measures which the African nationalist leaders m a y devise, and 
also take measures against any state according recognition to the 
white-minority government; 
(4) that Namibia was an African territory under the U N mandate, 
whose inhabitants were entitled to self-determination and inde-
pendence, and that South Africa's presence was an act of 
aggression; and 
(5) that the Portuguese were conducting genocide in Africa, and 
that their Western allies had to choose between their friendship 
for the African peoples and their support of colonial oppression 
and exploitation. 
T h e heads of state also adopted a programme of action on de-
colonization. They sent an African delegation consisting of the foreign 
ministers of Liberia, Tunisia, Madagascar and Sierra Leone to speak at 
4. T h e first O A U Resolutions, Agenda Item I: Decolonization, Final Version, 25 M a y 
1963. 
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the meetings of the U N Security Council which was examining the report 
of the United Nations Committee of Twenty-four on the genocide in 
Portuguese colonies. T h e y agreed to the breaking-off of diplomatic and 
consular relations between all African states and the governments of 
Portugal and South Africa, and to the boycotting of trade with the two 
countries by prohibiting the import of goods from those two countries, 
closing African ports and airports to their ships and planes, and forbidding 
the planes of those two countries to fly over African states. 
M o r e significantly, they established the African Liberation Committee 
consisting of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zaire, to be headquartered in D a r es Salaam and be 
responsible for co-ordinating the assistance from African states and for 
managing the Special F u n d . T h e Special F u n d was to be raised from 
voluntary annual contributions by O A U m e m b e r s to supply the necessary 
practical and financial aid to the various national-liberation movements . 
M e m b e r states also agreed to receive and sponsor nationalists from 
liberation movements for military, educational and vocational training, 
and to allow the transit of all material aid and volunteers. T h e y were to 
use their offices to unite the liberation movements so as to strengthen 
the effectiveness of the struggle. They also declared 25 M a y as African 
Liberation D a y on which to organize popular demonstrations and raise 
funds over and above the state contributions for the Special F u n d . 
At the same S u m m i t Conference in Addis Ababa, the m e m b e r s adopted 
a special resolution on apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. 
T h e y not only resolved to break diplomatic and trade relations with South 
Africa, but also to: 
(1) intensify the fight for Namibian independence before the Inter-
national Court of Justice; 
(2) support the U N Special Committee Against Apartheid; 
(3) fight for economic sanctions against South Africa; and 
(4) grant scholarships, educational facilities and possibilities of 
employment in African government services to refugees from 
South Africa. 
In addition, the m e m b e r s condemned racial discrimination in all its 
forms in Africa and the world. T h e y expressed the deep concern aroused 
in all African peoples and governments over racial discrimination against 
peoples of African descent living outside Africa, particularly in the United 
States. 
Through the African Liberation Committee, the O A U achieved con-
siderable success on decolonization. T h e vast majority of the independent 
states maintained the diplomatic and trade boycott of Portugal and South 
Africa. Even the few w h o failed did so not because of their lack of 
commitment to liberation and decolonization, but because of their econ-
omic dependency and military vulnerability stemming from their historical 
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plate 25.3 Above left: Dulcie September, representative of the ANC (African National
Congress) in France, assassinated in Paris in March ¡988; above right; Steve Biko ofSouth
Africa, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, assassinated in September 1977; below
left: Nelson Mandela of South Africa, leader of the ANC, before he was sentenced to life
imprisonment (photographed in the early 1960s); below right: ChiefAlbert Luthuli ofSouth
Africa, first president of the ANC, 1952-60
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and colonialist ties with South Africa. Such states were forced to support 
the liberation movements covertly while professing neutrality. This ambi-
guity was due to economic necessity that even the leaders of the liberation 
movement themselves were able to understand and appreciate. 
Internationally, the O A U was able to mobilize world-wide con-
demnation of colonialism and apartheid, as well as moral and practical 
support for the liberation movements. They secured United Nations 
recognition for the legitimacy of the liberation struggle. Under Resolution 
2555, the General Assembly requested all its specialized agencies to give 
material aid and assistance to liberation movements. Partly through the 
O A U ' s pressure, the United Nations did not recognize the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence ( U D I ) and the white-minority government 
of Ian Smith of Southern Rhodesia, and it established the Commission 
for Namibia to replace the illegal South African colonial administration. 
T h e U N , U N E S C O and the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
established anxi-apartheid committees. F r o m 28 January to 4 February 
1972 the Security Council met for the first time in Africa, in Addis 
Ababa, seat of the O A U . T h e acting president of the O A U was several 
times instructed by his colleagues to draw the colonial situation to the 
attention of the United Nations General Assembly. Thus , in 1969, 
A h m a d o u Ahidjo (Cameroon) presented to the Assembly the manifesto 
on Southern Africa k n o w n as the Lusaka Manifesto.5 
But that was not enough. In 1970 the O A U set out to direct its 
diplomacy towards the N A T O countries, the Scandinavian countries, 
Switzerland and Japan, with the object of explaining Africans' anxieties 
to them, appealing for their solidarity and showing them the threat that 
such a situation posed to Africa and world peace. But above all the O A U 
sought to dissuade them from going on supporting and arming colonialist 
regimes. T h e stubbornness of the Pretoria regime, its increasing recourse 
to violence and repression and its illegal occupation of Namibia led the 
United Nations, in co-operation with the O A U , to hold an international 
conference on sanctions against South Africa in Paris from 20 to 27 M a y 
1981. At the request of the O A U and the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t , the 
conference called for an early meeting of the Security Council with a 
view to adopting global mandatory sanctions against the racialist regime 
in South Africa for its apartheid policy. Sanctions were later refused by 
the Security Council; but the O A U had taken the opportunity of the 
Paris Conference to reaffirm before the international community that as 
regards Namibia the United Nations had a direct responsibility by virtue 
5. This manifesto was drawn up by the fifth summit of states of East and Central 
Africa meeting in Lusaka (Zambia), 14—16 April 1969. It was attended by Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, the Central African Republic, Chad, C o n g o -
Brazzaville, Congo-Léopoldville, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Somalia. 
754 
Pan-Africanism and liberation 
of Resolution 2448 of 1967, and that S W A P O was the only genuine 
representative of the people of Namibia.6 
In the course of time, the O A U was able to exert considerable influence 
on the liberation movements. Its official recognition of a liberation 
movement and of its leadership often became the decisive factor in 
international circles. It conferred legitimacy and acceptability to 
F R E L I M O in Mozambique, to the Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de 
Angola ( M P L A ) in Angola, to the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe, to 
S W A P O in Namibia, and to the African National Congress and the Pan-
African Congress in South Africa.7 O A U pressure led to the formation 
of F R E L I M O by the Mozambique African National Union ( M A N U ) and 
Unido democrática nacional de Moçambique ( U D E N A M O ) , and of the 
Patriotic Front by the Zimbabwe African National Union ( Z A N U ) of 
Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union ( Z A P U ) of 
Joshua N k o m o . Denial of diplomatic recognition by the O A U led to the 
international boycott of bantustans in South Africa, of the Smith-
Muzorewa government in Zimbabwe and of the Turnhalle Alliance in 
Namibia. Leaders like Moïse Tshombe of Zaire and Jonas Savimbi of 
Angola, w h o were denounced by the O A U for their non-pan-Africanist, 
pro-West interests, became outcasts in the black world. 
Simultaneously, the creation of the O A U and, especially the African 
Liberation Committee, had the positive effect of boosting the morale, 
hope, commitment and pace of the liberation struggle. With O A U support 
on the international scene, most liberation leaders and their followers felt 
that it was only a matter of time before they achieved their total 
independence. Their feelings often were reinforced by O A U manifestos, 
such as the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 on Southern Africa and the 
Arusha Action Plan of February 1981, on Namibia. There were no 
concrete, practical results during the years between 1963 and 1973, which 
were spent primarily on the organization of the African Liberation 
Committee and the national-liberation movements; on statements of 
principles and manifestos; and on military training. T h e armed struggle 
itself still was in its primary stage. 
T h e most fruitful period was the following decade from 1973 to 
1980 with respect to the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, 
Mozambique, Sao T o m e and Principe, as well as the Comoros, the 
Seychelles and Zimbabwe. The Liberation Committee's work in these 
6. T h e Paris Conference was attended by 122 governments, 15 specialized bodies and 
inter-governmental organizations, 37 international non-governmental organizations, 53 
national anti-apartheid organizations and a large number of political personalities. It was 
chaired by Salim A h m e d Salim, Foreign Minister of Tanzania, and it adopted two 
declarations, one about sanctions against South Africa and the other about Namibia. 
7. For details about the origins, ideologies, activities and leaderships of these liberation 
movements in Central and Southern Africa, see Chapter 10 above. 
755 
Africa since ig¡s 
areas greatly enabled the nationalists to carry on the war which led to 
the gradual liberation of large areas of the Portuguese colonies and the 
reorganization of the administration and the economy. In Guinea-Bissau, 
as discussed in Chapter 7 above, the P A I G C ' s campaign was decisive, 
and succeeded in overcoming the Portuguese grip on the country in 1973. 
F R E L I M O and the M P L A did the same in M o z a m b i q u e and Angola in 
1975 respectively. Faced with these successes the colonialists resorted to 
barbarous methods - such as the political assassination of the P A I G C 
leader, Amilcar Cabrai, and the leader of F R E L I M O , Eduardo Mondlane. 
In addition to the armed struggle, the nationalists embarked on civic 
training and the organization of the liberated areas. T h u s in Guinea-
Bissau, popular assemblies were elected, schools and hospitals set up and 
n e w economic arrangements brought into play. T h e Comoros , Seychelles 
and Z i m b a b w e also became independent in 1980. T h e only remaining 
vestige of European colonialism was settler colonialism in South Africa 
and Namibia, but victory in Namibia was only a matter of time. 
Outside Africa, the O A U has also paid particular attention to the 
situation in the Middle East and Palestine. T h u s it has expressed its 
solidarity with Egypt and with the Arab countries whose territory has 
been occupied since June 1967. 
T o make this solidarity effective it resorted to two methods: 
(1) appealing to its m e m b e r states to use all their influence to get 
Israel to implement Security Council Resolution 242; and 
(2) entrusting specific missions to certain heads of state. T h u s the 
eighth ordinary session of the O A U summit of June 1971, by 
resolution A H G / R e s . 66 (VIII), instructed the acting chairman 
to approach the United Nations about the renewal of hostilities 
because of the expiry of the cease-fire; while a commission of 
ten heads of state was instructed to consult with the Israeli and 
Egyptian governments. 
Another of the O A U ' s concerns has been the settlement of disputes 
between its m e m b e r states. T h e Bandung Declaration of 1955, to which 
the African nationalist leaders and the pan-Africanists subscribed, called 
for the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
T h e principle of peaceful settlement also figured in the various dec-
larations adopted by the first conference of independent African states, 
in one of the resolutions of the Monrovia Conference of M a y 1961, and 
in the Charter of the O A U . 
Article X I X of the Charter stipulates that: 
M e m b e r States undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means , 
and to this end decide to establish a commission of mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration whose composition and conditions of 
service shall be defined by a separate protocol to be approved by the 
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Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Said protocol shall be 
regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter. 
M a n y of these disputes arose from frontier problems inherited from col-
onialism. T h u s in 1962 Algeria and Morocco clashed with one another, and 
so over the years did Uganda and Tanzania, G a b o n and Equatorial Guinea, 
Cameroon and Nigeria, Zaire and Angola, D a h o m e y and Niger, Chad and 
the Sudan, and Guinea and the Côte d'Ivoire. T h e dispute between Ethiopia 
and Somalia over the Ogaden has lasted some time, as have those between 
Libya and Chad over the Aouzou strip, and between Kenya and Somalia.8 
In 1979 the O A U had to deal with a matter of a special kind: the fact 
that the various political and military factions confronting each other in 
Chad decided on the insistence of their neighbours to refer the matter 
to the O A U . T h e latter referred the question to a committee of heads of 
state, which managed to compel 11 Chadian factions to c o m e together in 
a transitional government of national unity ( G U N T ) under the leadership 
of Goukouni Oueddei. This alliance was short lived, and faced with a 
recrudescence of the civil war, the O A U in 1981 dispatched an inter-
African peace-keeping force to the area. This step has been variously 
judged. It was the first of its kind, and despite its defects it played an 
appreciable role by saving m a n y h u m a n lives. 
T h e O A U rounded off its political and liberation activities by concerning 
itself with h u m a n rights and the self-determination of peoples. T h e 
reasons for such a concern go back a long w a y in time. T h u s pan-
Africanism, in seeking to rehabilitate the Africans was aiming to wipe out 
both the after-effects of the slavery from which the Africans of the 
diaspora were suffering and also the misdeeds of colonialism in Africa. 
T h e African Conference on the Rule of L a w was held in Lagos in 
1961 to discuss the various aspects of h u m a n rights. T h e report of the 
three working parties acknowledged that the law needed to be used to 
safeguard and foster the wishes of the African people and the political 
rights of individuals. Social, economic, educational and cultural conditions 
therefore needed to be established such as would allow individuals to 
regain their dignity and achieve their legitimate aspirations in all countries, 
whether independent or not. 
T h e Monrovia Conference of August 1959 adopted a resolution on 
racial discrimination which called upon the m e m b e r s of the international 
community: 
(1) to associate themselves with the resolutions of the United Nations 
and with the declarations and resolutions of the Bandung and 
Accra conferences condemning racialism and segregation; and 
(2) to combat them. 
8. In 1963 Somalia expressed reservations about the principle of the inviolability of 
borders inherited from colonialism. 
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It is also worth noting that D r N n a m d i Azikiwe of Nigeria stressed in 
1961, in his book The Future of Pan-Africanism, the need to draw u p a 
H u m a n - R i g h t s Convention applicable in the context of a pan-African 
organization. This was not achieved until 16 years after the setting-up of 
the O A U , w h e n o n President Leopold Sédar Senghor's motion, the 
Conference of H e a d s of State and Government , meeting in Monrovia , 
Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979, stated that 'considering that economic 
and social development is a h u m a n right; taking note of Resolution 24 
( X X I V ) of the H u m a n Rights Commiss ion on regional arrangements for 
the promotion and protection of h u m a n rights' it: 
(1) Reaffirms the need for better international co-operation, respect 
for fundamental h u m a n and peoples' rights, and in particular 
the right to development; 
(2) Calls on the Secretary-General of the O A U to: 
(a) draw the attention of m e m b e r states to certain international 
conventions whose ratification would help to strengthen 
Africa's struggle against certain scourges, especially apartheid 
and racial discrimination, trade imbalance and mercenarism; 
(b) organize as soon as possible, in an African capital, a restricted 
meeting of highly qualified experts to prepare a preliminary 
draft of an 'African Charter on H u m a n and Peoples' Rights' 
providing, inter alia, for the establishment of bodies to 
promote and protect h u m a n and peoples' rights [Decision 
iiS (XVI)]. 
F r o m 28 November to 8 December 1979, African legal experts met in 
Dakar to draw up a preliminary draft of a charter reflecting the African 
conception of h u m a n rights. It would after all be a big mistake actually 
to claim to build a n e w African society without recognizing and fostering 
the prime mover and accelerator of such a development: m a n . While 
Africa has always contributed in the United Nations and elsewhere to 
the gradual development of h u m a n rights, the time had come for it to 
set up a precise legal framework within its o w n borders such as would 
meet perforce the basic needs of the peoples sharing its territory. After 
the experts, the Conference of Ministers of Justice meeting in Banjul, 
Gambia, in June 1980 and January 1981 next considered the preliminary 
draft, and it was adopted in July 1981 at the summit of heads of state in 
Nairobi. Both sessions of the Conference of Ministers of Justice were 
opened by the president of the Gambia, Sir D a w d a K . Jawara, w h o did 
not fail to stress the importance of what was at stake: 
A truly African Charter should reflect those of our traditions that are 
worth preserving, and also our values and the legitimate aspirations of 
our peoples, so as to round off the worldwide international campaign 
to reinforce respect for h u m a n rights. W e do not see the individual 
as a being existing in a vacuum with unlimited freedom. In our view 
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he lives in a society and in continual interaction with his fellow m e n . 
T h u s in addition to his rights he has his o w n responsibilities to fulfil 
towards his family and his community. W e should, however, avoid 
the danger of extending the individual's responsibilities to the point 
of obliterating the individual in the interest of the group. 
T h e African Charter of H u m a n Rights and the Rights of Peoples, after 
a long preamble, comprises 67 articles divided into three parts. T h e first 
part deals with the rights and responsibilities of m e n and peoples, and 
the second with protective measures; the third covers miscellaneous 
provisions. 
In adopting this Charter the African states obviously intended not only 
to strike a blow for progress and the 'duty to be free' in Africa but also 
to have at their c o m m a n d an additional weapon to repel the horrible 
monster of apartheid and colonialism. 
Socio-cultural development work 
In the national-liberation struggle being carried out in Africa the assertion 
of cultural identity has been an important feature. Culture is liberating 
and supportive for the emancipation movement of the colonial peoples, 
and so the O A U cannot neglect this factor in its work. 
In 1965 it set up a Department of Scientific and Cultural Affairs within 
the Secretariat-General. F r o m 27 October to 6 November 1975, in co-
operation with U N E S C O , it held the Intergovernmental Conference on 
cultural policies in Africa in Accra, Ghana. In July 1976, the thirteenth 
ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government 
adopted the African Cultural Charter, which formed a complement to 
the political charter of 1963. 
T h e cultural renaissance of Africa showed itself with the holding in 
Algiers of the first Pan-African Festival, which gave rise to some grand 
artistic events from 21 July to 1 August 1969. T h e second festival took 
place in Lagos and Kaduna, Nigeria from 15 January to 12 February 1977. 
A series of meetings under O A U auspices led to a clearer picture of 
cultural activity and its place in development. At the Algiers Pan-African 
Festival a symposium discussed 'African culture, its role in the liberation 
struggle, the consolidation of African unity and the economic and social 
development of Africa', and drew up the African cultural manifesto. T h e 
second festival in 1977 tackled the topic 'Black civilization and education'. 
In January 1981 a symposium on 'Science and culture as a foundation 
for African development' met in Libreville, G a b o n . 
Cultural co-operation bodies m a d e their appearance over the years: 
centres for linguistic and historical studies through oral tradition were set 
up, and in 1980 an Inter-African Cultural F u n d was instituted. 
T h e relationships the O A U formed with U N E S C O and A L E C S O gave 
its activities an international dimension. Education, science and technology 
759 
Africa since IQ35 
also figure in the work of O A U . In co-operation with U N E S C O it held 
the Conference of Ministers of Education in 1964 and 1982. In Addis 
Ababa in 1982 with the E C A , the U N D P , U N E S C O and the Association 
of African Universities, it held the first Conference of Rectors and Vice-
Chancellors of African Universities about the Lagos Plan of Action. For 
scientific questions the O A U has an Executive Secretariat in Lagos and 
an African Scientific Commission. In 1982 the O A U took two steps in 
this field: it instituted the African Scientific Renaissance Prizes, and it 
held the first Congress of Scientists in Africa. 
In the field of social affairs, several meetings have been held with 
international and inter-African bodies about the situation of young people, 
w o m e n and the disabled.9 Moreover, since 1967 the Secretariat-General 
of the O A U has looked after the Conference of African Ministers of 
Labour: this is a standing body of the O A U , and is responsible for 
evolving a c o m m o n labour policy and facilitating the necessary co-
operation between m e m b e r states. 
O A U action also led to the setting up in 1972 of the All-African Trades 
Union Organization, which is based in Accra, Ghana. 
Afro-Arab co-operation 
This deserves a special place in the work of the O A U . Historic relation-
ships have of course long existed between the Arab world and Africa. 
Centuries of contact have resulted in cultural and economic co-operation 
between them. But it must be admitted that it remained ill-developed. 
Pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism 
Pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism were originally distinct movements in 
North Africa. Pan-Arabism looked eastwards to the Arabian peninsula 
and the Fertile Crescent. O n the other hand, pan-Africanism south of 
the Sahara looked westwards to the black presence in the Americas. Pan-
Arabism included cultural solidarity partly based on religious pride (the 
heritage of Islam). Pan-Africanism included cultural solidarity partly 
based on racial pride (the heritage of the black people). Pan-Arabism 
stressed the concept of a single 'Arab nation'. Pan-Africanism was evolving 
a concept of a unified 'African personality'. 
Both movements had a profound ambivalence about Western Europe. 
They were both attracted and repelled by European culture and civ-
ilization. Pan-Arabism looked back to ancient Arab empires of the 
Umayyads and of the Abbasids - and noted h o w Arabs had civilized 
Europe in the Middle Ages. Pan-Africanism looked back to the ancient 
9. T h e Conference of African W o m e n , the Pan-African Youth Movement and the 
Supreme Council for Sport in Africa work closely with the O A U , and have observer 
status at it. 
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empires of Mali, Songhay and Ghana - and noted h o w ancient Egypt 
had civilized ancient Greece. Arab nostalgia for Islam's glorious past 
inspired poets and playwrights into a literary renaissance. African nostalgia 
for ancestral profundity provoked literary movements like négritude.10 
It was mainly after the Second World W a r that pan-Africanism and 
pan-Arabism began to merge. Perhaps inevitably Sudan (Khartoum) was 
among the first to manifest elements of fusion between the two movements. 
A n ancient kind of ambivalence affected m a n y northern Sudanese. W e r e 
they Arabs or Africans? Poets and other writers grappled with this 
dilemma. A . M . Fayturi later captured it as he portrayed Africa lying 
unconscious in a coma, but he meant the Africa within himself which was 
in a coma. Fayturi struggled to shake the sleeping Africa within his o w n 
soul: 
Africa O h Africa 
W a k e up from your dark self... 
M a n y times has the earth rotated, 
A n d m a n y times have the burning planets rolled 
T h e rebel has built what he destroyed, 
A n d the worshipper debased what he once adored 
But you are still as you have always been, 
A rejected skull, a (mere) skull.11 
T h e partial merger of pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism entered a n e w 
phase with the Egyptian revolution of 1952. This phase went beyond the 
simple fact that M u h a m m a d Naguib, w h o briefly succeeded King Farouk 
as Egypt's head of state, had black African blood in his veins. It went 
beyond the additional biological fact that A n w a r Sadat - another Egyptian 
activist of the 1952 revolution and destined to lead Egypt for more than 
a decade later - also had black African ancestry through his mother. W h a t 
was even more significant was the shift in Egypt's political orientation. 
Gamâl c A b d al-Nasser, w h o succeeded Naguib as Egypt's leader, saw the 
country as the centre of three concentric circles — the Arab world, the 
Muslim world, and Africa. H e reminded his compatriots that they could 
not rçmain indifferent to the 'sanguinary struggle' going on south of the 
Sahara against imperialism and racism. Perhaps influenced by the doctrine 
of Suez and the Nile in nineteenth-century thought, or by the historic 
role of Egypt as the mother of civilization, al-Nasser described his country 
as the very gateway into Africa. In spite of his exaggeration of the 
centrality of Egypt in the destiny of Africa, al-Nasser's little book, The 
Philosophy of the Revolution, constituted an important step forward in the 
process of linkage between pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism." 
10. Consult U N E S C O , 1979. 
11. This translation is from M . Abdul-Hai, 1976, pp. 43-4. 
12. G . A . Nasser, 1954; see also, K . Osia, 1983. 
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A n alliance was developing between the nationalist movements of Africa 
and the Arab world. Cairo became for a while the capital of radical 
nationalism of both regions. Dissidents and activists from all over Africa 
and the Middle East converged on Cairo, plotted change and conspired 
for revolution. T h e United Arab Republic under al-Nasser subsidized 
m a n y of their activities. 
Cairo Radio became the first international voice of revolution broadcast 
on the African continent. It broadcast not only in English, Arabic and 
French, but also in Kiswahili. Other languages were later added. Egypt 
also offered scholarships to Africans, as well as to Arabs, to study at 
Egyptian institutions. Colonial governments in African territories became 
alarmed by the radicalizing role which al-Nasser's United Arab Republic 
was playing in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. This only encouraged 
Cairo into greater nationalist militancy. 
Al-Nasser's radical credentials had been enhanced by the Suez crisis 
of 1956 and his successful nationalization of the Suez Canal. T h e 
nationalization had been a declaration of Africa's right to her o w n resources 
in the face of external hostility. T h e tripartite invasion of Egypt by 
Britain, France and Israel gave al-Nasser the stature of a martyr w h e n 
he suffered military defeat, followed by the stature of a hero w h e n the 
aggressors were forced to withdraw ignominiously under international 
pressure. 
T h e next stage in the partial fusion of pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism 
came with the later stages of the Algerian war of independence. T h e war 
broke out in 1954 but its pan-African implications did not mature until 
after Ghana's independence in 1957. For a while the Algerian war divided 
the African continent rather than uniting it. This was because m a n y 
Francophone countries were torn between their belief in anti-colonialism 
and their friendship towards France. Paris claimed for a long time that 
Algeria was part of France - and conservative opinion in Francophone 
Africa tended for a while to give France the benefit of the doubt. This 
split Africa into the Casablanca (pro-Algerian government-in-exile) and 
Monrovia (more conservative) groups. 
W h a t was significant about this split was that it was not neatly between 
pro-Algerian Arabs and pro-French blacks. T h e pro-Algerian Casablanca 
Group included Africa's greatest pan-Africanist - K w a m e N k r u m a h . T h e 
non-Arab members of the Casablanca alliance included also Guinea and 
Mali, as well as Ghana. This was yet another stage in the historic linkage 
between pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. In the Casablanca declaration, 
N k r u m a h for the first time joined the Arabs in denouncing Israel as a 
'tool of neo-colonialism' and a surrogate of the West. 
Pan-African splits were moderated not only after Algeria became 
independent in 1962 but also w h e n the Organization of African Unity 
was formed in 1963. T h e O A U became Afro-Arab in composition, inspired 
by the mystique of a continent in which the Sahara was regarded as a 
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bridge rather than a divide. In some respects the O A U became the most 
important and most ambitious Afro-Arab experiment in history. It was 
also another stage of linkage between pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. 
T h e fifth stage of linkage came with the June war of 1967 between the 
Arabs and Israel. Israel's conquest of Sinai was regarded as an aggression 
against a m e m b e r of the Organization of African Unity and therefore a 
territorial occupation of Africa by Israeli forces. T h e Arab-Israeli conflict 
was n o w territorially Africanized. For nearly two decades after that, pan-
Africanism and pan-Arabism were more deeply interlinked. Israeli co-
operation with the racist regime in South Africa provided additional 
vindication for Afro-Arab solidarity. B y the time of the Arab-Israeli 
October war of 1973 there was sufficient solidarity between Africa and 
the Arabs to result in an almost unanimous African break of diplomatic 
relations with Israel. T h e politics of the Middle East were n o w truly 
interlinked with the politics of Africa. 
Did the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
( O P E C ) also become one of the foundations of Afro-Arab solidarity? This 
is a more ambiguous area of analysis. It is true that the rise of O P E C 
transformed Nigeria into a pivotal state in relations between the Arabs 
and black Africa. For about a decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s, Nigeria was a link in the chain which tied pan-Arabism with pan-
Africanism - partly through the politics of oil and partly through the 
politics of Islam. Indeed, President Ibrahim Babangida in 1986 even took 
the political risk of making Nigeria a full m e m b e r of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) - to the indignation of his Christian 
compatriots. 
But while the politics of both O I C and O P E C do often provide 
important areas of linkage between pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism, 
piety and petroleum are sometimes divisive rather than unifying. Almost 
half the membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (total 
membership of nearly 50 countries) are also members of the Organization 
of African Unity. T h e proportion from Africa is higher than the African 
proportion in the membership of O P E C . All three organizations - the 
O I C , O A U and O P E C - have helped to link pan-Africanism with pan-
Arabism. But religion and oil prices are often ambiguous in their impact 
on h u m a n relations and international diplomacy. 
T h e agenda of Afro-Arab co-operation 
O n the other hand, Afro-Arab participation in the Group of 77 and 
North-South negotiations has created a wider alliance with the rest of 
the Third World. This wider agenda has, in the last few years, acquired 
a new dimension. Awareness of a close-knit, united Third World came 
into being at Bandung in 1955, and grew stronger at the summit of non-
aligned countries in Algiers in 1973. T h e similarity between racialism in 
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South Africa and Zionism in Palestine and the occupied territories brought 
their victims, the Arab and African peoples, closer together. 
T h e economic crisis and its effects on the development of the Third 
World prompted their governments to take u p a c o m m o n position in 
opposition to the deterioration of the world situation and the policies of 
the industrialized countries. This proved all the m o r e necessary in that 
the fair increase in the oil price m a d e the Arab countries which export 
this raw material a major force on international financial and monetary 
markets. This n e w situation injected a n e w purpose, a n e w basis and 
a n e w philosophy into Afro-Arab co-operation. B y successive stages, 
relationships between Africa and the Arab world were to acquire a hitherto 
u n k n o w n dimension: 
(i) T h e extraordinary session of the O A U Council of Ministers, 1 9 -
21 N o v e m b e r 1973, set up a committee of seven m e m b e r s to 
m a k e contact with the Arab League states and consider ways of 
drawing up a policy of co-operation between the African states 
and the Arab world. 
(2) T h e Arab Heads of State meeting in Algiers, 26-28 N o v e m b e r 
1973, decided to set up the Arab B a n k for Economic Develop-
m e n t in Africa ( B A D E A — Banque arabe pour le développement 
économique de l'Afrique), in order to: 
(a) play a part in financing the economic development of African 
states; 
(b) encourage the participation of Arab capital in the develop-
ment of Africa; and 
(c) provide the necessary technical assistance for the develop-
ment of Africa. 
(3) At their meeting in Cairo on 23 January 1974 the Arab oil 
ministers decided, in accordance with the recommendations of 
the Economic Council of the Arab League, to set up a Special 
F u n d for Aid to Africa ( S F A A ) . Its initial capital was $200 
million, and it was intended in the first phase to provide 
emergency aid to African countries on favourable terms. 
(4) Meeting from 25 to 28 M a r c h 1974 in Tunis, the Council of the 
Arab League approved in principle the setting u p of the Arab 
F u n d for Technical Assistance to Africa; and on 10 July in Cairo, 
the African and Arab inter-ministerial committee approved the 
draft declaration and p r o g r a m m e of action on Afro-Arab co-
operation. 
(5) This document was first submitted to the Arab and African 
foreign ministers at their meeting in Dakar, 19-22 April 1976, 
then to meetings in Lusaka, 2 4 - 6 January 1977, and in Cairo, 
3 - 6 M a r c h 1977. A summit meeting in Cairo, 7 - 9 M a r c h 1977, 
was attended by 60 m e m b e r states of the Arab League and the 
O A U . In a declaration on Arab-African economic and financial 
co-operation they decided to adopt a comprehensive programme 
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of long-term economic, technical and financial co-operation in 
the fields of: 
(a) trade; 
(b) agriculture and stockbreeding; 
(b) mining and industry; 
(d) energy and hydraulic resources; 
(e) transport, communications and telecommunications; 
(f ) financial co-operation; 
(g) culture, education and social affairs; and 
(h) science and technology. 
T o improve the co-ordination of action and to help in the 
implementation of the declaration, die two parties: 
(a) set up a standing Afro-Arab ministerial committee; 
(b) gave each other observer status at meetings of their respective 
organizations; 
(c) appointed representatives at each other's secretariat; and 
(d) invited African and Arab institutions in the same field to 
work closely together. 
Let us take stock of the first few years of Afro-Arab co-operation. 
There is certainly a political will to act, and substantial means. But very 
early on the working of the institutions was paralysed by political conflicts 
in the Arab world, and both sides were irritated by administrative delays -
so m u c h so that die head of state of Niger, President Seyni Kountche, 
when welcoming the third session of the standing committee for A r a b -
African co-operation to Niamey in June 1978, recommended 'getting away 
from the continual deliberate shilly-shallying favoured by other forms of 
co-operation, more concerned to perpetuate dieir control than to work 
for the real economic and social advancement of our states'. 
Capital transfers from die Arab states to African countries increased 
considerably from 1973 to 1980. T h u s for 1974 official development aid 
by the O P E C countries to Third-World countries amounted to the 
equivalent of $2.5 billion, or 1.74 per cent of their G N P . Total transfers 
from O P E C members to the Third World were $5 billion in 1974 and 
$9 billion in 1975 - an increase of 66 per cent. But that was still not 
enough. A s the president of B A D E A wrote, 'the smallness of these 
transfers to Africa is even more alarming when w e realize Africa's real 
needs for development capital'. T h e 'crisis' of declining oil prices in the 
1980s (the 'oil glut') hurt the oil producers and reduced Arab aid. 
But in the minds of its promoters, Afro-Arab co-operation is not a 
matter merely of some financial transfers or private investments. It must 
translate into action the shared aspirations and the mutual understanding 
of peoples and civilizations. Hence the importance of reconciling the 
Lagos Plan of Action adopted by the O A U with the A m m a n Strategy 
advocated by the Arab League; this would pave the w a y for shared 
development programmes. T h e O A U - A r a b League plan to set u p an 
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Afro-Arab Cultural Fund and an Afro-Arab Cultural Institute also prom-
ised to give a fillip to cultural exchanges and cultural development. 
Conclusion 
It can be seen from the discussion that one of the underlying themes of 
pan-Africanism was the liberation of black peoples in general and Africans 
in particular. While the chapter in this volume on regional integration 
m a y suggest more divisions, clashes of personalities and failures than 
unity and success, this chapter on pan-Africanism and liberation indicates 
considerable unity of purpose and action by people of African ancestry 
throughout the world and by the O A U in particular. In spite of the initial 
lack of unity a m o n g the liberation movements, national economic self-
interests and vulnerability a m o n g some of the independent states, and 
massive economic, military and diplomatic support given to the colonial 
regimes by Western powers, the O A U and liberation movements were 
able to wage a c o m m o n pan-Africanist struggle and win against European 
colonialism and imperialism. All independent African states participated 
in the struggle in one form or another, in spite of the apparent multi-
dimensional national self-interests. Anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and 
non-alignment became the strongest bonds of pan-Africanist unity a m o n g 
independent states and a m o n g liberation movements. Pan-Africanist ideol-
ogy and liberation struggle also permeated the masses of Africa to the 
extent that they were prepared to bear the economic expenses and h u m a n 
sacrifices of liberating their fellow Africans. 
However, in the light of the vastly changing economic conditions and 
especially of the deteriorating economic order in Africa, the contours of 
pan-Africanism have n o w been extended to include the Middle East, and 
the Third World in general. T h e future will surely include the successful 
conclusion of the struggle in South Africa, as in Namibia; a more genuine 
economic and cultural independence for Africa; and the realization of 
that long-cherished but elusive dream of radical pan-Africanists - a 
continental government for Africa. 
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Independent Africa in world 
affairs 
Africa and the capitalist 
countries 
CHINWEIZU 
Three evils in modern history have coloured Africa's relationship with 
the capitalist world - the slave trade, imperialism and racism. W a s the 
link between capitalism and the three evils inevitable? O r can capitalism 
be divorced from those ominous forces? 
In a previous period of Africa's relationship with the capitalist world, 
it was certainly demonstrated that mature capitalism could comfortably 
survive the abolition of the slave trade. Indeed, the leading capitalist 
power of the nineteenth century (England) became also the leading 
abolitionist power. 
T w o of the most basic questions for the second half of the twentieth 
century have been, first, whether capitalism could comfortably survive 
the process of decolonization; and, secondly, whether capitalism could at 
last also divorce itself from racism once and for all. A s the slave trade 
eventually proved unnecessary for the health of international capitalism, 
in its more advanced stage, can imperialism and racism be said to be 
similarly dispensable for international capitalism? 
W h a t the years from 1945 to 1980 demonstrated was the capitalist 
world's reluctant readiness to accept the political decolonization of Africa. 
W h a t the rest of the twentieth century m a y also demonstrate is the 
capitalist world's readiness to accept the end of apartheid and insti-
tutionalized racism in Southern Africa - under the pressure of African 
liberation-fighters. 
Are w e therefore to conclude that capitalism is at last on the verge of 
shedding off all the three evils which had previously coloured its relation-
ship with Africa - the slave trade, imperialism and racism? 
There is a catch in the story. Political decolonization and formal 
independence in Africa have not meant the end of imperialism. T h e y have 
only meant a change in the guise of imperialism. Political decolonization 
has not been accompanied by economic decolonization. A n d protect-
orate status under single European countries sometimes gives way 
to protectorate status under such Western collective powers as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Communi ty . 
This chapter is about some of these n e w guises of capitalist power in 
Africa. 
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U p o n attaining independence1 four related ambitions determined what 
changes the n e w African states sought in their relations with the rest of 
the capitalist world.2 Their élites wanted to modernize their societies and 
thereby gain international respect for their people. T o that end, they 
wanted to complete the political decolonization of Africa and to end the 
humiliations of racism; they wanted economic development to make their 
countries powerful, affluent and respected members of the industrial 
world; and they wanted economic decolonization to free them from 
Western economic control. Western reactions to these aims were deter-
mined by whether their implications conflicted with or served the over-
riding Western interest in preserving their world dominance through the 
m i n i m u m necessary reforms. W h e r e the implications went beyond or 
against such reforms, the West opposed them; otherwise, the West 
supported them. 
Modernization was understood, by Africa and the West alike, as a 
process which would turn African societies into black replicas of twentieth-
century societies. T h e capitalist industrial societies were the generally 
preferred model; the socialist industrial societies, though the preferred 
model for a minority of the African élite, were repugnant to the majority 
of the African leadership as well as to the West. Consequently, considerable 
Afro-Western co-operation went into fostering Western-style democracy 
in state affairs; into establishing Western-style schools and universities to 
help transplant the Western intellectual tradition into Africa; into pro-
pagating the capitalist ideology a m o n g Africans, especially the liberal 
version which was dominant at the time; and into creating roads, tele-
communications and other technical infrastructures which would facilitate 
Western-style economic activity in Africa. 
For the West and the African states alike, the economic aim of 
modernization was the rapid attainment by Africans of the contemporary 
Western style and level of consumerism. But whereas Africans wanted to 
create their o w n industries to supply the products they craved, the West 
preferred that Africans should continue to depend on the West for them. 
Consequently, the two sides meant rather different things by economic 
development. 
African states saw the cornerstone of economic development as the 
creation of their o w n industrial base. T h e West, in contrast, limited its 
concept of African economic development to merely reforming Africa's 
productive capacity in ways that would make Africa a reliable supplier of 
agricultural and mineral inputs to the factories of the West, and to 
1. i960 is generally taken as the year of African independence. It was the year in which 
the largest number of African countries gained independence. 
2. Relations between Africa and the rest of the capitalist world were, in essence, Afro-
Western relations, with the West in the trilateral sense of Western Europe, North America 
and Japan. 
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developing African appetites so that Africa would become a more lucrative 
market for Western goods. 
O n economic decolonization, the African states and the West were in 
sharp conflict. T h e African states wanted to wrest control of their 
economies from a West which was determined to retain that control. For 
the West, losing control would m e a n giving up what a century of conquest 
and colonization had achieved for them, and what political decolonization 
had aimed to preserve. For the African states, however, not to wrest away 
that control would be to defeat the economic aim of their struggle for 
political independence. 
O n political decolonization itself, if their conflict seemed any less sharp 
than that over economic decolonization, it was only because Western 
economic hegemony over Africa was consistent with a variety of political 
arrangements: white-minority domination — as in the Republic of South 
Africa and the then Rhodesia; classical colonialism - as in the then 
unliberated colonies of Portugal; or neo-colonialism, that is, indirect 
political control through economic domination - as in the newly inde-
pendent African states themselves. Because of these options, Western 
opposition to the African aims of destroying racism and ending foreign 
political rule over every square inch of the continent was not as implacable 
as its opposition to economic decolonization. Nonetheless, the Western 
powers were reluctant to give up any existing form of political control 
for another which they considered less congenial. Thus , they could 
publicly agree that the political decolonization of Africa and the ending 
of racist apartheid were desirable, yet hinder these objectives through 
delaying tactics and ambivalences which Africans found most maddening. 
T h e details of the drama resulting from these conflicts and coincidences 
of interests and perceptions were shaped to no small degree by the system 
of multilateral institutions which the West had set up for managing the 
capitalist system following the disasters of the Second World W a r . T h e 
U N (and especially such of its agencies as U N C T A D ) , the E E C , the 
World Bank and the International Monetary F u n d ( IMF) would be 
principal actors and venues in the ensuing drama. 
Multilateralism and the Atlantic Charter 
In the early phases of the Second World W a r , it became clear to the 
leaders of the anti-Axis alliance that intense economic rivalries between 
capitalist powers must be defused if they were not to cause yet another 
global war. They therefore set about outlining arrangements which they 
hoped would enable them to manage the peace after the Second World 
W a r . T h e Atlantic Charter, enunciated in 1941 by U S President Franklin 
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill became their 
inspiration. France was under Nazi occupation. T h e cornerstone of the 
Atlantic Charter was the principle of multilateralism on which the top 
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political, economic and defence institutions of the post-war capitalist 
world would be organized. 
T h e Bretton W o o d s agreement of 1945 created under American lead-
ership three primary economic institutions, namely the I M F , the World 
Bank and the G A T T . T h e I M F , which went into operation in 1947, was 
given the job of smoothing out difficulties posed by balance-of-payments 
surpluses and deficits from international trade. T h e World Bank (officially 
named T h e International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 
which went into operation in 1946, was given the task of encouraging 
capital investment for the reconstruction and development of its m e m b e r 
countries. T o the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( G A T T ) , 
which began operation in 1948, fell the task of promoting multilateral 
trade through minimizing trade barriers, reducing import tariffs and 
quotas, and discouraging preferential trade agreements between countries. 
O n the political and military sides, the Atlantic Charter inspired two 
organizations. First was the United Nations Organization (the U N ) which 
came into being in 1945 with its headquarters in the U S A . It thereafter 
served as a political forum for discussing world affairs, and its various 
specialized agencies provided technical assistance for managing aspects of 
world affairs. In 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) 
was given responsibility for the collective defence of the European and 
North American powers of the capitalist world. Again the United States 
was 'the first among equals'. 
Later on, two other multilateral economic organizations were created 
which had consequences for independent Africa. T h e European Economic 
Community ( E E C ) was created by the Treaty of R o m e in 1957, and came 
into being in 1958 under French leadership. It was designed to foster 
c o m m o n external policies for its members in the areas of commerce, 
agriculture and transport. In 1961, a club of the leading capitalist powers, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( O E C D ) , 
came into being to expand world multilateral trade, among other things. 
These institutions (the U N , I M F , World Bank, G A T T , E E C , O E C D , 
N A T O ) were the apex of a structure of rules, laws, customs and 
organizations which together determined the workings of the capitalist 
world into which African states emerged from colonialism. A n d without 
m u c h questioning or understanding of the true purposes of these insti-
tutions, or of the system of structures over which they presided, African 
states were co-opted into them. They were persuaded to join the U N 
and its agencies; to join the I M F , the World Bank, and the G A T T ; and 
to develop subordinating relations with the E E C , N A T O and the O E C D . 
They were obliged, by various open and secret sections of the instruments 
transferring formal political power to them at independence, to retain 
whatever economic, diplomatic and cultural agreements they had been 
m a d e parties to by the departing colonial administrations. Furthermore, 
African states were prevailed upon to join such organizations as the 
772 
Africa and the capitalist countries
plate 26.1 The Sixteenth Franco-African Summit at La Baule, France, June, 1990
(British) Commonwealth and the French Community which their former
colonizers created as instruments for their continuing political hegemony.
Many African states (especially former French colonies) also signed
defence pacts with their departing masters, many of which permitted the
ex-colonizers (especially France) to station troops in the African countries,
and to intervene militarily, if need be, in the internal affairs of the
new African regimes. Thus, the African states not only subordinated
themselves to the apex institutions, but also tied themselves by a thousand
cables to the inner working structures of the capitalist world system. And
in effect, with independence, Africa changed from being a patchwork of
exclusive and competing imperial territories, each lorded over by one
European power or another, and became, in essence, a NATO protect¬
orate.
Within the NATO umbrella, ultimate responsibility for each ex-colony
remained with its former colonial master. Whenever there was civil strife
within an ex-colony (as in the civil wars in Nigeria and Chad), the NATO
countries usually followed the course advised by its ex-colonial master.
But if an ex-colony was felt to be under serious threat from 'external
communist subversion' (as with Lumumba's Congo), the USA, as the
leader of NATO, would take a direct hand in the matter.
773
Africa since 1Q35
Political decolonization and East-West rivalry, 1960-84
The campaign to complete the political decolonization ofAfrica eventually
weakened the NATO protectorship into an OECD hegemony. This
happened for two principal reasons. First, as African states diversified
their economic contacts with the rest of the world, the capitalist countries
with strong economic ties to Africa came to include non-NATO members
of the OECD like Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden and Japan. Secondly, by
giving material support to African decolonization movements, the Soviet
bloc gained steady influence in Africa, thus partially eroding the NATO
protectorship. Beginning with the largely rhetorical friendship of radical
African regimes in Ghana, Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville in the 1960s,
the Soviet bloc had, by the mid-1970s, established firm footholds in
Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, which proclaimed themselves pro-
Soviet socialist or Marxist states.
plate 26.2 Installation of a printing press at CICIBA, Libreville, Gabon, by technicians
from the Mitsubishi Corporation ofJapan
Western fears of Soviet bloc influence in Africa seriously affected Afro-
Western relations. Its impact was like the pressure of a hostile column
appearing at a siege, raising uncertain hopes of escape among the besieged,
and spreading alarm among the besiegers. Soviet actions and intentions
thus became a crucial element in the calculations of both sides in all
aspects of their relations.
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It became a preoccupation of the West to keep Soviet bloc influence 
out of Africa. African nationalism was, however, far from averse to 
obtaining Soviet bloc help in its campaign to end Rhodesian settler-
colonialism in Zimbabwe; Portuguese colonialism in Angola, Guinea-
Bissau and Mozambique; South African rule in Namibia; and apartheid 
and white-settler rule in South Africa. 
In the independent African states, N A T O protectorship was preserved 
by various means: propaganda campaigns to foster a pro-Western and 
anti-Soviet political and cultural climate; political chaperonage of African 
regimes by Western embassies; covert political interventions; and, when 
all else failed, open military interventions to prop up tottering pro-
Western regimes or to topple pro-Soviet regimes where they managed to 
emerge. T h e flashpoints of these activities were the numerous 'anti-
communist' military interventions in Africa by Western or Western-
sponsored forces. These included the U N operation in the Congo (Zaire), 
from i960 to 1964, first to oust Patrice L u m u m b a , w h o m the West saw 
as pro-Soviet and communist, and then to install a pro-Western leadership; 
British interventions in Kenya and Tanganyika (1964) to suppress mutinies 
against pro-Western regimes; the anti-Nkrumah coup in Ghana (1966) to 
topple an increasingly anti-Western leader; the Shaba Operations (1977 
and 1978-9) to protect the M o b u t u regime from its Zairian foes; numerous 
French interventions to preserve pro-French regimes (as in the Côte 
d'Ivoire, 1964 and 1968) or to replace those no longer acceptable to 
France, such as the coup against Emperor Bokassa (1979); and numerous 
mercenary expeditions to topple 'left-leaning' African governments, as in 
Guinea (1970) and the Seychelles (1979 and 1982). These means were 
largely successful in preserving a pro-Western status quo in the affected 
countries. 
T h e West had far less success in preventing pro-Soviet regimes 
from emerging from the remnants of the old colonies. There, African 
nationalism, with decisive Soviet-bloc support, inflicted defeats upon the 
West. 
Despite an overall Western self-interest in extending political de-
colonization to the remaining colonies, a fear, engendered particularly by 
the Congo experience, of pro-Soviet Africans coming to power in the 
wake of Europeans, m a d e the West throw its weight behind the surviving 
colonialisms of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. Consequently, 
against the N A T O - b a c k e d determination of impoverished Portugal to 
hang on to its colonies, and of the Rhodesians to hang on to Zimbabwe, 
prolonged armed struggles had to be waged. Considerable Soviet-bloc 
military and diplomatic assistance helped to make the victorious national-
ists pro-Soviet and even Marxist. 
In Ethiopia, the Marxist wing of the military revolution against the 
feudal monarchy w o n the competition for power which followed the 
overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie. T h e Marxists' victory was despite 
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considerable Western efforts (especially American) to install their pro-
Western friends in power. 
With these triumphs of Marxist African nationalists, N A T O ' s pro-
tectorship over Africa was seriously breached by 1975. With its worst 
fears of pro-Soviet states emerging in Africa thus fulfilled, the West under 
U S leadership saw less reason to push black majority rule and the ending 
of apartheid upon the white-settler minority ruling South Africa. It 
therefore also sought to entrench South African rule in Namibia. T h u s , 
despite major African victories against Portuguese and Rhodesian col-
onialism, the African campaign of political decolonization was still not 
concluded by the mid-1980s. Namibia was still fighting for its inde-
pendence; and despite mounting international pressure, the end of apart-
heid and of white-minority rule in South Africa were not yet in sight. 
At the end of 1984, it could be said that whereas N A T O lost its 
protectorship over those of its old colonies which it still had by 1970, it 
successfully defended its protectorship over the neo-colonies to which it 
had given political independence by 1970. All this vindicated the overall 
post-war Western strategy of granting political independence to colonies 
in order to be able to keep them within the Western economic orbit. 
However, in 1974, the dominant theme of the Afro-Western drama had 
shifted from the political to the economic sphere. 
Economic development and decolonization, 1960-73 
Determined to preserve Africa as an economic protectorate, and fearing 
Soviet bloc inroads if African aspirations went unmet, the West was 
prepared to foster a certain amount of Africanization of the African 
economy, and to sponsor that limited type of development which the 
colonial powers had begun after the Second World W a r . But the demands 
of African nationalism went far beyond what the West under U S leadership 
would countenance. Consequently, the first quarter-century of African 
political independence witnessed a steady escalation of African pressure 
for development and decolonization, and Western efforts to limit both. 
In the accepted recipe for development, investment funds and aid 
grants, producer goods and technical expertise would be imported and, 
together with internally mobilized savings, be used to establish import 
substitution and raw materials processing industries. Economic infra-
structure (roads, dams, railways, telecommunications, and so on) would 
be built to feed industries with their needs and to distribute their output. 
Social-welfare infrastructure (schools, hospitals, and so on) would upgrade 
local manpower for employment. Agriculture and mining would yield 
exports to pay for consumer goods, as well as supply part of the funds 
for industrialization. This strategy of reliance on domestic savings, foreign 
aid, foreign investment, foreign technology and experts, and foreign trade 
to upgrade local labour, local infrastructure and local raw materials was 
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expected to produce a G D P growth rate high enough to close the gap 
between Western and African standards of living. 
There were divergences between Africa's socialists and capitalists on 
the internal social arrangements through which this development strategy 
would be implemented. For the socialist roaders (those w h o believed in 
the socialist road to development), implementation would be through 
social and economic arrangements predicted on the collective ownership 
of the means of production. In practice, collective ownership was to m e a n 
state ownership. Marxists among the socialist roaders insisted that society 
and its collectivized means of production must be managed by a dic-
tatorship of the proletariat. Other African socialists would not go that 
far. For them, a state run by a coalition of representatives of all classes 
would do. A s some put it, there were no classes in Africa, therefore there 
was no question of leadership or dictatorship by some class. For the 
capitalist roaders (those w h o believed in the capitalist road to 
development), the strategy would be implemented through social and 
economic arrangements predicated on the capitalist principle of both state 
and private ownership of the means of production. T h e y thus opted for 
the mixed economy, with state and private enterprise mixed in varying 
proportions. 
T h e West naturally favoured the African capitalist roaders. It regarded 
the non-Marxist African socialists with various degrees of distrust, and 
African Marxists as dupes and agents of the Soviet bloc whose access to 
power must be blocked. 
However, even before the 1960s were over, it was clear that something 
was profoundly wrong with the basic development recipe. B y the early 
1970s, there was no sign of any African country (whether capitalist, 
African socialist or Marxist) 'catching up' with the West. T h e general 
complaint around the world was that the rich nations were growing richer 
while the poor, including Africa, were getting poorer. 
Prior to the O P E C oil-price hikes, only a minority of Africans actively 
linked economic development with the decolonizing of their external 
economic relations. Decolonization was generally seen as no more than 
Africanization, in the sense of putting more Africans into the economic 
structures inherited from colonial times. Only a minority of radical 
nationalists pressed for the nationalization of foreign enterprises and 
changes in the terms of Afro-Western economic relations. A n d only an 
even smaller minority of socialist roaders saw development as requiring 
changes in the local social and economic relations created under col-
onialism, together with a radical delinking of African economies from the 
capitalist world economy. 
T h e West for its part preferred Africanization of the colonial economic 
institutions, and at the slowest possible pace. It opposed for a while 
nationalization and even partial expropriation, and set its face against 
changes in the economic linkages between Africa and the West. 
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France under Charles de Gaulle demonstrated quite early that Africa's 
attempts at delinking would be severely punished by a complete severance. 
Guinea, for instance, was forcibly cut off w h e n France angrily conceded 
political independence to her in 1958, and unilaterally 'delinked' their 
economic relations. A n d in keeping with the N A T O code, the other 
capitalist powers shunned Guinea. H e r forced isolation from the advanced 
capitalist world lasted until 1963 - when she first restored relations with 
France - and forced her to rely heavily on the Soviet bloc. In contrast, 
Tanzania in 1967, and Angola at independence in 1975, opted for socialist 
development but carefully continued with as m u c h linkage to the West 
as they 'needed'. For instance, Angola's oil continued to be extracted 
through joint ventures with Western companies. 
There was a similar diversity a m o n g the capitalist roaders. S o m e (like 
the Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Kenya and Zaire) were closely chaperoned by 
the West in their economic affairs. Others, like Nigeria, preferred to travel 
the capitalist road under less supervision and control. G h a n a was a rather 
peculiar case. While N k r u m a h loudly espoused the socialist path, very 
little was done in his day to sever old colonial ties, and even less to alter 
the underlying capitalist reality of the Ghanaian society and economy. 
After Nkrumah's overthrow in 1966, the socialist rhetoric was dropped 
and Ghana stayed on the capitalist road to development. 
T h e socialist roaders were more aggressive about the nationalization of 
foreign assets than were the capitalist roaders. T h e latter generally 
preferred indigenization, a method whereby the state and individual 
Africans took shares in foreign companies, and Africans were absorbed into 
the management echelons for apprenticeship. With time and experience, 
Africans were expected to assume control of the economic institutions 
needed for development. 
Expropriation, whether by nationalization or indigenization, did not go 
without responses from the West. Western governments in the 1960s 
threatened crippling reprisals against those w h o nationalized their assets. 
France especially was tough with her former colonies. W h e r e such 
threats did not deter nationalization, they demanded heavy compensation. 
Western hostility to indigenization was less intense, though France was 
again more sensitive. But even an American firm like Citibank left Nigeria 
rather than compulsorily sell part of its share to the Nigerian government 
in the mid-1970s. 
T h e long-term French response to partial or total expropriation was a 
shift from equity participation to greater use of loans and supplier credits. 
This was followed by other Western powers. There was also a shift from 
parent-company direct control of African subsidiaries to management 
participation, technical assistance and training arrangements, production 
sharing and supply contracts. French investors began to rely on investment 
guarantee and insurance schemes provided by their h o m e governments 
to cover non-commercial risks like war, revolution and expropriation. 
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Other European powers followed suit. Such schemes were applicable 
for investments in countries with w h o m their h o m e governments had 
Investment Protection Agreements (IPAs) which provided for fair and 
prompt compensation in cases of expropriation. African countries which 
were eager to secure foreign investment found themselves entering into 
IPAs with Western countries. A s early as i960, France entered into such 
agreements with Senegal, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and Gabon. 
Italy, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and 
France established bilateral IPAs, and conventions containing investment-
protection clauses, with no less than 20 African countries by 1981. A n d 
by that year, 39 African countries had signed and ratified a multilateral 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes set up between 
the O E C D and developing countries. 
By such devices, the West often under both French and American 
leadership contained the m o m e n t u m of expropriation, and m a d e it safe 
for Western companies to keep investing in Africa. For African countries, 
to the extent that expropriation had occurred, its limits as a possible 
avenue for furthering development were soon evident. Neither partial nor 
total African ownership of companies operating in Africa improved the 
prices Africans got for their exports, the quantities they could sell, or the 
prices they had to pay for imports. They discovered that the power over 
these lay with the handful of Western companies which dominated world 
trade in each commodity. 
Even by the early 1960s, N k r u m a h (who had had a head start over 
most African leaders in tackling the problems of development,' since his 
country gained independence as early as 1957), was denouncing the 
hidden powers of Western oligopolies and charging that they were 
obstacles to economic progress in Africa.3 For the constraints on African 
development to be removed, the hold of these companies on the inter-
national market had to be broken by concerted governmental action. 
W h e n N k r u m a h raised these issues, most African leaders either ignored 
or pooh-poohed it all. Francophone African governments were often 
hostile. But by the mid-1970s, capitalist and socialist roaders alike had 
begun to c o m e around to Nkrumah's insights. Realizing that their 
development plans would remain impotent so long as they were not co-
ordinated with the decolonizing of their economic relations with the West, 
African leaders (even Francophone ones) found cause to join a gathering 
Third-World movement to alter the international economic order. A n d 
the final impetus which pushed them into the campaign for a N e w 
International Economic Order (NIEO) was the O P E C oil-price hikes. 
3. K . Nkrumah, 1966. 
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The OPEC watershed 
O P E C ' s success in unilaterally quadrupling oil prices between 1973 and 
1974 changed the perception of what was possible in the international 
economic sense. Suddenly, producers of primary commodities realized 
that they had the means to take their resources and destinies into their 
o w n hands. That marked a watershed; after it, the pursuit of development 
and decolonization would be conducted in a different spirit. 
O P E C ' s impact on African-Western relations was on various levels. In 
spite of Washington's 'restraining influence' on O P E C ' s most powerful 
m e m b e r , Saudi Arabia, the oil cartel caused an acute balance-of-payments 
crisis for the non-oil producers, a crisis which turned economic m a n -
agement into something of a nightmare. But it simultaneously raised 
hopes for eventually resolving the crisis through spectacular increases for 
export earnings if the O P E C achievement for oil was repeated for other 
commodities. Washington was openly hostile to O P E C . Paris was more 
cautious. London stood to gain by high oil prices. 
At the level of general consciousness, O P E C gave instant and public 
validity to the thesis that structural and market impediments existed 
which constrained development. In particular, it showed that if the 
commodity-pricing constraint were overcome, there could be a gush of 
funds to finance development and even the high consumerism which 
development was supposed eventually to produce. A s all could see, capital 
funds were no longer a constraint on development in O P E C countries. 
O P E C also showed that the pricing and other constraints could be 
overcome by producer-cartels and concerted political attacks on the 
structures of external economic relations. Given this visible possibility, at 
the propaganda and international diplomacy level, O P E C ' s success turned 
a hitherto mostly academic debate about development strategy into a public 
debate, and galvanized isolated calls for decolonization of international 
economic relations into a global chorus. T h e dream of changing the 
structure of relations to the advantage of Third-World countries energized 
the campaign for a N e w International Economic Order ( N I E O ) to replace 
that constructed under the Atlantic Charter. For Africans in particular, 
the O P E C example strengthened the resolve to win better terms for their 
side in the ongoing negotiation of economic arrangements between the 
A C P and the E E C countries. France's Trojan horse into O P E C was 
Gabon - but until the late 1980s France also assiduously cultivated the 
Arab members of O P E C . 
A n d as African economies plunged from stagnation into decline and 
crisis, partly as a result of the jump in oil prices, pressure was maintained 
both for searching for effective development strategies and for the changing 
of external economic linkages. W e shall n o w examine the subsequent c a m -
paign to decolonize Africa's external economic relations, and the debate 
on development and dependency which accompanied that campaign. 
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The economic decolonization campaign, 1974-84 
African states pursued economic decolonization through two principal 
outlets: the general Third-World campaign for a N e w International 
Economic Order, and the negotiations for the L o m é Convention between 
the African-Caribbean-Pacific countries ( A C P ) and the E E C . T h e focus 
of these efforts were external economic relations; they ignored whatever 
contributions internal social relations within African countries might have 
contributed to the lack of development. 
F r o m about the mid-1960s, a campaign to reform the structures of 
global economic relations had been initiated by the Group of 77 at the 
United Nations, partly under inspiration from some Latin American 
economists. Emboldened by the success of O P E C , the campaign quickly 
gathered m o m e n t u m and high visibility, and loudly articulated Third-
World economic grievances against the West. 
In 1974, the Group of 77 pushed through at the U N a Declaration on 
the Establishment of a N e w International Economic Order, together with 
a Programme of Action for it. They also had passed a Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of State. This Charter had two significant aspects. It 
asserted that nations had sovereignty over their natural resources, and 
over foreign properties and trans-national corporations in their territories, 
and had the right to nationalize, and to regulate compensation for, foreign 
goods and properties. This was in contrast to existing international law 
which recognized a duty, upon nationalization, to pay compensation as 
determined by international law. Secondly, it obliged the developed 
countries to redress the inequalities in the international economic structure 
by reorganizing the decision-making structures of the I M F , the World 
Bank and other international financial organizations, and by increasing 
net transfers of resources to developing countries, and giving them access 
to science and technology in accordance with their development needs 
and objectives. 
Washington, Paris and London heard these 'alarm bells' with anxiety. 
T h e issues on which the N I E O campaign concentrated were the wide 
fluctuations in prices of raw materials which resulted in erratic earn-
ings for their exporters; the deteriorating terms of trade which steadily 
lowered the prices of raw materials relative to those of manufactures; 
lack of Third-World access to Western technology for industrialization; 
restricted access to Western markets for such Third-World manufacturers 
as there were; and insufficient capital inflows from foreign trade, foreign 
aid and foreign investment to finance Third-World development. T o 
remedy the situation, they proposed reforms in the monetary system, in 
technology transfer and industrialization mechanisms, and in international 
trade. 
In order to make development funds more abundantly available to 
Third-World countries, they demanded changes in the voting structure 
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of the I M F to make it favour developing countries; substantial increases 
in the capitalization of the World Bank, so that it could increase loans at 
concessional rates to the poorest countries; refinancing and rescheduling 
of some Third-World debts, an interest-payment moratorium on some, 
and outright cancellation of others; and a m i n i m u m foreign-aid target of 
0.7 per cent of G N P for donor countries by 1980. 
O n technology and industrialization, they sought changes in the rules 
so as to m a k e it easier and cheaper for Third-World countries to acquire 
Western technology. T h e y proposed reductions in the cost of patents, 
licences, trademarks and technical experts. Since technology transfer 
occurred mainly through the multi-national companies, they sought legally 
binding codes for regulating multi-nationals operating in the Third World. 
They pressed for a redistribution of world industry, and urged the 
developed countries to help them reach 25 per cent of world industrial 
output by the year 2000. T o help stimulate this, they proposed that their 
manufactures be granted preferential access to Western markets. 
O n international trade, the Third World located the source of its woes 
in the structure of the world market. Control over the marketing of their 
crops and minerals, they found, was in the hands of Western trading 
organizations. T h e various commodity exchanges were located in the West 
and managed by them, and each was dominated by a few major companies. 
For instance, three multi-nationals controlled the world market in bananas; 
nearly 90 per cent of the leaf-tobacco export trade was controlled by six 
corporations; fifteen large companies controlled the international trade in 
cotton; six companies controlled the trade in cocoa and cocoa products; 
three companies controlled world trade in grains; while four companies 
controlled the market in bauxite, alumina and aluminium. 
From the example of O P E C , Third-World governments concluded that 
they needed producer-cartels to wrest control of markets from the Western 
oligopolies. W h e r e such cartels were not feasible, they sought to dilute 
Western control through International Commodities Agreements (ICAs) 
whose mechanisms, by manipulating prices and supplies, would stabilize 
and gradually expand Third-World export earnings. T o preserve the 
purchasing power of their exports, they proposed an indexation of the 
prices of primary commodities to those of manufactured goods. 
These ideas were brought together, and emerged from U N C T A D IV 
in Nairobi in 1976, as a proposal for an Integrated Programme for 
Commodities (IPC). It involved the extension of the few existing ICAs 
to cover 18 commodities and commodity groups; the setting up of a 
C o m m o n F u n d to finance buffer stocks for stabilizing prices within agreed 
ranges; and the creation of Compensatory Finance Facilities for offsetting 
shortfalls in export earnings. This system of agreements, funds and 
facilities was targeted to be operational by the end of 1978. 
T h e West did not care for reforms which would eliminate or weaken 
its control of the world economy. O n the other hand, it did not want a 
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proliferation of OPEC-style cartels for other commodities, nor a general 
climate of economic hostility and confrontation. A n d mindful of its long-
term interest in securing stable supplies of primary commodities at the 
lowest possible prices, the West entered into negotiations, not with the 
aim of giving in to the demands, but rather to defuse Third-World 
pressure, wreck the movement for N I E O , and bring whatever arrange-
ments they had to concede under the control of the I M F , the World 
Bank and other Western-dominated institutions. A s might be expected, 
the negotiations did not achieve m u c h . 
B y 1980, a U N publication, Development Forum* acknowledged that 
there had been little change in the rules and structures governing industry 
and technology transfer. By 1984, ICAs existed for only five export 
commodities from the Third World: sugar, cocoa, coffee, tin and natural 
rubber. A n d only one of these, the International Natural Rubber Agree-
ment, was created after U N C T A D IV. These ICAs did not work well, 
and were beset with operational difficulties ranging from insufficient funds 
for buffer stocks, quota quarrels a m o n g producers, and non-participation 
by key producers and consumers. 
Similarly, the Compensatory Finance Facilities failed to take off. T h e 
initial U N C T A D proposal for a $44 billion fund had, by 1983, been 
whittled d o w n to a proposal for a fund of $10 billion, with a paid-up 
capital of only $1 billion. At that level, it would, if established, be able 
to compensate for no more than 10 per cent of the estimated shortfall in 
export earnings. 
T h e idea of indexing the prices of primary commodities to the prices 
of manufactures died on the vine. A n d any hopes for the IPC package 
died w h e n the A d - H o c Intergovernmental Committee for the I P C held 
its last session in 1980. 
These resounding failures notwithstanding, in February 1980, the 
Group of 77 advocated a revised set of targets. They wanted a 7.5 per 
cent annual growth rate for the Third-World G D P during the 1980s. 
They wanted the Third World's share of the world market in manufactures 
to reach 20 per cent by 1990, and 30 per cent by 2000; its share of food 
and agricultural exports to reach 35 per cent by 1990 and 50 per cent by 
2000; and the transfer of at least $300 billion to the Third-World countries 
during the 1980s. 
African preoccupations within the general Third-World N I E O c a m -
paign were determined by the peculiarities of the African economy. 
Because Africa was primarily a supplier of raw materials, its emphasis 
naturally centred on the stabilization of its export earnings and on 
indexation. A n d since Europe remained Africa's principal trading partner, 
despite spectacular increases in African trade with the U S A and Japan, 
African efforts focused on negotiations with the E E C . 
4. Development Forum, September 1980, p. 13. 
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O n the eve of African independence, when the E E C was being formed, 
France insisted on bringing into the organization her special relations 
with her soon-to-be-independent colonies. Provisions were therefore made 
for associate membership for countries which had special relations with 
specific members of the E E C . T h e Yaounde Conventions of 1963 and 
1969 expanded these special relations into a multilateral one between the 
E E C countries and the 18 associated African ex-colonies of France, 
Belgium and Italy. This saved the African associates from the difficulties 
of making separate deals with the separate members of the E E C ; and it 
joined the E E C members for the mutually far more beneficial exploitation 
of the markets and resources of an enlarged African collection of states. 
In 1975, the Yaounde Convention was replaced by the first L o m é 
Convention between nine E E C countries and 46 A C P countries. B y 1979, 
when L o m é II was signed, the number of A C P countries had risen to 
58. A n d by 1984, when L o m é III was being negotiated, there were 10 
E E C countries and 64 A C P countries, of which 43 were African. Thus , 
the E E C - A C P relationship, which began with Franco-African relations 
at its core, evolved into one with Euro-African relations at its core. 
Through these conventions, the African countries sought to guarantee 
their earnings from their traditional markets in Europe. B y the trading 
rules of the L o m é Conventions, as m u c h as 95 per cent of A C P industrial 
exports, such as they were, could enter the E E C duty free. L o m é I included 
a mechanism, S T A B E X , for stabilizing the prices of 34 commodities and 
insuring the A C P countries against shortfalls in their export earnings 
from these commodities. L o m é II increased the S T A B E X list to 44 
commodities, and established a sister scheme, S Y S M I N (popularly known 
as M I N E X ) for six minerals, namely copper, phosphates, bauxite/alumina, 
manganese, tin and iron ore. While M I N E X did not compensate for 
shortfalls in mineral export earnings, it provided for low-interest loans 
from the European Development Bank to assist mining projects whose 
operations were constrained by sharp loss of revenue due to price drops. 
T h e E E C countries, for their part, sought to ensure a reliable flow of 
cheap primary products to their factories and, by excluding competitors, 
to retain their African markets for consumer and capital goods. T h e L o m é 
rules therefore precluded A C P countries from forming such cartels as 
could, by selectively pressuring the E E C countries, weaken the E E C ' s 
competitive position with respect to the rest of the industrial world. 
Similarly, the L o m é Convention gave preferential rights to E E C multi-
nationals active in the A C P countries, as against their American and 
Japanese rivals; but it did not give in to A C P demands to regulate and 
supervise the multi-nationals active in their countries. 
O n their other desires, the A C P countries were unsuccessful. For 
instance, the European Development Fund could give aid for investments 
in housing, water supply, health, energy and raw materials, but not for 
industries whose products could compete with European manufactures 
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in European markets. Furthermore, there was no provision for A C P 
representation on the European Development Fund. 
T h e A C P countries had m a n y reservations about L o m é II, which 
helped to prolong negotiations for L o m é III. But by coming into existence 
and by being operated at all, the L o m é Conventions were very m u c h an 
advance on the futile negotiations for an N I E O . 
Imperialism triumphant 
Outside the bustling diplomatic, propaganda and academic circuits of 
L o m é and other issues of the 1974-85 era, h o w were African-Western 
relations working out on the ground? Did the efforts to decolonize these 
relations accomplish much? H o w m u c h development was achieved? 
All in all, the efforts at economic decolonization were unsuccessful, 
leaving intact the order set up under the Atlantic Charter. T h e N I E O 
campaign and the L o m é Convention had no significant impact on the 
dependent m o d e of Africa's insertion into the capitalist world system. If 
anything, the colonial economic relations and forces waxed stronger. 
African countries still belonged to the U N , the World Bank, the I M F , 
and so on; and the character of these institutions as Western instruments 
of domination had not changed, nor was there any significant enhancement 
of African and Third-World influence in them, except in the department 
of rhetoric. 
There were no reforms of the monetary and trading systems to tilt 
their operations in the Third World's favour. Despite their fervent 
denunciations of the I M F , African countries were still constrained to do 
business widi it on its o w n terms. Similarly, Western oligopolies continued 
to control the marketing of Africa's exports. Efforts to circumvent them 
failed. For example, in 1981, Zaire began independently to market its 
diamonds, but gave up in 1983 and returned to the DeBeers Central 
Selling Organization. 
There were no significant changes in the inherited colonial pattern of 
Africa's foreign trade, even as it increased from $4.9 billion in i960 to 
$89.6 billion in 1980. Western Europe continued as Africa's principal 
trading partner; African trade with the Soviet bloc stagnated and declined; 
intra-African trade also stagnated. Consumer imports formed the largest 
import item, accounting for between 35 and 45 per cent.5 Thus , in terms 
of the content and direction of its trade, Africa remained a supplier of 
primary materials to the West and a market for Western manufactures. 
T h e figures for 1981 illustrate the consistent pattern in the post-colonial 
period under review. Out of a total African trade with the rest of the 
world worth $106 billion, the O E C D accounted for $71 billion; of this, 
the E E C accounted for $43 billion, the U S A for $13 billion, and Japan 
5. ECA, 1983. 
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for $7 billion. African trade with non-African developing countries 
accounted for $16 billion; trade with the Soviet bloc accounted for a mere 
$1.3 billion; and other unspecified and special categories of trade accounted 
for $18 billion. Intra-African trade accounted for an additional, but puny, 
$6.7 billion, bringing total African international trade to a grand total of 
$113 billion.6 
Internally, African economies retained their colonial character, especially 
since little effort had been m a d e to change that. Their world market 
orientation continued to determine investment in agriculture and mining; 
and production in the industrial enclaves was determined by the exigencies 
of the international economy. There was hardly any development based 
on comprehensive resource inventories and on the organization of the 
domestic market to promote internal sectoral linkages. Consequently, 
African economies continued to produce what the West, through the 
world market, demanded from them rather than what the citizens within 
these economies needed. 
Protected by the various IPAs, the multi-nationals continued to d o m i -
nate production and distribution in Africa. For instance, die archetypical 
E E C multi-national operating in Africa, Britain's Lonhro, was still making 
most of its profits from its diverse African operations. In 1982, $1.2 
billion - that is, one quarter of its worldwide gross earnings of $4.7 
billion — came from Africa; but this yielded profits of $120 million, about 
50 per cent of Lonhro's total profits for the year, making Africa by far 
its most lucrative theatre of operation. A n d the scope of its African 
operations was vast. Most of its 800 subsidiaries were in Africa: in 
Malawi, Z imbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria, G h a n a , Mauritius, Uganda , 
Swaziland and South Africa. Lonhro owned newspapers, tea estates, 
hotels, ranches, sugar growing and processing establishments; it m a n u -
factured ploughs, textiles, beer, paints, confectionery, cosmetics and 
coaches; it distributed and retailed motor vehicles, oilseeds, records, tapes, 
mining machinery and spare parts, and also leased aircraft; it mined 
coal, copper, gold and platinum; and it operated construction and civil 
engineering works. In fact, Lonhro was Africa's single largest food 
producer, ranching and farming over 1.5 billion acres.7 
A n d contrary to what die anti-multi-national propaganda of African 
governments might lead one to expect, multi-nationals were actually 
sought after and welcomed. For instance, Lonhro was officially welcomed 
back into Tanzania in 1983, five years after it was thrown out for meddling 
in the Zimbabwean war of independence. It was paid compensation for 
the assets of its 18 subsidiaries which Tanzania had nationalized, asked 
to reinvest the money , and invited to revive operations which had 
deteriorated under nationalized management. 
6. Based on the I M F , 1982. Numbers rounded off. 
7. South (London), July and September 1983; Euromoney, December 1983. 
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Lonhro's extensive operations and its return to Tanzania illustrate the 
general welcome, however grudging, accorded the much-denounced multi-
nationals. B y the early 1980s, even the African Marxist states were turning 
from M a r x to the mixed economy, and were seeking closer economic ties 
with the once-abhored West and its multi-nationals. Guinea and Congo-
Brazzaville, which had taken the socialist road in the 1960s, were making 
political reconciliations with the West, and seeking trade, aid and invest-
ment from the capitalist world. A n d within a decade of their self-
proclamation as Marxist states, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique were 
turning away from the Soviet model of development and relinking with 
the West. 
For example, Mozambique, a hardline Marxist state, began courting 
the West in earnest in 1982. Severe drought, shortage of management 
and technical expertise, and lack of foreign capital from the Soviet bloc 
had helped to create a crisis in its economy. Per capita G N P fell from 
$208 in 1981 to less than $155 in 1983. In response to the crisis, 
Mozambique began to shift from a totally planned economy towards a 
limited free market in labour and some goods. It applied to join the 
World Bank and the I M F , and became the sixty-fifth A C P country at the 
end of 1984. Furthermore, it went into joint ventures with U S , Japanese 
and Spanish companies, and offered parts of its state farms to Lonhro.8 
Thus , rather than drifting away from the West, Africa remained tied 
to the capitalist world system in the traditional colonial manner, and by 
the very structures it had sought to change or escape. Slavery had ended; 
old-style territorial empires had ended: but neo-colonialism and economic 
imperialism remained triumphant. 
T h e persistence of Africa's dependency and 
underdevelopment 
Despite an almost complete success at political decolonization, Africa failed 
at economic development and economic decolonization, and consequently 
failed at that modernization upon which it counted for world respect. 
T h e version of modernity achieved was tacky and moribund. Like 
scattered drops of rain on dusty ground, artefacts of modernity dotted 
the African landscape - a few airports and seaports, slum towns with a 
smattering of modern amenities, a few factories, some ribbons of modern 
roads, and so on; but the spirit of modernity was not quite there, since 
the G D P growth which produced these artefacts had neither internal 
coherence nor self-sustaining engines within Africa. 
Not only had Africa failed to create a robust modernity; worse still, it 
had lost even its traditional ability to feed itself. By 1984, it was the only 
8. South, December 1984. 
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continent that was unable to feed itself. Famine raged or threatened 
across wide swathes of Africa. Its dominant image was one of chronic 
incompetence symbolized by the emaciated refugee with a begging bowl 
glued to his palm. A s African leaders clamoured for relief aid, and as 
millions starved and died, Africa became an object of world charity, pity 
and thinly disguised contempt. After a quarter of a century of effort, 
Africa had neither attained modernity nor gained the respect of the world. 
It was an African habit, in the period under review, to blame all its 
woes on the West, particularly on the West's refusal to alter the inequitable 
relations it had set up under colonialism. But that attitude was the highest 
expression of African irresponsibility. After all, neither the relationships 
in question nor Africa's condition of underdevelopment were immutable. 
Within the range of what is possible, people can, and often do, change 
their situations. 
But was it possible, in the world conditions between i960 and 1984, 
for any poor underdeveloped country to develop? Yes, indeed! Develop-
ment was possible, both without delinking from or altering the funda-
mental structures of Western capitalist dominance (as shown by Singapore, 
Taiwan, H o n g K o n g , South Korea and other Third-World N I C s - N e w 
Industrial Countries), and with delinking from the capitalist system (as 
with China after 1949). So, w h y did Africa fail? W h y did not even one 
African country become an N I C ? \ 
S o m e liked to claim that lack of financial capital prevented them; some 
claimed that they had no resources, or that they did not have sufficient 
population for a large internal market to sustain development. However 
acceptable such claims might be for the poorest of Africa's tiniest states -
but really, h o w big was Singapore or Taiwan, and h o w m a n y resources 
did they have? - there were others for w h o m these excuses certainly 
would not hold. Surely, with its oil billions, with its 100 million population 
able to provide a large internal market, with its large pool of administrative 
and technical manpower, with its large areas and its mineral and agri-
cultural potential, Nigeria had the ingredients and the opportunity to 
develop in the first quarter-century of its independence? T h e reasons for 
its failure might cast light on w h y all of Africa failed. 
Nigeria's enormous capital funds, derived from oil rents, were neither 
accumulated nor invested in enlarging the country's productive forces. 
Most of it was dissipated abroad. Nigeria's inability to accumulate and 
properly invest its enormous oil income was largely due to the origins, 
ideology and aspirations of its governing class. T h e dominant section of 
the élite were mandarins, largely originating from the non-producer 
sections of the colonial petite-bourgeoisie. Even those w h o originated from 
the producer sections had been turned into mandarins by their long, 
academic preparation for bureaucratic careers. A s a result, they were, on 
the whole, inexperienced in production, averse to its rigours and risks, 
and even superciliously hostile to material production. O n the other hand, 
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they had enormous appetites for material consumption. Forgetting that 
hunting is not the carcass on the plate, they conceived development 
planning as the making of shopping lists of modern artefacts to be 
imported and consumed. T h e y craved the best that the industrial world 
could offer, and were therefore preoccupied with the distribution for 
consumption of whatever income was available from an economy which 
remained colonial in character. 
Their phrase for it was 'sharing the national cake'. F e w leaders spared 
a thought for the need to plant more grain and build bigger ovens for 
baking the national cake. If the cake increased, as it was doing, through 
mining rents for which they did not have to exert themselves, all the 
merrier. But if it did not, if the size of the rent dropped, all energies 
would go into the desperate scramble for what was left. Preoccupied with 
getting and spending their rent on the most modern consumer goods, 
they were ill disposed to capital accumulation for productive investment. 
In contrast, the bourgeoisie of the Western core were habitual accumu-
lators of capital, highly experienced at it, and with highly developed 
productive organizations as well as vast sums of already accumulated 
capital which they could deploy for further accumulation. T h u s was the 
stage set for a most unequal contest for accumulation between a seasoned 
and powerful bourgeoisie in the centre and an inexperienced mandarinate 
in the periphery. 
Half-hearted efforts by some sections of the Nigerian élite proved 
inadequate to stop the drain from the country's still-colonial open veins. 
Exchange controls, currency over-valuation, complicated import duties 
and tariffs, rather than stemming outflows of funds, only promoted 
corruption a m o n g those sections of the mandarinate whose task it was to 
administer these barriers to capital flight. Industrialization by import-
substitution factories and the semi-processing of agricultural products did 
not produce the expected savings in foreign exchange, since the factories 
had to be imported, and then maintained with imported parts and 
expertise. Through tax holidays, repatriation of dividends, transfer-
pricing by multi-nationals, debt servicing, massive consumer imports, and 
corruption of the mandarinate w h o preferred to loot the national treasury 
and bank the proceeds abroad, the net flow of capital funds was out of 
Nigeria to the West. All in all, efforts at capital accumulation and 
investment in Nigeria were like a tug-of-war between a crawling baby 
and a seasoned giant. 
Central to Nigeria's failure was the view of development as primarily 
the development of consumption. It was quite agreeable to the West, but 
Nigerians voluntarily adopted it, and lived by it. Their principal complaint 
was that enough could not be extracted from the local and international 
economy to satisfy their growing appetites. Rather than nudge them into 
developing their domestic production, that insufficiency sent them in 
search of foreign debt with which to finance an increased consumption 
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of imports. Because of their high-consumption and low-production 
strategy of development, the modernity they attained was the mere 
Westernization of taste without a Nigerian productive capacity to service 
that taste. In other words, they implemented the Western notion of 
African development rather than that which Africans had set out to 
implement. 
T h e wilful refusal by African élites to concentrate on the productive 
heart of development was influenced by the welfarist preoccupations of 
the social-democratic movements of the West. Such movements as the 
Fabian socialism of the British Labour Party and the London School of 
Economics were preoccupied with distribution to the utter neglect of 
production - which was understandable, since they were operating in 
societies where the production problem had been solved in the nineteenth 
century or earlier. But distributive welfarism was certainly inappropriate 
to Africa's underproductive economies. Yet it was adopted as their outlook 
by the founding generation of African leaders. W h y ? Most of them 
had grown up in the social-democratic atmosphere of Western univer-
sities, and had received considerable support from Western social-demo-
cratic movements during their struggle for political independence, so 
that was part of the atmosphere in which their world outlook had been 
formed. 
It must be stressed that responsibility for the negative impact of 
Western socialist movements on African development lay squarely on the 
African élite w h o adopted what was inappropriate to their circumstances. 
O n e question remains to be addressed. W h e n distributive welfarism 
produced not welfare, but poorfare societies in the peripheral and under-
productive economies of Africa, w h y did the African leadership not 
abandon it and take up the cardinal task of organizing production? After 
all, they did not have the excuse of the Cargo Cults of Melanesia, whose 
members knew only of modern goods brought to their shores by ships 
and planes but were unaware of the factories in which the goods were 
produced. This widely-travelled and Western-educated African leadership 
could not claim ignorance of the need for and the ways of industrial 
production. W h y then were they averse to giving production pride of 
place in their approach to development? This failure, it should be noted, 
was characteristic of all tendencies - capitalist, African socialist and 
Marxist alike. 
There happened to be in the African élite a deep mandarin disinclination 
for the rigours of production. A s m a n y Nigerian businessmen put it 
during their oil b o o m , iWhy make when you can buyV. Those Africans 
w h o had no mineral rents for buying, and w h o therefore clamoured for 
aid instead, might as well have said: ' W h y m a k e when you can beg or 
borrow?'. Their mandarin disinclination to production, their commitment 
to distributive welfarism, and their cargo-cult view of development as the 
satisfying of growing appetites by growing imports constituted the main 
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strands of a dependency mentality which prevented Africa from achieving 
the development it professed to be striving after. 
But w h y did the dependency mentality persist despite its being an 
obstacle to the declared goal? Throughout the period under review, mining 
rents and aid largesse from the capitalist world system were not so lacking 
as to compel the African élite to produce instead of buying, begging or 
borrowing. Therefore, whatever little inclination some m a y have had for 
production did not have to be exercised. A n d for so long as the existing 
arrangements could satisfy the expectations of the populace by paying for 
modest imports of modern goods, and could sustain the hopes of the 
majority of the population that more goodies would soon be available for 
everybody, the élites felt no pressure to change their ways and submit to 
those rigours of capital accumulation and investment in productive forces 
which make for autonomous development. However slowly the G D P was 
growing, especially with respect to the aspiration to 'catch up', the meagre 
gains were still enough for the African leadership not to want to change 
the colonial style of African-Western relationship. T h e most they found 
politically profitable was to complain and agitate for bigger crumbs from 
the West's table; and w h e n they failed to get more , as in the N I E O 
campaign, they would loudly rail against the West for its hardness of 
heart, and so gain credit among their followers as champions of African 
progress. 
T h u s , addicted to a not-too-onerous dependency, they had no irr-
esistable urge to exploit their opportunities for development within the 
capitalist world system (as the Third-World N I C s were doing); nor were 
they desperate enough to cut loose from the system and strike out on 
their o w n (as China did); nor did they have the political motive of survival 
in the face of foreign aggression to prompt them into industrial production 
(as had happened with Japan and the Soviet Union). 
T h u s , whereas the structural roots of Africa's failure to decolonize 
economically or to develop lay in inherited dependency relations, the 
African inability to organize and change those relations by concentrating 
on the enlargement of their productive forces ultimately resulted from the 
dependency mentality with which the African leadership was thoroughly 
suffused. 
But when all is said and done, there is one struggle which Africans 
are likely to win sooner rather than later - the struggle against apartheid 
and institutionalized racism. W e are back to the third evil which has 
historically accompanied Africa's relationship with the capitalist world. 
Along with the slave trade and imperialism, capitalism has always been 
linked to racism as well. Capital's marriage to the slave trade turned out 
to be resilient and multi-faceted. W h a t about capital's marriage to racism? 
It is to this third historic link in a polygamous system that w e should 
n o w return. 
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Toward deracializing capitalism 
A central theme of this part of the chapter is that the alliance between 
old-style racism and capitalism in South Africa m a y be on the verge of 
breaking up. But while the break-up of the alliance m a y w o u n d apartheid 
mortally, capitalism in South Africa m a y still remain intact w h e n the 
struggle is all over. 
If one were asked to choose the most impressive African happening of 
the mid-1980s, one would be tempted to choose the anger of young South 
Africans demonstrating against apartheid — and their readiness to risk 
their lives day after day in indignant demonstrations against the forces 
of repression. 
If what the world was witnessing in South Africa in the 1980s and 
early 1990s was a revolution in its infancy, h o w quickly was the world to 
expect the maturation of the revolution? H o w near was victory? 
T h e optimists saw similarities with either the Ethiopian revolution of 
1974 or the Iranian revolution of 1979 — both of which began with 
demonstrations in the streets, and built up to a climax. Pre-revolutionary 
Iran and Ethiopia were each an alliance of domestic feudalism and 
international capitalism. In a sense, those two regimes of Iran and Ethiopia 
had lasted thousands of years - and yet they were overthrown in a few 
months of demonstrations. T h e alliance between domestic feudalism and 
international capitalism collapsed speedily. 
A s compared with the Shah and Haile Selassie, apartheid was destined 
to last a few years longer. It was going to be overthrown neither by street 
demonstrations nor by external African armies. Apartheid could only fall 
as a result of organized struggle from within. 
External African armies were organized but were not from within. 
Street demonstrations were from within but were not yet a case of 
organized struggle. 
African states could support and nourish and arm the internal liberation-
fighters. Demonstrations could make the townships ungovernable. But 
without internal guerrilla fighters and saboteurs, the struggle could not 
triumph. 
But could Western economic sanctions bring about the fundamental 
change? W e should distinguish between expressive sanctions or boycott 
and instrumental sanctions or boycott. Expressive boycott is a moral 
judgement, but instrumental boycott is intended to be a political tool. 
Western sanctions will not in themselves lead to ' O n e m a n , one vote'. 
Expressive boycotts will boost up the morale of the oppressed. Western 
instrumental boycotts will help liberalize the regime — but they will fall 
short of ' O n e m a n , one vote'. A r m e d struggle from within still has to be 
the core of revolution. 
But if apartheid will not be saved by White defiance and apartheid 
armaments, will it be saved by its alliance with capitalism? Actually, that 
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alliance is under severe stress now. W h e n racism begins to interfere too 
m u c h with the laws of supply and demand, capitalism begins to feel 
betrayed. Alternatively, w h e n economic racism becomes inefficient, capi-
talism feels uneasy. 
It happened in the days of the slave trade. Capitalism once prospered 
on slavery. A n d then as technology became more efficient, slave labour 
m a d e less sense than wage labour. A n d so England - the leading slaving 
power of the eighteenth century - became the leading abolitionist power 
of the nineteenth. 
Similarly, an alliance between capitalism and apartheid has m a d e good, 
if selfish, economic sense until recently. W h y is that alliance n o w under 
stress? T h e following reasons are at the core of the explanation. First, 
black purchasing power is n o w ready to expand dramatically if the system 
were economically more equitable. Western capital would like to tap black 
purchasing power. Secondly, black skills have reached n e w levels and 
could m a k e the production forces more efficient. Western capitalism would 
like to exploit black skills. Thirdly, a better educational and training system 
for blacks could rapidly transform South Africa into black Australia - rich 
and highly industrialized. Western capitalism could retain a stake. Four-
thly, opposition to apartheid is creating instability which is unhealthy for 
capitalism. Western investors would prefer stability. Moreover, instability 
creates uncertainty about the future — capitalist investment is a form of 
calculated planning which needs some degree of predictability. This is 
quite apart from the fact that escalating repression in South Africa 
alienates important sections of public opinion in the Western world — and 
these outraged groups begin to put pressure on business firms and chain 
stores. A m o n g the latest chain stores in the mid-1980s in Britain to join 
in boycotting South African goods was Littlewoods. M a n y Western 
institutions have pulled out of South Africa, including Barclays B a n k , 
once notoriously tainted by the brush of apartheid. Other capitalist 
departures from South Africa include I B M , Coca-Cola and, to s o m e 
extent, General Motors. 
Prolonged struggle against racism could therefore become a struggle 
against capitalism itself - as the activists get radicalized (as in Angola, 
Mozambique and, to s o m e extent, Zimbabwe) . Sooner or later capitalism 
has to cut its losses - and break its bond with apartheid. 
But what is the future of capitalism in South Africa once apartheid 
is defeated? For better or worse, victory against apartheid will not necess-
arily m e a n victory against capitalism. First, let us remember that 
there is a degree of capitalist development which, w h e n reached, makes 
capitalism virtually irreversible. Karl M a r x thought that capitalism 
was a stage of development lower than socialism. W h e n capitalist 
development reaches its peak, it will result in a socialist revolution. 
So according to M a r x himself, socialism should first arrive at the 
most advanced capitalist countries. Strictly speaking, Britain and the U S A 
794 
Africa and the capitalist countries 
should have gone socialist before Ethiopia and Mozambique. 
Later Marxists amended the theory to say that the capitalist chain 
breaks at its weakest link - Ethiopia and China and Mozambique were 
such weak links. But what about the strong links? W h e n will they ever 
break? W h e n will the U S A ever have a communist revolution? O n e 
possible answer is that there is a stage of capitalist development beyond 
which a communist revolution is impossible - unless imposed from 
without. T h e U S A , France, and most other Western European countries 
m a y have reached such a stage. 
But what would m a k e a communist revolution impossible in the U S A 
or France? There is first the fact that Marx's prediction of increasing 
enlargement of the proletariat has not happened, especially in the U S A . 
W h a t has happened is the increasing enlargement of the bourgeoisie. 
Secondly, Marx's prediction of increasing misery has not happened except 
among racial minorities. T h e white workers have not got poorer, but 
richer. A n d the very poorest are not workers at all (lumpen militariat at 
best). W h a t this means is that American, British and French workers 
have a lot more to lose than their 'chains' - they have cars, T V sets and 
boats to lose. So w h y upset the capitalist system? 
N o r must w e forget that class consciousness in the West has not 
prevailed over national consciousness. O n the contrary, anti-communism 
is linked to working-class American patriotism. M a r x under-estimated 
capitalism's ability to co-opt, convert and corrupt others in its o w n 
support. Prosperous capitalism can do just that. Capitalism can win 
powerful allies among the disadvantaged themselves. 
But has South Africa reached the stage of irreversible capitalism - the 
stage which most Western countries have reached? T h e chances are that 
it has not. A n d therefore under black rule South Africa stands an even 
chance of either continuing as a capitalist system (but without racism) or 
better embarking on a socialist path of development. 
Factors in South Africa in favour of capitalism after black majority 
rule 
After liberation from apartheid, black South Africa could become a sub-
imperial power in Southern Africa ('Power corrupts, absolute power 
corrupts absolutely'). T h e new black leaders would have to guard against 
temptation. Black South Africans are the most oppressed Blacks of the 
twentieth century, but will probably become the most powerful Blacks 
of the twenty-first century. They m a y not want to rock the capitalist 
boat. 
Links between mineral wealth and international capitalism (mutual 
need) m a y tempt black rulers to retain capitalism as the more profitable 
systemic option. Links between gold and the international monetary 
system m a y also tempt black South African rulers to refrain from 
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rocking the capitalist boat. Familiarity does not always breed contempt. It 
sometimes breeds contentment. 
Factors in favour of socialism in South Africa after black majority 
rule 
Radicalization through prolonged struggle could turn black South Africa 
socialist. Moreover, class polarization as an off-shoot of racial polarization 
could help to socialize post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, even the high 
degree of urbanization in South Africa is an asset for modern socialism. 
A n enlarged black proletariat alongside arrested embourgeoisement should 
help the cause of building socialism. T h e white man's prophecy that 
every black nationalist is a Marxist could at last fulfil itself. 
T o summarize, the marriage between apartheid and Western capitalism 
m a y be coming to an end. Institutionalized racism m a y have become a 
liability rather than an asset to global capitalism operating in South Africa. 
International capital m a y be on the verge of ditching apartheid - not in 
the interest of justice, but in the interest of interest and profit. T h e end 
of apartheid in South Africa will not necessarily m e a n the end of the twin 
hegemony of Washington and Brussels in Africa's economic affairs. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter w e began by drawing attention to the three traditional 
evils which historically have coloured the relationship between Africa and 
the capitalist world — the evils of the slave trade, imperialism and racism. 
W e k n o w from the historical record that mature capitalism could indeed 
get rid of the slave trade, and still m o v e from strength to strength.9 W h a t 
w e still do not k n o w yet is whether advanced capitalism can dissociate 
itself from either imperialism or racism - and still retain its vigour as a 
coherent system. 
In this chapter w e have noted that political decolonization in Africa 
did not damage mortally the vigour of Western capitalism - since it was 
not accompanied by economic decolonization. T h e record shows that 
international capitalism no longer needs territorial empires with imperial 
banners in order to feed on other societies. Capitalism can be parasitic 
without flying the flag. 
F r o m Africa's perspective, international capitalism has always been 
bicentric. During the colonial period the twin centres were primarily 
L o n d o n and Paris. But in the post-colonial period covered in this volume 
L o n d o n has declined as a major factor in Africa, Washington has risen, 
and Paris has retained its hegemony in a n e w guise. T h e twin focus of 
9. Chinweizu, 1975. 
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Africa's relationship with Western capitalism has shifted from the 
hegemony of 'London and Paris' to the pre-eminence of 'Washington and 
Paris'. However , there are signs in the last years of the twentieth century 
that the European C o m m u n i t y as a whole will inherit the mantle of 
France in Africa. If the trend continues, the twin focus of Africa's 
relationship with Western capitalism will in time become Washington and 
Brussels. 
If Africa's struggle against formal territorial occupation has been 
successful, and the continent's struggle against economic exploitation 
has barely started, what about Africa's crusade against apartheid and 
institutionalized racism? 
T h e last crucial battles concern the liberation of South Africa. There 
are signs that Western capitalism will in time accommodate itself to the 
termination of apartheid and overt racism in Southern Africa. Indeed, 
apartheid (like slavery in the nineteenth century) m a y have begun to be 
a drag on the systemic vigour of capitalism. But the genius of capitalism 
is partly its capacity to invent new forms of control. T h e slave trade 
ended - and so have old-style territorial European empires in Africa. 
Western capitalism has survived those changes. A n d n o w overt apartheid 
and institutionalized racism m a y at last be buried in the battlefields of 
Southern Africa. Western capitalism will also survive that shock. 
W h a t is certain is that the Emperor of Capital will find a n e w magic 
equation of power. It is as if capitalism had a secret formula of self-
reincarnation. W h e n Africa celebrates the end of apartheid — as she once 
celebrated the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade or even the end of 
colonialism - she would be well advised to be on the alert against the 
next incarnation of capitalism in the çost-apartheid era. 
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Africa's relations with the socialist countries go back to the period w h e n , 
shortly after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Lenin pledged the support 
of the newly-formed Soviet state to all colonized peoples. Since then all 
socialist countries - the U S S R and its allies together with the People's 
Republic of China - have extended various forms of aid to African states, 
both before and after their independence. T h e socialist countries' foreign 
policy, like that of other powers, is apparently governed by two guiding 
principles which always go hand in hand: an ideological one, according 
to which the Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China have a duty 
to support countries of Marxist-Leninist persuasion; and a strategic one, 
according to which they defend their national interests. T h e communists 
must accordingly support liberation struggles in order to hasten the 
colonial revolution, which is an integral part of the world revolution. 
T h e increasing importance of Africa in world affairs has led the socialist 
countries to develop their relations with the countries of that continent. 
T h e resulting interaction has affected the course of events in the African 
countries in m a n y ways. 
Broadly speaking, the socialist countries' policy in Africa m a y be 
divided into four periods: 
(1) from 1917 to 1945 their influence was essentially indirect and 
relied on the European communist parties and radical pan-
African leaders in Africa, the West Indies and the U S A ; 
(2) from 1945 to i960, encouraged by the weakened position of the 
colonial powers and the rise of nationalism following the Second 
World W a r , the socialist countries directly or indirectly supported 
national-liberation movements and newly-independent African 
states; 
(3) from i960 to 1975 there was a decline in the direct involvement 
of the socialist countries, particularly the U S S R , in favour of 
essentially diplomatic activity; 
(4) from 1975, after the end of the Vietnam W a r , the socialist states 
increased their influence, for instance in Angola and the H o r n 
of Africa. 
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T h e Soviet Union and Africa: relations between Africa 
and the socialist countries since 1935 
Writing at a time when colonialism was not yet well developed and very 
little was known about Africa in Europe, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
scarcely referred to Africa in their works. Lenin, however, frequently 
discussed African affairs in his books on imperialism and the national and 
colonial question.1 Thus , for him, Africa, on account of its particular 
political and socio-economic situation, was capable of arriving at the 
Soviet system and achieving communism without passing through the 
stage of capitalism.2 Africa's anti-colonialist movements were encouraged 
to combat the colonizers so as to widen the anti-imperialist front. T h e 
Comintern consequently sought to enter into mutual consultation with 
the early nationalist organizations, such as the National Congress of 
British West Africa ( N C B W A ) , the Kikuyu Central Association or the 
African National Congress ( A N C ) , even though, in its view, the leadership 
of these movements was in the hands not of the working class, which in 
any case was rather small in Africa in the 1930s, but of the progressive 
national bourgeoisie. S o m e organizations linked to the Comintern played 
a particularly active role. These included the Red International Labour 
Union (RILU) , the United Front F r o m Below ( U F F B ) and the Inter-
national Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers ( I T U C - N W ) . 3 
A m o n g the first Africans to collaborate with some of these movements 
was J o m o Kenyatta, w h o had visited the U S S R in 1929, 1932 and 1934.4 
H e was a correspondent of the I T U C - N W . 
African democrats and the international communist m o v e m e n t 
T h e Comintern found it difficult in most cases to enter, into contact with 
the African nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s, and so the Kremlin used 
African-Americans and West Indian pan-Africanists as well as communist 
parties in metropolitan countries to spread socialist ideas. There, a West 
Indian, Sylvester Williams, influenced M . Garvey, w h o was to play an 
important role among the early African nationalists, while an African-
American, W . E . B . DuBois, and a West Indian, G . Padmore, influenced 
m a n y African socialists including K w a m e Nkrumah. 5 
1. V . I. Lenin, 1966; 1965, vol. 31, p. 150; and 1920 (published in translation in 1950), 
pp. 360-2. 
2. V . I. Lenin, 1965, pp. 153-4. 
3. Report of Joe, 100, 20, 1930, S L U T , M O M U Box 3, file 373, sub-file 51:3, cited 
by T . Wilson, 1974; F. Meli, n.d. 
4. J. M . Brown, 1972, p. 268. 
5. I. Geiss, 1974; and A . Langley, 1973. 
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T h e French Communist Party, in view of its importance in French 
political life, had a significant role to play in the French colonial empire. 
In October 1921, the Executive Committee of the Third International 
called on the Politburo of the French Communist Party to set up speedily 
a Communist Colonial Council to encourage anti-colonial activities in 
Africa and elsewhere. 
T h e strategy of the French Communist Party was to develop active, 
sustained anti-militarist propaganda directed at ex-servicemen and war 
casualties and at the metropolitan assembly points for colonial troops. 
There were also precise directives laying d o w n the activities to be 
promoted in Cameroon, Togo, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar and 
French West Africa. This was the background to the exhaustive survey 
of the geographical, demographic, ethnic, economic, political and social 
situation conducted in all the colonies. T h e object of this survey was to 
enable the leadership of the French Communist Party 'to draw up a 
tactical plan of action and to examine the practical tasks that it [the 
leadership of the party] will need to pursue to induce the native masses 
to support the communist effort and at the same time to take up arms 
against capitalism and imperialism'.6 
In November 1922, in an article entitled, ' A n awakening race', Izvestia 
reported that 'black delegates took part in the Fourth Congress of the 
Communist International'. T h e newspaper added that 'this apparently 
insignificant fact seems to us to be the beginning of one of the most 
important movements in history, and destined to play a considerable role 
in the overall struggle against world imperialism'.7 
T h e Africans' participation in the international communist movement 
steadily increased. Anti-colonialist groups were formed, such as the 
League against Imperialism and for National Independence, which was 
sponsored by the French Communist Party and whose members included 
Africans like Chadli Ben Mustapha (Tunisia), G u m e d e (South Africa), 
Tiemoko Garang Kouyate and Lamine Senghor (West Africa). 
Thus two years before the world economic crisis of 1929, the ideological 
and strategic foundations of the anti-colonial movement had been laid. 
T h e Soviet Union and its allied parties played a crucial role in the political 
and ideological training of the cadres of the movement. In 1930 the Stalin 
School was founded in M o s c o w to train Marxist cadres. T h e repercussions 
of the economic crisis that was shaking the world made the anti-colonial 
movement's task easier. However, the rise of fascism in Europe temporarily 
caused the colonial question to assume minor importance a m o n g concerns 
of the communist parties, to the disappointment of some pan-Africanists like 
G . Padmore w h o considered this shift to be harmful to the African cause.8 
6. Archives of the Republic of Senegal, 1923. 
7. Archives of the Republic of Senegal, 1922. 
8. G . Padmore, 1935, p. 3020. 
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After the war, European communist parties continued to play a relatively 
important role in French-speaking Africa, but less so in English-speaking 
Africa where the British Communist Party, unlike its French counterpart, 
had not established strong roots. T h e British party was m u c h smaller in 
any case. 
A few radical Africans w h o were studying in Great Britain came into 
contact with leaders of communist parties w h o exercised some influence 
on their political ideas. T h e Africans included J o m o Kenyatta of Kenya, 
K . N k r u m a h of Ghana, F. Macauly of Nigeria, F. F. Small of Gambia, 
and I. K . Musazi of Uganda. S o m e of them, like S. M u l u m b a of the 
Bataka Party in Uganda, sought, through the Communist Party of Great 
Britain, to obtain the Soviet Union's assistance in achieving the political 
independence of East Africa.9 
Marxism gained a stronger and more lasting foothold in other parts of 
Africa. T h e Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire en France ( F E A N F ) 
included in its rank, and especially a m o n g its cadres, a majority of 
Marxists, like Osende Afana of Cameroon, author of an important work on 
the economy of West Africa. Through the communist study groups, 
founded during the Second World W a r or soon after, and the General 
Confederation of Labour, m a n y trades-union cadres became receptive to 
Marxism and to techniques for organizing the masses. In Portuguese-
speaking Africa, Marxist intellectuals trained in Portugal through their 
links with the Communist Party, like Agostinho Neto and Amilcar Cabrai, 
founded the M P L A in Angola and the P A I G C in Guinea and Cape Verde. 
However, at the climax of the independence movements, in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the position of c o m m u n i s m in Africa was ambigu-
ous. O n the one hand, there were very few parties openly claiming 
allegiance to Marxism: where they existed, particularly in South Africa, 
Algeria, Egypt, Senegal and Sudan, their influence was limited by a 
multitude of factors, such as the weakness of the working class, the obstacle 
represented by traditional ideologies and the resistance of religions. But 
on the other hand, the socialist countries, and especially the U S S R , 
enjoyed considerable prestige. 
T h e Soviet U n i o n , Eastern Europe and decolonization in Africa 
It was not until after the Second World W a r , from which the colonial 
powers emerged weakened, that the socialist world began taking a close 
interest in Africa. T h e period between 1945 and i960 was marked by a 
strong upsurge of anti-colonialism. T h e socialist world was willing to give 
support to the African anti-colonialist movements in order to weaken 
their c o m m o n enemy: international imperialism.10 
9. J. Mulira, 1974, p. 44. 
10. Byakov et al., 1981, p. 143. 
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Nevertheless, colonial Africa continued to present a theoretical problem 
for socialist thinkers. W h o in Africa could be regarded as the driving 
force of the revolution and the power capable of unseating imperialism? 
T h e academician E . M . Zhukov in 1947 condemned the role of the African 
bourgeoisie in the liberation struggle." But another Soviet professor, the 
Africanist 1.1. Potekhin, stated in 1950 that 'In most countries of tropical 
and southern Africa the leading role in the national liberation movement 
falls to the bourgeoisie and to the national intelligentsia',12 thus acknow-
ledging the absence of a communist party of any significance and the 
weakness of the working class in the African colonies. 
In fact, from 1950 until the African countries gained independence, 
the policy of the socialist countries and China seemed to be based more 
on the latter point of view than on the former. N o doubt the socialist 
world was unstinting in its support for the African workers' unions, but 
the socialist countries also made contact with anti-colonialist movements 
through movements organized under their o w n auspices, such as the 
World Peace Movement , the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 
and the International Union of Students, to mention a few. They also 
relied on local communist parties where they existed. 
After determining the channels through which, as w e have seen, they 
might work with the anti-colonialist movements, the socialist countries 
embarked upon a programme of active support for the permanent de-
colonization of Africa in the form of material and diplomatic assistance. 
This was offered on the Marxist-Leninist principle that the socialist 
world has the duty to help those w h o aspire for decolonization. T h e C P P 
in Ghana was among the first to benefit from the support of the U S S R , 
followed by the M a u M a u movement, J o m o Kenyatta and his party 
( K A N U ) , the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons ( N C N C ) , 
the Uganda National Congress, the P A I and the U P C in Cameroon, the 
Independence Congress Party in Madagascar, the F L N in Algeria and 
liberation movements of the same type, such as F R E L I M O in M o z -
ambique, the M P L A in Angola, and Z A P U and Z A N U in Zimbabwe. 
M o r e recently the A N C in South Africa and S W A P O in Namibia have 
received similar support. 
T h e draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to the United 
Nations General Assembly at the Fifteenth Session in i960, which called 
on all the colonial powers to grant independence to their colonies, and 
its resolution adopted in 1961 on the implementation of the decolonization 
process, were the basis of all the Soviet bloc's subsequent policy in regard 
11. E . M . Zhukov, 1947. 
12. See Soviet Ethnography, no. I, 1950; V . I. Popov et al., 1975, pp. 21-4; V . I. Lenin, 
1965, vol. 28, p. 125; Pravda, 17 March 1957, p. 1; Tass, 1 February and 3 February 
i960; and D . Skvirsky, 1967, pp. 194-7. 
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to its participation in the decolonization of Africa.13 Approved by the 
Twenty-first Congress of the C P S U , which solemnly affirmed its support 
for independence movements,'4 confirmed by the Twenty-third to Twenty-
seventh Congresses, these initiatives gained the Soviet Union the friend-
ship of the Africans and represented a major diplomatic victory over the 
Western colonial powers. Since then the socialist world has willingly given 
assistance to most African nationalists, anxious to secure their political 
independence, and sees itself today as the guardian of African inde-
pendence, a view that most of them agree with. Oginga Odinga, a Kenyan 
politician, once said ' T h e U S S R uses its prestige to help oppressed 
nations that want to free themselves from all forms of neocolonialism. . 
. and is always with us in times of struggle. W e will never forget this'.'5 
In the phase of the struggle for independence this assistance was 
received by the nationalist parties of such different countries as Algeria, 
Egypt, Ghana , Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Tunisia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika 
and Somali. In Southern Africa, where the fight against colonialism lasted 
m u c h longer, the support of the U S S R and Eastern Europe proved even 
more decisive for the Z A P U m o v e m e n t in Zimbabwe, F R E L I M O in 
Mozambique , and the M P L A in Angola. In their struggle against the 
apartheid regime, the A N C in South Africa and S W A P O in Namibia have 
received political, diplomatic, financial and military aid from the European 
socialist states.16 
Once they had gained their independence, several states sought the co-
operation of the U S S R and the European peoples' democracies, either in 
a bid to escape neo-colonialism, which the father of Ghana's emancipation, 
K w a m e N k r u m a h , denounced as 'the last stage of imperialism','7 or to 
counterbalance the unilateral influence of the capitalist states. F r o m 1957, 
the date of Ghana's independence, to 1985, the U S S R signed agreements 
with some 37 African countries. O n e of the most interesting aspects of 
this co-operation concerned education and research, in the form of the 
training of African cadres in the U S S R and locally in Africa itself, the 
sending of Soviet teachers and researchers to African universities and 
research centres and the establishment of scientific links between Soviet 
and African institutions: approximately 30000 Africans received their 
higher and specialized secondary education in the U S S R . ' 8 Co-operative 
links with other m e m b e r states of the A C M S , albeit less wide-ranging, 
are based on the same principles.'9 
13. D . Skvirsky, 1967, pp. 196-215. 
14. Current Soviet Policies HI, i960, p. 20. 
15. Radio Moscow, 16 October i960; Pravda, 16 October i960, p. 3. 
16. H . Donalson and L . Nogee, 1981. 
17. K . N k r u m a h , 1966. 
18. Communication from A . Letnev, Africa Institute, M o s c o w , 9 September 1987. 
Cf. A . A . Gromyko , 1984. 
19. T h e A C M S Countries and Africa: Trade and Cooperation, 1980; V . Lopatov, 1987. 
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T h e People's Republic of China and the decolonization 
of Africa 
For ideological and national reasons, the Third-World countries have 
pride of place in the foreign policy objectives of Beijing, and there is no 
better illustration of this than China's relations with Africa, whose 
importance to Beijing is based on three considerations. 
First, Africa's efforts to achieve emancipation represent an important 
stage in the world revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against capi-
talism: socialist China therefore has a duty to support those efforts; 
secondly, the national interest of China demanded that it should be 
present in Africa where until recently its two rivals, the U S A and the 
U S S R , were already competing and where it might find support, at least 
at the diplomatic level, that would help it to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives; lastly, China believes that it has been through a semi-colonial 
experience similar to that of Africa and hence is in a very good position 
to understand the problems of colonialism and to help the continent 
through its process of decolonization.20 
Several facts testify to the importance attached by China to Africa: the 
pledge m a d e at the International Trade Conference held in Beijing in the 
mid-1950s, to assist the African countries struggling for independence;21 
the support given to the M a u M a u movement which the Chinese regarded 
as a force against imperialism;22 Prime Minister Zhou E n Lai's tour of 
Africa in late 1963 and early 1964, during which he m a d e his famous 
assertion, 'Africa is ripe for revolution'; the condemnation of the 'unilateral 
declaration of independence' by the whites of Rhodesia (11 November 
1965); the support extended to nationalist movements in the Portuguese 
colonies, in Z imbabwe , in South Africa and in South-West Africa; and 
its consistent condemnation of the apartheid regime and its provision of 
aid to the opponents ofthat system, particularly the Pan-African Congress. 
China's first major contribution to the decolonization of Africa was the 
costly Tanzania-Zambia railway, the T A Z A R A , which it agreed to build 
w h e n all the rich and technologically more advanced countries had refused. 
China's purpose in undertaking this $450 million project was, according 
to Chinese sources, to '. . . assist Zambia and Tanzania in their struggle 
against colonialism and aggression from the racist Southern Rhodesia, 
South Africa and Portugal'.23 
T h e T A Z A R A was a useful project for land-locked Zambia whose 
communication links with the outside world had been cut by the racist 
20. G . T . Y u , 1975, p. 67; see also Premier Zhou E n Lai's speech at the banquet given 
by President Nkrumah , ibid., p. 89. 
21. Neve China News Agency, N o . 447, cited by B . Larkin, 1971. 
22. Peking Review, 15 August i960, p. 16. 
23. Peking Review, 17 July 1970, p. 16. 
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plate 27.1 Chairman Mao Zedong of China meeting with President K. D. Kaunda of
Zambia in Beijing, China, February 1974
regime of Rhodesia because of President Kaunda's continual criticism of
it and because of his support for ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas. The
importance of the project for anti-racist and anti-colonialist movements
in Africa was also demonstrated by the fears it aroused in racist South
Africa, which backed the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. The
South African prime minister uneasily commented: 'the Chinese have
established a bridgehead in Tanzania and the possibility that through the
construction of the TAZARA railway they will infiltrate further into the
heart of Africa and establish themselves on a permanent basis in Tanzania
and Zambia."4
China often offered military aid to several pro-Chinese guerrilla move¬
ments in South Africa such as the Pan-African Congress of South Africa25
and especially the ZANU guerrillas, who were trained and equipped by
Chinese experts in various camps in Tanzania and Mozambique26 and
who, with the massive support of the Chinese, led Zimbabwe to political
24. Star (South Africa), 15 May 1971; Africa Research Bulletin, May 1971, p. 2098c.
25. African Communist, 2nd quarter 1967, p. 17.
26. D. Martin and P. Johnson, 1981, pp. 11-12; Tanzania Standard (Dar es Salaam),
10 December 1977; Africa Research Bulletin, December 1977.
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independence. China cites this victory as an example of its successful 
action in the cause of liberation struggles in Africa,27 echoed by the prime 
minister of Zimbabwe w h o , in paying tribute to China's role in the 
emancipation of his country, stated that 'China had been the ideological 
and military inspiration of Zimbabwe's nationalist movement'.2 8 
Several African statesmen, including Nyerere, G o w o n and Kaunda , 
have expressed similar views and paid tribute to the role played by China 
in the overall decolonization process in Africa.29 Today, anti-colonialist 
and anti-racist movements can continue to count on China's support, as 
was emphasized by the Chinese prime minister during his visit to Africa 
in 1980 . 3 0 
The impact of the Vietnam War on Africa 
T h e Vietnam W a r has had political, psychological, economic and military 
repercussions in Africa. 
That war, like the wars waged by the African liberation movements, was 
the product of imperialism and colonialism and one of the consequences of 
superpower rivalry over a Third-World country. T h e North Vietnamese, 
supported by the communists, were engaged in guerrilla warfare in the 
south (backed by the U S A ) in a bid to unify the country. T h e U S A sent 
to the south several hundred thousand well-equipped m e n against the 
poorly-equipped North Vietnamese, supported by the Soviet bloc and 
China. T h e Africans regarded this deployment of American force against 
North Vietnam as an act of neo-colonialist aggression against a vulnerable 
brother country and believed that the same fate might well befall any 
Third-World nation seeking to oppose the interests of the superpowers.31 
In view of the Western powers' constant collaboration with the apartheid 
regime of South Africa, m a n y Africans felt that the Vietnamese were 
fighting the same enemy as themselves. Their sense of solidarity was also 
based on the African states' and Vietnam's c o m m o n membership of the 
Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t whose security and integrity were threatened by 
the aggression perpetrated against Vietnam. Finally, receiving the assist-
ance of China and the U S S R (North Vietnam's two main allies) for its 
efforts to vanquish colonialism once and for all in the Portuguese colonies 
and in Southern Africa, m a n y African leaders felt obliged in their turn 
to support the Vietnamese. 
North Vietnam's victory over the United States had a considerable 
27. New China News Agency, 30 June 1980; Africa Research Bulletin, July 1980, p. 5730. 
28. Africa Research Bulletin, M a y 1981, p. 6059. 
29. See, for example, Times of Zambia, 22 February 1974; New Nigerian, 18 September 
1974; Africa Research Bulletin, March 1974, p. 3185. 
30. New China News Agency, 30 June 1980. 
31. A . A . Mazrui, 1972, p. 124. 
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impact on Africa. T o most African nationalists, it was the victory of David 
over Goliath. It also destroyed the myth that military might was the only 
key to victory and provided confirmation that the resolve, abnegation and 
commitment of a people fighting for its just cause were infinitely more 
important. It consequently served to boost the confidence of the peoples 
of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique , instilling in them the 
conviction that, through their determination, they would overcome the 
military might of imperialist, colonialist and racist regimes. Since the end 
of that war, African nationalists have been introduced by China and 
Vietnam to the Vietnamese techniques of guerrilla warfare, which have 
greatly helped some states, like Zimbabwe, to attain independence. 
T h e other consequence of the Vietnam war was that China and the 
U S S R were too absorbed in that conflict to be able to give their full 
support to Africa in its efforts to achieve decolonization. T h e United 
States was also too involved in the conflict to concern itself with what 
was happening in Africa. However, once the war was over, while the 
United States was led by the 'Vietnam war syndrome' to pursue a prudent 
policy in Africa, the U S S R and China increased their influence and their 
audience in the continent, particularly in the former Portuguese colonies, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania and the H o r n of Africa. 
Finally, after the end of the Vietnam W a r , the two superpowers shifted 
their interests to the African continent where the Western and Soviet 
blocs continued to vie with one another, for instance in Angola and the 
H o r n of Africa. T o sum u p , the victory of the North Vietnamese seemed 
to boost the credibility of the socialist countries, especially the U S S R 
and China, as defenders of the interests of small Third-World states 
against the Western superpowers. 
Africa's relations with the socialist countries 
True though it is that the economic and political systems of present-day 
Africa have indigenous precedents, they can be analysed only in the 
context of a long period of development, leading at first to its gradual 
involvement in worldwide exchanges and later, around the mid-nineteenth 
century, to its becoming more directly incorporated into this network, 
and then finally, in the early twentieth century, to its subordination to 
the economic and political needs and objectives of the major Western 
powers.32 
T h e course of events in Africa confirmed the Soviet theoreticians in 
their belief that national liberation movements were allies in the fight 
against imperialism. T h e Bandung Conference saw the emergence of a 
third, intermediate force between the capitalist and socialist world systems, 
32. P. C . W . Gutkind and I. Wallerstein, 1976, vol. 1, p. 7. See also I. Wallerstein, 
1976a. 
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and one that was henceforth to be reckoned with. In Egypt, the Western 
attempts at destabilization and particularly the French and British 
expedition to Suez in 1956, led al-Nasser to accept arms from M o s c o w . 
T h e U S S R and its allies regarded the independence of Morocco, Tunisia, 
Sudan, G h a n a and Guinea, and the struggle of the Algerian F L N , as 
severe blows inflicted on colonialism and imperialism by non-communist 
movements and, in the eyes of M o s c o w , the possibility was not to be 
ruled out that they would subsequently become more radical. T h u s the 
Soviet press commented that, like Fidel Castro in C u b a , the Africans 
Sékou Touré, K w a m e N k r u m a h and even Modibo Keita could transcend 
the interests of their class, the national petite-bourgeoisie, and embark on 
a 'non-capitalist path of development', capable of leading to socialism. 
Soviet theoreticians thus came to define a non-capitalist path of 
development for the African countries which possessed a real revolutionary 
potential. This path is that taken by the 'national democracies'. A state 
which is 'genuinely independent, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-
dictatorial, democratic and progressive in its domestic and social policy 
constitutes a national democracy.'33 In short, Soviet theoreticians con-
sidered that there was an identity of interests between the socialist 
world, the African liberation movements and the international workers' 
movement struggling against imperialism. 
T h u s it was that in the 1960s those African states that seemed to be 
moving towards the socialist path received international socialist assistance, 
starting with Egypt, G h a n a , Guinea and Mali. 
But in fact most of the independent African states retained the colonial 
institutions and modelled their constitutions on those of their former 
colonizers. They also, at least for the first few years, retained a sizeable 
expatriate staff, nearly always from the former colonial power, in key 
sectors such as the civil service, the police and the army. Even in countries 
like G h a n a under N k r u m a h , which leaned towards the socialist world, a 
not inconsiderable n u m b e r of Western staff remained in their positions 
until 1961. They stayed on even longer in other former colonies like 
Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. These expatriate staff, w h o 
generally held key positions in governmental bodies, were bound to 
influence the political and economic policies of independent African states, 
and most likely in favour of the former Western colonial powers. 
In the economic field the former colonies have found it difficult to 
break off their economic and trade links with the former colonial powers 
which, along with other Western powers, control the major world financial 
institutions including the World Bank, the currencies used in the African 
33. According to the definition given by the Soviet theoretician B . Ponomarev in i960 
and the concept brilliantly analysed by the French historian J. Chesneaux, 1964, 
pp. 3-19. 
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states, the prices of raw materials and the quotas for the main exports of 
the African states. 
In the cultural sphere, the national language of most of the former 
colonies remains that of the colonizers whose education systems they have 
copied, at the same time retaining most Western cultural values, in respect 
of dress and eating habits, for instance.34 This lasting heritage is due to 
the fact that the colonies were long under the cultural domination of the 
colonial powers and that the West engages in effective propaganda for 
this purpose in the former colonies. 
U n d e r these circumstances the socialist countries have always found it 
difficult to eradicate or indeed at times to reduce the African states' 
dependence on the Western capitalist powers, and this factor, added to 
the repression of communist militants by the governments in power, 
explains w h y communist parties have found it so hard to become 
established in the continent. Even more disappointing to the socialist 
world is the fact that those African states and leaders that had initially 
showed interest in the socialist road to development have in one way or 
another reverted to dependence on the capitalist world. In Egypt for 
instance, al-Nasser pursued a policy of repression against the Egyptian 
Communis t Party and under al-Sadat, Egyptian-Soviet relations reached 
a n e w low. Elsewhere in black Africa, the socialist world suffered other 
setbacks. In Guinea the relations established in 1959 soon deteriorated. 
Ambassador Daniel Solod was expelled from Conakry in 1961 and, despite 
Anastase Mikoyan's visit to the Guiñean capital in January 1962, the 
dialogue between the Soviet Union and Guinea never again became as 
harmonious as it had been in the beginning. Guinea gradually re-entered 
the Western sphere of influence. 
In Ghana the socialist world hoped that N k r u m a h , the theoretician of 
African socialism, would espouse the ideas of scientific socialism and 
improve Ghana's relations with the socialist world. But despite the aid it 
had received from the Soviet bloc, the Accra regime had to wait for a 
time before recognizing East G e r m a n y for fear of offending the Federal 
Republic which had undertaken to provide it with massive economic aid.35 
A n d finally the coup d'Etat that overthrew N k r u m a h on 24 February 1966 
and established a pro-Western regime abruptly put an end to the influence 
of the Soviet bloc. T h e successive regimes in Accra have never really re-
established the cordial relations existing between the socialist world and 
G h a n a under N k r u m a h . In Mali the socialist world's influence never 
recovered from M o d i b o Keita's disappearance from the political scene 
after the coup d'État of 18 November 1968. 
In pro-Western Nigeria, the influence of the Soviet bloc m a d e itself 
felt only during the civil war. T h e Eastern countries were then providing 
34. A . Okolo, 1983, pp. 252-4. 
35. W . S . Thompson, 1969, cited by R . Legvold, 1970, p. 25. 
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that country with military aid. After the civil war, however, Nigeria again 
became dependent on the Western bloc although it had been refused 
military aid by it. T h e U S S R had complained at the beginning of the 
civil war that Lagos had rejected its offer of assistance.36 
In East and Central Africa the same thing happened as in West and 
North Africa. Kenya, which at independence was on good terms with the 
socialist world,37 became during the latter half of the 1960s one of the 
most pro-Western African states. This period was also marked by anti-
communist hysteria in the country, ending with the expulsion of alleged 
communists from K A N U , the ruling party.38 Western political and econ-
omic influence, which dates from the colonial period, has continued to 
m a k e itself felt through substantial Western investments, and Kenyans 
with radical views have always been viewed as communists and therefore 
dangerous to civil peace and national development. 
Uganda, Zambia and Z imbabwe are also dependent on the West, though 
to a lesser degree. Obote's attempt to launch a socialist programme in 
the late 1960s divided his party and caused a split in the country between 
'communists' and democrats. President Julius Nyerere also attempted, in 
1967, to set Tanzania on the path of self-reliant development along 
socialist lines in order to reduce its dependence on foreign powers. Despite 
these sincere efforts, Tanzania is still dependent on the Western countries, 
as Nyerere has himself acknowledged: 'Our country is still economically 
dependent on economic and political decisions taken by other people 
without our participation or consent.'39 Admittedly, Chinese aid to T a n -
zania has increased in recent years, but this has in no way affected that 
country's dependence on the Western powers. Even socialist Somalia, the 
Somali Democratic Republic before 1977 and socialist Ethiopia after the 
revolution continued to depend essentially on the Western capitalist 
countries economically and culturally, if not in the military field, where 
the socialist world has taken the place of the West, especially in Ethiopia, 
since 1978. T o s u m up, the political, economic and social influence of 
the Western powers in the former colonies is so well entrenched and 
structured in such a way that most of the newly independent African 
states find it difficult to break away from it without being severely 
penalized by the international capitalist system. Moreover, the socialist 
countries do not have the same close and long-established historical 
relations with them, and their economic system is not so well established 
36. International Affairs, 1963, p. 79; and African Communist, 1965, no. 2, p. 41. 
37. O . Odinga, 1969. 
38. '"Kenya will not go communist" says Kenya's Prime Minister', East African 
Standard (Nairobi), 1 March 1965, p. 5. 
39. Speech by J. Nyerere, reported in Daily News (Tanzania), 25 March 1977; Africa 
Diary, 11-17 June 1977, p. 8525. 
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throughout the world nor as subtly organized as the Western capitalist 
system. 
T h e one area in which the socialist world has exercised an appreciable 
influence is that of ideology. T h e socialist ideology with its mobilizing 
appeal and unifying effect was adopted by a number of African leaders, 
both progressive and reactionary, as a means of setting to rights societies 
traditionally beset by ethnic and religious conflict. African nationalists 
have also used this ideology to denounce Western colonialism and alert 
the West to African needs.40 
Socialism has also been adopted by a n u m b e r of African leaders because 
as one of them, J. Nyerere, has pointed out, it fits in well with the African 
way of life. Africans do not need to be taught socialism as it is already 
rooted in their traditional society.41 T h e Tanzanian leader explained that 
he had not been converted to socialism through reading Marxist writings, 
but that the main motivating factors had been his parents' influence and 
his peasant background.42 Several African leaders seem to have opted for 
socialism for reasons of both economic and political pragmatism. It seems 
likely that N k r u m a h to some extent adopted the socialist ideology in 
order to obtain from the socialist world the political and material support 
that the Western bloc, apparently hostile and unwilling to compromise, 
was not prepared to grant him. It should be noted, however, that N k r u m a h 
transformed his tactical stance into a theoretical and strategic choice as 
from 1968.43 Siad Barre would appear to have m a d e this choice for similar 
reasons and because it served his irredentist policy towards neighbouring 
countries, Kenya and Ethiopia. W h e n socialist aid ceased, he demonstrated 
the peripheral nature of his socialism as follows: 'I a m a nationalist first, 
a M o s l e m second and a socialist third.'44 Sékou Touré had to adopt 
socialism as his country could not have survived otherwise after the total 
cessation of Western aid. Colonel Mengistu seems to have opted for the 
socialist model of development partly as a means of unifying Ethiopia 
after the pro-Western emperor had been overthrown. T h e socialist world 
unhesitatingly extended support to the Derg: it has always been ready to 
assist African regimes showing leanings towards socialism.45 
F r o m the early 1960s a fruitful dialogue started u p between the 
representatives of scientific socialism and African socialism that greatly 
contributed to a mutual understanding of their points of view. Despite 
criticism on both sides and despite certain recognized differences of 
40. A . A . Mazrui, 1980b, pp. 44-6. 
41. ibid.; see also Africa Report (New York), 1962. 
42. P. Enahoro, 1983, pp. 98-122. 
43. See S. Ikoku, 1971. 
44. D . L a m b , n.d. 
45. Pravda, 14 September 1974. 
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opinion, the participants in the dialogue46 shared the same fundamental 
views, namely anti-imperialism, anti-racism, aspiration to social progress, 
and willingness to go on developing friendly relations between the forces 
of national liberation and world socialism. Having analysed the underlying 
causes, both internal and external, of the regimes inclining towards 
socialism in the building of the n e w society, Soviet researchers adopted 
a more realistic attitude. Without underestimating the revolutionary 
potential of the liberated peoples, they began to concern themselves more 
with the study of the huge difficulties standing in the way of those w h o 
have issued a challenge to centuries of underdevelopment and the pervasive 
presence of neo-colonialism. 
Africa and the socialist world in economic interaction 
State what you need and w e shall help you . . . in the form of loans, 
technical aid . . . w e do not seek to get an advantage . . . w e do not 
need profits . . . w e do not ask you to participate in blocs . . . w e 
are ready to help you as a brother helps a brother.47 
This statement reflects the theory of the Soviet bloc's economic policy 
towards Africa. 
T h e socialist countries and Africa have engaged in extensive economic, 
technical and trade co-operation since i960. T h e socialist leaders have, 
since Lenin, always considered it their duty as internationalists to offer 
economic and technical assistance to colonized or independent African 
states in order to enable them to achieve self-reliance, further arguing 
that socialist aid, unlike that of the capitalist donors, is selfless and has 
no strings attached.48 
Whereas one of the aims of the Western countries is economic d o m i -
nation so as to secure supplies of raw materials and outlets for m a n u -
factured goods, the prime objective of the Soviet bloc's African policy 
was not to tie countries within its sphere of influence to an economic 
zone of which it is the centre. T h e fact is that the U S S R ' s k n o w n mineral 
reserves are ample for its needs, at least in the m e d i u m term, and the 
industry of the socialist bloc does not seem for the time being to need 
any outlets outside its domestic markets, which are far from saturated. 
But the Soviet bloc was concerned to help African countries take c o m m a n d 
of their o w n raw materials to prevent their being dominated by Europe 
and the U S A . T h e socialist world nevertheless depends on Africa for 
some commodities such as fish and certain rare minerals.49 At the time 
46. For details, see I. I. Potekhin, 1963, pp. 71-5; Colloque Soviéto-Congolais, 1988. 
47. Statement by A . A . Arzumanyan, head of the Soviet delegation to the Afro-Asian 
Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo: A . A . Arzumanyan, 1958, pp. 185-6. 
48. V . Rymalov, 1959b. 
49. See P. Biamès, 1980; and P. Decraene, 1982. 
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of détente, the aid of the Soviet bloc was presented as a peaceful way of 
competing with the capitalist countries: ' T h e socialist nations compete 
with the Western powers not in the arms race but in extending aid to 
underdeveloped countries'.50 Hence, the following definition of the A s w a n 
D a m : ' T h e A s w a n site is an arena in which socialism and capitalism 
compete, and the outcome of this competition is to the undoubted 
advantage of socialism'.51 Since the 1960s, however, the economists and 
leaders of the socialist world have tended to emphasize the mutual 
advantages of economic exchanges between Africa and the socialist world.52 
T h e following are some of the features of the socialist countries' aid 
to Africa: lower interest rates than those charged by most Western donors, 
ranging from about 2.5 to 3 per cent yearly, with a grace period of usually 
one year and an average repayment period of 12 years, and the aid 
provided in the form of loans. T h e projects financed by means of this 
aid become, on their completion, the property of the recipients. T h e aim, 
according to Ivan Chernyshev, the official in charge of the U S S R ' s 
economic relations with foreign countries in the late 1970s, was to offer 
easy terms to Africa.53 
T h e Soviet bloc's economic co-operation with Africa developed con-
siderably during the 1960s and 1970s owing to the growing importance 
of the continent for the global objectives of the socialist world. For 
example, trade between the U S S R and Africa increased fivefold between 
i960 and 1975 and the number of African states trading with the Soviet 
Union alone rose from six to 36 between i960 and 1976.54 
T h e choice of a recipient and the amount of aid are governed by the 
following considerations: the strategic importance of the receiving country; 
its potential until recently for reducing the influence of the United States 
and China; its support for Marxist-Leninist ideology; and its value as a 
source of raw materials and as a commercial outlet.55 This has been more 
or less confirmed by Soviet commentators in the following terms: 
T h e provision of credits by our country is not based on any political, 
military or economic conditions that are unacceptable to a developing 
country. However, it would be unjustifiable to reach the conclusion that 
the Soviet Union is indifferent as to whom and on what conditions to 
grant credits. This would ignore the demands of reality.^ 
For these reasons, Egypt received massive aid up to 1975 and G h a n a 
under N k r u m a h received the second-largest volume of aid in black Africa 
50. V . Rymalov, 1959a. 
51. I. Belyanev, 1962; E . M'Bokolo, 1980. 
52. A . A . Gromyko , 1967. 
53. Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa), April 1977. 
54. Novosti, April 1977; Africa Research Bulletin, 15 April-14 M a y 1977, p. 4281. 
55. P. D . Dean and J. A . Vasquez, 1976, pp. 7-28. 
56. V . Romanova and I. Tsriklis, 1978. Italics added for emphasis. 
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plate 27.2 A. Mikoyan, minister offoreign affairs of the USSR, arrives in Ghana where
he is welcomed by President K. Nkrumah, January 1962
from the USSR despite its small population and size when compared
with, huge pro-Western Nigeria. Under the Soviet bloc's aid programme
several projects were launched in Ghana, particularly in the mining and
agricultural sectors. Several Ghanaians were also trained under the
programme. Where trade was concerned, Ghana exported cocoa to the
socialist countries in exchange for manufactured goods.
The socialist countries found it difficult to establish economic and trade
ties with pro-Western Nigeria until after the civil war when their relations
improved, but Nigeria remained among the countries receiving the
least aid from the Soviet bloc. Socialist technical assistance to Nigeria,
particularly in key areas like the oil and steel industries, increased after
1970 and played an essential role by enabling several thousand Nigerians
to acquire skills needed for the country's development.57 As regards trade,
Nigeria has exported to the socialist world such products as cocoa beans,
57. Africa Diary, 28 May-3 June 1973, p. 6487; and Africa Diary, 6-12 November
1982, pp. 1 198-9.
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receiving in return cement, drugs and machinery.5 In the military field, 
the Soviet bloc countries played a leading role in Nigeria, especially 
during the civil war w h e n the federal government received substantial 
Soviet military assistance which contributed to the Lagos regime's victory, 
as was confirmed by General G o w o n . 5 9 It continued to receive considerable 
military aid from the U S S R , in the form of equipment and training. It 
is estimated that from 1974 to 1978 Nigeria purchased from the Soviet 
Union $80 million worth of arms, more than from any other country, 
and that this represented 40 per cent of its arms imports for that period. 
Several other West African states have received similar economic aid from 
the socialist countries and, albeit to a lesser degree, military assistance. 
A m o n g the countries of former British East and Central Africa, Kenya 
has received the most economic aid from the Soviet Union, despite its 
pro-Western positions. T h e $48 million it thus obtained was probably 
intended to put an end to the anti-communist phobia in evidence there 
during the 1960s. Because of this anti-communist feeling, a large part of 
the aid granted to Kenya by the socialist countries remained unused,60 
and some projects that it had served to finance, like the L u m u m b a 
Institute, were even interrupted, while Soviet military aid was rejected.61 
S o m e of these projects survived, including a 500-bed hospital in K i s u m u , 
equipped and partly run by Soviet doctors.62 
In the 1960s Uganda received Soviet credit of $16 million, extended 
to Milton Obote's African socialist regime, to finance such major projects 
as the building of a spinning mill, the first of its kind in East Africa, and 
the first mechanized-agriculture college in East Africa, which is in 
operation and partly run by Soviet instructors.63 
A s regards trade, Uganda has exported coffee, cotton and copper to 
the Soviet bloc countries in exchange for machinery and drugs. In the 
military field, the Soviet bloc, especially the U S S R , provided massive 
military assistance. It is estimated that in 1978 M o s c o w covered 92 per 
cent of its arms requirements. 
Tanzania, which spearheads the fight against colonialism and racism in 
South Africa, has received economic assistance from the socialist world. 
B y 1976 it had received $40 million from the Soviet Union, supplemented 
by $13 million from the East European countries. Trade between Tanzania 
and the socialist world has been more modest. Tanzania has exported 
mainly tobacco and cotton to the Soviet bloc countries, in exchange in 
5p. West Africa Pilot, 1971. 
59. Daily Times (Lagos), June 1974; and Radio Moscow, 28 M a y 1974. 
60. C . Stevens, 1976, p. 2, quoting T . M b o y a , the former Kenyan Minister of Economic 
Planning. 
61. Daily Nation (Nairobi), 30 April 1965, p. 1; Kenya, House of Representatives Debate, 
3 March 1967, cols 741-2. 
62. C . Stevens, 1976, p. 259. 
63. J. Mulira, 1983, p. 51. 
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particular for tools and vehicles.64 Because of Tanzania's anti-colonialist 
stand, the socialist countries have provided it with a relatively large 
amount of military aid to help it to protect itself against the racist regime 
of South Africa. 
In the case of Zambia, the Soviet bloc's aid remained minimal until 
1976. After that date, however, the U S S R granted that country $100 
million worth of military aid to help it defend itself against racist South 
Africa. This aid was highly appreciated by President Kaunda, w h o 
commented on it in the following terms: ' T h e U S S R has always been 
Zambia's ally'.65 
In Central and South Africa, as has already been said, the socialist 
countries supplied both economic and military assistance to the national 
liberation movements of Mozambique , Angola and Zimbabwe , thereby 
enabling them to achieve independence. T h e $2 billion granted to Angola 
by the U S S R under the Soviet-Angolan co-operation agreement of 1982 
was the largest credit it had ever accorded to an African state. It was 
meant to finance various development schemes.66 T h e leaders of the A N C 
and S W A P O guerrilla movements have expressed their profound gratitude 
for the economic and military aid they received from the Soviet bloc.67 
O w i n g mainly to its strategic and ideological importance, Somalia was 
in 1977 one of the main beneficiaries of Soviet aid in Africa, receiving a 
total of $154 million, and received the largest volume of military assistance, 
worth $181 million, making the Somalian army one of the best equipped 
in black Africa. 
Being just as important strategically and ideologically, Ethiopia also 
received massive economic aid, representing $100 million in 1974. This 
aid served to finance various development schemes including refineries.68 
After the revolution, co-operation between socialist Ethiopia and the 
socialist countries developed considerably. In 1979, for instance, those 
countries received over 3500 Ethiopian students, the highest number from 
any single African state.69 In 1978 trade increased 15-fold. In the military 
field, the Soviet Union's commitments to Ethiopia during the Ogaden 
war represented $1 billion worth of arms and, in addition, 1500 Soviet 
military advisers were in Ethiopia during that period and an estimated 
20000 Cuban soldiers. In 1981 Soviet military aid to Addis Ababa 
64. Daily News (Tanzania), 25 March 1977; News Agency, 27 March 1977. 
65. Times of Zambia, 1977. 
66. Radio Lisbon, in Africa Research Bulletin, 14 January-14 February 1982, p. 6324; 
and Toss, July 1978. 
67. Radio Moscow, quoting a guerrilla source; see also Voice of Kenya TV, 3 March 
1986, 21.30 hrs N e w s . 
68. New China News Agency, 5 July 1981; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 July 1979, 
p. 6122. 
69. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 July 1979, p. 5355. 
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amounted to about $1.5 billion.70 Ethiopia thus became indisputably the 
leading recipient of Soviet military aid in the continent with the exception 
of Egypt in the early 1970s. This situation enabled Ethiopia to build up 
a formidable defence capability against its enemy, Somalia, and in its o w n 
internal struggles against separatist forces and domestic foes. 
China's economic aid policy towards developing countries is slightly 
different in some respects from that adopted by the other socialist 
countries and, according to Chinese officials, is based on the following 
principles: the aid provided must be to the mutual advantage of the donor 
and the recipient, whose independence is to be respected; it is granted 
free of charge and is intended to ensure that the recipient becomes self-
reliant; it is invested in projects that rapidly become cost-effective; the 
quality of the products supplied is guaranteed; local technicians must be 
trained to carry through the projects implemented with Chinese aid; and 
the Chinese experts must enjoy the same advantages as the local experts.71 
China has endeavoured to comply strictly with these principles in its 
economic co-operation with Africa. 
Generally speaking, China has been m o r e ready to offer its aid to 
countries with socialist leanings following a policy of self-reliance, such 
as Tanzania. But, for pragmatic reasons, it has also offered aid to some 
pro-Western countries hostile to the Soviet Union like Zaire or Ethiopia 
before 1974. T h e purpose of Chinese aid to Africa appears to have been 
to eliminate or at least reduce American and Soviet influence in the 
continent, or to gain African support in certain international forums like 
the United Nations, the Non-aligned M o v e m e n t and the Afro-Asian 
Peoples' Solidarity Organization, and lastly to help Africa to eradicate 
imperialism and achieve economic self-reliance. O n the other hand, Beijing 
has sought to obtain the support of the African continent in its continual 
struggle towards international revolution. China, in so far as it claims to 
lead the Third-World countries, has the duty to be generous in assisting 
its weakest m e m b e r s , and particularly the African countries. 
China's apparent generosity to Africa m a y be illustrated by the fact 
that from 1956 to 1977 it offered the continent aid representing $1.4 
billion and 50 per cent of total Chinese aid to all non-socialist countries. 
T h e main recipients of Chinese aid in West Africa have been G h a n a , 
Sierra Leone, G a m b i a and Nigeria and, in the H o r n of Africa, Somalia 
and Ethiopia. In the first group of countries, it has been used for 
agricultural projects and the building of bridges and, in the second, for 
road construction and the setting up of textile mills respectively.72 
Uganda received financial and technical aid from China that was used 
70. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 March 1981, pp. 6002-3; Tass, 8-10 M a y 1977. 
71. See W . Partke, 1975, pp. 9-12; and A . Lawrence, 1965, pp. 173-4. 
72. See New China News Agency, 13 February 1973; West Africa (London), 20 February 
1978; New China News Agency, 15 February 1978; and W . Partke, 1975, p. 113. 
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for a successful rice-growing project.73 Kenya received a loan of $16.8 
million and a donation of $3.1 million. It was also granted $40 million 
to build a modern stadium.74 O n e of the projects carried out in K e n y a 
with Chinese aid concerned the b a m b o o industry. Z imbabwe , whose prime 
minister was energetically supported by China during the guerrilla war, 
became one of the main recipients of Chinese aid to Africa, receiving a 
total of some $82 million for various major development projects.75 
However, the foremost recipient of Chinese aid to Africa is Tanzania, 
which presents certain particularly interesting features for China. These 
include the ruling party's indefatigable fight against racism. T o the anti-
colonialist stand of T A N U and later the C C M (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) 
and their support for liberation movements should be added Tanzania's 
behaviour on the international scene (forcing the United States for 
instance to close d o w n its satellite-tracking station on the island of 
Zanzibar) and its socialist policy of self-reliance, which is based on the 
same philosophy as that followed by China.76 In short, Tanzania is seen 
by China as 'a glorious banner against old and n e w imperialism'.77 A n d 
Tanzania has extended a favourable reception to China because it has 
regarded China as a defender of colonized and oppressed peoples.78 This 
well-disposed attitude towards each other led the two countries into a 
sort of natural alliance. 
B y 1977 China had committed $362 million of aid to Tanzania out of 
a total of $2.5 billion to the entire continent of Africa. This m a d e Tanzania 
by far the leading recipient of Chinese aid to Africa. B y 1971 China had 
moved into first place among the donor countries, its bilateral aid 
exceeding the total amount of aid received by Tanzania from all other 
donors, including the contributions of the rich countries. A substantial 
proportion of this aid was used to finance the T A Z A R A project which 
cost Tanzania and Zambia a total of $456.3 million, shared equally by 
the two countries. T h e rest went into various major development projects, 
particularly in agriculture, communication, health services and education.79 
China's trade policy is largely based on the financing of aid through 
trade. For example, 60 per cent of the credit granted for T A Z A R A took 
the form of deliveries of products for sale on the Tanzanian and Zambian 
markets.80 Tanzania exported tobacco, copra and sisal, in exchange for 
industrial products and drugs. Despite these excellent relations between 
73. Radio Kampala, 1 M a y 1965; and New China News Agency, no. 22, 1973. 
74. Standard of Kenya, 17 September 1980. 
75. New China News Agency, 18 September 1981; and Africa Research Bulletin, 15 
December 1982-14 January 1983. 
76. Xinhua News Bulletin, 1968, pp. 5-6 and 15. 
77. New China News Agency, 5 June 1965. 
78. J. K . Nyerere, 196yd; see also G . T . Y u , 1975, p. 7. 
79. G . T . Yu, 1975, p. 80. 
80. Tanzania Standard (Dar es Salaam), 26, 1976. 
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plate 27.3 The Chinese-built 'Green Uhuru Railway', TanzaniaZambia: the laying ofthe
track across the Tanzania-Zambia border, September 1973, in the presence of Chinese officials
and Presidents J. Nyerere of Tanzania and K. Kaunda ofZambia
the two countries, the Western countries continued to be Tanzania's main
trading partners: from 1970 to 1977, 63 per cent of its exports went to
Western countries and 49 per cent of its imports came from them.81
The decision to build a railway linking Tanzania to Zambia was taken,
as has been noted, after the minority white regimes of Rhodesia and
South Africa had threatened to cut all the lines of communication with
81. United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, p. 40.
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land-locked Zambia. T h e importance of T A Z A R A for that country and 
for all anti-colonialist and anti-racist movements was obvious. It was 
spelled out by the Tanzanian prime minister in the following terms: 
T A Z A R A is a project of special status in Africa and in the world of 
aid given by one country to another in a pure spirit of goodwill and 
mutual benefit. T h e status of T A Z A R A is a victory for co-operation 
between Third-World countries.82 
This 1278 miles-long railway was built by 15000 Chinese and 30000 
African workers, w h o completed it in 1975, ahead of schedule. T h e loan, 
which was interest-free, was to be paid back over a period of 30 years 
starting in 1983 in freely convertible currencies or in the form of goods 
acceptable to China.83 These were indisputably among the best terms that 
a recipient could ever have hoped to obtain from a foreign donor. Even 
w h e n the operation of the railway showed a deficit amounting in 1983 to 
$100 million, owing to pilfering and poor hauling power, China agreed 
to grant additional aid to purchase new locomotives from West G e r m a n y 
and rescheduled the repayments, with the result that in November 1983 
the railway achieved a profit for the first time.84 
In the military field, Tanzania, because of its special relationship with 
China, received during the period 1967-76 assistance estimated at $75 
million, representing the largest share (51 per cent) of Chinese aid to 
Africa. China also provided other African states with military assistance, 
in particular Mozambique , Cameroon and Zambia. 
In short, the socialist world as a whole - both the Soviet bloc and 
China - has granted economic, technical and military aid in various forms 
to most African states, and this aid, by enabling them to have recourse 
to donors other than Western ones alone, has reduced their dependence 
on the former colonizers and has allowed African societies to carry through 
a large number of projects relating to development (education, industry 
and agriculture) and to defence. 
International rivalry in Africa's relations with the socialist 
world 
Africa's political, economic and military relations with the socialist world 
gready helped to fan the intense rivalry that used to exist between the 
two superpowers and the People's Republic of China. O n m a n y occasions 
Africa has, either deliberately or inadvertently, provided that rivalry with 
ideal situations in which to reveal itself. For instance, the inherent ethnic 
and regional discord in most African states, which has given rise to 
82. Peking Review, no. 38, 22 September 1978. 
83. G . T . Yu, 1975, p. 127. 
84. Africa NOTP, 1983; Africa, 1984, pp. 18-19. 
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instability, has been exploited by rival powers. T h e Angolan crisis, the 
civil war in Nigeria and the Ogaden conflict are cases in point. Africa's 
mineral resources - bauxite, diamonds, oil, and so on - its rich markets 
and the strategic position of its sea ports and airports have m a d e it one 
of the regions of the globe most coveted by the superpowers. 
Politically, the African states that have opted for a non-capitalist course 
of development have met with the condemnation of the capitalist Western 
powers, which have supported or installed regimes favourable to them-
selves. T h e pro-Western government of Kenya, for instance, has received 
the support of the West against apparently pro-socialist parties like the 
Kenya People's Union. Ghana under N k r u m a h was deprived of the aid 
of most Western countries because of his strongly pro-socialist stand; in 
the H o r n of Africa, the regimes supported by the socialist camp have 
always been challenged by the pro-Western ones and vice versa. T h e 
socialist world for its part has tried to help and support pro-socialist 
regimes in power, as in Guinea, Mali, Angola and Ethiopia. T h e super-
powers view communist and Western infiltration in Africa in the context 
of worldwide, East-West global rivalry and m a k e no secret of the fact 
that it fills them with alarm. A s Ali Mazrui has noted: 
a revolutionary ideology — Marxism — with a powerful advocate -
U S S R - became something of which the Western powers were 
increasingly fearful . . . the ideological and political competition for 
control of the world between U S S R and the Western world gathered 
m o m e n t u m . . . 8s 
In its efforts to gain political influence in the continent, China has 
come up against the Western powers and the U S S R alike, already 
competing for the same aim. O w i n g to its ideological differences with the 
U S S R , China, although socialist too, criticized certain aspects of Soviet 
policy in Africa and regarded the U S S R as simply one of the European 
powers exercising domination over the African continent.86 T h e U S S R 
for its part accused China of invoking racist arguments to discredit its 
African policy.8' 
M a n y regions in Africa have suffered form international rivalry, but it 
has been felt most acutely in Angola and the H o r n of Africa. Mozambique 
has suffered a lot from the South-African-backed Mozambique National 
Resistance - but there have been no Cuban troops to defend F R E L I M O . 
A noteworthy feature of the policy followed by Angola is that the 
nationalist movements there have been supported from the beginning by 
the superpowers and that this state of affairs continued after the country 
gained independence. T h e Soviet bloc, including Cuba, always supported 
85. A . A . Mazrui, 1977, pp. 179-80. 
86. New China News Agency, 27 December 1967 and 3 July 1977. 
87. G . V . Astafyev and A . M . Dubinsky, 1974, pp. 112-14. 
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the MPLA, while the Western bloc, particularly the United States, has
given its support to the FNLA and UNITA. The competition between
the two blocs in Angola was clearly based on ideological and strategic
interests.
plate 27.4 Cuban troops in Angola
The former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, placed the Soviet
bloc's intervention in Angola in the context of USA-USSR rivalry
throughout the world and blamed the Kremlin for having both initiated
and escalated the crisis there.88 He justified US intervention on the
grounds that its purpose was to normalize the situation. The Western
powers consequently undertook to provide the FNLA and UNITA
88. R. Lemarchand, 1981, p. 83.
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guerrillas with aid equal to that received by the M P L A from the U S S R . 
T h e Soviets and Cubans for their part justified their support for Angola 
and their presence in the country on the grounds that the Angolan people 
had requested their protection against imperialist aggression.^ Since then 
other countries have allowed themselves to become involved in the 
Angolan crisis, such as China, to some extent, and South Africa, which 
has intervened directly in the civil war on the side of U N I T A on the 
pretext of defending Namibia against S W A P O guerrillas operating from 
Angolan territory and preventing Marxism from making inroads in the 
region. 
T h e M P L A , which subscribes to the Marxist ideology, readily accepted 
the aid offered by the socialist world, while U N I T A , a pro-Western 
guerrilla group, received the support of the West and South Africa to 
oppose the power of the M P L A . But apart from these ideological 
motivations, the deposits of uranium and oil in Angola are not unconnected 
with the interest taken in that country by foreign powers. T h e United 
States, which had major economic interests in Zaire, Namibia and South 
Africa, saw the U S S R ' s bid to play a role in Angola as a threat to its 
economic interests in the region. Finally, at the strategic level, Angola is 
in a very advantageous position in many respects. Its coast and harbours 
on the Atlantic Ocean are of great interest to maritime powers in both 
the N A T O and Warsaw Pact groups of countries.90 
T h e strategic consequences have until recently been a central concern 
to the superpowers owing to the intensification of the arms race, calling 
for n e w air and seaport facilities for their naval and air forces. T h e Horn 
of Africa offers one of the best examples in the continent of the 
crystallization of international rivalry around strategic requirements. T h e 
point is that it is strategically important for the socialist c a m p and the 
capitalist camp alike because of its position at the junction of Asia and 
Africa, its excellent harbour facilities in the Gulf of A d e n and the Indian 
Ocean and, above all, its proximity to vital sea routes linking the oil-
producing countries to America and Europe, through which 70 per cent 
of oil and other raw materials are imported by Western Europe.91 
T h e presence in the Indian Ocean of large U S naval forces that could 
be used to attack the U S S R led the Kremlin to seek sea and airport 
facilities in the H o r n of Africa for its o w n enlarged naval force in the 
Indian Ocean. M o r e than 60 per cent of its ships visiting the area were 
thus said to have been based in the ports of the Horn of Africa and the 
Gulf of Aden. 9 2 Alarmed by the presence in Kagnew, Ethiopia, of 
American communication and surveillance facilities, the U S S R increased 
89. New Times, 1 February 1976, p. 1. 
90. B . Handler, 1970. 
91. Christian Science Monitor, 23 M a r c h 1978. 
92. C . Crocker, 1976, p. 652. 
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its economic and military aid to Somalia in exchange for authorization to 
use the important port of Berbera, close to the strategic strait of Bab el-
M a n d e b through which all ships pass from the R e d Sea. T h e power 
controlling that part of the Red Sea would be in a position to dictate 
changes and to exert influence in the Horn of Africa and in the Middle 
East. Increasing concern was therefore felt by the United States and its 
allies at the accentuation of the U S S R ' s presence in the Indian Ocean 
and its ports.93 
T h e rivalry of the superpowers which sought to establish their influence 
in the Horn of Africa in order to gain control of it was no doubt partly 
responsible for the outbreak of the Ogaden war in 1977. T h e fact is that 
the massive military aid granted to Ethiopia and Somalia by both Warsaw 
Pact and N A T O countries encouraged the two neighbouring states to 
settle their differences on the battlefield. T h e U S S R and its allies accused 
the United States of supporting the irredentist ambitions of Somalia 
against Ethiopia in exchange for the bases m a d e available to it in Berbera 
and M o m b a s a for its Rapid Deployment Force ( R D F ) , established not 
long before to threaten Soviet and African interests.94 T h e United States 
in turn accused the Soviet Union and Cuba of being responsible for the 
crisis in the region, warning the U S S R that if this situation continued, 
U S A - U S S R relations would be affected, with particular reference to the 
Strategic A r m s Limitation Talks ( S A L T ) . 9 5 
Various African statesmen at the O A U summit meeting held in K h a r -
toum in 1978, in particular Obasanjo of Nigeria, regretted this international 
rivalry in the continent, and his remarks were echoed by Sékou Touré 
and Nyerere.96 
This constant rivalry between the superpowers cannot but be det-
rimental to the development of Africa. 
Non-aligned Africa and Eastern Europe: socialist 
countries and the Non-Aligned Movement 
It is often taken for granted that socialist countries are part of the so-
called 'Eastern bloc' only. This is not always the case. Socialist countries 
have also been part of the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t . Indeed, a m o n g the 
founding fathers of the movement was Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito. 
Tito, Nehru, al-Nasser and N k r u m a h became the architects and the 
vanguard of a strategy which was sometimes called 'positive neutralism', 
93. S. Turner, 1977, p. 346. 
94. Radio Moscow, 17 December 1982, in Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 December 
1982, p. 6688. 
95. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 December 1978, p. 4775. 
96. African Currents (London), Autumn 1978/Winter 1979, pp. 8-23. 
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and which became one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of every 
liberated African country. 
In fact, Yugoslavia was the country which first made non-alignment a 
universal movement - instead of its being just another name for Afro-
Asian solidarity. T h e Bandung Conference in 1955 was an important stage 
in forging political alliances between Asian and African states, although 
the conference was held two years before Ghana's independence. If the 
Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t had been forged only by Nehru (India), al-
Nasser (Egypt) and N k r u m a h (Ghana), it would have been perceived 
primarily as a movement of the non-white races of Africa and Asia. It 
was the white m a n , Tito, w h o prepared the way for such subsequent 
non-coloured members of the movement as Cyprus and some of the 
Latin-American countries. By the time of the 1979 Havana Conference, 
the non-aligned movement consisted of 95 members drawn from four 
continents of the world. 
In 1986, the Non-Aligned Conference was held in Harare - its first 
venue south of the Sahara. Robert M u g a b e , himself a socialist and whose 
Z A N U liberation movement had achieved military victory against Ian 
Smith with the help of the socialist world, became chairman of the 
international force which had once been led by Tito, Nehru, N k r u m a h 
and al-Nasser. 
There was a time when a non-aligned stance with both West and 
East Germany was almost impossible. T h e Federal Republic's Hallstein 
Doctrine forced African countries to choose between the two Germanies. 
W h e n Zanzibar (recognizing East Germany) , united with Tanganyika 
(recognizing West Germany), a real diplomatic problem arose. Julius 
Nyerere as president of the new United Republic of Tanzania tried to 
solve it by letting East Germany have a consulate in Zanzibar while West 
Germany had an embassy in Dar es Salaam. W h e n the Federal Republic 
protested against even this compromise, Nyerere's action contributed to 
a fundamental re-evaluation of the Hallstein Doctrine, at least as applied 
to the Third World. (The doctrine was designed to force all third countries 
apart from the U S S R to choose between the two Germanies in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations.) In time, the Federal Republic 
relented, beginning with the conciliatory policies of Willie Brandt towards 
the Eastern alliance as a whole. Africa was subsequently spared the 
dilemma of choosing between the two Germanies - though the dilemma 
of choosing between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan got more 
complicated rather than less over the years. 
T h e smaller East European countries helped Africa's non-alignment in 
a different way. S o m e African countries wanted to balance their cultural 
relations between East and West. Poland became a useful recruiting 
ground for African colleges and universities. M a n y departments in African 
institutions of higher learning included Polish visiting professors and 
researchers. Czechoslovakia and Hungary were also important for African 
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higher education, especially in terms of scholarships for African students 
to study in those countries. Eastern Europe could not of course outweigh 
the influence of Western Europe in Africa. But progress towards cultural 
balance was helped by the scientific, scholarly and cultural relations 
between Africa and the Marxist side of the European heritage. 
There was non-alignment even in the choice of medical facilities w h e n 
Africans suffered from terminal diseases. Three historic African figures 
looked to different sides of the Cold W a r for medical attention in their 
last terminal illnesses. K w a m e N k r u m a h looked to Romania in his last 
struggle against skin cancer - and died there in 1972. Franz Fanon looked 
to the United States in his last crusade against leukemia - and died there. 
Nkrumah's old comrade-in-arms, Sékou Touré, also looked to the United 
States when death confronted him. H e died in Cleveland, Ohio. Disease 
and death do not respect ideological boundaries - and science, in its 
universalisai, is the best form of non-alignment. 
Conclusion 
If the 1960s were the decade of greatest change in Africa, the 1980s were 
the decade of greatest change in the socialist world. T h e most basic 
change in Africa in the 1960s was decolonization - as more than half of 
the continent achieved sovereignty in that decade. T h e most basic change 
in the socialist world in the 1980s was liberalization - bearing the names 
glasnost and perestroïka in the Soviet Union, but bearing other names all 
the way from Beijing to Budapest. 
There is no doubt that Africa's decolonization in the 1960s was of 
direct relevance to Africa's relations with the socialist world. After all, 
formal African independence enabled one African country after another 
to establish diplomatic relations with socialist states. But if Africa's 
decolonization in the 1960s transformed its relations with the Marxist 
world, did the Marxist world's liberalization in the 1980s change its o w n 
relations with Africa? 
In the case of the U S S R , liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev in 
the late 1980s affected foreign policy as well as domestic politics. T h e 
n e w Soviet posture sought to avoid confrontations with the West, to cut 
d o w n the arsenals of war, to reduce Soviet hegemonic control over Eastern 
Europe and to defuse regional conflicts. There is no doubt that the Soviet 
Union exerted its influence on both Cuba and Angola to get them to 
agree to the linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola 
and the independence of Namibia. T h e 1988 accords between Angola, 
Cuba and the Republic of South Africa were not only a product of the 
efforts of the U S assistant secretary of state, Chester Crocker. T h e accords 
in Southern Africa were also a by-product of the impact of perestroïka on 
Soviet foreign policy. O n the Namibian side, the accords were also an 
achievement for the United Nations after m a n y years of persistent U N 
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pressure on South Africa and the international community on behalf of 
the Namibian people. 
T h e n e w rapprochement between the Soviet bloc and the Western 
alliance in the 1980s had risks as well as benefits. S o m e of the foreign 
aid which was coming from both sides to Africa was partly motivated by 
ideological and strategic rivalry between the two power blocs. If the 
rivalry between them declined, would there be less motivation to give the 
same level of aid? O f course, peace between die two superpowers was 
good news for everybody — but would there be less generosity towards 
the Third World as a result? 
Another risk inherent in the rapprochement between the West and the 
Marxist world concerned future Soviet support for the liberation struggle 
in the Republic of South Africa itself. If the new Soviet international 
posture m a d e it eager to defuse regional conflicts, would the Soviet 
alliance be less supportive of armed struggle in the Third World as a 
whole? If Soviet pressure was being put on the Vietnamese to reach 
accommodation in Cambodia and on the Palestine Liberation Organization 
to make concessions to Israel, and if agonizing pressure had been put on 
the Soviet Union itself to withdraw from Afghanistan, would there be 
increasing socialist pressure on the African National Congress also to 
make more and more concessions to the apartheid regime in Pretoria? 
Would this n e w m o o d of rapprochement in the Marxist world make it 
increasingly difficult for the A N C and the P A C to pursue the option of 
armed struggle for the liberation of South Africa? 
Indeed, in M a y 1989, President Gorbachev paid an official visit to the 
People's Republic of China — the first Soviet leader to do so in 30 years. 
T h e reduction in the Sino-Soviet regional conflict could also have 
consequences for Africa - not all of them for the better. T h e rivalry 
between the two communist giants had in the past influenced their policies 
on military and economic aid to Africa. China's support for certain 
countries and movements in Africa had quite often been stimulated by 
competition with the Soviet Union - including China's support for Robert 
M u g a b e and Z A N U during the anti-colonial struggle. (The Soviet Union 
had supported Joshua N k o m o and Z A P U . ) N o w that there was declining 
rivalry between the U S S R and the People's Republic of China after 
Gorbachev's visit in 1989, would Beijing's priorities in the Third World 
be re-ordered? Would Beijing's limited resources be used more exclusively 
for Asian neighbours? W o u l d Africa become less important in China's 
foreign policy? 
A s the decade of the 1980s was coming to an end, these were some of 
the questions which were being posed by the forces of history. T h e 
answers to those questions were still not clear. T h e 1960s had released 
the new currents of post-colonial diplomacy - and transformed Africa's 
relations with the socialist world. Will the forces of liberalization in the 
socialist world in the 1980s and 1990s produce a second phase of 
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transformation? A s Karl M a r x would have said, what is history if not a 
gigantic contradiction unfolding itself in dialectical stages? If the thesis 
was once armed struggle in the South, and the antithesis is n o w rap-
prochement in the North, the synthesis lies hidden in the w o m b of future 
history. 
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Locksley E D M O N D S O N 
Introduction 
A m o n g the most significant phenomena of the middle to late twentieth 
century must be included the rise of the developing nations, also charac-
terized as the 'Third World' or sometimes the 'South'. While any of these 
labels are considered satisfactory, the term 'Third World' is the preferred 
one in this chapter if only because it connotes a more self-conscious 
identity, and remains the most frequently used self-assigned designation, 
a m o n g the nations and peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean.1 
A contemporary historical perspective on this phenomenon of a rising 
Third-World identity becomes the more justifiable w h e n w e consider that 
in the 1940s the 'Third World' as such was unknown; that in the 1950s 
there existed neither a 'Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t ' nor a 'Group of 77;' or 
that in the 1960s the specific phrase ' N e w International Economic Order' 
was not yet in existence. A s far as Africa was concerned, its relations 
with Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean were, prior to the 1960s, 
largely controlled or mediated by relevant Western colonial powers. 
It is thus important to be reminded that ' O n e cannot grasp the reality 
of the Third World if the analysis is limited to contemporary data' since 
'the Third World is a historical phenomenon that is part and parcel of 
the process of emergence of the present world order' whose 'genesis' was 
at least 'some two centuries ago'.* This broader historical perspective, 
while not within this chapter's scope, must always be borne in mind, the 
1. T h e Non-Aligned Movement , formally launched in 1961, is the Third World's main 
political expression (see Table 28.4 below); the larger Group of 77 is the Third World's 
main economic bargaining unit (see Table 28.5 below). Defining the Third World in terms 
of the self-conscious identification of independent states with one or both of these groups, 
this would include all African states, except South Africa; most states located in the Asia-
Middle East-Pacific region (including Cyprus, a member of both groups; excluding China, 
Israel, Japan, Turkey, Australia and N e w Zealand); all Latin American and Caribbean 
states; and a handful of European states, namely Yugoslavia and Malta (members of both 
groups) and Romania (which has joined the Group of 77). 
2. I. Sabri-Abdalla, 1980, p. 32. 
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more so that the post-Second World W a r 'decline of the colonial frontier', 
in the authoritative words of Professor Hans Morgenthau, has c o m e to 
represent 'one of the great turning points in the history of the world'.3 
T h e reason, as Morgenthau saw it, was that this decolonization process 
was inextricably linked to the decline of Europe which, on the foundations 
of the colonial system, had been able to establish its undisputed dominance 
in and over the modern international system. T o extend this line of 
argument, a significant international systemic consequence of de-
colonization was that it brought in its train a situation wherein the 
overwhelming majority of the world's peoples, hitherto subordinated 
politically, were n o w better able to establish formal bilateral and multi-
lateral ties a m o n g themselves and with others while, in the process, 
challenging certain traditional assumptions of international intercourse 
and seeking a restructuring of relevant procedures and foundations. 
T h e purpose of this chapter is to explore from an African perspective 
h o w , and to some extent why, this challenge from the Third World arose 
and evolved in the post-Second World W a r period (especially since the 
1950s) through to around 1980. It seeks to identify broad trends and 
processes in an evolutionary perspective, which shed light on the widening 
and deepening of Africa's links with the rest of the Third World and which 
highlight Africa's presence and impact in the initiation and extension of 
Third-World collaborative processes. 
Africa's Third-World condition and significance 
Broaching, at this stage, some objective political, economic, racial and 
cultural characteristics of the African condition, past and present, will 
better help to establish Africa's situational and behavioural significance 
within the Third-World arena. This significance derives from the typical 
Third-World traumas which Africa's presence represents, often in exag-
gerated form, as well as from the accompanying impetus from Africa to 
mobilize the Third-World challenge against the international status quo. 
T w o political considerations immediately spring to mind. T h e first is 
that the m o m e n t u m towards Africa's decolonization which m o v e d to a 
n e w and heightened stage with Ghana's attainment of independence in 
1957 - the first such experience in sub-Saharan Africa - coincided in 
time with (and indeed catalysed) the take-off stage of the Third-World 
movement beyond the foundations laid at the Asian-African Conference 
held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 (hereafter called the Bandung 
Conference) (Table 28.3 below). Secondly, the proliferation of African 
state actors in the aftermath of the decolonization process established a 
commanding African numerical presence in Third-World and other 
international institutions, which helped to ascribe a global salience to 
3. H . J. Morgenthau, 1973, p. 351. 
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T A B L E 28.1 Regional composition of the United Nations, igtfSo 
Year Africa' Asiah Caribbean" Latin- North Europe0 Oceania' Total 
America America 
1945 
1950 
1955 
I959f 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
4 
4 
5 
10 
37 
42 
47 
51 
9 
16 
21 
23 
28 
30 
37 
40 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
7 
10 
13 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
14 
16 
26 
26 
27 
27 
29 
29 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
51 
60 
76 
82 
118 
127 
144 
154 
* T h e four founding members were Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa. 
b
 Including the Middle East and islands in the Pacific; also including Cyprus and Turkey. 
c
 The islands in the Caribbean archipelago plus the independent mainland political 'extensions' of 
Guyana and Suriname. 
d
 T h e entry of nine already independent European countries in 1955 was the result of a package 
deal resolving East-West controversies about the qualifications of Germany's Second World W a r 
allies as well as certain new post-war East-European communist regimes. West and East Germany 
were admitted separately in 1973. 
' Australia and N e w Zealand. 
' In 1958 the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria - both original 
members of the U N - and continued as a single member state, which is reflected in this 1959 
column's total membership of 82 but not in the regional breakdown which counts them separately 
under Africa and Asia respectively. In 1961 Syria resumed its separate membership. 
Africa-related concerns within a Third-World framework. 
T h e latter is well illustrated in Table 28.1, portraying the regional 
composition of the United Nations from 1945 to 1980. African-ruled 
states which in 1945 accounted for three (or less than 6 per cent) of the 
51 founding members of the United Nations, by 1980 had risen to 50 
(or 32.5 per cent) of the 154-member body.4 
Patterns of membership or participation in certain other international 
organizations are similarly revealing. For example, African representation 
at the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference in 1961 was already 
prominent with 11 (or 44 per cent) of the 25 fully-fledged participants; 
by the time of the Sixth Non-Aligned S u m m i t in 1979, Africa's 50 
delegations comprised 54 per cent of the 92 full members in attendance 
(Table 28.4 below). African representation in the Group of 77 has 
remained fairly constant at approximately 41 per cent, beginning with 32 
of the 77 founding members in 1964 and by 1980 accounting for 50 of 
the Group's 122 members (Table 28.5 below). 
But beyond such quantitative indices of Africa's commanding Third-
World presence, lie some important qualitative aspects of the African 
4 . White-ruled South Africa, a founding m e m b e r of the United Nations, is excluded 
from this computation of the presence of African-ruled states in the U N . 
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T A B L E 28.2 Location of the LDCs (least developed countries), ig8i 
Africa Asia Caribbean Total 
Haiti Benin 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mali 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Uganda 
Upper Volta 
Tanzania 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Laos 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Samoa 
Yemen Arab 
Republic 
Yemen (People's 
Democratic 
Republic) 
Total 21 31 
Source: H . Lopes and H . C . Tri, 1981. These authors point out that the criteria adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1971 for defining the L D C s were: 
'a very low level of per capita income - barely $200 per person and per year in 1979 -
as against an average of $700 in the developing countries taken as a whole and $8000 in 
market-economy industrialized countries; a gross domestic product ( G D P ) in which the 
industrial's sector's contribution is 10 per cent or less - against 19 per cent in the 
developing countries as a whole; a literacy rate of 20 per cent or less.' T h e original list 
of 25 L D C s rose to 31 by the turn of the 1980s. 
condition. T h e international economic arena is the first place to begin 
since it is here where the Third World's concerns are largely focused and 
it is here where post-colonial Africa mirrors most clearly persisting Third-
World traumas, dilemmas and predicaments. 
A case in point, as documented in Table 28.2, is that easily the largest 
number of L D C s (least developed countries) are to be found on the 
African continent.5 W h a t is more , in the words of the O A U (Organization 
of African Unity), ' T h e effect of unfulfilled promises of global develop-
ment strategies has been more sharply felt in Africa than in other countries 
of the world'.6 
Such was the language of the opening paragraph of the Preamble to 
the now-historic Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of 
5. These L D C s - the preferred usage in this chapter - are sometimes labelled L L D C s 
by certain writers w h o would thus assign the L D C classification to the rest of the Third 
World. 
6. Organization of African Unity, 1981, para. 1. 
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Africa, 1Ç80-2000, adopted by the O A U in 1980. Submitting 'that Africa's 
underdevelopment is not inevitable', and that such a condition was indeed 
'a paradox w h e n one bears in mind the immense h u m a n and natural 
resources of the continent', the O A U proceeded to identify the causes as 
largely residing in the structure of international exploitation: 
T h u s Africa, despite all efforts m a d e by its leaders, remains the least 
developed continent. It has 20 to 21 least developed countries of the 
world. Africa is susceptible to the disastrous effects of natural and 
endemic diseases of the crudest type and is victim of settler exploi-
tation arising from colonialism, racism and apartheid. Indeed, Africa 
was directly exploited during the colonial period and for the past 
two decades this exploitation has been carried out through neo-
colonialist external forces which seek to influence the economic 
policies and directions of African States.7 
In this statement on the African economic condition are embedded 
certain political and associated racial and cultural humiliations visited on 
Africa during the colonial period, with residues even today, as in apartheid 
South Africa. This is another important qualitative dimension of Africa's 
situation within the Third-World setting. 
It is not insignificant that in his closing address at the Bandung 
Conference, India's prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru - by then recognized 
as one of the most influential leaders in the emerging Third-World 
movement - saw fit to emphasize Africa's exceptional political and racial 
burdens which he counselled his fellow Asians to place prominently on 
their agenda of concern: 
W e have passed resolutions about conditions in this or that country. 
But I think there is nothing more terrible than the infinite tragedy 
of Africa in the past few hundred years. Everything else pales into 
insignificance w h e n I think of the infinite tragedy of Africa ever 
since the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley 
slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys. 
W e must accept responsibility for it, all of us, even though w e 
ourselves were not directly involved. But unfortunately, in a different 
sense, even n o w the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any 
other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to 
help Africa to the best of her ability because w e are sister continents.8 
T h e race-sensitive underpinnings of the early phases of the Afro-Asian 
movement - which were to provide the foundation for a wider Third-
World m o v e m e n t - were largely a consequence of the African situation. 
T h e continuing presence and arrogance of racist South Africa has projected 
this racial dimension as a Third-World m o v e m e n t priority, not only in 
7. ibid., paras 5-6. 
8. J. Nehru, 1964, p. 19. 
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terms of what apartheid represents objectively to a largely non-white 
Third World but also because, through African diplomatic persistence, 
the issue became lodged in the forefront of Third-World movement 
concern.9 
While the Bandung Conference of 1955 is the most appropriate starting 
point for this examination of Africa's relations with the developing regions, 
certain pre-Bandung factors and forces conditioning the subsequent 
emergence of the Third-World movement should be recognized, since 
these bear centrally on Africa's location and role in the international 
system of at least the past century. 
Reaching further back into history, the late-nineteenth-century partition 
of Africa is critically important as an explanation and measure of the 
eventual consideration of Western-world dominance which simultaneously 
resulted in what Lenin aptly characterized as 'the partition of the world'. 
T h u s the creation of the Third World - in the objective sense of its 
structured subordination, in contradistinction to its subjective recognition 
as a self-conscious transformative force - is directly an outgrowth of the 
dominant political, economic, cultural and racial forces whose late-
nineteenth-century ascendancy was best underlined in Africa's formal 
subjugation which completed the processes of wider Third-World sub-
ordination. 
In that historical situation it is not surprising that long before the 
'Third World' came to be recognized as such, its eventual rise and 
challenge were anticipated in certain pan-African circles, as was the case 
at the First Pan-African Conference of 1900, held in London , which in 
its 'Address to the Nations of the World' had this to say: 
In any case, the modern world must remember that in this age w h e n 
the ends of the world are being brought so near together the millions 
of black m e n in Africa, America and the Islands of the Sea, not to 
speak of the brown and yellow myriads elsewhere, are bound to have 
a great influence upon the world in the future, by reason of sheer 
numbers and physical contact.10 
So, too, a decade before the Bandung Conference, w e find the Fifth 
Pan-African Congress of 1945, held in Manchester, England, not only 
anticipating the rise of the Third-World movement but also formulating 
anti-colonial and post-colonial liberationist ideologies of a kind which 
9. M . El-Khawas, 1971. 
10. This 'Address' is reprinted in full in V . P. T h o m p s o n , 1969, pp. 319-21. At this 
First Pan-African Conference, where the word 'Pan-African' was first formally used, the 
approximately 30 participants from Africa and the African diaspora, while addressing 
black-world conditions generally, were especially concerned about recently consolidating 
patterns of European colonial and racial domination on the African continent, especially 
in Southern Africa. 
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subsequently came to underpin the Third-World challenge." This was 
evident in its 'Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World1, authored 
by K w a m e N k r u m a h , the congress's joint political secretary, inciting 
colonized workers, farmers, intellectuals and professionals everywhere to 
defeat imperialism and, in its concluding message, urging that 'Colonial 
and Subject Peoples of the World - Unite'.12 
Even more expressive of such pan-African notions of wider Third-
World solidarity was this resolution of the 1945 congress - as summarized 
by George Padmore, its other joint political secretary - couched in 
language which came to be characteristic of the formative years of the 
Non-AIigned M o v e m e n t over a decade later: 
Congress also expressed the hope that before long, the peoples of 
Asia and Africa would have broken their centuries-old chains of 
colonialism. T h e n , as free nations, they would stand united to 
consolidate and safeguard their liberties and independence from 
the restoration of Western imperialism as well as the danger of 
C o m m u n i s m . 1 3 
Such were the situational and ideological antecedents of post-colonial 
Africa's contribution to developing Third-World thought and practice in 
the pre-Bandung era. In reviewing this latter period it is, of course, 
hazardous to generalize, as w e must, about the foreign policies and 
international-relations orientations of independent Africa's numerous pol-
itical entities. But this problem is partially mitigated because of certain 
factors arising within the context of the developments being addressed in 
this chapter. 
For one thing, the rise within the United Nations of an African 
caucusing group in the late 1950s and the establishment of the Organ-
ization of African Unity ( O A U ) in 1963 were symptoms as well as 
facilitators of Africa's search for c o m m o n positions on matters affecting 
the continent as a whole. This process has not always proceeded smoothly, 
as testified by numerous cleavages and divisions which have arisen within 
the O A U , at times posing serious threats to its survival. But less 
fundamental intra-African cleavages have been manifested on Third-
11. Convened in Manchester, England, in October 1945, this Fifth Pan-African 
Congress, unlike its predecessors in the inter-war years which sought amelioration of 
colonial conditions, explicitly proclaimed the goal of the liquidation of colonialism. 
Prominent African participants included K w a m e N k r u m a h and J o m o Kenyatta, w h o later 
were to lead their countries, Ghana and Kenya respectively, to independence. See 
G . Padmore, 1963, for the official account of the Congress's proceedings. 
12. K . Nkrumah, 1962, pp. 44-5; G . Padmore, 1963, pp. 6-7. Emphases supplied by 
the present writer to draw attention to the striking fact that the Declaration's language is 
couched throughout in universal colonial terms, including no specific mention of Africa 
anywhere in its text. 
13. G . Padmore, 1956, pp. 168-9. 
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World-related issues per se, involving Africa's interests as a developing 
region alongside those of the remaining Third-World countries. 
This suggestion is corroborated in Nweke's comprehensive study, The 
Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955-1975, which concludes 
that while, on the one hand, 'the larger the involvement of the great 
powers in African conflicts, the lower the level of harmonization a m o n g 
African states', on the other hand 'it can be said that harmonization tends 
to be highest w h e n African states join the rest of the Third World in 
negotiating with the great or industrial powers'.14 
Despite some inevitable intra-African differences over ideologies, poli-
cies and priorities pertinent to Third-World causes, these in the final 
analysis have been outweighed by commonalities in their perception of 
relevant fundamental problems and needs, thus allowing the holistic view 
of African interests and behaviour which informs the present analysis. A 
remarkable degree of African solidarity on the basics of the Third-World 
situation and challenge has indeed proved to be a crucial underpinning 
of the Third-World movement . 
A s is being implied, certain objective realities of the African condition, 
past and present, are so poignant with wider Third-World challenges as 
to constitute one distinctive dimension of analysis. But this also constitutes 
a point of departure for the next stage of identifying the subjective feelings 
and aspirations to which such objective realities have given rise, inspiring 
independent Africa to seek to extend its ties to other Third-World regions 
and to play its part in organizing the Third-World assault on the 
international status quo. 
Africa's ties with other Third-World regions 
Afro-Asianism, as the very term implies, is the logical starting point of any 
exploration of Africa's ties with other Third-World areas. But subsumed 
under this broad Afro-Asian setting is the special case of Africa's relations 
with the Arab world, a focus which will be seen to be deserving of attention 
in its o w n right. Finally, as shall be demonstrated, the context and content of 
expanding interactions between Africa and the Latin American/Caribbean 
regions have been significant manifestations of a maturing sense of Third-
World identity broadened beyond its Afro-Asian foundations. 
Afro-Asianism as T h i r d - W o r l d foundation: from the spirit of 
B a n d u n g to T h i r d - W o r l d solidarity 
A s illustrated in the title of Rupert Emerson's comprehensive 1962 
study, the post-First World W a r and especially post-Second World W a r 
14. G . A. Nweke, 1980, pp. 263 and 265. 
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phenomenon of the movement away ' F r o m Empire to Nation' is largely 
the story of 'the rise to self-assertion of Asian and African peoples', with 
all the parallels and reciprocities in their respective and cumulative 
struggles for self-determination.15 
This developing mutuality of interests between the colonized of Africa 
and Asia, which as documented by David K i m c h e had been manifest 
from time to time in the inter-war years,'6 was to mature significantly in 
the aftermath of the Second World W a r , eventually transcending the 
colonial experience to lay the post-colonial foundations of the Third-
World movement . T h e impact of the Afro-Asian decolonization processes 
on a burgeoning commonality of interests between these two regions can 
be viewed at five levels. 
First, the proximity of both anti-colonial struggles in terms of timing, 
and some critical colonial actors (notably Britain and France) present in 
both settings, necessarily sensitized Africans and Asians to parallels and 
commonalities in their colonial experience. T h u s are explained, for 
example, the 'fraternal greetings' and pledges of solidarity communicated 
by the Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945 to 'the toiling masses of India' 
and to 'the struggling peoples of Indonesia and Viet N a m " 7 as well as 
that congress's generalized hope for continuing anti-colonial and post-
colonial Afro-Asian solidarity which w e cited previously. 
Secondly, contributing to such awareness of the bonds between the 
colonized of Africa and Asia was the presence in parts of eastern and 
southern Africa - not to mention Africa's island communities in the 
Indian Ocean - of significant concentrations of peoples of Asian descent 
experiencing alongside Africans the impositions of European domination. 
This is best illustrated in the experience of the historically persistent 
phenomenon of racism in South Africa which inspired over the years a 
range of parallel or convergent African and Asian challenges arising within 
or beyond the African continent. 
For example, it was in South Africa, where he lived from 1893 to 
1914, that M a h a t m a Gandhi initially developed his political technique of 
civil disobedience - Satyragraha - applying and refining it throughout a 
prolonged seven-year struggle by South Africa's Indian community against 
racism (1906-13), before taking it back to India eventually to undermine 
the colonial system. T h e government of India's 1946 complaint before 
the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, protesting 
against certain racist policies of the South African government being then 
targeted at the Indian community there, can thus be viewed as another 
milestone in this chain of converging experiences of oppression and 
struggle a m o n g Asians and Africans in South Africa. 
15. R. Emerson, 1962. 
16. D . Kimche, 1973, ch. 1, pp. 1-16. 
17. G . Padmore, 1963, p. 67. 
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This was indeed explicitly recognized in the Fifth Pan-African C o n -
gress's 1945 resolution to the United Nations, applauding the anticipated 
protest by the government of India and demanding 'justice and social 
equality for the Indian community in South Africa' w h o 'suffer dis-
crimination in a similar manner' to Africans. T h e Bandung Conference 
participants were similarly motivated a decade later in extending their 
' w a r m sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the 
victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African and 
Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa'. 
Thirdly, as symbolized in the title of D . A . L o w ' s essay, ' T h e Asian 
mirror to tropical Africa's independence', the earlier mobilization and 
successes of Asian anti-colonial struggles came to have a powerful effect 
in Africa, concretely because 'the imperial groups in tropical Africa 
were loosened by the immediately preceding upheavals in Asia',18 and 
inspirationally in boosting African nationalist assertiveness. 
Fourthly, in the process or as a result of their anti-colonial liberation 
struggles, organizational linkages were at times forged between these 
African and Asian enemies of empire. A n early case in point was the 
1927 conference in Brussels, convened by the League Against Imperialism 
and Colonialism, in which m a n y Asian and African nationalists (including 
India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Vietnam's H o Chi M i n h and Senegal's Lamine 
Senghor) were involved. Significantly, Indonesian President Sukarno in 
his opening address at the 1955 Bandung Conference, alluded to this 
1927 Brussels conference as a precursor of sorts,19 a notion extended more 
recently in Kimche's unqualified assertion that the Brussels meeting was 
'the father of Afro-Asian solidarity, the forerunner of the conference at 
Bandung'.2 0 
Fifthly, c o m m o n Afro-Asian sensitivities to colonial domination did 
not cease on the attainment of political independence. Not only did the 
newly independent countries collaborate to terminate remaining vestiges 
of colonialism elsewhere in their regions, but they also organized to 
protect, project and enhance their newly acquired freedom. 
T h e formation of the Asian-African (later renamed Afro-Asian) group 
within the United Nations in 1950, the Bandung Conference of 1955, 
and the launching of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization in 
1957, were the major Afro-Asian precursors and foundations of the wider 
Third-World movement initiated in the early 1960s. O f these, the Bandung 
18. D . A. Low, 1982, p. 28. 
19. Sukarno, while admitting that the 1927 Brussels conference (which m a n y Bandung 
delegates had attended) had given 'new strength in their fight for independence', proceeded 
to draw important distinctions between that earlier meeting (held 'in a foreign country' 
and 'convened by necessity'), and the Bandung Conference ('assembled . . . by choice' 
by 'free, sovereign and independent' ex-colonies 'in our o w n house'). See text of Sukarno's 
speech in R . Abdulgani, 1981, pp. 169-80. 
20. D . Kimche , 1973, p. 5. 
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T A B L E 28.3 Countries participating in the Asian-African Conference, 
Bandung, Indonesia, 18-24 April iç^S 
Asian countries (23)* African 
countries (6)h 
Afghanistan 
Burma* 
Cambodia 
Ceylon* 
China (People's 
Republic) 
Indonesia* 
Iran 
Iraq 
Japan 
Jordan 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Nepal 
Pakistan* 
Philippines 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Vietnam (North) 
Vietnam (South) 
Yemen 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Gold Coast 
Liberia 
Libya 
Sudan 
•Sponsoring countries. 
* After deliberating on whether the remaining independent states in Asia (Israel, 
Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea) should be invited, the five sponsors agreed on a 
case-by-case basis not to do so because of various political complications their attendance 
might pose. Once consideration was given to inviting the People's Republic of China, this 
set to rest any thought of inviting Taiwan. 
b
 African representation included two non-independent but internally self-governing 
countries, the Gold Coast (which became independent as Ghana in 1957) and the Sudan 
(which attained independence in 1956). T h e Central African Federation (then comprising 
the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland) although under white-minority rule, was invited, but 
it declined. South Africa was not invited. 
Conference is the most appropriate starting point of analysis.21 
A s indicated in Table 28.3, the Asian-African Conference convened in 
Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, under the sponsorship of five Asian 
states (Burma - n o w M y a n m a r , Ceylon - n o w Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan), involved the participation of 29 countries, 6 African and 23 
Asian. Its declared purposes, as stated in a December 1954 communiqué 
issued by the sponsoring countries, were: 
1. to promote goodwill and co-operation a m o n g the nations of Asia 
and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as c o m m o n 
interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly 
relations; 
2. to consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations 
of the countries represented; 
3. to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African 
2i. See G . H . Jansen, 1966, and P. Queuille, 1965, generally on Afro-Asian relations 
leading up to Bandung. Specifically on the immediate origins of and proceedings at the 
Bandung Conference, see R . Abdulgani, 1981; A . Appadorai, 1956; G . M . Kahin, 1956; 
D . Kimche, 1973, chs 3-4, pp. 29-^79. 
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peoples, for example, problems affecting national sovereignty and 
of racialism and colonialism; and 
4. to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the 
world of today and the contribution they can make to the 
promotion of world peace and co-operation. 
T h e Asian presence at Bandung was unquestionably dominant, in terms 
of sponsors, location and range of participants. T h e low level of African 
representation was due simply to the fact that at that time only a 
handful of African countries were politically independent. Indeed, the 
qualifications for participation at Bandung were stretched to include two 
African colonies - the Sudan and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) - then 
on the verge of acquiring independence, a concession without which 
Africa's presence would have been significantly reduced from six to four. 
But some accounts of the conference have by other means accomplished 
an even greater reduction of African representation at Bandung by 
misleadingly identifying only three 'African' participants (Ethiopia, Gold 
Coast, Liberia) while classifying the other three (Egypt, Libya and Sudan) 
separately as part of an exclusive nine-member 'Arab' contingent.2* 
In at least two respects Africa's presence and impact at Bandung was 
less insignificant than its minimal representation would suggest. First 
there was the 'decisive contribution' m a d e by Egypt's Gamäl ' A b d al-
Nasser in the drafting committees, leading one analyst to label him as 
'the hero of Bandung'.*3 W h a t is more, al-Nasser's Bandung exposure 
and performance paved the way for his rapid emergence as one of the 
most prominent architects and leaders of the burgeoning Third-World 
movement. 
Secondly, Africa's impact on the Bandung proceedings was registered 
in the importance assigned to h u m a n rights and self-determination issues 
on that continent, especially as these bore on institutionalized racism. For 
example, in the conference's final communiqué, colonial developments in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were addressed on two separate occasions; 
racial discrimination in Africa generally was cited as a prime example of 
the suppression under colonialism of the national cultures of dependent 
22. This misleading portrayal of Africa's representation at Bandung appears, for 
example, in R . Abdulgani, 198t, p. 39; G . H . Jansen, 1966, p. 223; D . Kimche, 1973, 
pp. 238 and 248 (note 1), w h o eventually qualifies his initial suggestion of three African 
participants to read 'three African states south of the Sahara'. This is, of course, a matter 
of interest and concern to African historiography, which for a long time suffered from a 
reluctance to include North Africa within a holistic African continental framework of 
analysis. 
23. G . H . Jansen, 1966, p. 223. See also R . Abdulgani, 1981, pp . 48 and 160-1 on al-
Nasser's crucial role, as chairman of the session on peaceful coexistence, in resolving 
serious differences and proposing compromise wording on this, the conference's 'thorniest 
issue' - considered elsewhere by India's Prime Minister Nehru as 'the most important 
declaration of the Conference' (J. Nehru, 1964, p. 21). 
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peoples; and racial discrimination in South Africa was highlighted as a 
special case of the denial of h u m a n rights. 
In addition to resolutions on 'cultural co-operation', ' h u m a n rights' 
and 'self-determination', and the 'problems of dependent peoples', from 
which the foregoing illustrations are drawn, the communiqué contained 
other substantive resolutions on 'economic co-operation' and 'the pro-
motion of world peace and co-operation', with the latter subject also 
constituting a separate declaration. This assessment captures well the 
conference's accomplishments and legacies: 
Bandung was in essence a celebration of the wave of independence 
that swept across Asia and was then cresting in Africa. T h e very act 
of bringing together the first generation of nationalist leaders created 
an unprecedented sentiment of Third World change and potential. 
Bandung thus became the symbol of a goal . . . [and] pointed to the 
two principles that have remained the foundation of Third World 
solidarity, decolonization and economic development.24 
A s the most important organized expression of Afro-Asianism, the 
Bandung spirit in the immediate aftermath helped to boost other parallel 
ventures (such as the Afro-Asian caucus in the United Nations) and to 
inspire the initiation of others (such as the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity 
Organization). 
T h e Asian-African group which first emerged in the United Nations 
General Assembly in December 1950, during the Korean crisis, had 
continued to meet thereafter on an informal basis. It was in the aftermath 
of the Bandung Conference and the Suez crisis of 1956 - w h e n Britain, 
France and Israel temporarily occupied the Suez Canal, recently nation-
alized by President al-Nasser - that the group acquired sufficient cohesion 
and permanence to be more formally recognized as a caucusing group. 
After i960 there was a shift in nomenclature from Asian-African group 
to Afro-Asian group, 'indicative of the increased African influence' in this 
caucus.25 
A s can be seen in Table 28.1, this increased African influence was 
manifested in a remarkable expansion of African membership in the 
United Nations after 1959, the year i960 being the critical turning point 
w h e n , with the admission of 16 newly independent states, African 
representation came to surpass that of Asia (as well as Latin America) 
for the first time. 
T h e impact of the Afro-Asian group on a range of United Nations' 
issues and processes through the 1950s and 1960s has been extensively 
analysed by D . N . Sharma.26 Especially relevant to our present purposes is 
24. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, p. 9. 
25. D . Kay, 1970, p. 26. 
26. D . N . Sharma, 1969. 
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the impact it had during these first two decades of its existence in bringing 
United Nations concern, influence and pressure to bear on two matters of 
fundamental concern to African states, namely, the general issue of decolon-
ization - which is the subject of Y . El-Ayouty's comprehensive study27 -
and the specific problems of racism cum colonialism in Southern Africa.28 
T h e adoption by the U N General Assembly in December i960 of the 
historic 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial C o u n -
tries and Peoples'29 sponsored by 43 Afro-Asian states, signalled dra-
matically the arrival of this newly reorganized and expanded Afro-Asian 
group in the United Nations system. Proclaiming 'the necessity of bringing 
to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations', the Declaration - in language reminiscent of the anti-
colonial censures by the Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945, the Bandung 
Conference of 1955 and the First Conference of Independent African 
States of 195830 - condemned colonialism as 'a denial of fundamental 
h u m a n rights' and 'an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
cooperation', and stipulated that 'immediate steps' be taken 'to transfer 
all powers to the peoples' living under colonialism'. 
It was no mere happenstance that the Declaration's adoption coincided 
with the admission of 16 new African m e m b e r states in the United 
Nations almost three months earlier, which thus significantly boosted the 
Afro-Asian presence and impact in that organization. W h a t is more, the 
Declaration's timing was most appropriate in view of the fact that by 
i960 colonialism, while largely eradicated from Asia, was still in place in 
m a n y parts of Africa. 
A follow-up resolution by the U N General Assembly a year later, 
establishing a Special Committee to oversee the implementation of the 
i960 Declaration,31 was a further consequence of Afro-Asian resolve to 
27. Y . El-Ayouty, 1971. See also D . Kay, 1970, ch. 6, pp. 146-80; D . N . Sharma, 
1969, ch. 6, pp. 196-256. 
28. M . El-Khawas, 1971; D . Kay, 1970, pp. 54-80; D . N . Sharma, 1969, ch. 7, pp. 
257-3°3-
29. U N General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December i960, adopted by a 
vote of 89 in favour, none against and 9 abstentions (Australia, Belgium, France, Dominican 
Republic, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States). 
30. T h e Fifth Pan-African Congress's 'Declaration to Colonial Peoples of the World' 
insisted that 'All colonies must be free from imperialist control'; the Bandung Conference's 
communiqué asserted that 'Colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should 
be speedily brought to an end'; the First Conference of Independent African States 
(comprising Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United 
Arab Republic), meeting in Accra, in the year following Ghana's independence, condemned 
colonialism as a 'threat . . . to world peace' and called for 'rapid steps', including a 
'definite date' in each instance, for the termination of colonial rule. 
31. U N General Assembly Resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, adopted by 
a vote of 97 in favour, none against, 4 abstentions (France, South Africa, Spain, United 
Kingdom) and 1 not participating (Portugal). 
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dictate the ideology and institutionalize the direction of U N anti-colonial 
commitment and activity thereafter. 
Similarly, the problems of racism cum colonialism in Southern 
Africa by the turn of the 1960s assumed a heightened salience in U N 
processes, thanks to the intensification of Afro-Asian pressure. T h e 
time was n o w appropriate to build on and expand earlier Afro-Asian 
initiatives, dating back to the first session of the U N General Assembly 
in 1946. 
T h e question of South Africa's racial policies was first placed on the 
U N agenda in 1946, two years before the formal inauguration of apartheid 
with the 1948 electoral victory of the National Party, the instrument of 
Afrikaaner nationalism. This was in the form of a complaint by the 
government of India - which although not attaining its political inde-
pendence until 1947 had been admitted as a founding m e m b e r of the 
U N in 1945 - protesting against the South African government's recent 
enactment of discriminatory legislation targeted specifically against South 
Africans of Indian origin. Joined by Pakistan in 1947 (following Pakistan's 
separate independence and U N membership), both Asian states continued 
thereafter to keep this question before the United Nations. In a parallel 
development in 1952, 13 Afro-Asian m e m b e r states (Afghanistan, B u r m a , 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Y e m e n ) placed on the General Assembly's agenda 
the wider question of racial conflicts arising from the policies of the 
apartheid regime, then in its fourth year in power. 
Despite the preliminary reservations or outright opposition of certain 
Western powers in bringing such matters of presumed 'domestic jur-
isdiction' before the United Nations, the stage was set for a mounting 
condemnation of apartheid through the 1950s and for the two parallel 
Afro-Asian challenges to merge within the more comprehensive U N 
assault on apartheid launched in the early 1960s. 
Complementing other burgeoning Afro-Asian and wider Third-World 
initiatives on Southern African regional problems in general, the Afro-
Asian caucusing group while functioning at the peak of its visibility and 
influence in the 1960s was instrumental in catalysing some significant 
United Nations' institutional developments. 
A case in point was the U N Security Council's implementation in 1963 
of a voluntary embargo against the supply of arms to the government of 
South Africa (later strengthened to become mandatory in 1977). Also, 
there was the example of the Security Council's imposition of selective 
mandatory sanctions (1966) and later comprehensive sanctions (1968) 
against the minority racist regime in Rhodesia which had unilaterally 
declared its independence from the United K i n g d o m in 1965, precipitating 
a 15-year struggle culminating in the establishment of independent 
Zimbabwe under African rule in 1980. 
A third instance of the Afro-Asian caucus's impact was in mobilizing 
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the U N General Assembly in 1966 to terminate the League of Nations 
Mandate over South-West Africa - following South Africa's prolonged 
betrayal of that responsibility - and in 1968 to rename that country as 
Namibia, which set the stage for the Security Council to declare in 1970, 
and for the International Court of Justice to ratify in 1971, that South 
Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal and should be terminated. 
Finally, not the least significant of such illustrative developments was the 
establishment by the General Assembly in 1962 of the Special Committee 
Against Apartheid for the purpose of keeping South Africa's racial policies 
under constant review. 
Another important institutional expression of Afro-Asianism catalysed 
by the experience of Bandung was the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity 
Organization ( A A P S O ) , established in Cairo in 1957.32 Strongly supported 
by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the Á A P S O was 
composed of a variety of complementary group interests - at least at the outset 
- from the Afro-Asian world as well as from the socialist block countries. 
Radical Afro-Asian nationalism superseded international socialism as 
A A P S O ' s driving force, due in large measure to the fact that 'Nasser 
was careful to keep the organizational controls in Egyptian hands'.33 
Additionally, as suggested in the choice of sites for its four plenary 
conferences (in Egypt, 1957; Guinea, i960; Tanzania, 1963; Ghana , 1965), 
'radical African states gave the greatest backing to A A P S O ' . 3 4 
A n important aspect of the organization's role is that it not only served 
to enhance al-Nasser's Afro-Asian leadership credentials, but it also 
provided yet another base for him to emerge as a major architect of a wider 
Third-World movement . Another significant feature was that A A P S O 
represented a non-governmental organizational parallel to the efforts being 
pursued by Afro-Asian states to build a measure of solidarity, serving in 
the process to broaden and popularize the ethos of Afro-Asianism in these 
formative years. T h u s , in addition to providing a meeting place for a 
variety of political groups and movements not necessarily affiliated to 
ruling establishments, numerous conferences were organized by A A P S O 
between 1956 and 1965 involving Afro-Asian professionals and specialists 
in a range of endeavours such as medicine, law, journalism, creative 
writing, economics, social welfare, rural development, w o m e n and youth 
affairs. 
A A P S O began to decline by the mid-1960s - surviving as a shadow of 
its former self through the 1970s - due in part to the destabilizing impact 
of Sino-Soviet rivalries on its internal processes. But its longer-run 
legacies have remained; first, in helping in a critical formative period to 
32. T h e most detailed studies of A A P S O are D . Kimche , 1968; and 1973, chs 7-10, 
pp. 126-213. 
33. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, p. 10. 
34. ibid., p. 11. 
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advance the Afro-Asian foundations for a wider Third-World movement; 
and, secondly, in directly contributing to that transition by giving birth to 
the parallel Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization 
(better k n o w n as the Tri-Continental Solidarity Organization) founded 
under A A P S O ' s auspices in Havana, C u b a , in 1966. 
A n important ingredient of emergent Afro-Asianism, deserving of 
recognition in its o w n right, was India's special relationship with Africa, 
which has indeed been alluded to a n u m b e r of times in our previous 
analysis.35 This was rooted initially in the catalytic impact of the Indian 
independence movement on African nationalism and the inspiration 
furnished organizationally by the Indian National Congress and indi-
vidually by M a h a t m a Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru in their anti-colonial 
struggles. 
Nehru proceeded to have an even greater impact on the cementing of 
mutual interests and ties in the post-colonial period. This was partly a 
function of his o w n profound sensitivity to Africa's political and racial 
burdens - 'the infinite tragedy of Africa' as he put it at the Bandung 
Conference, thus re-echoing a theme he had broached almost a decade 
earlier w h e n , at the Asian Relations Conference in N e w Delhi in 1947, 
he spoke of 'our suffering brethren in Africa' and of Asia's 'special 
responsibility' to assist the African freedom-struggle. 
At more concrete levels, Nehru was instrumental in the shaping of 
institutional arenas for a consolidation and projection of India's and 
Africa's mutual interests — whether in the Afro-Asian movement of the 
1950s which he spearheaded, or in the Third-World movement of the 
early 1960s for which he was a catalyst, or in the former British 
Commonweal th which he helped significantly to transform into a n e w 
multi-racial Commonweal th . 
A s noted previously, the presence in parts of Africa of significant 
communities of Indian descent has catered to this sense of a special 
relationship. W e have already illustrated h o w , in the case of South Africa, 
this served to strengthen the bonds of solidarity between India and Africa 
in their mutual interest in the elimination oí apartheid, in which connection 
it is of significance that India was the first country in the world to break 
off diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa in the early 
1950s. A n d while in parts of East Africa friction has at times surfaced in 
the domestic relations between Africans and Asians,36 this has not seemed 
35. O n India's special relationship with Africa, see Indian National Congress, 1976; 
Indian Council for Africa, 1967; A . A . Mazrui, 1977, ch. 6, pp. 114-29; J. Nehru, 1964; 
R . L . Park, 1965; R . R . Ramchandani, 1980; M . J. Zins, 1983. 
36. See R . R . Ramchandani, 1980, pp. 171-94, in which Ramchandani's o w n essay, 
'Indians in East Africa: past experiences and future prospects,' convincingly argues that 
occasional friction between Africans and Asians in East Africa is embedded in the socio-
economic and socio-racial inheritances and structures which arose essentially from warped 
colonial patterns of development. 
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sufficient to affect adversely those countries' relations with India. 
If this special relationship seemed to have weakened somewhat after 
the mid-1960s, it was due not to any inherent problems but to wider 
transformations in the international system. Part of the reason seemed to 
lie in the decline of India's influence in the Third World, especially after 
Nehru's death in 1964. But as A H Mazrui has observed, it 'has not been 
so m u c h a case of the decline of India in absolute terms, but simply a 
restoration of balance in her stature in the Third World' relative to the 
'exceptional level of diplomatic and political influence' attained under 
Nehru.3 7 
Conversely, the more that there came to be a diversification and spread 
of critical Third-World centres of influence, including some on the African 
continent itself, this automatically modified the earlier pre-eminence of 
the Indian-African connection. This should not, however, blind us to the 
fact that while since the mid-1960s such relations seemed not to be as 
politically and diplomatically salient as previously, there was in fact a 
widening of links in other less dramatic forms, including increasing 
economic and technical co-operation and expanded cultural and edu-
cational exchanges. 
In any event, the publication, as late as 1976, of a 132-page book by 
the Indian National Congress, India and the African Liberation Struggle, 
charting from M a h a t m a Gandhi to (then prime minister) Indira Gandhi 
a chain of continuity in Indian political concern and involvement in 
African liberation, suggested that the notion of this special relationship 
continued to have a powerful ideological hold. 
A c o m m o n tendency a m o n g analysts of the post-Second World W a r 
phenomenon of Afro-Asianism has been to characterize the period after 
the mid-1960s as one of 'the decline of the Afro-Asian movement' ,3 8 or 
of 'the demise of Afro-Asianism'39 or one in which 'Afro-Asianism is n o w 
officially dead'.40 
T h e unsuccessful effort - aborted in 1965 - to convene a second Afro-
Asian conference, along the lines of Bandung,4 1 is usually cited as a 
primary cause as well as consequence of that decline or demise. Another 
contributory factor and result was an eroding influence of A A P S O by the 
late 1960s, as previously discussed. Additionally, during the 1970s the 
Afro-Asian caucusing group in the United Nations effectively ceased to 
operate. 
O n e of the factors underlying the débâcle of the projected Bandung II 
was that it had in effect been superseded by the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t 
37. A . A . Mazrui, 1977, p. 120. 
38. D . Kimche, 1973, ch. 14, pp. 250-62. 
39. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, pp. 18-22. 
40. P. Willetts, 1978, p. 15. 
41. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, pp. 20-2; F. B . Weinstein, 1965. 
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which had held its first two summit conferences between 1961 and 1964 
(see Table 28.4), as well as by the Group of 77 established in 1964 (see 
Table 28.5). Such transitional developments explain this M a y 1965 
reaction by Senegal's President Leopold Senghor, w h e n asked about the 
feasibility of a second Afro-Asian conference, then still being actively 
mooted by others: 'For m y part, I think Afro-Asianism has been super-
seded, for this form of solidarity should be extended to Latin America 
in particular and to the tiers monde in general.'42 
T h e launching of the Tri-Continental Solidarity Organization under 
A A P S O ' s sponsorship in Havana in 1966 was yet another measure of 
Afro-Asianism reaching beyond its specific geographical confines to forge 
a wider sense of Third-World identity. Also, given the increasing m o b -
ilization of Group of 77 and Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t pressures directly 
within the U N system during the 1970s,43 bearing especially on the search 
for a new international economic order, the most salient of Third-World 
concerns, it is not surprising that in time the Afro-Asian caucusing group 
became superfluous. 
T h u s the apparent failure of Afro-Asianism to survive as a movement 
was in effect a function of its success in serving as the critical catalyst 
and foundation for a wider Third-World coalition, as has indeed been 
admitted by some of those analysts pinpointing the former's decline. It 
is thus more appropriate to speak not of the demise but rather of the 
transformation of Afro-Asianism. 
Africa and the A r a b world: contours in a special relationship 
F r o m 7 to 9 M a r c h 1977, there met in Cairo 'the first conference of the 
Heads of States and Governments of the O A U and the Arab League' in 
which - in the official words of the conference's proceedings — 59 'African 
and Arab countries' met for the purpose of consolidating 'African-Arab' 
(at times alternatively labelled 'Arab-African') co-operation.44 
T h e significance to the present analysis of this officially-styled 'Arab-
African' summit is threefold. For one thing, as the first meeting of its 
kind, it was symptomatic of the attainment during the 1970s of a 
n e w and hitherto unsurpassed widening and deepening of political and 
economic ties between the African and Arab worlds. Secondly, such 
developments bore significantly on a heightening sense of Third-World 
solidarity characteristic of the 1970s, while serving as a reminder of the 
impact on that process of the spirit of Afro-Asianism which has always 
42. L . Senghor, quoted in Africa Diary, 19-25 June 1965, p. 2386. 
43. K . P. Sauvant, 1981, p. 112, Table 12, documents statistically the increasing 
frequency of meetings of both groups within the U N system between 1965 and 1979. 
44. C . Legum, 1977. 
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been underpinned critically by the African world-Arab world nexus.
The third reason has to do with definitions and terminology which
need to be clarified at the outset. Since a number of states are sim¬
ultaneously African and Arab, this has given rise to a situation not of
distinctly separate or mutually exclusive regional definition but of one
characterized by considerable overlap and fusion of the two. This phenom¬
enon indeed lies at the core of a special relationship between the African
and Arab worlds, such terminological differentiations - as were similarly
employed by the 1977 'Arab-African' summit - being thus understood
in the light of the foregoing caveats.
plate 28.1 The Arab League and the Organization ofAfrican Unity Conference, Cairo,
1977
Portraying the range of factors encompassing that special relationship
were these sentiments expressed by the 1977 summit participants who
were profoundly
aware of our numerous links and interests, of the geographical,
historical and cultural factors, of the desire to develop co-operation
in the political, economic and social spheres, and of the requirements
of our joint struggle against all kinds of domination and exploitation.
If changing national, regional and global circumstances from the 1950s
onwards proved more conducive than previously to a search for cementing
meaningful political, economic and social ties for mutual advancement
and development, the predisposing factors of geographical contiguity,
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long-standing historical relationships of over 12 centuries and widespread 
demographic and cultural fusions gave a particular sense of urgency to 
that mission. 
For example, at least 60 (with some estimates running as high as 80) 
per cent of the world's Arab population resides on the African continent. 
It is estimated that one-third of Africa's peoples are Musl im, comprising 
overwhelming majorities not only in North Africa but also in nine sub-
Saharan countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia , Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, Somalia), while accounting for a plurality in another two 
(Chad and Nigeria) and representing a substantial minority of at least 25 
per cent in another seven (Burkina Faso - previously Upper Volta, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania). Additionally, such cultural fusion is manifested in the linguistic 
field since Arabic, Kiswahili and Hausa, 'the most important non-
European languages in the African continent . . . have been deeply 
influenced by Islam'.45 
Such demographic cum cultural ties have assumed significance in the 
structure of certain international organizations. T h e League of Arab 
States - popularly k n o w n as the Arab League - had only one African 
state (Egypt) among its eight founding members in 1945; by 1980, nine 
of the League's 22 members were from Africa, including three non-Arab 
but predominantly Islamic countries (Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia). 
Conversely, the 5 0 - m e m b e r O A U in 1980 included nine Arab League 
states. T h e Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the highest 
Islamic intergovernmental body, founded in 1971, had exactly one half 
of its 1980 membership of 42 drawn from the African continent. 
T h e contours of this special relationship between the African and Arab 
worlds have been sufficiently mapped out in various studies46 to make it 
possible to present the essential outlines. T o start with the 1950s, this 
was a time when there began to emerge a burgeoning compatibility of 
political interests, primarily on the questions of anti-colonialism and non-
alignment. 
T h e heightened decolonization struggles in North Africa in the early 
post-war years, which for the most part preceded sub-Saharan equivalents, 
proved inherently crucial to these maturing ties. Over time these were 
further extended as African decolonization assumed continent-wide pro-
portions, the more so with the prolonged and brutal colonial conflict in 
Algeria - an issue first brought before the United Nations by Saudi 
Arabia in 1955 - and the intractability of the colonial and racist regimes 
in Southern Africa. 
45. A . A . Mazrui, 1977, p. 130. 
46. Z . Cervenka, 1977, ch. 9, pp. 156-75; E . C . Chibwe, 1977; V . T . Le Vine and T . 
W . Luke, 1979; A . A . Mazrui, 1975c, and 1977, ch. 7, pp. 130-55; G . Nicolas, 1978; and 
G . A . N w e k e , 1980, ch. 10, pp. 214-34. 
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With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, accomplished 
through the displacement of Palestinians, notions of non-alignment 
increasingly proved appealing to the Arab world, feeling that its interests 
were being sacrificed on the altar of great-power politics.47 Even a m o n g 
the more conservative and Western-oriented Arab states in the Middle 
East, the emerging logic of international relations in that region dictated 
that they assume some ideological distance from both West and East. In 
the longer run, the rationale of non-alignment came to constitute a basis 
for the enhancement of parallel or convergent interests between the Arab 
and African worlds, both fearful of their sovereignty being jeopardized 
by external interests. 
O f critical significance to these maturing ties was the role of Egypt -
renamed the United Arab Republic, 1958-7048 - especially after the 1952 
revolution which overthrew the monarchy, culminating in al-Nasser's full 
assumption of power in 1954. Pre-1952 Egypt had begun to play a modest 
role in building bridges between Africa and the wider Arab—Asian worlds, 
for example in being the only African state participating - along with 11 
Asian states - in the founding in 1950 of the ad hoc Asian-African group 
in the United Nations. But under al-Nasser there was a distinctive 
transformation in the tempo of Egyptian activism, which came to embrace 
and entwine the three circles — the 'Arab circle', the 'African circle' and 
'the circle of our brethren-in-Islam' - which al-Nasser's 1954 publication, 
Philosophy of Revolution, identified as being central to Egypt's identity. 
Al-Nasser's increasingly important impact simultaneously on the politics 
of pan-African and pan-Arab liberation by the later 1950s equipped him 
thoroughly with the motivation and image to emerge to exceptional 
prominence as a founder of the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t , the Third 
World's political foundation.49 
Beginning with Ghana's attainment of independence in 1957, the retreat 
of colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa paved the way for a more concerted 
intra-African concern with building meaningful pan-African ties across 
the Sahara - a priority recognized by al-Nasser and N k r u m a h alike -
which naturally spilled over into wider notions of African and Arab world 
solidarity. 
With the creation of the O A U in 1963 there was n o w in existence an 
African regional organization paralleling, and in m a n y respects c o m p -
lementing, the Arab League. In addition to some overlapping membership, 
47. F. A . Sayegh, 1964. 
48. T h e 1958 union of Egypt and Syria assuming the name United Arab Republic 
disintegrated in 1961 with Syria's withdrawal, but the name continued to be used officially 
until 1971 when it was changed to Arab Republic of Egypt. T h e name Egypt is being 
used throughout this chapter unless it proves necessary in ad hoc cases to refer to 'United 
Arab Republic' instead. 
49. O n Egypt's Africa-related foreign policy in the al-Nasser era (1952^70), see T . Y . 
Ismael, 1971; and A . B . Sawant, 1981. 
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both bodies shared a c o m m o n bond in being 'the first [regional] organ-
izations created and directed by the poor nations, for the poor nations of 
the world'. T h e Arab League as the 'nucleus of the Afro-Asian group' 
in the United Nations during the 1950s n o w came to be reinforced by 
the O A U w h e n the former 'began to lose its youthful dynamism'.50 
But the most salient political issue in Arab League politics, the issue 
of Israel's presence and performance, was effectively insulated from O A U 
politics in the earlier years despite the hopes of the Arab League members 
of the O A U that both organizations would forge a c o m m o n stand. T h e 
reason was that m a n y of sub-Saharan Africa's newly independent states 
had close economic and sometimes military ties with Israel which had 
been active in its diplomatic efforts to build such links. Also the majority 
feeling prevailed that the Middle East crisis, not being strictly an African 
issue, did not properly fall within the O A U ' s purview. 
However, there began to be a detectable shift in the O A U ' s position 
after the Six-Day war in 1967 which had led to Israel's occupation of 
Arab territory including Egypt's Sinai peninsula. A steadily emerging 
build-up in African condemnation of Israel's policies entered another 
stage at the eighth O A U summit in 1971 w h e n it was maintained for the 
first time that 'the continued Israeli occupation constitutes a serious threat 
to the regional peace of Africa'. Simultaneously, the O A U established a 
committee to mediate the conflict (primarily between Egypt and Israel), 
but its eventual failure, attributed by its chairman Leopold Senghor to 
Israeli intransigence,51 served to intensify support for the Arab cause. 
In an extraordinary turn of events in October 1973, 17 sub-Saharan 
states severed their diplomatic relations with Israel followed by another 
four in November, with the result that by the end of 1973 only four 
m e m b e r states of the O A U — Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius — 
continued to maintain diplomatic ties with Israel. 
These late 1973 developments can be evaluated in a clearer perspective 
w h e n it is recalled that prior to 1967 all O A U m e m b e r states excepting 
those belonging to the Arab League had diplomatic relations with Israel; 
that in the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day war only one other 
African state (Guinea) terminated its diplomatic ties; and that this situation 
remained unchanged over the better part of the next five years until a 
distinctly shifting African diplomatic m o o d became manifest over the 18-
month period prior to October 1983 during which another seven states 
severed relations with Israel. 
Three major developments in 1973 set the stage for the October 
diplomatic turnabout. T w o of these, very m u c h interrelated in the 
burgeoning contexts of African-Arab-Third-World solidarity, were first 
the convening of the tenth anniversary O A U summit in Addis Ababa in 
50. B . Boutros-Ghali, 1975, p. 60. 
51. Y . El-Ayouty, 1975a. 
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M a y and, secondly, the fourth Non-Aligned S u m m i t Conference held in 
Algiers in September, which were important forums for the harmonization 
of Arab-African-Third-World diplomatic strategies. 
A n exceptionally influential role in both settings was played by Algeria's 
President Boumedienne. It was he w h o spearheaded Arab diplomacy 
within the O A U , establishing convincing parallels between the liberation 
struggles in the Middle East and Southern Africa - a position which was 
facilitated by Israel's increasingly close military and economic ties with 
apartheid South Africa, a significant source of the developing alienation 
of interests between Africa and Israel. Additionally, as chairman of the 
Fourth Non-Aligned S u m m i t he could bring his prestige and influence 
to bear on a heightening coalescence of pan-African, pan-Arab and Third-
World interests. 
T h e third immediate development contributing to the October 1973 
diplomatic ruptures was the October 1973 W a r (6-24 October) between 
Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Israel on the other. T h e point of 
no return was reached w h e n Israel pushed further than ever before into 
Egyptian territory, occupying for the first time lands west of the Suez 
Canal, directly and unarguably on continental African soil. 
S o m e analysts contend that African capitulation to the Arab 'oil weapon' 
was a major factor leading to Israel's diplomatic isolation,52 but such a 
view is ahistorical and, indeed, cynical. It is true that at the height of the 
October 1973 W a r a drastic increase in the price of oil was announced 
by O P E C (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and that 
O A P E C (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) banned 
the export of crude oil to any country siding with Israel. But to see these 
as root causes of African states' diplomatic behaviour toward Israel in late 
1973 is to 'distort the sequence of events' since ' m u c h of Africa had 
already sided with the Arabs on the Palestine question' well before the 
oil factor came into play.53 
This latter view is supported elsewhere in the conclusion that there is 
'no evidence either that the Arabs ever mentioned the possibility of using 
the 'oil weapon' against African countries or that African countries threw 
their support behind the Arabs with financial benefit in mind.54 T h e 
reasons lay instead in an emerging spirit of political solidarity on mutual 
interests between the African and Arab worlds which entered a new stage 
after 1967, developing with even greater intensity in the 1970s. 
With the political coalition in place by 1973 and in view of the dramatic 
projection of Arab-Islamic oil power in the international economic arena, 
the question of forging viable and mutually beneficial economic ties 
52. V . T . L e Vine and T . W . Luke, 1979, pp. 9-18. 
53. A . A . Mazrui, 1975c, p. 736. 
54. Z . Cervenka, 1977, p. 162. 
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inevitably emerged as a major challenge to African and Arab world 
relationships. 
A dramatic start was the November 1973 decision by the Arab League, 
meeting in Algiers, to impose an oil embargo against colonialist Portugal, 
white-ruled Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa.55 It was then also agreed 
to establish these three major institutions to promote economic co-
operation: the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, specifically 
intended for the benefit of African countries not belonging to the Arab 
League; the Special Arab F u n d for Africa, designed to provide emergency 
financial assistance to non-Arab African countries for oil imports and 
development of oil resources; and the Fund for Arab-African Technical 
Assistance - including both Arab and African countries - for the purpose 
of promoting economic and technical co-operation.56 T h e increasing 
importance of economic factors in these expanding relationships was 
further manifested in evolving perceptions of the responsibilities O P E C 
ought to assume in promoting Third-World development in general and 
African development in particular.57 
These consolidating patterns of political and economic relationships 
during the 1970s came to be culturally reinforced by the Islamic revival, 
the political potency of which led, for example, to the establishment in 
1971 of the intergovernmental Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC), sited in Saudi Arabia.58 Such then was the evolving situation 
conducive to the convening of the first Arab-African Summit Conference 
of 1977. 
These manifestations of solidarity did not, of course, mean the eradi-
cation of certain important differences in political outlook and priorities. 
For example, the Arab League constantly failed in its efforts to obtain 
O A U support for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. A n d 
in the greatest of ironies, Egypt, which during the 1950s and 1960s had 
been the cornerstone of these developing links, had by 1979 become a 
political pariah in the Arab world - because of A n w a r Sadat's signing of 
a peace treaty with Israel - and a source of friction in the relationship. 
T h u s while Egypt was immediately suspended from membership in 
the Arab League - its headquarters being simultaneously moved from 
Cairo to Tunis - as well as in the O I C , the O A U although pressured 
refused to take similar steps and continued to welcome Egypt's par-
ticipation. Also at the Sixth Non-Aligned S u m m i t Conference in 1979, 
sub-Saharan states were instrumental in working out a compromise to 
55. G . A . Nweke , 1980, ch. n , pp. 235-50. 
56. These three institutions are discussed in E . C . Chibwe, 1976; W . R . Johnson, 1983; 
A . Sylvester, 1981; and J. Vignes, 1976-7. 
57. M . J. Williams, 1976. 
58. O . H . Kokole, 1984; A . Oded, 1986. 
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prevent Egypt's suspension from the movement , which the other Arab 
states were seeking. 
But the most challenging issue around the turn of the 1980s was 
whether the promises and hopes of economic co-operation and solidarity 
could withstand the rising structure of oil prices and the widening patterns 
of international economic recession. T h e fact that such concerns were 
being aired was indeed a measure of h o w far African and Arab world 
relationships had matured since the 1950s, arriving at a stage of un-
paralleled initiatives and aspirations in the 1970s, and in the process 
profoundly influencing the thrust of the challenge from the Third World. 
Latin American and Caribbean ties: a maturing sense of Third-
W o r l d identity 
A s underscored in certain U N E S C O - s p o n s o r e d publications or sym-
posia,59 Africa's racial and cultural presence throughout Latin America 
and the Caribbean is a permanent reminder of the deepseated historical 
contacts between the African continent and these African diasporas, of 
the traumatic conditions of the trans-Atlantic slave trade under which 
these diasporas were created, and of the racial/cultural ties which have 
underpinned a sense of trans-continental pan-African identity. 
This has been especially true of the Caribbean where the African 
demographic and cultural presence is far more concentrated and pro-
nounced than in the remaining Latin American area, which is characterized 
by marked national variations - from Brazil, with a significant African 
presence, to Argentina, where it hardly exists. 
Within the Caribbean - here defined as 'the islands in the area together 
with Belize and "the Guyanas" (Guyana, Suriname, Cayenne)'60 — are to 
be found most national communities having black majorities with the rest 
containing substantial black minorities. Considering further that slavery 
cum colonialism came to have a more total impact on the shaping of 
Caribbean societies than elsewhere, there is the inevitability of a racial 
frame of reference in Caribbean nation-building and foreign-policy pro-
cesses, necessarily leading back to Africa.61 This is one reason w h y in a 
study of this nature it is inappropriate to treat the Latin American 
geographical region as one undifferentiated whole. 
T h e historical record is replete with numerous instances of persistent 
interactions, often involving organized collaboration, between Africa and 
the Caribbean in advancing the ethos of trans-continental pan-Africanism, 
59. M . M . Fraginals, 1984; U N E S C O , 1980. 
60. This was the definition adopted by the U N E S C O Working Group for the 
Preparation of a General History of the Caribbean, meeting in Paris, 14-18 December 
1981, contained in 'Final Report' ( C C - 8 1 / C O N F . 610/4, U N E S C O , Paris, 7 April 1982). 
61. L . Edmondson, 1974; L . Edmondson and P. Phillips, 1979. 
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most of which have been discussed in several chapters in Volume VII as 
well as in this volume. In the early twentieth-century experience, for 
example, there was the launching, beginning in 1900, of a Pan-African 
Conference/Congress series involving blacks from the African continent 
and the diaspora; the phenomenon of Garveyism which transcended its 
Caribbean roots to become a major force in the development of African 
nationalism, as was attested to by K w a m e N k r u m a h and J o m o Kenyatta 
among others; the joint founding by Senegal's Leopold Senghor and 
Martinique's Aimé Césaire of the cultural pan-African doctine of négritude 
in the 1930s; and the joint organization of the Fifth Pan-African Congress 
of 1945 by Ghana's K w a m e N k r u m a h and Trinidad's George Padmore. 
Such interactions preceded - with a handful of exceptions - the rise 
of sovereign independent states in both Africa and the Caribbean and 
were thus necessarily dominated by non-governmental interests. B y con-
trast, the post-colonial period of the 1960s and 1970s was one in which 
newer opportunities were present for expanding the range of collaborative 
pan-African endeavours, n o w including governments as well. 
T h e First World Festival of Negro Arts held in Senegal in 1966, the 
Sixth Pan-African Congress hosted by Tanzania in 1974, and the Second 
World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture ( F E S T A C ) in 
Nigeria in 1977, were notable examples of activities in which African-
Caribbean links were being advanced within the broader context of trans-
continental pan-Africanism. 
F r o m time to time African leaders explicitly acknowledged the sig-
nificance of racial ties with the Caribbean as a basis for furthering their 
mutual interests. 'I would broadly say that wherever there is African 
blood there is a basis for greater unity', Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie 
declared while addressing the Jamaican parliament in 1966. Four years 
earlier, K w a m e N k r u m a h appealed directly to West Indian heads of 
government to work at maintaining the then disintegrating West Indies 
Federation, in these terms: 
M y excuse for making this appeal is the sincere conviction I hold 
that success in the establishment of a powerful West Indies nation 
would substantially assist the efforts w e are making to redeem Africa's 
reputation in world affairs and to re-establish the personality of the 
African and people of African descent everywhere. 
But another African president, although himself a committed pan-
Africanist, warned of the possibilities of a race-conscious pan-Africanism 
undermining the search for a wider sense of Third-World solidarity. This 
was Julius Nyerere's concern which — significantly in his capacity as 
host - he expressed to the Sixth Pan-African Congress of 1974: 
Pan-Africanism would be doing a great disservice to h u m a n liberation 
if it caused Africa and the Caribbean to try to isolate themselves 
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from the rest of the Third World; or if it provoked other parts of 
the Third World into isolating Africa and the Caribbean. 
However, the developing consolidating pattern of pan-African ties between 
Africa and the Caribbean through the 1970s, especially focused on 
Southern African issues, suggested to the contrary that their Third-World 
liberationist commitments were thereby collectively enhanced. 
Africa's relations with the Caribbean cannot of course be pinned d o w n 
on the basis of race alone. Another important cementing factor was that 
most African and Caribbean states were colonies until recently, an 
experience which sharpened their c o m m o n sensitivities to establishing 
their national and international political identities. 
These considerations thus came to influence African and Caribbean 
collaboration within the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t - which the newly-
independent Caribbean states had a relatively greater propensity to join 
than the longer-independent Latin American states - and within the 
Commonweal th - where the predominantly African presence was c o m p -
lemented by the Anglophone states of the Caribbean. 
Within these two forums, as within the U N system which enhanced 
their institutional opportunities for collaboration, Southern African issues 
and inequities in the international economic system became the two major 
focuses of c o m m o n concern and endeavour. T h e salience of the latter was 
further underscored with the establishment in 1975 of the A C P Group 
(African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States), designed to protect and 
advance their economic positions collectively in negotiations with the 
European Economic Community . 6 2 
Mutual international economic interests came to constitute an even 
more predominant force - relative to racial, cultural and political factors -
in relations between Africa and the wider Latin American region beyond 
the Caribbean. With good reason, it was observed in the mid-1960s that, 
in some fundamental areas, Africa and Latin America still remained 'giant 
strangers'.63 However, it was also apparent that a 'Latin American-African 
Partnership', in the words of another analyst,64 had been steadily emerging 
since the 1950s, preliminarily on some shared sensitivities regarding 
decolonization and the maintenance of national sovereignty, and ultimately 
over a mutual concern with economic development which came to 
dominate their c o m m o n agendas of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Despite divergent levels of economic development between both con-
tinents, at times resulting in varying economic priorities, it was being 
confidently asserted by the late 1960s that in U N debates on socio-
economic issues 'the Africans have formed a steadfast alliance with the 
Latin Americans w h o have in the economic and social fields subordinated 
62. K . Hall and B . W . Blake, 1979. 
63. A . Segal, 1966. 
64. P. Saenz, 1969. 
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PLATE 28.2 Fidel Castro of Cuba and the Group of77 in Havana, Cuba, 21 April, 1987
the principle of hemispheric solidarity with the United States to the
principle of solidarity among the "have not" countries'.65
Illustrative of widespread Latin American sensitivity to economic
underdevelopment linked to perceptions of their neo-colonial domination
was the pioneering role of Latin American scholars in advancing depen¬
dency theory as a framework for analysing and explaining the region's
economic underdevelopment, an approach which soon came to acquire
wider Third-World intellectual currency as well as practical political
significance.66
Another example was the leading role of Latin American states in the
establishment in 1964 of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development) and in the accompanying mobilization of the
Group of 77,6' to the extent of producing UNCTAD's first secretary-
general, the Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch, credited with inspiring
the school of dependency theorists as well as the development of nego¬
tiating strategies for the establishment of a new international economic
65. ibid, p. 326.
66. H. C. F. Mansilla, 1984.
67. See Table 28.5 below on the Group of 77 within UNCTAD, whose role as the
major forum for Third-World economic diplomacy is discussed later in this chapter.
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order ( N I E O ) . Similarly, the formulation of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1974 as a major plank of the N I E O being demanded by the 
Third-World coalition, originated from a proposal by Mexican President 
Luis Echeverría. 
Such dovetailing and institutionalization of Latin American and African 
international economic interests within an expanding framework of Third-
World solidarity was - with the distinctive exception of Cuba 
(simultaneously sharing a Latin American and Caribbean identity) and 
the partial exception of Brazil - not as readily apparent in other political 
arenas, thus leading to the view that 'The relationship of Latin American 
societies to African and Asian nations is of a fundamentally ambivalent 
nature'.68 A case in point, as documented in Table 28.4 below, was a 
general pattern of Latin American reluctance through the 1960s and 1970s 
to become fully-fledged participants in the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t . 
At least four reasons m a y be advanced to explain such behaviour. First, 
the fact that all Latin American (unlike most Caribbean) states acquired 
their political independence in the nineteenth century, mostly by the 
1820s, served to detach them somewhat from the heightened post-war 
forces of Afro-Asian nationalism which underpinned the creation of the 
Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t . Related to this was a second factor, namely that 
Spain was an insignificant colonial power in the Afro-Asian world which 
minimized the prospect of the dominant Hispanic politico-cultural identity 
of Latin America naturally reaching out to Afro-Asia. 
Thirdly, the reluctance of Latin American states to enter the N o n -
Aligned M o v e m e n t - especially in the earlier years when the movement's 
agenda was not as dominated by economic development issues as it later 
came to be - was also due to the fact that they were already part of an 
inter-hemispheric security system, the Organization of American States, 
whose founding in 1948 preceded by 13 years the launching of the 
Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t . Fourthly, in Latin American (as opposed to 
Caribbean) nations, even in those with distinctive Afro-Asian demographic 
and cultural formations, Afro-Asian constituencies have not proved sig-
nificant in influencing directly respective domestic, m u c h less foreign 
policy, decision-making processes. 
Brazil has offered a partial exception to some of these generalizations, 
insufficient however to have predisposed it to join the Non-Aligned 
M o v e m e n t in which it opted for Observer status from the very outset in 
1961. Despite that, there was since the mid-1950s a steadily expanding 
Brazilian foreign-policy interest in the Afro-Asian world.69 T h e African 
dimension was m u c h the more significant underpinning of that develop-
ment, due to historically, demographically and culturally significant ties 
68. H . C . F. Mansilla, 1984, p. 341. 
69. W . A . Selcher, 1974. 
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between Brazil and Africa,70 which became all the more salient in view 
of Brazil's unique N e w - W o r l d presence as a Lusophone fragment seeking 
to establish a sense of special identity with Lusophone Africa.71 
Significant political complications arose in the latter quest during the 
final stages of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, from the 1960s to the 
mid-1970s, at a time w h e n increasing colonialist intransigence in the face 
of the heightening African liberation struggles led to an erosion of 
international diplomatic support for Portugal. Characteristic of an ambiva-
lent position on that issue was the fact that in 1973-4, a year or two 
before Portugal was forced to withdraw from Africa, 'Brazil was the only 
Latin American State to vote consistently in the U N with Portugal, 
although often abstaining on South Africa votes and siding with the 
African bloc on Rhodesian and Namibian votes'.72 
With Portugal's retreat, it became easier after the mid-1970s for Brazil 
to pursue more confidently a previously articulated interest in widening 
its political, economic and cultural ties beyond Lusophone Africa, even 
while attaching a special consideration to the Lusophone connection.73 
B y the turn of the 1980s, one of its more distinctive and potentially 
significant manifestations was a maturing economic and political relation-
ship being forged between Nigeria and Brazil, two rising regional powers 
and demographically the largest countries on their respective continents.74 
Revolutionary Cuba, by contrast, at no stage exhibited any ambivalence 
whatsoever about the centrality of the African and wider Third-World 
connection. Compared with other Latin American and Caribbean states -
or for that matter with any states from Asia or the Middle East - Cuba's 
political links with Africa since the 1959 revolution were unrivalled in 
terms of range and consistency, as attested to in the volume of literature 
on that subject.75 It was thus appropriately concluded that 'Afro-Latinism 
as a form of solidarity between Africa and Latin America has been 
strengthened mainly through the Cuban connection'.76 
T h e seeds of this relationship were rooted in the conditions and 
immediate aftermath of the 1959 C u b a n revolution. Coinciding in time 
with the heightening Afro-Asian and burgeoning Third-World challenges 
to the international status quo, revolutionary C u b a from the outset was 
70. R . Pélissíer, 1982; J. H . Rodrigues, 1982. 
71. W . A . Selcher, 1974. 
72. A . Segal, 1974, p. A107. 
73. A . Dzidzienyo and J. M . Turner, 1981; T . Forrest, 1982; H . Hoffman, 1982; and 
A . C . Peixoto, 1983. 
74. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, c. 1981-4; U . J . O g w u , 1982. 
75. For example, see S. Y . Abdi, 1978, pp. 17-24; Cuba Review, 1978, pp. 1-50; 
A . M . Kapcia, 1979, pp. 142-59; W . M . LeoGrande, 1980; A . A . Mazrui, 1981, pp. 329-
45; C . Mesa-Lago and J. S. Belkin, 1982; E . Mestri, 1980; A . Segal, 1983b, pp. 123-47; 
and N . P. Valdes, 1980, pp. 49-^79. 
76. A . A . Mazrui, 1981, p. 343. 
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induced to seek to maximize its shared affinities with such forces, a 
posture which was further reinforced by subsequent moves, primarily 
through United States instigation, to isolate Cuba from Western hemi-
spheric international institutional processes.77 
A s seen by one analyst, Cuban involvement in Africa during 1959— 
79 proceeded through four distinct phases.78 T h e first, 1959-74, w a s 
characterized by 'loose, informal, and limited ties, often with an emphasis 
on contacts with African nationalist movements rather than independent 
governments'. T h e second period, 1975-6, was one in which 18000-
24 000 Cuban combat troops were introduced in Angola at the request of 
the M P L A (Popular M o v e m e n t for the Liberation of Angola), which not 
only helped to secure the position of the M P L A over its rivals contending 
for control of the government in the light of colonial Portugal's recent 
withdrawal, but more significantly succeeded in neutralizing invading 
South African troops supporting the a n t i - M P L A forces. 
T h e third period of Cuban involvement, 1977-8, was focused on the 
Horn of Africa where some 20 000 combat troops assisted the government 
of Ethiopia in defeating Somalia's military incursion into the Somali-
populated Ogaden region of Ethiopia. T h e fourth period, beginning in 
1979, was seen as one of'consolidation and stabilization' offering promises 
of a reduction of Cuba's military presence and an expansion of its civilian 
and technical assistance programmes. 
Cuba's massive military adventures in Angola and the Horn of Africa, 
while not without their African critics, eventually came to be seen as less 
controversial, given that the O A U viewed Somalia as the aggressor in the 
Horn and that apartheid South Africa's designs over Angola had been 
thwarted. But these episodes tended to overshadow other aspects of 
Cuba's deepening ties with Africa. 
At the peak of its military presence in 1978, in addition to approximately 
19000 combat troops in Angola and 16 000-17 000 in Ethiopia, Cuba also 
had between 2455 and 2755 military advisers in another 11 African 
states.79 B y 1980, between 8500 and 12200 Cuban civilian advisers - some 
70 per cent of w h o m were based in Angola - were serving in 12 African 
countries,80 providing technical assistance in such areas as health care, 
agronomy, education and engineering. B y 1977, C u b a had diplomatic 
relations with 25 African states, 12 of which had ambassadors accredited 
in Havana. 
77. For example, since 1962 Cuba has been suspended from the Organization of 
American States; in 1964 the O A S imposed sanctions. Also during 1964-75 Cuba was 
excluded from the deliberations of the Latin American Group within U N C T A D , which 
delayed its ability to join the Group of 77 before 1971 when its membership was sponsored 
by the African and Asian Groups and was not opposed by the Latin American Group. 
78. A . Segal, 1983b, pp. 130-3. 
79. W . M . LeoGrande, 1980, p. 66. 
80. ibid., p. 69. 
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T h e seemingly asymmetrical nature of Cuba's role in Africa, which has 
led one observer to lament this case of 'microdependency',8' is perhaps 
better viewed as one of reciprocity, given the mutual interests of the 
actors involved in consolidating their ties within an ideological framework 
of burgeoning Third-World solidarity. Cuba's consistent commitment to 
advancing its Third-World identity was a significant motivation as well 
as a consequence of the African connection. Not only was C u b a the 
only Latin American/Caribbean founding m e m b e r of the Non-Aligned 
M o v e m e n t in 1961, but until joined by some other recently independent 
Anglophone Caribbean states in the late 1960s it was the movement's 
only such full m e m b e r . Its role in the launching of the Tri-Continental 
Solidarity Organization in 1966 was another notable Third-World-focused 
initiative. A n d the selection of Cuba to chair the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t 
from 1979 to 1982 was the most revealing testimony of all to its political 
credentials among the dominant Afro-Asian interests in that major Third-
World forum. 
While deciding on Havana as the site of the Sixth Non-Aligned S u m m i t 
scheduled for 1979, the Fifth S u m m i t of 1976, meeting in Sri Lanka, 
formally congratulated Cuba for keeping militaristic South Africa at bay 
in Angola. As manifested in Cuba's decisive assault against an expansionist 
apartheid regime, in Brazil's ambivalent posture during the period of 
Portuguese colonialism, and in the firm diplomatic support a m o n g the 
newly independent Caribbean states for Southern African liberation 
struggles, the challenges associated with colonialism and racism in 
Southern Africa came to have significant bearing on the patterns of political 
relations being forged between Africa and the Latin American/Caribbean 
region. 
African states increasingly sought to mobilize Latin American/ 
Caribbean support for Southern African liberation causes, which explains 
the concern which began to develop in the late 1970s w h e n an expansionist 
South Africa, in need of allies, began to court actively certain potentially 
receptive Latin American states to build strategic and economic ties. 
T h e fact that such options were being broached on both sides was a clear 
reminder that there still remained a measure of political ambivalence in 
certain critical areas of Latin America's relations with Africa, standing in 
marked contrast to the solidarity attained with respect to international 
economic matters. 
However, the entry for the first time during the 1970s of non-aligned 
organizational activities in the Latin American/Caribbean region — notably 
the Third Conference of Ministers of the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t in 
Georgetown, Guyana, in 1972 and the Sixth S u m m i t in Havana in 1979 -
81. A . A . Mazrui, 1981. 
82. D . Fig, 1984, pp. 239-55; E . Kannyo, 1982, pp. 52-59; North American Congress 
on Latin America, 1982. 
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mainly spearheaded by Caribbean actors, together with a slowly but 
steadily rising Latin American representation in the movement , seemed 
suggestive of an emerging potential for securing Latin America's political 
ties with Africa on a firmer foundation. 
Africa within the Third-World movement 
T h e expansion of independent Africa's political, economic and cultural 
ties with other Third-World regions, while varying in scope and intensity, 
collectively served to give shape and direction to a self-conscious Third-
World movement challenging the international status quo and intent on 
transforming traditional international mores and structures historically 
implicated in the subordination of the Third World. 
T o comprehend Africa's role in that wider process it is profitable to 
focus first on the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t which emerged as the Third 
World's most potent organized political expression, and secondly on the 
n e w international economic order ( N I E O ) which in the 1970s came to 
represent the capstone of the Third World's economic challenge. 
Africa and the Non-Al igned M o v e m e n t 
While its philosophical origins are often dated back to the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, the first Non-Aligned S u m m i t was convened in 1961 
in Belgrade among certain Afro-Asian states, Cuba and Yugoslavia. 
Professing an attitude of independence from Cold-War alliances and from 
East-West military blocs, the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t soon came to 
transcend its initial emphasis on international strategic issues arising in 
the context of East-West rivalries to become a proactive voice for Third-
World political, racial and economic liberation.3 
A s indicated in Table 28.4, the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t experienced 
a growth in participation from 25 at the First Summit Conference in 
1961, to 92 at the Sixth S u m m i t in 1979, with Africa contributing the 
largest regional representation beginning with the Second Summit in 
1964. Africa's numerical dominance in the movement arose less because 
that continent is comprised of the largest number of states than as a 
result of a conscious political decision by the O A U at its founding in 
1963 to embrace non-alignment as a collective imperative. T h e explicit 
enunciation in the O A U ' s Charter of an 'affirmation of a policy of non-
alignment with regard to all blocs', thus resulted in Africa being the only 
continent fully identified with the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t . 
Consequent on the O A U ' s decision, the influx of African membership 
83. R . Jaipal, 1983; O . Jankowitsch and K . Sauvant, 1980, pp. 41^77; G . H . Jansen, 
1966; R . A . Mortimer, 1980, pp. 6-42 and 74-94; P. Willets, 1978; G . Williams, 1981, pp. 
46-65. 
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into the Non-Aligned Movement , while on the one hand making the 
movement more ideologically diffuse and hence less cohesive than pre-
viously, on the other hand served more positively to strengthen it in m a n y 
ways. First, with this expanded organizational infrastructure, its legitimacy 
as the Third World's major political voice could be better established. 
Secondly, this widening of ideological credentials for membership there-
after helped to minimize the type of controversies which had affected the 
First Summit as to which states were or were not ideologically acceptable 
for non-aligned membership. Thirdly, the African influx guaranteed that 
thereafter the movement would become even more active on a wider 
range of North-South issues, given the acute sensitivity of Africans to 
the fused challenges of political, economic and racial liberation on a 
continent in the throes of decolonization and early nationhood. 
Besides strengthening the membership base of the Non-Aligned M o v e -
ment, Africa also contributed some of the movement's most outstanding 
leaders. T h e first such example was Egypt's Gamäl c A b d al-Nasser, w h o 
along with President Tito of Yugoslavia and Prime Minister Nehru of 
India were the real architects of non-alignment,84 it being not accidental 
that the Preparatory Meeting for the First Summit (1961) and the Second 
Summit Conference (1964) were both held in Cairo. Ghana's K w a m e 
N k r u m a h , w h o was also a founding m e m b e r of the movement w h e n 
launched officially in 1961, played an exceptionally important role in 
helping to establish newly independent Africa's commitment to non-
alignment which within Ghana's first year of independence had emerged 
as a cornerstone of its foreign policy and of its pan-African outlook.85 
F r o m the late 1960s through to the 1970s, other African leaders 
contributed decisively to the expansion and transformation of the vision 
of non-alignment. Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, for example, in hosting 
the Third Summit of 1970, helped to insert the commitments of the non-
aligned more uncompromisingly on the requirements of Southern African 
liberation and, as well, chaired the movement during a critical period of 
programmatic transition toward economic liberation objectives. Tanzania's 
Julius Nyerere at the same time emerged as one of the most important 
ideological catalysts for the movement's transforming focus,86 even while 
Algeria's Houari Boumedienne, w h o succeeded Kaunda as chairman, 
became a most effective mobilizer of the movement's newly established 
mission in search of a n e w international economic order. 
T h e choice of African sites for the Second, Third and Fourth N o n -
Aligned Summit Conferences - Cairo in 1964, Lusaka in 1970 and Algiers 
in 1973 - as well as Egypt's hosting of the 1961 Preparatory Meeting 
preceding the First S u m m i t Conference in Belgrade, was symptomatic of 
84. G . A . Nasser, c. 1966, provides glimpses of his evolving thoughts on non-alignment. 
85. K . N k r u m a h , 1958b, pp. 45-53. 
86. J. K . Nyerere, 1970c. 
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plate 28.3 From left to right: J. B. Tito of Yugoslavia, A. Ben Bella ofAlgeria, A. M.
Obote of Uganda and H. Bourguiba of Tunisia at the Second Non-Aligned Conference in
Cairo, 5-10 October 1964
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Africa's critical contributions to the movement's early development and 
eventual consolidation. For this was the crucial first decade of the 
movement's emergence, then of its institutionalization, and finally of its 
programmatic transformation. 
Throughout the first two decades of the Non-Aligned Movement 's 
existence, African developments and concerns bore profoundly on its 
purpose and direction. This was apparent from the outset, since a major 
'factor in bringing the Non-Aligned together was the importance attached 
to African issues in i960',87 such as the violence of the apartheid South 
African state exhibited in the Sharpeville massacre in March of that year, 
the heightening ferocity of the Algerian war of independence and the 
breakdown of civil order in the ex-Belgian Congo (now Zaire). 
Subsequently, the movement's m u c h more sharpened anti-imperialist 
thrust which had become manifest by the early 1970s, coupled with its 
programmatic transformation assigning priority to the search for a N e w 
International Economic Order, were largely a product of Africa's objective 
political and socio-economic condition within the international system 
and of the subjective reaction of Africans to that state of affairs. 
In search of a N e w International Economic Order ( N I E O ) 
T h e Non-Aligned Movement's programmatic transition by the 1970s did 
not suddenly materialize, representing instead a rising Third-World 
concern from tlie 1950s with the structure of international economic 
relations. Thus while the N I E O as such made its first formal appearance 
in the early 1970s, it can also be seen as a longer-run process of Third-
World mobilization for international economic change. 
T h e expression ' N e w International Economic Order' first formally 
appeared in the September 1973 Economic Declaration of the Fourth 
Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Algiers. It was soon after launched 
as the basis for the April 1974 formal discussions on raw materials and 
development for which the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly was convened, and at which the Declaration and Action 
Programme on the Establishment of a N e w International Economic Order 
was adopted.8' T h e N I E O was further formalized in December 1974 with 
the U N General Assembly's adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States.90 
87. P. Willens, 1978, p. 11. 
88. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, and G . Williams, 1981, contain useful overviews of the 
development of the N I E O process. 
89. U N General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VT) of 1 M a y 1974. 
90. U N General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, adopted by 
a vote of 120 to 6, with 10 abstentions. Voting against were Belgium, Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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A Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly convened in 
September 1975 on development and co-operation took trie N I E O delib-
erations a stage further, as also did the initiation of the North-South 
dialogue in the shape of the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation (which became known as the North-South Conference) 
between eight developed and 19 underdeveloped nations lasting from 
1975 to 1977. By the late 1970s the promises as well as the frustrations 
of implementing the N I E O agenda gave rise to a growing Third-World 
recognition of a need to institutionalize South-South economic relation-
ships on a firmer footing. 
T h e essence of the N I E O was a search by the South (Third World) 
for a fundamental restructuring of the world economy, mainly in the areas 
of international trade, economic aid, foreign investment, technology 
transfer and international monetary reform. This represented the capstone 
and harmonization of a variety of Third-World pressures for international 
economic change over the previous two decades. 
For example, the communiqué from the Bandung Conference of 
1955 included a section exclusively devoted to 'economic co-operation'. 
Motivated by the formation of the European Economic Community, the 
First Economic Conference for Afro-Asian countries was convened in 
Cairo in 1958, followed by a Second Afro-Asian Economic Conference, 
again in Cairo, in i960, both meetings attracting 10-11 African delegations 
of the 38 present on each occasion. A 1962 Conference on the Problems 
of Developing Countries produced the Cairo Declaration of 1962 signed 
by 36 mostly Afro-Asian countries - only four being from Latin America -
pledging themselves to co-operate to strengthen the economic and social 
activities of the United Nations. 
A major milestone in this evolving Third-World challenge to the 
traditional international economic order was the establishment of 
U N C T A D (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in 
1964 as a permanent organ of the United Nations General Assembly. 
Formed because of the Third World's dissatisfaction with the existing 
international trading system, represented by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade which had been created exclusively by the Western 
world, U N C T A D ' s full conferences held every three to four years 
provided a forum where Third-World collective interests were aired and 
co-ordinated, from U N C T A D I in 1964 to U N C T A D V in 1979. 
O n e of U N C T A D ' S main legacies was in providing a base for the 
formation of the Group of 77, the Third World's main economic m o b -
ilizing and bargaining unit,9' which, as documented in Table 28.5, 
expanded its original membership base of 77 to encompass by 1980 a full 
complement of Third-World participants numbering 122. A m o n g the 
most lasting contributions of the Group of 77 was the formulation of the 
91. K . P. Sauvant, 1980. 
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T A B L E 28.5 Composition of the Group of 77*, 1Q64-8Í 
Year Africa* 
1964 32 
1980 50 
Asiab 
23 
39 
Caribbean" Latin 
America0 
4 17 
13 17 
3 
Europe' 
1 
3 
Total 
77 
122 
*Formed in 1964 by the then 77 developing countries participating in the first U N C T A D 
session, for the purpose of presenting a common bargaining front in international trade 
and related economic negotiations. 
* All independent states in Africa, excepting South Africa, are in the Group. 
b
 Almost all states (including Cyprus) in Asia-the Pacific-Oceania are in the Group, 
significant exceptions being Australia, China, Israel, Japan, N e w Zealand and Turkey. 
c
 All independent Caribbean states are members. 
d
 All Latin American states are members. 
e
 Yugoslavia was a founding member, Romania and Malta subsequently joined. 
'Algiers Charter' in 1967, developed at its First Ministerial Conference 
as a joint bargaining strategy for U N C T A D II. T h e Algiers Charter came 
to be regarded as 'the Third World's first comprehensive platform on 
development', as 'a major achievement in Third World organizing', and 
as a significant precursor 'of the demands that would be reiterated with 
greater force in the mid-1970s'.92 
Paralleling such Group-of-77 initiatives was a distinctive shift in the 
focus of the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t by the late 1960s to embrace 
international economic concerns as a movement priority. T h u s for the 
first time at the Third Summit Conference in Luska in 1970 two separate 
declarations were adopted, one on political, the other on economic issues. 
T h e 1972 Conference of Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement , 
meeting in Georgetown, Guyana, took matters a step further by developing 
an 'Action Programme for Economic Co-operation' while a year later, at 
the 1973 Algiers Summit Conference, the N I E O was for the first time 
articulated as such. T h e Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t thus came to play a 
critical 'initiating role' in the formulation of the N I E O . 9 3 
In this developing context, the dramatic actions by the O P E C states 
in 1973 to increase the volume of their oil revenues while seeking more 
control over these resources is best seen as another complementary Third-
World strategy to redress traditional international economic imbalances. 
It is not without significance that Boumedienne was simultaneously a 
leading force behind the O P E C and wider N I E O challenges. Also, despite 
the economic hardships visited on the Third-World states without oil 
resources, a measure of mutual empathy developed as the O P E C model 
seemed to c o m m e n d itself as a way in which the formation of commodity 
92. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, p. 28. 
93. O . Jankowitsch and K . Sauvant, 1980. 
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producer organizations might assist in the establishment of their economic 
sovereignty.94 
W h a t the N I E O thus came to represent was a convergence of previous 
institutional initiatives from all parts of the Third World. If Latin 
Americans were the most significant force behind the establishment 
of U N C T A D , Africans were mainly responsible for consolidating and 
transforming the role of the Non-Aligned M o v e m e n t along such paths, 
while the Arab-Islamic world primarily gave the impetus for enjoining 
producer associations in the Third-World economic challenge. 
But at all these levels, as well as others, Africa's presence and impact 
was critical. 'Perhaps more than any other event', it has been argued, the 
impact of African decolonization on the structure of the United Nations 
'changed the focus of the international community towards the problems 
of the L D C s ' . 9 5 T h e special recognition assigned in N I E O declarations 
to the problems of the L D C s (see Table 28.2 above) and to landlocked 
countries, both of which abound in Africa, further illustrate the impact 
of the African condition. 
Africa's important role in the establishment of the A C P Group (Africa-
Caribbean-Pacific Group of States) as a permanent negotiating force with 
the European Economic Communi ty in 1975 was another reminder of 
that continent's impact on the course of international economic change.'6 
So too were the exceptional roles played by Egypt in the late 1950s to 
early 1960s, and more so by Algeria a decade later,97 in mobilizing the 
Third-World economic challenge. A n d by the late 1970s, Julius Nyerere 
stood out as one of the Third World's leading consciences, confident in 
the belief in the necessity and possibility of meaningful Third-World 
self-reliance within institutionalized frameworks of South-South co-
operation.98 
Africa and the continuing Third-World challenge 
As the world entered the 1980s, there was a distinct decline in the 
euphoria which attended die heightened Third-World challenge of the 
1970s. A n increasing economic malaise in Africa, highlighted especially 
in drought- and famine-stricken areas, was coming to be an often cited 
symptom of a wider Third-World malaise. Third-World countries being 
burdened by an unceasing international recession and an increasing 
94. K . P. Sauvant, 1980, pp. 31-5, contains data on the range and membership of such 
'producers' associations' as of 1978. 
95. G . Williams, 1981, p. 4. 
96. K . Hall and B . W . Blake, 1979; J. Ravenhill, 1985; R . Yakemtchouk, 1977. 
97. R . A . Mortimer, 1980, emphasizes Algeria's critical role under Boumedienne at 
various stages of his analysis, especially in Chapter 3, pp. 24-42. 
98. J. K . Nyerere, 1979a. 
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indebtedness were becoming more vulnerable. T h e North-South dialogue 
began to grind to a halt. 
In such conditions it is easy for Third-World and especially African 
sympathizers to adopt a pessimistic outlook. This is where an historical 
perspective m a y serve as a tempering measure, not to blind the observer 
to the difficulties ahead but also to issue a reminder of the past obstacles 
hurdled or challenged. 
A s this chapter is being completed in the 1980s it is fitting to conclude 
with two historical reminders, which also serve to take us back to where 
this essay began. T h e year 1985 was the hundredth anniversary of the 
Congress of Berlin where the partition of Africa was agreed on; it was 
also the thirtieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference which was the 
first major Afro-Asian co-ordinated challenge to the kind of system 
represented by the Congress of Berlin. Viewed from those two per-
spectives, Africa's relations with the developing regions and Africa's role 
in the Third-World movement have m a d e m a n y notable strides. 
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Edmond K w a m K O U A S S I 
T h e United Nations ( U N ) as w e k n o w it today is the child of two major 
historical forces of the twentieth century - the Second World W a r and 
the process of post-war decolonization.1 T h e Second World W a r had 
heightened the urgency for establishing a global body which was dedicated 
to the maintenance of peace. Decolonization had transformed the c o m -
position of that global body and tilted the balance of opinion within its 
more representative institutions. 
T h e world conflict and the process of decolonization were themselves 
interlinked, and Africa was of course an integral part of both global 
episodes. T h e horrors and destruction of the Second World W a r prepared 
international opinion for another experiment in global peace-making - a 
more representative body than the League of Nations, and hopefully a 
more effective one. T h e brutalities of aggression and war crimes, the 
obscenities and inhumanities of genocide against the Jews and others, the 
sheer scale of destruction of life and property - all these factors m a d e 
the international community ready for another global experiment. 
But it was not just the war which shaped the n e w world body. A s w e 
shall see, it was also the era of decolonization. M a n y countries formerly 
under colonial domination achieved independence during the first 25 
years of the existence of the United Nations so that the number of 
m e m b e r nations of the Organization rose from 51 to 157 in 1980. In this 
connection the changes affecting Africa are undoubtedly the most striking. 
T h u s Africa gradually emerged from a state of servitude and subjection, 
and especially from i960, honestly and earnestly began to achieve its 
status as a continent of sovereign nations eager to balance its relations 
with the rest of the world. 
Africa was also very poorly represented at the United Nations in 1945, 
one might say symbolically represented by four theoretically independent 
but practically dependent states. These were Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt and 
1. 'Decolonization' is defined here as the termination of colonial rule, the dismantling 
of colonial institutions and the elimination of colonial styles and values. While the initiative 
for colonization is normally taken by the imperial power, the initiative for decolonization 
usually comes from the colonized and their struggle for liberation. 
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South Africa. N o r was Africa represented at all in the equitable geo-
graphical distribution of non-permanent seats on the Security Council as 
required by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter. T h e 
agreement which operated within the organization from 1946 onwards 
distributed the non-permanent seats between the various regions of the 
world as follows: two for Latin America, one for Western Europe, one 
for Eastern Europe, one for the Near East and one for the Commonwealth . 
Africa was left out of account, and it was only m u c h later, on 17 December 
1963, that Resolution 1991 (XVIII) of the General Assembly did it justice 
by allocating five of the ten non-permanent seats on the Security Council 
to Africa and Asia. 
So long as Africa remained in a state of dependence (as was the case 
from 1945 to i960), the United Nations considered that it had a mission 
of emancipation and a responsibility of liberation towards it. F r o m then 
on the U N links and contacts with Africa were unilateral and in some 
respects paternalistic relationships, inasmuch as they stemmed from 
actions planned and decided by external foreign protagonists, naturally 
inclined to confuse Africa's interests with those of the international 
community or even with their o w n . 
But in retrospect w e can n o w identify more clearly the wider pattern 
of relationships. Since its formation in San Francisco in 1945 the United 
Nations has played three main roles (a number of conflicting roles) in 
relation to Africa: the U N as a collective imperial power which it inherited 
from the League of Nations; secondly, as an ally of liberation; and thirdly, 
as a partner in development. It is these roles which this chapter will 
examine, and our technique here will, whenever possible, be that of 
examining case-studies of those three roles of the United Nations. 
Because the world body's imperial role ('absentee landlord') was so 
benevolent, it is not easy to disentangle it from the world body's role as 
an ally of liberation. Unlike other imperial powers, the United Nations 
was keen to speed up the pace of decolonization. T h e U N therefore often 
clashed with those very colonial powers that were administering the 
trusteeships on its behalf. W h e r e the world body's role as a collective 
imperialist ended and its role as an ally of liberation began was not always 
easy to ascertain. T h e special cases of Namibia and the E w e people 
illustrated some of the dilemmas. Let us examine the latter case in 
historical detail. 
The U N as benevolent imperialist 
O n 10 April 1947, while the United Nations Trusteeship Council was 
holding its first session, its chairman received a telegram from Accra 
(Gold Coast, n o w Ghana) which read as follows: 
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A U E w e Conference comprising E w e of French Togoland, British 
Togoland, Gold Coast, greetings. W e deplore and protest against 
partition of Eweland. Request unification of Eweland under single 
administration to be chosen by people themselves by plebiscite. 
T h e E w e affair was beginning. F r o m its first meeting in 1947 until the 
independence of French Togo in i960 the Trusteeship Council did not 
hold a single session without this question being dealt with directly or 
indirectly. 
For the Trusteeship Council it was the main topic for which it drew 
up its doctrine and part of its method of working. For the General 
Assembly of the United Nations it was the avenue through which m a n y 
governments began to tackle the problems of colonial politics and then 
engaged in a campaign for decolonization. 
T h e E w e habitat extends continuously over almost the whole of the 
south of present-day Togo and the south-east of present-day Ghana, and 
sporadically in the south of the People's Republic of Benin and Nigeria. 
During the partition of Africa after the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 
most E w e peoples were in German Togoland, with some scattered in the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria. W h e n G e r m a n Togoland was partitioned into 
English and French zones on 1 October 1920 (Fig. 29.1) the E w e were 
still more divided; but there was little agitation for their reunification 
until the Second World W a r . In 1943 a press campaign began in the Gold 
Coast (Ghana) demanding the annexation of Togoland under a French 
mandate; and in 1944 a pan-Ewe movement, the 'All E w e Conference', 
was set up. O n the French side the Comité de l'unité togolaise ( C U T ) , the 
Committee for Togolese Unity, until then a purely cultural association, 
transformed itself so as to carry out similar propaganda, and appointed 
as its secretary-general M r Sylvanus Olympio, then an official with the 
United Africa C o m p a n y (a subsidiary of the Unilever group), later to 
become Togo's first president. These were the bodies that were to 
approach the United Nations in 1947. 
T h e E w e affair came before the Trusteeship Council again at its 
November 1947 session. M r Sylvanus Olympio put the E w e point of 
view to the Council, and criticized the Franco-British m e m o r a n d u m 
whose solutions he regarded as inadequate. 
During the first debate it was noteworthy that the Council paid great 
attention to the petitioners, w h o were allowed to express their point of 
view to it by word of mouth. Whereas in the Mandates Committee of 
the League of Nations, dominated by the colonial powers, the latter 
enjoyed complete confidence, in the Trusteeship Council, in which they 
were a minority, the atmosphere was slightly anti-colonialist. If the voting 
was not more critical of the British and French it was partly because the 
solidarity between London and Paris impressed the Council. 
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fig. 29.1 Togoland in ¡9¡g - Franco-British Declaration, London, 10 July 1919 (after
E. K. Kouassi)
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In late December 1949-early January 1950, a U N visiting mission went 
to the area and reviewed the main points of the E w e problem. It concluded 
that the problem was not merely an economic one: 
M a n y Togolese on both sides of the border adopt a firm political 
position, and only mention the border difficulties as one argument 
a m o n g others; they proclaim that unification is an essential step on the 
road to self-government or independence. 
In other words they considered that self-government or independence, 
which according to the Charter are the basic objectives of the trusteeship 
system, must be achieved in the framework of a Togolese state with 
borders more or less corresponding to those of the former G e r m a n 
Togoland and that the maintenance of the existing dual administration 
was incompatible with the fulfilment of their hopes. 
During 1950 the administering authorities suggested enlarging the 
Consultative Committee to include elected, not appointed, members to 
represent public opinion. It also became clear that on the British side the 
northern peoples were asking to become part of the Gold Coast, whereas 
on the French side they were asking for the status quo. In this situation, 
the problem being strictly confined to the E w e , it seemed out of the 
question to reconstitute ex-German Togoland. 
T h e elections to the 'enlarged' Consultative Committee took place in 
the autumn of 1950. T h e y occurred without any particular difficulty in 
British Togoland. In French Togoland, on the other hand, the C U T , 
sensing that victory would be denied because of the electoral system 
adopted, withdrew all its candidates four days before the elections. T h e 
seats reserved for it were given to its opponent, the Parti togolais du 
progrès (PTP) , the Togolese Progressive Party. Out of a total of 47 
members elected, eight (British Togoland) were in favour of becoming 
part of the Gold Coast, 15 in favour of E w e unification, and 24 in favour 
of the status quo. T h e Committee met in November, but with six British 
E w e delegates boycotting it and the C U T representatives replaced by 
those of the P T P , it could only come d o w n on the side of the administering 
authorities. Hence the majority declared itself against E w e unification. 
T h e Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 
which was then beginning its session, received petitions blaming the 
French government for the way the elections were carried out and also 
for the arbitrary arrests. Several delegates criticized the attitude of the 
French government, which had to have an inquiry set up into the 
propriety of the electoral procedure. For the first time at the United 
Nations, an administering power was the subject of harsh criticism from 
members not belonging to the communist bloc. At the eighth session of 
the Trusteeship Council (February-March 1951) the British and French 
found themselves on the defensive, although they had conscientiously 
prepared the ground in Washington and N e w York. T h e prevailing 
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impression was that the administering powers were using delaying tactics, 
and that firm measures should be taken to put a stop to this: the Americans 
and Iraqis suggested the holding of fresh elections, at any rate in the 
south. In the end the Council urged the administering authorities to find 
a solution to the problem through the enlarged Committee. 
At the ninth session of the Trusteeship Council in M a y 1951, Britain 
and France seemed to lack the imagination to submit a plan that would 
satisfy the Council. T h e British were mainly concerned with the aftermath 
of internal self-government in the Gold Coast, while the French were 
envisaging sweeping reforms in West Africa: so on both sides it was 
thought better not to change the situation in the Togolands. Inasmuch 
as these reforms represented not a solution to the E w e problem but 
merely a way of improving the lot of the E w e , they were criticized by 
the representatives of various political bodies that gave evidence to the 
Council, and also by the Dutch, the Dominicans and the Argentines, w h o 
found them insufficiently constructive. 
T h e British and French suggested the setting up of a n e w 'Joint 
Council for Togolese Affairs', whose objective would be 'to provide a 
meeting-place for the representatives of the peoples of the two Togos at 
which views could be exchanged about the development of these terri-
tories, and the measures taken co-ordinated and followed up so as to 
ensure their progress in all fields'. In November the affair came before 
the seventh session of the General Assembly. This idea was again put 
forward, and was criticized by 'the E w e nationalists'. 
T h e Fourth Committee recommended that the administering authorities 
should consult the parties and groups before setting up the Joint Council, 
and also enlarge its scope so as to enable it to consider all E w e problems 
and unification. It also asked the Trusteeship Council to organize a 
visit to carry out a thorough examination of the problem and make 
recommendations. Thus the higher authority (the Fourth Committee of 
the General Assembly) showed itself more severe towards the admin-
istering authorities than the lower authorities (the Council). At this point 
the E w e affair ceased to be a separate issue and became merely part of a 
triple problem, the other two being: the union of British Togoland with 
the Gold Coast, and self-government for the latter; and the closer 
integration of French Togoland with the French Union, and at the same 
time the beginning of internal self-government. W h a t had initially been 
an ethnic and cultural problem had n o w become territorial and political. 
T h e special mission of the Trusteeship Council stayed in the area for 
August and September 1951, toured the territories for five weeks, and 
received 2896 petitions. Its report s u m m e d up the situation. A majority 
of the population favoured independence, but attached conditions: for the 
British Togolese, to become Ghanaians; and for the French Togolese, to 
join the French Union which in practice multiplied the demands for 
unification. 
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O n the recommendation of the Visiting Committee, the Trusteeship 
Council in November 1955 adopted the principle of a referendum to 
ascertain the wishes of the people. In British Togoland the referendum 
produced 93 000 votes in favour of annexation to the Gold Coast and 
67000 against; but in the south - that is, in E w e country proper - the 
majority was against annexation. T h e Trusteeship Council recommended 
the annexation of British Togoland to the Gold Coast and the abrogation 
of the trusteeship agreement on independence day. Ghana, resulting from 
the union of the former Gold Coast and southern British Togoland, 
became a m e m b e r of the United Nations in 1957. 
O n the French side, the independence of the Gold Coast brought with 
it self-government for Togo. In 1956 the self-governing Republic of Togo 
was proclaimed, and a referendum was held in October. There were 
331 000 votes for adopting a n e w system and 22000 for maintaining the 
trusteeship system. 
Having, in the words of the Charter, achieved 'its capability to govern 
itself, Togo could free itself from the trusteeship agreements. But the 
Trusteeship Council refused to abrogate its agreements, asking for the 
Togolese legislative assembly to be re-elected by universal suffrage and 
for the elections to be supervised by a United Nations commissioner with 
a team of observers. Eventually the trusteeship agreements were abrogated 
on 27 April i960, the day on which Togo was declared independent. 
T h u s the E w e affair came to an end, 13 years after it had begun: Ghana 
was independent; Togo was independent; and the E w e were still divided. 
T h e United Nations had terminated one more responsibility as a collective 
imperial power. 
T h e Congo: collective imperialism in transition 
If there is a country the history of whose decolonization is closely bound 
up with the work of the United Nations, it is surely the former Belgian 
colony of the Congo, n o w Zaire (Fig. 29.2). 
T h e pre-conditions of Africa's development are: first, national integrity; 
and, secondly, basic political stability. Without these, sustained develop-
ment is but an elusive mirage. T h e boundaries of the political community 
have to be intact (national integrity) and the foundations of political 
authority have to be relatively durable (basic political stability). T h e 
greatest challenge faced by the United Nations as a partner in Africa's 
development came precisely with the independence of the former Belgian 
Congo - n o w Zaire. Both the national integrity (boundaries) and the 
political stability (authority) of the newly-independent state were put into 
question; and the United Nations was caught in between. But the question 
still remains: was the Congo mission of the U N a n e w kind of collective 
imperialism by the world organization? O r was it a case of the U N as 
Africa's genuine partner? T h e United States was initially more supportive 
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of the Congo's national integrity (preventing the Congo's disintegration) 
than of its basic political stability (supporting the duly elected government 
of Patrice L u m u m b a as prime minister). T h e vacillation of both the U N ' s 
secretary-general and the United States finally resulted in the assassination 
of Patrice L u m u m b a . Stability was purchased at the cost of political 
legitimacy. A n d the background to this saga did indeed go back almost 
to Independence D a y in what was then Léopoldville, the capital of the 
newly 'liberated' Belgian Congo . It is to this saga that w e must n o w turn 
as a special case-study of the United Nations as a partner in Africa's 
development, an ally in Africa's liberation and, paradoxically, as a collective 
imperial power in a n e w guise at the same time. 
T w o of the leading actors of the 1960-1 drama of the Congo lost 
their lives during this dubious combat: L u m u m b a was assassinated and 
Hammarskjöld died in a still unexplained aeroplane 'accident'.2 
F r o m 15 July i960, w h e n the first U N peace-keeping troops arrived 
in the Congolese capital, Léopoldville, to 14 January 1963, when the 
government of Katanga at last agreed to end its secession, none of the 
vicissitudes of the history of the Congo can be analysed without reference 
to the U N attitude. T h e latter had to respond to the appeal m a d e to it 
by the first Congolese central government. T h e crisis included the 
following: 
(1) the Congo's state of unpreparedness for the independence for-
mally granted by Belgium; 
(2) the virtual absence of trained technical, political and military 
personnel; and 
(3) the arrogance of the representatives of the former colonial power. 
In a daily order dated 5 July i960, the Belgian General Jansens, 
commander of the Congolese gendarmerie, bluntly told his m e n : 'Inde-
pendence is all right for civilians. For soldiers there is only discipline. 
Before 30 June you had white officers . . . Nothing has changed'. 
For the Congolese soldiers w h o had been present at the independence 
celebrations and had heard L u m u m b a ' s speech in the presence of the 
King of the Belgians, this was a flagrant provocation to African history: 
for them something had changed. Mutiny broke out in the 'Leopold II' 
camps on the outskirts of the capital; and at Thysville, 200 kilometres 
away, the garrisons called for the Africanization of senior ranks in the 
gendarmerie. This revolt, brought about by the attitude of the Belgian 
officers, was the starting-point of the whole affair. During the night of 5 
July L u m u m b a tried to restore calm in the mutinous camps; on the 6th 
he dismissed Jansens and appointed his uncle Lundula and his former 
secretary M o b u t u as commanders of the gendarmerie. H e promoted 
2. C . Roire, 1967. 
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all the Congolese non-commissioned officers. But the military disorder 
intensified. 
S o m e Europeans were ill-treated, others threatened, by this mutiny of 
their former servants. This affair of the gendarmerie gave the Belgians 
an excuse to reinforce their contingents which had remained in the 
country. Several battalions of parachutists were sent to Léopoldville, 
Luluabourg and Elisabethville to protect Belgian nationals. In the capital 
of Katanga province it was a matter not only of regaining control of the 
gendarmerie but also of making a success of secession. Three days after 
the arrival of Belgian reinforcements - that is, on 11 July - T s h o m b e 
appeared on the scene and proclaimed the 'independence' of the province. 
In reply, the central government asked M r Timberlake, the American 
ambassador, for 3000 American troops to be sent to the Congo, and 
L u m u m b a and Kasavubu cabled the U N secretary-general, then in 
Geneva, asking for U N military assistance. T h e Léopoldville government 
wanted intervention by the United Nations in order to put an end to that 
of Belgium and in this it enjoyed the support of the Asian and socialist 
countries as well as the more radical African states which later formed 
the Casablanca group. A majority of the Security Council, meeting on 13 
July, and the Secretary-General, at the suggestion of one of the key 
figures in this whole period, the Tunisian Mongi Slim, decided to send 
a United Nations' force to the Congo to restore order. 
So the die was cast that day, 14 July i960: the M o n g i Slim resolution 
(supported by the United States, whereas the British and French stayed 
completely loyal to Brussels in not wanting any internationalization) 
simply 'appealed to the Belgian Government to withdraw its troops', and 
provided for U N military assistance to the Congolese government until 
'the National Security forces' were 'able, in the opinion of that govern-
ment, fully to perform their duties'. This was a long way from the request 
of L u m u m b a and Kasavubu. In their second telegram to Hammarskjöld, 
they said: 'assistance sought aims not restore internal situation in Congo 
but rather protect national territory against act aggression by troops from 
metropolitan Belgium'. 
O n the evening of 15 July the first U N troops, 300 Tunisians and 80 
Ghanaians, arrived in Léopoldville under the c o m m a n d of the Swedish 
General Van Horn. T h e U N force was deployed in the next few days; 
and when L u m u m b a went to the United States at the end of July the 
peace-keeping force numbered 11155. T h e biggest contingents, which 
were also to play a decisive political role in the next few weeks, were 
those of Morocco (2465 m e n ) , Ghana (2412) and Tunisia (2151). But the 
presence of the U N troops solved neither of the problems which in the 
eyes of the Congolese government justified their presence and deployment 
in the country's territory: the secession of Katanga was being consolidated, 
and the Belgian troops were still there. 
A further meeting of the Security Council took place on 21 and 22 
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July, producing a further resolution. T h e Security Council decided to 
abide by its initial interpretation of the role of the U N force: the 
maintenance of order. Hammarskjöld's hesitant attitude during this period 
was partly justified by the emergence into the open of dissensions within 
the Congolese government. While L u m u m b a , with his unitarist, centralist 
views, was demanding the end of the secession of Katanga, if necessary 
by the use of force, President Kasavubu continued to favour a federal 
solution; at the beginning of August he telegraphed to the Security 
Council in this sense. This federal option implicitly suggested that it was 
still possible to negotiate with Tshombe . 
T h e ambiguity and confusion grew. T h u s when the Security Council 
met for the third time on 8 and 9 August i960, it was to hear the 
secretary-general asking to have his powers defined. H e wanted to k n o w 
whether the U N force should proceed to occupy Katanga province by 
every available means. This clear question was to receive another vague 
reply from the Security Council: the third M o n g i Slim resolution certainly 
acknowledged that it was 'absolutely necessary' for the U N troops to 
enter Katanga, but it also said in the next paragraph that the U N force 
'will not take part in any internal conflict, will not intervene in such a 
conflict in any way, and will not be used to influence its outcome'. 
In these circumstances, Hammarskjöld had to make some crucial 
decisions alone. O n 10 August, w h e n nobody, not even Belgium, had 
recognized the independence of Katanga, Hammarskjöld telegraphed to 
Tshombe to ask for a 'frank exchange of views' about 'the arrangements 
for deploying United Nations troops in Katanga'. O n 12 August he landed 
at Elisabethville with the French-Moroccan General Kettani and 300 
Swedish U N troops: and in two days of talks Tshombe got him to agree 
to eight of the ten conditions he attached to the entry of U N troops in 
Katanga. A m o n g them were the undertaking by the U N not to interfere 
in Katanga's internal or administrative affairs; not to permit the use of 
means of transport, aircraft or other, to allow elements sent by the 
Léopoldville government or emissaries of the latter to be introduced into 
Katanga; and not to meddle in the legal system or administration of 
Katanga, until the Congolese constitution was finally drawn up and 
approved by Katanga: the status quo would be maintained on the basis of 
the Katanga constitution. B y accepting those terms, the secretary-general 
agreed to the principle of'coexistence' between the U N force and Katanga, 
and implicitly undertook not to help the Congolese central government 
to regain control of the secessionist province. In trusting Tshombe , 
and through him the Belgians, the secretary-general m a d e a serious 
mistake. Not only did the compromise not begin to solve the problem 
of Katanga's secession, it actually precipitated the start of the conflict 
between Hammarskjöld and L u m u m b a which was only to end with 
the death of the Congolese prime minister. T h e U N role was getting 
imperialistic. 
881 
Africa since iç3J 
O n 14 August i960, L u m u m b a protested against the Hammarskjöld 
agreement, and submitted to the United Nations five very precise demands 
which were completely at odds with the Elisabethville compromise. T h e 
Congolese prime minister asked die international organization: 
(1) to give Congolese soldiers and police the task of guarding the 
Congo's aerodromes; 
(2) to send African troops immediately to Katanga; 
(3) to put aircraft at the disposal of the Congolese central government 
to transport its troops anywhere in the country; 
(4) to proceed at once to seize all the weapons distributed by the 
Belgians in Katanga and hand these weapons over to the central 
government; and 
(5) at once to withdraw all non-African troops from Katanga. 
T h e crisis deepened and the neo-imperialist tendencies on the part of the 
officials and troops of the United Nations became obvious when on 5 
September, after a meeting with two Belgian envoys, Messrs Denis and 
Van Bilsen, President Kasavubu decided to dismiss L u m u m b a , which he 
announced over the radio at 8.15 p . m . T h e conflict between the two m e n 
had been latent ever since the time of the struggle for independence. 
Kasavubu naturally chose to make an open break at a time w h e n L u m u m b a 
seemed to have lost m u c h of his international weight: only the communist 
countries, plus the United Arab Republic and Indonesia, supported him 
fully in his disagreement with Hammarskjöld. T h e prime minister cer-
tainly tried to reply: less than an hour after his rival, he went to the radio 
station and m a d e a speech in which he said that 'there is no head of state 
any more'. 
O n m a r t y r d o m and reform 
Here w e c o m e to one of the most disturbing episodes in the activities of 
the U N representatives. In the early afternoon of 6 September, A n d r e w 
Cordier, a close colleague of D a g Hammarskjöld, commandeered the 
Ghanaian contingent under the c o m m a n d of Colonel Ankrah to guard 
the radio-station building, and sent a note to L u m u m b a forbidding him 
in future to speak to his fellow-citizens. At the same time Kettani's 
Moroccan contingent of U N troops surrounded the prime minister's villa. 
Collective imperialism was using African troops to prevent L u m u m b a 
from maintaining the Western independence and territorial integrity of 
the Congo. 
While L u m u m b a asked in vain to be found a seat on a plane bound 
for N e w York, where he wanted to go himself to state his government's 
position at the U N , Kasavubu, w h o m the U N then regarded as the only 
indisputable legitimate authority, went to Manhattan with no difficulty. 
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plate 29.1 Above left: Dag Hammarskjöld (left), secretary-general of the United Nations,
and Joseph Kasavubu (seated right, in profile), president of Congo, meet in Léopoldville on 29
July i960; above right: M. Tshombe, prime minister of the secessionist province of Katanga
(now Shaba), Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), August i960; below left: P. Lumumba, prime
minister of the Republic of Congo, July i960; below right: Colonel J. D. Mobutu, chief of
staffof the Congo Army, September i960
At the conclusion of the discussions, both in the chamber and in the
corridors, which lasted from 7 to 22 November, Kasavubu was acknow¬
ledged as the only Congolese qualified to appoint a delegation to represent
his country.
When Kasavubu returned to Léopoldville in great triumph on the
evening of 27 November, Lumumba was finally beaten. The head of the
only Congolese central government to have been legally invested by the
parliament was thus neutralized. His only hope then was Antoine Gizenga,
who on 13 November had replaced Finant at the head of the Stanleyville
provincial government. In trying to escape from Léopoldville in December
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i960 to the Eastern province, he was captured by Mobutu's troops and 
later sent to Katanga where he was shot in the presence of T s h o m b e and 
his ministers on 17 January 1961. It was this anti-Lumumba stance on 
the part of the United Nations, until the official announcement of 
L u m u m b a ' s death by M u n o n g o on 13 February, that most sickened world 
public opinion at the time. 
L u m u m b a was not to die in vain. His death at last enabled the Security 
Council to emerge from the alleged 'neutrality' to which it had confined 
itself since the beginning of the crisis. T h e emotion aroused by L u m u m -
ba's murder was to compel the United Nations to give its secretary-
general somewhat more precise instructions for actions than in the 
past. 
In the tumult aroused by L u m u m b a ' s death, the Afro-Asian countries, 
which had long swung to and fro between the two blocs but were n o w 
genuinely indignant, managed to put through a resolution which was to 
give fresh impetus to U N activities. T h e text of 21 February, adopted 
when news had just been received, again through Dayal, of the massacre 
of six Lumumbist leaders by Kalondji in Kasai, instructed the U N troops 
to avert the danger of civil war and resort to force 'if necessary, as a last 
resort' in order to restore peace. T h e resolution, which also called for 
steps to be taken to evacuate the mercenaries and 'all Belgian military 
and paramilitary personnel and political advisers', referred explicitly to 
the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo. Hammarskjöld could 
thus, if he wished, put down the Katangan secession and the Belgian 
intervention by force. However, Kasavubu, whose authority the United 
Nations had recognized, denied the latter's right to intervene. But on 17 
April Kasavubu yielded to the arguments of the secretary-general's two 
n e w special envoys, Gardiner from Ghana and Nwokedi from Niger: he 
agreed to co-operate with the United Nations in return for two promises 
(which were in fact kept) - the recall of the Indian Dayal and financial 
assistance for the Léopoldville authorities. 
T h e result of this agreement was the Coquilhatville Conference of all 
the anti-Lumumbist provinces. Kasavubu said that he acknowledged the 
validity of the U N resolutions and wished to convene the Congolese 
parliament. W h e n Tshombe indicated his disagreement soldiers loyal to 
Kasavubu arrested the Katangan leader; he was to remain under house-
arrest at Léopoldville until he agreed to the proposed meeting of par-
liament. It was briefly supposed that the solution of the Congo's problems 
was in sight. But this hope was dashed by Tshombe's volte-face on his 
return to Elizabethville. T h e Congolese parliament met on 27 July; and 
with an absolute majority of Lumumbists, it elected a government of 
national unity headed by Adoula. But the problem remained intact: the 
Congolese army pursued its independent policy, and above all Tshombe 
and his protectors consolidated their secession. T h e total number of 
mercenaries and 'advisers' in Katanga at that time was estimated at 1500. 
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Yet, right up to the end, the U N officials in the Congo thought that they 
could fulfil their mission without using force. 
O n an order signed by Kasavubu, Indian and Swedish troops from 28 
August 1961 onwards tried to arrest the mercenaries and 'evacuate' them. 
T h e U N troops did occupy the aerodrome and more strategic points of 
Elisabethville without firing a shot, and took 273 'non-Africans' prisoner, 
including 237 Belgians. U p to 13 September everything went very well. 
But when the Indian U N troops, with the agreement of the local U N 
representative, O'Brien, tried to go on to serious business — the disarming 
of the mercenaries of Falques and Lasimone - heavy fighting broke out. 
Everywhere, both at Katima and Jadotville, the U N troops were isolated 
and surrounded. 
This 13 September offensive, which started under bad conditions 
without having been prepared, still less explicitly approved, by senior 
officials of the United Nations, was a failure for Hammarskjöld. Through 
the intermediary of the British, who were m u c h in evidence and very 
active during this period, M r Hammarskjöld sought and obtained from 
Tshombe the promise of a cease-fire and discussions. This was not to be. 
O n 17 September, just after midnight, the aeroplane taking Hammarskjöld 
to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) made a sharp turn over 
the aerodrome and crashed 12 kilometres away. Hammarskjöld's death, 
like L u m u m b a ' s , was not in vain, for it led to the firm decision to put 
d o w n the secession of Katanga by every possible means, as is evident 
from the resolution of 21 November 1961 sponsored by U Thant, the 
new secretary-general. This resolution referred explicitly to the use of force 
by the U N Congo contingent if necessary to put d o w n the mercenaries and 
end the secession. T h e U N force was n o w given some of the equipment 
it lacked; in particular the Americans provided jet aircraft. T h e aim of 
the military operation launched by the U N troops on 18 December was 
exclusively political; to get Tshombe to negotiate. Thus , when the 
centre of Elisabethville had been occupied, those w h o had most strongly 
supported the U N initiative, namely the Americans, exerted themselves 
to bring it to an end by making Tshombe agree to negotiate with 
Léopoldville. W h e n these negotiations were frustrated by Tshombe's 
vacillations and evasions, the U N with the full backing of the United 
States launched a decisive offensive. Briskly carried out in the first days 
of January 1963, this ended in the declaration of submission by the 
Katanga ministers. B y the time his last bastion at Kolwezi fell on 21 
January, Tshombe was already done for: a week before, the Union miniere 
had announced that from n o w on it was ready to pay its mining royalties 
to the central government. T h e mercenaries for their part opted to seek 
temporary refuge in Angola. Tshombe, after trying to stay on the political 
stage for a few more months, left for Europe on 15 June 1963. 
H e was not to return to the Congo until a year later, on 26 June 1964, 
four days before the departure of the U N troops, w h o despite all the 
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vacillations of their superiors had finally managed to put d o w n the 
secession. H a d the U N really finished its job in the military field? If its 
mandate had really been to establish peace in the Congo, the U N force 
would no doubt have stayed there m u c h longer: 1964 was, after all, the 
year of the most terrible war the country had known since independence. 
T h e 'rebellion' spread, but the United Nations did not intervene. 
During the last months of their stay, the 5350 U N troops w h o had 
stayed did little more than stand surety for the legitimacy of Adoula's 
central government. Nobody suggested keeping a U N military presence 
in the Congo at dawn on 30 June 1964. 
Did the U N fulfil its mission in the Congo? Would the Congo have 
emerged from chaos sooner if the international organization had acted 
more quickly and forcefully against the Katangan secession and its 
supporters in certain European countries? Did the United Nations ensure 
success for the interests of the whole international community, or for 
those of only one camp? These questions, which only history will perhaps 
answer, cannot alter the facts: the intervention of the United Nations, 
called for by Patrice L u m u m b a , was necessary; the 'cold war' was not 
imported into the Congo by the international organization, it settled there 
because that country was both one of the richest in Africa (because of its 
mineral deposits) and also one of the most vulnerable (because Belgian 
colonialism had been neglectful). W h a t would have happened to the 
Congo without the United Nations? With the U N it at least survived. 
In the Congo the U N had indeed played out three of its roles in Africa. 
At times the U N was a collective imperial power - and its sins of both 
omission and commission cost Patrice L u m u m b a his life. T h e U N in the 
Congo was also Africa's partner in development - trying to safeguard the 
preconditions of national integrity and political stability for the fragile 
Congo. But the U N was also an ally of Africa's liberation as it tried to 
prevent n e w forms of re-colonization of the Congo by Belgians and others. 
In this last role as ally in Africa's liberation the U N was maintaining 
its n e w tradition of fostering decolonization - a tradition which had 
received its earlier supreme test on the issue of French claims over 
Algeria. Let us n o w turn to this issue of decolonization in Algeria and 
elsewhere. 
T h e U N as ally in liberation 
In terms of the U N as a friend of the decolonization and liberation of 
Africa, the problem of Algeria was the most difficult in the 1950s. F e w 
imperial powers have been as resistant to the loss of a colony as France 
was to the loss of Algeria. A n d yet France was a permanent m e m b e r of 
the Security Council (with its veto) and an ally of the United States in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) from 1948 onwards. 
Under those circumstances, what chance did the world body have of 
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supporting the movement for liberating Algeria? Let us study the pro-
gression of this case of Algeria in greater detail. 
It is c o m m o n knowledge that the U N work in helping to bring into 
being the new independent African states hastened the process of their 
decolonization. This is true for both North Africa and black Africa. 
O n 16 October 1952 the General Assembly decided to put on its agenda 
the problems posed by the maintenance of the French role in Tunisia 
and Morocco. France argued in vain that the United Nations had no 
jurisdiction, pleading the famous Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter 
which precludes the U N from intervening in the internal affairs of 
m e m b e r states. M r Robert S c h u m a n n could not convince the Assembly 
that the affairs of these protectorates were a matter solely for France, and 
a first resolution about them was adopted in December 1952. 
T h e Assembly was able to exert even stronger and more vigilant 
pressures in the development of the Algerian crisis, which had degenerated 
into open warfare after 1954. T h e French government thought it was on 
firmer legal ground about non-intervention in Algeria. But (and w e quote 
M r Ben Bella's speech to the General Assembly on 9 October 1962, after 
the unanimous vote admitting his country to the United Nations), 
for seven years the Algerian question came up regularly at every 
session of the Assembly. T h e debates to which it gave rise marked 
out the changing course of the conflict, and delegations were in a 
position to appreciate the dimensions of this conflict and to become 
familiar with its circumstances 
T h e case of Algeria (Fig. 29.3) is thus particularly indicative of the 
role played by the United Nations in decolonization. M a n y French 
government initiatives on Algeria at h o m e seemed to coincide with the 
way the affair went in the General Assembly. For example, the 1957 
parliamentary debates in France and the adoption of more liberal laws 
for Algeria were designed to counterbalance the effect on international 
opinion of France's intensification of the war. 
In September 1955 at the Tenth General Assembly, the Afro-Asian 
countries made their first attempt to get the United Nations to consider 
the Algerian problem as a potential threat to world peace. A . Pinay, the 
French minister of foreign affairs, reverted to the argument based on 
Article 2, paragraph 7: Algeria had for 125 years been legally part of 
France, so that this was definitely a case in which this provision of the 
Charter should apply. But despite manoeuvres smacking of 'diplomatic 
canvassing' there were on 30 September 1955, 28 votes for putting the 
item on the agenda, 27 against and 5 abstentions. This was w h e n France 
'slammed the door', for some time adopting a policy of staying away and 
letting it be understood that it might even leave the Organization. So the 
Assembly was led to go back on its decision: on 25 November 1955, the 
Algeria problem was removed from the agenda, and France resumed its 
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seat. It was only a postponement: the representative of the Front de 
liberation nationale - F L N (National Liberation Front), with the Afro-
Asian Group, soon got a special subcommittee of the group set up to 
deal with the matter (it was chaired by U Thant, then the delegate of 
Burma) . 
In June 1956 the Security Council received a request for it to meet, 
following an approach by the Arab states based on Articles 34 and 35 of 
the Charter (under which any m e m b e r state m a y bring to the attention 
of the Security Council any 'dispute or situation . . . likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security'). This also failed. 
T h e Afro-Asian Group, arguing that France (which was accused of waging 
a war of extermination) had violated the Universal Declaration of H u m a n 
Rights, therefore renewed its request for the matter to be put on the 
agenda of the November 1956 General Assembly, and secured it without 
a debate. T h e Latin American compromise resolution was adopted in 
February 1957, after the Afro-Asian draft was rejected in the Political 
Committee. T h e n e w resolution - designed not to offend French sus-
ceptibilities too m u c h — did not even mention the Algerian people's right 
to self-determination but merely expressed the hope that 'in a spirit of 
co-operation, a peaceful democratic and just solution will be found, 
through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations'. 
Nevertheless, this vote was a success for the F L N inasmuch as it 
indirectly asserted the jurisdiction of the United Nations. T h e course of 
events at the September 1957 session was the same: inclusion on the 
agenda without a debate and without opposition from France, which 
(while maintaining its legal argument of domestic jurisdiction) hoped to 
take advantage of the debates to 'answer the accusations and slanders' 
levelled at it and not let its opponents monopolize the rostrum. 
T h e Algerian issue was symbolic of a n e w anti-colonial m o o d in the 
world body. In 1958 the African Group was formed - strongly anti-
imperialist. Ghana (where the leaders of the Union des populations du 
Cameroun, the U P C , were living) and Guinea supported a draft resolution 
calling for the lifting of the ban on the U P C and the holding of fresh 
elections in Cameroon under the control of the United Nations. India 
and most of the Asian states supported the French proposal aimed at 
giving Cameroon its independence without new elections. This was 
adopted. Pressures were also exerted by the African states in support of 
the Algerian F L N , and this led to a hostile atmosphere towards France 
at every session. Moreover the anti-apartheid campaign carried out by the 
small African Group during the year 1958-9 led the United States to 
vote for the resolutions condemning South Africa instead of abstaining. 
i960 was Africa's year. It was also the year in which the United Nations 
Secretariat became aware of a certain overall responsibility towards the 
blank continent. T h u s in January i960 D a g Hammarskjöld, the secretary-
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general, went on a big six-weeks' tour of Africa, where he met most of 
Africa's future heads of state. Hammarskjöld was aware from then on of 
an enormous task to be accomplished; and this ' m o o d ' was accompanied 
during that year, i960, by a remarkable publicity campaign by the press. 
A n event of exceptional gravity also occurred in i960. This was the 
Sharpeville shootings in South Africa, which on 25 M a r c h led to a call 
for a meeting of the Security Council and the adoption of the famous 1 
April resolution calling on South Africa to abandon apartheid. This was 
regarded as a victory for the African Group, and was certainly not 
unconnected with Pretoria's decision to permit a visit by the secretary-
general of the United Nations in July. 
At the end of i960 the African delegations to the General Assembly 
scored another notable success by securing the adoption, after a Soviet 
motion had been rejected, of a resolution against colonialism in Africa by 
90 votes to nil, with nine abstentions. T h e U N became a fuller ally in 
Africa's struggle for liberation. 
Despite their internal difficulties, the African states were playing a 
significant role in the glass palace at Manhattan. 
Yet 1961 was to be a particularly gloomy year at the United Nations. 
A s has been pointed out in earlier chapters, the African delegations were 
split between the Casablanca Group (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, 
United Arab Republic and the provisional government of the Republic 
of Algeria) and the Brazzaville Group, comprising nearly all the other 
states of what had been French Africa. 
1961 began with the Angola affair (riots in Luanda in February, an 
insurrection in March) , which came up at the U N three times in March 
and April and ended in a vote by the Security Council (nine votes for, 
with two abstentions) calling on the Portuguese government to stop its 
repressive activity. T h e year continued with the Franco-Tunisian conflict 
at Bizerta, which ended at the extraordinary session in August in the 
resolution calling on France to withdraw its troops from the whole of 
Tunisian territory. This resolution, which was adopted by 66 votes, with 
30 abstentions, received 8 votes from the Brazzaville Group. 
O n the problem of decolonization, the end of 1961 saw several proposals 
for the setting of a deadline for the independence of the African colonies. 
1962, suggested by the Soviet Union, was rejected as too soon; while 
1970, put forward by Nigeria and Liberia, seemed too late to m a n y 
delegations. In the end it was decided not to set a deadline but a resolution 
was adopted setting up a Special Committee of the United Nations for 
the countries which were still colonized. This Committee, comprising 
representatives of Asian and African countries, the colonial powers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and k n o w n as the Committee of 
Seventeen, was in fact set up in January 1962. 
From 1963 onwards the situation improved markedly, thanks in par-
ticular to the ending of the Algerian war and of the period of anarchy in 
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the Congo. A s w e have seen, the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) 
was also created, ushering in a new and different era in the development 
of die relationship between Africa and the United Nations. With the 
setting up of the O A U in M a y 1963, Africa could henceforth look to an 
organization for receptiveness, dialogue, negotiation and consultation with 
the outside world. 
As a result the U N relations with Africa underwent profound quan-
titative and also qualitative changes. O n the one hand the continent's 
coefficient of representation in the Organization rose from a tenth in 1945 
to about a third in 1963 (this ratio remained constant until 1980). O n the 
other hand, the African states came to realize both that the balance of 
power had changed in their favour and also that some of their interests 
were quite specific. They m a d e precise demands, and their basic objective 
was to make their diplomatic and, indeed, their political influence pro-
portional to their numerical strength. 
T h e confluence of the basic philosophy of the United Nations, which 
had been built up during the Second World W a r by the victors, and the 
demands of the African states which for various reasons were het-
erogeneous, gave rise to complex, ambiguous and sometimes difficult 
relationships with Africa. 
As it turned out, alliance in liberation between the U N and Africa was 
easier than partnership in development. S o m e of the most difficult 
differences in approach towards development were between U N insti-
tutions and the orientation of the Organization of African Unity. It is to 
some of these divergences that w e must n o w turn. 
The U N as partner in development 
Africa's relations with the United Nations in the economic field are 
conducted partly through the Organization of African Unity and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; their formation and 
aspects of their activities have been discussed in the earlier chapters. 
Here, w e will confine ourselves to the relations between the two at both 
institutional and normative levels. 
In April 1958 the United Nations set up a United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa ( E C A ) , its function being to speed up the economic 
and social development of the African continent, to carry out studies, and 
to keep the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which set it 
up and supervises it, informed of the situation in the region. 
But the O A U , when it was set up in 1963, from the outset asserted 
its competence for co-ordinating, strengthening and harmonizing co-
operation between African peoples in all fields, including those of the 
E C A . T h u s , Article X X of the Charter of Addis Ababa authorized the 
Assembly of Heads of State to set up five specialized commissions, 
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including an Economic and Social Commission whose task was to promote 
economic co-operation in Africa. 
At its first session in Niamey in December 1964, this Economic and 
Social Commission, which was established by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government in July 1964, enunciated the principles that were 
to govern the O A U ' s relations with the E C A . Having defined itself as 
the supreme planning and executive body, it confined the role of the E C A 
to technical and consultative questions: in other words, the E C A was to 
carry out studies and surveys which would serve as a basis for decisions 
by the O A U . 
This attempt to subordinate a U N organ to the O A U was clearly stated 
by the O A U ' s first administrative secretary-general in 1966, when he told 
the representatives of the member states that the principles governing the 
relationship between the O A U and the E C A applied also to the relationship 
between the O A U and the other United Nations specialized agencies.3 
As against the O A U ' s determination to exercise control over the activities 
of the E C A , the latter's Executive Secretariat quoted its organization's 
statute: they pointed out that an organ of the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, which was answerable to the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council and whose policies were defined 
and financed by the United Nations, could not agree to submit to a policy 
defined by African states within the O A U . T h e O A U could only be 
complementary to the E C A and ready to support the latter's undertakings 
in the economic and social field; its recommendations, even though 
welcomed by the Economic and Social Council, could not be binding on 
the United Nations General Assembly. 
T h e collision between these two different, not to say opposing, ideas 
about the E C A created dissension among the m e m b e r states of the O A U 
which, together with financial problems, led to the suspension of the 
O A U ' s economic and social activities. 
It was in these circumstances that the agreement between the United 
Nations and the O A U about co-operation between the latter and the E C A 
was signed on 15 November 1965. But this agreement, which 'can be 
summarized as a declaration of intent by both sides to co-operate',4 further 
sanctioned a compromise between the two divergent views of the E C A 
and O A U in that it did not solve the real problem of the distribution of 
work between them. It amounted to no more than consultative procedures 
on minor practical and administrative questions. Hence James M a g e e 
wrote of this agreement that it merely allows each of the two organizations 
to take cognizance of the other's programme of work.5 
3. See O A U documents CM/ioi/Rev.i, p. 8. 
4. A. Mamadou, 1971. 
5. J. Magee, 1970. 
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Neither side having changed its position, difficulties continued to exist 
in the evolution of the relationship between the O A U and the E C A . In 
1968, on the E C A ' s tenth anniversary, the United Nations secretary-
general, U Thant, restated the world organization's point of view as 
follows: the E C A , he said, is 'the window on Africa which allows the 
United Nations to see the economic and social problems of this continent 
from an African point of view, to see them in the context of the entire 
international economic structure'.6 
O n that occasion the secretary-general of the O A U spoke of the need 
for co-operation between the E C A and the O A U , whose activities should 
be complementary 'in order to make better use both of the technical and 
technological capabilities of the E C A and also of the political characteristics 
and sovereign decisions of the top bodies of the O A U ' . T h e primacy of 
the O A U was again reasserted in the resolutions of September 1967 and 
February 1969.7 Co-operation between the O A U and the E C A has thus 
far been a failure. 
There were two main reasons for the failure, aggravated by personal 
rivalry: first the O A U ' s narrowly African view and, secondly, the two 
organizations' differing perceptions of African problems. T h e O A U having 
been set up by African governments which are supposed to exercise 
control over it, its credentials were established and its legitimacy acknow-
ledged and asserted vis-à-vis the E C A , which was regarded as being an 
outward-looking organization and insufficiently African both as regards 
staff recruitment and policy formulation. 
T h e prime grievance voiced about the E C A was that the planning and 
executive posts were held by non-Africans, which to some extent implied 
that the E C A ' s economic policy towards Africa was dictated from N e w 
York and not decided in Addis Ababa. T h e E C A perceived African 
problems through strictly economic criteria: the development of Africa 
presupposes the immediate economic integration of the continent and the 
creation of an African C o m m o n Market, since the multiplicity of customs 
barriers is an obstacle to its development. 
T h e O A U , on the other hand, remained more sensitive to the h u m a n 
aspect of development; it could not disregard the linguistic, religious, 
cultural and ideological obstacles of all the potential conflicts that too 
sudden integration would cause. A step-by-step approach - that is, first 
a free-trade area rather than an integrated economic community — seemed 
to it the wise course. 
This twofold approach to the economic realities of Africa, which was 
not conducive to harmonious co-operation, was often complicated by the 
contrasting temperaments and ambitions of the officials of the O A U and 
the E C A . T h e ups and downs of the relationship between the Ghanaian 
6. U N document E/4651 E / C N 14/453, v°l- J> P- 297-
7. O A U document C M / R e s 219 (xii) and Annex I, CM/ctee C / R P T , Rev. 1. 
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Robert Gardiner at the head of the E C A and the Guiñean Diallo Telli 
of the O A U were mirrored in the tensions and difficulties in the 
development of the relationship between the Nigerian Adedeji Adebayo 
of the E C A and the Togolese E d e m Kodjo of the O A U . 8 
Thus despite inter-secretariat contacts and joint meetings and con-
ferences, relations between the two organizations were characterized rather 
by rivalry in the economic and social field. 
It was not until 1980 that both agreed on a n e w development strategy 
contained in the Lagos Plan of Action adopted in April 1980. T h e African 
states fundamentally disagreed with the economic guidelines suggested in 
the 'Berg Report' on Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action published by the World Bank in 1981. While the Lagos 
Plan of Action aimed at inward-looking development based on reducing 
dependence on the outside world and on food self-sufficiency at national 
and continental levels, the World Bank report encouraged the African 
economy to be outward-looking and lay emphasis on expanding African 
cash-crop exports.9 
Towards a ' N e w International Economic Order' 
As has been conclusively demonstrated in Chapter 25, it was Africa that 
opened the debate on the concept of a N e w International Economic Order 
(NIEO) in 1979. In fact the first version of the N I E O as it appears from 
the resolutions of M a y 1974 is only a somewhat rearranged version of 
demands made by Third-World countries since U N C T A D (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development) was set up. This being 
so, the work and role of the Joint E C A - O A U Committee on Trade and 
Development to prepare c o m m o n African positions particularly stand out. 
T h e Joint Committee has a twofold responsibility: first, to consider all 
Africa's short-term problems in the field of trade and development, and 
also their financing; and, secondly, to see h o w best these problems can 
be efficiently considered and presented at meetings of the Council of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This Joint E C A -
O A U Committee thus has a problem of economic checking to solve on 
the continental level and a strategic political stance to adopt in relation 
to major international negotiations in the commercial, monetary and 
customs field. Accordingly the joint meetings of the E C A and the O A U 
'are aimed at ensuring complete co-operation between the Organization 
of African Unity and the Economic Commission for Africa in their efforts 
to harmonize the positions of African countries in the deliberations and 
negotiations that take place within U N C T A D , pursuant to Resolution 
8. See S. Gharbi, 1981. 
9. A . d'Almeida, 1983; E . K . Apkevon, 1983; E . K . Kouassi, 1983; U N E S C O , 1983; 
Organization of African Unity, 1981. 
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135 (VIII) of the E C A and Resolution 158 (IX) of the O A U ' . ' ° 
T o carry out its duties the Committee generally holds two sessions a 
year, one at the beginning of January or in March and another one, the 
more important and more regular one, in August to prepare for the annual 
meeting of the Council of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
T h e regularity and permanence of this Committee can be judged 
from the continual care which, starting from the third session, the 
recommendations of all the previous meetings of the Committee take to 
fix in advance the place and date of the next meeting." This Joint 
Committee seems to function to the satisfaction of both organizations; 
and it was mainly due to its work, together with the efforts of the African 
Group at U N C T A D , that a c o m m o n African position on the continent's 
economic problems was adopted and submitted to the second and third 
conferences of U N C T A D . 
U N technical assistance to Africa is channelled through the United 
Nations Development Programme ( U N D P ) , which was set up by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1965. Fifteen organizations of the 
U N system (ILO, F A O , U N E S C O , W H O , I B R D , U N C T A D , and so 
on) participate in the execution of U N D P projects. 
Until 1971 project-financing applications were submitted by govern-
ments on a project-by-project basis. Since that date, every beneficiary 
country has drawn up a list of requests corresponding to its priority needs 
for U N D P assistance for a period of three to five years. In every case 
the developing countries meet 50 per cent of the financing of projects 
carried out with the help of the U N D P . Hence m a n y African leaders 
complain about the high cost of the assistance provided by the U N D P . 
In Liberia in 1966, for example, the technical assistance provided by the 
World Bank for the road-building programme meant that the Liberian 
government paid the emoluments of the contractors for technical services, 
not to mention the interest on the long-term loans granted by the Bank. 
N o w the procedure operated by the U N D P for granting and apportion-
ing this assistance rules out any action by the O A U at any stage in the 
execution of U N programmes. Thus multilateral technical assistance for 
Africa is an area organized exclusively by the United Nations. 
Furthermore, the U N D P ' s resources come mainly from the Western 
world, which does not necessarily treat all African countries the same: so 
10. See U N , E C A document E / C N / i ^ g , E / C N / 1 4 / W P 1/15; O A U / T R A N S / 1 4 
of 18 January 1969. 
11. Cf. the Committee's recommendations at its 3rd session in: E / C W / 1 4 / 4 4 9 , 
E / C N / 1 4 / W P 1/15, O A U / T R A N S / 1 4 of 18 January 1969, p. 9; the recommendations 
of the 4th session in: E / C N / 1 4 / 4 5 9 , E / C N / 1 4 / W P 1/14 Res.3, O A U / T R A N S / 2 3 / R e s . 3 
of 23 August 1969, Annex 1, p. 5; the recommendations of the 5th session in: 
E / C N / 1 4 / 4 9 0 , E / C N / 1 4 / W P 1/31, O A U / T R A N S / 3 0 of 24 August 1970, p. 16. 
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that according to the O A U aid is distributed unfairly, often according to 
preferences dictated by political leanings or ideologies. 
Hence the O A U would like to see the Pan-African Organization acting 
as the natural means of co-ordinating and distributing assistance and 
multilateral aid. 
T h e U N agencies for their part seem to be afraid that the O A U , which 
is not a homogeneous body, cannot play this disinterested and impartial 
role of co-ordinating and distributing international assistance. They are 
also disinclined to finance O A U activities connected with national lib-
eration movements in Africa. 
There is thus mutual suspicion between the O A U and the organizations 
of the U N family in the field of multilateral aid to Africa. 
Relations between the O A U and the United Nations over economic 
co-operation problems are thus characterized by two factors: an unfriendly 
continental relationship, and the U N 'reserved sector'. But in their 
approaches to the wider concerns of North-South relations, there is more 
consensus. Africa, the United Nations and its specialized agencies are 
more in accord at the global level than they are when the focus is more 
narrowly African. 
International co-operation on h u m a n resources 
W e must distinguish between co-operation over supposedly 'harmless' 
technical matters and political co-operation, which might offend the 
susceptibilities associated with the sovereignty of states. Technical co-
operation takes place primarily between Africa and the U N specialized 
agencies, but also between the O A U and other U N agencies working to 
promote the well-being of African peoples. Let us take Africa and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), for example. Until the early 
1960s, Africa and the I L O had little in the way of direct relations, since 
these were the preserve of the colonial powers. T h e 29 founder-members 
in 1919 included only Liberia, followed by Ethiopia (1922), Egypt and 
the Union of South Africa (1939), Libya (1952) and G h a n a (1957). 
Nevertheless, the International Labour Organization did manage to set 
up a special committee during the colonial period, the Committee of 
Experts on M a n p o w e r , to advise on the best way of protecting workers 
in colonial countries; it distinguished itself in the struggle against forced 
labour in Africa. 
Most African countries joined the I L O between i960 and 1964, at the 
same time as the latter established relations with African employers' and 
workers' organizations. T h e prime objective for Africa was to create the 
conditions and institutions needed to translate into reality the economic 
and social ideals expressed in the norms the n e w states had accepted. 
It was in the context of these problems that the first African regional 
conference held in Lagos, Nigeria, in i960 drew the ILO's attention to 
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the need for technical assistance in industrial, commercial and agricultural 
training, and also in the training of management staff. T h e fundamental 
importance attached to employment and training was reaffirmed in 1964, 
w h e n a special committee on women's work emphasized the need to 
tackle the following problems: 
(1) the employment and condition of w o m e n in a rapidly changing 
Africa; 
(2) the need to use female labour; and 
(3) the need to give w o m e n and girls better means of professional 
training. 
Aware of these problems, the I L O increased its presence in Africa by 
setting up a Regional Office at Addis Ababa , and m a d e perceptible changes 
in its programme. T h u s the sudden surge of technical assistance was to 
a large extent a reply to requests emanating from African states themselves. 
Africa gradually began to receive an increasing share of the technical co-
operation resources available to die I L O from its regular budget, the 
United Nations Development Programme ( U N D P ) and m a n y bilateral 
and multilateral sources. 
Because of the seriousness of the twin problems of unemployment and 
acute shortage of skilled labour, the I L O took it as its basic task to help 
Africa develop its h u m a n resources. With this object, in 1963 it founded 
its International Centre for Professional and Technical Training at Turin, 
Italy, with the aim of training those w h o would in future train others. Since 
this centre was set up, m a n y Africans have gone there on scholarships, thus 
ensuring a continuing 'nursery' of African specialists. T o emphasize the 
importance of research the I L O in 1961 set up the International Institute 
for Labour Studies, whose main task was to study the social problems of 
economic development. For a very long time it was headed by an African, 
Professor Albert Tevoedjre. 
Furthermore, through the Conference of African Ministers of Labour 
the O A U works on questions of interest to the I L O which are due to be 
debated at the next session of the international conference. T h e I L O had 
to reform its programme and structure to take account of the emergence 
of n e w states on the international scene, and concentrate on questions 
such as m a n p o w e r development; professional and technical training; the 
decentralization of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the 
recruitment of African officials; the election of the president of the 
international conference, and standing orders; the development of sub-
regional offices and correspondents in Africa. T h e I L O conference also 
considered the appointment of African candidates to the governing body 
and the African Consultative Committee; the composition of African 
delegations to the international conference; the contribution of African 
states to the endowment fund of the International Institute for Labour 
Studies; and the problem of unifying the trade union movement in Africa. 
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This last problem, being bound up with the role of trades unions in the
development of African states, is still being studied by the OAU. Similar
activities are to be observed in the relationship between the OAU and
UNESCO.
As for co-operation between Africa and UNESCO, it was in November
i960, at its sixteenth session, that the UNESCO General Conference
admitted a large number of African states as members. The conference
adopted a resolution under which it decided to convene a Conference of
African States in 1961 with a view 'to establishing an inventory of
educational needs and programme to meet those in the coming years'. It
then drew up a document entitled Outline plan for African educational
development which was approved by the UNESCO Executive Board at its
fifty-second session. It was decided to set up a central planning group on
school buildings in Khartoum and a textbook production centre in
Yaounde, and lasdy to make 50 teachers available for some African states.
With this encouragement, the African states got UNESCO to hold
another meeting in Antananarivo from 3 to 12 September 1962 devoted
to higher education in Africa, including such topics as choice of syllabuses,
adaptation to African realities and needs, training of staff specializing in
public administration and development techniques, and so on. With this
momentum the African ministers of education decided to institute a
Conference of Ministers of Education of African Countries to follow up
the implementation of the programmes drawn up at UNESCO.
plate 29.2 Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow ofSenegal, director-general of UNESCO, 1974-87
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W h e n the O A U was set up in 1963 it had to define its relationship 
with U N bodies: and this fell to the Conference of African Ministers of 
Education at its first session from 17 to 24 March 1964 in Abidjan. T h e 
O A U set up an Educational and Cultural Committee to complement 
U N E S C O ' s efforts. Arrangements for regional and international co-
operation were the subject of an agreement signed on 10 July 1968 
between the O A U and U N E S C O . F r o m then on healthy co-operation 
developed between the two organizations. It showed itself in the first 
Pan-African Cultural Festival, in the organization of Conferences of 
African Ministers of Education, in the Conference for the Application of 
Science and Technology to Africa held in Dakar from 22 to 31 January 
1974, in the solution of the problem of African refugees, and so on. 
U N E S C O ' s fourth director-general was an African, M r Amadou-Mahtar 
M ' B o w , w h o completed his second term of office at the head of the 
organization. 
In all these fields the work of the O A U and U N E S C O have been 
harmonized. 
T h e O A U also co-operates with the other U N agencies. This takes 
place against a wider institutional background than the above-mentioned 
bilateral relations. T h e most favoured field is rural and agricultural 
development in Africa. A n Inter-agency Regional Committee brings 
together the activities of the O A U and the main U N agencies and co-
ordinates the work of the E G A and other voluntary organizations in 
executing their programme for integrated rural development in Africa. In 
this connection the role of the United Nations Development Programme 
( U N D P ) is predominant: it finances projects, and supplies seeds, fer-
tilizers, insecticides, pesticides and fungicides. 
In the context of this co-operation, the organizations concerned have 
drawn up plans for the regional organization of rice cultivation in West 
Africa, a project for which the initiative was taken by the O A U . 
Similar relations operate as regards the problems of youth, employment, 
technical training and literacy. 
Other types of relationship also develop on the joint committees 
between the O A U , the Food and Agriculture Organization ( F A O ) and 
the World Health Organization ( W H O ) on food and nutrition in Africa, 
campaigns against rinderpest and trypanosomiasis, the setting up of 
phytosanitary centres, and so on. 
There is equally fruitful co-operation between the intergovernmental 
agencies for the resettlement and education of refugees (the U N O , U N D P , 
U N H C R , E C A , U N E S C O , O A U ) which belong to the working group 
of the O A U Bureau for African Refugees. Co-operation here is especially 
crucial because of the importance of its subject. O f all the continents, 
Africa has the largest number of refugees, with a total of 3.5 million by 
1979. Nowadays, half of the world's 10 million refugees live in Africa, 
which justifies the intensity of the co-operation with the United Nations 
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High Commissioner for Refugees ( U N H C R ) to cope with the enormous 
problems and difficulties caused by their presence. 
T h u s in 1967 the O A U , the U N H C R and the E C A took the initiative 
of holding a conference in Addis Ababa to analyse and assess the situation 
of refugees in Africa, revise current policies and strategies, and where 
necessary formulate new ones adapted to the ever-growing problems. 
Following this conference the Heads of State and Government of the 
O A U in 1969 adopted the Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee 
problems in Africa, which came into effect in 1974. 
A second pan-African conference on the situation and rights of refugees 
in Africa was organized by the O A U , the U N H C R and the E C A from 
7 to 17 M a y 1979 at Arusha, Tanzania. This conference had three 
objectives: 
(1) to keep all the bodies concerned (governments, governmental 
organizations, voluntary agencies and refugee relief agencies) 
adequately informed of the worsening of refugee problems in 
Africa and of possible solutions; 
(2) to examine and assess the current situation and problems of 
refugees in Africa; and 
(3) to study and assess national laws concerning refugees and suggest 
improvements. 
T h e U N H C R has since continued to attach particular importance to the 
implementation of the recommendations of this conference. Activities 
carried out in 1983 include a research project by three experts in 21 
African countries on the impact of study fellowships in Africa, and a 
seminar on the situation of refugees in West Africa. 
O n e result of this meeting was the holding in Geneva in April 1981 
of the first International Conference for Assistance to Refugees in Africa 
( I C A R A I). It achieved its objective, namely to draw attention to African 
refugees and mobilize resources for the current programme on their 
behalf. 
O n 18 December 1982 the United Nations General Assembly, drawing 
the lessons of this experiment, adopted Resolution 37/197, which in 
paragraph 5 asks the secretary-general, in close co-operation with the 
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations High C o m -
missioner for Refugees, to convene a second International Conference for 
Assistance to Refugees in Africa ( I C A R A II). During the preparatory 
work for I C A R A II the importance of identifying lasting solutions to the 
problems of refugees in Africa was emphasized. 
O n e of the aims of Resolution 37/197 is to complement the work of 
the U N H C R by submitting to I C A R A II relief programmes more con-
cerned with development and taking account of the repercussions of the 
presence of refugees on national economies. T h e United Nations Trust 
F u n d for South Africa put $300 000 at the U N H C R ' s disposal for refugee 
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relief in South Africa during the period i July 1982-30 June 1983; while 
in 1982 the U N H C R committed $134.7 million for the financing of relief 
activities in Africa." 
In another field, that of the protection of the habitat and the environ-
ment, the General Assembly in 1974 set up the United Nations Habitat 
and H u m a n Settlements Foundation, because of the serious nature of 
housing problems and allied problems of h u m a n settlements. In 1978 a 
United Nations Centre for H u m a n Settlements (Habitat) was set up 
within the U N system to act as a liaison centre for activities related to 
these h u m a n settlements; it is housed at Nairobi (Kenya), as is the 
United Nations Environment Programme ( U N E P ) , set up by the General 
Assembly following a recommendation by the United Nations Conference 
on the H u m a n Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972. 
In M a y 1982 the Executive Board of U N E P held a special sort of 
meeting at Nairobi to mark the tenth anniversary of the Stockholm 
conference. T h e Nairobi Declaration, which was adopted by consensus, 
provides in particular that 
the h u m a n environment would greatly benefit from an international 
atmosphere of peace and security, free from the threats of any war, 
especially nuclear war, and the waste of intellectual and natural 
resources on armaments, as well as from apartheid, racial segregation 
and all forms of discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression 
and foreign domination. 
Such is the picture of the co-operation which has been developing 
between Africa and the organs of the U N system in the technical and 
social fields. T h e partnership in development between Africa and the 
world body continues to be a many-faceted process. 
Conclusion 
W e have examined Africa's relationship with the United Nations in this 
chapter from the point of view of three areas of interaction. 
In its role as an absentee imperial landlord, the world organization 
served as a supervisory body over the administration of the former 
G e r m a n colonies of Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, Togoland, Cameroons 
and South-West Africa (former mandates of the League of Nations). In 
reality, the Republic of South Africa - which was the administering 
authority of South-West Africa under the League - did not recognize the 
United Nations as a successor to the League and therefore refused to be 
accountable to the U N about the 'dependent territory'. A s w e indicated, 
it took a number of battles both within the United Nations and at the 
12. United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1982-3. 
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plate 29.3 S. Nujoma, first president ofNamibia, and J. Perez de Cuellar, secretary-general
of the United Nations, at the Independence Day ceremony ofNamibia, 21 March 1990
International Court of Justice at the Hague before the UN's jurisdiction
over South-West Africa (later re-named Namibia by the liberation fighters)
could at last be definitively confirmed, notwithstanding South Africa's
continuing dissent.
On balance, the UN's insistence on continuing jurisdiction in Namibia
was motivated by a desire to free the country from South Africa's control.
It has been a case of the UN insisting on being a collective imperial
power over Namibia in order to serve as Namibia's ally in liberation - a
UN desire to 'reconquer' Namibia in order to free it.
Apart from Namibia, the UN's role as a collective imperial power
basically ended with the independence of the prize trusteeship of Tan¬
ganyika in 1 96 1. The other trusteeships had gained independence earlier.
The world body's role as an ally of liberation went beyond speeding
up the independence of its own trusteeships. Especially after India's
independence in 1947, and India's admission to the UN, voices against
imperialism and colonialism in the chambers of the world organization
gathered strength. In i960 more than 15 African countries joined the UN
in a single year. Before long, resolutions were being passed in the General
Assembly condemning imperialism, colonialism, racism and eventually
Zionism as moral offences against a new international code of justice.
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• Other United Nations organs 
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FIG. 29.4 The United Nations System (Source: United Nations) 
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T h e U N ' s role as a partner in Africa's development - though modest 
in relation to Africa's needs - has nevertheless been significant. Rescuing 
the former Belgian Congo from territorial disintegration was important 
not only for the future of Zaire but also for all other fragile states 
in Africa. H a d Katanga's secession succeeded so early after Africa's 
independence, the demonstration impact on other separatist groups else-
where in the rest of the continent could have put severe stress on the 
very principle of national cohesion all over Africa. 
But the U N ' s partnership in Africa's development has over the years 
taken other forms as well. In spite of stresses and strains in its relationship 
with the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa has played a major role on matters which have 
ranged from the functions of the African Development Bank to the 
formulation and promotion of the Lagos Plan of Action. 
Partnership in Africa's development has also included the contributions 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization, of U N E S C O , of the World 
Health Organization, of the International Labour Organization and of a 
variety of other specialized agencies of the U N family. 
T h e question for the future is whether the African states can stay 
united enough to repay the two primary debts that they owe to the world 
body. Just as the United Nations once served as an ally in Africa's 
liberation, can Africa n o w be counted as an ally in the liberation of the 
U N ? Just as the world organization and its agencies continue to be 
partners in Africa's development, will African states become effective 
partners in the development of the world body in return? In some ways 
the United Nations is as fragile as the African states it has sought to 
serve. T h e world body itself needs development and growth. It needs 
stability and integrity. It needs to expand its o w n 'per capita income' and 
make its o w n 'structural adjustments'. But, like Africa, it needs to achieve 
all this without risking the trauma of 'recolonization'. 
A n opportunity for a further linkage between Africa and the U N was 
sadly lost when the United States virtually 'vetoed' the election of 
Tanzania's statesman, Salim A h m e d Salim, to the post of secretary-
general of the United Nations. T h e Reagan administration regarded Salim 
A h m e d Salim as a 'dangerous radical'. Washington therefore firmly shut 
the door against this possibility of the first African secretary-general of 
the U N . 
But the future m a y yet have its surprises.* It m a y yet reveal that the 
historic partnership between the world body and some of its poorest and 
weakest m e m b e r states can still achieve the miracle of their joint redemp-
tion in world affairs in the years ahead. 
* M r Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) was elected Secretary-General of the United Nations 
in December 1991. 
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This volume has sought to delineate the special characteristics of the 
phase of African history since 1935, period by period. T h e years from 
1935 to 1945 emerge as the decade of global conflict - beginning with 
Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 and culminating in Japan's 
surrender in August 1945. T h e 15 years from 1945 to i960 witnessed, as 
w e have shown, the intensification of the anti-colonial struggle - resulting 
finally in the independence of 16 African countries in the single year of 
i960. A s for the period after independence, this has witnessed the 
attempts at the consolidation of freedom, the building of nations, the 
institutionalization of order and the struggle for development. Let us take 
each of these themes of this volume in turn. 
A world aflame 
If in 1935 Italy was heir to one of Europe's most ancient empires (classical 
R o m e ) , Ethiopia was a continuation of one of Africa's oldest civilizations. 
T h e conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in the 1930s seemed to symbolize 
a clash of antiquities between Europe and Africa — two vehicles of ancient 
culture in collision. 
But there was of course an uglier side to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
as well. It was a case of modern European imperialism having a last fling 
at contemporary Africa. Ethiopia - which had for so long been an oasis 
of African sovereignty in splendid isolation within a colonized continent -
was at last over-run by European territorial greed. 
This volume has discussed the long-term impact of the Second World 
W a r on Africa - ranging from facilitating the struggle for liberation to 
the incorporation of Africa more firmly into the Western capitalist orbit.1 
T w o months after declaring war on Germany, the British government 
declared its readiness to buy all West African cocoa. T h e exploitation of 
African economies to meet European consumption patterns entered a n e w 
phase under the stimulus of war. 
1. For other surveys, see also R. Oliver and M . Crowder, 1981; P. Duignan and L . H . 
Gann, 1973 and 1975 and G . S . P . Freeman-Grenville, 1973. 
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But the Second World W a r did not merely change Africa's destiny; it 
also fundamentally altered Europe's o w n future. Out of the global conflict 
was born a n e w division of Europe into communist and capitalist camps. 
B y a strange twist of fate, the continental partition of Europe was 
symbolized by the division of Berlin — the very city where Africa's o w n 
partition had been plotted some six decades earlier. A n African nemesis 
had exacted the ultimate revenge. T h e city which had pronounced the 
curse of the scramble for Africa in 1885 was also the city which had 
suffered the curse of the partition of Europe from 1945 onwards. Just as 
the fragmentation of Africa seemed irreversible for the foreseeable future, 
so did the division of Europe following the Second World W a r , in spite 
of Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of the 1980s. For once the ancestors of 
Africa had triumphed in their sacred revenge — but leaving two unhappy 
continents licking the wounds of partition. 
W h a t must never be forgotten is Africa's involvement in the global 
conflict which preceded those events and changed the face of both post-
war Europe and post-war Africa. Fifty-five thousand Ugandans served in 
the King's African Rifles, for example. S o m e of the 87 000 Tanganyikans 
w h o gave service in the war participated in the 1942 invasion of M a d -
agascar against Vichy and in favour of de Gaulle. M a n y African soldiers 
were involved in the war against Japan in B u r m a . As far back as 1939 
the Nigerian Regiment had raised 15 battalions. A n d thousands of North 
African soldiers gave their lives for several years in the fluctuating fortunes 
between R o m m e l , Montgomery, Eisenhower and other high-profile c o m -
batants north of the Sahara. 
But in the final analysis, the most poignant phase of the war for Africa 
took place quite early in the global conflict. Italy, the new pretender to 
the legacy of classical R o m e , was among the first to be defeated. T h e 
resistance within Ethiopia had refused to be extinguished. Grenades were 
thrown at the Italian-appointed Viceroy in Addis Ababa; Abuna Abraham 
was blinded by poison gas as the Italians moved towards making him the 
head of the Ethiopian Church. 
T h e Ethiopian resistance held down 56 Italian battalions. O n 20 January 
1941, Emperor Haile Selassie crossed from Sudan into Ethiopia on foot. 
O n 7 March 1941, the British and imperial forces massively penetrated 
the country with the Ethiopian emperor's permission. T h e British, with 
African soldiers, took Addis Ababa in April 1941. T h e emperor resumed 
administration at the end of January 1942. 
A n d so the battle of the Titans between heir to Caesar and heir to the 
Queen of Sheba ended in the ignominy of Caesar's dreams. T h e world 
had become too complicated. Competitive imperialism between rival 
European powers had aided the fortunes of the besieged descendant of 
Sheba. T h e heir to Caesar was isolated by some of his o w n former 
provincials. O n 18 April 1945, Benito Mussolini was executed by fellow 
Europeans. ' H o w are the mighty fallen!' 
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T h e crusade against colonialism 
T h e second sub-period of this volume concerns the years 1945 to i960 — 
characterized by the intensification of the nationalist struggle against 
colonialism. There were three basic constituencies for this struggle. O n e 
constituency was internal to each colony — an attempt to mobilize the 
oppressed masses against racism and foreign rule within the particular 
society. T h e second constituency was within the governing imperial 
power — an attempt to enlist the progressive forces within the controlling 
hegemonic state. In a sense this was a strategy of dividing the enemy -
creating discord within the imperial métropole. 
T h e third constituency was the globe itself - the international c o m -
munity at large. H o w could world opinion be enlisted on the side of the 
forces of decolonization? 
Mobilizing the masses in the colonies themselves was the most critical 
of the strategies. But even before the outbreak of the Second World 
W a r , North African nationalists like Bourguiba had indeed started the 
mobilization of their o w n domestic constituency. T h e Parti populaire 
algérien (PPA) was formed by Messali Hädj in 1936. A n d in Spanish 
Morocco, c A b d al-Khalik Tares had founded the Islah Party in the same 
year. Also in 1936 Egyptian nationalism had at last succeeded in forcing 
the British to lift the military occupation of Egypt with the exception of 
the Suez Canal Zone. But the Egyptian crusade against the residual 
British military presence in the Canal Zone continued to be waged even 
before the ink was dry on the new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. In 
January 1944, the independence of Morocco was first demanded by the 
Nationalist Party. A h m e d Balafredj was arrested - and riots broke out in 
Rabat and Fez in March. In Algeria also in 1944 Ferhât c Abbäs founded 
the A M L {Amis du manifeste et de la liberté). T h e movement rapidly 
gained half-a-million members . 
Elsewhere in Africa the stirring of nationalism and domestic m o b -
ilization were also evident, taking a variety of forms. F r o m 1933 to 1946, 
the French had been forced to send into exile Léon M b a from Cameroon 
for 'sedition'. In 1940, the Tonsi movement started in Angola as the 
'Tawa cult', in cultural rebellion against alien values. In September 1946, 
J o m o Kenyatta returned to Kenya after 15 years abroad. H e set himself 
the agenda of political mobilization at h o m e . 
It was not long before political associations and parties were m u s h -
rooming all over the African continent - ranging from the Union 
des populations du Cameroun ( U P C ) to the Convention People's Party 
(CPP) in Ghana, from the Rassemblement démocratique africain 
( R D A ) in the French empire to the Tanganyika African National 
Union ( T A N U ) . Resistance to colonialism was getting institutionalized 
and better organized. Political mobilization at h o m e was truly under 
way. 
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But however fundamental the domestic constituency was, it was also 
important to seek allies in the colonialist countries themselves. At the 
very m i n i m u m this could be a case of 'splitting the enemy' - turning 
Frenchman against Frenchman, Briton against Briton. If colonialism had 
operated on the basis of 'divide and conquer', anti-colonialism could 
adopt the counter-strategy of 'divide and liberate'. T h e R D A ' s original 
links with the French Communist Party could strategically be justified 
on those grounds if no other. 
T h e French colonial policy of political association and integration was 
particularly well-suited for anti-colonial activities within metropolitan 
France itself. After all, the French colonies in Africa were directly 
represented on legislative institutions in Paris itself — a form of colonial 
representation which had no equivalent in the British style of colonial 
administration. It was in November 1945 that Leopold Senghor and 
Lamine Gueye (Senegal), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d'Ivoire), Apithy 
Sourou Migan (Dahomey), Fily D a b o Cissoko (French Sudan) and Yacine 
Diallo (Guinea) were elected to represent French West Africa in the 
French Constituent Assembly. A few weeks earlier Prince Alexandre 
Douala-Manga Bell and D r L . P. Anjoulet had been elected as Cameroon's 
first deputies. It would have been inconceivable for J o m o Kenyatta, 
Obafemi Awolowo or N n a m d i Azikiwe to be elected to sit in the 
House of C o m m o n s in London. Instead of being directly represented in 
metropolitan institutions, African patriots in British colonies tried to 
influence British opinion less directly through native Britons of liberal or 
left-wing persuasion. British members of parliament like Fenner Brockway 
and Barbara Castle became regular channels through which African 
nationalists conveyed their grievances to the House of C o m m o n s . A n d 
British newspapers like the Daily Worker, the New Statesman and the 
Manchester Guardian helped to wage the anti-colonial struggle within the 
imperial power itself. 
Algerians, on the other hand, were gaining the level of access to 
metropolitan France which was increasingly conceded to other French 
dependencies. O n the eve of the end of the Second World W a r , a French 
ordinance gave Algerian Muslims 15 deputies in the National Assembly 
and seven senators in the Council of the Republic. This concession was 
m a d e in M a r c h 1944 in anticipation of the liberation of metropolitan 
France. B y August 1946 it was possible for Ferhät 'Abbäs, leader of the 
Union démocratique du manifeste algérien, to lay before the National 
Constituent Assembly in Paris a draft law for an Algerian republic 
federated to France. A n d yet about ten years later Ferhät 'Abbäs was the 
political head of the Algerian government-in-exile - in rebellion against 
French rule in Algeria. 
Ferhät 'Abbäs's latter role brings us back to the third constituency of the 
anti-colonial struggle - the constituency of the international community at 
large. 'Abbas became the main international spokesman of the Front de 
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libération nationale - F L N (National Liberation Front) of Algeria. Abbas 
travelled from one foreign capital to another to champion the Algerian 
cause and solicit support for it. 
T h e United Nations ( U N ) also became an important ally and a good 
battleground for the African nationalists. But the most basic parts of the 
international community were inevitably one's o w n neighbours. For 
Algeria this meant fellow-African countries, especially the rest of the 
Maghreb and Egypt in the first instance. But Algeria also tried to win 
over the rest of Africa. O n e such determined effort was m a d e at the 1958 
All-Africa Peoples Conference in Accra. 
But the African continent was not merely a recipient of external 
influences. It was also helping to change the agenda of global reform. 
Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was 
one of the most important African initiatives of the twentieth century. 
Only five years previously (1951) Iran under M u h a m m a d Mosadeq had 
nationalized its oil resources. T h e Central Intelligence Agency of the 
United States was soon to neutralize Mosadeq and reinstate the more 
pro-Western authority of the Pahlavi dynasty of the Shah. This seemed 
at first to have sealed the fate of any Third-World country wanting to 
nationalize and control its o w n resource. 
T h e doors of Third-World initiatives in controlling their o w n resources 
were reopened by Gamäl ' A b d al-Nasser in July 1956. T h e resource this 
time was not oil - as in Mosadeq's Iran - but an Egyptian canal built by 
Egyptian labour at considerable h u m a n cost. M a n y thousands of Egyptian 
lives had been lost in its construction about a hundred years before al-
Nasser at last nationalized the waterway. Unlike Mosadeq, al-Nasser 
got away with his courageous bid. After Suez, the nationalization and 
socialization of African resources became increasingly a safe political 
option for African governments to consider. 
Suez and its aftermath constituted the great divide between the Soviet 
Union as an imperialistic threat to Africa and the Soviet Union as an ally 
in the struggle for independence. T h e U S S R provided Egypt with pilots 
for the Suez Canal w h e n the Western pilots were withdrawn in the 
escalating crisis after al-Nasser's nationalization. T h e Soviet Union under-
took the even bigger commitment of helping Egypt construct the Aswan 
D a m from which Britain, the United States and the World Bank had 
reneged on their commitment. F r o m then on, the Soviet Union seemed 
to have abandoned all territorial appetite for Africa, and the record showed 
a readiness to support African liberation struggles. Suez was the turning 
point. Al-Nasser's remarkable moves were Africa's ultimate cultivation of 
the international community - at least until the more recent phase of the 
global struggle against apartheid. 
These then were the phases of the anti-colonial struggle - first, the 
mobilization of the domestic populace; secondly, the penetration of the 
metropolitan imperialist circles in an attempt to 'divide and liberate', and 
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thirdly, the cultivation and conversion of the international community, 
beginning with a determined pan-African enlisting of one's o w n neigh-
bours. W e referred in an earlier chapter to K w a m e N k r u m a h ' s imperative: 
'Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things will be added unto you\ 
After the acquisition of the political kingdom, quo vadis Africa? It is to 
this theme that w e must once again return. 
Earlier chapters have paid special attention to the transition from the 
African struggle for independence to the striving for nation-building. T h e 
other chapters discussed the efforts to give greater cultural coherence to 
Africa's nationhood and to render greater legitimacy and authority to 
Africa's statehood. This struggle has continued to consolidate freedom, 
ensure territorial integrity and facilitate development and progress. 
But where do w e go from here? T h e two most important revolutions 
awaiting Africa are, first, a gender revolution in roles and, secondly, a 
scientific revolution in skills. These two revolutions in gender and science 
are closely intertwined. Let us look more closely at this special dialectic. 
A fundamental change in relations between the genders had indeed 
been occurring partly because of Africa's interaction with other cultures 
in this period. Islam and Western colonialism came with alternative 
paradigms of relationships between the sexes. Both the family and African 
society at large are caught up in these tensions of cultural change. It is 
this question of gender in African society since 1935 that w e n o w address. 
Gender roles in transition 
Africa since 1935 has witnessed significant changes in the roles and 
functions of m e n and w o m e n in Africa. In m a n y traditional cultures there 
has been a belief that G o d made w o m a n the custodian of fire, water, and 
earth. G o d himself took charge of the fourth element of the universe -
the omnipresent air. 
Custody of fire entailed responsibility for making energy available. A n d 
the greatest source of energy in rural Africa is firewood. T h e African 
w o m a n became disproportionately responsible for finding and carrying 
huge bundles of firewood, though quite often it was m e n w h o chopped 
d o w n the big trees initially. 
Custody of water involved a liquid which was a symbol of both survival 
and cleanliness. T h e African w o m a n became responsible for ensuring that 
this critical substance was available for the family. She has trekked long 
distances to fetch water. But where a well needed to be dug, it was often 
the m a n w h o did the digging. 
T h e custody of earth has been part of a doctrine of dual fertility. 
W o m a n ensures the survival of this generation by maintaining a central 
role in cultivation — and preserving the fertility of the soil. W o m a n ensures 
the arrival of the next generation by her role as mother - the fertility of 
the w o m b . Dual fertility becomes an aspect of the triple custodial role of 
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African womanhood, though always in partnership with the African m a n . 2 
What has happened to this doctrine of triple custody in the period 
since 1935? Different elements of the colonial experience affected the 
roles of m e n and w o m e n in Africa in different ways. 
A m o n g the factors which increased the woman's role on the land was 
wage labour for the m e n . According to Margaret Jean Hay, wage labour 
for m e n took some time before it began to affect women's role on the 
land. Hay's o w n work was among L u o w o m e n in Kenya: 
By 1930 a large number of m e n had left K o w e at least once for 
outside employment . . . M o r e than half of this group stayed away 
for periods of fifteen years or more . . . This growing export of 
labour from the province might be thought to have increased the 
burden of agricultural work for w o m e n . . . A s early as 1910, 
administrators lamented the fact that Nyanza was becoming the 
labour pool of the entire colony . . . Yet the short-term migrants of 
the 1920s were usually unmarried youths, w h o played a relatively 
minor role in the local economy beyond occasional herding and the 
conquest of cattle in war. Furthermore, the short-term labour 
migrants could and often did arrange to be away during the slack 
periods in the agricultural cycle . . . Thus labour migration in the 
period before 1930 actually removed little labour from the local 
economy and did not significantly alter the sexual division of labour.3 
But Margaret H a y goes on to demonstrate h o w the Great Depression 
and the Second World W a r changed the situation as migrant labour and 
conscription of males took away a bigger and bigger proportion of m e n 
from the land. This was compounded by the growth of mining industries 
like the gold mining at K o w e from 1934 onwards: 
T h e long-term absence of m e n had an impact on the sexual division 
of labour, with w o m e n and children assuming a greater share of 
agricultural work than ever before . . . T h e thirties represent a 
transition with regard to the sexual division of labour, and it was 
clearly the w o m e n w h o bore the burden of the transition in rural 
areas.4 
W o m e n in this period, from the 1930s onwards, became more deeply 
involved as 'custodians of earth'. In Southern Africa the migrations of 
2. I a m indebted to the late Okot p'Bitek, the Ugandan anthropologist and poet, for 
stimulation and information about myths of womanhood in northern Uganda. Okot and 
I also discussed similarities and differences between African concepts of matter and the 
ideas of Empedocles, the Greek philosopher of the fifth century before the Christian era. 
Consult also O . p'Bitek, 1971. 
3. M . J. Hay, 1976, pp. 98-9. For a feminist perspective, consult also M . R . Cutrufelli, 
1983. 
4. M . J. Hay, 1976, p. 105. 
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m e n to the mines became even more dramatic. By the 1950s a remarkable 
bifurcation was taking place in some South African societies - a division 
between a male proletariat (industrial working class) and a female peasantry. 
South Africa's regulations against families joining their husbands on the 
mines exacerbated this tendency towards gender-apartheid, the segregation 
of the sexes. M a n y w o m e n in the frontline states had to fulfil their triple 
custodial role of fire, water and earth in greater isolation than ever. 
T h e wars of liberation in Southern Africa from the 1960s took their 
o w n toll on family stability and traditional gender division of labour. 
S o m e of the fighters did have their wives with them. Indeed, liberation 
armies like Z A N L A and Z I P R A in Zimbabwe and F R E M L I M O in 
Mozambique included a few female fighters. But on the whole, the impact 
of the wars was disruptive of family life and of the traditional gender 
division of labour. 
After independence there were counter-revolutionary wars among some 
of the frontline states. T h e most artificial of the post-colonial wars was 
that of Mozambique initiated by the so-called Mozambique National 
Resistance ( M N R of R E N A M O ) . 
Again, there have been implications for relations between the genders. 
In addition to the usual disruptive consequences of war for the family, 
the M N R , by the mid-1980s, had inflicted enough damage on the 
infrastructure in Mozambique that m a n y migrant workers never got h o m e 
to their families in between their contracts with the South African mines. 
It is not completely clear h o w this situation has affected the doctrine 
of 'dual fertility' in relation to the role of the African w o m a n . O n e 
possibility is that the extra long absences of the husbands have reduced 
fertility rates in some communities in Mozambique. T h e other scenario 
is that the pattern of migrant labour in Southern Africa generally has 
initiated a tendency towards de facto polyandry. T h e w o m a n w h o is left 
behind acquires over time a de facto extra husband.5 
If the more widespread pattern is that of declining fertility as a result 
of extra long absences of husbands, the principle of 'dual fertility' has 
reduced the social functions of the fertility of the w o m b and increased 
the w o m a n ' s involvement in matters pertaining to the fertility of the soil. 
O n the other hand, if the more significant tendency in mining c o m -
munities in Southern Africa is towards de facto polyandry, a whole n e w 
nexus of social relationships m a y be in the making in Southern Africa.6 
Other changes in Africa during this period which affected relationships 
between m e n and w o m e n included the impact of n e w technologies on 
gender roles. Cultivation with the hoe still left the African w o m a n 
5. There is no doubt that such arrangements occur in Mozambique. W h a t is not clear 
is h o w widespread de facto polyandry is becoming in Southern Africa. 
6. I a m indebted to the field research and interviews in Southern Africa which 
accompanied the B B C / W E T A television project; see A . A . Mazrui, 1986. 
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centrally involved in agriculture but mechanization of agriculture in Africa 
has tended to marginalize w o m e n . Their role as 'custodians of earth' is 
threatened by male prerogatives in n e w and more advanced technologies. 
Another threat to the central role of the African w o m a n in the economy 
in this period has come from the nature of Western education. It is true 
that the Westernized African w o m a n is usually more mobile and with 
more freedom for her o w n interests than is her more traditional sister. 
But a translation from custodian of fire, water and earth to keeper of the 
typewriter is definitely a form of marginalization for African womanhood . 
Typing is less fundamental for survival than cultivation. T h e Westernized 
African w o m a n in the second half of the twentieth century has tended to 
be more free but less important for African economies than the traditional 
w o m a n in rural areas. 
T h e third threat to the role of the African w o m a n in this period 
came with the internationalization of African economies. W h e n economic 
activity in Africa was more localized, w o m e n had a decisive role in local 
markets and as traders. But the colonial and post-colonial tendencies 
towards enlargement of economic scale have increasingly pushed w o m e n 
to the side in international decision-making. It is true that Nigerian 
w o m e n especially have refused to be completely marginalized, even in 
international trade. But on the whole, the Africans w h o deal with 
international markets and sit on the boards of trans-national corporations 
are overwhelmingly m e n . At the meetings of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries - where Muslims predominate - there are additional 
inhibitions about having even Nigeria represented by a female delegate. 
But what is the future avenue which is likely to change the balance 
between m e n and w o m e n in public life in Africa? T h e reasons w h y 
w o m e n are politically subordinate are not to be sought in economic 
differentiation. W o m e n in Africa are economically very active; w o m e n in 
Saudi Arabia are economically neutralized. A n d yet in both types of 
society w o m e n are politically subordinate. A n d so economic differences 
are not the real explanation of the political subjection of womanhood. 
W h a t is indeed universal is not the economic role of w o m e n but their 
military role. All over Africa (and indeed all over the world) w o m e n are 
militarily marginalized. W h a t will one day change the political balance 
between m e n and w o m e n is when the military machine becomes bi-
gender. T h e Somali army has started recruiting w o m e n . T h e Algerian air 
force has started recruiting w o m e n pilots. Both Muslim societies in Africa 
are beginning to give a military role to w o m e n . But the future needs 
more than tokenism in gender roles. In this continent of coups w e m a y 
have to wait for the day w h e n the announcement of a coup in West Africa 
declares as follows: 'Brigadier-General Janet Adebiyi has captured power 
in a military takeover in Lagos'.7 
7. This issue is discussed in similar terms in A . A . Mazrui, 1990. 
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Pan-Africanism: a confederation of genders 
Pan-Africanism has traditionally been viewed as relations between Africans 
across territorial boundaries. But pan-Africanism should be re-defined to 
include relations between Africans across the divide of gender. It is not 
enough to transcend the divisions of nationality and the territorial legacy 
of the scramble for Africa. There is a need to transcend an even older 
political divide between Africans - the political gap between m e n and 
w o m e n in the realm of public affairs. 
In Nkrumah' s terms, pan-Africanism was defined as readiness to share 
power in a territorial federation. But there is a bigger imperative to share 
power in a confederation of genders. 
Traditional Africa before European colonization knew great occasions 
of power-sharing between genders. T h e eras of Hatshepsut of Egypt 
(fifteenth century before the Christian era), Nzinga of Angola (about 
1581-1663), Yaa Asantewa of Ashanti (about 1830-1921) and Nehanda 
of Z imbabwe (about 1863-98) are among the highlights of pan-Africanism 
in this special sense of power-sharing across genders. S o m e of these eras 
have already been treated in earlier volumes of this U N E S C O series. 
Has the colonial impact helped or harmed the tradition of power-
sharing across genders in Africa? W e have indicated that the record in 
gender-relations has been mixed. Colonial rule and cultural Westernization 
have marginalized w o m e n in some of their roles - while raising them in 
others. Pan-Africanism as a case of gender relations has both suffered 
and gained from the impact of the West upon Africa. 
Because the period since 1935 has witnessed the fuller incorporation 
of Africa into the global system, the outside world has, by definition, 
impinged more deeply into the ordinary lives of African m e n and w o m e n 
than ever before. A n u m b e r of social contradictions have occurred. 
In relation to the role of w o m e n , Africa's internationalization has 
both diminished them economically and started their upliftment in 
diplomacy. 
W e have indicated that in this period since 1935 localized economies 
in Africa have provided a m u c h bigger role for w o m e n than have 
economies which have gone international. W e have mentioned that 
historically African w o m e n were often in charge of marketing surplus 
agricultural produce, as well as being active participants in the processes of 
rural production. W h e n both production and marketing went increasingly 
international in colonial and post-colonial Africa, the share of w o m e n in 
controlling the economic processes began, as w e noted, to decline. A s w e 
indicated, the Africans w h o sat on the boards of directors of trans-national 
corporations were overwhelmingly m e n . There seems to be little doubt 
that economic internationalization in colonial and post-colonial Africa has 
so far been a marginalizing experience for w o m e n . Economic pan-
Africanism across genders has suffered in this period. 
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On the other hand, diplomacy as a career after independence opened
up new pan-African opportunities for highly educated African women in
the post-colonial era. In September 1969, Angie E. Brooks of Liberia was
(as indicated in Chapter 1) nominated to serve as president of the United
Nations General Assembly - only the second woman ever to serve in that
capacity. (The first was Madame Pandit of India, a member of the Nehru
family.) In New York, Angie Brooks became the most senior African
diplomat. Pan-Africanism across gender benefited.8
plate 30.1 Left: Angie Brooks of Liberia, who served as president of the United Nations
General Assembly in 1969-70; right: Princess Elizabeth Bagaya of Uganda, minister offoreign
affairs, addressing the United Nations General Assembly, September 1974
Ambassador Brooks had blazed other diplomatic trails before - including
her services as the first woman and the first African to preside over the
United Nations Trusteeship Council. When she ascended to the presi¬
dency of the General Assembly itself in 1969, Ms Brooks affirmed: 'I am
proud of my continent, my country and my sex'. The most authoritative
voice in the General Assembly was for a while the voice of an African
woman.
Uganda's Elizabeth Bagaya (former Princess of Toro) served as Idi
8. For stimulation on this theme, I am indebted to a conversation with Delores
Mortimer, senior specialist managing international education exchange programmes at the
US Information Agency (USIA) in Washington, DC, currently on leave working at the
University of Michigan.
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Amïn's roving ambassador and later as foreign minister in the 1970s. But 
Princess Elizabeth was too independent to last in such a capacity under 
such a volatile military regime. Indeed, she was too independent to last 
as Uganda's ambassador to the United States in the late 1980s under 
President Yoweri Museveni. She refused to be 'precipitately' transferred 
to Paris - and preferred to resign instead. Nevertheless, Elizabeth Bagaya 
Nyabongo was for a while one of the true voices of both territorial and 
gender pan-Africanism. 
Uganda has had other w o m e n in prominent diplomatic roles from Bonn 
(Ambassador Bernadette Olowo) to Ottawa (High-Commissioner Anna 
Amailuk). In the late 1980s these included Freda Blick as ambassador to 
France. Also in France, as ambassador of Ghana, was Theresa Strictner-
Scott. Representing Africa abroad was a case of externalized pan-African-
ism in this diplomatic sense. S o m e of these w o m e n diplomats also 
represented one African country in another. Ambassador Amailuk, for 
example, once represented Uganda in Ghana. 
Quasi-diplomatic roles involving less formal international activity have 
also opened up for African w o m e n . Angie Brooks served as president of 
the International Federation of W o m e n Lawyers and was decorated by a 
number of foreign governments including Brazil, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Yugoslavia, Cameroon and the People's Republic of China. 
Kenyan w o m e n w h o have served in quasi-diplomatic roles over the 
years have included Margaret Kenyatta, Grace Ogot and others. T h e 
Kenyan Foreign Service has also included high-ranking w o m e n officials 
and diplomats - often serving both Africa and their own country. 
At the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, the country's most 
highly publicized w o m a n was not a diplomat at all: she was Alice Lenshina, 
the prophetess w h o led the L u m p a Church (see Chapter 17 of this 
volume). Alice's defiance of Zambia's government and ruling party pre-
cipitated serious civil conflict. But whichever side one preferred to 
take in the confrontation between Alice Lenshina and Zambia's newly 
independent government under Kenneth Kaunda, the phenomenon of 
Alice was one more indication that Africa could still produce highly 
committed female leaders, capable of inspiring their followers to great 
feats of courage and sacrifice. 
Other w o m e n in Zambia since then have assumed quasi-diplomatic 
roles from time to time - including D r M u t u m b a Bull both as a political 
figure and as a scholar. Such w o m e n have served both their country and 
the continent. 
Certain spouses of African leaders in this period developed a high 
diplomatic and political visibility of their o w n . In the 1980s, M r s Sally 
M u g a b e became active in a number of humanitarian and international 
causes - especially the special cause of the welfare of the children of 
Africa as a whole. M r s M u g a b e went into an active diplomatic alliance 
with the United Nations Children's Fund ( U N I C E F ) - and hosted pan-
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African meetings in Harare to promote the cause of Africa's children.
(The nearest American analogy to Mrs Mugabe was the late Mrs Eleanor
Roosevelt in her diplomatic and humanitarian work, both before and after
her husband's death.)
Another African presidential spouse who was diplomatically active for
a while was Mrs Jehan Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt. Among conservative
Muslim men in the Middle East, Mrs al-Sadat's public posture and
visibility were often a liability rather than an asset. But to many women
in the Arab world, Mrs al-Sadat became, at least for a while, a role model.
She was forced into relative oblivion after the assassination of her husband
in 1981.
PLATE 30.2 Left: Jehan al-Sadat ofEgypt, an advocate of the promotion ofwomen's rights;
right: Winnie Mandela ofSouth Africa, a leader in the a»ii-apartheid struggle, Johannesburg,
October 1985
In Southern Africa as a whole in this period, pan-Africanism has been
at its most tumultuous both politically and in gender relations. In the
Republic of South Africa the most spectacular spouse of any race in the
1980s was Winnie Mandela. Although she had neither a direct diplomatic
role nor an official political office in the struggle against apartheid, Winnie
Mandela became the most famous African woman of the 1980s. She
found herself in the middle of a variety of historical and pan-African
processes in her part of the continent. It was not just the politics of race
which affected her. It was also the politics of gender and of age-grades.
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In Southern Africa as a whole, bridges needed to be built not only 
between races, but also between genders and across generations. Relations 
between m e n and w o m e n had been disrupted by repression, by wars of 
liberation and by labour migration. A n d relations between the African 
youth and the older generations continued to be strained by the anger 
and radicalization generated by apartheid. 
In the middle of these three sets of pan-African relations - gender, 
race and generation - came the crisis of Winnie Mandela late in the 
1980s. As a w o m a n whose husband (Nelson Mandela) had been in prison 
for more than a quarter of a century, Winnie Mandela had symbolized 
the strain of political struggle upon gender relations. As a w o m a n w h o 
attempted to organize young activists for social roles, Winnie Mandela 
had been one of the bridge-builders across generations. 
But in 1988 and 1989 things went seriously wrong for M r s Mandela -
partly because of the activities of those very young people that she had 
tried to organize. T h e w o m a n w h o had been a martyr to apartheid since 
her husband was sentenced to life-imprisonment in 1964, the w o m a n w h o 
had herself suffered banning and restriction in a black ghetto for long 
periods of time, had n o w become a subject of denunciation and derision 
in some of the circles which once acclaimed her as 'mother of the nation'. 
But her very status had been part of the wider saga concerning gender-
relations in Southern Africa. Repression and war have often created 
'widows of the revolution' - widows of martyrs to the liberation struggle. 
There have also been 'cage widows' - wives of husbands put away in 
detention for life. Winnie Mandela had become the most internationally 
illustrious of the so-called 'cage widows'. 
Behind it all were some hard sociological trends. For the black youth 
in Southern Africa, new forms of initiation into warriorhood had emerged. 
M a n y a teenager had been enlisted into the liberation armies. A n d in 
urban centres the n e w warriorhood sometimes took the form of confronting 
armed security forces in the streets of Soweto. Winnie Mandela's exper-
iment of a youthful soccer team with additional responsibilities of guarding 
her could have been a pilot scheme worth emulating. But it became an 
experiment which had gone wrong. Her soccer team degenerated into a 
gang fighting other young people. Youthful gang warfare caught up with 
Winnie Mandela's dreams. 
Southern Africa had also created special kinds of divergence between 
gender and class. In South Africa's mining communities, m e n had not 
been allowed to live with their wives. As w e indicated, gender apartheid 
had been added to racial apartheid. W e have noted that w o m e n had often 
remained on the land as subsistence farmers - while their m e n travelled 
thousands of miles for wages. T h e result was, as w e indicated, the creation 
of a migrant male proletariat and a sedentary female peasantry. A s a wife 
separated from her o w n husband by an unjust system, Winnie Mandela 
became a role model for the rural peasant w o m e n as well. 
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In the struggle to build bridges across races, South Africa in this period 
produced two black Nobel laureates for peace - Albert Luthuli and 
D e s m o n d Tutu. But there were no Nobel Prizes to be w o n in the struggle 
to build bridges between genders or bridges across generations. 'Peace' 
in terms of the Nobel Prize was not yet defined by the yardstick of either 
fighting sexism or moderating generational conflict. Winnie Mandela was 
too controversial in the 1980s to stand a chance of becoming the first 
black female to win the Nobel Prize even if her efforts across genders 
and generations had succeeded. However, since M r s Mandela's political 
career was far from over, the final estimate of her pan-African contribution 
could only be computed by history itself in the fullness of time. 
Also in the w o m b of time was whether a w o m a n secretary-general of 
the Organization of African Unity would come before or after the first 
w o m a n president of an African country.9 
Colonial education: liberating but not developmental 
W h a t m a y c o m e sooner to Africa than such a gender revolution is the 
second major shift w e have referred to — a more general transformation 
of Africa's level of expertise. While the continent m a y indeed be awaiting 
both a sexual revolution and a scientific one, prospects for the latter m a y 
be more imminent than for the former. 
A major point to bear in mind is that the skills which came to Africa with 
colonial rule happened to have one over-riding historical ambiguity. T h e 
skills turned out to be useful for liberation but basically useless for develop-
ment. Colonially imported skills were essentially those of communication — 
and expertise in these new forms of literary and oral communication did 
help the cause of decolonization. W h a t colonialism failed to transfer effec-
tively were skills of production. It is in that sense that the colonial heritage 
of education and training fell short of promoting real development in African 
'territories', as w e have shown in the relevant chapters. 
T h e impact of the Great Depression and the Second World W a r on 
Europe helped, as w e have indicated, to m a k e capitalism more accountable 
and eventually to make imperialism more responsible. It was mainly after 
the Second World W a r that the imperial powers began to pay special 
attention to colonial education and training in Africa. N e w skills of 
communication were being forged. It was in 1948 that the University 
College of the Gold Coast was established — and Ibadan opened its doors 
to its first pupils as a University College. In February of the following 
year (1949) the University of Lovanium was established by decree in the 
Belgian Congo, though it was not until 1954 that the first 30 Africans 
were admitted to a pre-university course, of w h o m only 11 were declared 
to have passed. 
9. See A . A . Mazrui, 1990. 
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In Uganda, Makerere became a University College late in 1949. A s for 
research institutions which were emerging, these included the Institute 
of Tropical Ophthalmology which was set up in B a m a k o , French Sudan, 
in 1953 and O R A N O (Organisation pour la recherche sur l'alimentation et 
la nutrition en Afrique) was set up in Dakar. Research organizations of 
this kind did have developmental implications and were not merely based 
on skills of communication. But the study of nutrition or ophthalmology 
is not the same thing as the study of techniques of production. In any 
case, these research institutions were only a small fraction of the thrust 
of colonial education. T h e main thrust was still in the direction of literary 
and verbal skills. 
S o m e of those techniques of communication were used by African 
patriots within the constituency of the imperial métropole, and even to 
communicate with the international community at large. A s earlier chap-
ters indicated, the concept of négritude was born a m o n g black patriots in 
France - especially A i m é Césaire and Leopold Senghor. T h e négritude 
movement began at the beginning of the period covered in this volume. 
T h e nearest Anglophone equivalent to négritude as a movement of cultural 
validation in this early period was, as was shown earlier, J o m o Kenyatta's 
book, Facing Mount Kenya, which was also a declaration of cultural 
vindication, and was first published in 1938. Both négritude and Facing 
Mount Kenya were important aspects of Africa's n e w skills of c o m -
munication - addressed both to the métropole and to the world at large. 
In such instances, these skills were being used as part of the crusade of 
liberation. In 1947 Alioune Diop founded Présence africaine in Paris -
another weapon of communication in the struggle for Africa's vindication. 
O n balance, these colonially-transmitted skills of literature and oratory 
in European language did indeed serve the cause of Africa's political 
liberation well. It was not by accident that anti-colonial movements were 
disproportionately led by Westernized and semi-Westernized African 
patriots. T h e founding fathers of the n e w African nations were in a large 
measure products of either missionary schools within Africa or Western 
colleges abroad - or, quite often, both. These included the founder-
presidents of Ghana (Nkrumah), Senegal (Senghor), Tanzania (Nyerere), 
Nigeria (Azikiwe), Côte d'Ivoire (Houphouèt-Boigny), Malawi (Banda), 
Kenya (Kenyatta), and m a n y others. T h e evidence is overwhelming that 
although Westernized African patriots were only a small minority of the 
total population of the continent, they were the vanguard of the struggle for 
political independence. A s w e indicated in the political chapters of this vol-
ume,theseWestern-educatedAfricanseventuallyovershadowedthetradition-
al rulers - and inherited the reins of power from the departing colonialists. 
It is in this sense that the skills of communication transferred to Africa dur-
ing the colonial period helped the cause of Africa's political independence. 
W h a t the colonial powers did not transfer were genuine skills of 
production. T o that extent colonial education - though greatly valuable 
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for the phase of Africa's political liberation has been unequal to the
task of Africa's development. Agricultural techniques in Africa continue
to be mainly rudimentary, factories have to import almost every nut and
bolt, dams are often in disrepair, equipment grinds to a standstill because
of lack of spare parts. Africa's industrial capacity to use its own minerals
is pathetic. Even our capacity to dig for these minerals without foreign
equipment, expertise and organization, is astonishingly modest. The
continent still produces from its mines what it is unable to use; and
imports for use what it is unable to produce.
PLATE 30.3 Triga nuclear reactor, Zaire, 1965
The conclusion is irresistible. While colonial rule did create its own
grave-diggers by educating a political élite, colonialism did not create an
economic vanguard for Africa's development. The mission of Africa's
emancipation was well served by colonial education; but the mission of
Africa's development can never be fulfilled through the colonial legacy
alone. Skills of communication must now be combined with skills of
production and development.
On governance and development
Africa entered its new era of independence with an even wider skill gap
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than production gap; a chasm between its n e w post-colonial institutions 
and the ability to control them effectively. 
There was first the lop-sided capitalism which African countries had 
inherited from the colonial era. T h e continent had received Western 
consumption patterns without Western productive techniques, Western 
tastes without Western performance, urbanization without indus-
trialization, capitalist greed without capitalist discipline. T o paraphrase a 
Western poet (Alexander Pope): 
A little capitalism is a dangerous thing; 
Drink deep, or taste not the Western Spring. 
Africa did not drink from the spring of capitalism as deeply as South-
east Asia had done, nor was Africa allowed not to taste capitalism at all. 
T h e result in Africa became a tragedy of greed without the atonement 
of efficiency. 
T h e n there were the political institutions which post-colonial Africa 
had inherited. Africa's o w n indigenous structures of governance had been 
either abolished or undermined by colonial rulers. A n d the idea of a 
standing African army was inaugurated with weapons produced by a 
technology far in advance of the level attained locally. Africa emerged 
into independence with skills of destruction m u c h greater than its skills 
of production. A n d yet both sets of skills were still heavily reliant on 
external models and foreign suppliers. This played havoc with civil-
military relations in Africa, and the whole legacy of coups and counter-
coups. Because of the skill gap, militarization in Africa has not fed 
into civilian industrialization. There has been no symbiotic relationship 
between defence and development. Apart from Egypt and the Republic 
of South Africa, almost no African country has a major 'defence industry' 
at all. Mos t African armies not only import every tank and every rocket; 
they also import every sten gun, every cartridge; sometimes even the 
uniforms of African armies are imported. 
Militarization without industrialization has destabilized both economic 
and political systems. T h e marriage between politics and the military has 
been one problem; the divorce between defence and development has 
been another. There is a devastating skill gap in all these areas - political, 
economic and technological underdevelopment. 
A m o n g the casualties of this situation are h u m a n rights in Africa. T h e 
failure of Western liberal institutions in most of Africa is due not only 
to their foreignness but also to Africa's weak capacity for organizing either 
disciplined political parties, or efficient corporate power or effective trade 
unions. After all, Western democracy was imposed on Japan, as well as on 
Africa. Americans imposed it on Japan over a period of less than a decade; 
Africans had a longer period of colonial tutelage. A n d yet Western 
institutions prospered in alien Japanese soil, but have had difficulty 
surviving in alien African soil. T h e skill gap in organization m a y well be 
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part of the explanation, as well as the less developed capitalist base in 
Africa as compared with Japan. 
T h e relationship between the skills of governance and prospects for 
economic development since independence have been affected by the 
following inter-related factors: 
(1) H o w big the government is (SIZE); 
(2) H o w m u c h the government does ( R O L E ) ; 
(3) H o w well the government does it ( E F F E C T I V E N E S S ) ; 
(4) H o w representative and equitable the government is 
(LEGITIMACY). 
T h e first consideration of 'bigness' has included the size of not only 
the civil service proper but also the parastatals. T h e second consideration 
of role has related to the role of the state in the economy and the nature 
of the government's functions. T h e third consideration has concerned 
competence, effectiveness and degree of rationality in governmental behav-
iour. T h e fourth conditioning factor is about democracy and rep-
resentativeness — or lack of them. 
It is important to remember that, in Africa, representativeness in the 
post-colonial era is often measured ethnically rather than electorally. 
Ethnic arithmetic often helps to reassure different groups whether or not 
they are truly part of the machinery and a m o n g the beneficiaries. A 
government is deemed to be more or less representative by the extent to 
which it reflects the ethnic composition of the wider society. In Nigeria 
this principle of representativeness since the civil war is often referred to 
as 'the federal character' of the nation. 
T h e dynamic of ethnic representativeness has had a propensity to 
enlarge governmental and bureaucratic institutions. T h e civil service and 
the parastatals have often become 'bloated' in response to the delicate 
balance of ethnic arithmetic. 
O n the other hand, insensitivity to the need for ethnic balance in post-
colonial Africa can sometimes be destabilizing. T h e absence of ethnic 
representativeness in a country like Nigeria or U g a n d a has often been a 
bigger political risk than the absence of electoral representativeness at the 
ballot box. Ethnic arithmetic has often been a more compelling imperative 
than the ballot in the liberal sense. 
A s for the criterion of performance of the government, one central 
dilemma in post-colonial Africa concerns the relationship between econ-
omic liberalization and political liberalization. There are certain countries 
in Africa where political pluralism has tended to be economically de-
stabilizing. Nigeria under President Shehu Shagari (1979-83) was pol-
itically open and competitive, but economically the country was sheer 
economic anarchy. G h a n a under L i m a n n and Sudan under Sadiq al-
M a h d l were also politically open but economically devastated societies. 
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(Southern Sudan was neither politically free nor economically protected. 
It was devastated both politically and economically.) 
In such African countries there has been a genuine moral dilemma. 
Political pluralism has carried a high risk of economic decay. In the final 
analysis it has sometimes been an agonizing choice between either political 
freedom or economic development - but not both together. In such a 
situation what was the duty of donors and international institutions? H a s 
there been a genuine risk that institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary F u n d would actually prefer military regimes like 
those of Ibrahim Babangida and Jerry Rawlings to democratically elected 
regimes like those of Shagari, L imann and al-Mahdl? 
Is there a risk in the 1990s that external bodies would encourage 
economic liberalization while discouraging political liberalization? Could 
the latter encouragement of military regimes occur implicitly - sometimes 
almost unconsciously? 
A s for the role of corruption in governance after independence, this 
sometimes has taken the form of privatization of the state. Ethnic pri-
vatization has occurred w h e n ethnic representativeness was abandoned -
and one particular ethnic group monopolized or disproportionately con-
trolled the state. T h e Nubi in Idi Amln's Uganda was one case in point. 
Dynastic privatization occurred w h e n the resources and symbols of the 
state were monopolized by an individual and his more immediate family. 
Bokassa in the Central African Empire literally attempted to create a 
dynasty. 
Anarchic privatization has occurred w h e n the wealth and power of the 
state are dissipated in a free-for-all scramble for advantage. Nigeria under 
Shehu Shagari became a case of anarchic privatization, especially from 
1981 onwards. 
In the political domain, Africa's worst evils since independence are the 
danger of tyranny on one side and the risk of anarchy on the other. 
Tyranny is too m u c h government, anarchy is too little government. T h e 
tyrannical tendency is often a centralization of violence. T h e anarchic 
tendency is basically a decentralization of violence - often neighbour 
against neighbour. 
In the economic domain, Africa's worst evils are the risk of economic 
dependency on one side and the peril of economic decay on the other. 
Dependency is a truncated capacity for self-reliance. Decay is a truncated 
capacity for development. 
T h e crisis of governance in Africa concerns the relationship between the 
political evils of tyranny and anarchy on one side and the economic evils of 
dependency and decay on the other. W h a t is the way out? A m o n g the most 
important skills which need to be developed from the 1990s onwards 
are precisely those which will ameliorate this central crisis of governance. 
Africans do not have to imitate Western liberal institutions in order to 
reconcile stability with equity. But the people of the continent do need 
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to develop enough skills and organization to fight and defend their rights 
even against their o w n governments. Rulers everywhere tend to become 
arbitrary unless there is organized counterforce to check their excesses. 
T h e skill gap in Africa is part and parcel of such rampant violation of 
h u m a n rights in the continent. Yoweri Museveni's army in Uganda in 
the 1980s constituted the first successful attempt by civilians to organize 
militarily against an undemocratic African regime. But the problems 
remained enormous. Both stability and equity were still in doubt. 
O n population and the environment 
African problems in the coming decades will extend beyond the quest 
for political order and viable economies. T h e very ecology of Africa is 
endangered; deforestation and desertification are rendering large parts of 
Africa desolate. Part of the problem is a weak planning capability in the 
continent as a whole. Although the majority of African governments 
favour national development plans, most of those plans are honoured 
more in the breach than in the observance. Forests are depleted without 
m u c h of an effort at reforestation. T h e tropical rain forest in the Côte 
d'Ivoire has been devastated by French and Lebanese economic interests 
in collusion with the local establishment. Little attention is paid to the 
ecological damage or to the need for compensatory reforestation. Senegal -
after considerable environmental damage - has initiated a modest attempt 
at growing n e w trees. Skills of planning still lag behind ecological 
protection. 
T h e skill gap extends to the use of firewood as the most prevalent 
form of energy in rural Africa. W o o d is also the most ancient form of 
domesticated energy. But rural Africa has to learn h o w to use this energy 
economically. Relatively simple alterations in methods of cooking and in 
the efficiency of using fire could drastically cut d o w n the consumption 
of firewood. A n d this in turn could reduce, or even arrest, the pace of 
deforestation and desertification in parts of the continent. 
T h e n there is the problem of relating livestock to available pasture in 
those societies where cattle, goats or camels have high cultural value. 
Governments have found it hard to persuade pastoralists that large 
numbers of cattle, goats or camels have a potentially detrimental effect 
on the ecology and on the future availability of grass. Surplus cattle and 
deficit skill have all too often become a deadly combination. 
W h a t about the morally dubious concept of 'surplus people' in a 
continent of deficit skill? A limited capacity for planning has also affected 
the issue of population growth in the continent. Is Africa producing more 
people than it can feed? Although the 1980s gave mixed signals about 
the relationship between food production and population growth in Africa, 
the risk of less food production per capita did persist. O n e solution was 
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to improve the level of food production; the other was to decrease the 
rate of population growth. Both solutions required skills. O n food 
production the relevant chapters in this book have dealt with that issue. 
W h a t about population growth? 
B y the 1980s there were more babies being born in Africa than anywhere 
else in the world. T h e rate of population growth in black Africa became 
the highest in the entire history of the h u m a n race - and it was still 
gathering m o m e n t u m (Table 30.1). T h e rate of growth was 2.5 per cent 
per year in 1960-^70, 2.7 per cent in 1970-80, 3.1 per cent in 1980-86, 
and by 1989 it was estimated at 3.2 per cent. Countries like Kenya 
exceeded a growth rate of 4 per cent per year. 
Africa's love of children was at once its glory and its unfolding tragedy. 
In the 1980s, research indicated that African families desired to be even 
larger than they already were. O n average the African w o m a n wanted six 
or more children. In 1988 the Kenyan w o m a n aspired to be the mother 
of eight children. T h e desired family size in Africa as a whole ranged 
from five in G h a n a to nine in Mauritania. 
O n e major reason behind love of children was Africa's concept of 
immortality. Immortality in Africa was not simply a matter of going to 
heaven. It was also leaving one's blood still flowing in the veins of the 
living. In modern terms, no one was deemed to be really dead for as long 
as his or her genes were still part of the living. William Wordsworth10 
was coming close to Africa's philosophy w h e n he said: 
O h joy! That in our embers 
Is something that doth live; 
That Nature yet remembers 
What was so fugitive. 
Because of high infant mortality, African parents in the 1980s had six 
children in order to be sure that they had at least four. T o make allowances 
for the death of babies was itself a form of family planning. In m a n y 
African villages death was a more familiar visitor than the doctor. 
W h a t Africa therefore needed most was not birth control, but death 
control - not h o w to have fewer children, but h o w to ensure that more 
babies survived. Normally, death control at first increases population 
growth. But after a while it is supposed to reassure parents sufficiently 
to m a k e them take the risk of having fewer babies. A n d yet by the end 
of the 1980s this demographic transition had still not occurred in Africa. 
Three types of conflict affected children in Africa. There was conflict 
between h u m a n beings (especially racial and ethnic confrontations). Sec-
ondly, there was conflict between population growth and the environment 
(a kind of ecological warfare). A n d , thirdly, there was the struggle against 
10. W . Wordsworth, Ode on Intimations of Immortality. 
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poverty and ignorance (the campaign for social upliftment and for the 
satisfaction of at least the basic h u m a n needs). 
T h e racial and ethnic confrontations in both civil wars and wars of 
liberation produce children of war — often deprived of at least one parent, 
often displaced from their village or location. Children in refugee camps 
are a classic illustration of such deprivation. 
T h e struggle between population growth and the elements of nature 
was a more primordial engagement. Sometimes nature teased Africa in a 
very cruel way - drought this year, flood the next, and all very destructive. 
Parents and children were caught up in those upheavals of the environ-
ment. 
T h e third struggle for Africa's children was against poverty and 
ignorance. Sometimes simple solutions of rehydration for children, or salt 
replacement, could save a million lives in Africa. Immunization campaigns 
of the kind undertaken by U N I C E F (the United Nations' Children's 
F u n d ) and the World Health Organization ( W H O ) in the 1980s kept 
death at bay in some villages. Lessons in nutrition were also life-saving. 
T h e three kinds of conflict were often interlinked. T o fight ignorance 
about soil erosion was basically to struggle for soil conservation and 
environmental protection. Racial and ethnic confrontations had conse-
quences for both poverty, on one side, and ecology, on the other. 
W h a t was the role of skilled Africans in all this struggle? W h a t was 
the role of artists, educators and intellectuals? Their role was indeed 
partly educational and partly mobilizational. T h e y had a role to play in 
educating both the public and policy-makers. T h e y also had a role to 
play in generating commitment and enthusiasm for policies which could 
protect children in all three types of stressful situations and conflicts. 
But the mobilizer needed first to be mobilized — the educator needed 
first to be educated. T h e artists, teachers and intellectuals needed to be 
exposed m u c h more to problems of children of war, problems of ecological 
catastrophe and of social deprivation, than they have ordinarily tended to 
be. 
F r o m the mid-1980s, U N I C E F started trying to enlist artists, intel-
lectuals and other skilled Africans in a crusade to save the children of 
Africa. 
But h o w was Africa to ensure a dramatic fall in infant mortality? 
U N I C E F demonstrated that some of the methods required relatively 
modest skills. A n d yet even those modest skills had not yet been utilized. 
Millions of babies in both colonial and post-colonial Africa died from 
diarrhoea. Simple methods of re-hydration and salt-replacement could 
have saved most of those babies. Skilled outsiders are beginning to m a k e 
small packets of 'salt-and-water' available to mothers in rural Africa. 
G o o d drinking water is another important prerequisite in this respect, 
and African governments and international agencies should address them-
selves to its provision. 
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In addition, immunization against the other baby-killers of Africa could 
m a k e a considerable difference to life-chances. Baby-killers like dyptheria, 
whooping cough, measles and typhoid could be rapidly arrested with 
large-scale immunization. Countries like Burkina Faso have embarked on 
such programmes. 
But in the period covered by this volume there was one disease where 
the skill gap affected Westerners and Africans alike. T h e disease which 
Westerners had called A I D S (Acquired I m m u n e Deficiency Syndrome) 
was probably the most important disease to have hit the h u m a n race in 
this particular period of global history. 
T h e disease pre-eminently belonged to the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, especially from the 1980s onwards. In the first place it defied all 
laws of international class struggle and distribution of wealth. T h e majority 
of the first casualties were either Americans in such prominent cities as 
N e w York and San Francisco or Africans in some of the poorest sectors 
of the continent. T h e skill gap was in both the West and Africa. 
For once in this period of history the West was as ignorant medically 
as Africa. Rich and poor were afflicted alike. Westerners and Africans 
shared a m o m e n t of medical bewilderment. 
But let us not permit this brief m o m e n t of shared ignorance disguise 
the distance between those w h o walk on the m o o n and those w h o strive 
to reach the village. T h e skill issue is fundamental not just for policy-
making within each African country. A s indicated earlier, it is basic to 
the entire North-South divide, to the stratification of the world into 
developed and underdeveloped countries. That is the ultimate burden of 
this period of h u m a n history. 
Conclusion 
T h e years covered in this volume (1935 to the present day) constitute 
the great connecting period between the age of colonialism and the n e w 
era of independence. W e have divided this short period in Africa's history 
into, first, the decade of global conflict (1935-45); secondly, the decade 
and a half of intensified struggle against colonialism (1945-60); and 
thirdly, the glittering but uncertain d a w n of independence and its quest for 
development, especially from i960 onwards. Problems have proliferated. 
But historians confront their greatest challenge when they not only 
study the past but also use their knowledge to try and understand the 
present and identify the likely trends of the future. T h e period covered 
in this volume coincides with the greatest technological revolutions in 
h u m a n history - from space exploration to the impact of the computer 
on earth. While Africa has been marching towards independence, others 
have walked on the m o o n . 
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TABLE 30.1 
AFRICA 
EASTERN 
AFRICA 
British Indian 
Ocean Terr. 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius* 
Mozambique 
Réunion 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Somalia 
Uganda 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Africa: total population and annual 
2025, medium ; 
1950 
221984 
64984 
2 
2456 
173 
60 
19 573 
6265 
4230 
2881 
493 
6198 
257 
2 120 
34 
2423 
4762 
7886 
2440 
2730 
M I D D L E A F R I C A 26316 
Angola 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Zaire 
NORTHERN 
AFRICA 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
4131 
4467 
1314 
2658 
808 
226 
469 
60 
12184 
51798 
8753 
20330 
1029 
'955 
247954 
72774 
2 
2691 
194 
69 
21680 
7189 
4718 
3169 
571 
6744 
293 
2391 
38 
2657 
5 556 
8803 
2 753 
3257 
28792 
4437 
4843 
1414 
2838 
889 
238 
477 
62 
13595 
57994 
9715 
22990 
1126 
variant 
Population 
IQ6O 
279316 
82326 
2 
2948 
215 
80 
24191 
8332 
5309 
3 529 
660 
7461 
339 
2742 
42 
2 935 
6562 
10026 
3141 
3812 
31811 
4816 
5297 
1534 
3064 
988 
252 
486 
64 
15310 
65 " 5 
10800 
25922 
1349 
1965 
317056 
94165 
2 
3224 
240 
114 
27150 
9749 
6016 
3975 
753 
8338 
393 
3183 
47 
3267 
8047 
11586 
3614 
4466 
35343 
5180 
5 874 
1677 
3334 
1 m 
270 
495 
68 
17335 
73297 
11923 
29389 
1623 
rate of change 
(thousands) 
1970 
361768 
108228 
2 
3 522 
274 
168 
30623 
11 498 
6742 
4518 
826 
9395 
441 
3728 
53 
3668 
9806 
13 513 
4189 
5260 
39599 
5 588 
6610 
1849 
3652 
1263 
291 
504 
73 
19769 
83158 
13746 
33053 
1986 
1975 
413 298 
123 675 
2 
3680 
320 
243 
34309 
13 741 
7595 
5 244 
892 
10498 
484 
4384 
59 
4156 
11183 
15900 
4841 
6143 
45243 
6520 
7520 
2057 
4030 
1447 
225 
637 
81 
22726 
93799 
16018 
36289 
2446 
ig8o 
477232 
144172 
2 
4132 
392 
304 
38750 
16632 
8785 
6183 
966 
12095 
508 
5163 
63 
5345 
13 120 
18867 
5 738 
7126 
52183 
7723 
8653 
2320 
4477 
1669 
217 
806 
94 
26225 
107240 
18740 
40875 
3043 
195°-
1985 
552884 
167815 
2 
4731 
463 
354 
43083 
20096 
10237 
7340 
1020 
13711 
547 
6102 
65 
6370 
15647 
22748 
7006 
8292 
60209 
8754 
10 051 
2646 
5018 
1939 
312 
985 
107 
30398 
123348 
21788 
46 511 
3786 
1
 Including Agalesa, Rodrigues and St Brandon 
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TABLE 30.1 (cont.) 
1990 1995 
Population (thousands) 
2000 200s 2010 2015 2020 202$ 
AFRICA 
EASTERN 
AFRICA 
British Indian 
Ocean Terr. 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius* 
Mozambique 
Réunion 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Somalia 
Uganda 
United Rep. of 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
M I D D L E AFRICA 
Angola 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
Sao T o m e and 
Principe 
Zaire 
NORTHERN 
AFRICA 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Libyan Arab 
642 m 
196873 
2 
5472 
55° 
409 
49240 
24031 
12004 
8754 
1082 
15656 
598 
7237 
69 
7497 
18794 
27318 
8452 
9709 
70 054 
10020 
"833 
3039 
5678 
2271 
352 
1172 
121 
35 568 
140553 
24960 
52426 
4545 
746819 
232243 
2 
6362 
658 
474 
57140 
28978 
14113 
10494 
1142 
17922 
647 
8602 
72 
8441 
22666 
32971 
10222 
11340 
81933 
11531 
14037 
3511 
6447 
2678 
400 
1382 
135 
41813 
159245 
28704 
58388 
5446 
866 585 1001 349 1 
273 594 
2 
7358 
789 
552 
66364 
35060 
16627 
12458 
1201 
20493 
692 
10200 
75 
9736 
26958 
39639 
12267 
13 123 
95981 
13295 
16701 
4074 
7337 
3167 
455 
1612 
151 
49190 
178949 
32904 
64210 
6500 
321148 
2 
8469 
945 
644 
76961 
42389 
19529 
14654 
1258 
23365 
735 
11973 
78 
11312 
31730 
47460 
14632 
15012 
112 344 
15317 
19897 
4740 
8352 
3746 
519 
1827 
167 
57780 
199330 
37286 
70099 
7695 
1484741 
374399 
2 
9657 
1123 
748 
88889 
50905 
22827 
17104 
1309 
26456 
777 
13 791 
80 
13 114 
36982 
56333 
17328 
16974 
130958 
17 561 
23665 
5497 
9491 
4406 
592 
2052 
184 
67509 
219580 
41 510 
75 746 
8976 
301371 1 
431034 
2 
10 841 
1315 
862 
101753 
60071 
26476 
19 701 
1354 
29 592 
817 
I S S " 
82 
15035 
42561 
65845 
20264 
18951 
151395 
20004 
27893 
6325 
10728 
5130 
671 
2309 
201 
78135 
238925 
45 279 
81050 
10276 
[ 452 067 1 
487868 
2 
11950 
1 510 
979 
114313 
69799 
30272 
22278 
1391 
32 593 
855 
17196 
83 
16905 
48101 
75485 
23286 
20870 
172266 
22438 
32264 
7154 
12013 
5860 
752 
2 594 
219 
88972 
256728 
48484 
85768 
» 567 
596855 
542 536 
2 
12976 
1697 
1094 
126618 
79113 
34014 
24730 
1419 
35416 
889 
18847 
84 
18 701 
53144 
84917 
26260 
22616 
192342 
24731 
36547 
7947 
13245 
6568 
828 
2875 
235 
99366 
274390 
51950 
90355 
12 841 
931 
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TABLE 30.1 (cont.) 
1950 ¡955 
Population (thousands) 
i960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
NORTHERN 
A F R I C A (cont.) 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Western Sahara 
SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
WESTERN 
AFRICA 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
St Helenab 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
89S3 
9190 
3530 
14 
15736 
389 
734 
666 
13683 
264 
63150 
2046 
3654 
146 
2 775 
294 
4 9 0 0 
2550 
505 
824 
3520 
825 
2400 
32 935 
5 
2500 
1944 
1329 
10132 
10150 
3860 
21 
17639 
433 
794 
736 
15385 
291 
70754 
2111 
4012 
169 
3221 
313 
5759 
2826 
522 
914 
3 9 " 
901 
2689 
37094 
5 
2811 
2081 
1414 
11626 
11165 
4221 
32 
19892 
481 
870 
817 
17396 
326 
80173 
2237 
4452 
196 
3799 
352 
6774 
3136 
542 
1039 
4375 
991 
3028 
42305 
5 
3187 
2241 
1514 
13323 
12359 
4630 
50 
22623 
549 
963 
910 
19832 
370 
91628 
2430 
4961 
229 
4527 
404 
7828 
3488 
524 
" 9 5 
4922 
1096 
3660 
48676 
5 
3626 
2429 
1627 
15310 
13859 
5127 
76 
25581 
623 
1064 
1016 
22458 
419 
105 202 
2693 
5550 
267 
5515 
464 
8612 
3900 
525 
1385 
5484 
1221 
416s 
56581 
5 
4158 
2656 
2020 
17305 
16012 
5611 
117 
28866 
755 
1187 
1141 
25301 
482 
121715 
3033 
6202 
278 
6755 
548 
9831 
4149 
627 
1 609 
6169 
1371 
4771 
66346 
5 
4806 
2931 
2285 
19382 
18681 
6384 
135 
32 379 
902 
1339 
1306 
28270 
563 
141258 
3459 
6957 
289 
8194 
641 
10736 
4461 
795 
1876 
6863 
1551 
5 586 
78430 
5 
5 538 
3263 
2615 
22025 
21 822 
7261 
155 
36372 
1083 
1538 
1 518 
31569 
664 
165 141 
3985 
7877 
324 
9933 
745 
12839 
4987 
873 
2199 
7915 
1766 
6608 
92016 
6 
6375 
3665 
3028 
b
 Including Ascension and Tristan de Cunha 
Source: United Nations (1990) World Population Prospects, S T / E S A / S E R . A/120. 
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TABLE 30.1 (cont.) 
Population (thousands) 
iggo 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
NORTHERN 
AFRICA (cont.) 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Western Sahara 
S O U T H E R N 
AFRICA 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
W E S T E R N 
AFRICA 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
St Helenab 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
25061 
25203 
8180 
178 
40928 
1304 
1774 
1781 
35282 
788 
193 702 
4630 
8996 
370 
11997 
861 
15028 
S 755 
964 
2 575 
9214 
2024 
7731 
108542 
7 
7327 
4151 
3 531 
28301 
29128 
9076 
202 
45972 
1549 
2053 
2079 
39348 
943 
227426 
5421 
10396 
438 
14535 
984 
17608 
6700 
1073 
3032 
10799 
2 335 
9104 
127694 
8 
8423 
4740 
4138 
31559 
33625 
9924 
228 
51416 
1822 
2370 
2 437 
43666 
1121 
266 645 
6369 
12092 
515 
17600 
1119 
20564 
7830 
1197 
3 575 
12685 
2702 
10752 
149 621 
10 
9716 
5437 
4861 
34648 
38647 
10702 
254 
57168 
2124 
2731 
2847 
48139 
1326 
311360 
7486 
14080 
595 
21218 
1271 
23845 
9162 
1338 
4207 
14885 
3129 
12694 
174307 
11 
11172 
6250 
5 7 " 
37586 
44017 
11464 
280 
63108 
2451 
3138 
3303 
52662 
1554 
360430 
8745 
16349 
676 
25503 
1434 
26931 
10667 
1491 
4921 
17350 
3612 
14884 
201266 
13 
12730 
7172 
6687 
40408 
49416 
12188 
308 
69074 
2779 
3 579 
3776 
57150 
1790 
410942 
10065 
18822 
757 
30069 
1593 
29884 
12252 
1649 
5689 
19918 
4129 
17167 
228753 
15 
14269 
8161 
7750 
43022 
54627 
12925 
335 
74821 
3095 
4013 
4245 
61446 
2023 
460383 
11369 
21327 
841 
34776 
1736 
32708 
13820 
1791 
6477 
22439 
4642 
19406 
255393 
17 
15685 
9139 
8821 
45 647 
59605 
13630 
362 
80133 
3397 
4427 
4698 
65363 
2249 
507455 
12587 
23710 
922 
39334 
1864 
35442 
15273 
1918 
7245 
24774 
5 " 9 
21482 
280 890 
19 
16988 
10045 
9842 
Africa since 1Ç35 
W e have noted in this volume (and in previous ones) Africa's par-
ticipation in the history of science. But colonialism interrupted, rather 
than facilitated, Africa's o w n technological evolution. A s Walter Rodney 
put it, Europe ''underdeveloped Africa'.1 ' At best, the skills which Europe 
transferred to Africa were literary and verbal - skills more of c o m -
munication rather than of production and development. 
But Africa managed to m a k e good use even of those limited skills. W e 
have shown h o w the Western-educated élites exploited the n e w techniques 
to mobilize the people at h o m e , to divide public opinion in the métropole, 
and to cultivate the wider international community on to the side 
of Africa's aspirations. T h e struggle continues to improve governance, 
safeguard the environment, achieve development and protect Africa's 
children. But m a n y stresses have persisted. 
T w o transformations are particularly necessary if Africa's predicament 
is to be changed fundamentally - a social shift in relations between m e n 
and w o m e n and a paradigm shift in relations between people and their 
environment. Gender relations are the oldest foundations of tradition. 
Science is the newest basis of modernity. 
Africa has to find a meeting point between the two - between a 
revolution in h u m a n relations (men and w o m e n ) and a revolution in 
h u m a n performance (skill and value). This particular period of African 
history since 1935 m a y turn out to have been a fitting preparation for 
this dual African transformation. 
11. W . Rodney, 1981. 
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transformation; author of numerous works on the subject; Professor of 
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see also Algeria; Libya; Mauritania; 
Morocco; North Africa; Tunisia 
magnesium 250 
Maguire, A . 2ß2n 
Mahal, C . 265 
Mahana J7J 
Mahdr 41, 149, 475, 662 
al-MahdT, fAbd al-Rahmän 52, 53 
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pan-Africanism 725, 727-$, 749; politics 
446, 453, 454» 458» 466» 476, 483» 486, 
491 (see also independence above); 
religion 504, 513; science and philosophy 
637, 661; and socialist countries 803, 
808, 809, 821; and Third World move-
ments 832,849; and United Nations 890; 
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7S3> 918 
Mandela, Winnie 18-19, 0 /7» 9*8» 9*9 
Mandingo 661 
Mandinka see M a n d e 
Mandirola, R . 593n 
M a n e , Acacio 211 
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M a r x , K . / M a r x i s m and Marxist/Leninism 
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ism 712; and philosophy and science 
667, 672, 674; and political values 470, 
475,482-3,486,488,495-6; and socialist 
countries 798-9, 801, 828; and Southern 
Africa 278; and Third World movements 
834; see also communism; Communist; 
socialism; socialist 
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899 
M b o y a , T o m : and independence struggle 
117, 240; and literature 560-1; and pol-
itical structures 451; and political values 
and ideologies 468, 487, 495; and social-
ist countries 81511 
Mbughuni , L . A . 6 2 m 
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Meilila 129 
Mende language 545 
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Ministers of Education, Conferences of 
(1964 & 1982) 691, 700, 898-9 
Ministers of Justice, Conferences of 
(Banjul, 1980-81) 758 
Ministers of Labour, Conferences of 
African 760, 897 
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32, 46, 286, 311, 370-1 (j« also agri-
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Morrison, D . G . 6s8n 
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malgache ( M D R M , Madagascar) 223-5, 
235 
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démocratiques ( M T L D , Algeria) 134,135 
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w o m e n 19; see abo Angola under Cuba 
M o y e n Congo see Middle Congo M o y o , 
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253, 322, 341-2» 353; arts 591, 599, 600, 
602, 603, 623; and capitalist countries; 
774~5> 787, 794-5; economic deco-
lonization strategies 410-11, 414; 
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901; economy 296; Heads of State 
meeting (1981) 758; independence strug-
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economy 70, 295,299, 310-11, 379, 3^9, 
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S P U P (Seychelles Peoples United Party) 
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agriculture above); independence strug-
gle and independence (1956) 108, 115, 
144, 146, 148-50, 157, 158, 159; lan-
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Takoradi, Sekondi 181 
Talear 227 
talibe 512 
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88; pan-Africanism 748,749; politics 8 4 -
5, 476 (see also independence above); and 
United Nations 901 
Tanganyika Concessions 256 
Tanganyika League 112 
Tanganyikan African Association ( T A A ) 
232-4 
Tanganyikan African Nationalist Union 
( T A N U ) 212, 232-4, 443, 452, 453, 474, 
818, 907 
Tangier 128 
Tangri, R . 2 4 m 
T A N U see Tanganyikan African National-
ist Union 
Tanzania: agriculture and rural develop-
ment 318-19, 320, 322-4, 329, 330-2, 
339» 341-^ 2» 344» 349. 4*9» arts 590-1, 
605, 609; and capitalist countries 775, 
778, 786-7; economic decolonization 
strategies 396-8, 407, 410-11, 413-14, 
419,426-^7, 429; economy 253, 311, 369, 
380, 804-6, 815-18, 8igy 820 (see also 
agriculture; economic decolonization 
above); education 686, 691, 693, 920; 
independence struggle and inde-
pendence see under Tanganyika; language 
4, 528, 529, 530, 546; literature 4-5, 11, 
564» 571. 573» 576, 578; pan-Africanism 
IOI9 
Index 
Tanzania: agriculture and rural develop-
ment—tont. 
721, 722, 730-^2, 736, 750, 752, 75411, 
757; political structures, changing 442, 
443,445,448-9,450, 452,453,461,466; 
political values, changing 468, 481-2, 
483, 486, 487; politics 5-6, 16 {see also 
independence; political above); popu-
lation and society 341-2, 344; religion 
503-4; science and philosophy 644-5, 
647, 659, 674; and socialist countries 
803, 804-^7, 811, 815-18, 8iQy 820, 824, 
825; and Third World movements 832, 
844, 849, 855, 864; union with Zanzibar 
(1964) n o ; and United Nations 904; 
w o m e n in 30 
Tarkwa 380 
Tarrafal 64 
Tari Concession 77 
*Tawa cult* 907 
taxes 62, 77, 87, 88, 252 
Taylor, J.E. 165 
T A Z A R A (Tanzania-Zambia railway) 804-
5, 818, 5/9, 820 
Tchicaya U Tam'si 556 
Tchimbamba (Paul Lomani-Tshibamba) 
19411, 195 
T C P (Togoland Congress Party) 442 
tea 82, 198, 289, 317, 320, 322, 345; and 
monoculturalism 418; and world 
economy 346 
technology see science and technology 
Teisen, M . 59411 
Teitgen, P . H . I78n 
Tekle, Afewerk 596, 600 
television 627-8 
Telli, Diallo 750, 894 
Telugu language 542 
T e m n e language 545 
Tempels, Father R . P . 673, 725 
Ten-Year Plan (Côte d'Ivoire) 394 
Ten-Year Plan (France, 1942-52) 294, 359 
Ten-Year Plan for the Systematic Study of 
Oral Tradition and Promotion of African 
Languages 532 
Tennyson, Alfred Lord 559, 564, 640 
Tenreiro, Francisco 218 
Territoire français des Afars et des Issas 154, 
155; after 1977 see Djibouti 
territory 476 
terror warfare 137, 156 
tertiary education 682, 683, 685-6, 692-9, 
903, 919-20; and arts 595, 600, 621; and 
diaspora 706-^7, 709, 716, 718-19, 719; 
and independence struggle 163,275; and 
language 567; and literature 567; and 
pan-Africanism 718, 724; and politics 
436; and scientific research 642-6; see 
also entries beginning academic 
Teso 230 
Tete 269; Agreement (1934) 254 
Tevoedjre, Albert 897 
Texaco 651 
textiles industry 34, 46, 90, 286-7, 373-> 
427, 589, 604, 641; see also clothing; 
cotton; sisal 
T F A I see Territoire français des Afars et des 
Issas 
Thatcher, Margaret 654 
theatre 4, 553, 557, 577, 616, 617-22, 718 
theology see religion 
Thiaroye 295 
Thiel, J.F. 583n 
This 69, 72 
Thiong'o, Ngugi w a 4 , 571, 577 
Third International (1919) 475 
'Third W a y ' (Libya) 495 
Third World 829-^70; Africa's condition 
and significance 830-6; Africa's ties with 
836-62; continuing challenge 869-70; 
economy 832-3, 856-8, 866-9; m o v e -
ments 862-9 (^ a&° N I E O ; N o n -
Aligned Movement) ; see also Asia; 
Bandung Conference; Caribbean; Latin 
America; L D C s 
Third World Academy of Science 646 
Thirty-year plan (Belgian Congo) 215 
Thoahlane, T . 275n 
T h o m a s , L . V . 67n 
T h o m p s o n , R . F . 59311, 72on 
T h o m p s o n , V . M . I54n, 227n 
T h o m p s o n , V . P . 70811, 834n 
T h o m p s o n , W . S . 8ogn 
Thomson-Houston Radio and Electrical 
Appliance C o m p a n y 294 
Throup, D . 8on, 98n, 23511, 237n 
Thysville 879 
Tidy, Michael: on independence struggle 
1 6 m , 164, 188; on political structures 
43811, 441, 443n-4n> 4 6 m , 466n 
Tigre 42, 44, 151; language 579 
Tigrinya language 537, 579 
Tijjäniya 70 
timber 66, 93, 198, 199, 288, 418-19 
Timberlake, M r 880 
Timbuktu 532; University 692 
tin 250, 252, 292; from 1935 to 1945 81, 
85, 88, 92-3; I C A 783; and world 
economy 347 
Tindouf 69 
Tirailleurs sénégalais 66, 107 
Tito, Josip Broz 310, 824, 825, 864, 865 
Tiv 43911; language 543 
T N C s see multinational corporations 
tobacco 31, 289, 320, 327; m a p of 353; 
and monoculturalism 418-19; and world 
economy 346-^7 
T o d d , Garfield 263 
Togo: before i960 see Togoland; arts 609; 
economy 311, 330, 347, 369, 378, 379, 
410-12, 419; independence struggle and 
independence (i960) 109, 112, 164,173, 
179-81, 193, 208; language 528, 529, 
546; literacy 701; pan-Africanism 719, 
750; politics 461, 491 {see also inde-
pendence above); religion 504; and 
socialist countries 800; and United 
Nations 873^7, 894 
Togoland, British 76, 84, 85, 873-7; & & 
1957 see Ghana; m a p 874 
Togoland, French 60, 61, 873-7; *far l9^° 
see Togo; m a p 874 
Togoland, G e r m a n 873, 901; m a p 874 
Togoland Congress Party ( T C P , Ghana) 442 
Togolese Progressive Party ( P T P ) 875 
Tolbert Jnr, William R . 458 
Tombalbaye, Franois Ngarta 457, 491 
Tomiche, F J . 36n 
Tomiche, N . I44n 
Tomlinson Commission (1954 & 1956) 258, 
265 
Tonga 258, 638 
Tonsi movement 907 
Touareg language 542 
Touba 70 
Toulba, Mustafa 654 
Tourè, Samori 443 a 
tourist art 583, 584, 587-92, 605 
Toussaint L'Ouverture 710 
Touval, S . I52n 
T o w a , Marcien 633n, 669, öogn 
Tracey, H . 6o6n, 6o9n 
trade 89, 289, 305-6; and agriculture and 
rural development 317, 325-31, 341; 
arms 12-13,121,146; and independence 
struggle 256-^7; and industry 366-^72; 
see also agriculture; capitalism; economy; 
export and plantation crops; industry 
trade unions 898; first 71-2; East Africa 
130, 237; and economy in world context 
296, 312—13; Equatorial and Central 
Africa 69, 85, 98, 190, 207; and inde-
pendence struggle 106-^7, 130, 167-S, 
178, 181-2, 185, 190, 207; North Africa 
and Horn 52, 54, 130; Southern Africa 
252, 255, 259; West Africa 167-^, 178, 
181-2, 185 
Trades Union Congress: Britain 181; 
Ghana 168; Nigeria 181 
Trades Union Federation (South Africa) 
313 
tradition see Africanism; indigenization and 
also entries beginning traditional 
traditional and indigenous leadership see 
inheritance model 
traditional arts 583, 584, 586-7; tradition 
and modernity in literature, conflict 
between 565, 566-^7 traditional medicine 
and healing 505, 518, 519, 635, 636-9 
traditional philosophy 661-4, 665, 666, 
670-1, 672, 673 
traditional religion 59; and Christianity 
509-10, 519,520; and education 685; and 
independence struggle 114, 197; m a p of 
504; and philosophy 662; and politics 
444-5, 476; and science and technology 
636, 637, 653; and social evolution 501-
2, 503, 516-20 
traditional science and technology 635-9, 
653, 685 
trans-national corporations see mul -
tinational corporations 
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TransAfrica 717, 723 
Transkei 259; independence struggle and 
independence (1976) 108 
transnational see multinational cor-
porations 
transport 403-4; lack of 326; see also rail-
ways; roads 
Transvaal 118; independence struggle and 
independence (1902) 108; after 1910 see 
South Africa 
Traoré, A . 7 m 
Traoré, B . 61711, 6i9n 
Traoré, Lt. {later Gen . ) Moussa 458 
Trapido, S. 255n 
Treason Trials (South Africa) 259, 277-8 
Trevaskis, G . K . N . 1 5 m 
Trevor-Roper, H u g h 580, 676 
Tri, H . Q 832 
Tri-Continental Solidarity Organization 
(1966) 845, 847, 861 
Trincaz, P . X . 38gn 
triple custody doctrine 910-11 
Tripoli 38, 43, 140, 458, 668 
Tripolitania 30, 33, 44, 108, 140-1; after 
1951 see Libya 
Tronchon, J. 22in-3n, 225-6 
Trovoada, Miguel 459 
True Whig Party (Liberia) 190 
Trust Fund for South Africa 900 
trust territories see mandated territories 
Trusteeship Council ( U N ) 112, 872-3, 
875^7» 903, 9*5 
tsetse fly 335, 337-8 
Tshibangu, Tshishîku 60711, 938; on phil-
osophy and science 633-77; o n religion 
and social evolution vi, 501-21 
Tshilubu language 612 
Tshisekedi, Etienne 461 
Tshombe, Moïse 444, 461, 755, 883, 884, 
885 
Tsiranana, Philibert 226, 227, 247, 458 
Tsogho 616 
Tsriklis, I. 8i3n 
Tsumeb 273 
Tswana 77, 258, 438 
T u b m a n , William Vacanarat Shadrach 188, 
i8gt 190, 362, 458 
Tuburi language 536 
T U C see Trades Union Congress 
tungsten 250, 352 
Tunis 461; All-African People's C o n -
ferences (i960) 747; Arab League 
meeting (1974) 764; arts 582, 595, 608; 
Beys of 23; economy 31, 318; indepen-
dence struggle and independence 107; 
politics 49, 54; population and soci-
ety 37» 387; religion 515; science and phi-
losophy 643; in Second World W a r 44 
Tunisia 129-32; from 1935 to 1945 30-40 
passim, 46-7, 50-2, 54, 289; agriculture 
and rural development 30, 31, 32, 33, 
47; arts 582, 586, 587, 595, 602, 603, 
608, 618, 622-3, 625; economy 30-3, 
46-7, 286, 311, 318, 335, 344, 353, 371, 
384, 410, 413, 419 {see also agriculture 
above and industry below); independence 
struggle and independence (1956) 107, 
108, 129-32, 137, 158, 907; industry 30, 
31, 46, 419; language 529; literacy 701; 
literature 570; pan-Africanism 721, 725, 
746, 749, 751; politics 39-40, 49-52, 54, 
440,461,472,481 {see also independence 
above); population and society 35-7,344, 
387; religion 503-4, 514, 515; science 
and philosophy 643, 668-9; and socialist 
countries 800, 803, 808; and Third 
World movements 840; and United 
Nations 880, 887, 890 
Tunisian Front 51 
Tunisian National Front 54, 130 
Tunj'i, V . 61 in 
Turkey 618, 720 
Turner, H . W . 516 
Turner, J . M . 85gn 
Turner, S. 824n 
Turner, V. 616 
Turnhalle Alliance 273—4, 755 
Tutsi 209, 210, 213 
Tutu, Bishop {now Archbishop) Desmond 
118,674,721,919 
Tutuola, A m o s 183 
Twaddle, Michael 937; on Eastern Africa 
vi, 221-48 
T w i language 528 
Twining, Edward 234 
Twose, N . 336n 
typhus 36 
Tyro 671 
U Thant 885, 889, 893 
U A N C (United African National Council) 
270-1 
Ubangui-Chari 60, 61, 67, 198, 199; after 
i960 see Central African Republic 
Uchendu, V . C 33111 
U D A O {Union douanière de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest) 728 
U D E A C {Union douanière et économique de 
l'Afrique Centrale) 378, 413, 729 
U D E A O {Union douanière et économique de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest) 729 
U D E N A M O {Unido democrática nacional 
de Mozambique) 265, 755 
U D F C {Union des femmes du Cameroun) 
217 
U D I see Unilateral Declarations of Inde-
pendence 
U D M A {Union démocratique du manifeste 
algérien) 134 
U D S G {Union démocratique et sociale 
gabonaise) 194 
U D S R {Union démocratique et socialiste de 
la résistance) 177 
U E A C (Union of Central African States) 
3 " 
U F F B (United Front F r o m Below) 799 
U F P (United Federal Party) 264 
Uganda: from 1935 to 1945 81, 89-92,906; 
agriculture and rural development 89, 
229-30, 320, 324, 327, 329, 342, 344, 
347, 419; arts 593, 600, 603, 607, 621; 
and capitalist countries 786; economic 
decolonization strategies 410-11, 413, 
414, 427-9; economy 311, 815, 817-18 
{see also agriculture; economic deco-
lonization above and industry below); 
education 920; independence struggle 
and independence (1962) n o , 112, 221, 
228-32, 246; industry 90, 91, 419; lan-
guage 529, 546—7; literacy 701; literature 
557, 559, 566-7, 572-3, 575; Pan-
Africanism 709, 721, 730-2, 748, 749, 
752, 754n, 757; political structures, 
changing 436-7, 442, 445, 448-9, 453-
4, 461-2, 464, 465; politics 5, 81, 923-4 
{see also independence; political above); 
population and society 341-2, 344; 
religion 504; science and philosophy 641, 
644-5; and socialist countries 801, 802-
3, 810, 815, 817-18; and Third World 
movements 832; w o m e n in 20, 915-16 
Uganda Agreement (1900) 228 
Uganda National Congress ( U N C ) 230 
Uganda People's Congress ( U P C ) 230-1, 
443 
U G C C (United Gold Coast Convention) 
167, 170,472 
U G E A O {Union générale des étudiants d'Af-
rique occidentale) 178 
U G T A N {Union générale des travailleurs 
d'Afrique noire) 182 
ujamaa villagization see Arusha Declaration 
'ulamä 40, 41, 48, 106, 156, 618, 668 
U m b u n d u language 533 
Umkonto we Sizwe (South Africa) 260 
Umma 158, 464, 668 
U m m a Party: Egypt 56; Sudan 149; Zan-
zibar 244 
U M O A (West African Monetary Union) 
311 
U N see United Nations 
U N A D 3 3 2 5 
U N C (Uganda National Congress) 230 
U N C S T D (United Nations Conference on 
Science and Technology) 646-^ 7 
U N C T A D (UN Conference on Trade and 
Development): created (1964) 857,86on, 
867-9; and agriculture and rural 
development 348, 354, 356; Conferences 
(1964, 1967 Sc 1979) 867-8; Nairobi 
meeting (1976) 782-3 
U N C T A D (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development) 303, 310, 311, 
372, 894-5, 903 
U N D A T s ( U N Development Advisory 
Teams) 409 
underdevelopment and struggle for econ-
omic independence see agriculture; econ-
omic decolonization; economy; industry; 
urbanization and migration 
U N D P (United Nations Development 
Programme) 308, 895, 897, 899, 903 
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U N E C A 68911-9011, 69711 
U N E P (United Nations Environmental 
Programme) 334, 649, 653-4, 901, 903 
U N E S C O (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
854, 895, 898-9, 903, 904; and 
diaspora 718; and education 308, 686-
90, 697n-8n, 699-701; and language 
530-8; and literacy 699-701; and pan-
Africanism 754, 759-60, 76in; and 
science 646—7 
U N H C R (United Nations High C o m -
missioner for Refugees) 899-901, 903 
U N I {Union nationale pour l'indépendance', 
Somalia) 155 
Uniäo democrática nacional de Mozambique 
(UDENAMO) 265, 755 
Uniäo Nacional para a Independencia total 
de Angola ( U N I T A ) 15, 19, 219-20,269, 
273. 278, 444, 454, 822-3 
U N I C E F (United Nations Children's 
Fund) 903, 916, 928 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI): Comoros 247; Rhodesia 264, 
754 
Unilever 300, 873 
Union of African States 725 
Union of the Angolan Peoples ( U P A ) 218, 
269 
Union of Central African States ( U E A C ) 
311 
Union culturelle musulmane 512, 514—15 
Union démocratique du manifeste algérien 
( U D M A , Algeria) 134 
Union démocratique et sociale gabonaise 
(UDSG) 194 
Union démocratique et socialiste de la résis-
tance ( U D S R , Upper Volta) 177 
Union démocratique et socialiste de la résis-
tance ( U D S R , Gabon) 194 
Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique 
Centrale ( U D E A C ) 378, 413, 729 
Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique 
de l'Ouest ( U D E A O ) 729 
Union des femmes du Cameroun ( U D F Q 
217 
Union générale des tudiants d'Afrique occi-
dentale ( U G E A O ) 178 
Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique 
noire ( U G T A N in F W A ) 182 
Union des intérêts sociaux congolais 
(UNISCO) 196 
Union Minière (Belgian Congo) 85,98,206, 
287, 651 
Union of Musicians 612 
Union nationale camerounaise 453 
Union nationale pour l'indépendance ( U N I , 
Somalia) 155 
Union of the Peoples of North Angola 
(UPNA) 218 
Union des populations du Cameroun ( U P C ) 
196, 215, 2i6t 217-18, 296, 802, 889, 
907 
Union progressive sénégalaise (UPS) 453 
Union socialiste camerounaise 217 
Union soudanaise (French Sudan) 178 
Union of South Africa (1910-61): after 
1961 see South Africa 
Union des syndicats confédérés (Cameroon) 
217 
Unionist Party (Eritrea) 151 
U N I P (United National Independent 
Party, Northern Rhodesia) 242, 243 
U N I S C O (Union des intérêts sociaux 
congolais) 196 
U N I T A see Uniäo Nacional para a Inde-
pendencia total de Angola 
U N I T A R (United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research) 903 
unitary systems of government 450-^2 
United Africa Company 873 
United African National Council ( U A N C ) 
270-1 
United Arab Republic (Egypt, Syria and 
Y e m e n , 1958H61) 108, 727, 749, 762, 
850; and United Nations 882, 890; see 
also Casablanca group 
United Federal Party ( U F P , Southern 
Rhodesia) 264 
United Front From Below ( U F F B ) 799 
United Fruit Company 720 
United Gold Coast Convention ( U G C Q 
167, 170, 472 
United National Independent Party 
( U N I P , Northern Rhodesia) 242, 
243 
United Nations 51,871-904; created (1945) 
49, 112, 772, 872; and agriculture and 
rural development 326, 343, 348-51, 
354-6; as ally in liberation 886-91; and 
Belgian Congo and Katanga 877-86; as 
benevolent imperialist 872-7; and capi-
talist countries 772, 775, 781, 783, 785; 
Centre for H u m a n Settlements 901,903; 
Children's Fund ( U N I C E F ) 903, 916, 
928; Conference in Austria (1979) 647; 
Conference on Africans (1945) 713; C o n -
ference on H u m a n Environment 
(Stockholm, 1972) 901; Conference on 
Science and Technology for Develop-
ment ( U N C S T D ) 646-7; Conference on 
Trade and Development see U N C T A D ; 
and Congo 877-86; Development Advis-
ory Teams ( U N D A T s ) 409; Develop-
ment Decades (i960- 70 & 1970-80) 
733; Development Programme ( U N D P ) 
308, 895, 897, 899, 903; and Eastern 
Africa 234; Economic and Social Council 
and Commission 892,903; and economy 
of Africa 302-3, 310, 398, 406-7, 420, 
733* 891-6,904 (see also Economic C o m -
mission for Africa and also industry 
below); Environmental Programme 
( U N E P ) 334, 649, 653-4, 901» 903; and 
E w e conflict in Togoland 872—7; High 
Commissioner for Refugees ( U N H C R ) 
899-901, 903; and independence strug-
gle in Africa 112, 128, 136, 140-1, 147, 
151-2, 155, 168, 194, 208, 211-14, 218, 
220, 234, 279, 871-2, 877-91, 902, 904, 
909; and industry 369-70, 372, 381, 383; 
Institute for Training and Research 
( U N I T A R ) 903; international co-oper-
ation on h u m a n resources 896-901; 
International Court of Justice 273, 752, 
902, 903; International Labour Organ-
isation (ILO) 754, 895, 896-7, 903, 904; 
list of bodies 903; mandated territories 
143, 751; and Middle East 280; Multi-
national Programming and Operational 
Centres 409, 410, 413; and N I E O 894— 
6; and pan-Africanism 713, 714, 746-^7, 
749» 75 I _ 2» 754» 756-6 0» •» partner in 
development 891-4; and population and 
society 896-901; Population Fund 903; 
regional composition 831; and science 
646—7, 649, 653-4, 657; and socialist 
countries 802, 817, 826-7; Special C o m -
mittee Against Apartheid 752, 844; 
Special Fund 903; and Third World 
movements 831, 835, 837-S, 841-53 
passim^ 856-60, 866-9; Transport and 
Communications Decade for Africa 416; 
Trust Fund for South Africa 900; U n i -
versity 903; University Institute for 
Natural Resources in Africa ( I N R A ) 646; 
and West Africa 168; World Food 
Council 903; World Food Programme 
( W F P ) 903; see also Economic C o m -
mission for Africa; Economic C o m -
munity of West African States; Food and 
Agricultural Organization; International 
Monetary Fund; mandated territories; 
Trusteeship Council; U N E S C O ; World 
Bank; World Health Organization and 
also under individual countries 
United Native African Church 516 
United Party (Gambia) 168, 170 
United Party (UP, South Africa) 255, 256-
7 
United Republic of Cameroon see 
Cameroon 
United Republic of Tanzania see Tanzania 
United States: from 1935 to 1945 93, 94, 
96, 97, 277, 291; aid from 490; A I D S in 
929; and arts 591, 611, 613, 624, 629; 
black people in 578, 605, 799; capitalism 
125; discovered 660; and East Africa 225; 
economy of 291, 300; and economy of 
Africa 285, 287, 292, 296, 299, 305-6 , 
363, 370-1» 375, 771-3, 776, 779-81» 
783, 787, 794-7; and Equatorial and 
Central Africa 64, 199, 211; in Europe 
23; and independence struggle in Africa 
21, 107, 112, 121, 140, 142-4, 147, 161, 
168, 188, 190, 199, 211, 225, 269-71, 
274, 277-8, 909; independence struggle 
of 171; and Japanese economy 922; and 
language 526, 530-1, 549; and Liberia 
370-1; Libya attacked by (1986) 576; 
literature 559; and North Africa and 
Horn 44, 49-50, 55, 140, 142, 143-4, 
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147, 576; and pan- Africanism 477,621-
3, 705—17 passim; and politics of Africa 
440; recessions 300; religion 510; and 
science and philosophy 641, 651, 652; 
and socialist countries 798, 812, 822-4, 
826; and Southern Africa 269—71, 274, 
277-8; and Third World movements 
860; trade with 350; and United Nations 
876, 879, 885, 889, 890, 904; and West 
Africa 161, 168, 188, 190; and w o m e n 
915; see also Vietnam W a r 
United States of Africa 257, 727, 728 
United Tanganyikan Party ( U T P ) 234 
Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights 
748,873 
universities see education; tertiary edu-
cation 
University of East Africa 644-5, 693 
unscience 669, 670-2 
U N T A C D A 412 
U N U (United Nations University) 903 
U P (United Party, South Africa) 255, 
256-7 
U P A (Union of the Angolan Peoples) 218, 
269 
U P C (Cameroon) see Union des populations 
du Cameroun 
U P C (Uganda People's Congress) 230-1, 
443 
U P N A (Union of the Peoples of North 
Angola) 218 
Upper Volta: after 1984 see Burkina Faso; 
from 1935 to 1945 60; economy 311, 
332-3, 410-12; independence struggle 
and independence (i960) 109, 164, 177, 
179, 184; pan-Africanism 729, 749 
U P R O N A (Party of Unity and National 
Progress) 212, 214 
U P S {Union progressive sénégalaise) 453 
uranium 93, 250, 277, 289, 650, 651; and 
monoculturalism 418-19 
urbanization 69, 97, 314-16, 380-91; and 
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